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Intelligence Reform: a Question of Balance John D PUBLICATION Intelligence Reform: A Question of Balance John D. Bansemer August 2005 Program on Information Resources Policy Center for Information Policy Research Harvard University The Program on Information Resources Policy is jointly sponsored by Harvard University and the Center for Information Policy Research. Chairman Managing Director Anthony G. Oettinger John C. B. LeGates John D. Bansemer, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, is currently assigned to the National Security Council staff. Previously, he was commander of the 23rd Information Operations Squadron, Air Force Information Warfare Center. He has also served on the Air Staff, where he developed defensive information warfare doctrine and policy. He prepared this report while serving as an Air Force National Defense Fellow with the Program in 2004–2005. Copyright © 2005 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. Not to be reproduced in any form without written consent from the Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard University, Maxwell Dworkin 125, 33 Oxford Street, Cambridge MA 02138. (617) 495-4114 E-mail: [email protected] URL: http://www.pirp.harvard.edu ISBN 1-879716-94-1 P-05-2 October 2005 PROGRAM ON INFORMATION RESOURCES POLICY Harvard University Center for Information Policy Research Affiliates AT&T Corp. PDS Consulting Australian Telecommunications Users Group PetaData Holdings, Ltd. BellSouth Corp. Samara Assoc. The Boeing Company Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Booz Allen Hamilton Flom LLP Center for Excellence in Education Strategy Assistance Services Commission of the European Communities TOR LLC Critical Path TransMedia Exchange CyraCom International United States Government: Ellacoya Networks, Inc. Department of Commerce Hanaro Telecom Corp. (Korea) National Telecommunications and Hearst Newspapers Information Administration Hitachi Research Institute (Japan) Department of Defense IBM Corp. National Defense University Korea Telecom Department of Health and Human Lee Enterprises, Inc. Services Lexis–Nexis National Library of Medicine John and Mary R. Markle Foundation Department of the Treasury MITRE Corp. Office of the Comptroller of the Motorola, Inc. Currency National Security Research, Inc. Federal Communications Commission NEC Corp. (Japan) National Security Agency NEST–Boston United States Postal Service Nippon Telegraph & Telephone Corp. Verizon Acknowledgments The author gratefully acknowledges the time and effort of all the people who reviewed and commented critically on the draft version of this report. Raymond Alden Tad Oelstrom Lorry Fenner Richard Posner Oswald H. Ganley Nicholas Rostow Anthony Green F.M. Scherer David Hayes Suzanne Streeter Chris Lusk Aras Suziedelis Lionel Olmer These reviewers, as well as others who wish to remain anonymous and the Program’s Affiliates, are not responsible for or necessarily in agreement with the views expressed here, nor should they be blamed for any errors of fact or interpretation. If there was a consistent theme to comments I received it was to make explicit recommendations for reforming the intelligence community (IC). I found nearly all of the recommendations proposed by several of the reviewers congenial. These recommendations ran the gamut from better integration of training and education programs across the IC, to improved cultural awareness of IC personnel, to the need to prioritize limited resources, to the critical importance of hiring capable personnel and strong leaders. I avoided recommendations for two reasons. First, multiple studies and commissions examining the IC have made numerous recommendations over the past fifty years to improve the operation of the IC. More recommendations on my part would only add to the cacophony of reform recommendations already in the public square. This leads to the second, more important reason for avoiding recommendations – the intended focus of my report was to elucidate why change appears to be so hard within the IC and to describe the potential consequences of reforms that only address certain aspects of the IC. Thus, while I was unable to incorporate all of the feedback I received into this report, I’m extremely appreciative for the thoughtful critiques I received. I would like to thank Margaret MacDonald for her patience and assistance throughout the editing process. Her comments and suggestions were always on target and helped clarify and often simplify multiple aspects of this report. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the U.S. Air Force for having the institutional wisdom to allow a number of Air Force officers to participate in fellowships with prestigious academic institutions throughout the country. I am especially grateful to the Air Force for the opportunity to interact with the faculty and staff of Harvard and other universities on a broad range of important and timely national security issues. vi The views, opinions, and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the author and should not be construed as an official position of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other government agency or department. Contents Page Acknowledgments .........................................................................................................................v Contents ...................................................................................................................... vii Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................xi Chapter One: A Need for Change? ...............................................................................................1 1.1 Background ..................................................................................................................... 1 1.2 Scope and Organization................................................................................................... 4 Chapter Two: Goldwater–Nichols as a Model for Intelligence Reform ....................................7 2.1 Why Goldwater–Nichols? ............................................................................................... 9 2.1.1 The Failure of Joint Action.................................................................................. 9 2.1.2 JCS Structure..................................................................................................... 13 2.1.3 The Poor Quality of Joint Personnel ................................................................. 14 2.2 Goldwater–Nichols Legislation..................................................................................... 16 2.3 Legislative Effectiveness............................................................................................... 18 2.3.1 The Effectiveness of Joint Action ..................................................................... 18 2.3.1.1 Operation Desert Storm.................................................................................. 19 2.3.1.2 Operation Allied Force................................................................................... 21 2.3.1.3 Analysis.......................................................................................................... 23 2.3.2 The Strength of Joint Advice............................................................................. 24 2.3.3 The Quality of Joint Personnel.......................................................................... 25 2.4 The Success of Goldwater–Nichols............................................................................... 27 Chapter Three: Reforming Intelligence: A Fifty Year Effort ...................................................29 3.1 IC Origins: The National Security Act of 1947............................................................. 30 3.2 Early Studies of the IC .................................................................................................. 31 3.2.1 Intelligence Survey Group (Dulles–Jackson–Correa Report) ........................... 31 3.2.2 The First Hoover Commission .......................................................................... 32 3.2.3 The Second Hoover Commission...................................................................... 33 3.2.4 Executive Branch Activity 1955–1963 ............................................................. 34 3.3 The 1970s ...................................................................................................................... 35 3.3.1 The Schlesinger Report ..................................................................................... 35 3.3.2 The Murphy Commission.................................................................................. 38 3.3.3 The Church Committee ..................................................................................... 39 viii 3.3.4 The Pike Committee.......................................................................................... 40 3.3.5 The Rockefeller Commission............................................................................ 41 3.3.6 Results............................................................................................................... 42 3.4 The 1980s ...................................................................................................................... 43 3.5 The 1990s ...................................................................................................................... 43 3.5.1 The Aspin–Brown Commission .......................................................................
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