DOCSLIB.ORG

Establishing a Framework for the Oversight of Major Defense Acquisition Programs - a Historical Analysis

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by AFTI Scholar (Air Force Institute of Technology) Air Force Institute of Technology AFIT Scholar Theses and Dissertations Student Graduate Works 3-2004 Establishing a Framework for the Oversight of Major Defense Acquisition Programs - A Historical Analysis Diane I. K. Kuderik Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons Recommended Citation Kuderik, Diane I. K., "Establishing a Framework for the Oversight of Major Defense Acquisition Programs - A Historical Analysis" (2004). Theses and Dissertations. 3967. https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/3967 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ESTABLISHING A FRAMEWORK FOR THE OVERSIGHT OF MAJOR DEFENSE ACQUISITION PROGRAMS – A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS THESIS Diane I. K. Kuderik, Captain, USAF AFIT/GCA/ENV/04M-04 DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED. The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the United States Government. AFIT/GCA/ENV/04M-04 ESTABLISHING A FRAMEWORK FOR THE OVERSIGHT OF MAJOR DEFENSE ACQUISITION PROGRAMS – A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS THESIS Presented to the Faculty Department of Systems and Engineering Management Graduate School of Engineering and Management Air Force Institute of Technology Air University Air Education and Training Command In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Cost Analysis Diane I. K. Kuderik, BS Captain, USAF March 2004 APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED. AFIT/GCA/ENV/04M-04 ESTABLISHING A FRAMEWORK FOR THE OVERSIGHT OF MAJOR DEFENSE ACQUISITION PROGRAMS – A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS Diane I. K. Kuderik, BS Captain, USAF Approved: ___________//Signed//__________________ 19 Feb 04 Michael A. Greiner, Maj, USAF (Chairman) date ___________//Signed//______________________ 19 Feb 04 John Driessnack, Lt Col, USAF (Member) date ___________//Signed//_______________________ 19 Feb 04 David R. King, Maj, USAF (Member) date AFIT/GCA/ENV/04M-04 Abstract The Department of Defense (DoD) has budgeted over $134.5 billion for Fiscal Year 2004 for Acquisition, yet little is written about the personnel responsible for managing and evaluating Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP), that is those who perform Acquisition Oversight. The Acquisition Oversight process has not been studied in a disciplined manner. Congress, past Administrations, and the DoD Inspector General have commissioned several studies on the Acquisition Oversight Process. Recommendations were considered and implemented such that the process evolved to where it stands today. Over 40 years separate the first iteration with the latest version. Commission reports, countless studies, and historians agree on the need for oversight in military acquisitions; they agree that the system takes too much money, takes too long, and does not perform as well as most would wish; yet they disagree on who should perform oversight. This thesis reviewed relevant literature to model historical oversight hierarchies. Then expert opinions were gathered from the studies mentioned above, on how well the oversight process modeled preformed. As expected, the oversight process has improved over time but further improvements are currently being sought. Those seeking improvement would do well to study past processes and learn from their mistakes. -iv- Acknowledgments I would like to express my sincere appreciation to my faculty advisor, Maj Michael Greiner, for his guidance and support throughout the course of this thesis effort. The insight and experience was certainly appreciated. I would, also, like to thank my readers, Lt. Col John Driessnack from the Defense Acquisition University and Maj David King of SAF/AQP, for both the support and latitude provided to me in this endeavor. Mostly I would like to thank my family and church for their support and understanding. Diane I. K. Kuderik - v - Table of Contents Page Abstract .......................................................................................................................iv Acknowledgments .........................................................................................................v List of Figures ........................................................................................................... viii List of Tables .............................................................................................................. ix I. Introduction ...........................................................................................................1 Background.............................................................................................................1 Problem Statement..................................................................................................7 Research Objective .................................................................................................8 Scope.......................................................................................................................9 Assumptions..........................................................................................................10 Thesis Overview ...................................................................................................10 II. Literature Review.................................................................................................12 Introduction...........................................................................................................12 Role Definition (1947-1950) ................................................................................13 Decade of Reorganization (1950-1960)................................................................28 Era of McNamara (1961-1968).............................................................................39 Oversight Outgrowth (1969 – 1988).....................................................................44 Reducing Service Oversight (1977-1988) ............................................................52 Streamlining (1989-2003).....................................................................................61 Ongoing Pilot Studies ...........................................................................................70 Summary...............................................................................................................71 III. Methodology........................................................................................................73 Introduction...........................................................................................................73 Criteria of Acquisition Oversight .........................................................................74 Data Source...........................................................................................................77 1949 Oversight......................................................................................................78 1964 Oversight......................................................................................................85 1977 Oversight......................................................................................................92 1988 Oversight......................................................................................................99 Chapter Summary ...............................................................................................102 - vi - Page IV Conclusion ...........................................................................................................103 Review of Research Objectives ..........................................................................103 Discussion of Results..........................................................................................103 Recommendations for Future Research..............................................................104 V Bibliography ......................................................................................................106 - vii - List of Figures Figure Page 1. The Defense Acquisition Management Framework ...............................................3 2. Budget Pie Chart.....................................................................................................5 3. Model Key ..............................................................................................................9 4. National Military Establishment...........................................................................17 5. Air Force Acquisition Oversight Hierarchy of 1949 ......................................26, 78 6. Air Force Acquisition Oversight Hierarchy of 1955 ............................................33 7. Air Force Acquisition Oversight Hierarchy of 1959 ............................................39 8. Air Force Acquisition Oversight Hierarchy of 1964 ......................................43, 85 9. Air Force Acquisition Oversight Hierarchy of 1977 ......................................51,
Recommended publications
  • Directors of Central Intelligence As Leaders of the U.S

