MAY/JUNE 2010 report: canada

Against the Odds: Fighting Canada’s Free Trade Deal With Colombia

In June 2009, activists in Ottawa protested the arrival of Colombian president Álvaro Uribe in his push for the proposed Canada-Colombia FTA.

By Sheila Katz and Gauri Sreenivasan Sheila Katz has been f t e r t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e f r e e t r a d e the Democratically controlled Congress when a Latin American Area of the Americas (FTAA) in 2005, Canada’s Conservative prime minister, Stephen solidarity activist for A the United States and Canada were Harper, stepped in to lend a hand. more than 30 years, not about to give up on their hard-fought Harper opened negotiations for a bilateral free beginning with her ­hemispheric vision. They embarked on a new trade agreement with Colombia, as well as Peru, membership in the strategy to promote the NAFTA model, pursu- in 2007 as the centerpiece of the prime minister’s Toronto-based Latin American Working ing bilateral free trade and investment arrange- new Americas Strategy. At the time of this writ- Group (LAWG). ments with strategic political allies in the region. ing, ratifying the Colombia deal remains an ac- Gauri Sreenivasan A key partner in this strategy was Colombia’s tive, though as yet unfulfilled, political objective has worked for president, Álvaro Uribe, arguably the govern- of both the Canadian and Colombian govern- more than 15 years ment leader with the worst human rights record ments and each country’s business elite. For Co- with Canadian civil society organizations in the hemisphere. lombia, ratification by Canada would, no doubt, on issues of economic It was in this context that a year later, for- influence members of the U.S. Congress, given justice, trade, invest- mer U.S. president George W. Bush concluded­ Canada’s recognized historical commitment to ment, and human the controversial United States–Colombia international human rights.1 And Uribe desper- rights in Canada’s Trade Promotion Agreement. Bush was fight- ately needs to show the world that doubts about relations with the developing world.

Richie Allen Richie ing a bruising battle to ratify his trade deal in his government’s legitimacy are unfounded. 23 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS report: canada

For Canada, trade expansion is a key element of the a n y c a n a d i a n s w e r e s h o c k e d w h e n h a r p e r a n d Conservative government’s foreign policy direction for the his ministers claimed that the Colombian hemisphere. This trade policy must also be understood to M government shared Canada’s fundamental include a strong security agenda in line with U.S. foreign values of “freedom, democracy, human rights, and the policy post–9/11.2 The ideological thrust of this approach rule of law,” since they knew of Colombia’s violent is to influence the growing polarization between U.S. al- and troubled history.3 For several decades, Canadian lies and “pink tide” countries that are questioning neolib- civil society—unions, faith-based organizations, human eral prescriptions for their development models. Its fur- rights organizations, and development NGOs—had ther purpose is to promote Canadian corporate interests worked hard to focus public attention on widespread in the region—especially those in the extractive sectors, human rights violations and the root causes of armed which have billions of dollars invested in petroleum and conflict in Colombia: the influence of drug mafias tied mining, especially in the Andean region. to the army, politicians, and rebel groups, together with Harper believed he could wrap up negotiations on the pressing need for land reform and social justice. both deals (Colombia and Peru) in record time and then As the Colombian guerrilla war escalated in the 1990s, ram implementation legislation through Parliament. In- and neoliberal policies intensified inequality, unemploy- deed, the deal with Peru was concluded seven months ment, and social exclusion, CSO strategies in Colombia later, ratified and in effect by August 2009 (its and abroad focused on supporting a negoti- U.S. counterpart was implemented six months Many Canadians ated settlement to the conflict based on social earlier). While there is a long history of Cana- were shocked justice. A specific advocacy goal of the soli- dian international cooperation in Peru, there darity movement was to ensure that Cana- has not been decades of widespread solidar- when Harper dian funds, like those provided­ through the ity and public education work on human claimed that Canadian International Development Agency ­ rights problems in that country (as there has (CIDA), respected labor, human rights, and been on Colombia). A less severe “crisis” in the Colombian environmental standards. CSOs also called for Peru related to a continuing internal armed government a moratorium on Canadian investment in Co- conflict—including trade union deaths, rural shared their lombian territories where the armed conflict displacement, and so forth—together with was taking place and where crimes against Peru’s lesser geopolitical significance to the values of humanity were being committed. They spe- United States, also explain weak public and “freedom, cifically demanded an end to the killing of Parliamentary knowledge of Peru as a human trade union and indigenous leaders, as well rights disaster. Thus, enabling conditions for democracy, as an end to impunity for these crimes. campaigning were absent, and Canadian civil human rights, The campaign against the trade deal had society organizations (CSOs)—with much other foundations to build upon, given the regret—concentrated their limited resources and the rule almost 15 years of controversy surrounding on opposing the Colombia FTA. of law.” NAFTA. Canadian trade activists had accu- Why, then, with powerful leaders work- mulated knowledge and understanding of the ing so hard for it, has the Canadian Parliament still profound political and socio-economic impacts of such not ratified the Colombia trade deal almost three free trade deals, and how they lock in a radical free mar- years later? As this article goes to print, new allianc- ket policy framework. These agreements limit the role es in Parliament mean the deal may soon be passed. of governments in shaping market outcomes through Whatever the result of these new negotiations, it is economic, social, and environmental policies, and pro- important to underscore why the deal has eluded vide substantive and unprecedented rights to investors governments to date. Two factors played a key role with no enforceable rights for workers, consumers, in- in this result: First, and most importantly, Canadian digenous peoples, the displaced, or others affected by activists successfully mobilized a campaign to oppose investor actions. “Side agreements” negotiated for labor the Colombia deal, working with opposition parties and the environment have proved largely ineffective in in Parliament. Second, with a minority in Parliament, protecting workers and the environment from the nega- the government had limited room for maneuver in tive effects of free trade. advancing the free trade agenda, despite the best ef- In this context, a coalition of Canadian CSOs, trade forts of its most powerful leaders. unions, and grassroots solidarity groups launched a pub- 24 MAY/JUNE 2010 report: canada

