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Home , Ronald Reagan

William M. LeoGrande

The Reagan administration came to office in 1981 with Agency. At first the war was nominally intended aninstinctiveanimosity toward theSandinista merely to interdict the flow of arms from to government in Nicaragua and a determination, among the FDR-FMLN. But with the operation being run some senior officials, to roll-back the Sandinista from Washington by those who sought the Sandinistas' revolution. But initially, the administration's policy ouster, and being conducted on the ground by towards Nicaragua was a function of its effort to win counter-revolutionary forces who had the same the war in El Salvador. Nicaraguan assistance to the objective, the aim of arms interdiction soon gave way Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR-FMLN) had to the goal of eliminating the Sandinista regime. An expanded during the months prior to the Salvadoran operation originally slated to include about 500 'final offensive', and was seen within the administration commandos ended up by fielding an army of some as an essential element in the war. Thus US policy was 15,000. framed as how to halt Nicaragua's support to the The creation of the contra army was supplemented by Salvadoreans. a massive military build-up of the Honduran Armed At first, the US Ambassador to Nicaragua, Lawrence Forces financed by the , and a series of Pezzullo, was able to convince the new administration regional military exercises unprecedented in size and that it could restore the understanding Washington duration. In conjunction with these manouevres, the had had with the Sandinistas before Reagan's election United States built in Honduras the basic infrastructure - that US economic aid was contingent upon necessary to support direct intervention in Nicaragua Nicaraguan restraint in El Salvador. Though the by US troops. Sandinistas responded positively to Pezzullo's efforts, The covert war and themilitary build-up on hardliners within the Reagan administration were Nicaragua's borders constituted only one facet of the determined to win Nicaragua's acquiescence not with administration'scomprehensiveassaultonthe the carrot of economic aid but with the stick of Sandinista regime. Economic pressures were applied threatened military action. On 1 April, 1981, US first by halting bilateral aid, then by pressuring economic aid was cut off. multilateral institutions like the World Bank and the The hardliners were mostly Reagan political appointees Inter-American Development Bank to curtail lending from the right-wing of the Republican Party: National to Nicaragua, and finally by imposing a full trade SecurityAdviser RichardAllen, CIA Director embargo. William Casey, Secretary of Defense Casper Wein- The political rhetoric unleashed against the Sandinistas berger being most prominent among them. At the reached such heights that the Mexicans characterised StateDepartment,professionalforeignservice it as 'verbal '. I The Sandinistas were alleged officers tended to adopt a more pragmatic - though to be worse violators than Somoza, no less anti-communist - approach to dealing with 'genocidal' in their treatment of the Miskito Indians, the Sandinistas. anti-semitic, puppets of Cuba and the , Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American guilty of against all their neighbours, and Affairs Thomas O. Enders led a second effort to incompetent to boot. restore the understanding with Nicaragua in the late summer of 1981, but this too failed, in part because The War at Home hardliners in the administration insisted that Wash- ington's proposals be framed in a way certain to By 1983 the administration's credibility and support offend the of the Nicaraguan leaders. for its Nicaragua policy in Congress had begun to After a few months of fruitless exchanges, the talks erode. The visible failure of Reagan's policy to achieve broke down. its stated objectives, its growing price tag, and the This failure produced a full-fledged policy of hostility President's apparent determination to escalate US towards Nicaragua - exactly what the hardliners had involvement began to frighten moderate Democrats sought all along - the centrepiece of which was the covert war organised by the Central Intelligence Washington Post, 25 November, 1981. IDS Bulletin, vol 9 no 3,Ittstitute of Development Studies. Sussex 12 and Republicans who had supported Reagan. The of November 1984. When Reagan sought a renewal of Republicans' poor showing in the 1982 mid-term military aid for the in April, the Democrats elections reinforced these doubts and shattered the held firm againstit. But after several weeks of mantle of invincibility Reagan had acquired in the rancorous debate punctuated by an ill-timed trip to 1981 battles over the budget. Politicians who had been Moscow by Nicaraguan President , afraid to criticise the President before the 1982 election enough conservative Democrats broke ranks to felt safer in 1983. approve Reagan's proposal to provide so-called The defection of these moderates, including most of 'humanitarian' aid to the contras. The United States the leadership of the Democratic Party, raised the thereby resumed its direct involvement in the covert possibility that Congress might repudiate Reagan's war. Nicaragua policy by cutting off funds for the covert A year later, the administration returned to Congress war. The administration reacted by abandoning with the largest contra aid request ever: $100 mn in efforts to convince Congress of the wisdom of its unrestricted aid, to be administered once again by the policy, and sought instead to intimidate it with dire CIA. After several bruising rounds of debate, the predictions of communist victory and an explicit administration once again eked out a narrow victory. warning that Congress would be blamed for 'losing' With a majority coalitionof Republicans and Central America. conservative Democrats firmlyinplace,liberal President Reagan's extraordinary speech to