    Directors of Central Intelligence As Leaders of the U.S

    All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this book are those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Central Intel- ligence Agency or any other US government entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of the authors’ factual statements and interpretations. The Center for the Study of Intelligence The Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) was founded in 1974 in response to Director of Central Intelligence James Schlesinger’s desire to create within CIA an organization that could “think through the functions of intelligence and bring the best intellects available to bear on intelli- gence problems.” The Center, comprising professional historians and experienced practitioners, attempts to document lessons learned from past operations, explore the needs and expectations of intelligence consumers, and stimulate serious debate on current and future intelligence challenges. To support these activities, CSI publishes Studies in Intelligence and books and monographs addressing historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of the intelligence profession. It also administers the CIA Museum and maintains the Agency’s Historical Intelligence Collection. Comments and questions may be addressed to: Center for the Study of Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency Washington, DC 20505 Printed copies of this book are available to requesters outside the US government from: Government Printing Office (GPO) Superintendent of Documents P.O. Box 391954 Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954 Phone: (202) 512-1800 E-mail: [email protected] ISBN: 1-929667-14-0 The covers: The portraits on the front and back covers are of the 19 directors of central intelligence, beginning with the first, RAdm.
  • Strategic Posture Commission

    Strategic Posture Commission

    Perry and Schlesinger and Perry America’s Strategic Posture Americ a’s ow to secure the nuclear peace remains one of the most profound questions of the modern era. Twenty years after the end of the Cold War Hand with the arrival of a new administration in Washington, it is time to think through fundamental questions about the purposes of nuclear deterrence Strategic and the character of the U.S. strategic posture. While the existential threat to the United States has decreased, the rising threat of catastrophic terrorism, the possession and spread of nuclear weapons by other states, and a general worldwide nuclear renaissance continue to influence decisions about America’s Posture strategic posture. Recognizing the changing character of these threats, Congress formed a The Final Report of the commission in 2008 to examine the United States’ long-term strategic posture and make recommendations. For more than eleven months this bipartisan Congressional Commission commission of leading experts on national security, arms control, and nuclear America’s Strategic Posture technology met with Congressional leaders, military officers, high-level officials of several countries, arms control groups, and technical experts to assess the on the Strategic Posture appropriate roles for nuclear weapons, nonproliferation programs, and missile defenses. This official edition contains a discussion of key questions and issues of the United States as well as the Commission’s findings and recommendations for tailoring U.S. strategic posture to new and emerging requirements
  • Allen Dulles: Reluctant Manager

