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Home , Cold War (1979–1985), Cold War (1985–1991), Geoffrey Hosking, John Lewis Gaddis, Reagan Era, Ronald Reagan

Triumphalism and the Reagan Factor

Onur İŞÇİ* Abstract Key Words

Three decades after Gorbachev’s 1986 Cold War Triumphalism, Reagan Victory campaign, the sudden death of School, US-Soviet Confrontation, Demise of the the still continues to keep USSR, . diplomatic historians busy with its momentous implications. The mutually excluding political realms of the Cold War forged a conservative In 1986 the Union of Soviet Socialist American historical discourse, which perceived the Soviet Union as an evil empire. Existing Republics finally became the toast of biases against continued after the American diplomats, who believed Soviet collapse and were conjured up in a new that global harmony was a step closer. scholarly genre that might properly be termed as After four decades of “the Reagan Victory School”. The adherents of conflict, the new was seen as a this school suggest that President Reagan’s resolve and unsophisticated yet faithfully pragmatic long lost friend that reemerged from its designs – the Strategic Defense ashes, promising to adopt democracy (SDI) in particular – became the and a liberal . Mikhail major factor behind the Soviet Union’s demise Gorbachev’s Glasnost and and America’s “triumph” after the Cold War. signaled the end of a modern period Looking at several influential monographs on the subject, this paper seeks to demonstrate the in history that had been economically well nuanced yet often mono-causal notions and politically exhausting for virtually vocalized by American scholars of Cold War the whole world. Faced with a serious triumphalism. ideological and military threat after the Second World War, the spearheaded the transatlantic community and systematically pursued the common interests of the democratic world against what President Ronald * Asst. Professor, Bilkent University, Department Reagan would later call an “evil of International Relations, Ankara. empire”. During the first 40 years of E-mail: [email protected] Cold War bipolarity, American leaders 97 PERCEPTIONS, Winter 2015, Volume XX, Number 4, pp. 97-116. Onur İşçi

had become so familiar with the names road ahead could actually be even more and faces of Soviet leaders that these dubious and unpromising than the past shadowy figures somehow symbolized 50 years. everything loathsome and hateful in Like all events that have such their minds. Thus came into being a momentous ramifications, the collapse popular surge of anti-Sovietism in of the Soviet Union became the America that uncannily resembled center of scholarly controversy. Several what Edward Said called, “Captain new monographs, in their different 1 Ahab in pursuit of Moby Dick.” agendas, provide readers of Cold War history with the essential route map to The mutually excluding understand the causal factors behind political realms of the Cold War the collapse not only as a march of forged a conservative American abstract social forces and historical discourse, which but as a human event with complicated perceived the Soviet Union as ramifications. By reexamining the an evil empire. causes and outcomes of 1986-1991, a plethora of recent monographs expose the blueprints of new political factions When Gorbachev took office in 1986 in American scholarship that emerged and propagated his new thinking (novoe after the Soviet Union’s demise. As myshlenie) campaign, the Transatlantic historian Peter Holquist puts it, “while alliance embraced “the great Other the Soviet Union may be no more, its – understood yet not understood.”2 past marches on in popular memory and 4 The initial euphoria, however, soon the professional historical literature.” faded with the dissemination of armed The number of new publications conflicts in such regions as Yugoslavia on the Soviet Union’s death grew and the Southern Caucasus. Russia exponentially over the following proved to be ever more lethargic in decades, and the most apparent reason adopting and the oligarchs/ for this scholarly enthusiasm seemed to of the young federation be the opening of the previously closed found it more lucrative to adopt Yegor Soviet archives. The demise of the Soviet Gaidar’s – ’s Deputy Union, thus, furnished historians with Prime Minister – shock therapy, which new archival references and enabled essentially contradicted the principles them to present their arguments with of market liberalization.3 Suddenly, the more evidence. Nevertheless, the adherents of Western optimism and growing interest vis-à-vis the causes the Third Wave realized that the new behind the collapse cannot merely be 98 Cold War Triumphalism and the Reagan Factor attributed to the opening of archives. geopolitical sophisticates on the left” is Another, perhaps more relevant reason, one of – a struggle between was the contemporary incredulity neo- and liberalism.5 towards the ideological divides intrinsic Therefore to say that the USSR’s in the works of Cold War historians. unforeseen implosion between 1986- 1991 had been “extensively studied” would do violence to “both the verb During the first 40 years of 6 Cold War bipolarity, American and the adverb.” Existing literature on the subject yields to more questions leaders had become so familiar than answers. First and foremost, what with the names and faces of role, if any, did play Soviet leaders that these shadowy in the collapse of the Soviet Union? figures somehow symbolized As Daniel Deudney and G. John everything loathsome and Ikenberry suggest in their Who Won the hateful in their minds. Cold War, “the emerging debate over why the Cold War ended is of more than historical interest: At stake is The mutually excluding political the vindication and legitimation of an realms of the Cold War evidently entire world view and foreign policy 7 influenced the conservative American orientation.” historical discourse that perceived Jay Winik’s On the Brink; Beth A. the Soviet Union as an evil empire. Fisher’s The Reagan Reversal; John These biases continued after the Gaddis’s The Cold War: A New History; collapse and were conjured up in a new and Jack Matlock’s How the Cold War scholarly genre what might properly Ended are the four examples used in be termed as “the Reagan Victory this paper that demonstrate the well School”. The adherents of this school nuanced yet mono-causal notions suggest that President Reagan’s resolve supported by the Reagan Victory and unsophisticated yet faithfully School. These neoconservative scholars pragmatic foreign policy designs – the hold the view that when Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in became president in 1981, the USSR particular – became the major factor was a flourishing superpower that had behind the Soviet Union’s collapse surpassed the US in the , and and America’s “triumph” after the that Reagan’s new military buildup Cold War. Essentially, the divide duel with the USSR exacerbated between the Reagan Victory School the Soviets’ financial vulnerability, and what John Gaddis calls “the many consequently leading to its demise. The 99 Onur İşçi

