DOCSLIB.ORG

Anonymous Aaron Barr Hbgary.Com

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Anonymous Aaron Barr Hbgary.Com Page 1 of 1 From: "Aaron Barr" <[email protected]> To: "Aaron Barr" <[email protected]> Sent: Monday, January 31, 2011 8:39 AM Attach: Anonymous_v2.pdf Subject: Anonymous 2/9/2011 Anonymous Organization is globally distributed with initiatives and operations started by individual groups. People lend a hand where they have capabilities and leaders seem to be both naturally selected as well as being historically connected with the organization. The most prominent leaders appear to be old school, made apparent by making historical references pre wikileaks. There is also a group that is represented in FB that has an equally tight coupling. One of the goals is to tie as many of the IRC Nicks to FB profiles as possible. IRC is the main method of operational communication. It is through IRC that most people that participate in DDOS get their commands. Those commands are communicated through twitter and FB accounts as well. FB and twitter accounts are used to communicate details and propaganda of the operation. There are a group of people who are skilled in graphic design and video/audio creation that help with production. The group focuses anonymity on hiding IPs and hostnames. While there are some references that are made to not providing personal details in IRC. Some of the apparent leaders that have FB accounts also are conscious to how much information the release, even amongst friends. Some hide their friends list to even friends. Anonymous came into notoriety in 2008 with Operation Chanology, an attack against the church of Scientology. Since then there are many attacks that hav been attributed to the group. Their activities were first noted in 2006 and 2007 in opposition to some policies on the social networking site Habbo.com. TIMELINE ------ anonops.eu (taken down around Dec. 11th ) Jul. 12th FB GROUP Anonymous (12,782) created. Dec. 5th Leakspin.org was registered (private registration). Dec. 6th Mastercard pulls plug on payments. Dec. 7th Julian Assange was arrested. Dec. 8th Paypal, Visa, and Mastercard were attacked. Dec. 8th @anonops created. There was an account @Anon_Operation but it was shut down. Twitter account was directing attacks through LOIC. Dec. 10th @Op_Payback was closed by twitter. Dec. 10th @Anon_Leakspin (1,436) was created. Dec. 10th @crowdleaks (3,593) was created and announced Dec. 10th http://operationleakspin.org was registered. Dec. 10th FB Page Operation Payback ITA (294) created @ 1:20am Dec. 10th FB Page Operation Leakspin (2,286) created @8:41am. Dec. 12th http://anonnews.org was created (private registration). Dec. 13th FB Page Operation Paperstorm (958) created @ 8:20pm. Dec. 13th http://anonops.blogspot.com was created. Dec. 13th FB Page Anonymous News Network (7,081) created @ 10:20pm Dec. 14th http://www.operationpaperstorm.org was created (private registration). Dec. 14th FB Page Operation Darknet (259) created @ 12:17am. Dec. 15th http://operationpaperstorm.blogspot.com was created. Dec. 16th FB Page Operation Payback (811) created @ Dec. 18th Anonops.ru was created (private registration). Dec. 18th @OfficialAnonOps (440) was created. Dec. 22nd FB Group Anonops (2373) created @ Dec. 26th FB Page Crowdleak (117) was created. Jan. 5th http://www.crowdleaks.com was registered (privateregistration). Jan. 5th FB Group WeAre Legion Jan. 5th FB Group Anonymous – Operation Tunisia ( ) was created . Jan. 18th FB Page Operation Egypt was created. GROUPS Name Operation Payback ITA Date Dec. 10th 2010 @ 1:20am Users 294 Founder Ciccio Bong Early Adopters Alexandru Oprea, Facelottery Italia, Confora Enzo, Gianluca D’Agostini, Jacopo Tumminello Heavy Users Twitter @anonops_ita (27) create Jan. 7th 2011 Website www.anonops-ita.blogspot.com Comments Name Operation Leakspin Date Dec. 10th 2010 @ 8:41am Users 2,286 Founder Early Adopters Ryan