    Allen Dulles: Reluctant Manager

    All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this book are those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Central Intel- lig ence Agency or any other US government entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of the authors’ factual statements and interpretations. Th e Center for the Study of Intelligence The Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) was founded in 1974 in response to Director of Central Intelligence James Schlesinger’s desire to create within CIA an organization that could “think through the functions of intelligence and bring the best intellects available to bear on intelli- gence problems.” The Center, comprising professional historians and experienced practitioners, attempts to document lessons learned from past operations, explore the needs and expectations of intelligence consumers, and stimulate serious debate on current and future intelligence challenges. To support these activities, CSI publishes Studies in Intelligence and books and monographs addressing historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of the intelligence profession. It also administers the CIA Museum and maintains the Agency’s Historical Intelligence Collection. Comments and questions may be addressed to: Center for the Study of Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency Washington, DC 20505 Printed copies of this book are available to requesters outside the US government from: Government Printing Office (GPO) Superintendent of Documents P.O. Box 391954 Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954 Phone: (202) 512-1800 E-mail: [email protected] ISBN: 1-929667-14-0 The covers: The portraits on the front and back covers are of the 19 directors of central intelligence, beginning with the first, RAdm.
  • *1573 the Limits of National Security

    *1573 the Limits of National Security

    Jamshidi, Maryam 8/15/2019 For Educational Use Only THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL SECURITY, 48 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1573 48 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1573 American Criminal Law Review Fall, 2011 Symposium: Moving Targets: Issues at the Intersection of National Security and American Criminal Law Article Laura K. Donohuea1 Copyright © 2012 by American Criminal Law Review; Laura K. Donohue *1573 THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL SECURITY I. INTRODUCTION 1574 II. DEFINING U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 1577 III. THE FOUR EPOCHS 1587 A. Protecting the Union: 1776-1898 1589 1. International Independence and Economic Growth 1593 2. Retreat to Union 1611 3. Return to International Independence and Economic Growth 1617 a. Tension Between Expansion and Neutrality 1618 b. Increasing Number of Domestic Power-Bases 1623 B. Formative International Engagement and Domestic Power: 1898-1930 1630 1. Political, Economic, and Military Concerns 1630 a. Military Might 1637 b. Secondary Inquiry: From Rule of Law to Type of Law 1638 2. Tension Between the Epochs: Independence v. Engagement 1645 © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 Jamshidi, Maryam 8/15/2019 For Educational Use Only THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL SECURITY, 48 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1573 3. Expanding National Spheres of Influence 1650 C. The Ascendance of National Security: 1930-1989 1657 1. A New Domestic Order 1658 a. Re-channeling of Law Enforcement to National Security 1661 b. The Threat of Totalitarianism 1665 c. The Purpose of the State 1666 2. Changing International Role: From Authoritarianism to Containment 1669 3. Institutional Questions and the National Security Act of 1947 1672 a.
  • NSIAD-89-19FS Defense Management

    NSIAD-89-19FS Defense Management

    Jj ‘if QJI;pi’i Ui$&&t%$; Fl li:‘I #&GTI I3 i I a -‘-“” Fact Sheet for the Honorable William V. Roth, Jr., U.S. Senate November 1988 DEFENSE MANAGEMENT Status of Recommendations by Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management GAO/NSIAD-tW19F!3 United States General Accounting Office GAO Washington, D.C. 20548 National Security and International Affairs Division a-221205 November4,1988 The Honorable William V. Roth, Jr. United States Senate Dear Senator Roth: As requested, we are reporting on the status of actions taken to implement the recommendations made by the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (Packard Commission). The Packard Commission divided its recommendations into four sections and we have -maintained the same structure in the appendixes II through V to this report. The appendixes contain a total of 55 recommendations. The results of our analyses are summarized below and the details are in the appendixes. Our analyses show the actions taken on the recommendations but it is still too early to assess the actual effect of most of the actions taken. The status of the recommendations is based on data available as of July 31, 1988. Appendix II has the 17 recommendations that cover National Security Planning and Budgeting. In its recommendations the Packard Commission sought to closely relate defense plans to available resources, stabilize the defense budget process, and streamline the role of the Congress in reviewing the defense budget. While some action has been taken on most of the recommendations, little or no action has been taken on others. More specifically: -- The National Security Council provided a single budget level, instead of provisional budget levels, in the presidential guidance to the Secretary of Defense.
  • The Progressive Era Origins of the National Security Act