lic campaign calling for trade negotiations with Colom- bia to cease until a full human rights impact assessment was carried out.4 The obstacles were many—including Harper’s ‘Wise Words’ a hostile government, little access to the media, and the Canadian prime minister Stephen Harper’s alliance with ideological fundamentalism of Canada’s new foreign the ideological aims of George W. Bush in the Americas policy directions in the Americas. was made evident when he addressed the Council on The campaign consisted of developing and distrib- Foreign Relations in New York in September 2007. “In my uting popular materials, speaking tours of Colombi- view,” Harper said, “Colombia needs its democratic friends ans, media outreach, education, and mobilization. to lean forward and give them the chance at partnership Building on in-depth knowledge of the trade model and trade with North America. I am very concerned that and coordination with Colombian partners, Canadi- some in the United States seem unwilling to do that. What an organizations also provided expert analysis of the message does that send to those who want to share in agreement itself, showing that applying its policies in freedom and prosperity? There is a lot of worry in this a country like Colombia, without evaluating the agree- country about the ideology of populism, nationalism, and ment’s likely human rights impacts, was a recipe for protectionism in the Americas and the governments that “making a bad situation worse.”5 In turn, the question promote it. But frankly, my friends, there is nowhere in the hemisphere that those forces can do more real damage of whether the agreement could actually harm rather than those forces in the United States itself. And if the than help became a dominant frame of debate in both U.S. turns its back on its friends in Colombia, this will set the media and Parliament. back our cause far more than any Latin American dictator The campaign captured the moral high ground could ever hope to achieve.” Bush later fulfilled his side in the debate, which had been cast, initially, by the of the alliance by referring to the “the wise words” of the prime minister as a battle about politics and ideology, Canadian prime minister in several speeches. not about trade. “Deepening both economic and po- litical engagement between our countries is the best way Canadians can support the citizens of Colombia in their efforts to create a safer and more prosperous the letter read.7 Representative Mike Michaud (D- democracy,” Harper said.6 Activists know that it can Maine), one of the letter’s signers, undertook a one-day be a struggle to make trade policy news-relevant to the visit to Ottawa to meet with then trade minister David general public. Facilitated by the government’s politi- Emerson and the leaders and key members of all three cal framing of the trade deal, however, and the fact that Canadian opposition parties to shore up opposition to Colombia and Canada are minor trading partners, Ca- the proposed deal. Michaud urged Canadians to “stick nadian CSOs were able to engage citizens and politi- with your strong tradition about human rights and la- cians on the political implications of doing business bor rights and continue to be the leader you have been with a human-rights-violating government, the risk of for so many years.”8 A headline in Embassy, a Canadian complicity for Canadian business in a war economy, newsweekly on foreign affairs, announced: “Opposi- and the misuse of and damage to Canada’s reputation tion to Colombia Trade Deal Reaches Fever Pitch.” as a human rights champion. The contrast of the high road taken by the U.S. Congress, and the distrust of an e y f a c t o r s i n t h e c a n a d i a n c a m p a i g n i n c l u d e d overt alliance between Harper and Bush, also spurred strategically coordinating with opposition mem- citizen backlash at Canada’s recklessness (see “Harper’s K bers of Parliament committed to stopping the ‘Wise Words,’ ” above, at right). Colombia deal, tracking political events as they hap- It was clear to Canadian campaigners that the prin- pened, and adapting the strategy accordingly. In a simi- cipled position of the Congress in Canada’s most im- lar situation to that in the United States at the time, the portant ally and trading partner was a potent asset. Conservatives controlled the government but held only a The U.S. Congress was well aware that the Canadian minority of seats in the House of Commons, where legis- deal, if passed, could erode opposition to the U.S. free lation must pass to implement the deal. trade agreement with Colombia. In January 2008, sev- Under pressure from civil society, Parliament’s Stand- en Democratic congressional representatives wrote the ing Committee on International Trade (CIIT) undertook Canadian Parliament to share their concerns. “No trade an in-depth study called “Human Rights, the Environ- agreement with Colombia is acceptable at this time,” ment and Free Trade With Colombia” in 2008. The com- 25 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS report: canada

