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Reagan's Bluffing in the Cold War Game Helped Him End the Soviet 68 OSR Journal of Student Research Volume 2 Article 12 2014 Reagan's Bluffing in the Coldar W Game Helped Him End the Soviet Threat Richard A. Contreras Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/osr Part of the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons Recommended Citation Contreras, Richard A. (2014) "Reagan's Bluffing in the Coldar W Game Helped Him End the Soviet Threat," OSR Journal of Student Research: Vol. 2 , Article 12. Available at: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/osr/vol2/iss1/12 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Office of Student Research at CSUSB ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSR Journal of Student Research by an authorized editor of CSUSB ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Contreras: Reagan's Bluffing in the Cold War Game Helped Him End the Soviet 68 Reagan’s Bluffing in the Cold Author Interview War Game Helped Him End Which professors (if any) have helped you the Soviet Threat in your research or creative activity? Professor Dr. Christine Dias was instrumental Richard A. Contreras in explaining to me and helping me to understand the intricacies of APA style. Before Abstract taking her SSCI 306 expository writing course, The Cold War between Russia and the United I had only used MLA. States neared its end when President Ronald Reagan took office in January of 1981. A What are your research or creative worldwide policy of détente had been in effect interests? over the previous decade which allowed the I enjoy researching in the field of intercultural USSR to build up its arsenal of nuclear communication. Specifically, I plan to look into weapons. Reagan was determined to reverse the Latino-Muslim experience. this course, and by his derailing of détente and style of tough rhetoric, the Soviet government What are your plans after earning your degree? What is your ultimate career and newly-elected leader Mikhail Gorbachev goal? had no choice but to give into Reagan’s This fall, I will begin my graduate degree capitulations. The U. S. leader’s bluff helped him program at CSUSB’s department of to end the Cold War and nuclear threat— that Communication Studies. I would like to communist regime would indeed fall and teach communication courses at the usher in a new wave of democratic university level. governments worldwide. Acknowledgements I dedicate my Bachelor’s degree to my Keywords: Reagan, Cold War, détente, father Richard Sr. and grandmother Gorbachev, communism, Star Wars, SDI, Apolonia who didn’t live to see me reach Russia, nuclear weapons this accomplishment. I hope my endeavors also inspire my two daughters Lilly and Cherie. OSR Journal of Student Research│ Volume II, Issue 1, Winter 2014 Published by CSUSB ScholarWorks, 2014 1 OSR Journal of Student Research, Vol. 2 [2014], Art. 12 69 The Cold War between the Soviet governmental disarray and near collapse of the Republic and the United States had been brewing Soviet political machine early in his first term as for nearly four decades when Ronald Reagan, the U.S. leader. De-facto figureheads had all but 40th president of the U.S. took office in January given way to an inner working of confusion at the 1981. During the late 1960’s and 1970’s and with top of Russian leadership. Three successive heads the advent of détente as orchestrated by President of state — Leonid Brezhnez, Yuri Andropov, and Richard Nixon, there had been a cooling off of Konstantin Chernenko— were sickly and in hostilities between the two countries and an effect not running the country while in office. increase on diplomatic, economic, and cultural This task was in essence, given to a group of communication and understanding between the others, thus diluting power and the force of the two world superpowers. Reagan, however, did resulting messages sent to the U.S. In a short span not believe in the philosophy of his fellow during 1983-84, the three Russian premiers died republican leader. Instead of utilizing Nixon’s and the Soviets struggled to find a leader that strategy of discussion and embargoes, the so- didn’t fit with the feeble and decrepit old guard of called “Great Communicator” believed in turning ruling Russians. Since the old guard subscribed to up the heat and —by utilizing a game-playing the newer appeasement strategy of détente, the strategy— Reagan’s bluffing in the Cold War Soviets felt they had an upper hand in the cold game helped him to stand up to the Soviet war battle. challenge. Mandelbaum and Talbott noted that the Mandelbaum and Talbott surveyed the Soviets relished the standing and power that dark clouds on the horizon from the Russians’ cooperating with