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OSR Journal of Student Research

Volume 2 Article 12

2014

Reagan's Bluffing in the Coldar W Game Helped Him End the Threat

Richard A. Contreras

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Recommended Citation Contreras, Richard A. (2014) "Reagan's Bluffing in the Coldar W Game Helped Him End the Soviet Threat," OSR Journal of Student Research: Vol. 2 , Article 12. Available at: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/osr/vol2/iss1/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Office of Student Research at CSUSB ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSR Journal of Student Research by an authorized editor of CSUSB ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Contreras: Reagan's Bluffing in the Game Helped Him End the Soviet 68

Reagan’s Bluffing in the Cold Author Interview War Game Helped Him End Which professors (if any) have helped you the Soviet Threat in your research or creative activity?

Professor Dr. Christine Dias was instrumental Richard A. Contreras in explaining to me and helping me to understand the intricacies of APA style. Before Abstract taking her SSCI 306 expository writing course, The Cold War between and the United I had only used MLA. States neared its end when President took office in January of 1981. A What are your research or creative worldwide policy of détente had been in effect interests? over the previous decade which allowed the I enjoy researching in the field of intercultural USSR to build up its arsenal of nuclear communication. Specifically, I plan to look into weapons. Reagan was determined to reverse the Latino-Muslim experience. this course, and by his derailing of détente and style of tough rhetoric, the Soviet government What are your plans after earning your degree? What is your ultimate career and newly-elected leader goal? had no choice but to give into Reagan’s This fall, I will begin my graduate degree capitulations. The U. S. leader’s bluff helped him program at CSUSB’s department of to end the Cold War and nuclear threat— that Communication Studies. I would like to communist regime would indeed fall and teach communication courses at the usher in a new wave of democratic university level. governments worldwide. Acknowledgements I dedicate my Bachelor’s degree to my Keywords: Reagan, Cold War, détente, father Richard Sr. and grandmother Gorbachev, , Star Wars, SDI, Apolonia who didn’t live to see me reach Russia, nuclear weapons this accomplishment. I hope my endeavors also inspire my two daughters Lilly and Cherie.

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The Cold War between the Soviet governmental disarray and near collapse of the Republic and the had been brewing Soviet political machine early in his first term as for nearly four decades when Ronald Reagan, the U.S. leader. De-facto figureheads had all but 40th president of the U.S. took office in January given way to an inner working of confusion at the 1981. During the late 1960’s and 1970’s and with top of Russian leadership. Three successive heads the advent of détente as orchestrated by President of state — Leonid Brezhnez, , and , there had been a cooling off of — were sickly and in hostilities between the two countries and an effect not running the country while in office. increase on diplomatic, economic, and cultural This task was in essence, given to a group of communication and understanding between the others, thus diluting power and of the two world . Reagan, however, did resulting messages sent to the U.S. In a short span not believe in the philosophy of his fellow during 1983-84, the three Russian premiers died republican leader. Instead of utilizing Nixon’s and the Soviets struggled to find a leader that strategy of discussion and embargoes, the so- didn’t fit with the feeble and decrepit old guard of called “Great Communicator” believed in turning ruling . Since the old guard subscribed to up the heat and —by utilizing a game-playing the newer strategy of détente, the strategy— Reagan’s bluffing in the Cold War Soviets felt they had an upper hand in the cold game helped him to stand up to the Soviet war battle. challenge. Mandelbaum and Talbott noted that the Mandelbaum and Talbott surveyed the Soviets relished the standing and power that dark clouds on the horizon from the Russians’ cooperating with détente brought: point of view when Reagan entered the arena: The Soviet side was more unified The fortunes of the and enthusiastic in its commitment had fallen. Reagan’s postwar to the principles and practices of predecessors had all been détente. It formally recognized their committed to trying to tame the status as the international equal of ; he was prepared to the United States. It meant that their kick it. This was bad enough for the country was one of only two Soviet leadership. What made members of the most exclusive club matters worse from the Soviet in the world, the club of perspective was that Reagan was superpowers, with all the attendant trying to kick them while they were rights and privileges (24). down (10). The Russian position would eventually By forming his decisions based on a change, and it became apparent when a new, “new” self-imposed style of détente, the president fresh, and young leader was chosen. In 1984 was able to use rhetoric, scare tactics, war games, Mikhail Gorbachev, a 45-year-old relative and a decisive military and nuclear arsenal unknown to the outside world, suddenly took the buildup to sway the U.S.S.R. into capitulating to perch of the leadership. eventual U.S. demands; He was able to persuade Notwithstanding, rapidly-changing events as the Soviet leadership into agreeing to and signing pertaining to the Soviet scheme of things had multiple disarmament and reduction treaties. placed the communistic country in a corner, at Consequently, in the late 1980’s the threat of least in Reagan’s mind. worldwide nuclear annihilation was virtually The opportunistic approach the U.S. frozen. Rapidly propelled by the fall of the Berlin president saw stemmed from events that had Wall in late 1989, the Soviet Union regime would occurred a few months before Gorbachev’s crumble in ashes in 1991— and this also took appointment. As one of the men the eventual most of Eastern European bloc Communism leader replaced lay dying (Andropov), an along with it, but not before tough talk and ongoing war game was being conducted not too weighty action behind the bluff message forced far from the outskirts of Soviet airspace. Russian the Russians’ hands. intelligence collection programs had been alerted President Reagan was helped by for a possible U.S. nuclear attack. In fact, so

