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University of New Hampshire University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository

Master's Theses and Capstones Student Scholarship

Winter 2011

Consequences of a separatist platform? The rise and fall of the Bloc Quebecois

Zachary Azem University of New Hampshire, Durham

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Recommended Citation Azem, Zachary, "Consequences of a separatist platform? The rise and fall of the Bloc Quebecois" (2011). Master's Theses and Capstones. 156. https://scholars.unh.edu/thesis/156

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship at University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses and Capstones by an authorized administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. CONSEQUENCES OF A SEPARATIST PLATFORM? THE RISE AND FALL OF THE BLOC QUEBECOIS

BY

ZACHARY AZEM BA, University of New Hampshire, 2010

THESIS

Submitted to the University of New Hampshire in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts in Political Science

December, 2011 UMI Number: 1507809

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AlynraMLyon/Associate-Pfpfessor of Political Science

r^/Wa /^ 2&// Date TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES & FIGURES V

ABSTRACT VI

CHAPTER PAGE

I. INTRODUCTION 1 II. LITERATURE REVIEW 7 Introduction 7 Origins of Alienation 8 Development of Early Systems 9 First Impact of the Quebec Voting Block 11 Emergence of Separatism in Quebec 12 Decline of the Liberals in Quebec 15 Emergence of the Bloc Quebecois 17 Political Survival After the Failed 20 Platform and Demographics of Bloc Voters 23 The Quebec Nation 26 Death of the BQ? 27 Conclusion 30 III. METHODS AND PROCEDURES 33 IV. RESULTS 40 Hypothesis 1: NDP Surge 40 Hypothesis 2: Modified Contact Hypothesis 44 Hypothesis 3: Campaigns 50 Hypothesis 4: Separatism 61 Hypothesis 5: SMDP 65 V. CONCLUSION 72 REFERENCES 79 APPENDIX A NDP ORANGE CRUSH 84 APPENDIX B CONTACT HYPOTHESIS 2004-2011 87 APPENDIX C PROTEST PARTIES 2004-2011 90 APPENDIX D SUPPORT FLUCTUATIONS IN RIDINGS 93 APPENDIX E OPEN LETTER OF FORMER BQ MEMBERS 100 LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Bloc Quebecois Results in Quebec 2 Table2: The"McGill Five" 3 Table 3: Elected Bloc Quebecois MPs in 2011 5 Table 4: Liberal Dominance and Downfall in Quebec 16 Figure 1: Spectrum of Canadian Political Ideology 26 Table 5: Incumbent Bloc MPs Who Lost in 2011 29 Table 6: NDP Percentage of Vote in 2006-2011 41 Table 7: NDP Seat Changes 2008-2011 42 Table 8: Changes in Quebec Representation 43 Table 9: Contact Hypothesis: Bloc Quebecois 45 Table 10: Contact Hypothesis: Protest Parties 46 Table 11: Total and Quebec Seat Changes in Watershed 48 Table 12: Electoral Support Trends from 2008 to 2011 49 Table 13: Longest Tenure For Party Leaders 51 Table 14: EKOS Seat Projections 53 Figure 2: NANOS Leadership Data 55 Table 15: Polling in Quebec Prior to 2011 Election 57 Table 16: Parti Quebecois/Bloc Quebecois Election Performance.. 58 Table 17: Quebec Second Choice Parties in 2011 59 Table 18: Quebeckers Views on Distinctness 62 Table 19: Proportional Representation 68

v ABSTRACT CONSEQUENCES OF A SEPARATIST PLATFORM? THE RISE AND FALL OF THE BLOC QUEBECOIS By Zachary Azem University of New Hampshire, December, 2011

This thesis analyzes the contributing factors to the Bloc Quebecois' overwhelming loss in the 2011 Canadian Federal Election. Using both qualitative evidence and statistical analysis, it will investigate the extent in which five potential causes affected this outcome: a shift in support of the , the distribution of Francophone protest party votes, campaign strategies of the New Democratic Party and Bloc Quebecois, changing views on separatism, and the single member district plurality system.

