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Beyond Mortar and Bricks !E Symbolic Function of the Berlin Wall

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Beyond Mortar and Bricks !E Symbolic Function of the Berlin Wall THE JOURNAL OF UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH University of Kansas | Summer 2008 Beyond Mortar and Bricks !e Symbolic Function of the Berlin Wall Fig. 1. Fig. 2. Standing Berlin Wall 1 Fall of the Berlin Wall 2 !roughout history, civilizations Berlin Wall, followed by a discussion of have built walls to create boundaries the audience reactions and symbolism and to protect against attackers. How- of the wall. !en, evidence will dem- ever, the unique purpose of the Berlin onstrate that, while the Berlin Wall was Wall — to prevent the German citi- symbolic of oppression as it stood, its zens from traveling freely within their destruction also served as a visual ar- own country — sets the wall apart gument. In conclusion, this article will from other similar structures. Clearly, compare the Berlin Wall and a pres- the Berlin Wall was never simply an ent-day wall — the Israeli West-Bank object or mere piece of history, but barrier — in order to exemplify how rather functioned as a symbol of op- the analysis of the Berlin Wall provides pression. !is essay proves this asser- important insight into the function, tion by o$ering a brief history of the nature, and symbolism of walls. ANNE KRETSINGER is a 2008 graduate from Communication Studies Department at the University of Kansas. 15 Fig. 3. !e Construction of the Berlin Wall 7 THE HISTORY OF THE BERLIN barricaded or bricked up so as not to WALL serve for escape purposes.”9 Clearly, To begin, one must consider the the presence of the Berlin wall altered history behind the Berlin Wall. Be- life for German citizens, depriving tween 1949 and 1961, 2.6 million East people of their ability to move freely in Germans attempted to evade the “re- their own nation. pressions of the Communist system” by escaping from Soviet-controlled East Germany to West Berlin.3 !is AUDIENCE INTERPRETATION population rearrangement posed a se- OF THE BERLIN WALL rious threat of economic collapse in Although the Soviets constructed East Germany. As a result of this threat the Berlin Wall in an attempt to pre- and mounting Cold War tensions, the vent the impending economic col- East German government decided to lapse in East Germany, the e$ects of prevent migration to West Berlin by the structure caused the wall’s audi- constructing the Berlin Wall, “a Wall ences, including East and West Berlin- that divided Berlin for nearly three de- ers and Americans, to view the Berlin cades.”4 !e Communist regime in the Wall as a symbol for a number of dif- German Democratic Republic autho- ferent ideas. !ese viewpoints are re- rized construction of the Berlin Wall, %ections of the di$erent “terministic and the process of assembly, which screens,” held by each audience mem- one can see in Fig.1, began on August ber, that "ltered or shaped the way that 13, 1961.5 Stretching along the border people viewed the Berlin Wall. Ken- between East and West Berlin, the wall neth Burke describes the role of termi- was twenty-six miles in length and nistic screens when he states, “Even if ranged from 7 to 13 feet high.6 any given terminology is a re%ection !e wall was created with “up- of reality, by its very nature as a termi- rooted trees and barbed wire entangle- nology it must be a selection of reality; ments; wire fencing was erected, road and to this extent it must function also surfaces torn up, ditches dug and so as a de%ection of reality.”10 Each Berlin on.”8 Railroads between the East and Wall audience held terministic screens West were destroyed during the con- formed by past experiences surround- struction of the Berlin Wall, and “win- ing Berlin’s political state, mounted dows facing towards the border were Cold War tensions, and the creation 16 of the wall. !ese terministic screens terests,” while demonstrating the fact greatly shaped the way that each audi- that, like the citizens of Berlin, America ence viewed the Berlin Wall. also saw the necessity of tearing down Two main audiences of the Ber- the wall.15 In his speech, “by embrac- lin Wall included citizens of East and ing both principled ideological and West Germany. Although the Commu- moral opposition to the Soviets and in nist regime in the German Democratic other contexts a pragmatic viewpoint, Republic instigated the erection of the Reagan was able to take a strong moral Berlin Wall, the structure a$ected the position in opposition to tyranny, but lives of the citizens of both sides of also to lessen the risk of con%ict and the wall.11 !e Soviets forcibly evicted set the stage for successful negotiation many people living near the wall, and between the two nations.”16 In contrast a large number of