Bell, Kygon Infraction Heavy Users Twitter Dec. 11th @anonops announces leakspin website. Website http://operationleakspin.org, became http://crowdleak.net Comments Anonops.blogspot.com first message was about Operation: Leakspin. Name Anonyswiss Date Dec. 11th 2010 Users 386 Founder Rehruf Arthur Early Adopters Karin Andersson, Dirk Thunig, Steve Haycock, Sue Verinity, Quatermain Ulan, Mizzy Links, Mytril Aveloni Heavy Users Twitter Website Comments Dec. 11th @anonops announces leakspin website. Name Operation Paperstorm Date Dec. 13th @ 8:20pm Users 956 Founder Ciccio Bong Early Adopters Matthew Hebert, Miguel Trejo, Shane Tarrant, Adrian Garcia, Gross Meister, Rehruf Arthur Heavy Users Twitter Website Comments Dec. 14th http://www.operationpaperstorm.org was created (private registration). Dec. 15th http://operationpaperstorm.blogspot.com was created. Name Anonymous News Network Date Dec. 13th @ 10:20pm Users 7,081 Founder Early Adopters Rehruf Arthur, Dirk Thunig, Pascal Avot, Francoic Claudius Koenigstein, John Q Nagel, Robyn Connell Jackson Heavy Users Twitter Website Comments Name Operation Darknet Date Dec. 14th @ 12:17am Users 259 Founder Ciccio Bong Early Adopters Matthew Hebert, Shane Tarrant, Rehruf Arthur, Jeffrey Garten, Dani Fonda, Andrew East, John Q Nagel, Ryan Bell, Guy Fawkes Heavy Users Twitter Website Comments Name Operation Payback Date Dec. 16th @ Users 811 Founder Early Adopters Ciccio Bong, Ilkermn Ernesto, Jeffrey Garten, Emily Spahn, Fernando LeBlanc, Antje Krasu, Robert Tepnox, John Q Nagel, Canfora Enzo Heavy Users Twitter Website Comments Name Crowdleak Date Dec. 26th @ Users 811 Founder Ciccio Bong Early Adopters Steve Haycock, Dani Fronda Heavy Users Twitter Website Comments Jan. 5th http://www.crowdleaks.com was registered (privateregistration). Site becomes the new home of leakspin.org. Name Anonymous – Operation Tunisia Date Jan. 5th @ Users Founder Early Adopters Latifa Ben Amor, Riadh Abidi, Luis Salvatierra, Pascal Lannoo, Daniel Ellen Heavy Users Twitter Website Comments Jan. 5th http://www.crowdleaks.com was registered (privateregistration). Site becomes the new home of leakspin.org. Name Operation Egypt Date Jan. 18th Users 6,489 Founder Allis Free Early Adopters Pascal Avot, Wholly Subersive, Matt Bleak, Sigfried Attednev, Miss Jane, Alex Bunyip Heavy Users Twitter Website Comments Jan. 5th http://www.crowdleaks.com was registered (privateregistration). Site becomes the new home of leakspin.org. WEBSITES Dec. 5th Leakspin.org was registered (private registration). Dec. 10th http://operationleakspin.org was registered. Dec. 12th http://anonnews.org was created (private registration).. Dec. 13th http://anonops.blogspot.com was created. Dec. 14th http://www.operationpaperstorm.org was created (private registration). Dec. 15th http://operationpaperstorm.blogspot.com was created. Dec. 18th Anonops.ru was created (private registration). Jan. 5th http://www.crowdleaks.com was registered (privateregistration). Dec. 18th Anonops.ru was created (private registration). Main IRC communications and information dissemination. Founder of the IRC is Q. Dec. 18th @OfficialAnonOps (440) was created. Used very little. Dec. 22nd FB Group Anonops (2373) created @ @anon_ops http://twitter.com/anonops Founder: Early Adopters: Denim Blue, Joel Dunsil, Omar David Sandoval Sida, Luke Hamilton, Billy Wenge-Murphy, Antal Mittendorff, Nathan Willits Posting on Anonymous page had operation payback listed on Dec. 8th @ 10:12pm. Same day Youtube account was created AnonOps. Anonops-irc.org domain under whois guard. Created 14Dec2010. OpPayback Youtube account created on Oct.28, 2010. Points to Anonops-irc.org PEOPLE Karin Andersson @athenianDemocra Benjamin B. Franklin (242) Slesh Dott (269) Old School. Anton Onszers (183 - ) Might be Philip Mellish one mutual friend. Share Group. Philip last posted on Dec. 26 and donated to wikileaks. Anonops Net ( ) Started Dec 9, 2010 @mmxanonymous