détente brought: point of view when Reagan entered the arena: The Soviet side was more unified The fortunes of the Soviet Union and enthusiastic in its commitment had fallen. Reagan’s postwar to the principles and practices of predecessors had all been détente. It formally recognized their committed to trying to tame the status as the international equal of Russian bear; he was prepared to the United States. It meant that their kick it. This was bad enough for the country was one of only two Soviet leadership. What made members of the most exclusive club matters worse from the Soviet in the world, the club of perspective was that Reagan was superpowers, with all the attendant trying to kick them while they were rights and privileges (24). down (10). The Russian position would eventually By forming his decisions based on a change, and it became apparent when a new, “new” self-imposed style of détente, the president fresh, and young leader was chosen. In 1984 was able to use rhetoric, scare tactics, war games, Mikhail Gorbachev, a 45-year-old relative and a decisive military and nuclear arsenal unknown to the outside world, suddenly took the buildup to sway the U.S.S.R. into capitulating to perch of the superpower leadership. eventual U.S. demands; He was able to persuade Notwithstanding, rapidly-changing events as the Soviet leadership into agreeing to and signing pertaining to the Soviet scheme of things had multiple disarmament and reduction treaties. placed the communistic country in a corner, at Consequently, in the late 1980’s the threat of least in Reagan’s mind. worldwide nuclear annihilation was virtually The opportunistic approach the U.S. frozen. Rapidly propelled by the fall of the Berlin president saw stemmed from events that had Wall in late 1989, the Soviet Union regime would occurred a few months before Gorbachev’s crumble in ashes in 1991— and this also took appointment. As one of the men the eventual most of Eastern European bloc Communism leader replaced lay dying (Andropov), an along with it, but not before tough talk and ongoing war game was being conducted not too weighty action behind the bluff message forced far from the outskirts of Soviet airspace. Russian the Russians’ hands. intelligence collection programs had been alerted President Reagan was helped by for a possible U.S. nuclear attack. In fact, so OSR Journal of Student Research│ Volume II, Issue 1, Winter 2014 https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/osr/vol2/iss1/12 2 Contreras: Reagan's Bluffing in the Cold War Game Helped Him End the Soviet 70 palpable was the hypersensitivity to war evident, Ryavek describes the controversial Soviet fighter jets shot down a Korean airliner in initiative: “The nature of the SDI is a layered Russian airspace in the summer of 1983. This led defense of radars, sensors, and laser or particle to an increased buildup of nuclear war materiel beam weapons in orbit that could sense the by the Reagan administration as well as the launching of missiles early on and destroy some aforementioned mock nuclear exercise. of them before they got into a position. The The Soviet intelligence operative, known Soviets are so concerned with it. A purely as the KGB, had put a program in place to strain defensive SDI would be something like a passive out information of an imminent attack. The force field of science fiction” (122). program, known as RYAN, picked up chatter of The president also knew very well that missile deployment and aiming of nuclear rhetoric and a war of words would be effective in warheads from nearby NATO-friendly European sending a message to the Soviet leadership. During countries. And even though these war games the war games scare of 1983, a popular movie was were just that —games and not operational— the screened in the U.S. to a widespread audience. The fear it created within the Soviet machine was film The Day After showed the devastating and highly effectual. catastrophic effects of a nuclear attack in the One historian (Fisher 30) observed how United States and Russia if the nations chose to use an all-out war scare took place in Russia as a such an option. The massive loss of life and a result of the war game attack: “At various times portrayal of an end-of-the-world scenario played Russian strategists were acutely fearful. But those out before millions in the U.S. household fears, although at times extreme, were scarcely audience. What worked even better, however, is insane”. what the spook film did to the Russian leadership: Seeing the resulting Soviet anxiety, so frightened of the consequences of war, the Reagan played another hand. He began one of the Soviets did not show the movie to the general most massive buildups of nuclear arsenal in U.S.
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