sign in sign up
<<
Home , April 1949, April 1950, August 1949, August 1953, Cold War, Cold War (1947–1953)

NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969 I

NATO STRATEGY DOCUMENTS 1949-1969

Edited by Dr. Gregory W. Pedlow Chief, Historical Office Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers

in collaboration with NATO International Central Archives

NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969 III

Contents

1. FOREWORD p.VII

Dr. North Atlantic Organization

2. THE EVOLUTION OF NATO STRATEGY, 1949-1969 p.IX

Dr. Gregory Pedlow Chief, Historical Office Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

3. DOCUMENTS:

MC 3 19.10.1949 p.1 The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area

MC 3/1 19.11.1949 p.9 The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area

MC 3/2 28.11.1949 p.41 The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area

DC 6 29.11.1949 p.49 The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area

DC 6/1 1.12.1949 p.57 The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area

DC 6/2 16.1.1950 p.65 The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area

MC 3/3 28.3.1950 p.71 Portuguese objection to paragraph 8g of the Strategic Concept (D.C. 6/1) IV NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969

MC 3/4 28.3.1950 p.75 French proposal to amend D.C. 6/1 regarding certain lines of communication

MC 14 28.3.1950 p.85 Strategic Guidance for the North Atlantic Regional Planning

DC 13 28.3.1950 (and decision 1.4.1950) p.107 Organization Medium Term Plan

DC 6/3 1.4.1950 p.179 Portuguese objection to paragraph 8g of the Strategic Concept (D.C. 6/1)

DC 6/4 24.5.1950 p.183 Portuguese objection to paragraph 8g of the Strategic Concept (D.C. 6/1)

MC 3/5(Final) 3.12.1952 p.185 The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area

MC 14/1(Final) 9.12.1952 p.193 Strategic Guidance [supersedes DC 13 and MC 14]

MC 48(Final) 22.11.1954 p.231 The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Strength for the Next Few Years

MC 48/1(Final) 9.12.1955 p.251 The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years - Report N° 2

C-M(56)138(Final) 13.12.1956 p.269 Directive to the NATO Military Authorities from the North

MC 14/2(Rev)(Final Decision) 23.5.1957 p.277 Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969 V

MC 48/2(Final Decision) 23.5.1957 p.315 Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept

DPC/D(67)23 11.5.1967 p.333 Decisions of Defence Planning Committee in Ministerial Session

MC 14/3(Final) 16.1.1968 p.345 Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area

MC 48/3(Final) 8.12.1969 p.371 Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept for the Defence of the NATO Area

NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969 VII

Foreword

The end of the Cold as symbolised by the opening of the in November 1989, and the many changes in NATO that soon followed, led in 1991 to a revision of NATO strategy, taking it away from its previous focus. One of the key aspects of the new, post-Cold War NATO has been transparency.This new policy was most clear- ly demonstrated when the new NATO Strategic Concept of 1991 was issued as an unclas- sified document and released to the public. NATO's new openness, combined with growing historical interest in the history of NATO during the Cold War, led a number of historians and political scientists to ask in 1992 whe- ther NATO could declassify and release a number of its important strategy documents from the and . The therefore began to consider these requests while at the same time working on the development of policies and procedures for the declassification and public disclosure of older NATO documents in general, not just those related to NATO's strategy. Although steps were soon underway to begin the process of identifying and reviewing NATO documents for declassification and release, the North Atlantic Council recognized that consi- derable time would be required before all of the NATO strategy documents that had been requested by researchers would become available through this process, so in 1995 the Council decided to declassify NATO's older strategy documents as a complete package. Aware that these strategy documents had been developed under greatly different interna- tional circumstances, the Council also decided that the publication should include an intro- ductory essay describing the evolution of NATO strategy during the 1950s and 1960s, so that the strategy documents may be seen in their proper historical context. The essay by Dr. Gregory W. Pedlow that follows, describes these historical circumstances. Publication of the enclosed NATO strategy documents clearly demonstrates the ’s commitment to transparency and openness in the new -Atlantic security environment. It is my hope that all who read these documents will be enlightened about the foundation upon which the success of NATO has been built since its inception in 1949.

October 1997

Javier SOLANA Secretary General The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969 IX

THE EVOLUTION OF NATO STRATEGY 1949-1969

by Dr. Gregory W. Pedlow Chief, Historical Office Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969 XI

³ At that time there was no The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in NATO structure that had come into exis- Military Committee in Per- Washington on 4 was the first tence by the end of 1949 (2). manent Session, and the step in the development of a comprehensi- Military Committee (Chiefs The new NATO bodies immediately set of Staff) met very infre- ve strategy for the new Alliance. Article 3 about developing an overall strategy for the quently. As a result, the of the treaty called for the signatories to Standing Group (which Alliance. One of the key factors that would was composed of senior “maintain and develop their individual and be considered in this process was the use military representatives collective capacity to resist armed attack”, from , the United of nuclear to defend the North while Article 5 stated that “the Parties Kingdom and the United Atlantic area. At this time most States) enjoyed consider- agree that an armed attack against one or military planners believed that NATO was able power. The other more of them in Europe or America shall members of the Alliance greatly inferior in conventional military be considered an attack against them all” could send Military Repre- strength to the and its Eastern sentatives Accredited to the and in such an event, each of them would Standing Group to Wash- European . This perception, along exercise the right of individual or collective ington, but these represen- with the ’ preeminence in the tatives had little real pow- self-defence. Article 9 then began the pro- nuclear field, therefore profoundly influen- er. In the cess of giving the Alliance an organisational status of these representa- ced the development of NATO strategy. tives increased with the structure by establishing the North Atlantic formation of the Military Council (NAC) and calling for it to “set up Initial Strategic Planning, Representatives Committee such subsidiary bodies as may be necessa- meeting on a permanent 19491950 basis, but this committee ry; in particular it shall establish immediate- should not be seen as the ly a defence committee which shall recom- equivalent of a permanent The first NATO strategy document was session of the Military mend measures for the implementation of known as “The Strategic Concept for the Committee, so the Stand- Articles 3 and 5.” ing Group remained the Defense of the North Atlantic Area”. An dominant body in oversee- initial draft bearing this title was prepared Once the process of ratifying the Treaty ing and by the Standing Group on 10 October plans during the early was completed in , the North 1949 as document SG 1 and then circula- 1950s. For an analysis of Atlantic Council (at that time composed the Alliance’s military ted to their for comments. solely of the Foreign Ministers of the mem- structures during the After incorporating a few minor editorial 1950s see Douglas L. ber ) set about creating the structu- changes into the document, the Standing Bland, The Military Com- re that would be needed to carry out the mittee of the North Atlantic Group submitted the Strategic Concept to Alliance: A Study of Struc- process of planning for collective selfdefen- the Military Committee as MC 3 on 19 ture and Strategy (New ce, a key aspect of which would be the York, 1991), pp. 135-155. (3). As the Standing Group’s development of an overall strategic transmittal letter noted, MC 3 was “drawn ᕢ Doris M. Condit, The Test concept for the Alliance. In September up in broad terms which take into account of War, 1950-1953, History 1949 the Council created the Defence of the Office of the Secretary both political and strategic considerations”. Committee (DC), which was composed of of Defense, . 2 (Washing- The Standing Group added that in the futu- ton, 1988). p. 313. the Defence Ministers of the member re it would issue “more detailed strategic nations; the Defence Committee was tas- ᕣ Documents submitted to guidance of a purely military nature” for use and approved by the ked with drawing up unified defence plans by the Regional Planning Groups. Military Committee are all for the North Atlantic area. The Council numbered in the MC series, but not all such also created the Military Committee (MC), MC 3’s main objective was “adequate mili- documents relate to strate- made up of the Chiefs of Staff of the mem- tary strength accompanied by economy of gic issues. MC 3 is therefo- re the first MC document ber nations, along with a three- exe- effort, resources and manpower”. It is to set forth the NATO cutive body known as the Standing Group important to note that even the earliest Strategic Concept. (SG) tasked to oversee the military plan- drafts of NATO’s strategic concept already Defence Committee docu- ments bear DC numbers, ning process while the Military Committee mentioned nuclear weapons. Thus MC 3’s while documents issued by was not in session (1). The Alliance did not on “Military Measures to Implement the Standing Group are in the SG series. The initial yet have an integrated military command Defense Concept” called for the Alliance to draft of the Strategic structure; instead there was a looser com- “insure the ability to deliver the atomic Concept, SG 1, is not mittee system with five Regional Planning bomb promptly. This is primarily a US res- included in the present collection because it is vir- Groups composed of representatives from ponsibility assisted as practicable by the tually identical to MC 3. the member nations. Chart 1 shows the nations”. In addition to this proposed use XII NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969

