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Fall 2014 Dwight , The aW rrior, & John Kennedy, The oldC Warrior: Foreign Policy Under Two Presidents Andrew C. Nosti

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Nosti, Andrew C., "Dwight Eisenhower, The aW rrior, & John Kennedy, The oC ld Warrior: Foreign Policy Under Two Presidents" (2014). Student Publications. 265. https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/student_scholarship/265

This is the author's version of the work. This publication appears in Gettysburg College's institutional repository by permission of the copyright owner for personal use, not for redistribution. Cupola permanent link: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/student_scholarship/ 265 This open access student research paper is brought to you by The uC pola: Scholarship at Gettysburg College. It has been accepted for inclusion by an authorized administrator of The uC pola. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Dwight Eisenhower, The aW rrior, & John Kennedy, The oldC Warrior: Foreign Policy Under Two Presidents

Abstract This paper presents a comparison between President Eisenhower and President Kennedy's foreign affairs policies, specifically regarding the , by examining the presidents' interactions with four distinct Cold War regions.

Keywords Eisenhower, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Kennedy, John F. Kennedy, Foreign Affairs, Policy, Foreign Policy, Cold War, President

Disciplines American Politics | Anthropology | Defense and Security Studies | European History | History | Political History | Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration | Public Policy | Social and Cultural Anthropology | United States History

Comments This paper was written for Prof. Julie Hendon's First Year Seminar, FYS 103: Bringing the Past into the Present, Fall 2014.

This student research paper is available at The uC pola: Scholarship at Gettysburg College: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/ student_scholarship/265 Andrew Nosti

Dwight Eisenhower, The Warrior, & John Kennedy, The Cold Warrior:

Foreign Policy Under Two Presidents

Introduction

The date was November 19th, 1963, the centennial of the Gettysburg Address. A person

living in and around Gettysburg, Pennsylvania picked up that day’s copy of The Gettysburg

Times. Looking up at the reader were two different presidents who represented two different

political philosophies and ideologies of American history. One picture was of Dwight David

Eisenhower, the retired war general and America’s 34th President. The other photograph was of

John Fitzgerald Kennedy, a former war hero, accomplished author and the current president of

the United States, Eisenhower’s successor. Letters addressed to Paul L. Roy, an editor for The

Gettysburg Times, accompanied both photographs, one written by Eisenhower and another by

Kennedy. Both letters focused upon the same theme: the legacy of Abraham Lincoln’s

Gettysburg Address. These two letters, so similar in subject but so different in meaning, present an opportunity to compare and contrast the foreign policy stances between President Eisenhower and President Kennedy; a portrayal that goes beyond their opinions on the Gettysburg Address and outwards to their views of America and the world around it (Eisenhower, The Gettysburg

Times and Kennedy, The Gettysburg Times).

Throughout this paper, I touch upon different instances of foreign affair policy that connect to the ideals these presidents set forward in their letters. I start with the letters themselves then branch off to broader topics, such as , , or . To do this, I use speeches, letters, or interviews given or written by the presidents themselves that reflect their ideology, and then provide historical evidence that support their rhetoric in action. I found this copy of The Gettysburg Times while doing research in the Adams County Historical Society, located in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. The Gettysburg Times is a local periodical, founded in

1800, that publishes every day except for Sundays and certain holidays. I accessed the article online with the assistance of a volunteer within the historical society by typing in a date and pulling up the issue I desired (“Welcome to the Newspaper Archives of the Gettysburg Times”).

Letters from the Gettysburg Times

A little background on the significance of this time period and of Gettysburg should be understood before diving into the broader complexities of these presidents’ foreign affairs stances. After President Eisenhower left office in early 1961, he retired to Gettysburg,

Pennsylvania, and would spend the remainder of his days as its most illustrious resident, passing away on March 28, 1969. President Kennedy, unable to speak during the centennial celebrations, had made a visit to Gettysburg on March 31st of the same year, but only took a private tour instead of making a public appearance. In 1963, the Cold War was at the height of its tensions. President Eisenhower spent eight years trying to contain the and the spread of abroad. President Kennedy had already guided America through a little over two and a half years of escalating tensions between the world’s two premier superpowers.