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palpable was the hypersensitivity to war evident, Ryavek describes the controversial Soviet fighter jets shot down a Korean airliner in : “The nature of the SDI is a layered Russian airspace in the summer of 1983. This led defense of radars, sensors, and laser or particle to an increased buildup of nuclear war materiel beam weapons in orbit that could sense the by the Reagan administration as well as the launching of missiles early on and destroy some aforementioned mock nuclear exercise. of them before they got into a position. The The Soviet intelligence operative, known Soviets are so concerned with it. A purely as the KGB, had put a program in place to strain defensive SDI would be something like a passive out information of an imminent attack. The force field of science fiction” (122). program, known as RYAN, picked up chatter of The president also knew very well that missile deployment and aiming of nuclear rhetoric and a war of words would be effective in warheads from nearby NATO-friendly European sending a message to the Soviet leadership. During countries. And even though these war games the war games scare of 1983, a popular movie was were just that —games and not operational— the screened in the U.S. to a widespread audience. The fear it created within the Soviet machine was film showed the devastating and highly effectual. catastrophic effects of a nuclear attack in the One historian (Fisher 30) observed how United States and Russia if the nations chose to use an all-out war scare took place in Russia as a such an option. The massive loss of life and a result of the war game attack: “At various times portrayal of an end-of-the-world scenario played Russian strategists were acutely fearful. But those out before millions in the U.S. household fears, although at times extreme, were scarcely audience. What worked even better, however, is insane”. what the spook film did to the Russian leadership: Seeing the resulting Soviet anxiety, so frightened of the consequences of war, the Reagan played another hand. He began one of the Soviets did not show the movie to the general most massive buildups of nuclear arsenal in U.S. populace (Ryavek 105). history. Defense Department spending for Reagan’s second term ushered in the rapid developing, planning, and exercising additional changes of accord between the two nations now troops, along with their equipment and weaponry, that the groundwork of decisiveness, firmness and totaled approximately $54 billion in 1984. rhetoric had been laid. The president would meet Research for one of the resulting programs, with Secretary General Gorbachev four specific known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) times in face-to-face meetings to see if an ate chunks out of the government budget and sent agreement on disarmament could be reached. Two the U.S. deficit skyrocketing into the trillions. of the meetings were on neutral sites: , Reagan, however, knew that at this stage in 1985 and Reykjavic, in in the game, the spending of an astronomical 1986; then the two sides met on the others’ home amount of money and decisive show of force was turf: Washington in 1987 and the essential before any diplomatic discussions could following year. These meetings or “summits” begin with the new Soviet leader. Benjamin would be a key part of the decision points in Taylor in a front-page story reported the ending decades of hostility. It was important at president’s own words as the leader reiterated this first for the two countries to meet neutrally, with view: “The negotiations in Geneva won’t really many of the other world economic along with the get down to the brass tacks until they see that we leaders of the other nations— that, including the are going forward with the scheduled deployment U.S., compromised the G7 nations, or so-called of missiles in ” (1). “”— could put added pressure on What was not known to many at the time Gorbachev to capitulate with U.S. demands. was that the SDI did not yet exist and was only in The two superpower leaders had agreed in developmental stages. In fact, it never came into principle; hence, two years later a ground-breaking existence. However, at the time, talk of such a and historic compromise was reached: the system struck fear in the Soviet regime and December 1987 signing of the INF Treaty at the prompted a forced and rapid response in the Rose Garden. Reagan, however, had psychological game of war. to use additional charm and subtleness to prod the