VI CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

On May 2 2011, the Canadian people sent a message that realigned the political landscape in the federal House of Commons.1 The Conservative Party defied all polls and finally secured a majority government in Parliament. The once-dominant Liberal Party, which forced the 2011 election, not only suffered its greatest loss in its history but also lost its leader who could not win his own riding.2 Additionally, the Green Party finally broke through with leader

Elizabeth May winning a seat in the House of Commons. Truly dramatic changes occurred with both the separatist Bloc Quebecois and the leftist New Democratic

Party in the province of Quebec. The Bloc Quebecois (often referred to as the

Bloc or BQ) became the Official Opposition in its inaugural election in 1993 and

had maintained a majority of seats in Quebec ever since. Yet, this time the New

Democratic Party (often referred to as the NDP) won 59 seats in the province after only possessing one in 2008.3 Meanwhile the Bloc shockingly dropped from

49 seats in 2008 to only four seats in 2011, a prediction not even the most daring

1 The terms "Parliament" and "House of Commons" are interchangeably in this paper. 2 Riding is the term used in for a Parliamentary District. 3 NDP candidate Thomas Mulcair first won the riding of Outremont in a special election in 2007. He then became the first NDP member to win in a general election in Quebec with his victory in 2008.

1 pundit made. Therefore my research question is: Why did the Bloc Quebecois

suffer such heavy losses in the 2011 Canadian Federal Election?

Table 1: Bloc Quebecois Election Results in Quebec Election % of Vote Bloc Quebecois Seats 1993 49.3% 54 1997 37.9% 44 2000 39.9% 38 2004 48.9% 54 2006 42.1% 51 2008 38.1%. 49 2011 23.4% 4 Note: As The Bloc Quebecois is a separatist party, it only runs candidates in the province of Quebec. Therefore the percentage of the vote and seat total is only within the province. All electoral data used is from .

One of the best examples illustrating the scope of the NDPs "Orange

Crush" is the Members of Parliament (MPs) referred to as the "McGill Five."4 The

four undergraduate students and one doctoral student at McGill University were

on the ballot as NDP candidates in largely symbolic fashion. They were running

in strong Bloc Quebecois districts and appeared to have little chance of victory.

Three of them (Borg, Freeman and Liu) were not even native Quebecers.

Charmaine Borg planned to spend her fall in Mexico and did not even attempt to

monitor the vote count in her riding.5 The chances of victory appeared so slim

that multiple candidates admitted that they never visited nor campaigned in their

riding.6 They instead spent their time helping Quebec's one New Democratic

Party MP, Thomas Mulcair, win re-election.

4 Scott, M. (2011, May 4). "McGill 5 Head Off to House of Commons." Gazette. 5 Porter, C. (2011, May 14). "Dose of Reality For Political Junkies..." Star. 6 Scott, M. (2011, May 4). "McGill 5 Head Off to House of Commons." .

2 Table 2: The "McGill Five MP Age Riding Region 20 Riviere-des-Mille-lles Laurentides 21 Terrebonne-Blainville Laurentides Mylene Freeman 22 Argenteuil-Papineau-Mirabel Laurentides Matthew Dube 23 Chambly-Borduas Monteregie 40 Vaudreuil-Soulanges Monteregie MP Vote Margin BQ Inc. Prev Margin Laurin Liu 49.2% 20.7% 1-Time 26.2% Charmaine Borg 49.3% 18.5% 4-Time 35.9% Mylene Freeman 44.3% 15.3% 4-Time 22.6% Matthew Dube 42.7% 15.1% 3-Time 35.2% Jamie Nicholls 43.6% 17.9% 3-Time 12.6% Note: The column "Prev Margin" represents the average victory margin of the defeated BQ incumbent in their previous elections. All electoral data used in from Elections Canada.

Despite the pollsters predicting strong NDP gains in Quebec, no reason existed to believe that these ridings would fall victim to the Orange Crush. Four of the ridings were represented by the Bloc Quebecois since 1993 (Vaudreuil-

Soulanges being the exception) and four of the ridings featured incumbent MPs who were elected at least 3 times previously (Riviere-des-Mille-lles being the exception). Furthermore, each incumbent Bloc MP in these ridings enjoyed double-digit margins of victory in previous elections. It is within this context that we witnessed the wave in which NDP candidates rode into . The results were stunning as all five students won with over 40% of the vote with all margins of over 15%.