http://www.youtube.com/user/mmxanonymous Marissa Stevens (blocked - ?) Started Dec. 17th 2010. Alias profile pretending to be a girl. Guy Fawkes (not accepting my requests.) Amator Phasma (only has 4 friends…looks interesting). This guy is active and technically capable. USA Name FR Place Nicks Comments Alexi Halloway 171 Arcata, CA Jeffrey Garten 560 Brea, CA shitstorm Newer to Anonyymous Ryan Bell 891 Arcata, CA Ashley Vincent, Beth Noyes, Donald G. Lane Jr. Benjamin Spock de 781 San Francisco, CA Comman 1550 Bay St. Apt. 312 Vries derX? San Francisco CA 94123 Michael Larson 138 Hemet, CA Mmxano Graphics Design, Web IT. n Did video for opEgypt Chris Fowler 501 Long Beach, CA New Ann Weasel 304 Highland, CA [email protected] O’Niemus Paul Jay Salerno 1553 San Francisco, CA Works at Wikileaks California PLF Controls bots Jules Manson 899 Los Angles Goes way back. California Comman an- derX F268B25C.hsd1.ca.comcast.ne t drag0n Host: mc.videotron.ca Donald G. Lane Jr. 1092 Hyde Park, NY Shitstorm Johny Long, Donald Myers. ? [email protected] Ethical_hackers_lounge@yahoogr oups.com Angela Marie Lane Dan Lane Donald Myers 86 German Town, NY heyguise John Q Nagel 122 Antona Legion 155 Montana, US Jok Monopol UNK Tampa, FL George Cantrell 348 Columbus, GA Joe Avila 151 Atlanta, GA Allan Mitchell 30 Jacksonville, FL Brian Norris East Port Orchard, voiceleaks.blogspot.com WA @herrknochen Emily Spahn 92 Nanticoke, MD Mchigan Godbert Texas HelperDr one civil Kevin Smith UNK Portland, OR [email protected] Jared Paul 139 Houston, TX HelperDr [email protected] one? Ashley Kruger UNK Cocoa Beach, FL Kate Morrigan 150 Boston, MA [email protected] [email protected] cl3m3nti ne M42 Prob west cost. Just woke up at 9:55EST c0s Texas HelperDr an- one 83D09466.pool.starband.net)
Load more

Recommended publications
  • (U//Fouo) Assessment of Anonymous Threat to Control Systems
    UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A‐0020‐NCCIC / ICS‐CERT –120020110916 DISTRIBUTION NOTICE (A): THIS PRODUCT IS INTENDED FOR MISION PARTNERS AT THE “FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY” LEVEL, ACROSS THE CYBERSECURITY, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND / OR KEY RESOURCES COMMUNITY AT LARGE. (U//FOUO) ASSESSMENT OF ANONYMOUS THREAT TO CONTROL SYSTEMS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (U) The loosely organized hacking collective known as Anonymous has recently expressed an interest in targeting inDustrial control systems (ICS). This proDuct characterizes Anonymous’ capabilities and intent in this area, based on expert input from DHS’s Control Systems Security Program/Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS‐CERT) in coordination with the other NCCIC components. (U//FOUO) While Anonymous recently expressed intent to target ICS, they have not Demonstrated a capability to inflict Damage to these systems, instead choosing to harass and embarrass their targets using rudimentary attack methoDs, readily available to the research community. Anonymous does have the ability to impact aspects of critical infrastructure that run on common, internet accessible systems (such as web‐based applications and windows systems) by employing tactics such as denial of service. Anonymous’ increased interest may indicate intent to Develop an offensive ICS capability in the future. ICS‐CERT assesses that the publically available information regarding exploitation of ICS coulD be leveraged to reDuce the amount of time to develop offensive ICS capabilities. However, the lack of centralized leadership/coordination anD specific expertise may pose challenges to this effort. DISCUSSION (U//FOUO) Several racist, homophobic, hateful, and otherwise maliciously intolerant cyber and physical inciDents throughout the past Decadea have been attributeD to Anonymous, though recently, their targets and apparent motivations have evolved to what appears to be a hacktivist1 agenda.