mittee received briefs; heard testimony from government, ited attack on the proposed labor side agreement, not- business, and a broad spectrum of CSO representatives; ing the past failings of such agreements, especially the and undertook an official mission to Bogotá. As the com- inadequacy of the proposal that fines levied through the mittee was nearing the conclusion of its study, but before side deal could possibly remedy labor rights violations, it had the opportunity to submit its recommendations, such as assassinations.11 The Conservatives eventually the government announced that negotiations had been pulled the bill from the order paper (the government’s completed. The deal was done. Incensed at the disrespect agenda), fearing they would not have enough votes to of democratic process, the committee issued its report move it forward. Although the Canada-Peru free trade to Parliament on June 18, 2008, recommending that the agreement was signed almost a year before the Colom- trade agreement not be signed.9 bia bill came up for debate, the government waited and The committee’s report called for an “independent, submitted both deals—Colombia and Peru—together impartial and comprehensive human rights impact as- for first reading. The Peru deal went through its three sessment . . . [to] be carried out by a competent body readings fairly quickly, with little Parliamentary or pub- which is subject to levels of independent scrutiny and lic resistance. validation” and stated that “the recommendations of this In the fall of 2009, the Liberal Party’s official position assessment should be addressed before Canada considers started to shift toward support for the Colombia trade signing, ratifying and implementing an agreement with deal. Although the Liberal caucus became divided over Colombia.”10 Shortly after, Conservative MPs reneged on the issue, the party seems to have largely abandoned the unanimous recommendations, noting that the com- its commitment to the principle of ensuring a human mittee’s recommendations conflicted with the Conserva- rights impact assessment before ratification. After the tive government’s position. Meanwhile, the proposal for summer break, the Conservative government reintro- a human rights impact assessment became a clarion call duced the Colombia trade bill as its priority legislation, for the campaign, widely endorsed by major newspaper gambling this time for Liberal support. But again, op- editorials, the three opposition parties, CSOs, and many position members in the New Democratic Party and the concerned union members and citizens. Bloc Québécois were vigilant, ensuring that their mem- Neither members of Parliament nor the public would bers were present in the House to maximize debate on see a word of the trade deal’s text until five months after the deal and to prevent procedural measures that could the committee’s report was issued, when the deal was close the debate. Meanwhile, CSOs intensified a grass- signed in Lima on the margins of a November 2008 Asia- roots campaign focused on the divided Liberal caucus, Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting. The legislation given that this party would hold the balance of power in to implement the agreement, Colombia Implement- any vote on the bill. ing Legislation Bill (C-23), was tabled for first reading When the Harper government formally closed (“pro- on March 26, 2009. (Bills in the Canadian Parliament rogued”) the Parliamentary session in December, the must pass three “readings,” or periods of consideration bill died on the order paper like all other government followed by a vote in the House of Commons. After bills. It had clocked a record 30 hours of debate on passing a second reading, a Parliamentary committee amendments.­ studies the bill in depth and can make changes before it is sent back to the House for the final vote. A bill t i s a l m o s t unprecedented f o r a t r a d e a g r e e m e n t t o then passes to the second chamber, the Senate, where it be stalled by domestic pressures in the Canadian Parlia- must pass another three readings before it can receive I ment. In 1988, the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement royal assent from the Canadian governor general and be was easily passed in the House, even after a bitterly fought promulgated­ as law.) federal election in which the Conservatives won a major- For the next few months, opposition parliamentarians ity of seats if not of votes in the House. NAFTA­ was then questioned the Colombia agreement at every opportunity­ passed by the party that had campaigned against it after that during debates, asking why the human rights impact as- party assumed government. In a parliamentary system, once sessment they had requested was not undertaken. The elected, the government wields enormous executive power Bloc Québécois, for example, tabled an amendment to with very few checks and balances. It has full authority, for a second reading of the bill, requesting that it not be example, to negotiate and sign trade deals in virtual secrecy considered since the Parliamentary committee’s report from the public and members of Parliament but must then had been ignored. The New Democratic Party led a spir- put implementing legislation before the House. 26 MAY/JUNE 2010 report: canada