While the McGill Five provides an example of the overwhelming impact that the New Democratic Party had on the Bloc Quebecois, no similarities seem apparent among the four surviving Bloc MPs. Strangely enough, the sole freshman Bloc MP, Jean-Francois Fortin, was the only candidate to win by a

3 double digit margin. Meanwhile, , the last active MP to cross the floor and form the Bloc Quebecois in 1991, barely survived with a 2.7% margin and 38.3% of the vote. In his previous eight elections, his average margin of victory was 35.55%. Andre Bellavance hung on in an Eastern Township region that lost six other Bloc MPs that had had equal or better electoral strength as

Bellavance in previous elections.7 never had an easy time in the

Montreal district of Ahuntsic as the Liberal candidate narrowly defeated her in

2004 but then won tight victories in 2006 and 2008. Despite the influx of votes for the NDP and the continued presence of a strong Liberal challenger, Mourani actually won by a bigger margin than she had in 2006.

The result is difficult to understand, as one minor party defeated another to gain the title of Official Opposition in the House of Commons. This provides yet another case study as to why Canada is a main exception to Duverger's Law.8

The law remains strong in most other electoral situations, which indicates the strength of Quebec's regional interests compared to Canada's national interests.

Quebec's voting block acts very independently from the rest of the country and has been the catalyst for any extreme electoral results in the country's history.

7(2004, Nov 8). "Duceppe Backtracks on the Canadian Flag Flap." CTVNews. When later considering the extent of the militant sovereigntist vote for the BQ in 2011, it is important to note that Bellavance is most famous for refusing to provide Canadian flags to a Royal Canadian Legion hall in his riding. Duverger's Law is fully explained in the Literature Review.

4 Table 3: Elected Bloc Quebecois MPs in 2011 MP Age Riding Andre Bellavance 47 Richmond-Arthabaska Jean-Francois Fortin 38 Haute-Gaspesie—La Mitis—Mantane-Matapedia Louis Plamondon 68 Bas-Richelieu—Nicolet-Becancour Maria Mourani 42 Ahuntsic MP Region Vote Margin Incumbent Prev Margin Louis Plamondon Central Quebec 38.3% 2.7% 8-Time 35.5% Jean-Francois Fortin Eastern Quebec 36.1% 10.5% Maria Mourani Montreal 31.8% 1.5% 2-Time 1.3% Andre Bellavance E. Townships 33.8% 1.3% 3-Time 20.4% Note: The column Prev Margin "represents" the average victory margin of these BQ members in all elections prior to 2011. Jean-Francois Fortin was running for the House of Commons for the first time in 2011. All electoral data used is from Elections Canada.

It is within the context of these statistics and trends that we ask why the

Bloc Quebecois suffered such heavy losses in the 2011 Canadian Federal

Election. It appears that no one single cause exists. Rather a multitude of variables culminated in the "perfect storm" for dramatic electoral change in

Quebec. The New Democratic Party's sudden electoral legitimacy in the province may have provided Quebeckers with a clear alternative to the three parties that they had supported strongly in the past. For Francophone voters who wanted to express their displeasure in the federal government while maintaining a moderate or federalist view on separatism, the NDP may have provided such an outlet.9 The stunning defeat of the Bloc Quebecois may have been a result of declining support and salience of the issue of Quebec separatism. The NDP leader 's courting of Quebec during the election cycle may have swayed the Quebec people. Quebecers may also have been unimpressed by

Gilles Duceppe's erratic and unenergetic campaign strategy. Finally, the losses

9 Federalist Quebeckers are those who do not believe that Quebec should separate from the rest of Canada. Moderates are those who seek some special autonomy from Canada, yet do not actively desire separatism.