latter part of this paper explores four warriors, arguing that they managed to more monographs written by scholars undermine both Nixon’s legacy of soft from the liberal opposition: Frances line détente policy at home and the Fitzgerald’s Way Out There in the Soviet threat abroad. The author clearly Blue; Raymond Garthoff ’s The Great identifies President Reagan as the Transition; William Pemberton’s Exit mastermind of this team. In response with Honor; and David Abshire’s Trust to the liberal left’s harsh criticism of is the Coin of the Realm. In contrast with President Reagan, Winik poses the the Reaganauts, Fitzgerald, Garthoff, question: Why did the Soviet Union Pemberton and Abshire make it clear collapse when it did? Simply put, one that Mikhail Gorbachev was the key major factor comes to the forefront in player during both the Reagan and Winik’s account: Reagan’s firm stance Bush administrations, and emphasize in the talks with the the reactive role Reagan played while USSR, and the of nuclear Gorbachev was transforming the missiles in by launching the Soviets into a more open society. SDI – more popularly known as the Star Wars. The Reagan Reversal in US Winik particularly emphasizes Foreign Policy ’s role in the arms negotiations, and suggests that Based on several hundred interviews, he deserves much credit with his recently declassified documents and determination on the implementation letters of correspondence, Jay Winik’s of a zero-option strategy against voluminous account on the Reagan the Soviets. Opposing the years – On the Brink – carries the Reagan accommodationist policies of the 8 debate to a new level. The author Nixon-Ford-Carter administrations sheds light on four defectors from the toward the Soviet Union, which Democratic Party, who joined Reagan’s seemingly took the US to the brink brain team and laid out the blueprints of of an uncontrollable arms race, Winik Reagan’s neo-conservatism: Assistant seeks to demonstrate how Perle Secretary of State ; and his comrades had defended the Assistant Secretary of Defense and line until the Soviets yielded and arms control negotiator Richard ultimately decided to remove all SS- Perle; U.S. Ambassador to the United 20 intermediate range nuclear missiles Nations ; and human (INF) from Europe. For Winik, rights advocate . Reagan and Perle had decisively “won” Winik gives credit to these four cold the Cold War when they prompted the 100 Cold War Triumphalism and the Reagan Factor

SDI against the Soviet Union. “For the witnessed several tragedies. Overall, prophets of détente and for die-hard Winik’s argumentation is flawed for doves, the [collapse] had a jarring, even two reasons. First, it lacks scholarly uncomfortable, ring to it. The euphoria evidence and highlights those that of the young people madly chipping attribute the end of the Cold War solely away at the …stood in to the United States’ actions. Readers sharp contrast to those in the West will not be able to find the slightest who had for years preached coexistence clue about what happened in the Soviet with the Communist world.”9 Winik Union during this period. Secondly, further suggest that those who were although written in a rather convincing alarmed by Reagan’s tough rhetoric – prose, the author employs a populist since they thought it signaled another discourse and manifests his political “menacing round in the escalating arms inclinations. While his prose makes race” – were almost disappointed to see the book less valuable for academic that “the reverberations of the collapse circles, Winik probably secures a larger were without precedent” and that “not audience of conservatives outside the even a single shot had been sounded.” 10 American academe. In a similar vein, Beth A. Fischer’s The Reagan Reversal seeks to explain Taking a leader-oriented the ways in which President Reagan historical approach, Fischer managed to become a major catalyst argues that much as Reagan in ending the Cold War.11 Fisher is was responsible for the initial particularly interested in the reasons anti-Soviet campaign during behind President Reagan’s reversal the early , he deserved all of his assertive stance in early 1984 the credit for masterminding – 15 months prior to Gorbachev’s the Planning administration. The author suggests Group and reversing the evil- that “in January of that year President empire rhetoric to a non- Reagan abandoned his hardline approach to Moscow and began belligerent, conciliatory tune pursuing a more congenial relationship” after 1984. with the Soviet Union.12 In her preface, Fisher suggests that she actually started off her project with frequently-cited Suffice it to say, soon after the liberal suppositions in mind – Reagan collapse people from all around the being merely the spokesperson of his globe heard innumerable shots and administration. The author tells the 101 Onur İşçi