A Time Line of the Canadian Anti–Colombia FTA Campaign

June 2007 The government of Canadian prime minister Stephen Harper launches negotiations for a proposed Canada-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (CCFTA). The Liberal Party supports free trade but favors a delay to address human rights questions in Colombia. July 2007 Harper travels to Latin America to kick off his Americas Strategy. September 2007 Harper gives a speech at the Council on Foreign Affairs in New York warning that by not ratifying a similar trade agreement, the United States risks turning “its back on its friends in Colombia” (George W. Bush later quotes Harper’s “wise words”). January 2008 U.S. congressional Democrats send a letter to the Canadian Parliament. “No trade agreement with Colombia is acceptable at this time,” it says. February 2008 Congressman Michael Michaud (D-Maine), one of the letter’s signers, visits Ottawa and urges Canadians to “stick with your strong tradition about human rights and labor rights and continue to be the leader you have been for so many years.” May 2008 Parliament’s Standing Committee on International Trade (CIIT) begins work on a Colombia study and later travels to Bogotá. June 2008 The Harper government announces the completion of trade negotiations. In Parliament, the CIIT tables its study recommending a human rights impact assessment (HRIA) of the trade deal.

October 2008 Harper wins another minority government in the Canadian election.

November 2008 Harper and Colombian president Álvaro Uribe sign the CCFTA on the margins of an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Lima, Peru; the text is released. January 2009 The Canadian Liberal Party replaces its spokesperson for international trade policy. This later translates into a new Liberal position favoring the CCFTA. February 2009 Visiting leaders of Colombian social movements meet with the Canadian secretary of state for Latin America and denounce the CCFTA. March 2009 Colombian senator Jorge Robledo, who opposes the CCFTA, visits Canada and addresses the CIIT. Bill C-23, the CCFTA’s implementing legislation, is tabled in the House of Commons.

May 2009 The government withdraws Bill C-23 from the Parliamentary order of business.

June 2009 Uribe visits Canada to press for the CCFTA. Citizens rally against him in both Ottawa and Montreal.

August 2009 Liberal Party officials visit Colombia and speak with Uribe and his officials, as well as selected pro-CCFTA unions and civil society organizations. September 2009 Parliament reopens. CCFTA and Bill C-23 are the first order of business.

December 2009 Harper prorogues, or closes, the Parliamentary session. Bill C-23 dies on the agenda. March 2010 Parliament reopens, and the CCFTA is resubmitted as priority legislation. The Liberal trade spokesperson offers a pre-negotiated amendment that would allow the Canadian and Colombian governments to write their own annual HRIAs.