citizens from both to Berliners, Americans did not expe- East and West Berlin had family mem- rience the direct e$ects of living in a bers located on opposing sides of the city divided by the Berlin Wall; how- wall.12 Aside from abolishing travel ever, it is apparent that much of the and dividing families, however, one of world viewed the standing Berlin Wall the most dramatic e$ects of the wall as a symbol of the Cold War and of the was the “lost opportunity of exchang- oppression of Berliners. Because the ing life in the GDR [German Demo- Cold War was largely a post-World cratic Republic] for life in the Federal War II economic political struggle be- Republic. !e denial of this opportu- tween the United States and the Soviet nity, it has been observed, depresses Union, America supported and en- morale... resulting in resignation and couraged removal of the Berlin Wall. desperation.”13 !us, the Berlin Wall Reagan’s speech clearly re%ects these acted as a symbol of oppression for post-World War II American goals and both East Germans and West Berlin- ideas, while providing insight into the ers for twenty-eight years until the fall reaction and mindset of the American of the Berlin Wall occurred on Novem- audience, regarding the Berlin Wall. ber 9, 1989. A second audience of the Berlin Wall includes Americans. Ronald Rea- THE SYMBOLISM gan’s speech, “Tear Down !is Wall,” OF THE BERLIN WALL demonstrates how the views of this After examining the history be- American audience greatly contrast hind the Berlin Wall, as well as the re- with the German audience feelings actions of the wall’s audiences, it is toward the Berlin Wall. Delivered in necessary to determine exactly what West Berlin on June 12, 1987, Reagan’s signi"cance the structure holds. To speech re%ects the symbolic mean- begin, in order to understand why civ- ing of the Berlin Wall, as depicted by ilizations create walls, such as the one the American audience. !e line ‘tear in Berlin, one must examine the fun- down this wall’ in Reagan’s speech damental nature of humans. In places “has been treated as a wonderful ap- where there are no natural boundar- plause line, which it certainly was, ies, humans often have the tendency but it was more than that.”14 !e line to “impose boundaries — marking o$ is a symbolic expression of the need to territory so that it has an inside and a end the oppression of Berliners. Rea- bounding surface — whether a wall, gan’s speech depicts “the courage and a fence, or an abstract line or plane. determination of the citizens of Ber- !ere are few human instincts more lin, people with whom America and basic than territoriality. And such de- the rest of the world share common in- "ning of a territory, putting a boundary 17 around it, is an act of quanti"cation.”16 how “the feeling of ‘being locked up,’ It is clear that the East German gov- in addition to wall-induced separa- ernment’s creation of the Berlin Wall tion and social isolation from friends is a re%ection of this basic human in- and family, could produce various stinct to create boundaries. !e imple- psychological disorders such as psy- mentation of the Berlin Wall created a chosis, schizophrenia, and behavioral barrier that contained the German cit- problems including alcoholism, de- izens within either the East or West by pression, anger, despondency, dejec- physically constraining travel. tion, and suicide.”22 Even after the wall However, just as Lako$ and John- fell, “psychologists and psychoana- son claim it is human nature to create lysts maintained that the wall reap- walls, it is also the nature of humans to peared as ‘die Mauer in den Köpfen’ or resist the constraints such boundaries ‘the wall in the heads’ of the German impose. !is is likely because people people.”23 !ese assertions re%ect the see these boundaries not just as struc- idea that, aside from its physical im- tures, but rather as symbols for larger position, the Berlin Wall also a$ected ideas. For example, after the construc- the psychological make-up of many tion of the Berlin Wall, it became ap- Germans who lived with the wall. Evi- parent that the symbolism of the struc- dently, the Berlin Wall is not merely a ture made the wall “a state of mind as physical structure, but rather is sym- much as… a physical structure.”1 Sup- bolic of a number of ideas and emo- porting this argument is the fact that tions that caused con%ict in the minds while the Berlin Wall stood, “East Ger- of the German people. mans were prohibited from mention- Analysis of the Berlin Wall as a vi- ing the term ‘wall’… !e preferred sual argument furthers the idea that term was the ‘anti-fascist protection the structure is not just a cement ob- bulwark’.”19 !e East German govern- struction, but a symbol of the control ment knew that the citizens would be and oppression of the German people.
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