reader that she initially assumed “the others to develop and execute his president played an inconsequential policies.”16 Instead, the author argues, role” in his foreign policy apparatus, “Reagan did take control of U.S. and that it was only when she began to foreign policy – but only in those issue reconsider her assumptions “the answer areas that especially interested him.”17 to [her] puzzle began to unfold; it became increasingly clear that Reagan’s fingerprints were all over them.”13 Up until Pope John Paul II’s Essentially, Fischer seeks to debunk visit to , and Reagan’s “the liberal myth” that portrays Ronald implementation of zero- Reagan as a reactive actor in coping tolerance policies, détente with the USSR, and challenges the apologists like the Nixon- conventional wisdom, which “holds Kissinger bloc had turned a that the Reagan administration did blind eye to the ideological, not begin seeking better relations military, and economic with Moscow until November 1985, conflicts, in which eventually when Ronald Reagan and Mikhail the whole globe was embroiled. Gorbachev first met during the summit meeting.”14 Instead, Fischer suggests, it was in October 1983 when Deputy Secretary of State In explaining the Reagan reversal Kenneth Dam delivered a mesmerizing Fischer takes into account three major speech “that epitomized the Reagan hypotheses, two of which had been administration’s confrontational raised earlier: (i) The Grand Old Party posture [which] marked the end of (GOP) leaders put some pressure on Reagan’s hardline period.”15 Hence, him before the 1984 elections, asking taking a leader-oriented historical him to tone down his provocative approach, Fischer argues that much as rhetoric against the Soviet Union; (ii) Reagan was responsible for the initial a relatively moderate faction of the anti-Soviet campaign during the early GOP took control of foreign policy; 1980s, he deserved all the credit for (iii) President Reagan himself decided masterminding the National Security to take action and readjusted his Soviet Planning Group and reversing the evil- policies. Fischer dismisses the first two empire rhetoric to a non-belligerent, options and emphasizes the third option conciliatory tune after 1984. In other as the major cause of reversal. She uses words, for Fischer, President Reagan examples from cognitive psychology was not a “no hands president, allowing and public records to support her case. 102 Cold War Triumphalism and the Reagan Factor

Consequently, Fischer provides the American ambassador to Moscow tries readers with a more analytical account to make a case as to how Gorbachev compared to Jay Winik’s monograph, and not Ronald Reagan transformed and she does so by remaining aloof to the Soviet Union during the 1980s. both a populist discourse and a strictly Contrary to Fischer’s claims, Matlock academic jargon. Similar to Winik, suggests that the Soviet-American however, scholars would find Fischer’s rapprochement began at Reykjavik in argument problematic for two reasons. 1986 – not in 1983 as Fischer argues. Firstly, her reliance on public records or In his succinct account, Matlock cognitive psychology does not disclose spares a substantial space to emphasizing a convincing image of the President. the domestic developments through Although her hypothesis might seem which Gorbachev managed to take stronger than Winik’s, she too lacks “full command of the Soviet leadership sufficient evidence to give a personal and…come to the conclusion that the account of the President; how and why Soviet Union required more than arms Reagan changed his mind about US- 19 negotiations to solve its problems.” Soviet relations in 1983, just before the Despite his seemingly fair treatment elections, remains unclear. Secondly, of Gorbachev, however, Matlock’s even if one assumes that Reagan exceeding admiration of Reagan and indeed reversed his policy on his own, his “firm attitude and bargaining skills” Fischer’s account still focuses merely on seems to limit his perception of the the actions of the U.S., dismissing the Soviet collapse to America-centric role of domestic problems in Moscow Cold War lenses. The author asserts behind the collapse. that “psychologically and ideologically, the Cold War was over before Reagan Saboteurs of the Cold War 20 moved out of office.” It might be Status-quo fair to suggest that the Soviet collapse and the end of the Cold War are Probably the most prominent historically two different events. But Moscow insider within the Reagan Matlock’s argumentation still proves administration was Jack Matlock, to be quite problematic since he does who successfully discredits Beth not support it with evidence from the Fischer’s arguments in his Reagan and Soviet archives. Bearing in mind the Gorbachev.18 Based on his personal fact that when Matlock’s book came encounters with such major players as out in 2005 the Soviet archives were , , by and large open (disorganized to be and Anatoly Chernayev, the four-term sure, but open), one wonders why the 103 Onur İşçi