    [Show full text]
  • About the Sony Hack
    All About the Sony Hack Sony Pictures Entertainment was hacked in late November by a group called the Guardians of Peace. The hackers stole a significant amount of data off of Sony’s servers, including employee conversations through email and other documents, executive salaries, and copies of unreleased January/February 2015 Sony movies. Sony’s network was down for a few days as administrators worked to assess the damage. According to the FBI, the hackers are believed have ties with the North Korean government, which has denied any involvement with the hack and has even offered to help the United States discover the identities of the hackers. Various analysts and security experts have stated that it is unlikely All About the Sony Hack that the North Korean government is involved, claiming that the government likely doesn’t have the Learn how Sony was attacked and infrastructure to succeed in a hack of this magnitude. what the potential ramifications are. The hackers quickly turned their focus to an upcoming Sony film, “The Interview,” a comedy about Securing Your Files in Cloud two Americans who assassinate North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. The hackers contacted Storage reporters on Dec. 16, threatening to commit acts of terrorism towards people going to see the Storing files in the cloud is easy movie, which was scheduled to be released on Dec. 25. Despite the lack of credible evidence that and convenient—but definitely not attacks would take place, Sony decided to postpone the movie’s release. On Dec. 19, President risk-free. Obama went on record calling the movie’s cancelation a mistake.
    [Show full text]
  • Sample Iis Publication Page
    https://doi.org/10.48009/1_iis_2012_133-143 Issues in Information Systems Volume 13, Issue 1, pp. 133-143, 2012 HACKERS GONE WILD: THE 2011 SPRING BREAK OF LULZSEC Stan Pendergrass, Robert Morris University, [email protected] ABSTRACT Computer hackers, like the group known as Anonymous, have made themselves more and more relevant to our modern life. As we create and expand more and more data within our interconnected electronic universe, the threat that they bring to its fragile structure grows as well. However Anonymous is not the only group of hackers/activists or hacktivists that have made their presence known. LulzSec was a group that wreaked havoc with information systems in 2011. This will be a case study examination of their activities so that a better understanding of five aspects can be obtained: the Timeline of activities, the Targets of attack, the Tactics the group used, the makeup of the Team and a category which will be referred to as The Twist for reasons which will be made clear at the end of the paper. Keywords: LulzSec, Hackers, Security, AntiSec, Anonymous, Sabu INTRODUCTION Information systems lie at the heart of our modern existence. We deal with them when we work, when we play and when we relax; texting, checking email, posting on Facebook, Tweeting, gaming, conducting e-commerce and e- banking have become so commonplace as to be nearly invisible in modern life. Yet, within each of these electronic interactions lies the danger that the perceived line of security and privacy might be breached and our most important information and secrets might be revealed and exploited.
    [Show full text]
  • The 2014 Sony Hack and the Role of International Law
    The 2014 Sony Hack and the Role of International Law Clare Sullivan* INTRODUCTION 2014 has been dubbed “the year of the hack” because of the number of hacks reported by the U.S. federal government and major U.S. corporations in busi- nesses ranging from retail to banking and communications. According to one report there were 1,541 incidents resulting in the breach of 1,023,108,267 records, a 78 percent increase in the number of personal data records compro- mised compared to 2013.1 However, the 2014 hack of Sony Pictures Entertain- ment Inc. (Sony) was unique in nature and in the way it was orchestrated and its effects. Based in Culver City, California, Sony is the movie making and entertain- ment unit of Sony Corporation of America,2 the U.S. arm of Japanese electron- ics company Sony Corporation.3 The hack, discovered in November 2014, did not follow the usual pattern of hackers attempting illicit activities against a business. It did not specifically target credit card and banking information, nor did the hackers appear to have the usual motive of personal financial gain. The nature of the wrong and the harm inflicted was more wide ranging and their motivation was apparently ideological. Identifying the source and nature of the wrong and harm is crucial for the allocation of legal consequences. Analysis of the wrong and the harm show that the 2014 Sony hack4 was more than a breach of privacy and a criminal act. If, as the United States maintains, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (herein- after North Korea) was behind the Sony hack, the incident is governed by international law.