The strains of the Cold War formed the basis of both presidents’ foreign affair policies.

Both articles were fairly brief, Eisenhower’s containing three paragraphs and Kennedy’s four, and fit into the headlining position, directly at the top center of the first page. Despite their brevity, these letters predominantly take up the top portion of the front cover of the newspaper and are surrounded by a black outline, creating a box that encompasses the two letters. Outside of the two letters, the cover page consists of eight other columns, five of which discuss the celebrations throughout the previous and present day (Eisenhower and Kennedy). These two short letters contain hints of a complex dynamic between President Kennedy

and former President Eisenhower. Each president used his letter to discuss more than just the

Gettysburg Address; each man took the content of Lincoln’s famous discourse and shaped it to

convey his views of America’s role in the propagation of liberty at home and abroad. Although

Eisenhower had already left office, his letter still displays his opinions on foreign affairs that he

expressed throughout his tenure in office. And despite the fact that Kennedy’s assassination three days after the publication of his letter overshadowed its importance and left it in the vast

darkness of forgotten history, his letter still accurately portrays his foreign affairs up to and

including that moment in time. Eisenhower staunchly believed in liberty as an American ideal

while Kennedy was a vehement Cold Warrior, considering liberty to be a right America should

uphold throughout the entire world. This disparity is what I address throughout this paper;

starting with the two letters written to Paul L. Roy and then branching out to a broader historical

perspective, I use these letters to construct a literary illustration on the dissimilarities between

Eisenhower and Kennedy’s foreign affair ideologies.

The letters found within the November 19th Gettysburg Times edition were written as follows. Eisenhower’s letter (Eisenhower, The Gettysburg Times):

“Dear Mr. Roy:

On the 100th Anniversary of his immortal Gettysburg Address, the nation pays tribute to

one of history’s towering figures, Abraham Lincoln. Of all our great national leaders, Lincoln was

most typically American. His achievements from the humblest beginnings to the final crowning

years of his life stand as a lasting inspiration to every citizen to respect and defend the

fundamental principles on which our governmental system of personal liberty and individual

opportunity was founded.

The Nation calls on us now for the same faith and devotion so deeply felt by Lincoln as

he stood here amid the havoc of Gettysburg to memorialize our way of life as a government ‘of the people, by the people and for the people.’ More than ever we need the example of Abraham

Lincoln to guide, influence, and uphold us.

The wise compassionate, challenging words of his Gettysburg Address should be etched

on the minds and hearts of every American. They will ever be one of the brightest jewels in the

nation’s rich heritage.

Sincerely,

Dwight ”

Kennedy’s letter (Kennedy, The Gettysburg Times):

“Paul L. Roy The Gettysburg Times Gettysburg, Penn

From the past man obtains the insights, wisdom and hope to face with confidence the

uncertainties of the future. Abraham Lincoln was keenly aware of this when, a century ago, he

journeyed to Gettysburg to make ‘a few appropriate remarks.’

Today, as we honor Lincoln’s immortal eulogy to the dead on Cemetery Ridge, let us

remember as well those thousands of American patriots whose graves at home, beneath the sea

and in distant lands are silent sentries of our heritage.

Lincoln and others did indeed give us a ‘birth of freedom,’ but the goals of liberty and

freedom, the obligations of keeping outs a government of and by the people are never-ending.

On this solemn occasion let us all re-dedicate ourselves to the perpetuation of those ideals

of which Lincoln spoke so luminously.

As Americans, we can do no less.