CHART 1

of nuclear weapons to defend the North minor revisions in the document, which was Atlantic area, MC 3 called for the member issued under the same title as MC 3/1 on nations to “arrest and counter as soon as 19 and MC 3/2 on 28 practicable the enemy offensives against November 1949. MC 3/2’s revised section North Atlantic Treaty powers by all means on military measures strengthened the available, including air, naval, land and psy- wording of the statement on nuclear wea- chological operations”, noting that initially pons by stating that the Alliance should the “hard core” of ground power would “insure the ability to carry out strategic have to come from the European nations bombing including the prompt delivery of while the others were mobilising. Other the atomic bomb”. At this point, however, military measures included neutralising MC 3/2 was not yet an approved NATO enemy air operations, securing and control- strategy document, for it lacked the final ling the sea and air lines of communication, step-Ministerial approval. defending the main support areas and On 29 November 1949 the Military bases that would be essential to the defen- Committee transmitted its strategic ce of the Alliance, and mobilising and concept to the Defence Committee as expanding the overall power of the Allied document DC 6, still with the title of nations for “later offensive operations desi- “Strategic Concept for the Defense of the gned to maintain the security of the North North Atlantic Area”. The statement on Atlantic Treaty area”. the “prompt delivery of the atomic bomb” Comments by the Military Committee and remained unchanged from MC 3/2, and some of the national delegations led to when the Defence Committee met to dis- NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969 XIII

ᕤ Minutes of the Defence cuss DC 6 on 1 , the DC 6/1 provided an overall strategic Committee, 2nd Minister expressed his concept for the Alliance, but much more Meeting, 1 December 1949, Item 8. government’s concerns about the strategic detailed strategic guidance was needed for concept containing such an explicit - use by the Regional Planning Groups in ᕥ Lord Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years, ment on the use of the atomic bomb. developing their regional defence plans, so 1949-1954 (, Other defence ministers wished to retain at its second meeting on 29 ), p. 27. In 1951 the statement, and the Defence Committee 1949, the Military Committee directed the the NAC absorbed the Defence Committee; finally accepted a compromise offered by Standing Group to prepare detailed thereafter the the Chairman, U.S. Secretary of Defense “Strategic Guidance for North Atlantic Council’s membership Louis Johnson - to strike out reference to Regional Planning” and then submit a draft was not limited solely to Foreign Ministers. the atomic bomb “with the understanding to the Military Representatives Accredited that the striking out recognizes no change to the Standing Group so that comments ᕦ SG 13/16 has not been of position”. The agreed wording was that could be solicited from the nations and reprinted separately in the present volume the Alliance should “insure the ability to incorporated into the Strategic Guidance because the entire carry out promptly by all paper. Once this process of incorporating document is included means possible with all types of weapons, national comments was completed, the as the Enclosure to MC (4) 14. without exception” . Strategic Guidance paper (SG 13/16) was sent to the Regional Planning Groups on 6 The new wording on strategic bombing . Formal approval of the was the only major change to DC 6, and a “Strategic Guidance for North Atlantic revised version incorporating the changes Regional Planning” came at the third mee- made by the Defence Committee was ting of the Military Committee on 28 issued as DC 6/1 on 1 December 1949. , at which SG 13/16 was appro- DC 6/1 was thus the first NATO strategy ved as MC 14(6). document to receive ministerial approval, MC 14 provided additional strategic gui- since the Defence Committee was compo- dance to permit regional planning groups to sed of the NATO Defence Ministers and develop detailed defence plans to meet was preparing the Alliance’s strategy at the contingencies up to . The Standing behest of the North Atlantic Council. On Group’s introductory directive to the 6 January 1950 the NAC gave its approval Regional Planning Groups warned that “the to the new strategic concept at the third North Atlantic Treaty nations should not be Council meeting in Washington(5). misled into planning in the frame of mind prevailing at the end of II, which Like the MC 3 series documents from was largely based on the enormous milita- which it was derived, DC 6/1 emphasised ry power available to the Allies at that that each nation’s contribution to defence time.” Noting that NATO nations would should be in proportion to its geographical require many years to raise similar forces position, industrial capacity, population and while the USSR had “maintained, if not military capabilities. The document also increased, her technical, military and econo- noted that in developing their military mic capabilities”, the Standing Group stated strength consistent with overall plans, the that “special emphasis must be laid on the allies “should bear in mind that economic necessity for developing methods to com- recovery and the attainment of economic pensate for numerical inferiority”. stability constitute important elements of their security”; thus the goal of NATO The key objectives of NATO’s defence poli- defence planning was to be a “successful cy as set forth in MC 14 were “to convince defence of the North Atlantic Treaty the USSR that war does not pay, and should nations through maximum efficiency of war occur, to ensure a successful defence” their armed forces with the minimum of the NATO area. MC 14 assumed that in necessary expenditures of manpower, the event of war, the Soviet Union would money and materials”. attempt to defeat NATO forces and reach XIV NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969

