Altering the Deal: Explaining Variation in U.S. Intelligence Reform by Louis P. Melancon B.A. in Political Science, May 1995, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign M.S. of Strategic Intelligence, July 2003, National Intelligence University M.A. in Defence Studies, December 2007, King’s College London A Dissertation submitted to The Faculty of The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy January 10, 2019 James H. Lebovic Professor of Political Science and International Affairs The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University certifies that Louis P. Melancon has passed the Final Examination for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy as of November 5, 2018. This is the final and approved form of the dissertation. Altering the Deal: Explaining Variation in U.S. Intelligence Reform Louis P. Melancon Dissertation Research Committee: James H. Lebovic, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Dissertation Director Steven J. Balla, Associate Professor of Political Science, Public Policy and Public Administration and International Affairs, Committee Member Eric Grynaviski, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Committee Member ii © Copyright 2019 Louis P. Melancon. All rights reserved. iii Acknowledgments The author wishes to acknowledge a few groups of people: 1) His tireless and patient committee. They perservered through my stumbles to help me complete this. 2) My wife Heather and children Eloise and Teddy. They helped me remember that whoopee cushions are always funny. 3) My coaches and fencing sparing partners. They helped me forget the struggles of a dissertation through the struggles of a one-on-one fight with swords. 4) The faculty and staff of the National Intelligence University. Who had to endure me making sure they know that whoopee cushions are always funny. iv Abstract of Dissertation Altering the Deal: Explaining Variation in U.S. Intelligence Reform Since the formalization of intelligence as a standalone function of the U.S. government in 1947, there have been dozens of reform efforts. These efforts have produced a variety of outcomes; although most failed to produce any changes, some made superficial changes, and a small handful had drastic impacts on how the government organizes for and generates intelligence. This research is intended to answer this question: Why do some intelligence-reform efforts result in change but others fail? The vast majority of the established literature on this topic either lacks a theoretical basis or relies upon a biased status quo to explain the variation. Most work on intelligence reform places failure squarely on bureaucratic intransigence. Intelligence agencies prefer the status quo and can prevent change by holding an overwhelming information advantage. Yet information advantage is not fixed. Reformers can shift informational asymmetries to their favor through the apt design of the reform itself. Reformers that generate new solutions rather than simply recycle solutions, impose new definitions and terminology rather than use the intelligence agencies own jargon, or talk about systemic issues rather than specific actions of the intelligence agencies nullify the information advantage. When reformers take on two or more of these approaches, the information advantage shifts to their advantage at the expense of the intelligence agencies. When that happens, reformers can push reform through and create change. The examples of the Rockefeller Commission, the Halloween Day Massacre, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) all reflect v this dynamic. Failures of reform, such as the Maxwell Commission and the Church Committee’s work on electronic surveillance, reflect reformers not taking on these approaches and leaving the information advantage to the intelligence agencies. Put simply, reformers that shift the dialogue of the reform by imposing new definitions, propose new solutions, or examine the problems in broader contexts rather than individual actions, strip the tool of information advantage away from intelligence organizations, producing actual reform. vi Table of Contents Acknowledgments iv Abstract of Dissertation v List of Figures vii List of Tables viii Chapter 1: The Role of Information in Intelligence Reform 1 Chapter 2: Explaining Intelligence-Reform Outcomes 27 Chapter 3: Examining the Universe 63 Chapter 4: Information Advantage in Action 116 Chapter 5: Conclusions 148 Bibliography 163 Appendix A: Case Summaries 191 Appendix B: Counting Rules 208 Appendix C: Outside Coder Biographic Data 215 vii List of Figures Figure 1. Interests in Alignment 29 Figure 2. Agent’s Interest Drift 29 Figure 3. Oversight and Enforcement to Detect and Correct Agent Drift 30 Figure 4. Principal Interest Drift and the Irrelevance of Oversight and Enforcement 32 Figure 5. Matrix for Necessity and Sufficiency 80 viii List of Tables Table 1. Potential Cases 66 Table 2. Culled Universe With Assessed Outcomes 70 Table 3. Test for Time Necessity or Sufficiency 83 Table 4. Test for Visibility Necessity or Sufficiency 88 Table 5. Test for Relevancy Necessity or Sufficiency 89 Table 6. Test for Divided Government Necessity or Sufficiency 92 Table 7. Test for Unified Government Necessity or Sufficiency 93 Table 8. Test for Coalition Necessity or Sufficiency 96 Table 9. Test for Questioning Necessity or Sufficiency 99 Table 10. Test for Proposal Necessity or Sufficiency 102 Table 11. Test for Terminology Necessity or Sufficiency 103 Table 12. Consolidated Consistencies and Coverages of Conditions 107 Table 13. CHANGE Truth Table 111 Table 14. ~change Truth Table without ~term 113 ix Chapter 1: The Role of Information in Intelligence Reform The U.S. government has attempted intelligence reform on several occasions. Some of these attempts have led to real change—dramatically altering the intelligence functions and organizations by, for example, redefining oversight relationships. A few of these reform attempts led to only superficial adjustments, such as adding a new layer of management. Most attempts at intelligence reform, however, have simply fizzled out, producing no change at all (Jones, 2005; Neary, 2010). What explains this variation in outcomes? What variable is setting the conditions for change? As with almost any problem, any variation in outcome could be the result of external stimuli or internal processes (Jervis, 1976, p. 35). This research claims that the set of conditions that are most consistent and that best explain a reform’s success or failure are internal to the reform—specifically, those that deal with information asymmetry. These conditions show that actors who seek reform are actually seeking to renegotiate the relationships between themselves and the intelligence organizations that they are seeking to reform. Unlike most of the literature on intelligence reform, this research is not very interested in explaining why the reforms start—or even why they sometimes are resolved suboptimally. This research asks a more modest question: Once a reform starts, why do changes (optimal or not) occur for some but not for others? Though this is seemingly a fairly modest goal, the resulting explanation carries more power (based on the historical record) than do the suggestions from the literature that are purely focused on why an intelligence reform would start or on why its enacted solutions might not be optimal. The existing (largely practical) literature is focused on why reforms start and on 1 external stimuli as an explanation for why some intelligence reforms create change and others do not. Some researchers have looked at events that impact national security, whereas others have considered domestic struggles between political parties. The existing theoretical studies have not fully discarded either argument, but they mainly rely on explanations in which a government’s internal processes—almost exclusively the bureaucratic status quo—determine suboptimal outcomes. Researchers have considered the key variables for intelligence reform to be the events that cause the reforms, the political environments at the time of the reforms, and organizations’ status quo preferences. Each of these explanations, however, has a mixed record in terms of explaining why change does (or does not) occur. Although some significant events have resulted in change, many others have produced no change. Some minor reform-initiating events have produced great change, and other minor events have produced nothing. Some reforms have created change in times of divided government, and others have done so in times of unified government. Some changes have occurred despite a seemingly overwhelming coalition against change, and at other times, there has been a failure to produce change despite a seemingly overwhelming coalition in favor of it. These explanations take a broad view on intelligence reforms, as they incorporate factors that are interesting for other questions (e.g., Why do intelligence reforms start? Why are the results not efficient?), but in so doing, they lose explanatory power relative to the historical record. The basic question of this research (Why do some intelligence- reform efforts create change when others do not?) presents an opportunity to reexamine the problem and to thus gain previously unidentified insight. The small scope (inside the reform itself) and the loose assumptions are indicative