John F. Kennedy”

There are two significant lines within these two letters that hint at the beliefs of each

president. For Eisenhower, the line is: “More than ever we need the example of Abraham

Lincoln to guide, influence, and uphold us,” (Eisenhower, The Gettysburg Times). Eisenhower wished for Americans to take up the mantle that Abraham Lincoln had left behind; a mantle that included supporting liberty in lands outside of America itself, just as Lincoln did with the Confederacy. Kennedy, on the other hand, wrote, “On this solemn occasion let us all re-dedicate

ourselves to the perpetuation of those ideals of which Lincoln spoke so luminously,” (Kennedy,

The Gettysburg Times). President Kennedy did not only want Americans to value the principles

the Lincoln set forth, but he also urged them towards the “perpetuations of those ideals” to other

lands. Kennedy believed that, “As Americans, we can do no less” than propagate these values

throughout the entire world. Both presidents believed in the proliferation of liberty and

democracy abroad. As a result, you can see these basic principles reflected in their foreign affair

policies in interactions with places such as Cuba, Southeast , and Berlin.

Cuba

Beginning in 1956, , the American supported dictator in Cuba, faced a growing rebellion led by that had broken out into civil war (Warner: 804). During

this civil war, despite American unhappiness about some of the actions taken by Batista,

Eisenhower sent aid to the regime in order to keep Castro’s forces at bay (Warner: 804-805). By

early 1958, America had sent roughly $774 million to Batista and was taking steps to send

weapons as well (Warner: 804-805). At the end of June, 1958, some of the rebels kidnapped

Americans on Cuba, setting the tone for the future relationship between Castro and the U.S.,

(Warner: 806).

By the end of 1958, communist forces had penetrated the rebel movement and began to

influence Castro; , the CIA director at the time, said, “‘…communist elements can

be expected to participate in the government”’ if Castro was to take over (Warner: 808). Despite

American efforts, in January of 1959, Batista fled the country and Castro entered Havana, thus

taking over the government (Warner: 809). Castro visited America on April 15th, 1959, and met with then Vice-President Richard

Nixon (Warner: 811). The conversation between Nixon and Castro would play a significant role in the Eisenhower administration’s actions against Cuban revolutionaries. Neither seemed able to agree on much; Nixon spoke a lot about his opposition to communism and Castro spoke about the will of the people (Warner: 811-812). It was the only direct interaction between Castro and

Eisenhower’s administration, and it comprised a conversation between ideological counterparts that did not come close to an agreement being made by either side (Warner: 811-812).

On November 9, 1959, President Eisenhower approved and signed a statement that said,

“‘based on an assessment…of the Castro government…US objectives for Cuba and Latin

America will not be altered except as a result of Cuban opposition to Castro’s present course

and/or a change in the Cuban regime,” (Warner: 813). Finally, on March 17, 1960, President

Eisenhower gave the go-ahead for the CIA to implement a plan to forcefully overthrow the

Castro government through an infiltration into Cuba of anti-Castro guerilla fighters (Warner:

813). This authorization by President Eisenhower marked the first step in a long-lasting effort to overthrow Castro, one that would carry on into Kennedy’s tenure.

Cuba was a defining point in Eisenhower’s foreign affair practices. President

Eisenhower opposed Castro’s revolutionary forces by sending aid to a dictator. The reason for this opposition stemmed from a fear that Castro’s revolution would cause similar revolutions to rise up throughout other portions of and allow communist forces to infiltrate the western hemisphere (Warner: 813-814). Eventually, despite American efforts, Batista fled from

Cuba and Castro succeeded in establishing a new government. But Eisenhower did not simply permit Castro to rule Cuba as he saw fit; instead, Eisenhower signed a plan to overthrow the revolutionary that he had sent aid to oppose. Eisenhower set the standard for American interaction with Cuba, as I will show below with an examination of John F. Kennedy’s Cuban

policies.

In President Kennedy’s first State of the Union Address on January 30, 1961, he laid out

what his administration’s plan in Cuba would be. “Our objection with Cuba is not over the

people’s drive for a better life. Our objection is to their domination by foreign and domestic

tyrannies… Communist domination in this Hemisphere can never be negotiated,” (Kennedy,

Public Papers…1961: 23). President Kennedy would spend the entirety of his time in office in a constant power struggle with Cuban leader, Fidel Castro.

The first major event in Kennedy’s American-Cuban relations occurred in the first year of his presidency with the beginning on April 17, 1961, the same plan that

Eisenhower had signed (Stoll: 142). The operation was “an invasion of Cuba by a force of anti-

Castro exiles who had been trained by the CIA in ,” (Stoll: 141-142). The operation failed miserably, becoming one of the blackest stains on President Kennedy’s time in office.