the Atlantic coast, the Mediterranean and PHASE 2 - Stabilization of initial Soviet of- the . Another key assumption fensive to allied initiation of major offensive was that “all types of weapons, without operations. exception, might be used by either side”. PHASE 3 - Allied initiation of major offensi- MC 14 instructed military planners in the ve operations until Soviet capitulation is Regional Planning Groups to develop plans obtained. aimed at holding the enemy as far to the east as possible in , as far to the PHASE 4 - Final Achievement of Allied War east and north as possible in , and “out- Objectives. side a defensible area” in . MC 14 also included detailed intelligence DC 13 also set forth a concept of opera- guidance for regional planning, including an tions for Phase 1 operations. The three assessment of Soviet strategic intentions. European of NATO were conside- red to constitute the “couverture” facing Even before MC 14 was officially adopted, its east of the North Atlantic Treaty Area. Their source document - SG 13/16 - was serving primary task was thus to “delay and arrest as the basis for the defence plans being pre- the enemy advance” and they were to do pared by the Regional Planning Groups this “as far to the East as possible” while during the early months of 1950. The “making full use of mobility and offensive Standing Group then consolidated these action whenever opportunity offers”. plans into the “North Atlantic Treaty and subversive action were seen Organization Medium Term Plan”, which was as means of providing some additional delay, approved by the Military Committee on 28 and “maximum support” was to be given to March 1950 and forwarded to the Defence “such psychological measures as might be Committee as DC 13. Defence Committee taken against the enemy”. Through all these approval followed on 1 . means the forces constituting the major ele- ment of the “couverture” of the North As the most detailed strategy-related docu- Atlantic Treaty Area would “gain time for ment produced heretofore by NATO, DC reinforcements to arrive and for cumulative 13 bore a cover sheet stating, “Because of effect of the strategic air offensive to be felt”. the of the contents of this docu- As for the North American Area, its “initial ment, it is being given a specially limited dis- basic undertaking is to initiate the strategic tribution.” Although titled simply a “Medium air offensive against the enemy at the outset Term Plan”, DC 13 included considerable of hostilities”. strategic guidance; in fact, a subsequent stra- tegy document, MC 14/1, stated that DC 13 DC 13 also contained an estimate of the had “provided the basis for all NATO strate- force requirements considered necessary gic planning”. In its section on Defence for the implementation of these plans by Policy, DC 13 incorporated the strategic the target year of 1954. In addition to concepts of DC 6/1 and the strategic gui- 2,324 warships of varying sizes from battle- dance of MC 14. DC 13 stated that the ove- down to minesweepers and 3,264 rall strategic aim of NATO, should war break naval aircraft, DC 13 called for 90 divisions out, would be “to destroy by a strategic in NATO’s land forces and 8,004 combat offensive in Western Eurasia the will and aircraft in NATO’s air forces. capabilities of the USSR and her satellites to wage war”. The document envisaged four The adoption of DC 13 on 1 April 1950, phases for the operations that would occur almost exactly one year after the signing of after the outbreak of hostilities: the North Atlantic Treaty, marked the end of the initial formulation of NATO’s strate- PHASE I - D-Day to the stabilization of ini- gy. This strategy was contained in three tial Soviet offensive, to include the initiation basic documents: DC 6/1, which set forth of the Allied air offensive. the overall strategic concept; MC 14, which NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969 XV

ᕧ Condit, Test of War, provided more specific strategic guidance the and adjoining coastal pp. 344-347. For the for use in defence planning; and DC 13, waters - a Channel Committee overseeing evolution of NATO’s military command which included both of these aspects as naval and air commands for the Channel structure during the well as considerable detailed regional plan- area. On 18 February 1952 and 1950s and the politi- cal disputes that had ning. It is important to note that the key joined the Alliance. Shortly after- to be overcome in this elements of NATO strategy, including the ward, at the North Atlantic Council meeting process, see Gregory use of atomic weapons to defend Europe, in on 20-25 February 1952, the W. Pedlow, ”The Politics of NATO were thus already in place before the out- Alliance improved its organisational structu- Command, 1950- break of the . re, creating the post of Secretary General 1962“ in U.S. Military Forces in Europe: The and establishing a permanent session of the Early Years, ed. by Evolution of NATO, 1950-1952 Council. Chart 2 shows the Alliance’s orga- Simon W. Duke and nisational structure after the changes of Wolfgang Krieger When North Korean forces launched their (7) (Boulder, 1993), pp. 1952 . invasion of South on 25 June 1950, 15-42. While these structural changes were occur- starting a conflict that soon saw troops of ᕨ The revised document ring, the Alliance continued to refine its the United States and other NATO mem- was not called DC 6/2 strategy documents. On March 1950 because the Defence bers fighting there on behalf of the United and France proposed some small Committee no longer Nations, fear quickly grew that Western existed, having been changes (MC 3/3 and 3/4 respectively) to Europe, which also contained onehalf of a absorbed by the NAC the Strategic Concept; these were appro- in 1951. All military country divided along ideological lines, ved by the Defence Committee as DC 6/3 strategy documents might be the next target of Soviet- would henceforth bear and DC 6/4 on 1 April and 24 sponsored aggression. Recognising that the MC numbers. respectively. By the autumn of 1952 the existing loose NATO structure of planning ᕩ Standing Group believed that a more com- Although listed as groups would not prove adequate in such a ”superseded“ by MC prehensive review of the Strategic Concept conflict, the North Atlantic Council on 26 3/5(Final), SG 1/7 (DC 6/1 of 1 December 1949) was needed had never been a stra- approved the establish- tegy document in its in order to reflect the addition of the two ment of an integrated military force under own right but simply a new member nations and the Alliance’s centralised command. Then on 19 Decem- proposal for modifica- substantial organizational changes since late tions to DC 6/1. ber 1950 the Council requested the nomi- 1950. The result was SG 1/7 (“The nation of General Dwight D. Eisenhower as Strategic Concept for the Defense of the the first Supreme Allied North Atlantic Treaty Area”) on 6 Europe (SACEUR), and he soon arrived in November 1952. SG 1/7 proposed a num- Europe to supervise the work of the plan- ber of “minor factual amendments” to DC ning group preparing for the creation of his 6/1 but stated that “no substantive modifi- new headquarters, the Supreme Head- cation” was required. quarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). On 2 April 1951 General Eisenhower’s The proposed amendments to DC 6/1 command - Allied Command Europe (ACE) - were accepted by the Military Represen- and its new headquarters SHAPE were acti- tatives Committee as MC 3/5 and then vated, and the new headquarters took over approved by the NAC on 3 December the work of the three European Regional 1952(8). MC 3/5 (Final), “The Strategic Planning Groups, which were abolished. The Concept for the Defense of the North North Regional Planning Atlantic Area”, was now the official strategic Group was replaced in 1952 by Allied concept for NATO, superseding DC 6/1 Command Atlantic (headed by a second and SG 1/7(9). Overall the wording of MC Supreme Commander known as SACLANT - 3/5 was quite similar to DC 6/1. Thus the Atlantic), lea- section on Military Measures still called for ving only the -US Regional Planning NATO defence plans to “insure the ability Group still in existence out of the original to carry out strategic bombing promptly by five. That same year a third major NATO all means possible with all types of wea- command area was established to deal with pons, without exception”. XVI NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969