author did not make use of his Russian 1972, Gaddis has been considered to and provide first-hand sources. be the most controversial yet successful Similar to such Reagan Victory post-revisionist Cold War historian. School adherents as Winik and He has written half a dozen books Fischer, Matlock tries to give full credit on this topic since 1972, all of which to Ronald Reagan and dismisses the became academic best-sellers. In 1972, fact that Gorbachev had been signaling Gaddis challenged both conventional his reform agenda two years before he scholars in the discipline, who pinned took office. In other words, the winds the blame on Stalin for escalating the of change had already been blowing in tension after the Second World War, Russia as early as 1983, before Deputy as well as the revisionist historians Secretary Dam’s speech, which Fischer that perceived the United States as tries to show as the reason behind the main agitator in the Cold War the Reagan Reversal, or before the conflict. Instead, Gaddis argued, it Reykjavik summit, as Matlock suggests. was a series of misunderstandings and Whether or not President Reagan foreignness that these two novice world played the leading role in crumbling powers suffered after 1945. When the the Soviet Union into dust, and if he fell, however, Gaddis did, how he embarked on this odyssey reconsidered his earlier remarks in We are questions that deserve a more Now Know (1997) and argued that it detailed historical scrutiny; one that was indeed ’s personality can be found in Gaddis’s and leadership that prompted the The Cold War: A New History.21 Cold War in the first place. His latest publication, The Cold War: A New History (2007), essentially conjures up Although most Americans – if not reiterates – the arguments he probably see détente as a failed put forward since his last work. attempt to check the Soviets, it was actually Nixon’s pursuit Unlike We Now Know, which covered the period from the end of the Second of negotiation rather than World War until the end of the Cuban confrontation policies that Missile Crisis, Gaddis’ new account paved the way for a leader like covers the whole Cold War period in Gorbachev. less than 300 pages. While this seems to be another major accomplishment for Gaddis, the book actually has Since the publication of The United less to offer compared to his earlier States and the in works. Leaving aside Gaddis’s post- 104 Cold War Triumphalism and the Reagan Factor revisionist and rigidly that began it quietly folded its political stance, We Now Know was a tent and vanished from the historical more focused account of the origins stage.”23 of the Soviet-American animosity and Although some of these scholars offered new perspectives on the Cuban recognize the fact that the Soviet Missile Crisis. Nevertheless, Gaddis downfall was partly a result of manages to convey a gripping narrative Mikhail Gorbachev’s new thinking on “the saboteurs of the Cold War (novoe myshlenie) and his pursuit of status-quo”, that is Ronald Reagan, a romantic dream of socialist reform, Pope John Paul II, Margret Thatcher, they attribute the major role to Ronald and Lech Walesa. For Gaddis, up until Reagan’s attacks on Soviet policy after Pope John Paul II’s visit to Poland, 1980, when the gap between the Soviet and Reagan’s implementation of zero- Union and the United States widened. tolerance policies, détente apologists This flamboyantly subjective and like the Nixon-Kissinger bloc had ultimately chauvinist perspective on turned a blind eye to the ideological, the Reagan phenomenon necessitates military, and economic conflicts, in an extensive and deeper approach which eventually the whole globe was to the study of the dissolution of the embroiled. Soviet Union. Frances Fitzgerald’s Like Jack Matlock, Gaddis suggests Way out There in the Blue and Raymond that Reagan’s contribution to the Soviet Garthoff ’s The Great Transition are collapse was to embrace Gorbachev two successful examples of the popular and let him further his reforms in liberal opposition to the Reaganites. Russia. Having read Gaddis’s account, In an attempt to eschew the self- one still wonders though how helpful congratulatory idea that unrelenting Reagan had been with his “evil economic and military pressure of empire” rhetoric. Moreover, Gaddis’ President Ronald Reagan caused the controversial remark about the post- USSR’s demise, these scholars seek to 1991 period becomes rather absurd demonstrate how the Soviet Union since it is difficult to believe that “the collapsed from within. world is a better place for the Cold War having been won by the side that The Collapse from Within won it.”22 Obviously, neoconservatives – such as – might think Frances Fitzgerald, who won the otherwise, and argue that the Cold in 2002 with her Fire in War, was a “hegemonic struggle that the Lake, makes a persuasive case against ended without bloodshed when the the Reagan Victory School. With her 105 Onur İşçi