However, instead of easing relations with Cuba, Kennedy went on to defend his tough stance of

Cuban-Soviet relations by saying on an April 20th address, “…the final report from the refugee

forces on the beach came from the rebel commander…He has gone now to join in the mountains

countless other guerrilla fighters, who are equally determined that the dedication of those who

gave their lives shall not be forgotten, and that Cuba must not be abandoned to the Communists.

And we do not intend to abandon it either!” (Kennedy, Public Papers…1961: 305). President

Kennedy knew that the invasion failed, but he would not “abandon” those in Cuba.

“The climax of the tension between Kennedy and Cuba came in October of 1962, with

the thirteen days of the ,” (Stoll: 144). On October 16, the president was

shown photographs of Soviet “offensive missile sites under construction in Cuba,” (Stoll: 145). Kennedy, however, had been assured by the Soviet Union that they had no intention of placing offensively capable sites in Cuba (Stoll: 145). In a televised address occurring on October 22,

1962, six days after learning about Soviet weapons sites only 90 miles from America, President

Kennedy said, “Neither the United States of America nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small…this sudden, clandestine decision to station strategic weapons for the first time outside of Soviet soil – is a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country,” (Kennedy, Public Papers…1962: 807). President Kennedy then laid out his plan to place a naval blockade on the island to disallow the continuous weapon buildup in Cuba and begin talks of disestablishing the sites already in place (Kennedy, Public Papers…1962:

807-808, Stoll: 146, Matthews: 369). The operation worked; within a week of the placement of the naval blockade, Soviet Premier Khrushchev had agreed to dismantle and remove the missile sites from Cuba (Matthews: 372, Stoll: 151).

Outside of the two major events involving Kennedy and Cuba, an operation entitled

“” was in effect for the entirety of the Kennedy administration following the debacle of the Bay of Pigs Invasion. The operation “involved an array of secret plots to topple the Cuban dictator,” (Matthews: 364); meaning an ongoing effort to dispose Fidel Castro from power in Cuba. The operation involved around 400 CIA officers and cost anywhere between

$50 million and $100 million. The operations never proved to be a success, but Kennedy never gave up on his desire to oust Castro; “Richard Helms, the CIA’s Deputy Director of Operations under Kennedy, later recalled ‘He was wild with Castro, and the whole government was pushed hard to see if there wasn’t some way to unseat him. The fact that the agency was not able to get the results was something that did not please him,” (Stoll: 154).

Middle East

Following World War II, the became a hotbed for Cold War conflicts

(Holbo: 249). “The central objective of American policy in the region [the Middle East] during the 1950s and 1960s was to encourage Muslim countries to co-operate and support Washington's of the Soviet Union and global Communist influence” (Jackson: 240). By the time

Eisenhower came to office, Truman had already sent millions of dollars to Greece and in an attempt to better relations with these countries and secure democratic allies in this part of the world (Holbo: 249).

On , 1957, President Eisenhower gave a speech that summed up his reasons for involvement in the Middle East and what that involvement should mean. The ideology became known as the “Eisenhower ,” and would form the basis for Middle East – US relations.

Eisenhower said, “The reason for Russia’s interest in the Middle East is solely that of power politics. Considering her announced purpose of Communizing the world, it is easy to understand her hope of dominating the Middle East…. If the nations of that area should lose their independence, if they were dominated by alien forces hostile to freedom, that would be both a tragedy for the area and for many other free nations whose economic life would be subject to near strangulation…. All this would have the most adverse, if not disastrous, effect upon our own nation’s economic life and political prospects…. The action which I propose would have the following features….it would authorize the United States to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area in the Middle East in the development of economic strength….authorize the Executive to undertake in the same region programs of military assistance and cooperation….authotize such assistance and cooperation to include the

employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity

and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression

from any nation controlled by International Communism,” (Eisenhower, Public Papers…1957:

8-9, 12-13). Eisenhower clearly stood against Communist influence in the Middle East.