    [Show full text]
  • Risk Report Back in October 2016, Dyn Encountered a Massive DNS Ddos Attack That Knocked
    Dyn DNS Cyberattack By Bryce Kolton 12/7/2016 | INFO 312 Introduction On October 21st 2016, a terabit sized attack took down internet connectivity for users across the globe. Over three waves, millions of users were interrupted during main business hours. The attack targeted Dyn (pronounced “dine”), a company that in part provides Domain Name Service registration for websites. Companies affected included Amazon, BBC, CNN, Comcast, Fox, GitHub, Netflix, PayPal, Reddit, Starbucks, Twitter, Verizon, Visa, Wikia and hundreds more. Credit card terminals were inoperative, news sites unavailable, and users unable to reach some of the internet’s most popular websites. The internet ground to a halt for several hours, with major Fortune 500 companies among those affected. The focus of this risk management report will be the cyberattack at large; The background, causes, previous mitigations, response, still present risks, and recommendations after one of the largest cyberattacks ever recorded. Understanding the Domain Name Service As an illustrative example, let’s say you want to visit a new grocery store your friend just told you about, “Sya’s Grocery.” You know the name, but you need to find the physical address. By using a service like Google Maps, you can transcribe the human-readable name into the destination. The Domain Name Service works much the same way, but for URLs. When you type in “google.com,” your computer is clueless to the ‘real address’ it’s supposed to go to. That’s where DNS steps in: your device asks its closes DNS server “Who is ‘google.com’?” If the server doesn’t know, it’ll pass the request along until it finds a server that does.
    [Show full text]
  • Attack on Sony 2014 Sammy Lui
    Attack on Sony 2014 Sammy Lui 1 Index • Overview • Timeline • Tools • Wiper Malware • Implications • Need for physical security • Employees – Accomplices? • Dangers of Cyberterrorism • Danger to Other Companies • Damage and Repercussions • Dangers of Malware • Defense • Reparations • Aftermath • Similar Attacks • Sony Attack 2011 • Target Attack • NotPetya • Sources 2 Overview • Attack lead by the Guardians of Peace hacker group • Stole huge amounts of data from Sony’s network and leaked it online on Wikileaks • Data leaks spanned over a few weeks • Threatening Sony to not release The Interview with a terrorist attack 3 Timeline • 11/24/14 - Employees find Terabytes of data stolen from computers and threat messages • 11/26/14 - Hackers post 5 Sony movies to file sharing networks • 12/1/14 - Hackers leak emails and password protected files • 12/3/14 – Hackers leak files with plaintext credentials and internal and external account credentials • 12/5/14 – Hackers release invitation along with financial data from Sony 4 Timeline • 12/07/14 – Hackers threaten several employees to sign statement disassociating themselves with Sony • 12/08/14 - Hackers threaten Sony to not release The Interview • 12/16/14 – Hackers leaks personal emails from employees. Last day of data leaks. • 12/25/14 - Sony releases The Interview to select movie theaters and online • 12/26/14 –No further messages from the hackers 5 Tools • Targeted attack • Inside attack • Wikileaks to leak data • The hackers used a Wiper malware to infiltrate and steal data from Sony employee
    [Show full text]
  • USA -V- Julian Assange Judgment
    JUDICIARY OF ENGLAND AND WALES District Judge (Magistrates’ Court) Vanessa Baraitser In the Westminster Magistrates’ Court Between: THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Requesting State -v- JULIAN PAUL ASSANGE Requested Person INDEX Page A. Introduction 2 a. The Request 2 b. Procedural History (US) 3 c. Procedural History (UK) 4 B. The Conduct 5 a. Second Superseding Indictment 5 b. Alleged Conduct 9 c. The Evidence 15 C. Issues Raised 15 D. The US-UK Treaty 16 E. Initial Stages of the Extradition Hearing 25 a. Section 78(2) 25 b. Section 78(4) 26 I. Section 78(4)(a) 26 II. Section 78(4)(b) 26 i. Section 137(3)(a): The Conduct 27 ii. Section 137(3)(b): Dual Criminality 27 1 The first strand (count 2) 33 The second strand (counts 3-14,1,18) and Article 10 34 The third strand (counts 15-17, 1) and Article 10 43 The right to truth/ Necessity 50 iii. Section 137(3)(c): maximum sentence requirement 53 F. Bars to Extradition 53 a. Section 81 (Extraneous Considerations) 53 I. Section 81(a) 55 II. Section 81(b) 69 b. Section 82 (Passage of Time) 71 G. Human Rights 76 a. Article 6 84 b. Article 7 82 c. Article 10 88 H. Health – Section 91 92 a. Prison Conditions 93 I. Pre-Trial 93 II. Post-Trial 98 b. Psychiatric Evidence 101 I. The defence medical evidence 101 II. The US medical evidence 105 III. Findings on the medical evidence 108 c. The Turner Criteria 111 I.