Out There in the Blue, Fitzgerald offers American secret agent trying to save the an in-depth analysis on the history of country from a newly invented super- President Reagan’s Strategic Defense weapon. As Fitzgerald further asserts, Initiative, which apparently was became so enthralled designed to provide a security umbrella with the Star Wars that the country against a possible nuclear attack against kept pouring in billions of dollars the US.24 Popularly known as the Star despite the abundance of scientific Wars project, SDI remained a highly evidence against the feasibility of such controversial matter even after Reagan a defense system. Out There in the Blue stepped down. As Fitzgerald suggests: makes a convincing case as to why. “Between 1983 and the fall of 1999 For Fitzgerald, those who listened the U.S. had spent 60 billion USD to Reagan’s “patriotic pieties” believed on anti-missile research, and though in the 19th century Protestant beliefs technological progress had been made about and in a number of areas, there was still no desired to make America invulnerable. capable interceptor on the horizon.”25 Although American exceptionalism had Puritan roots – the perception When Reagan launched his of the country as a covenanted New initiative in 1983, the project was Israel – “it was in its complete form a immediately called “Star Wars” in secularized, or, rather, a deicized version the press. As Fitzgerald explains, “the th of 19 century beliefs about spiritual title was a reflection not merely on 27 rebirth, reform and evangelism.” the improbability of making nuclear Since these pieties had been a part of missiles impotent and obsolete,” but American patriotism, as the author also on Reagan’s speech from just two concludes, Murder in the Air delivered weeks before when he had spoken of 26 the message to the public. In reality, the Soviet Union as “the evil empire.” however, from Reagan’s own team Historians have long debated over the members to senators, people knew what possible sources of inspiration behind was going on. In one instance “Senator Reagan’s imagination. Fitzgerald Bennett Johnston went to the floor of seems to agree with Michael Rogin - the Senate without any preparation – professor of political science at Berkeley just cold – and asked if anyone believed – who claimed in the mid-eighties that in an astrodome defense. A dead silence Reagan was profoundly influenced by followed.”28 Fitzgerald’s account is the movies he starred in. She suggests partly a successful survey history of the that behind Reagan’s SDI obsession SDI phenomenon in American history was the 1940 production Murder in and partly a good psychobiography of the Air, where the president played an Ronald Reagan. 106 Cold War Triumphalism and the Reagan Factor

Similar criticisms against the the author seeks to answer some of unduly alarmist and antagonist the questions he had raised earlier Reagan administration can be found in Détente and Confrontation: “Was in Raymond Garthoff ’s The Great détente a potential solution to the risks Transition.29 Garthoff, like Matlock, is and costs of confrontation, a solution a career diplomat who negotiated the undercut by actions of the Soviet Union, SALT I treaty – the episode that initiated or of the United States, or both? Or a historical period covered in his earlier did détente exacerbate the problem by publication Détente and Confrontation. providing only a disarming illusion of The Great Transition covers the Reagan an alternative?”30 Essentially Garthoff and Bush administrations, and offers seeks to provide the readers with the a stimulating account of Soviet- roots of American unilateralism that American, Transatlantic, and Asian- was to come two decades later. American relations during the 1980s. He journeys from Reagan’s repudiation The Movement of détente and avowal of direct confrontation in his first term to the The debate between the “Reaganauts” reemergence of a soft-line policy under and liberals ultimately boils down George Bush the senior. to the puzzling nature of the Reagan Garthoff makes it clear that administration, and to the myths Mikhail Gorbachev was the key surrounding the character of the player during both the Reagan president himself. Since Reagan’s and Bush administrations. Unlike inauguration in 1981, scholars, Matlock, Gaddis, or Fischer, the journalists, lay observers, as well as author emphasizes the reactive role those who were personally involved Reagan played while Gorbachev was in his administration have been trying transforming the Soviets into a more to deconstruct this myth surrounding open society. He further asserts that, Reagan’s persona. They do so by although most Americans probably see posing a set of similar questions. Was détente as a failed attempt to check the he remote from the particulars of his Soviets, it was actually Nixon’s pursuit of own administration or did he actually negotiation rather than confrontation manage to amalgamate the once policies that paved the way for a leader dichotomized conservative and liberal like Gorbachev. Hence, Reagan’s public factions? Could the revival of crusader attitude and belief in dialogue Grand Old Party conservative ideas through strength are deeply criticized be attributed to the success of his in Garthoff ’s account. In many regards, ambitious team of political activists? 107 Onur İşçi