The most prominent conflict for Eisenhower in the Middle East was a little-known military incursion into Lebanon beginning on July 15, 1958 (Little: 27). Lebanon was, for the most part, an American ally in the Mid-East; America had supplied the country with weapons to

defend itself, all for its “self-defense,” or in other words, its defense from communism (Little:

33). In 1957, “claiming that American inaction would open up the door to similar Soviet gains

in the region, won congressional authorization in early March to spend up to $200 million in

economic aid and, if necessary, to send U.S. troops to any Middle-Eastern nation threatened by

aggression, whether direct or indirect, ‘from any country controlled by international

communism,’” (Little: 34). Then, as elections approached in Lebanon, Eisenhower sent even

more aid over to support the campaign of the candidate that supported American interests,

similar to the Eisenhower policy in Cuba (Little: 34). Political issues permeated Lebanon and

tempers flared, resulting in a plethora of internal conflicts. As a result, Eisenhower then sent an

additional $2 million to help end the Lebanese in-fighting, which could destabilize the

government and subject it to communist rule (Little: 36).

In May, 1958, tensions reached a peak and violence broke out between the two opposing

sides (Little: 39). On May 13, Eisenhower pledged to his Lebanese ally, Chamoun, that he

would send troops to support his increasingly autocratic, but American-friendly, regime (Little:

40). On July 14, after months of diplomatic stalling by the U.S., Chamoun finally demanded that America uphold its agreement (Little: 43). Eisenhower did not love the idea of military

intervention into a foreign country, but believed that inaction would be worse than any other

possible option (Little: 44). By the morning of July 15, over 1,700 American marines were

landing in Lebanon, with many more, up to 5,000 overall, to come (Little: 27).

Typically, Eisenhower was against military intrusion, especially with ground troops, into other nations. He always upheld that intervention should only occur under the direst of situations. In most locations, these circumstances were never met and we are left to wonder what would have happened if they were. However, in Lebanon, the required conditions for intervention were met, and Eisenhower did not disappoint his allies. Eisenhower clearly had a willingness to militarily intervene in foreign lands to combat communism if he believed it was a necessity. Eisenhower exercised his right to send both aid and troops to Lebanon, reflecting his

Middle Eastern Cold War ideology, known today as the .

Some historians have concluded that Kennedy was the “‘foundation of the US-Israeli

Alliance,’” (Reich: 196). Kennedy took a more active approach to moving towards an Arabian-

Israeli solution than Eisenhower had, working together and communicating with Middle-Eastern leaders to reach this goal (Reich: 196). He also believed that was rooted in a military equality between and its enemies, and in September of 1962, agreed to sell missiles to

Israel in order to defend itself “against the jet aircraft supplied to the United Arab Republic by the Soviet Union and also against the potential threat of ’s missiles,” (Little: 196).

The basis for Kennedy’s support of Israel did not stem from a Zionist attitude or a love of the newly formed Jewish nation, but instead from a couple major, but not as simplistically moral, reasons. First, a desire to help an enemy of Egypt, a Soviet-ally and major power-player in the

Middle East (Ben-Zvi: 229). As the saying goes, the enemy of your enemy is your friend. Secondly, he wished to make Israel an American-led example in the Middle East, “believing that

‘American money, American technology, and the force of the American example could provide

the impetus for a successful process of economic development to unfold in many Third World

countries, the president and his top advisors remained convinced that the use of these resources

and means could help ‘mitigate or remove conditions’ that made these countries susceptible to

pressures for revolutionary change” (Ben-Zvi: 230). These “revolutionary changes” are what

made Middle-Eastern countries susceptible to Communist influence. A nation is much less likely to look for outside help if it is already economically stable.

Kennedy took a stance against Communist influence in the Middle-East, primarily in an effort to stem Communist impact on Egypt and strengthen American ties in that nation (Ben-Zvi:

235). He sold weapons to Israel and pumped money into the region in order to prevent it from falling into destitution and, possibly, communist hands; overall, all actions that were supported by the Eisenhower Doctrine. The extent to which President Kennedy affected the Middle East in his Cold War, anti-communist efforts can still be seen today; Israeli-American relations can principally be traced back to John F. Kennedy’s support of it in a potentially communist-leaning portion of the world.

