ORGANIZING FOR NATIONAL SECURITY Edited by Douglas T. Stuart November 2000 ***** The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. ***** Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this report may be obtained from the Publications and Production Office by calling commercial (717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at [email protected] ***** Most 1993, 1994, and all later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for electronic dissemination. SSI’s Homepage address is: http://carlisle-www.army. mil/usassi/welcome.htm ***** The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please let us know by e-mail at [email protected] or by calling (717) 245-3133. ISBN 1-58487-039-7 ii CONTENTS Foreword ........................ v 1. Introduction Douglas T. Stuart ................. 1 2. Present at the Legislation: The 1947 National Security Act Douglas T. Stuart ................. 5 3. Ike and the Birth of the CINCs: The Continuity of Unity of Command David Jablonsky ................ 25 4. The DoD Reorganization Act of 1986: Improving The Department through Centralization and Integration Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr . ............ 65 5. Institutionalizing Defense Reform: The Politics of Transformation in the Root, McNamara, and Cohen Eras Joseph R. Cerami ................ 101 6. Time for a Revolution: The Transition from National Defense to International Security Grant T. Hammond .............. 133 7. National Security and the Interagency Process: Forward into the 21st Century Gabriel Marcella ................ 163 8. Improving National Security Decisionmaking Constantine Menges .............. 195 iii 9. Servants, Supplicants, or Saboteurs: The Role of the Uniformed Officer and The Changing Nature of America’s Civil- Military Relations John Hillen ................... 209 10. DoD in the 21st Century Lawrence J. Korb ................ 223 11. The National Security Act of 2002 William A. Navas Jr. ............. 231 12. Presidential Leadership and National Security Policy Making Robert D. Steele ................ 245 13. Conclusion Douglas T. Stuart ............... 283 Glossary ....................... 289 About the Contributors ............... 293 iv FOREWORD The pace and scope of change over the last decade have indeed been extraordinary. The United States has been confronted with not just the collapse of the Soviet empire but also with revolutionary scientific breakthroughs, the transformation of the global economy, and the erosion of many of the basic premises of the Westphalian system of international order. The U.S. policy community has attempted to make sense of these and other changes by recourse to bodies such as the National Defense Panel and the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (USNCS/21). The USNCS/21 is currently in the third phase of its mandated activities. At the end of phase three, the members of the Commission will recommend changes in the institutions of the U.S. national security policymaking system. Its conclusions are likely to stimulate a lively, and much needed, debate. The U.S. Army War College chose the theme of “Organizing for National Security” for its Tenth Annual Strategy Conference in order to contribute to the upcoming debate about institutional reform. This volume provides a summary of the proceedings of that conference. It includes historical, analytical, and prescriptive articles relating to the national security bureaucracy. Virtually all of the authors accept that some degree of reform is necessary for a system which can trace its roots back to the 1947 National Security Act. Not surprisingly, they differ in their opinions about which parts of the system are most in need of repair, and in their specific recommendations. Several contributors applaud the trend toward jointness in the armed services and recommend that this serve as a model for future reforms of the institutions responsible for national security policymaking. In order for institutional reform to succeed, it will have to be guided by a coherent and compelling national strategy which must, in turn, be anchored in widely-accepted v national interests. It will also have to be in accord with such constitutional principles as civilian control of the armed forces and the inviolability of the civil liberties of all Americans. This is a tall order for U.S. policymakers. Hopefully, the chapters in this volume will offer some useful insights and some encouragement. DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR. Director Strategic Studies Institute vi CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Douglas T. Stuart The weekend of July 25-27, 1947, was an especially hectic and stressful period for the Washington policy community. Congress was rushing to wrap up its end-of-term business before adjourning for the summer. The budget was the most contentious issue, since the Republican majority was still looking for ways to make good on its promise to cut 15 percent from the $37.5 billion that President Harry S. Truman had requested in January. These deliberations were complicated by the fact that the President had also asked Congress for supplemental funding for aid to Greece and Turkey. Legislation also had to be passed in order to terminate 175 war powers which the President still had at his disposal from World War II. One important piece of legislation was easily dispensed with during this weekend. The so-called “unification bill,” which had already been passed by the Senate, was approved in the House by a voice vote on the afternoon of July 25. Few commentators referred to the legislation by its official name—The National Security Act (NSA). The ease with which the legislation was passed belied the long process of congressional hearings and the intense struggles which preceded the final vote. The finished product was a patchwork of compromises which raised many more questions than they resolved. Commentators wondered, for example, how a new “super” Secretary of Defense, with the help of three assistants, would be able to exercise control over the military services which were theoretically under his authority. Some commentators asked how “jointness” could be achieved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), without a strong Chairman to control their deliberations. The future 1 of the National Security Council (NSC) was very uncertain, since President Truman viewed it as a “second”—and unnecessary—cabinet. Nor was it clear whether the new Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) would be asked to do more than simply assist the NSC in the coordination and evaluation of intelligence information provided by the separate branches of government. Many of these questions were answered by the late 1950s. The Office of the Secretary of Defense had been expanded and given greater authority as the Department of Defense. The Joint Chiefs had acquired a Chairman, although his powers were still circumscribed. The CIA had evolved from being a support agency for the NSC into an independent and influential component of the national security system. Finally, the NSC had become established at the “top of policy hill.” 1 The national security bureaucracy which exists today differs in important respects from the system which was in place by the late 1950s. However, what is most striking about the existing system is not how much has changed, but how little. The Clinton administration came into office committed to fundamental reform of the national security bureaucracy, and some interesting changes have taken place since that time. But these changes are better understood as exercises in gardening rather than architecture. Over the last decade many experts and political leaders have asserted that there is a self-evident need for structural reform in the national security bureaucracy, in light of the dramatic changes which have taken place since the collapse of the Soviet empire. During the spring of 1999, the U.S. Army War College selected this issue as the central focus of its Tenth Annual Strategy Conference. Entitled Organizing for National Security in the New Century , the conference provided an opportunity for policy analysts, government representatives, and academic experts to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the existing arrangements for 2 national security policy making and to propose some reforms. The organizers were careful to anchor these discussions in presentations on the institutional history of the national security bureaucracy. The articles in this volume are based on the proceedings of the Tenth Annual Strategy Conference. This publication would not have been possible without the expert assistance and guidance of several people, including Colonel Joseph Cerami, Ms. Marianne Cowling, Ms. Victoria Kuhn, Professor Douglas Lovelace, Jr., Ms. Rita Rummel, and Dr. Earl Tilford. Special thanks must be reserved for Dr. Steven Metz, who played an indispensable role in the design of the conference and in the conceptualization of this book. This volume will be published shortly before the election of a new U.S. president. The next president will enter the White House at a time when the United States is enjoying unprecedented power and influence throughout the world, and at a time when no nation in the world poses a direct military threat to America’s survival. The new administration would be well advised to take advantage of this fortuitous situation to address fundamental problems in our national security bureaucracy. Hopefully, this book will provide some valuable guidance about what works and what does not work in the existing system.