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Communist leader in the right direction— and this policy of and nuclear deterrence was no easy task. ignored by the fellow leaders of the détente Gorbachev came into power seemingly movement (Meyerson 66-67). determined to rule in his own particular style yet On , 1987, the aging president took constantly battled with the old hard line stance of Gorbachev once more to task by the use of Marxist-Leninist politics. He was in a conundrum powerful rhetoric. Standing outside the and appeared eager to appease both his constituent in West , and before communist populace as well as keep a wary eye on an audience of millions, Reagan implored the the West. One of the first Soviet leaders to Soviet leader into a call for decisive action. He encourage and (Russian asked Gorbachev, that if he was for peace, liberty, terms that mean demonstrating an openness to new and prosperity to come to the gate, open it and to ways of living), the new Chairman instituted an tear down the — the literal dividing increasing exchange of ideas, , and arts with place of freedom and eastern the West. He encouraged citizens to expand their imprisonment, and long a symbol of Cold War horizons and was less concerned with the that began in the days of Khrushchev and contamination of the average Russian’s mind with Kennedy some three decades earlier. What was regards to western propaganda. A new way of Gorbachev to do now? All eyes were on him. living was opening up in the aging Soviet bloc and In the last year of his lame-duck when the U.S. president spoke the rest of the presidency, Reagan had one more decisive card to world, and most importantly, anti-democratic play. In May 1988, he and his wife (First Lady regimes took note. ) took a trip to the Soviet Union. During the time of tough negotiation, With the INF treaty in place, now it was time for breakthroughs started taking place in the late 80’s, the president to negotiate a lasting peace and see and by then the table for hard negotiations had that Gorbachev indeed would tear the wall down. been set. Presidential historian Michael Bechloss During a speech at Moscow University the recalled a particular time when Gorbachev had commander-in-chief told gathered students and been forced into a corner by Reagan during talks dignitaries that they were participants in a new, at Reykjavik. Reagan had made a proposal and the exciting era of history. He spoke of the freedoms communist leader made a counter: “This all that most take for granted, and experts have depends, of course, on you giving up SDI” (41). concluded that it was probably the first time most Reagan flat-out refused, promptly walked out and of the students had ever been exposed to the idea flew back to the U.S. This hard line made of liberty. He implored them to accept the gift of Gorbachev conclude that the Soviet bear could no liberty that America was willing to share with the longer realistically compete with the soaring rest of the world. Those students in that university American eagle. The U.S. and its enigmatic leader hall, Reagan said, were a “generation living in one were firmly in charge. of the most exciting, hopeful times in Soviet What of détente’s fate? The Soviets, under history. It is a time when the first breath of the auspices of talking softly and sweetly with freedom stirs the air and the heart beats to the Nixon, Ford, and Carter had by Reagan’s entrance, accelerated rhythm of hope, when the accumulated built up a cache of nuclear armaments that had put spiritual energies of a long silence yearn to break the U.S. in a risky position. In order to quell the free” (Lefcowitz’s “Great Communicator”). growing Communist force, a carefully-balanced In an often-quoted part of the presentation fight of tough talk and action was needed. the president referred to a Russian song that By the sixth year of Reagan’s presidency, poignantly drove his point home. He made Europe and America were at peace. Liberal reference to the line that asks a simple question: foreign policy ideology had taken firm root; and ‘Go ask my mother, go ask my wife; then you will the great Communicator had effectually halted the have to ask no more, Do the Russians want a war?’ advance of the Soviet machine, even making it His aim was to pull at the heart strings of the new reverse its tracking. Reagan led through what generation of potential Russian leaders. He many historians refer to as a ‘peace through recalled the days of joint exploration between the strength’ campaign. He was able to awaken the two countries and said that it would please him

