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CIA's Relationship with Congress, 1946–2004 L. Britt Snider

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CIA's Relationship with Congress, 1946–2004 L. Britt Snider THE AGENCY AND THE HILL: CIA’s Relationship with Congress, 1946–2004 L. Britt Snider The Center for the Study of Intelligence CSI was founded in 1974 in response to Director of Central Intelli- gence James Schlesinger’s desire to create within CIA an organiza- tion that could “think through the functions of intelligence and bring the best intellects available to bear on intelligence problems.” The center, comprising professional historians and experienced practitio- ners, attempts to document lessons learned from past operations, explore the needs and expectations of intelligence consumers, and stimulate serious debate on current and future intelligence chal- lenges. To support these activities, CSI publishes Studies in Intelligence and books and monographs addressing historical, operational, doctri- nal, and theoretical aspects of the intelligence profession. It also administers the CIA Museum and maintains the Agency’s Historical Intelligence Collection. Comments and questions may be addressed to: Center for the Study of Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency Washington, DC 20505 Printed copies of this book are available to requesters outside the US government from: Government Printing Office (GPO) Superintendent of Documents PO Box 391954 Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954 Phone (202) 512-1800 E-mail: [email protected] ISBN: 978-1-929667-17-8 GPO Stock#: 04101500257-1 All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this book are those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect official posi- tions of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US government entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of the author’s factual statements and interpretations. THE AGENCY AND THE HILL The Center for the Study of Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency Washington, DC 20505 Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publications Data Snider, L. Britt The Agency and the Hill:CIA’s Relationship with Congress, 1946–2004/ L. Britt Snider Includes bibliographic references, index. ISBN 978-1-929667-17-8 (pbk.:alk paper) 1. Intelligence—United States. 2. Congress. 3. Intelligence history. 4. Intelligence oversight. 5. Intelligence organization. 6. Intelligence management. 7. Intelligence policy. Typeset in Times. Printed by Imaging and Publication Support, CIA. THE AGENCY AND THE HILL: CIA’s Relationship with Congress, 1946–2004 L Britt Snider Center for the Study of Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency Washington, DC 2008 CONTENTS Preface . .xiii PART I: WHAT THE RELATIONSHIP WAS LIKE Chapter 1: THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP, 1946–76 . 3 The Central Intelligence Group (1946–47) . 3 The Early Oversight Arrangements: 1947–56 . 5 The Mansfield Resolutions: 1953–55 . 11 Debate in the Senate: 1956 . 14 Subsequent Developments: 1956–59 . 17 The Issue of GAO Audits: 1959–62 . 20 Shootdown of the U-2: 1960 . 21 The Bay of Pigs: 1961 . 21 The Remainder of the 1960s: A Period of Quiescence . 23 McCone’s Early Interaction with the Congress . 23 CIA Interaction with the Congress: 1963–66 . 25 The SFRC Asserts Its Right to Oversee the CIA: 1966 . 26 1971: A Pivotal Year . 27 Congressional Inquiries into Watergate: 1973–74 . 28 Congressional Inquiries into the CIA Activities in Chile: 1973–74 . 31 Allegations of Domestic Spying and Other Abuses: 1974–75 . 33 The Church Committee: 1975–76 . 35 The Nedzi/Pike Committees: 1975–76 . 37 AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY . 39 The Early Congressional Arrangements: 1947–76 . 39 The Joint Committee “Panacea” . 42 The Personalities, Attitudes, and Circumstances of the Early DCIs . 43 CHAPTER 2: THE RELATIONSHIP: 1976–2004 . 51 The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: 1976 . 51 The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence: 1977 . 53 v CONTENTS 1977–80: The Committees Prove Themselves . 56 The Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 . 59 The Mining of the Nicaraguan Harbors and the Casey Accords: 1984 . 60 Term Limits as an Issue for the SSCI: 1984 . 61 GAO Again: 1984 . 62 Continued Wrangling over Covert Action Notification: 1985–86 . 62 Tightening Control over Intelligence Funding: 1986 . 63 Investigating the Iran-contra Affair: 1986–87 . 64 Changes to Congressional Oversight Prompted by Iran-contra: 1987–91 . 66 GAO Audits Resurface: 1987–88 . 68 The Creation of a Statutory Inspector General for the CIA: 1989 . 68 Statutory Recognition of the Agency’s Support of Congress: 1992 . 69 Formalization of Notification Procedures: The Guatemala Inquiries, 1995 . 