U.S. Pakistan and Afghanistan Strategy for The Council on Foreign Relations sponsors Independent Task Forces to assess issues of current and critical importance to U.S. foreign policy and provide policymakers with con- crete judgments and recommendations. Diverse in backgrounds and perspectives, Task Force members aim to reach a meaningful consensus on policy through private and non- partisan deliberations. Once launched, Task Forces are independent of CFR and solely re- sponsible for the content of their reports. Task Force members are asked to join a consensus signifying that they endorse “the general policy thrust and judgments reached by the group, though not necessarily every finding and recommendation.” Each Task Force member also has the option of putting forward an additional or a dissenting view. Members’ affiliations are listed for identification purposes only and do not imply institutional endorsement. Task Force observers participate in discussions, but are not asked to join the consensus. Task Force Members Richard L. Armitage John M. Keane Armitage International L.C. SCP Partners Reza Aslan Michael Krepon University of California, Riverside Henry L. Stimson Center J. Brian Atwood Sloan C. Mann University of Minnesota Development Transformations David W. Barno Daniel S. Markey Center for a New American Security Council on Foreign Relations Samuel R. Berger John A. Nagl Albright Stonebridge Group Center for a New American Security Karan K. Bhatia John D. Negroponte Independent Task Force Report No. 65 General Electric Company McLarty Associates Marshall M. Bouton Charles S. Robb Chairs Chicago Council on Global Affairs George Mason University Richard L. Armitage and Samuel R. Berger, Steve Coll Teresita C. Schaffer Daniel S. Markey, Project Director New America Foundation Center for Strategic and Joseph J. Collins International Studies National War College Shirin R. Tahir-Kheli Independent Task Force Report No. 65 Report Force Task Independent James F. Dobbins Carnegie Corporation of New York RAND Corporation Ashley J. Tellis C. Christine Fair Carnegie Endowment U.S. Strategy Georgetown University for International Peace John A. Gastright John W. Warner DynCorp International Hogan Lovells Robert L. Grenier Andrew Wilder for Pakistan and ERG Partners United States Institute of Peace www.cfr.org Afghanistan 26085_AGS-Cover-R1.indd 1 10/29/10 2:30 PM U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan Independent Task Force Report No. 65 Richard L. Armitage and Samuel R. Berger, Chairs Daniel S. Markey, Project Director U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business execu- tives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other interested citizens in order to help them better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries. 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The Council on Foreign Relations takes no institutional positions on policy issues and has no affiliation with the U.S. government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors. The Council on Foreign Relations sponsors Independent Task Forces to assess issues of current and critical importance to U.S. foreign policy and provide policymakers with concrete judgments and recommenda- tions. Diverse in backgrounds and perspectives, Task Force members aim to reach a meaningful consensus on policy through private and nonpartisan deliberations. Once launched, Task Forces are independent of CFR and solely responsible for the content of their reports. Task Force members are asked to join a consen- sus signifying that they endorse “the general policy thrust and judgments reached by the group, though not necessarily every finding and recommendation.” Each Task Force member also has the option of putting forward an additional or dissenting view. Members’ affiliations are listed for identification purposes only and do not imply institutional endorsement. Task Force observers participate in discussions, but are not asked to join the consensus. For further information about CFR or this Task Force, please write to the Council on Foreign Relations, 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10065, or call the Communications office at 212.434.9888. Visit CFR’s website at www.cfr.org. Copyright © 2010 by the Council on Foreign Relations®, Inc. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. This report may not be reproduced in whole or in part, in any form beyond the reproduction permitted by Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law Act (17 U.S.C. Sections 107 and 108) and excerpts by reviewers for the public press, without express written permission from the Council on Foreign Relations. For information, write to the Publications Office, Council on Foreign Relations, 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10065. This report is printed on paper certified by SmartWood to the standards of the Forest Stewardship Council, which promotes environmentally responsible, socially beneficial, and economically viable management of the world’s forests. Task Force Members Task Force members are asked to join a consensus signifying that they endorse “the general policy thrust and judgments reached by the group, though not necessarily every finding and recommendation.” They par- ticipate in the Task Force in their individual, not institutional, capacities. Richard L. Armitage C. Christine Fair Armitage International L.C. Georgetown University Reza Aslan John A. Gastright University of California, Riverside DynCorp International J. Brian Atwood Robert L. Grenier University of Minnesota ERG Partners David W. Barno John M. Keane Center for a New American SCP Partners Security Michael Krepon Samuel R. Berger Henry L. Stimson Center Albright Stonebridge Group Sloan C. Mann Karan K. Bhatia Development Transformations General Electric Company Daniel S. Markey Marshall M. Bouton Council on Foreign Relations Chicago Council on Global Affairs John A. Nagl Steve Coll Center for a New American New America Foundation Security Joseph J. Collins John D. Negroponte National War College McLarty Associates James F. Dobbins Charles S. Robb RAND Corporation George Mason University v vi Task Force Members Teresita C. Schaffer John W. Warner Center for Strategic and Hogan Lovells International Studies Andrew Wilder Shirin R. Tahir-Kheli United States Institute of Peace Carnegie Corporation of New York Ashley J. Tellis Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Contents Foreword ix Acknowledgments xi Task Force Report 1 Introduction 3 The Threat 18 U.S. Strategic Objectives 29 An Assessment of U.S. Strategy and Policy 36 Policy Options and Recommendations: Pakistan 45 Policy Options and Recommendations: Afghanistan 56 Conclusion 65 Additional or Dissenting Views 68 Endnotes 72 Task Force Members 76 Task Force Observers 88 Foreword It is now nine years since the United States first went to war in Afghani- stan. The rationale for doing so in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks was clear. Now, however, the United States has embarked on a differ- ent and considerably more ambitious undertaking in Afghanistan that affects—and is affected by—the complex political currents of Pakistan and its border regions. It is not clear that U.S. interests warrant such an investment. Nor is it clear that the effort will succeed. In Pakistan, a weak civilian government is struggling to cope with a plethora of challenges exacerbated by this summer’s floods. The military has lost more than two thousand men in an ongoing battle with insur- gents in the country’s northwest. But the army does not fight all militants equally. Islamabad’s ongoing tolerance of—and even support for— extremist groups that target American interests in Afghanistan and glob- ally calls into question the basis of the U.S. relationship with Pakistan. In Afghanistan, the Taliban insurgency is more violent than at any point since the U.S. invasion after 9/11. NATO forces are paying a heavy toll. Afghan public enthusiasm for the government is waning after years of unmet expectations. The economy, devastated by more than thirty years of war, has not recovered sufficiently to provide for the people, while the government remains largely ineffective and riven by corruption. The Obama administration, about to embark on its