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Cold War Triumphalism and the Reagan Factor

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Cold War Triumphalism and the Reagan Factor Cold War Triumphalism and the Reagan Factor Onur İŞÇİ* Abstract Key Words Three decades after Gorbachev’s 1986 Cold War Triumphalism, Reagan Victory Glasnost campaign, the sudden death of School, US-Soviet Confrontation, Demise of the the Soviet Union still continues to keep USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev. diplomatic historians busy with its momentous implications. The mutually excluding political realms of the Cold War forged a conservative In 1986 the Union of Soviet Socialist American historical discourse, which perceived the Soviet Union as an evil empire. Existing Republics finally became the toast of biases against Moscow continued after the American diplomats, who believed Soviet collapse and were conjured up in a new that global harmony was a step closer. scholarly genre that might properly be termed as After four decades of superpower “the Reagan Victory School”. The adherents of conflict, the new Russia was seen as a this school suggest that President Reagan’s resolve and unsophisticated yet faithfully pragmatic long lost friend that reemerged from its foreign policy designs – the Strategic Defense ashes, promising to adopt democracy Initiative (SDI) in particular – became the and a liberal market economy. Mikhail major factor behind the Soviet Union’s demise Gorbachev’s Glasnost and Perestroika and America’s “triumph” after the Cold War. signaled the end of a modern period Looking at several influential monographs on the subject, this paper seeks to demonstrate the in history that had been economically well nuanced yet often mono-causal notions and politically exhausting for virtually vocalized by American scholars of Cold War the whole world. Faced with a serious triumphalism. ideological and military threat after the Second World War, the United States spearheaded the transatlantic community and systematically pursued the common interests of the democratic world against what President Ronald * Asst. Professor, Bilkent University, Department Reagan would later call an “evil of International Relations, Ankara. empire”. During the first 40 years of E-mail: [email protected] Cold War bipolarity, American leaders 97 PERCEPTIONS, Winter 2015, Volume XX, Number 4, pp. 97-116. Onur İşçi had become so familiar with the names road ahead could actually be even more and faces of Soviet leaders that these dubious and unpromising than the past shadowy figures somehow symbolized 50 years. everything loathsome and hateful in Like all events that have such their minds. Thus came into being a momentous ramifications, the collapse popular surge of anti-Sovietism in of the Soviet Union became the America that uncannily resembled center of scholarly controversy. Several what Edward Said called, “Captain new monographs, in their different 1 Ahab in pursuit of Moby Dick.” agendas, provide readers of Cold War history with the essential route map to The mutually excluding understand the causal factors behind political realms of the Cold War the collapse not only as a march of forged a conservative American abstract social forces and ideologies historical discourse, which but as a human event with complicated perceived the Soviet Union as ramifications. By reexamining the an evil empire. causes and outcomes of 1986-1991, a plethora of recent monographs expose the blueprints of new political factions When Gorbachev took office in 1986 in American scholarship that emerged and propagated his new thinking (novoe after the Soviet Union’s demise. As myshlenie) campaign, the Transatlantic historian Peter Holquist puts it, “while alliance embraced “the great Other the Soviet Union may be no more, its – understood yet not understood.”2 past marches on in popular memory and 4 The initial euphoria, however, soon the professional historical literature.” faded with the dissemination of armed The number of new publications conflicts in such regions as Yugoslavia on the Soviet Union’s death grew and the Southern Caucasus. Russia exponentially over the following proved to be ever more lethargic in decades, and the most apparent reason adopting liberalism and the oligarchs/ for this scholarly enthusiasm seemed to nomenklatura of the young federation be the opening of the previously closed found it more lucrative to adopt Yegor Soviet archives. The demise of the Soviet Gaidar’s – Boris Yeltsin’s Deputy Union, thus, furnished historians with Prime Minister – shock therapy, which new archival references and enabled essentially contradicted the principles them to present their arguments with of market liberalization.3 Suddenly, the more evidence. Nevertheless, the adherents of Western optimism and growing interest vis-à-vis the causes the Third Wave realized that the new behind the collapse cannot merely be 98 Cold War Triumphalism and the Reagan Factor attributed to the opening of archives. geopolitical sophisticates on the left” is Another, perhaps more relevant reason, one of ideology – a struggle between was the contemporary incredulity neo-conservatism and liberalism.5 towards the ideological divides intrinsic Therefore