Southeast Asia

A second region of major concern throughout the Cold War was Southeast Asia.

Eisenhower’s interactions with communist forces in the area are not as significant as Kennedy’s,

and therefore, I will discuss Kennedy’s positions and actions more in-depth than those of

Eisenhower. For Eisenhower, problems in Southeast Asia included primarily Korea and

Vietnam, while for Kennedy, it was chiefly Vietnam alone. It is important to understand that both Eisenhower and Kennedy were supporters of the

Domino Theory. This theory stated that if one nation in Southeast Asia was to fall into

communist hands, others would follow (Holbo: 273-274). The terminology for this theory was

first spoken by President Eisenhower on April 7, 1954. While speaking about the Indochina,

which we know as Vietnam, he said, “…you have broader considerations that might follow what

you would call the ‘falling domino’ principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock

over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very

quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound

influences,” (Eisenhower, Public Papers…1954: 383).

When General Eisenhower became President Eisenhower in 1953, he inherited a war in

Korea that he had promised to end (Tama: 43). Despite Korea being a hotspot for Cold War

conflict and the probability of a North Korean, communist victory, Eisenhower moved forward

with promoting an armistice in Korea (Tama: 43).

When the French left in 1954, Vietnam split and broke out into a violent turmoil; South

Vietnam had become a democratic nation led by Ngo Dinh Diem and supported by the United

States while the north had become a communist nation led by and supported by the

USSR (Craig: 1371). Eisenhower sent only a small amount of military advisors in comparison to his successor, roughly 900 by the end of his terms (Craig: 1371). However, despite the number being overshadowed today by the much larger numbers sent later on, it should still be noted that

Eisenhower was the very first president to make an American presence known in Vietnam.

President Kennedy and his administration “regarded South-East Asia (in particular…Vietnam) as a key component in its larger policy of waging a more vigorous and effective Cold War in the Third World,” (Craig: 1371). During his time in office, Kennedy increased the amount of aid sent to in the hope that the nation would win its fight

with its communist counterpart, , and establish a democratic stronghold in south-

east Asia (Craig:1371). One source states that in December, 1960, one month before Kennedy

took office, there was a total of roughly 900 US military personnel in South Vietnam (Tucker:

1744). Another source, however, states that Kennedy’s administration inherited even less

military advisers: only 500 (“Kennedy and the Cold War”). One year later, in December, 1961,

the end of Kennedy’s first year in office, the number of military advisers in South Vietnam had

increased to 3,200 military advisers (Tucker: 1745). That is an increase of 356% in just his first

year. In President Kennedy’s second year, the number of US military advisers in Vietnam

increased to 9,000 and the amount of aid going to the effort almost doubled (Snead and Peterson:

81). By the time of Kennedy’s assassination, 16,000 American military advisers were present in

Vietnam, an increase of at least 1778% from when he entered office (“Kennedy and the Cold

War”).

President Kennedy did not simply take action in Vietnam by placing military advisers in a foreign nation or by pouring federal aid into the conflict; he also did so by disposing of South

Vietnam’s president Ngo Dinh Diem. Diem has been a brutal leader and, by 1963, the Kennedy administration viewed the South Vietnamese president as “an impediment to winning the war,”

(“Kennedy and the Cold War”). Due to this view of Diem, Kennedy signed off on a decision that would remove his former ally from power. “It was JFK who authorized the coup that resulted in Diem’s overthrow…on November 1, 1963,” (“Kennedy and the Cold War”). With

Kennedy’s assassination coming only 21 days after the coup of Diem, the decision to do so stands as a testament to Kennedy’s unerring efforts to assist in the resistance of communism abroad; even if it meant intervening in other countries to the extent of political assassination Berlin

When was split into a Soviet controlled east and an American controlled west,

the country quickly became a symbol for the stance between Communist and Democratic forces.