    The Progressive Era Origins of the National Security Act

    Pace University DigitalCommons@Pace Pace Law Faculty Publications School of Law 1-1-2000 The Progressive Era Origins of the National Security Act Mark R. Shulman Pace Law School Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Law Commons, and the Public Affairs Commons Recommended Citation Shulman, Mark R., "The Progressive Era Origins of the National Security Act" (2000). Pace Law Faculty Publications. 223. https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/223 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Progressive Era Origins of the National Security Act Mark R.Shulman* Perhaps it is a universal truth that the loss of liberty at home is to be charged to provisions against danger; real or pretended, from abroad. -James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, May 1798' I. Introduction to "National Security" The National Security Act of 1947* and its successors drew the blueprint of the Cold War domestic political order. This regime centralized control of the military services-the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and a newly separate Air Force-in a single executive branch department. It created a new professional organization to collect and analyze foreign intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency. And at the center of this new national security apparatus, a National Security Council would eventually establish foreign policy by coordinating intelligence and directing military and para-military forces, as well as supervising a National Security Resources Board.
  • The Impact That Defense Reform Had on Procurement of Major Weapons Systems: a Case Study of the V-22 and the Effect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act on Its Procurement

    The Impact That Defense Reform Had on Procurement of Major Weapons Systems: a Case Study of the V-22 and the Effect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act on Its Procurement

    THE IMPACT THAT DEFENSE REFORM HAD ON PROCUREMENT OF MAJOR WEAPONS SYSTEMS: A CASE STUDY OF THE V-22 AND THE EFFECT OF THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT ON ITS PROCUREMENT A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE Military History by MICHAEL G. KING, LCDR, USN B.S., Lees-McRae College, Banner Elk, North Carolina, 2001 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2013-02 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Form Approved REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED (From - To) 11-01-2013 Master’s Thesis FEB 2013 – DEC 2013 4.
  • White Paper: Evolution of Department of Defense Directive 5100.01 “Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components”

    White Paper: Evolution of Department of Defense Directive 5100.01 “Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components”

    White Paper: Evolution of Department of Defense Directive 5100.01 “Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components” Office of the Secretary of Defense Chief Management Officer Organizational Policy and Decision Support This white paper is the product of a research project supporting the 2020 update to DoDD 5100.01 and future roles and mission reviews. Base Document Prepared April 2010 by Lindsey Eilon and Jack Lyon Revised January 2014 by Jason Zaborski and Robin Rosenberger Revised January 2018 by Bria Ballard Revised 2018/2019 by Nicole Johnson, Natasha Schlenoff, and Mac Bollman Revised 2020 by Mac Bollman, Tony Ronchick, and Aubrey Curran DoD Organizational Management Lead: Tedd Ogren Evolution of Department of Defense Directive 5100.01 Evolution of Department of Defense Directive 5100.01 “Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components” Executive Summary Since its initial formal issuance in 1954, Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5100.01, “Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components” has undergone both minor and substantial revisions as it outlines the primary functions of the Department of Defense. The directive derived from roles and missions discussions, following World War II, which aimed to delineate the purposes of, improve joint operations between, and inform resourcing the Military Services. To date, major organizational and functional changes within the Department of Defense have been almost exclusively due to specific and significant Congressional or Secretary of Defense direction in response to notable failures in coordinated operations between the Military Services. There have been no updates during major conflicts. The most recent major update of December 21, 2010, which reflected the results of the Congressionally-directed DoD 2009 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review, primarily recorded the evolution of the Department’s mission areas rather than promulgating any major adjustments.
  • Birth of an Enigma: 1945–1949