to say that the USSR’s in the works of Cold War historians. unforeseen implosion between 1986- 1991 had been “extensively studied” would do violence to “both the verb During the first 40 years of 6 Cold War bipolarity, American and the adverb.” Existing literature on the subject yields to more questions leaders had become so familiar than answers. First and foremost, what with the names and faces of role, if any, did Ronald Reagan play Soviet leaders that these shadowy in the collapse of the Soviet Union? figures somehow symbolized As Daniel Deudney and G. John everything loathsome and Ikenberry suggest in their Who Won the hateful in their minds. Cold War, “the emerging debate over why the Cold War ended is of more than historical interest: At stake is The mutually excluding political the vindication and legitimation of an realms of the Cold War evidently entire world view and foreign policy 7 influenced the conservative American orientation.” historical discourse that perceived Jay Winik’s On the Brink; Beth A. the Soviet Union as an evil empire. Fisher’s The Reagan Reversal; John These biases continued after the Gaddis’s The Cold War: A New History; collapse and were conjured up in a new and Jack Matlock’s How the Cold War scholarly genre what might properly Ended are the four examples used in be termed as “the Reagan Victory this paper that demonstrate the well School”. The adherents of this school nuanced yet mono-causal notions suggest that President Reagan’s resolve supported by the Reagan Victory and unsophisticated yet faithfully School. These neoconservative scholars pragmatic foreign policy designs – the hold the view that when Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in became president in 1981, the USSR particular – became the major factor was a flourishing superpower that had behind the Soviet Union’s collapse surpassed the US in the arms race, and and America’s “triumph” after the that Reagan’s new military buildup Cold War. Essentially, the divide duel with the USSR exacerbated between the Reagan Victory School the Soviets’ financial vulnerability, and what John Gaddis calls “the many consequently leading to its demise. The 99 Onur İşçi latter part of this paper explores four warriors, arguing that they managed to more monographs written by scholars undermine both Nixon’s legacy of soft from the liberal opposition: Frances line détente policy at home and the Fitzgerald’s Way Out There in the Soviet threat abroad. The author clearly Blue; Raymond Garthoff ’s The Great identifies President Reagan as the Transition; William Pemberton’s Exit mastermind of this team. In response with Honor; and David Abshire’s Trust to the liberal left’s harsh criticism of is the Coin of the Realm. In contrast with President Reagan, Winik poses the the Reaganauts, Fitzgerald, Garthoff, question: Why did the Soviet Union Pemberton and Abshire make it clear collapse when it did? Simply put, one that Mikhail Gorbachev was the key major factor comes to the forefront in player during both the Reagan and Winik’s account: Reagan’s firm stance Bush administrations, and emphasize in the arms control talks with the the reactive role Reagan played while USSR, and the containment of nuclear Gorbachev was transforming the missiles in Europe by launching the Soviets into a more open society. SDI – more popularly known as the Star Wars. The Reagan Reversal in US Winik particularly emphasizes Foreign Policy Richard Perle’s role in the arms negotiations, and suggests that Based on several hundred interviews, he deserves much credit with his recently declassified documents and determination on the implementation letters of correspondence, Jay Winik’s of a zero-option strategy against voluminous account on the Reagan the Soviets. Opposing the years – On the Brink – carries the Reagan accommodationist policies of the 8 debate to a new level. The author Nixon-Ford-Carter administrations sheds light on four defectors from the toward the Soviet Union, which Democratic Party, who joined Reagan’s seemingly took the US to the brink brain team and laid out the blueprints of of an uncontrollable arms race, Winik Reagan’s neo-conservatism: Assistant seeks to demonstrate how Perle Secretary of State Elliott Abrams; and his comrades had defended the Assistant Secretary of Defense and line until the Soviets yielded and arms control negotiator Richard ultimately decided to remove all SS- Perle; U.S. Ambassador to the United 20 intermediate range nuclear missiles Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick; and human (INF) from Europe. For Winik, rights advocate Max Kampelman. Reagan and Perle had decisively “won” Winik gives credit to these four cold the Cold War when they prompted the 100 Cold War Triumphalism and the Reagan Factor SDI against the Soviet Union. “For the witnessed several tragedies. Overall, prophets of détente and for die-hard Winik’s argumentation is flawed for doves, the [collapse] had a jarring, even two reasons. First, it lacks scholarly uncomfortable, ring to it. The euphoria evidence and highlights those that of the young people madly chipping attribute the end of the Cold War solely away at the Berlin Wall…stood in to the United States’ actions.
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