CHART 2

Just as the Strategic Concept required revi- and to destroy the will and capability of the sion to reflect new Alliance members and Soviet Union and her satellites to wage war, organisational structures, so did the initially by means of an air offensive, while at Strategic Guidance. In addition there had the same time conducting air, ground and sea been changes in intelligence estimates, and operations”. Allied strategic air attacks would the planning period had been extended to use “all types of weapons”. MC 14/1 also 1956. The Standing Group therefore deci- considered the possible impact of “weapons ded to carry out a major revision of MC 14 of mass destruction” upon NATO force goals while at the same time incorporating most and concluded that because “the conventio- of the information that had previously been nal NATO forces at present in being fall far contained in DC 13. On 9 December 1952 short of requirements, no relaxation can be the Military Committee approved MC 14/1, allowed in their planned expansion” during “Strategic Guidance”, which superseded the period 1953-54. However,“greater availa- both MC 14 and DC 13. Approval by the bility of such weapons and increased delivery NAC followed at the Ministerial Meeting in capability during the period 1954-56 may Paris on 15-18 December 1952. then necessitate reevaluation of the require- ments for a successful defense of the NAT MC 14/1 was far more detailed than MC 14 [North Atlantic Treaty] area”. because the new document included many subjects previously covered by DC 13, inclu- The /New Approach, ding assumptions, estimated enemy capabili- 1953-1954 ties, and courses of action. MC 14/1 stated that the Alliance’s overall strategic aim was The Lisbon NAC meeting in February 1952 “to ensure the defense of the NATO area had set very ambitious Force Goals by NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969 XVII

µ NSC 162/2, Basic Natio- 1954 a total of 96 NATO divisions after 90 still in progress, the NAC asked the NATO nal Security Policy, 30 days of mobilisation, with almost half of the Military Authorities on 10 , in Foreign Relations of the United divisions to be ready at the start of hostili- to provide a reassessment of the military States [hereafter cited as ties - but fulfilling these goals proved finan- strength needed by the Alliance in the FRUS], 1952-1954, vol. 2, cially and politically impossible for the (12) Affairs, midto late 1950s . pp. 585-586, 593. For the members of the Alliance. Even the United evolution of U.S. nuclear States under the new administration of At this time the United States - with the policy during the support of a number of European allies - Eisenhower Administra- President Eisenhower began to look for tion see David Alan ways to gain greater military effectiveness was calling for the complete integration of Rosenberg, ”The Origins from a military budget that was no longer nuclear weapons into NATO strategy. On of Overkill: Nuclear 23 U.S. Secretary of State John Weapons and American likely to increase substantially, and the gro- Strategy, 1945-1960,“ availability of nuclear weapons see- Foster Dulles made a special address to the , med to offer ”more bang for the buck“. As NAC in which he stressed the great nume- vol. 7, no. 4 (Spring 1983), pp. 3-71. a result, U.S. defence policy shifted in 1953 rical disparity between the conventional to the “New Look”, which placed greater forces of NATO and the forces of the ¸ Wampler, NATO emphasis on the use of nuclear weapons. Soviet bloc and called for NATO’s agreed Strategic Planning and Nuclear Weapons, The new policy was set forth in NSC 162/2 policy to be “to use atomic weapons as Nuclear History Program of 30 October 1953, which stated: “In the conventional weapons against the military Occasional Paper 6 event of hostilities, the United States will assets of the enemy whenever and where- (College Park, , (13) 1990), p. 9; Lawrence S. consider nuclear weapons to be as available ver it would be of advantage to do so” . Kaplan, NATO and the for use as other weapons”. NSC 162/2 also United States: pointed out the importance of nuclear By the summer of 1954 SHAPE had com- The Enduring Alliance pleted its work on the “New Approach” and (, 1988), p. 60. weapons to the defence of Europe: “The major deterrent to aggression against submitted two major studies to the Standing ¹ North Atlantic Council, Group: SACEUR’s Capabilities Study for C-M(53)166(Final), is the manifest determina- Resolution on the 1954 tion of the United States to use its atomic 1957 and a paper on The Most Effective Annual Review and capability and massive retaliatory power if Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Related Problems, 15 (10) Next Few Years. The Standing Group com- December 1953. the area is attacked.” bined the latter study with submissions from Ƹ Statement by the Secre- Meanwhile the NATO Military Authorities the other NATO military commanders to tary of State to the North were grappling with the question of how to produce a draft Standing Group report that Atlantic Council Closed Ministerial Session, Paris, integrate nuclear weapons into NATO stra- ultimately became a major new NATO stra- 23 April 1954, in FRUS, tegy. On 10 SACEUR Matthew B. tegy document, MC 48(14). 1952-1953, vol. 5, Western European Ridgway submitted to the Standing Group Security, pp. 511-512. a report on estimated force requirements Temporarily distracted in the autumn of for 1956; this was the first extensive exami- 1954 by the collapse of the proposed ƹ Robert J. Watson, The European Defence Community and the and nation of NATO strategy to include nuclear National Policy, 1953- weapons. Ridgway’s report proved contro- subsequent negotiations that led to the 1954, History of the Joint versial because it concluded that the use of admission of the Federal Republic of Chiefs of Staff 5 Germany into the Alliance, the Military (Washington, 1986), pp. nuclear weapons would necessitate 304-306, 311-313, 316- increases, not decreases, in force levels, due Committee approved MC 48, “The Most 317; Wampler, NATO (11) Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength Strategic Planning, pp. to expected high casualty rates . 11-16; John S. Duffield, for the Next Few Years”, on 22 November Power Rules: The Soon after issuing the report, Ridgway was 1954. This document was much broader Evolution of NATO’s replaced as SACEUR by General Alfred than its title indicates, for MC 48 actually Conventional Force Posture (Stanford, 1995), Gruenther, who called for a fresh look at provided interim strategic guidance pending pp. 85-87. the integration of nuclear weapons into a review of MC 14/1 and therefore contai- NATO strategy. Gruenther therefore esta- ned many concepts and assumptions that blished a “New Approach Group” at would later be included in MC 14/2. In SHAPE in to study this issue. contrast to previous strategy documents, While the “New Approach” studies were which made only veiled references to XVIII NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969