    Birth of an Enigma: 1945–1949

    1 Birth of an Enigma: 1945–1949 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is America’s most enigmatic institu- tion. Its mission requires secrecy, and, as a consequence, it and its history are shrouded in mystery. The “Company,” nevertheless, is among America’s most well-known institutions, with its own YouTube site, Facebook page, and Twitter account. “CIA” is likewise among the world’s most recognizable acronyms, and millions of people around the globe and within the United States consider the agency both a primary instrument of and an appropriate metaphor for US foreign policy. The enigma of the CIA goes beyond its notoriety. Opinion poll after opin- ionpollintheUnitedStatesrevealthatitisamongAmerica’smostunpopu- lar, disrespected, and mistrusted institutions. “The agency’s a funny place,” reads a recent comment, by one of its own veterans no less. “It’s like mid- dle schoolers with clearances,” he explained. Politicians and officials of both parties, from the president on down, are fine with this description and repu- tation. Attributing a policy disaster, security lapse, or even a war to an intel- ligence failure is easier for the American public to understand than would be adeepdiveintothepolicymakingprocess,andofcoursethepolicymakers and legislators escape blame. Further, intelligence gaffes seem susceptible to quick fixes. The offending intelligence officers can readily be replaced, insti- tutional reforms can be enacted, more spies can be sent into the field and better satellites built, and analysts can be more rigorously trained. For most Americans, writesCOPYRIGHTED another CIA veteran, the Company MATERIAL is a “combination of hope chest, voodoo doll, and the portrait of Dorian Gray.”1 Still,despite,orinaperversesensebecauseof,theCIA’simageandrepu- tation, the Company is unequivocally a cultural icon.
  • Explaining Variation in US Intelligence Reform by Louis P

    Explaining Variation in US Intelligence Reform by Louis P

    Altering the Deal: Explaining Variation in U.S. Intelligence Reform by Louis P. Melancon B.A. in Political Science, May 1995, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign M.S. of Strategic Intelligence, July 2003, National Intelligence University M.A. in Defence Studies, December 2007, King’s College London A Dissertation submitted to The Faculty of The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy January 10, 2019 James H. Lebovic Professor of Political Science and International Affairs The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University certifies that Louis P. Melancon has passed the Final Examination for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy as of November 5, 2018. This is the final and approved form of the dissertation. Altering the Deal: Explaining Variation in U.S. Intelligence Reform Louis P. Melancon Dissertation Research Committee: James H. Lebovic, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Dissertation Director Steven J. Balla, Associate Professor of Political Science, Public Policy and Public Administration and International Affairs, Committee Member Eric Grynaviski, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Committee Member ii © Copyright 2019 Louis P. Melancon. All rights reserved. iii Acknowledgments The author wishes to acknowledge a few groups of people: 1) His tireless and patient committee. They perservered through my stumbles to help me complete this. 2) My wife Heather and children Eloise and Teddy. They helped me remember that whoopee cushions are always funny. 3) My coaches and fencing sparing partners. They helped me forget the struggles of a dissertation through the struggles of a one-on-one fight with swords.
  • Organizing for National Security

    Organizing for National Security

    ORGANIZING FOR NATIONAL SECURITY Edited by Douglas T. Stuart November 2000 ***** The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. ***** Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this report may be obtained from the Publications and Production Office by calling commercial (717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at [email protected] ***** Most 1993, 1994, and all later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for electronic dissemination. SSI’s Homepage address is: http://carlisle-www.army. mil/usassi/welcome.htm ***** The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please let us know by e-mail at [email protected] or by calling (717) 245-3133. ISBN 1-58487-039-7 ii CONTENTS Foreword ........................ v 1. Introduction Douglas T. Stuart ................. 1 2. Present at the Legislation: The 1947 National Security Act Douglas T. Stuart ................. 5 3. Ike and the Birth of the CINCs: The Continuity of Unity of Command David Jablonsky ...............
  • The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986: 30 Years of Acquisition Reform

    The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986: 30 Years of Acquisition Reform

    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Calhoun, Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis and Dissertation Collection 2016-12 The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986: 30 years of acquisition reform Bond, Dale P. Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/51649 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA MBA PROFESSIONAL REPORT THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT OF 1986: 30 YEARS OF ACQUISITION REFORM December 2016 By: Dale P. Bond Scott M. Davis Aaron D. Pearsall Advisors: Robert Mortlock John Dillard Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED (Leave blank) December 2016 MBA professional report 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT OF 1986: 30 YEARS OF ACQUISITION REFORM 6. AUTHOR(S) Dale P.