Books 9.2004 8/11/04 1:51 PM Page 45

Books Who’s to Blame for September 11?

The 9/11 Commission Report: team had evaded security checks dur- demanding to know why the United Final Report of the National Com- ing a recent trial run at an unidenti- States had to put up with such mission on Terrorist Attacks upon fied New York airport.” attacks—that Tenet walked out of a the United States meeting of the principals.” Berger also Thomas H. Kean, Chair Sandy Berger stressed to the Bush transition team, W. W. Norton. 567 pages. $10.00. Clinton’s National Security Adviser and especially Condoleezza Rice, the also comes off well. He was alert to the gravity of the Al Qaeda threat. By Matthew Rothschild risk of terrorism earlier than most. He deputized counterterrorism expert William Cohen and the Joint Chiefs n page 340 of The 9/11 Richard Clarke and gave him wide Clinton’s Defense Secretary Commission Report is this authority, placing him on an equal William Cohen was exceptionally Osentence: “If the govern- footing with cabinet members cautious. Relying on the advice of ment’s leaders understood the gravity involved in national security. Berger Joint Chiefs of Staff head General of the threat they faced and under- and Clarke worked admirably together Hugh Shelton, Cohen scorned the stood at the same time that their poli- to prevent the Millennium Plot from idea of attacking bin Laden and his cies to eliminate it were not likely to coming to fruition at the end of 1999, operations. Together, Cohen and succeed any time soon, then history’s the report says. And Berger urged Shelton concluded that the 1998 judgment will be harsh.” aggressive action against Al Qaeda after cruise missile retaliation against Al Let’s call the roll. the Cole attack. “According to Clarke, Qaeda for the embassy bombings in Berger upbraided DCI [Director of Africa was a waste of million-dollar Bill Clinton Central Intelligence] Tenet so sharply weapons that hit only “jungle gym” The much-maligned former Presi- after the Cole attack—repeatedly equipment, in Shelton’s words. And dent comes out pretty well in the report. It shows that President Clinton recognized that “terrorism was a national security problem” and was “deeply concerned about bin Laden.” Clinton issued three Presidential Decision Directives about the threat. He received “a special daily pipeline of reports” about bin Laden and autho- rized his capture or killing. But the report faults Clinton for not respond- ing to the October 12, 2000, attack on the USS Cole, which killed seven- teen and wounded forty. It said he was more interested in brokering a peace between Israel and the Palestinians in his last few months in office. Eerily, Clinton received warnings similar to those that Bush later got. On December 4, 1998, he received a Presidential Briefing that said, “Bin Laden Preparing to Hijack U.S. Air- craft and Other Attacks.” It added that “two members of the operational