ƺ For an evaluation of the nuclear weapons by using the phrase “all Discussions on Strategy, 1955-57 major shift in NATO types of weapons without exception”, MC strategy that came with the approval of MC 48, 48 explicitly discussed the use of nuclear With and planning see Marc Trachtenberg, weapons. The new document stated that changing so rapidly, the Council asked the ”La formation du systè- Military Committee in to me de défense occiden- “the advent of atomic weapons systems will tale: les Etats-Unis, la drastically change the conditions of modern “continue to examine, in conformity with France, et MC 48“ in war”.As a result,“superiority in atomic wea- the agreed strategic concept and within the France et l’OTAN, resources which it is anticipated may be 1949-1996, ed. by pons and the capability to deliver them will Maurice Vaisse (Paris, be the most important factor in a major made available, the most effective pattern 1996), pp. 115-126. war in the foreseeable future”. of military strength for the next few years” ƻ NATO Information and also to indicate to the member govern- Service, Texts of Final MC 48 concluded that “essential NATO ments “how the reassessment in MC 48 of Communiques 1949- forces must first of all be forces-in-being” the pattern of military strength should 1974, Issued by (17) Ministerial Session of equipped with an “integrated atomic capa- affect national defense programs” . This the North Atlantic bility”. While expecting that a future major request led the Military Committee to issue Council, the Defence MC 48/1, “The Most Effective Pattern of Planning Committee war in Europe would start with a surprise and the Nuclear Soviet attack and would involve massive NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Planning Group nuclear exchanges, MC 48 did not limit Years - Report No. 2”, on 26 September (, no date), p. 87. NATO use of nuclear weapons to a retalia- 1955. The Military Representatives Com- tory strike after Soviet first use. Thus MC mittee, acting on behalf of the Military Ƽ North Atlantic Committee, approved the report on 14 Council, C- 48 called for the NATO Military Authorities M(54)118(Final), to be authorized to “plan and make prepa- , and final approval by the Resolution on the rations on the assumption that atomic and Military Committee itself, following incor- 1955 Annual Review and Related Problems, thermo-nuclear weapons will be used in poration of one amendment, came on 9 17 December 1954. defense from the outset“. In the event of . the ”remote possibility that the Soviets As the subtitle “Report No. 2” indicates, might attempt to take advantage of their MC 48/1 did not supersede MC 48 but preponderance in land and tactical air forces simply provided additional information. to overrun Europe without employing ato- Thus MC 48/1 confirmed the forward mic weapons,“ MC 48 argued that ”NATO defence strategy outlined in MC 48 but would be unable to prevent the rapid over- noted that because of delays in the German running of Europe unless NATO immedia- military contribution, effective implementa- tely employed these weapons both strategi- tion of the forward strategy would not cally and tactically.“ The concept of ”Massive occur before mid-1959 at the earliest. MC Retaliation“ that is normally associated with 48/1 described the status of NATO military a later NATO strategy document, MC 14/2, planning and preparations for the concepts can thus be more appropriately associated contained in MC 48 and called for additio- with MC 48 and its call for the massive use nal priority improvements such as the pro- of nuclear weapons to defend Europe vision of adequate early warning, modern (15) against aggression . alert systems and air defence. On 17 December 1954 the NAC Ministe- Although the key decision to move toward rial Session approved MC 48 and thereby substantial use of nuclear weapons to gave political approval for planning the defend the NATO area had already been defence of the NATO area using nuclear taken with the approval of MC 48 and MC weapons. However, the ministers pointed 48/1, there was still a need to reconcile the out in the final communiqué that “this new documents with the older strategy approval did not involve the delegation of documents still in effect (MC 3/5 and MC the responsibility of governments to make 14/1, both dating from 1952). Thus in the decisions for putting plans into action in the summer of 1956, the Standing Group and event of hostilities” (16). the Military Committee began to work on NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969 XIX

ƽ Wampler, NATO two new documents (draft MC 14/2 and tary authorities to reduce force require- Strategic Planning, pp. draft MC 48/2) to create a coherent set of ments by relying almost completely on 35-38; Duffield, Power (20) Rules, pp. 121-128. strategy documents. nuclear weapons to defend Europe . Other nations were not willing to go this far, ƾ North Atlantic At first the intent was simply to edit the however, and the resulting “political directi- Council, C- older papers to bring them into line with M(55)113(Revised), ve” of 13 December 1956 contained a NATO Defence the concepts in MC 48 and MC 48/1, but considerable degree of flexibility. Planning: Note by the new ideas soon began to enter into the CM(56)138, “Directive to the NATO Secretary General, process, including France’s request for MC 8 December 1955. Military Authorities from the North Atlantic 14/2 to include sections dealing with the Council” called for a review of NATO ƿ Wampler, NATO effects upon NATO of Soviet political and defence planning “to determine how, within Strategic Planning, pp. economic activities outside the NATO area. 36-37. the resources likely to be available, the The importance of events outside the defence effort of the Alliance and of each During this period NATO area took on even greater signifi- individual member can best achieve the NATO’s forward cance in the autumn of 1956, when the deployed military most effective pattern of forces”. The docu- forces were known as and France attempted to ment contained two parts, an analysis of the ”Shield“, while the regain control of the from Soviet intentions and the directive itself, U.S. strategic , a move which met with strong oppo- force was considered which stated that the Alliance should main- NATO’s ”Sword“. sition from the United States. The Soviet tain forces sufficient “to keep confidence in Union then took advantage of Western the military effectiveness of the NATO disunity and preoccupation with the Middle defence organization, and thereby to contri- East by sending troops and to sup- bute to the deterrent to aggression” and press the attempt by to move also able to deal with armed aggression “in toward a more democratic form of socia- accordance with the concept of ‘forward lism, thus crushing Western hopes for bet- strategy’, counting on the use of nuclear (18) ter relations with the Soviets . weapons at the outset”. Despite this state- While the NATO Military Authorities were ment, however, the Political Directive did working on a new strategy documents, the not support the idea of a ”trip-wire“ strate- member nations were warning that “the gy for NATO. Thus the Political Directive (21) safety of the Alliance cannot be secured by stated that allied “Shield” forces should military means alone”. This concern was have the ability to deal with infiltrations, noted by Secretary General Lord Ismay in a incursions or hostile local actions “without Council Memorandum on 8 December necessarily having recourse to nuclear wea- 1955, along with “a widespread feeling that it pons”. The importance of out-of-area will become increasingly difficult to sustain events was reflected in the statement: popular support for defence expenditures “Although NATO defence planning is limi- as now planned unless governments can ted to the defence of the Treaty area, it is explain more clearly why the money is nee- necessary to take account of the dangers ded”. Lord Ismay’s memorandum also which may arise for NATO because of expressed governments’ concerns that developments outside that area.” “considerable expenditure will be needed to achieve the basic objectives of our strategy”, The issuance of C-M(56)138 marked the and he therefore called for a “more detailed first time that the North Atlantic Council appraisal of the implications of the New had given such detailed political guidance to Look than has hitherto been possible”(19). the NATO military authorities, and the Standing Group immediately took the new The strongest advocate of the need for political directive into account in its ongoing savings in defence expenditures was the revision of NATO strategy. The result was United Kingdom, which began pushing for two new strategy documents - MC 14/2 the North Atlantic Council to issue political (the new “Strategic Concept”) and MC guidance that would cause the NATO mili- 48/2 (“Measures to Implement the XX NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969