a Joint Democrats appeared powerless to halt the admini- Session of Congress on 27April, 1983, exemplified the stration's rush to war. new approach. He cast the issue of Central America The legislative battle over aid to the contras in 1985 starkly in terms, railing against the Cuban- and 1986 was marked by some of the most Soviet threat. The threat to blame Congress for losing inflammatory rhetoric employed in the domestic Central America ifitfailed to acquiesce to his debate over Central America. Although much of it demands was thinly veiled: 'Who among us', he was directed against Nicaragua, its real target was the concluded his speech, 'would wish to bear the Democratic opposition to Reagan's policy. The responsibilityforfailingtomeetourshared Secretary of State accused members of Congress of obligation?'2 In case there was any doubt as to the being 'self-appointed emissaries' engaged in illegal import of this, US Ambassador to the negotiationswith enemy governments.4Inthe was more blunt a few days later Congress, Republicans openly called Democrats 'soft when she complained thatthe problems being on ' for opposing the restoration of aid to encountered by the administration's policy were due the contras.5 These attacks had their greatest effect on to the fact that, 'There are sOme members of Congress moderate Democrats from conservative districts in the who want tosee Marxist victoriesinCentral Southern border states - areas that voted over- America.'3 whelmingly for Ronald Reagan in both 1980 and 1984. The threatofaMcCarthy-stylerecrimination The Congressional opposition to Reagan's policy had temporarily silenced Reagan's congressional critics. multiple sources. In part it was based upon a sincere Since the l950s furore over 'Who lost China', the belief that his policy was endangering the national political charge of being soft on communism has been interest rather than safeguarding it. By escalating the a potent one in the United States. Nevertheless, levelofmilitaryconflictintheregion,the Reagan's political attack failed to win back the administration risked engulfing the entire region in support of the moderates, whose votes were essential war and drawing the United States into direct combat to the administration. The House of Representatives, involvment. That, in turn, would severely damage US with the Democratic Party leadership carrying the relations with Latin American nations like Mexico, battle, voted twice to stop funding the covert war Brazil,and Argentina - nationsvastly more entirely; it continued only by virtue of the Republican important to the United States than the mini-states of majority in the Senate. Central America. In June 1984, the House again refused to appropriate But perhaps the most important reason that Congress any additional funds for the war, thereby ending legal was willing to confront the President at all on the issue US aid to the contras. But the cut-off was shortlived. of Central America was the existence of widespread In 1985, Congressional resistance to Reagan's policy public opposition to Reagan's policy, opposition began to recede. Democrats were noticeably more based largely in the religious communities of the reticent to confront Reagan after the electoral debacle United States. The , virtually every major Protestant denomination, and many American Jewishorganisationswereoutspokenintheir 2 For the text of this speech, see President Ronald Reagan, 'Central America: Defending Our Vital Interests', Current Policy No. 48, US New York Times, 26 May, 1985. Department of State, Washington DC, 1983. 'House, in Dramatic Shift, Backs "Contra" Aid', Congressional Neu' York Times, 5 May, 1983. Quarterly WeeklyReport, 15 June, 1985.

13 opposition. Across , hundreds of congre- Middle East, but rather, who was responsible for gations defied the law by offering sanctuary to Central violating the law in Central America. What had been a American refugees entering the United States illegally. matter of poor judgment became one of criminality. It Public opinion polls confirmed the reluctance of the was then that comparisons of the scandal to Watergate general populace to see the United States become began to be taken seriously. On the day National more deeply involved in the Security Advisor and his 'can-do' [LeoGrande 1984]. Despiteitsbestefforts,the deputy , were fired for setting up the administration was unable to rally public support contra slush fund, correspondent Sam behind its policy. Within the administration, the Donaldson echoed the famous Watergate question by consistent opposition of such a large segment of the opening the ABC evening news with, 'The question public was considered a major obstacle to the pursuit tonight is what did high officials know and when did of a more aggressive policy in the area [LeoGrande they know it?' 1984:2]. The scandal re-invigorated Congressional efforts to stop US support for the contra war. Congressional Democrats, most of whom have opposed the contra -Contra war from the beginning, had despaired of being able to halt it after Reagan won approval of $100 mn in 1986. The first blow to the prospects for continued contra But the scandal confirmed that much of their criticism aid came with the 1986 election returns and the aboutthelawlessnessoftheadministration's Democrats' stunning victory in recapturing a Senate Nicaragua policy was truer than they ever imagined. majority. When the Republicans controlled the The administration's total disregard for both the spirit Senate, Reagan could depend on it to water down any and the letter of the law gave contra aid opponents a limit on contra aid imposed by Democrats in the powerful new argument: the administration could not House of Representatives. With the Democrats in be trusted to abide by any limits Congress might control, the Senate was not likely to be such a impose on the contra aid programme. The only way to congenial place for Reagan's Nicaragua policy. reign in an Executive branch that was intent upon a Moreover, the Republicans lost the Senate by an wider war that neither Congress nor the American overwhelming margin,despiteReagan'sintense people approved of, was to halt the contra aid campaigning. The election demonstrated dramatically programme entirely. how little Reagan's popularity was transferable to The scandal has put the contra aid programme in other Republicans (he had, said one wag, 'teflon coat jeopardy for several reasons. It further weakened tails') and how little Democrats had to fear from him. President Reagan'spoliticalinfluencewiththe This lack of political clout made Republicans less Congress and his standing in the opinion polls. It willing to risk unpopular stands at the urging of the solidified public opinion against the contra aid White House, and Democrats less afraid to oppose the programme by margins that consistently run 3 and 4to president. 