Matthew Rothschild is Editor of The Progressive. LINDA ZACKS

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they repeatedly dragged their feet on of bin Laden early on and tried to him. By March of 1998, the bin Laden any plans until the intelligence was grab everyone by the lapels to listen to unit at the CIA had run four complete clearly actionable, the report notes, a him. Like a modern-day Cassandra, rehearsals for a capture operation that standard that was never met. he repeatedly underscored to his had a decent chance of success. But For instance, after the Cole bomb- superiors in both Administrations the Tenet and his operations deputy deep- ings, when all the intelligence was urgency of the problem. Frustrated sixed the plan. The report notes: “It pointing toward Al Qaeda, the Pen- by the lack of seriousness on the part was the duty of Tenet and the CIA tagon still doubted it. A State of the Bush crowd, he ultimately leadership to balance the risks of inac- Department counterterrorism official asked to be reassigned. When the tion against jeopardizing the lives of exclaimed, “Does Al Qaeda have to Bush principals finally got around to their operatives and agents.” attack the Pentagon to get their holding their first meeting on Al The staff at the bin Laden unit at attention?” Qaeda on September 4, 2001, Clarke the CIA “felt that they were viewed as sent Rice some advice: “Decision- alarmists even within the CIA,” and Richard Clarke makers should imagine themselves on Tenet did not synthesize their work He is the one consistent voice in a future day when the CSG [Coun- or share it with other agencies of gov- the report who recognized the danger terterrorism Security Group] has not ernment, the report notes. Tenet did succeeded in stopping Al Qaeda issue a directive on December 4, attacks and hundreds of Americans 1998, saying: “We are at war. I want Travel with best-selling author lay dead in several countries, includ- no resources or people spared in this and talk radio host ing the U.S. What would those deci- effort, either inside CIA or the Com- sionmakers wish that they had done munity.” But he didn’t ride herd on Thom Hartmann earlier? The future day could happen this. “The memorandum had little and Power Places Tours at any time.” He also urged the overall effect on mobilizing the CIA to Crete, Greece. Administration to respond to the Cole or the intelligence community.” Most bombing by attacking Al Qaeda’s amazingly, even though Tenet said in camps. He wrote that he could not the summer of 2001 that “the system Join me as we explore "A Return understand “why we continue to was blinking red” and he was receiv- to Democracy" identifying myths allow the existence of large scale Al ing reports about imminent, “spec- and offering a powerful blueprint Qaeda bases where we know people tacular” attacks that could be catas- for reviving Jefferson's dream are being trained to kill Americans.” trophic, he failed to recognize the before it's too late. We'll It wasn’t the first time he used such huge clue that was Zacarias Mous- explore together how we can language. On May 29, 2001, he saoui. “On August 23, DCI Tenet revitalize and restore democracy to nations that are under wrote to Rice and her deputy, was informed about the Moussaoui corporate assault and how we Stephen Hadley, “When these attacks case in a briefing entitled ‘Islamic can better spread to the rest occur, as they likely will, we will won- Extremist Learns to Fly.’ Tenet was of the world the greatest der what more we could have done to also told that Moussaoui “wanted to political force ever known stop them.” (The report does criticize learn to fly a 747, paid for his train- for peace and human Clarke, rather peevishly, for failing “to ing in cash, was interested to learn happiness. --Thom Hartmann persuade these agencies to adopt his the doors do not open in flight, and views, or to persuade his superiors to wanted to fly a simulated flight from October 25-November 1, 2004 set an agenda of the sort he wanted.”) London to New York. . . . Tenet told preceeded by optional extension us that no connection to Al Qaeda to Athens, Santorini and Delphi George Tenet and the CIA was apparent to him at the time.” October 18-October 25, 2004 If there is one official who bears the Contact us at 1-800-234-8687 most culpability, it is former CIA Condoleezza Rice Director George Tenet, the report sug- Briefed during the transition that Power Places Tours gests. Tenet and the CIA were tardy in “Al Qaeda had sleeper cells in more The Leader in Spirit- Centered coming to grips with bin Laden’s role than forty countries, including the Travel for a Quarter Century and with Al Qaeda in general. Though United States,” Rice comes across as For more info visit bin Laden issued a fatwa against the stolid and bureaucratic in her www.thomhartmann.com United States as early as 1992, he was- response. On January 25, 2001, n’t taken seriously until 1996, when Clarke sent her a memo that stated, “the CIA set up a special unit of a “We urgently need . . . a Principals dozen officers” to analyze intelligence level review on the Al Qaeda net- about him and plan operations against work.” He warned that Al Qaeda “is