Was a myth rather than his legacy an appealing myth for many. reality? How did Reagan dodge the In James T. Patterson’s words, “it was -contra affair, when at some point Ronald Reagan’s good fortune to ride on during his second term this scandal a large wave [of political conservatism] seemed to shatter his public image? that swelled in the late and that William Pemberoton’s Exit with was to leave its considerable traces on Honor, and David Abshire’s Trust is the American politics for the rest of the Coin of the Realm seek to answer these century and beyond.”33 questions in their different agendas. Historians often portray the The rise of the New Right movement since the late 1970s still seems to affair as a tragic interlude caused be puzzling historians. With the by meddling intermediaries, exponential growth in literature on holding it as evidence of political conservatism in the United Reagan’s remoteness from the States, readers are more likely to consequences of his own policy be overwhelmed by a multitude of actions. divergent arguments. Conservative ideology had often been portrayed as a shallow combination of rigid dicta William Pemberton’s of following John Stuart Mill’s label – Ronald Reagan, Exit with Honor, is a the stupid party ideology. There is part of The Right Wing in American nonetheless a substantial body of new History Series published by M.E. publications that explains the ways in Sharpe. In Glen Jeansonne’s words which conservatism had managed to (the series editor), Pemberton’s work reformulate its raison d’étre.31 A similar is yet another attempt “to resurrect the debate revolves around the question Right from the substratum of serious vis-à-vis the of conservatism scholarship…and reveal its deep in the United States. While some roots.”34 To what extent Pemberton scholars argue that the Right has manages to trace these roots or expose no roots in American society, others the veil that separates Reagan’s public suggest that “the Right has always and private personas is debatable. been a part of [it].”32 Perhaps the most Nevertheless, in his succinct account of intriguing episode of this conundrum around 200 pages, Pemberton journeys is the Reagan presidency; a period through Ronald Reagan’s life, starting when image and reality somehow from his childhood in Dixon, to intermingled in Reagan’s optimist his early career as a B Grade actor in discourse and conservatism, making Hollywood, and moves chronologically 108 Cold War Triumphalism and the Reagan Factor towards his governorship in Cannon, who was the and finally to his notable two-term correspondent for presidency between 1981-1989. during the Reagan administration and Pemberton spares four chapters on who covered Reagan extensively in his Reagan’s early career until the end of The Role of a Lifetime. Even the title of his governorship and six chapters on his Pemberton’s book – Exit with Honor presidency. While this might seem to – seems to be inspired by Canon’s be a fair treatment for an introductory provocative introduction. In his very level biography, Pemberton relies first sentence, Canon suggests that heavily on secondary sources and “[Reagan] had always prided himself fails to give the reader a fresh insight on knowing how to make an exit, and about the blank pages of the “Great when the end came, on a day of sun Communicator”. Pemberton’s analysis and shadows he called bittersweet, in the first part does not go beyond Ronald Reagan understood exactly 37 a number of repetitive remarks on how to leave the stage.” Likewise, the Reagan’s ability “to use his fertile locus of Pemberton’s arguments in the imagination and glib tongue to create first part could be found in Canon’s word portraits that made partly conclusion, wherein he suggests that fictionalized contests come alive for “the presidency had turned out to his audience.”35 Through revealing the be Reagan’s best role... [it] seemed a dichotomy between reality (growing romantic extension of the world he had 38 up in Dixon with an known in Dixon and Des Moines.” alcoholic father and a religious mother) Discussing the circumstances under and Reagan’s fictionalized recollections, which Reagan’s psyche flourished which resembled rare Huck Finn-Tom might give the readers a sense of why Sawyer idylls, Pemberton seeks to Reagan often opted to act the part explain Reagan’s relentless optimism. of a “citizen-crusader” or a “cowboy- Pemberton reiterates the already Cincinnatus” in the latter part of his existing assumption that Reagan’s political career. This correlation alone, Hollywood experience and ability to however, does not illuminate the ways in fictionalize enabled him to “touch which Reagan channeled conservative the hearts of listeners who responded ideas or perceived the foreign policy to his sunny vision of a way of life decisions during his administration. that no longer survived and, indeed, Pemberton is most likely aware of this probably never existed.”36 Pemberton’s flaw; hence in the second part of his suggestions bear a strong resemblance book, he seeks to expose a different to those raised earlier by Lou image of Reagan, one that was 109 Onur İşçi

available to the Washington insiders. initiative triggered the consequent The author suggests that “Reagan did disintegration of the USSR. Pemberton not contribute to the formulation of convincingly argues that most Cold- postwar conservative thought, but he War Sovietologists – including the was a powerful spokesman for those prominent hard-liner Richard Pipes ideas,” and that his was – reached problematic conclusions in simply based on his belief in American their works, which colonized the field 43 exceptionalism; “the idea that he would immediately after the Soviet collapse. develop movingly in his verbal portraits Pemberton suggests that despite of America as God’s shining City on a Reagan’s containment policy he was Hill.”39 a closet supporter of détente. In other words, for Pemberton, despite Reagan’s Pemberton secures a balanced evil empire rhetoric and gargantuan portrait of Reagan by exposing his defense build-up, “he joined Mikhail public disguise as a self-assured leader. Gorbachev to bring the cold war to an The author emphasizes the fact that end.”44 The Reagan Victory School’s although Reagan managed to cushion confinement to Cold War lenses, as himself with a strong image, “his grasp Pemberton further suggests, downplays of most issues was shaky to nonexistent” the importance of domestic factors and that “he was often almost entirely leading to the demise of the Soviet absent from the nuts-and-bolts Union. Ultimately, Pemberton poses a work of his administration’s policy significant question: How did Reagan, 40 formulation.” Likewise, Pemberton who “did not have a coherent foreign challenges Reagan’s reputation as a policy [except for] a few fundamental “budget slasher” and argues that “The beliefs, manage to bring Moscow to Reagan Revolution… was more a the bargaining table?”45 A significant 41 matter of perception than reality.” proof of Reagan’s lack of experience Through presenting statistics on the in foreign policy decisions was the macro-economic situation and on the Iran-contra affair which almost ruined budget deficit stalemate throughout Reagan’s political career in his second the 1980s, the author convincingly term. demonstrates that spending actually Pemberton deserves much credit rose under Reagan, “even for many for his skillful treatment of the Iran- social programs.”42 Contra Scandal. Readers will find In his chapter on the Soviet collapse, a concise account of this scandal, Pemberton seeks to challenge the almost every aspect, scrutinized in orthodox conviction that Reagan’s SDI 25 pages. Those who expect a more 110 Cold War Triumphalism and the Reagan Factor comprehensive narrative would be statements in response to Al-Shiraa’s interested in David Abshire’s Saving (Lebanese periodical) initial coverage the Reagan Presidency: Trust is the Coin of the story deeply undermined his of the Realm. Abshire, the former U.S. situation. In Abshire’s words, “If ambassador to NATO (1983-1987) Reagan did know (the particulars of and vice-chairman of The Center for the Affair) he could have been guilty of Strategic and International Studies, a cover-up and obstruction of justice, was brought back to Washington and if he were guilty of these, the acts D.C. by Reagan as a cabinet-level would be grounds for impeachment.”48 to investigate the Iran- contra affair, which haunted Reagan’s credibility during his second-term. Three decades after Glasnost, a As the title implies, the book is based set of questions still remain to be on Abhire’s personal memoirs and a answered: Why did Gorbachev detailed account of his 86 days long fail to implement the economic investigation. In Abshire’s words, his reforms in time to prevent a purpose is to clarify the period when conservative counterrevolution he carried out the formidable task of against the reforms? restoring the “coin of the realm of trust for it to become the basis of Reagan’s leadership.”46 Hence, the author focuses on a central Although the contra part of the affair question; one that was posed earlier by (American funding of contra-guerilla Sen. about President forces in ) began to unfold as Nixon in the Watergate hearings: early as 1981, it was not until 1986 that “What did the president know and Reagan’s trading of arms for hostages when did he know it?”49 The answer (held by mujahedeen) to this question is central not only for became publicized. It soon became clear understanding the mystery behind the that the diversion of funds received scandal but also for getting a better from the Iranian arms sales to support sense of Reagan’s touch with reality the Nicaraguan anti-communist rebels and the particulars of his government. had been authorized by the President; Abshire provides a convincing this was an act in violation of the answer by exposing both causes and Constitution and constituted “theft ramifications of the crisis, while keeping of government property - stealing his role in saving the presidency as a and using funds for unauthorized reappearing theme. Following a brief purposes.”47 Reagan’s disastrous press episode on negotiations, Abshire 111 Onur İşçi