Berlin had also been split, just like the rest of the country. The difference was that Berlin lied

fully in the east, and therefore, was surrounded by Soviet forces. Berlin had already proven to be a vital location in the Cold War struggle with the Berlin Airlift during Truman’s presidency, but its significance would continue into both Eisenhower and Kennedy’s presidential terms

(Giangreco and Griffin).

“Having inherited the Berlin problem upon taking office in January of 1953, the

Eisenhower administration quickly reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to and actively exploited it as a part of a broader program aimed at undermining Soviet power in Eastern

Europe” (Coleman: 5). Eisenhower upheld the stance begun in the Truman administration; a stance that marked Berlin as a pivotal locale in the Cold War struggles. Throughout the early portions of Eisenhower’s administration, the Soviet Union loomed as a serious threat to the protection and freedom of West Berlin. An uprising in East Berlin left both nations with a tough decision to make about the future of the divided city (Coleman: 17). The uprising struck a major blow to the legitimacy and public opinion of the Soviet Union (Coleman: 15). Eisenhower decided to take advantage of this temporary weakness. In 1953, he signed off papers that sent supplies over to the East, such as food, to act as almost a technique against his

Soviet counterparts (Coleman: 17). Eisenhower made it clear that he would support protests against the Soviet Union, but did not ever voice that he would send in troops to assist demonstrations or start open warfare with the Soviets (Coleman: 19). Eisenhower did not simply use propaganda techniques to influence East Berlin residents; he also took steps to insure that West Berlin never fell to his enemies. On October 1, 1953,

Eisenhower’s secretary of state presented the National Security Council with an Eisenhower- supported agenda that was meant to insure the protection of West Berlin by providing a plan if the Soviets were to ever enter into aggressions (Coleman: 20). The program was written in a way that clearly demonstrated the Eisenhower administration’s opposition to open warfare, but it did not completely rule out the option. The program supported diplomatic resolutions to the conflict, but still stated that if the situation got out of hand, America would militarily intervene

(Coleman: 20).

Eisenhower did take steps that displayed an escalation in tensions over Berlin throughout his tenure. He declared that if the Soviet Union would blockade West Berlin again, like they did under Truman, it “would be tantamount to a declaration of war” (Coleman: 22). Later, in

December of 1953, Eisenhower even stated that if he had been president during Truman’s time, he would have tested the Soviet Union’s with military forces instead of simply engaging in a long-time airlift (Coleman: 23).

Due to Eisenhower’s criticisms of the NSC’s (National Security Council) weak stances, a final agreement was reached in late January, 1954, an agreement that would guide Eisenhower’s interactions with East Berlin for the next few years (Coleman: 25). The paper “contained strong and repeated recommendations that the United States react ‘vigorously,’ ‘quickly,’ ‘forcefully,’ and ‘promptly’ to any new Berlin crisis” and stated “if the Soviet Union continued to challenge

U.S. interests once Washington’s intentions had been made clear, the United States would be compelled ‘to take immediate and forceful action to counter the Soviet challenge, even though such countermeasures might lead to general war,’” (Coleman: 25). Eisenhower clearly viewed

Berlin as a focal point in the Cold War fight from the moment he took office.

Throughout his time in office, stockpiles of weapons were sent to West Berlin, propaganda programs were implemented to undermine Soviet credibility and further internal conflicts, and agreements were made to defend West Berlin with the might of the American military (Coleman: 17, 25, 32). Throughout his tenure, Eisenhower and his administration treated Berlin as “the front line of the Cold war” (Coleman: 33). In a speech on March 16, 1959,

President Eisenhower summed up his stance on Berlin, “Our position, then, is this: we will not retreat one inch from our duty. We shall continue to exercise our right of peaceful passage to and from West Berlin. We will not be the first to breach the peace; it is the Soviets who threaten the use of force to interfere with such free passage….we shall have to remain continuously ready to repel aggression, whether it be political economic, or military,” (Eisenhower, Public

Papers…1959: 277-278).