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not some narrow, little terrorist issue downplayed the risks of Al Qaeda. that needs to be included in broader Embarrassingly, Wolfowitz “ques- NEW FROM JIM HIGHTOWER regional policy.” But Rice did not tioned the reporting” about the sever- heed his alarm. “The national securi- ity of the Al Qaeda threats in the It’s time to ty adviser did not respond directly to summer of 2001, the report notes. Clarke’s memorandum,” the report Once the attack happened, “Wol- make politics notes. “No Principals Committee fowitz made the case for striking meeting on Al Qaeda was held until Iraq,” the report stated, and argued September 4, 2001.” After she that Iraq “was ultimately the source In FUN briefed the President in August of of the terrorist problem,” according stores 2001 about the bin Laden threat, to Secretary of State Colin Powell. again! there is no evidence that she knocked July heads together to prevent an attack. John Ashcroft 19th On May 9, 2001, Attorney General Donald Rumsfeld John Ashcroft testified to Congress that “At no point before 9/11 was the protecting citizens from terrorist attacks Department of Defense fully engaged was “one of the nation’s most funda- in the mission of countering Al mental responsibilities.” But the very Qaeda, though this was perhaps the next day, when he submitted his bud- most dangerous foreign enemy then get, he highlighted “gun crimes, nar- threatening the United States,” the cotics trafficking, and civil rights as pri- report notes. Rumsfeld was not inter- orities,” the report notes. The FBI’s ested in retaliating for the Cole attack. counterterrorism expert, Dale Watson, “Rumsfeld thought that too much told the commission that “he almost fell time had passed.” Rumsfeld’s priori- out of his chair when he saw this memo ties were elsewhere, the report says. because it did not mention counterter- “His time was consumed with getting rorism.” Acting FBI Director Thomas new officials in place and working on Pickard asked for more counterterror- the foundations of a new defense pol- ism money, “an appeal the Attorney icy. . . . He did not recall any particu- General denied on September 10,” the lar counterterrorism issue that report notes. Ashcroft was repeatedly engaged his attention before 9/11, apprised of the terrorism warnings by other than the development of the Tenet and Pickard, who testified that Predator unmanned aircraft system.” “Ashcroft told him that he did not want On the afternoon of 9/11, Rumsfeld to hear about the threats anymore. wanted to expand the proposed Ashcroft denies Pickard’s charge.” The New York Times response to Iraq. Like the man who loses his keys in a dark alley but insists Dick Cheney bestselling author on looking under the lamppost Among his many duties, the Vice and our most popu- because the light is better there, President in May of 2001 got anoth- lar grassroots guru Rumsfeld said “he was not simply er one: “President Bush announced is back with another interested in striking empty training that Vice President Cheney would sites” in Afghanistan. “He thought the himself lead an effort looking at rollicking, rock em- U.S. response should consider a wide preparations for managing a possible sock em take on life range of options and possibilities. The attack by weapons of mass destruc- in the U$A under Secretary said his instinct was to hit tion and at more general problems of King George the W. Saddam Hussein at the same time.” national preparedness.” Cheney bare- ly did anything on this, however. Paul Wolfowitz “The next few months were mainly www.jimhightower.com The neoconman shows poorly in spent organizing the effort and bring- available from Viking Press these pages. Like Rumsfeld, he was ing an admiral from the Sixth Fleet www.penguin.com not interested in responding to the back to Washington to manage it. attack on the Cole, since he thought The Vice President’s task force was the October attack was “stale,” the just getting under way when the 9/11 report notes. And he repeatedly attack occurred.” After the attack, the