5 of the Bloc Quebecois are possibly inflated based upon the single member district plurality (SMDP) riding system contrasted to the actual percentage of the vote in the province. This paper will investigate these potential causes and their possible influence in the defeat of the Bloc Quebecois in 2011. CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The study of federal voting behavior in Canada is intriguing. Canada has a multi-party parliamentary system with candidates in single-member ridings getting elected via the first-past-the-post system. This makes Canada a notable exception to Duverger's Law as "third parties" have a history of gaining considerable influence in the House of Commons.10 While the Liberal Party or the

Conservative Party has always formed the government, multiple third parties gained enough seats to make an impact on the government. Within the past two decades, we have seen the Bloc Quebecois and New Democratic Party become the Official Opposition (the second largest party in Parliament). Federal voting behavior in Quebec is of particular interest because the province is largely

French-speaking and Catholic in a country that is overwhelmingly English-

Note: Duverger's law stipulated that in systems like Canada where they elect members of Parliament with a first-past the-post single-member district plurality, only two legitimate parties would exist. Riker, W. (1982). The Two- and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science. American Political Science Review. 76 (4) p 760.

7 speaking and Protestant.11 The differences between the Quebeckers and the federal government are profound. The issue of Quebec sovereignty or autonomy has only intensified over time.12 Even today, the historically powerful 'resentment' continues among Quebeckers, with one of their current foci being the

Conservatives' appointment of a unilingual auditor general.13 The Bloc

Quebecois formed in 1993 by providing a place for those who take a strong position on Quebec separatism and had become wildly popular in the province.

Despite Quebec having no major victories in its battle for autonomy and the possibility of future separation looking bleak, the BQ had emerged as the 'party for Quebec' It remained a formidable force in the Canadian House of Commons until it was nearly dismantled in the past election.14

Origins of Quebec Alienation

A discussion on distinct political differences in Quebec must begin with the province's alienation from the rest of Canada since its early history. The land originally was part of but became the British Province of Quebec in

1764 after the Seven Years' War15. The British Conquest of 1760-63 essentially

According the 2006 Canadian Census only 21.1% of identify as Francophone while 81.1% of Quebeckers do. According to the 2001 Canadian Census (question not asked in 2006 Census) 43.1% of Canadians are Catholic while 83.2% of Quebeckers are. 12 Belanger, E. (2004). "The Rise of Third Parties in the 1993 Canadian Federal Election: Pinard Revisited." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 37 (3) p 582. 13 De Souza, M. (2011, Nov 9). "Maxime Bemier Unhappy With Choice Of Unilingual Michael Ferguson For Auditor General." . 14 Young, L Belanger, E. (2008). "BQ in the House: The Nature of Sovereigntist Representation in the Canadian Parliament." Nationalism & Ethnic Politics, 14 (4) p 488. 15 Dyck, R. (2008) Canadian Politics: Critical Approaches p 101.

8 expelled France from North America but left a small population of French habitants. They generally resented British rule, although concessions were made so that they could retain their Catholicism and civil law system. The differences between the Francophones and Anglophones were accentuated as the

Constitutional Act of 1791 divided the Province into Upper Canada and Lower

Canada based upon lingual lines. They were not reunified until 1841.16 While

Confederation was designed to help put aside differences amongst the two lingual groups, tension existed from the start of the country. In 1885, Prime

Minister John Macdonald made a very controversial move to execute Louis Riel for inciting and leading both the Red River Rebellion and the North-West

Rebellion.17 The basis for Riel's actions was to fight for the Metis people who felt unfairly treated by Macdonald's government.18 Despite staging his rebellions in

Western Canada, he was thought of very fondly in Quebec due to his French

Catholic heritage.19 After the execution took place, a trite Macdonald famously said, "He shall hang, though every dog in Quebec bark in his favour."20

Development of Early Canadian Party Systems

Alan Cairns, one of the first theorists of voting behavior in Canada, seemed deeply troubled with the political system of his country. Since the creation of the Canadian state in 1867 until the time of his research in the early

16 Ibid p 101. 17 Ibid p 102. 18 Metis are Canadians who have a mixed European and Aboriginal heritage. 19 Dyck, R. (2008). Canadian Politics: Critical Approaches p 102. 20 Ibid 1960's, the Liberal and Conservative Parties alternately dominated and minor parties appeared to play no significant role.21 The Liberal Party was particularly dominant in Canada. This is not surprising due to Quebec's overwhelming support of the Liberals during this period. While Duverger would expect such a system, Cairns did not see the Canadian House of Commons and the two-party system as conducive to the welfare of the electorate. As the majority party held indefinite political power, the minority is disenfranchised of any political authority.