The civil society effort on Colombia was effective at plurality of the votes but not a majority of seats. Un- mobilizing public and political support, but the picture der minority governments, Parliament assumes a much is more complex than merely one of CSO campaigning. larger role in public affairs, since opposition parties Since 2004, Canadian politics has shifted to an era of working together can stop or delay legislative initiatives. minority governments—formed by parties that win a Public opinion also gains greater influence since there 27 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS report: canada

is a sharper public and political sensibility that the govern- paign’s human rights critiques, including the demand for a ment’s mandate is limited, the threat of confidence motions human rights impact assessment (a first for Canadian trade is potent, and parliamentarians are naturally more attuned policy). But the measure, as proposed, was not credible. to the mood in their constituencies. A broad range of CSOs and the other two parties rejected The context of minority government in Canada is the the idea that governments would write the human rights other­ critical piece of the Colombia trade deal’s report themselves, rather than an independent story.12 Harper had a minority mandate from The major monitor. They rejected the idea that announcing the Canadian public during this period (as is delay achieved such a process should be sufficient to allow the still the case today), making sharp ideologi- trade agreement with Colombia to go forward as cal swings in foreign policy more controver- in preventing the negotiated, rather than making changes to the sial. For diplomatic or military initiatives (like ratification of the agreement first based on the recommendations changing Canada’s long-standing views at the free trade of a credible prior assessment. ­ United Nations or pursuing combat roles in At the time of writing, with the Liberal Party Afghanistan), which do not require legislative agreement with allying so strongly with the government to get the process, Harper has had free rein, despite the Colombia speaks deal passed, it is unclear how the rest of the battle controversy. But a trade deal requires legisla- will unfold. Elections are not imminent but loom tion to be implemented. to the potency of ever present on the medium-term horizon—the Opposition parliamentarians, propelled by citizen activism perpetual forecast in the context of minority gov- public support and their own convictions, ernments in Canada. The position of the Liberal in Canada. have maximized their influence in this new Party will ultimately decide the bill’s fate, as it context and profoundly affected the public weighs its constituents’ concern for human rights debate on the Colombia deal as a result. For example, the and Canada’s historic reputation with pressures to protect Parliamentary trade committee gave itself the mandate to its free trade credentials. undertake a major study on the impacts of the agreement on Whatever the final outcome, the struggle against the human rights and the environment. MPs also ensured that Colombia trade deal has yielded both important achieve- Uribe, who had at first been offered a private hearing at the ments and lessons. First, an important precedent has International Trade Committee, would instead have to speak been achieved: There is now widespread political and on the record to parliamentarians and in view of public wit- public support for an independent human rights impact nesses, as is normal practice. assessment undertaken by the Canadian government Where MPs from all three opposition parties have agreed, as a basic step of due diligence before implementing a they have formed majority recommendations and positions. trade agreement, particularly with a country where seri- They have also made adroit use of debate procedures, mo- ous human rights violations take place. Second, public tions, and amendments to ensure that their positions on the debate and consciousness has been widened somewhat agreement are well-known to constituencies. As a result, the on how Canadian trade and investment in a conflict government was unable to control the pace or tenor both of country like Colombia brings special risks.14 Parliamentary debate on the deal in general and of debate on Finally, the major delay achieved in preventing Cana- the bill to implement it in particular. Ratification was thus da from backing a government deeply implicated in hu- held up for at least two years. man rights abuses speaks to the potency and potential of citizen activism in Canada, as well as the strength h e n a n e w p a r l i a m e n t r e t u r n e d t o o t t a w a it gains working with progressive opposition politicians in March, the government immediately rein- and in cross-border alliances with citizen movements in W troduced the Colombia deal as its highest pri- Colombia and in the United States. Negotiations have ority in Bill C-2. Following the trade minister’s tabling of also recently been completed for an EU-Colombia trade the second reading, the two opposition parties and CSO pact, though this deal is some distance from ratification. campaigners were outraged to hear the Liberal Party trade A new grassroots campaign against the EU trade deal specialist offer the government a quickly accepted amend- opens possibilities for transatlantic cooperation at all ment in which the trade agreement would be modified to levels. The efficacy of these alliances will shape, in an require the Canadian and Colombian governments to pro- important way, the prospects for the struggle in Colom- duce yearly reports on human rights impacts.13 This shows bia to assert human rights over the rights of investors that the proponents of free trade had to respond to the cam- and corporations. 28 MAY/JUNE 2010 notes