70 Procedures for “Whistleblowers” Who Wished to Contact Congress: 1998 . 71 The Joint Inquiry into the 9/11 Attacks: 2001–2003 . 73 Criticism from the 9/11 Commission and an End to Term Limits: 2004 . 74 AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY . 75 What Changed When the Select Committees Were Created 75 The Joint Committee Solution . 76 Term Limits for Members of the Select Committees . 77 The Impact of Personalities, Attitudes, and Circumstances . 78 CHAPTER 3: INTELLIGENCE-SHARING AND OTHER INTERACTION . 93 The Early Period: 1947–75 . 94 After the Creation of the Select Committees: 1976-2004 . 114 AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY . 120 Significance of the Incidental Interaction with Congress 120 Why Congress Needs Intelligence Support . 121 The Impact of Intelligence-Sharing with the Congress . 122 vi CONTENTS CHAPTER 4: ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AT THE CIA . 125 One-Man Operations . 125 An Expanded Office of Legislative Counsel: 1976–81 . 127 Casey and Congress: 1981–86 . 128 Responding to Iran-Contra: 1986–90 . 130 Strengthening Ties to the Hill after the Guatemala Episode: 1995 . 130 The Office of Congressional Affairs: 1988–2004 . 131 AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY . 132 The Agency’s Arrangements for Dealing with the Congress . 132 PART II: WHAT THE RELATIONSHIP PRODUCED CHAPTER 5: LEGISLATION . 137 The Agency’s Original Charter: Section 202 of the National Security Act of 1947 . 137 The CIA Act of 1949 . 141 Additional Legislation: 1949–64 . 143 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 . 143 The Classified Information Procedures Act of 1980 . 145 The Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 . 145 Exemption from the Freedom of Information Act for CIA: 1984 . 146 The CIA Inspector General Act of 1989 . 147 The Intelligence Reorganization Act of 1992 . 149 Naming of the Headquarters Compound: 1998 . 150 The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 . 151 AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY . 153 Legislating Missions and Authorities for the CIA . 153 The President and Intelligence Legislation . 155 What Never Made It Through the Congressional Mill . 157 CHAPTER 6: PROGRAM AND BUDGET . 159 The Transition from CIG to CIA: 1946–47 . 159 Covert Action: Funding a New Mission for the Agency . 161 vii CONTENTS Interaction in the Early Years: 1948–52 . 162 Interaction during the Eisenhower Years: 1953–60 . 165 The Agency Headquarters Building: 1951–56 . 170 Developments in the 1960s and Early 1970s . 172 Consideration of the Budget Process by the Church and Pike Committees . 177 Budget Oversight by the Select Committees on Intelligence: 1977–81 . 179 Interaction During the Reagan Administration: 1981–89 . 182 The End of the Cold War and Its Effect on the Budget: 1989–95 . 184 Return to Relative Stability and Modest Increases: 1995–2000 . 186 The Impact of the 9/11 Attacks: 2001–2004 . 187 AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY . 187 Exercising Power of the Purse . 187 Hiding within the Defense Budget . 188 The Quality of Budget Oversight . 189 The Impact of Budget Oversight . 190 CHAPTER 7: OVERSIGHT OF ANALYSIS . 193 The Early Years: 1947–74 . 193 The Church and Pike Committees . 199 Early Interaction with the Select Committees: 1976–80 . 201 Later Interaction Regarding Analytical Issues: 1980–90 . 204 The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait and the Persian Gulf War: 1990–91 . 207 The Gates Confirmation Hearings: 1991 . 210 Interaction with the Select Committees 1991– 2000 . 212 AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY . 220 The Nature of the Interaction over Analysis . 220 The Implications of Sharing Intelligence for Oversight . 222 viii CONTENTS CHAPTER 8: OVERSIGHT OF COLLECTION . 223 Early Congressional Awareness of Espionage Operations: 1947–60 . 223 Early Technical Collection: The U-2 and CORONA Programs . 227 The Cuban Missile Crisis: 1962–63 . 230 Contact with Respect to the Nosenko Case: 1967 . 231 Helms and the Leaders of the CIA Subcommittees: 1966–73 . 232 The Church Committee’s Investigation of CIA Domestic Activities: 1975–76 . 233 The Church Committee’s Look at Liaison Relationships: 1976 . 235 The Pike Committee’s Treatment of Operational Issues: 1975–76 . 236 Early Involvement of the SSCI in Operational Matters: 1976–80 . 236 Early HPSCI Involvement in Operational Matters: 1977–80 . 238 Executive Order 12333 and Limits on Domestic Activities: 1981 . 239 SSCI Inquiry into “Death Squads” in El Salvador: 1984 . 240 HPSCI Inquiry into Cuban Operations: 1987 . 241 HPSCI Inquiry into the Agency’s Relationship with Manuel Noriega: 1988 . 241 The SSCI’s Consideration of Arms Control Treaties: 1987–92 . 241 The SSCI’s Reviews of CIA Support to Military Operations: 1990–91 . ..
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