This considerable Strategic Concept”) - which were approved Strategic Concept”), which set forth the degree of flexibility in by the Military Committee in April 1957 for military measures needed to implement the MC 14/2 and MC 48/2 has led one recent submission to the Council. new strategy. MC 48/2 stated that there study of NATO strategy were two types of NATO forces, Nuclear MC 14/2, “Overall Strategic Concept for to characterise the Retaliatory Forces and Shield Forces, which new strategy as one of the Defence of the NATO Area”, placed would “defend the sea areas and NATO ”Differentiated heavy emphasis placed upon the use of Responses“ or ”Flexible territories as far forward as possible in nuclear weapons in the defence of the Response I“. Beatrice order to maintain the integrity of the Heuser, NATO, Britain, NATO area. MC 14/2’s section on the NATO area, counting on the use of their France and the FRG: Strategic Concept stated: Nuclear Strategies and nuclear weapons at the outset”. Forces for Europe, 1949-2000 (, Our chief objective is to prevent war by Although MC 48/2 focused primarily on 1997). p. 40. creating an effective deterrent to aggres- , the new document - like sion. The principal elements of the deter- MC 14/2 - did contain an element of flexibi- North Atlantic are adequate nuclear and other ready Council, C-R(57)30, II, lity in its call for NATO to be able to deal 9 May 1957. forces and the manifest determination to with “a limited military situation in the retaliate against any aggressor with all the NATO area which an aggressor might crea- forces at our disposal, including nuclear te in the belief that gains could be achieved weapons, which the defense of NATO without provoking NATO to general war”. would require. To deal with such an eventuality, NATO In preparation for a general war, should one forces should be capable of acting “prompt- be forced upon us: ly to restore and maintain the security of the NATO area without necessarily having a. We must first ensure the ability to carry recourse to nuclear weapons”. Such flexibi- out an instant and devastating nuclear lity did not, however, include the idea of a counteroffensive by all available means , for MC 48/2 repeated a state- and develop the capability to absorb ment contained in MC 14/2: “If the Soviets and survive the enemy’s onslaught. were involved in a hostile local action and b. Concurrently and closely related to the sought to broaden the scope of such an inci- attainment of this aim, we must develop dent or prolong it, the situation would call our ability to use our land, sea and air for the utilization of all weapons and forces forces for defense of their territories at NATO’s disposal, since in no case is there and sea areas of NATO as far forward as a concept of limited war with the Soviets.” possible to maintain the integrity of the The two new strategy documents received NATO area, counting on the use of Council approval on 9 May 1957 after nuclear weapons from the outset. considerable discussion. The most contro- versial issue was the documentsí declara- Although MC 14/2 is often characterised as tion that “in no case is there a NATO a strategy of “” in which concept of limited war with the Soviets”, NATO conventional forces served merely which the Permanent as a “trip wire” for the launching of NATO’s Representative felt was too restrictive. He nuclear retaliatory forces, the actual docu- finally gave his approval to the document ment provided for some flexibility in dealing after stating that the Netherlands with “infiltration, incursions, or hostile local Delegation considered this statement “too actions”. In keeping with the Political categorical” and reserved the right to ask Directive, MC 14/2 called for conventional for a revision of the document if studies forces to be able to deal with such lesser currently underway by SACEUR showed contingencies “without necessarily having this to be necessary (23). As part of this recourse to nuclear weapons”(22). compromise, the Council agreed that “in The companion document to MC 14/2 was communicating Council approval of the MC 48/2 (“Measures to Implement the two documents to the military authorities, NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969 XXI

J. Michael Legge, the latter should be given copies of the Berlin Crisis by demanding that the Theater Nuclear record of the present discussion”. MC 14/2 Western Allies give up their position in Weapons and the NATO Strategy of and MC 48/2 together superseded the four Berlin. This crisis, which continued off strategic document that had until then and on until late 1962, raised the question (Santa Monica, 1983), been in effect: MC 3/5, MC 14/1, MC 48 of how the West should respond to Soviet p. 9. and MC 48/1 [Chart 3 traces the evolution threats below the level of an allout attack. Although the records of of NATO’s strategy documents]. The two General thermonuclear war did not seem the LIVE OAK organisa- new strategy documents were issued in to be the most appropriate response to a tion remain classified until the year 2005 by final form on 23 May 1957. limited Soviet move such as blocking access agreement of the four routes to , so in early 1959 powers [the Federal Growing Disenchantment France, the United Kingdom and the United Republic of Germany with “Massive Retaliation”, joined LIVE OAK in States set up a tripartite planning staff 1961], considerable 1957-1962 under the “LIVE OAK” to deve- detail about Allied lop a series of contingency plans involving planning for the When NATO first began to rely upon U.S. Second Berlin Crisis increasing levels of force to deal with pos- can be found in declas- strategic nuclear weapons for the defence of sible Soviet moves(25). sified national docu- Europe, the territory of the United States ments, in particular was not threatened by nuclear weapons Mid-way through the Second Berlin Crisis, from the United in , the new administration of Kingdom and United because the Soviet Union did not possess States. See Gregory W. delivery systems with sufficient range to President John F. arrived in Pedlow, “Allied Crisis reach the United States. However, the Washington. Kennedy was much more Management for concerned about the possibility of limited Berlin: the LIVE OAK United States’ feeling of invulnerability began Organization, 1959- to diminish as the result of the deployment of warfare than an all-out Soviet nuclear 1963” in International Soviet longrange jet in the mid- attack, and he also worried that war might Cold War Military start by accident or by miscalculation, so he Records and History: 1950s and was then completely destroyed Proceedings of the by the Soviet Union’s successful launch of the directed his cabinet officials to reappraise International first artificial earth , , in U.S. defence strategy. On 20 April 1961 the Conference on Cold National Security Council issued a secret War Military Records October 1957. If a could boost a and History Held in satellite into space, it could also be used to policy directive known as National Security Washington D.C. 2126 hurl nuclear weapons at the United States. Action Memorandum (NSAM) 40, which March 1994, ed. by set forth U.S. policy toward NATO. In its William W. Epley Additional Soviet space successes during the (Washington, 1996), next two years were accompanied by boasts military section, NSAM 40 stated that the pp. 87-116. of comparable progress in the development U.S. should urge that “first priority be given, in NATO programs for the European area, Policy Directive, NATO of an intercontinental , and and the Atlantic soon there were fears that the Soviet Union to preparing for the more likely contingen- Nations, 20 April 1961, was leading in this field (the socalled “missile cies, i.e., those short of nuclear or massive in FRUS, 1961-1963, nonnuclear attack”. Thus while the Alliance vol. 13, West Europe gap” of 1960). and Canada, p. 285. should continue to prepare to meet such For a comprehensive The perceived growth in the Soviet nuclear an allout threat, these preparations should review of the develop- threat raised fears among the European allies ment of Kennedy not “divert needed resources from nonnu- Administration policies that the United States might not be willing to clear theater programs to meet lesser on see use its nuclear weapons to defend Europe threats”. NSAM 40 called for the United Jane E. Stromseth, The under all circumstances. All over Europe lea- Origins of Flexible States to try to implement this new policy Response: NATO’s ders were beginning to secretly fear that within NATO “by a constructive interpreta- Debate over Strategy in French President might be tion of existing doctrine”; thus a new doc- the 1960s (London, 1988), pp. 26-41; right in his belief that “No U.S. President will trine should only be prepared if that would (24) and exchange for Lyon.” be the only way to mobilise European Reiner Pommerin, energies and resources and if agreement on Strategiewechsel: Concerns about the effectiveness of a revision could be reached (26). Bundesrepublik und NATO’s nuclear-based strategy began to Nuklearstrategie in der Ára Adenauer-Kennedy increase in late 1958, when Soviet leader A few months later, tension over Berlin (BadenBaden, 1992), launched the Second increased substantially, particularly after the pp. 72-81. XXII NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969