    [Show full text]
  • List of Targets of Arrested Computer Hackers 6 March 2012
    List of targets of arrested computer hackers 6 March 2012 The five computer hackers charged in New York Tribune and Los Angeles Times, using on Tuesday and a sixth who pleaded guilty are misappropriated login credentials. accused of involvement in some of the most notorious hacking incidents of the past 18 months. -- February 2011: A cyberattack on private computer security firm HBGary that involved the The following are some of the cyberattacks in theft of 60,000 emails from HBGary employees and which the two Britons, two Irishmen and two the HBGary chief executive, as well as defacing his Americans allegedly played a role as members of Twitter account. Anonymous, Lulz Security or associated groups: -- April-May 2011: A cyberattack on a Fox -- December 2010: Operation Payback. Distributed Broadcasting Company website that involved the denial of service (DDoS) attacks by members of theft of names, dates of birth, telephone numbers, Anonymous on the websites of MasterCard, email and residential addresses for more than PayPal and Visa in retaliation for their refusal to 70,000 potential contestants on the Fox television accept donations for WikiLeaks. In a DDoS attack, show the "X-Factor." a website is bombarded with traffic, slowing it down or knocking it offline completely. -- May 2011: A cyberattack on Sony Pictures Entertainment that revealed the passwords, email -- January 2011: Defacing a website of the Irish addresses, home addresses and dates of birth of political party Fine Gael after accessing computer 100,000 users of the www.sonypictures.com servers in Arizona used to maintain the website, website and a subsequent online attack against www.finegael2011.com.
    [Show full text]
  • Easier Said Than Done: Legal Reviews of Cyber Weapons
    Easier Said Than Done: Legal Reviews of Cyber Weapons Gary D. Brown* & Andrew O. Metcalf** INTRODUCTION On June 1, 2012, author and New York Times reporter David Sanger created a sensation within the cyber-law community. Just over a year previously, Vanity Fair, among other media outlets, reported that a malware package of unprec- edented complexity had effectively targeted the Iranian nuclear research pro- gram.1 The malware, which came to be known as Stuxnet, was also discovered on many computer systems outside Iran, but it did not appear to do any damage to these other systems. Just as the discussions spurred by the discovery of Stuxnet had begun to die down, the New York Times published an interview with Mr. Sanger to discuss his newest book, in which he alleged that the Stuxnet malware had been part of a U.S. planned and led covert cyber operation. The assertion that a nation state had used a “cyber attack” in support of its national objectives reinvigorated the attention of cyber-law commentators, both in and out of government. What makes Stuxnet interesting as a point of discussion is that the basic functioning of the software is easy to understand and easy to categorize. A piece of software was deliberately inserted into the target systems, and physical damage was the result. However, resulting physical damage is not characteristic of most cyber operations, and the legal analysis of Stuxnet is of limited utility when examining a broad range of cyber activities.2 A distinct lack of physical effects is much more characteristic of cyber operations, and the absence of physical effects has continued to complicate the legal analysis of cyber in the context of military operations.
    [Show full text]
  • Barrett Brown Is Anonymous
    Case 3:12-cr-00317-L Document 90 Filed 09/04/13 Page 1 of 13 PageID 458 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION ________________________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § § No: 3:12-CR-317-L v. § No: 3:12-CR-413-L § No: 3:13-CR-030-L BARRETT LANCASTER BROWN § MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT’S REQUEST FOR A GAG ORDER BARRETT LANCASTER BROWN, through his counsel, respectfully submits this memorandum to set the framework for oral argument on September 4, 2013, and to enter exhibits that Mr. Brown believes are relevant to the courts determination.1 STATEMENT OF FACTS A. Barrett Brown Barrett Lancaster Brown is a thirty-two year old American satirist, author and journalist. His work has appeared in Vanity Fair, the Guardian, Huffington Post, True/Slant, the Skeptical Inquirer and many other outlets. See Summary Chart of Select Publications by Barrett Brown, Exh. A. He is the co-author of a satirical book on creationism entitled Flock of Dodos: Behind Modern Creationism, Intelligent Design and the Easter Bunny. As described by Alan Dershowitz, Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, “Flock of Dodos is in the great tradition of debunkers with a sense of humor, from Thomas Paine to Mark Twain.” See Flock of Dodos (book cover), Exh. B. Indeed, Mr. Brown’s use of sarcasm, humor and 1 Mr. Brown enters these exhibits, mainly consisting of articles and commentary, for limited purpose of assisting the Court’s determination in this matter, and not for the truth of the matter asserted by the statements therein.