1. And it made it politically difficult for members of When the administration's arms-for-hostages deal Congress to support the contras without appearing to with Iran was first revealed, it appeared that the condone the wrong-doing associated with the aid debacle's effect on policy toward Nicaragua would be programme. Conversely, the Democrats feel secure indirect.AsReagan'spublicapprovalratings enough to take up the issue of contra aid again. House plummeted and the White House staff was consumed Speaker made ending aid to the contras a with damage control efforts,the administration high priority. seemed too weakened and preoccupied to plot a major President Reagan and his allies on Capitol Hill insisted escalation in Central America. that the Council's dubious financial When the House Intelligence Committee began to dealings did not diminish the merits of the contras' follow the money trail from the Iranian arms deal, the cause. They argued that the misdeeds of Oliver North, administration had to reveal that the profits had been John Poindexter and Company were irrelevant to the illegally diverted into a slush fund to finance the basic issues that led Congress to approve military aid contra war. Overnight, the war against Nicaragua for the contras in 1986, and that the contras should not became a front-page issue and a major part of the be made to suffer for the wrong-doing of others. But growing crisis of government. inevitably, the stench of the scandal tainted the entire Before the contra slush fund was uncovered, the policy. administration's arms deal was criticised largely for its From the beginning, Congressional opposition to lack of wisdom. The diversion of money to aid the contra aid was based in large part on improprieties in contras, however, was clearly illegal. Once it was the administration's management of the programme. revealed, the issue was no longer whether the The CIA's mining of Nicaragua's harbours and its administration had followed a sensible policy in the authorship of the 'terrorism manual' advocating

14 , convinced many in Congress that the Democrats, it threw the Reagan administration onto policy was out of control. By failing fully to inform the the defensive. At first, the president pronounced it Intelligence Committees of the dimensions of the 'fatally flawed', but then softened his criticism in the contra war, the administration lost the confidence of light of the Accord's broad support in Congress. But Congress. The issue then became one of institutional theadministration wentto work immediately, prerogatives in the conduct of foreign policy. pressuring the Central Americans to toughen their attitude toward Nicaragua and demand that the Sandinistas make concessions not called for in the The Accord Accord itself, primarily, to open direct talks with the contras. Although the Iran-contra scandal undermined the Unable to muster the votes to extend military aid for foundations of the administration's majority coalition the contras, the Reagan administration was forced to in Congress, it did not spell automatic victory for postpone its request for additional aid until early 1988, opponents of contra aid. One of the perennial after the January summit of Central American weaknesses of the Democratic opposition was their presidents convened to evaluate progress under the inability to devise an alternative to Reagan's policy of Guatemala Accord. The administration succeeded in covert war that they could feel politically confortable convincing El Salvador and Honduras - both of withthat is, one that allayed their fears about being whose economies were dependent upon massive US blamed for losing Central America to communism. economic aid - to refuse at the summit to accept an For several years, their principal alternative was to call extension of the deadline for compliance with the for negotiated solutions to the Central American Accord. But, to the surprise of most observers, the crisis, and, in particular, to support the Contadora Nicaraguans prevented the summit from collapsing in process. But as Contadora faltered, it gradually lost its failure by making major unilateral concessions, political value for the Democrats. The Arias plan, including direct talks with the contras. which became the Guatemala Accord when the This set the stage for a showdown between Congress Central Americans signed it in August 1987, came as a gDdsend to the Democrats. The main difference and the Reagan administration. Would the United between the Guatemala Accord and Contadora was States abide by the Guatemala Accord's call for an end that the Accord played greater attention to the toalloutsideaidtoinsurgentforces?The internal political situation in each of the Central administration tried to argue that aid for the contras was essential pressure to keep the Sandinistas honest, Americancountries,callingforguaranteesof democratic political development, dialogue among but it was hard to disguise the fact that additional aid adversaries, and ceasefires in countries where there was directly contrary to the letter and spirit of the was fighting. regional agreement. It was something of a miracle that the