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best if he would be able to see in his lifetime a free hard-ball tactics for the world to stand still and Russia engaged in and grappling with the issues of take notice. In Reagan’s mind, there were two democracy (Lefcowitz’s “Great Communicator”). choices: to fight for world freedom and stay true Reagan, who died in 2004, would see the to the tenets of democracy; or god forbid, head fruits of his labor. After he was termed out of down a road of in his words, an ‘Armageddon’, office, he would live to see his predecessor George and suffer a worldwide destruction by an H.W. Bush sign more treaties and accords with unforgiving -- and heartless-- nuclear weaponry. Gorbachev and the later Russian leader Boris He was not going to back down even if it meant Yeltsin. The Berlin Wall indeed did fall in October world annihilation. 1989. The two Germanys —both East and West— It is safe to say, however, that Reagan, a united and became one. In 1990, former Warsaw man both of immense compassion and distancing Pact countries like , Czechoslovakia, coldness, indeed most probably had a fear of what Yugoslavia, and Romania would fight fervently to would come had his bluff been called. He would bury Communism and embrace a more open and often describe America as a ‘shining city upon a democratic way of living. Even in other parts of hill’; and in his mind, he knew if he was to save the globe a dramatic domino-effect of change was his precious city from burning down and indeed taking place. , who had been the world from an earth-wide nuclear meltdown, imprisoned for nearly 30 years by the South it was not going to be for a lack of trying. It was African regime, was suddenly freed. his bluffing tactics of steel nerve, Finally, in 1991, the Soviet Union would be no uncompromising talk, and a firm resolve that more. assisted his step forward to meet a foreboding In his presidential papers in May of 1986, Russian challenge head on and usher in a lasting Reagan wrote that it was his wish to attain peace, and meaningful peace for the world. but not at the cost of giving up democracy: “In sum, we will continue to exercise the utmost References restraint… in order to foster the necessary atmosphere for significant reductions in the Bechloss, Michael. “The Thawing of the Cold strategic arsenals of both sides. I call on the Soviet War.” 14 June 2004: 41. Print. Union to seize the opportunity to join us now in Benjamin Taylor, Globe S. "Reagan: Détente was establishing an interim framework of truly mutual a Cover for Soviet Buildup." Boston restraint… if the Soviet Union carries out this Globe (pre-1997 Fulltext): 1. Jun 01 agreement, we can move now to achieve greater 1983. ProQuest. Web. 26 May 2013. stability and a safer world”(681). Fisher, B. A Cold War Conundrum. Center for the With the rest of the world watching, Study of Intelligence Month Year Web. Gorbachev couldn’t call Reagan’s bluff. The 26 May 2013. future of those students in that room, their Lefcowitz, Eric. (Producer) & Epstien, Ira. families —and the rest of the globe, for that (Director). The Great Communicator- matter, rested on Gorbachev and his leadership. Reagan: in his own words. U.S.A.: Hail The Russians had no choice left but to say yes to to the Chief Productions, 1999. Video. the call of liberty, democracy, and capitalistic Mandelbaum, Michael and Talbott, Strob. endeavors; and to seize an opportunity that would Reagan and Gorbachev. New York: put the world on a road to lasting peace— as far Vintage, 1987. Print. as a was concerned, at least. Meyerson, Adam. "Ronald Reagan’s Peace Détente had ruled the day for most of the Cold Offensive: Containing the Soviets War— a conflict of one-upmanship, war games, without going to War." Policy Review 30 espionage, treason, and muted . Nov. 1985: 66-71. Print. With the world, led by the two Reagan, Ronald. Public Papers of the Presidents superpowers, locked in a struggle between liberty of the United States. Washington, D.C.: and freedom; and stunted by oppression and U.S. Government printing office, 1988. suppression, it took a strong, decisive, confident Print. figure like Reagan to step in and play a style of Ryavek, Karl. United States-Soviet Relations.

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New York: Longman, 1989. Print.

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