Ricardo Acuña, “Barrick’s Gold,” Canadian Dimension, October 29, 2006. ­(Ottawa), August 25, 2009. 25. “Prominent Canadians Ask Ignatieff to Put Human Rights Before Free Trade in 14. Interview with Peter Kent, The Current, CBC, July 29, 2009. Colombia” (press release, Ottawa: Council of Canadians, April 30, 2009). 15. See Patrick Markey and Esteban Israel, “Honduras Resists Demand to Lift 26. Ibid.; Juliet O’Neill, “Liberals Reject Call to Scuttle Proposed Canada-Colombia Emergency Decree,” Reuters, October 1, 2009. Free-Trade Deal,” Canwest News Service, April 30, 2009. 16. Dina Meza, “COFADEH documentó 708 casos de violaciones a los derechos 27. Ian Swanson, “Kirk Soothes on Trade,” The Hill, July 16, 2009. humanos de junio a diciembre” (COFADEH, Tegucigalpa, January 19, 2010). 28. “Colombia: Killings, Arbitrary Detentions, and Death Threats—the Real- A December 30, 2009, report by the Inter-American Commission on Human ity of Trade Unionism in Canada” (human rights report, London: Amnesty Rights, titled “Honduras: derechos humanos y golpe de estado,” was similarly International, ­July 3, 2007); “Statement by Prime Minister Harper on His Visit critical of rights violations. to Colombia Following Meetings With President Uribe, July 16, 2007, Bogotá, 17. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “IACHR Deplores Murders, Kid- Colombia” (press release, Office of the Prime Minister). nappings and Attacks in Honduras,” press release, no. 26/10, March 8, 2010. 29. “ ‘Nonsense’ to Believe Latin America Faces Only 2 Political Choices: PM,” 18. Douglas Bell, “Peter Kent: Man on a Mission,” The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Octo- CBC, July 17, 2007. ber 7, 2009. See also the minister’s webpage, international.gc.ca/international/ 30. “Prime Minister Stephen Harper Addresses the House of Commons in a Reply honduras.aspx. to the Speech From the Throne, October 17” (press release, Office of the Prime 19. Laura Carlsen, “The Sham Elections in Honduras,” The Nation, December 14, Minister, 2007). 2009. 31. Sheila Katz and Teresa Healy, “Under the Umbrella of U.S. Hegemony: Can- 20. “Mr. Obama Should Press for Changes at the OAS” (editorial), The Washington ada and Colombia Head Towards a Trade Deal” (Ottawa: Canadian Labour Post, February 10, 2010; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Multilater- ­Congress, 2008). alism in the Americas: Let’s Start by Fixing the OAS, 111th Cong., 2d. sess., 32. Ricardo Grinspun and Yasmine Shamsie, “Canada, Free Trade, and ‘Deep In- January 26, 2010, S. Prt. 111–42. tegration’ in North America: Context, Problems, and Challenges,” in Ricardo 21. “Canadienses ofrecen aumentar inversions a $200 millones,” La Tribuna Grinspun and Yasmine Shamsie, eds., Whose Canada? Continental Integra- ­(Tegucigalpa), March 5, 2010. tion, Fortress North America and the Corporate Agenda (Montreal & Kingston: 22. See Andrew Heard, “The Governor General’s Decision to Prorogue Parliament: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007). Parliamentary Democracy Defended or Endangered?” Centre for Constitutional 33. “What Role for Canada in the Americas? Statement of the Americas Policy Studies, discussion paper no. 7, 2009. Group,” Americas Policy Group–Canadian Council for International Co-opera- 23. Carl Meyer, “OAS Still Best Forum for Americas: Kent,” The Embassy (Ottawa), tion, April 15, 2009. March 3, 2010. 34. Rick Arnold and Manuel Pérez-Rocha, “Obama’s Agenda for Change and the 2009 Summit of the Americas” (Washington: Alliance for Responsible Trade, 2008). Against the Odds 35. “Pathways to Prosperity in the Americas” (U.S. State Department, Bureau of 1. Jeff Davis, “U.S. Politician Warns MPs Against Free Trade Deal With Colom- Western Hemisphere Affairs, 2010), pathways-caminos.org. bia,” Embassy (Ottawa), February 6, 2008. 36. “A New Partnership for the Americas” (Washington: Obama for America, 2. Sheila Katz and Teresa Healy, “Under the Umbrella of U.S. Hegemony: Canada 2008). and Colombia Head Towards a Trade Deal” (Ottawa: Canadian Labour Con- 37. Greg Grandin, “Obama and Latin America,” The Nation, May 11, 2009. gress, 2008). 