    [Show full text]
  • A PRACTICAL METHOD of IDENTIFYING CYBERATTACKS February 2018 INDEX
    In Collaboration With A PRACTICAL METHOD OF IDENTIFYING CYBERATTACKS February 2018 INDEX TOPICS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 OVERVIEW 5 THE RESPONSES TO A GROWING THREAT 7 DIFFERENT TYPES OF PERPETRATORS 10 THE SCOURGE OF CYBERCRIME 11 THE EVOLUTION OF CYBERWARFARE 12 CYBERACTIVISM: ACTIVE AS EVER 13 THE ATTRIBUTION PROBLEM 14 TRACKING THE ORIGINS OF CYBERATTACKS 17 CONCLUSION 20 APPENDIX: TIMELINE OF CYBERSECURITY 21 INCIDENTS 2 A Practical Method of Identifying Cyberattacks EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW SUMMARY The frequency and scope of cyberattacks Cyberattacks carried out by a range of entities are continue to grow, and yet despite the seriousness a growing threat to the security of governments of the problem, it remains extremely difficult to and their citizens. There are three main sources differentiate between the various sources of an of attacks; activists, criminals and governments, attack. This paper aims to shed light on the main and - based on the evidence - it is sometimes types of cyberattacks and provides examples hard to differentiate them. Indeed, they may of each. In particular, a high level framework sometimes work together when their interests for investigation is presented, aimed at helping are aligned. The increasing frequency and severity analysts in gaining a better understanding of the of the attacks makes it more important than ever origins of threats, the motive of the attacker, the to understand the source. Knowing who planned technical origin of the attack, the information an attack might make it easier to capture the contained in the coding of the malware and culprits or frame an appropriate response. the attacker’s modus operandi.
    [Show full text]
  • Analysis of Human Factors in Cyber Security: a Case Study of Anonymous Attack on Hbgary
    Analysis of Human Factors in Cyber Security: A Case Study of Anonymous Attack on Hbgary Benjamin Aruwa Gyunka Directorate of Information and Communication Technology National Open University of Nigeria (NOUN) Abuja, Nigeria [email protected] Abikoye Oluwakemi Christiana Department of Computer Science University of Ilorin Ilorin, Nigeria [email protected] ABSTRACT awareness programmes for workforces and the Purpose: This paper critically analyses the implementations and maintenance of basic human factors or behaviours as major threats to security culture and policies as a panacea for cyber security. Focus is placed on the usual roles social engineering cyber attacks against played by both the attackers and defenders (the individuals and organizations. targets of the attacker) in cyber threats’ Originality: Lots of work has been done and pervasiveness and the potential impacts of such many still on-going in the field of social actions on critical security infrastructures. engineering attacks and human factors, but this Design/Methodology/Approach: To enable an study is the first to adopt an approach of a effective and practical analysis, the Anonymous practical case study to critically analyze the attack against HBGary Federal (A security firm effects of human factors on cyber security. in the United State of America) was taken as a Keywords: The Anonymous; HBGary Federal; case study to reveal the huge damaging impacts Uniform Resource Location (URL); Content of human errors and attitudes against the security Management System (CMS); SQL Injection; of organizations and individuals. Cross-site Scripting (XXS); Social Engineering; Findings: The findings revealed that the Cyber Security; Information Security powerful security firm was compromised and Paper Type: Research Paper overtaken through simple SQL injection techniques and a very crafty social engineering attack which succeeded because of sheer 1 Introduction personnel negligence and unwitting utterances.
    [Show full text]