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report details how Cheney lived out Qaeda attack in the United States.” poverty in the Middle East (though Al Haig’s “I’m in charge here” fanta- That is hardly the kind of response its answer is a Middle East Free Trade sy. The report notes that Cheney gave you would expect from a competent Area). And it notes the history of the order to the military to shoot commander in chief. Muslim resentment at their lost down hijacked aircraft. “In most power and prestige in the world. cases, the chain of command autho- hile The 9/11 Commission But when the report examines rizing the use of force runs from the Report provides enough U.S. policy, it is painfully agnostic. President or the Secretary of Defense Winformation to set the “America’s policy choices have conse- and from the Secretary to the com- record straight about which individu- quences,” it says. “Right or wrong, it batant commander,” says the report. als bear responsibility for not pre- is simply a fact that American policy But in this case, Cheney made the venting this attack, the report is lack- regarding the Israeli-Palestinian con- order, after, he says, calling the Presi- ing when it gets down to the policies flict and American actions in Iraq are dent for approval. “There is no docu- of the United States that continue to dominant staples of popular com- mentary evidence for this call,” how- promote terrorism. mentary across the Arab and Muslim ever, the report notes. After Cheney The report recognizes some of the world. This does not mean U.S. had authorized a shootdown, White root causes of terrorism and the vari- choices have been wrong. It means House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua ous reasons why bin Laden and Al those choices must be integrated with Bolten urged him to call the Presi- Qaeda appeal to people in the Arab America’s message of opportunity to dent to confirm the order, where- and Muslim world. It properly under- the Arab and Muslim world.” upon Cheney did so. stands that the United States faces a This is a huge cop-out. two-fold enemy: not just Al Qaeda At this late date, it takes willful George W. Bush but “a radical ideological movement in blindness for the Commission not to Unlike Clinton, Bush was not the Islamic world.” And it concludes recognize how counterproductive the attending to the problem in a hands- that Islamic fundamentalism “will Iraq War has been on the war on ter- on manner, even though he had plen- menace Americans and American ror. Bush’s blunder has diverted intel- ty of warnings. In September 2000, interests long after Osama bin Laden ligence and military assets from going during the election campaign, Bush and his cohorts are killed or captured.” after Al Qaeda, it has alienated other was told by a CIA counterterrorism But it does not adequately address countries (not just our allies) that were official that “Americans would die how the United States can prevail “in cooperating with the United States, from terrorism during the next four the longer term over the ideology that and it continues to provide recruiting years.” Clinton himself said he told gives rise to Islamist terrorism.” footage for the next Al Qaeda video. Bush during the transition, “I think And that’s because it fails to come And as far as the U.S. embrace of you will find that by far your biggest to grips with two costly policies: the Ariel Sharon goes, nothing could be threat is bin Laden and the Al U.S. war against Iraq and the U.S. more harmful in the effort to win what Qaeda.” And the warnings kept com- backing of the Israeli occupation. the report calls “the struggle of ideas.” ing, one after another, in the Presi- The report notes that “support for There is simply no way to incorporate dential Daily Briefing (PDB). “There the United States has plummeted” in Israel’s ongoing occupation into a were more than forty intelligence arti- the Islamic world after its height in “message of opportunity” for Arabs cles in the PDBs from January 20 to the days after 9/11. But its explana- and Muslims. You can’t square the cir- September 10, 2001, that related to tion for this is weak. cle. Until the United States requires bin Laden,” the report notes. The First, it seems to point a finger at Israel to come to a just peace with the infamous PDB, “Bin Laden Deter- Edward W. Said, the Palestinian Palestinians, or until the United States mined to Strike in U.S.,” was number American scholar who even in death stops uncritically supporting Israel’s thirty-six. Bush’s reaction was amaz- still rankles U.S. policymakers. Anti- occupation, the well of resentment ingly blasé. “The President told us the American “views are at best unin- against America will only deepen. August 6 report was historical in formed about the United States and, The authors of The 9/11 Commis- nature,” and that he already knew at worst, informed by cartoonish sion Report evidently found it easier that bin Laden was dangerous. “He stereotypes, the coarse expression of a to lay out the shortcomings of U.S. did not recall discussing the August 6 fashionable ‘Occidentalism’ among intelligence, to hint at the failings of report with the Attorney General or intellectuals who caricature U.S. val- the particular individuals at the helm, whether Rice had done so. . . . We ues and policies.” Then, it blames the and to offer recommendations for have found no indication of any fur- lack of U.S. support on Al-Jazeera bureaucratic change than to fully ther discussion before September 11 and other Arab media outlets. come to terms with the ongoing poli- among the President and his top Taking a broader view, it does dis- cies of our government that are advisers of the possibility of an Al cuss the problems of illiteracy and reproducing terrorists every day.

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