CHART 3

Pedlow, “LIVE OAK”, building of the in August. Council in Paris, U.S. Secretary of Defense pp. 102-103; Sean M. Recognising that the tripartite LIVE OAK Robert McNamara stated that during the Maloney, “Notfallplanung für contingency plans might not be sufficient to “the forces that were Berlin: Vorläufer der deal with a serious escalation of the crisis on the cutting edge of action were the non- Flexible Response, resulting from a Soviet of West nuclear ones. Nuclear force was not irrele- 19581963,” Militärgeschichte, Berlin, NATO also developed a series of vant but it was in the background. Non- Jahrgang 7, Heft 1 Berlin Contingency Plans (BERCONs) that nuclear forces were our sword, our nuclear (1992), pp. 913. employed even greater levels of force than forces were our shield.” Noting that in the the tripartite plans, with land operations future, Soviet “probes, tests, exploitation of Address by Secretary of Defense McNamara ranging from one to four divisions. The weak spots and efforts to divide” were far at the Ministerial NATO BERCONs also contained nuclear more likely than a nuclear attack or even an Meeting of the North all-out conventional attack on Western Atlantic Council, options such as the use of a small number Paris, 14 December of low-yield nuclear weapons to demons- Europe, McNamara argued for a “stronger 1962, in FRUS, 1961- trate the West’s determination. For the non-nuclear posture” for NATO(28). 1963, vol. 8, National Security Policy, pp. Berlin Crisis, at least,“flexible response” was (27) Initial NATO Discussion 440, 445-446. already a reality by 1962 . of a Change in Strategy Just as the Berlin Crisis was beginning to fade away, a new international crisis, - this Reacting to the growing U.S. for a time over the introduction of Soviet modification of NATO’s military strategy, the mediumrange ballistic missiles into - NATO Ministers meeting at on 8-10 occurred in October 1962. Two months May 1961 “invited the Council in Permanent later, while addressing the North Atlantic Session, in close co-operation with the mili- NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969 XXIII

NATO Information tary authorities, to continue its studies of all agreed with the report, which became the Service, NATO Final aspects of the military posture of the “Athens Guidelines” after the Secretary Communiques, 1949-1974, p. 138. Alliance, with a view to improving its deter- General found compromise wording on the rent and defensive strength”(29). Discussion of applicability of these Guidelines that was Steinhoff and nuclear strategy continued at the next acceptable to France(32). Pommerin, Ministerial Session of the North Atlantic Strategiewechsel, In September 1962 Secretary General Dirk pp. 92-93. Council in December 1961, when US Secretary of Defense McNamara spoke in Stikker circulated a paper on NATO Address by Secretary favor of the need for a strategy of “flexible Defense Policy [NDP/62/10, 3 September of Defense McNamara response”, but no consensus was reached(30). 1962] calling for an early resumption of the at the Ministerial Council’s discussion on NATO defence Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Nuclear strategy was also on the agenda of issues, including the deployment of Medium Athens, 5 May 1962, the Ministerial Session at Athens in May Range Ballistic Missiles in NATO, the possi- in FRUS, 1961-1963, 1962, and Secretary of Defense McNamara vol. 8, National bility of developing a NATO nuclear force Security Policy, pp. once again spoke out on the need for more and the U.S. proposals for more flexibility in 278, 280281. flexibility in NATO nuclear strategy, warning NATO nuclear strategy. The Stikker paper that “our great nuclear superiority for gene- expressed concern that “because the inevi- Paul Buteux, The ral war does not solve all our problems of Politics of Nuclear tability of escalation of nuclear warfare is Consultation in NATO, deterring and dealing with less than allout often assumed, the idea is being encoura- 1965-1980 direct assault.” He noted that NATO’s tac- ged that no choice is open between (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 102-103; Steinhoff tical weapons help to deter the Soviets conventional defence and al-lout nuclear and Pommerin, from initiating the use of such weapons, but warfare.”(33) This call for more flexibility was Strategiewechsel, pp. “NATO can no longer expect to avoid not supported by several NATO nations, 100-102; Circular Telegram from the nuclear retaliation in the event that it ini- and the issue was temporarily set aside due Department of State, tiates their use. Even a local nuclear to the pressure of events in the Cuban 9 May 1962, in FRUS, exchange could have consequences for 1961-1963, West Missile Crisis. Europe and Canada, Europe that are most painful to contempla- pp. 389-393 te.” Noting that “recent events concerning Soon afterward, at the start of 1963, Berlin may provide relevant evidence of the Secretary General Stikker began a major United Kingdom utility of limited but decisive action”. NATO Force Planning Exercise designed to Public Record Office, DEFE 4/147, COS(62), McNamara again called for strong nonnu- relate strategy, force requirements and the Chiefs of Staff clear forces deployed “where the popula- resources that the member nations were Committee, 60th tions and territories begin”(31). able to provide. To provide Strategic gui- Meeting, 2 October dance for this process, the NAC directed 1962, Minute 2, with During the Athens meeting Secretary attached paper the Military Committee to prepare an JP(62)114(F), NATO General Stikker presented his special “Appreciation of the Military Situation as It Defence Policy - The report on NATO Defence Policy Affects NATO up to 1970”.When comple- Stikker Paper, [CM(62)48, 17 April 1962], which focused 28 September 1962. ted in September 1963, this document on the issue of political control of nuclear known as MC 100/1 (Draft) called for a Steinhoff and weapons. The report concluded with much greater degree of flexibility in Alliance Pommerin, recommendations for consultation on the Strategiewechsel, strategy. The document envisioned three p. 174. use of nuclear weapons under varying cir- stages of defence: an attempt to contain cumstances, with such use being virtually aggression with conventional weapons, a automatic in the event of a Soviet nuclear rapid escalation to the use of tactical attack but subject to consultation - if time nuclear weapons under certain circum- permitted - in the case of a full-scale Soviet stances, and a gradual strategic use of conventional attack. In both cases the nuclear weapons (34). NATO nuclear response would be “on the scale appropriate to the circumstances”. All MC 100/1 (Draft)’s criticism of a trip-wire of the nations except France, which did not strategy and its calls for flexibility in NATO’s wish to see NATO take any steps away responses to aggression (including the pos- from the policy of massive retaliation, sibility of limited tactical nuclear warfare) XXIV NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969