Guatemala In late January, the administration finally submitted Accord was signed at all. For four years, the Reagan its long-awaited aid request, but it was an unusually administration had successfully blocked the signing of small one - only $36 mn for six months - and only a Contadora agreement. But a variety of factors 10 per cent was for lethal military aid. At the last converged to break Washington's control over the minute, Reagan even agreed to let Congress vote on negotiating process in Central America. The Iran- whether to release the military portion of the aid contra scandal weakened the administration's ability package, in the hope that this would swing a handful to keep its allies in line. As Honduras and Costa Rica of undecided members. But it was not enough; the administration request was defeated 2 19-211 in the watched the scandal unfold in the United States, they began to doubt that Congress would renew aid to the House of Representatives. contras - a conclusion which invigorated their own While it was a major defeat for the administration's search for a solution to the Nicaraguan conflict. policy,thenarrownessofthevotegavethe The Central Americans feared that the United States administration hope that it could try again. In order to had created, in the contras, a Frankenstein monster muster a majority against the Reagan proposal, House that would be a source of permanent instability and Speaker Jim Wright was forced to promise wavering violence in the region. Honduras was especially moderateDemocratsthathewouldallowa worried. The Reagan administration had cajoled subsequent vote on humanitarian aid for the contras. Honduras into cooperatinginthe war against In March, to everyone's surprise, Wright's proposal Nicaragua, and if Washington were to tire of the war was also rejected by an odd coalition of Republicans and abandon it, Honduras would be left to contend who felt it was inadequate, and liberal Democrats who with both the contras and poor relations with opposed any contra aid whatsoever. Nicaragua. The one certainty was that the war between the For the same reason that the Accord bolstered the Reagan administration and its Democratic opponents

15 over contra aid was not yet over. Even the ceasefire meant preventing the radical left from attaining agreement between the Sandinistas and the contras power. This imperative, of course, predates the Cuba signed in late March did not fully diffuse the struggle revolution. It has a mixed parentage - partly a in Washington, as the administration and Congress product of the cold war, and the perception that Third proceeded to argue about what sort of aid package was World conflicts often or inevitably are an arena in that consistent with the accord. war, and partly an impetus to protect US economic interests from thedepredations of nationalistic Order or Progress? The Maintenance of regimes. Control In , and especially the Caribbean Basin, the motives behind have another source, Ronald Reagan came to office proclaiming that the best exemplified in the phrase which characterises the global rivalry between the United States and the Soviet region as 'our own backyard'. That motive is control; Union would be the keynote of his foreign policy. The the imperative that the United States be in a position administration's early rhetoric and actions in Central to control events in the region - the sovereignty of America faithfullyreflected the East-West optic other states notwithstanding.Itis a notion that through which the administration viewed virtually predates the cold war - indeed, predates the existence every Third World conflict. Where Carter saw poverty of the Soviet Union - and a notion that has long and dictatorship as the root causes of revolution, the outlasted the days when the United States had a major Reagan administration saw mainly the spectre of economic stake in the area. This motive of control can Cuban subversion. Intervention to stem the perceived be traced back at least to the turn of the century, if not spread of communism was restored to its traditional earlier, and it forms the basis of what can only be place in the armoury of US policy responses - called a uniquely American version of colonialism. covertly against Nicaragua, overtly against . In the wake of Vietnam, the liberal wing of the In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas proved to be more Democratic Party took on something of an anti- tenacious and resistant to US destabilisation efforts interventionist outlook. The battle in Washington than the administration expected. The policy of over US policy toward Nicaragua was very much a pressures allegedly designed to make the Sandinistas testing ground between this new outlook and the more behave as desired by Washington had a wide range of traditionalattitudeof globalintervention. The counterproductive effects. Instead of strengthening outcome of the conflict between Reagan and the internal democracy and pluralism,itpolarised Democrats was, therefore, of enormous potential Nicaraguan politics, thereby endangering the political importance. At stake was whether the United States survival of the internal opposition. Instead of forcing would begin to adopt a new attitude toward Latin the Sandinistas to reduce their ties to Cuba and the America, or whether theoldpresumptions of Soviet Union, Washington's hostility led to the rapid hegemony and control would be re-established as the expansion of those ties, as the Nicaraguans were basic doctrine underlying US relations with the forced to findalternativesourcesformilitary Hemisphere. hardware to fight the war, and economic aid to make up for the economic sanctions levied by the United States. Reference Underlying Washington's policy in Nicaragua was the LeoGrande, William M., 1984, Public Opinion and Central familiar imperative of US policy toward Latin America,WashingtonOfficeonLatinAmerica, America: 'No more Cubas'. In practical terms, this Washington DC

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