38. Andrew Quinn, “Clinton: U.S. Critics Losing Force in Latin America,” Reuters, 3. Foreign affairs minister Peter Mackay, conference speech notes, “Expanding March 1, 2010; Guy Hursthouse and Tomás Ayuso, “¿Cambio? The Obama Ad- Trade and Foreign Relations in the Americas: Canada Counts,” the Canadian ministration in Latin America: A Disappointing Year in Retrospective,” Council Club of Toronto, May 25, 2007. on Hemispheric Affairs, January 26, 2010. 4. “Canadian and Colombian Labour Jointly Reject Trade Talks” (Canadian Labour Congress and the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores de Colombia, canadian- A Diplomatic Theater of the Absurd labour.ca, July 16, 2007). 1. Thanks to Ricardo Grinspun and Eric Hershberg, who read and commented on 5. “Making a Bad Situation Worse: An Analysis of the Text of the Canada-Colombia an earlier draft of this article. Free Trade Agreement” (briefing note prepared by the Canadian Council for Inter- 2. Peter McKenna, Canada and the OAS: From Dilettante to Full Partner (Ottawa: national Co-operation, the Canadian Association of Labour Lawyers, the Cana- Carleton University Press, 1995). dian Labour Congress, and the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2009). 3. “Canada Condemns Honduran Coup,” Canwest News Service, June 29, 2009. 6. “Canada Signs Free Trade Agreement With Colombia” (press release, Office of 4. Marc Lacey and Ginger Thompson, “Envoy Prepares to Visit Honduras,” The the Prime Minister, November 21, 2008). New York Times, July 3, 2009. 7. Letter from the Congress of the United States to the Parliament of Canada, 5. Interview with Peter Kent, The Current, CBC, July 29, 2009. signed by Michael H. Michaud, Betty Sutton, Phil Hare, Linda Sanchez, Nancy 6. Leticia Salomón, “Honduras: Políticos, empresarios y militares: protagonistas Boyd and Marcy Kaptur, January 15, 2008. de un golpe anunciado,” Envío no. 328 (July 2009). 8. Jeff Davis, “U.S. Politician Warns MPs Against Free Trade Deal With Colom- 7. See, again, Leticia Salomón, “El Golpe de Estado en Honduras: Caracterización, bia,” Embassy (Toronto), February 6, 2008. evolucion y perspectives,” Enlace Academico Centroamericano, July 3, 2009. 9. “Human Rights, the Environment and Free Trade With Colombia. Report of 8. Octavio Sánchez, “A ‘Coup’ in Honduras? Nonsense,” The Christian Science the Standing Committee on International Trade,” House of Commons, 2d sess., Monitor, July 2, 2009. 39th Parliament, June 2008. 9. “Background Briefing on the Situation in Honduras,” U.S. Department of State, 10. Ibid. June 28, 2009. The case for considering Zelaya’s removal a coup was well 11. See the website of National Democratic Party trade critic Peter Julian: peter made by Doug Cassel, “Honduras: Coup d’Etat in Constitutional Clothing?” The julian.ca/page/615. American Society of International Law 13, no. 9 (July 29, 2009). 12. See Gauri Sreenivasan, “Continuity and Change: Trade and Investment Policy in 10. Zelaya’s metamorphosis is nicely recounted in William Finnegan, “An Old-Fash- the Harper Era 2006–2008,” in Teresa Healy, ed., The Harper Record (Ottawa: ioned Coup,” The New Yorker 85, no. 39 (November 30, 2009): 38–45. Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2008). 11. The same ideological frame is used in Roger Noriega, “A Coup in Honduras,” 13. Bill Curry, “Bipartisan Deal Amends Free-trade Pact With Colombia,” The Globe Forbes.com, July 29, 2009 and Mail, March 25, 2010. 12. Roberto Micheletti, “Moving Forward in Honduras” (editorial), The Washington 14. See, for example, “Land and Conflict: Resource Extraction, Human Rights, and Post, September 22, 2009. Corporate Social Responsibility: Canadian Companies in Colombia” (Mining 13. Laura Payton, “No Plans for Sanctions Against Honduras: Kent,” Embassy Watch Canada, CENSAT-Agua Viva, and Inter Pares, September 2009). 41