Duffield, Power Rules, were so far removed from the strategy of the Military Committee in Chiefs of Staff p. 171; Stromseth, massive retaliation that there was no possi- Session, which called for the preparation of Origins of Flexible Response, pp. 53-54. bility of France accepting it, even with reser- a new draft document to replace MC 14/2. vations, and several other nations were also Political approval for a new strategy came on For a recent examina- uncomfortable with some of its radical 9 May 1967, when the DPC in Ministerial tion of France’s rela- concepts, so work on the document and on tions with NATO Session issued its Guidance to the NATO the entire NATO Force Planning Exercise - during this period, see Military Authorities. This document Frederic Bozo, La ceased in the autumn of 1963 (35). At this (DPC/D(67)23, Decisions of the Defence France et l’OTAN: De point the issue of revising NATO strategy la guerre froide au Planning Committee in Ministerial Session, faded into the background; there seemed nouvel ordre européen 11 May 1967) stated that “the overall stra- (Paris, 1991), no hope of overcoming French opposition tegic concept for NATO should be revised pp. 65-91. See also to a change in strategy. Furthermore, U.S. Michael M. Harrison, to allow NATO a greater flexibility and to The Reluctant Ally: President Kennedy was assassinated in provide for the employment as appropriate France and Atlantic November 1963, and the administration of of one or more of direct defence, deliberate Security (, his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, soon beca- 1981). escalation and general nuclear response, me increasingly preoccupied with the gro- thus confronting the enemy with a credible In her recent exami- wing U.S. military involvement in Southeast threat of escalation in response to any nation of NATO strate- . There would be no further progress gy, Beatrice Heuser aggression below the level of a major on revising NATO strategy until after the characterises MC 14/3 nuclear attack”. Thus the key feature of the as being a strategy of French government announced its withdra- new NATO strategy that was evolving in ”Flexible Escalation“, wal from the NATO integrated military because the more 1967 was not just flexibility, which had alrea- structure in (36). commonly used term dy been a feature of earlier NATO strategy of ”Flexible Response“ documents to some degree, but the idea of applies equally well to Rapid Progress earlier strategic thin- escalation, which would be further develo- king, including MC on a New Strategy, 1966-1967 14/2. Heuser, Nuclear ped in the new strategy documents, MC 14/3 and MC 48/3 (37). Strategies and Forces, The French withdrawal from the integrated p. 53. military command structure led to a num- The new draft Strategic Concept, MC 14/3, ber of organisational changes within NATO. stressed the need for flexibility: “The deter- Of primary importance for the further rent concept of the Alliance is based on a development of NATO strategy was the flexibility which will prevent the potential decision to give responsibility for all defen- aggressor from predicting with confidence ce matters in which France did not partici- NATO’s specific response to aggression and pate to the Defence Planning Committee which will lead him to conclude that an (DPC), which had originally been establi- unacceptable degree of risk would be invol- shed in 1963 to oversee NATO force plan- ved regardless of the nature of his attack”. ning. The DPC was simply the NAC when MC 14/3 then spelled out three types of it was meeting without France on defence military responses to aggression against issues (thus at Fourteen instead of at NATO. Direct Defence would attempt to Fifteen). With the main opponent of a ”defeat the aggression on the level at which more flexible strategy no longer present, the enemy chooses to fight“. Deliberate the process of drafting a new strategy Escalation added a series of possible steps moved forward quickly. On 7 October ”to defeat aggression by raising but where 1966 an informal session of the Military possible controlling, the scope and intensity Committee reassessed the threat facing of combat“ with the ”threat of nuclear res- NATO and re-examined allied strategic ponse progressively more imminent. objectives by region. The Military Among the examples given were ”broade- Committee then called for allied flexibility ning or intensifying a non-nuclear engage- of choice to meet varying contingencies. ment, possibly by opening another front or This recommendation was then discussed initiating action at sea in response to low- at the 12-13 meeting of intensity aggression“, ”demonstrative use of NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969 XXV

nuclear weapons“, and ”selective nuclear completely changed both the face of strikes on interdiction targets“. The ”ulti- Europe and the overall military situation mate military response“ foreseen by MC that these two documents were replaced at 14/3 was General Nuclear Response, which the end of 1991 by the new NATO strate- was also seen as the ”ultimate deterrent“. gy, whose far less confrontational nature was symbolised by the fact that the new On 16 September 1967 the Military Strategic Concept for the Alliance was Committee in Chiefs of Staff Session appro- published as an unclassified document. ved MC 14/3 (“Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area”) and issued it as a Military Decision on 22 September 1967. On 12 December 1967 the DPC in Ministerial Session adopted MC 14/3, and the Final version was issued on 16 January 1968. The DPC noted that the new strate- gy was intended to reflect the substance and intent of the ministerial guidance of 9 May 1967, and in questions of interpretation, the ministerial guidance must prevail. The companion document to MC 14/3 was MC 48/3, “Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept for the Defence of the NATO Area”. After summarising the essen- tial features of MC 14/3, MC 48/3 descri- bed the measures required for defending NATO, including improved intelligence and early warning, prompt coordinated action during the period of warning time, increa- sed readiness, flexibility, offensive capability, improved air defence, immediate reaction and reinforcement forces, mobilization and force expansion and logistics. MC 48/3 then provided an analysis of strategic consi- derations in the different geographic areas of NATO. On 6 May 1969 the Military Committee approved MC 48/3 as a Military Decision and forwarded it to the Secretary General for submission to the DPC. Approval by the DPC in Ministerial Session followed on 4 , and MC 48/3 was issued in final form on 8 December 1969. As a result of the inherent flexibility (both of strategy and of interpretation) in the new doctrine of ”Flexible Response“, its two basic documents - MC 14/3 and MC 48/3 - remained in effect far longer than any previous NATO strategy documents. It was not until the end of the Cold War

NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969

DOCUMENTS