defines his conditions to the White Conclusion House, on which he would accept of the post. After all, as Abshire puts it, The interesting thing about the USSR he first had to “ensure that [he] had is that, even months before its demise, the conditions to be successful and it was lethargically stable. The central not become some kind of victim like planning was indeed a total mess, and Bud McFarlane.”50 Abshire further the party apparatus was much confused suggests that although the Reagan by the further exasperation of clashes administration “did not jump with joy between the various factions of Soviet about any outside advisors,” they knew public spheres in East Europe. But it was, nevertheless, a stable mess. In very well that Abshire was their “best Alexei Yurchak’s phraseology, by 1991, ticket to survival.”51 a great majority of the people living in Historians often portray the affair as the still thought that a tragic interlude caused by meddling “everything was forever until it was no 52 intermediaries, holding it as evidence more.” Why, then, under Gorbachev’s of Reagan’s remoteness from the leadership, did the Union of Soviet consequences of his own policy actions. Socialist Republics, the vanguard of Although Abshire too seems to refrain world socialist revolution, abolish itself from giving a direct answer to the with barely a whimper? This has been a quintessential debate since the end of question as to how much Reagan knew, the Cold War. he gives a clear-cut account on how the Reagan administration managed In response to this debate, Robert to overcome this scandal. Abshire’s Wegs suggests that Gorbachev thorough analysis and personal strongly believed in the free flow of reflections bring important pieces of information as “the basis for economic and ultimately the political and the Iran-contra puzzle to the surface, military strength of a country.”53 But and shed light on the entire dramatis the differences between the various personae; including chiefs of staff models of economic modernization Don Regan, Lt. Col. , eventually led to the Soviet collapse. , Howard Baker, the The readers will find a more detailed “covert master strategist” and CIA account of Sovietonomics in Ota Sik’s head Bill Casey, the Iranian arms The Economic Impact of . Sik dealer as well suggests that, “Soviet , as and the President which claims to be the sole exemplar himself. and champion of a universal socialist 112 Cold War Triumphalism and the Reagan Factor evolution, [had], in fact become the to be answered: Why did Gorbachev most formidable obstacle to any fail to implement the economic reforms advance toward a progressive and in time to prevent a conservative 54 humane .” Perhaps more counterrevolution against the reforms? notably, “technological backwardness, Or, why did he fail to resurrect any the distorted production structure… remaining belief in true socialism that the wasteful utilization of material inputs and the decelerating growth of was left in the Soviet Union at all? The labor productivity,” had all remained Soviet leadership could have used its unsolved, producing a decline in the immense military and internal-security national growth until the 1980s.55 apparatus to hold power, regardless of A brief survey of publications the cost. Ultimately, even while it was presented in this paper suggest that faltering, why did the USSR not even adherents of the Reagan Victory School attempt to stage a cynical foreign war fall back on such mono-causal notions to rally support for the regime? as American triumphalism. Juxtaposed These questions stress the need for a against these books, both David more substantial body of literature on Abshire’s Saving the Reagan Presidency and William Pemberton’s Exit with the Soviet Union’s internal dynamics Honor seek to demythologize Reagan’s throughout the 1980s. In the end, this cult as a Great Communicator. Despite paper supports the greater validity of differences in their agendas, both the argument that stresses the Soviet publications give the readers (in and Union’s internal problems as being outside the academe) a better picture behind the collapse of Cold War of Ronald Reagan and his role in the bipolarity. After all, the privileged party New Right movement. Pemberton and elite (Nomenklatura) in Russia and Abshire’s accounts on the ideological elsewhere in the Union were acutely framework of neo-conservatism aware that they could not follow the and President Reagan’s legacy are major contributions to the American attempts to reform a system that was historical profession. They also stress intrinsically against reform. To truly the need for more substantial research understand these questions and the on Russia’s domestic problems, which legacy of the Cold War, historians ultimately paved the way for the Soviet should approach the subject with Union’s implosion. less fixed ideas about the nature of Nevertheless, three decades after American triumphalism and the fate of Glasnost, a set of questions still remain the Soviet Union. 113 Onur İşçi