In August of 1961 President Kennedy “ordered the 18th Infantry’s 1st Battle Group up the autobahn, through Soviet-controlled , to reinforce West Berlin,” (Stoll: 161). On

July 25th of the same year, just a short while before sending the troops in, President Kennedy gave an address regarding Berlin. In the address he said, “We cannot and will not permit the

Communists to drive us out of Berlin, either gradually or by force. For the fulfillment of our pledge to that city is essential to the morale and security of Western Germany, to the unity of

Western Europe, and to the faith of the entire Free World,” (Kennedy, Public Papers…1961:

534). A couple months later, in October, ten American tanks faced off overnight against ten

Soviet tanks, and the Soviets retreated first (Stoll: 161). Kennedy critics have faulted him for not standing strong in Berlin when he “allowed” the

Berlin Wall to be built (Stoll: 162). Many others have proclaimed that the only manner in which

Kennedy could have done so was through force and by acting as the aggressor in an incursion

into East Berlin, a place American military forces had no right to be in (Stoll: 162). The debate

is ongoing, but I believe Kennedy had no choice but to allow the to be built, which

was actually simply the continuation of a wall that the Soviet Union had built along most of the

east-west border in Europe (Stoll: 162).

One of President Kennedy’s most famous speeches occurred on June 26, 1963, in Berlin.

The speech was a political slap in the face to the country that built the wall through the city that

Kennedy spoke in. It was one of Kennedy’s greatest insults to the Soviet Union. In the speech,

President Kennedy said, “There are many people in the world who really don’t understand, or say they don’t, what is the great issue between the free world and the Communist world. Let them come to Berlin. There are some who say that communism is the wave of the future. Let them come to Berlin. And there are those who say in Europe and elsewhere we can work with

the Communists. Let them come to Berlin… Freedom is indivisible, and when one man is

enslaved, all are not free,” (Kennedy, Public Papers…1963: ).

Kennedy undoubtedly intended Berlin to be an integral part of his stance against the

Soviet Union and the proliferation of communism. It was one of the first locations that Kennedy took steps to secure. President Kennedy made one thing clear on Berlin: he believed that it was an indispensable point of dissension and would do anything he could to defend it from the

Communists. If anyone wanted to see how Kennedy interacted with the Soviets, let them look at

Berlin.

Conclusion

When I read the two letters during my time in the Adams County Historical Society, I

could not help but think about how the Cold War culture and the personal, political beliefs of the

two authors bled into the letters they wrote. These two presidents, often portrayed as counter-

parts due to their historical proximity, party-opposition, and the brutal 1960 Campaign, had very similar foreign affair ideals. In two simple letters, written about nothing more than the

Gettysburg Address, a topic that encompasses only America and an American president, the power and influence that the Cold War had on the United States and its leaders can easily be seen. Without knowing a single thing about American or world history, an individual could pick up the same copy of the Gettysburg Times that I looked at, and understand that at this time, in

1963, these two individuals cared deeply about American ideals and the perpetuation of them abroad. With a little more historical knowledge, one can make the conclusion that these beliefs must have made a presence in the presidents’ foreign affair policies, as I have shown above.

Both President Eisenhower and President Kennedy opposed the spread of Communism around the world. They remain two of the most prominent defenders of democracy abroad, and defending it in very similar manners. From the jungles of Southeast Asia, to the Caribbean nation of Cuba, to the sandy deserts of the Middle East, and to the urbanized streets of Berlin,

Kennedy and Eisenhower took every step possible outside of all-out war to insure the proliferation and safety of democratic, American ideals abroad. The same beliefs that spurred on their foreign policy actions also impelled their words in their letters to the Gettysburg Times on

November 19, 1963. Eisenhower used Lincoln as an example to “guide, influence and uphold” his policies concerning the Cold War; which he believed to mean defend democracy around the world at nearly any cost. Kennedy found within Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address the same principles in which he wished Americans to “re-dedicate” themselves “to the perpetuation of;” which he had done throughout his tenure in office.

I affirm that I have upheld the highest principles of honesty and integrity in my academic work and have not witnessed a violation of the honor code. – Andrew C. Nosti

I acknowledge the assistance of the Writing Center.

5,993 Words

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