Endnotes

1 See Edward Said, “Islam and the West”, The Observer, 16 September 2001. 2 Geoffrey Hosking, Russia and the Russians: A History, , Harvard University Press, 2003, p. xi. 3 Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse 1970-2000, New York, , 2003. 4 Peter Holquist, “The Soviet Experience in Post-Soviet Historiography”, Paper presented at the Stanford University Conference on ‘Russia at the End of the Twentieth Century,’ California, U.S.A., 5-7 November 1998. 5 John L. Gaddis, “The Unexpected Ronald Reagan”, The United States and the End of the Cold War, New York, Oxford University Press, 1992. 6 Marshall Poe, The Russian Movement in World History, Princeton, Press, 2003, p.76. 7 Daniel Deudney and G. , “Who Won the Cold War?”, Foreign Policy, No. 87 (Summer 1992), p. 123. 8 Jay Winik, On The Brink: The Dramatic Behind the Scenes Saga of the and the Men and Women Who Won the Cold War, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1996. 9 Ibid, p. 595. 10 Ibid, p. 596. 11 Beth A. Fischer, The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War, Missouri, University of Missouri Press, 1997. 12 Ibid., p. xi. 13 Ibid., p. x. 14 Ibid., p. 16. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid., p. 102. 17 Ibid., p. 103. 18 Jack F. Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended, New York, Random House, 2004. 19 Ibid., p. 112. 20 Ibid., p. 312. 21 , The Cold War: A New History, New York, Penguin, 2006. 114 Cold War Triumphalism and the Reagan Factor

22 Ibid., p. xi. 23 Richard Pipes, “Back in the USSR”, Commentary, Vol. 121, No. 2 (February 2006), pp. 66-67. 24 Frances FitzGerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War, New York, Simon and Schuster, 2000. 25 Ibid., p.498. 26 Ibid., p. 22. 27 Ibid., p. 25. 28 Ibid., p. 370. 29 Raymond Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War, Washington DC, The Brookings Institute, 1994. 30 Raymond Garthoff,Detente and Confrontation, Washington D.C., The Brookings Institute,1985, p. 2. 31 , The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Santayana, Chicago, Henry Regnery, 1953, p. 3. 32 William Pemberton, Exit with Honor: The Life and Presidency of Ronald Reagan, New York, M.E. Sharpe, 1997, p. xi. 33 James T. Patterson, Restless Giant: The United States from Watergate to Bush versus Gore, New York, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 130. 34 Ibid., p. xi. 35 Pemberton, Exit with Honor, p. 15. 36 Ibid., p. 5. 37 Lou Canon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1991, p.15. 38 Ibid., p.837. 39 Pemberton, Exit with Honor, p.49. 40 Ibid., pp. 106-109. 41 Ibid., p. 105. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid., pp. 150-155. 44 Ibid., p. 149. 45 Ibid., p. 211. 115 Onur İşçi

46 David M. Abshire, Saving the Reagan Presidency: Trust is the Coin of the Realm, College Station, A&M University Press, 2005, p. 14. 47 Ibid., p. 5. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid., p. 15. 50 Robert McFarlane was the National Security Advisor to President Reagan during the scandal, who later became one of the major scapegoats along with John Poindexter. Ibid, p. 20. 51 Ibid, p. 23. 52 Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Genera- tion, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2005. 53 J. Robert Wegs, “ and the Soviet Union in the 1970s, 1980s, and Beyond”, Europe Since 1945: A Concise History, Bedford, St. Martin’s, 1996, p. 208. 54 Ota Sik, “The Economic Impact of Stalinism,” in Lyman Legters (ed.), Eastern Europe: Transformation and Revolution, Washington D.C., Heath, 1992, p. 188. 55 Ibid, p. 201.

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