His suggestion was to allow a proportional representation system in order to afford third parties more access and create an "effective opposition."22 Yet, this proposition would become moot as the evolution and the eventual breakthrough of third parties (the Bloc Quebecois and the New Democratic Party) would end up fulfilling Cairns' vision instead. However, some still argue to this day that a proportional representation system in Canada would allow for even more effective opposition, as it would include parties with smaller and scattered support. It would also prevent the inflated number of seats that the majority party typically receives. This issue is in the Results section below with the fifth hypothesis.

21 Cairns, A. (1968). "The and the Party System in Canada, 1921-1965." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 1 (1) p 55. 22 Ibid

10 First Impact of the Quebec Voting Block

By the late 1960's and 1970's, the popularity of the Social Credit Party led to a breakthrough in gained seats for the party.23 Although its reign was short­ lived, the party's membership was overwhelmingly from Quebec (known as

Creditistes) that had briefly allowed for the "effective opposition" that Cairns had desired.24 While the party would implode due to friction and an eventual split between the Creditistes25 and the English SoCreds in other provinces, Quebec proved to be a breeding ground for successful third party candidates. After the

"Quiet Revolution" in the 1960's, citizens of Quebec became increasingly disillusioned with the federal government. Many began to desire separation.26

The popularity of the Creditistes as a protest party appeared to be a mechanism by which Quebeckers could politicize their anti-government sentiment. This movement would eventually lead to the "ideological parties" of the provincial Parti

Quebecois and the federal Bloc Quebecois.27

23 Belanger, E. (2004) 'The Rise of Third Parties in the 1993 Canadian Federal Election: Pinard Revisited." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 37 (3) p 582. 24 Cairns, A. (1968). "The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921-1965." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 1 (1) p 57. 25 When they officially split in 1963 the Quebec faction of the Social Credit Party became known as the Ralliement Creditiste du Quebec. 26 The Quiet Revolution is a period in Quebec in the 1960's that resulted in radical changes, namely rapid secularization, provincialiy controlled health care and education and the beginning of political distinctions between federalists and separatists. Pinard, M.; Hamilton, R. (1978). "The Parti Quebecois Comes to Power: An Analysis of the 1976 Quebec Election." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 11 (4) p 743. 27 Belanger, E. (2004). "The Rise of Third Parties in the 1993 Canadian Federal Election: Pinard Revisited." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 37 (3) p 585.

11 Jerome Black (1978) identified the Quiet Revolution as a catalyst for political change in Canada and sought to explain this "multicandidate calculus of voting". Building on the work of Cairns, he tried to explain why the two-party system was dominant as well as why third parties were emerging. His theory was that voters who sympathized with a minor party would vote for it if (1) they believed their candidate had a legitimate chance of winning or (2) if they believed they could not affect the outcome between the two major parties.28 While the initial voting for the Creditistes came from the Quebeckers as 'protest votes,' particularly based upon economic frustration, the party gained legitimacy in every subsequent election.29 Eventually, Quebec voters perceived that a Creditiste MP had a legitimate chance of making it to the Parliament and, in the 1962 election,

26 Creditistes were elected.30 Quebec's ability to elect third party candidates to the House of Commons in the 1960's would be a harbinger of future elections.

Emergence of Separatism in Quebec

Although Quebec was a stronghold of liberalism for most of the 20th century, the Liberal party at both the national and provincial level had alienated

Quebec voters during the Quiet Revolution. The Creditiste movement would only be the start of political change in the province. Separatist sentiment increased in

28 Black, J. (1978). "The Multicandidate Calculus of Voting: Application to Canadian Federal Elections." American Journal of Political Science, 22 (3) p 631. 29 Belanger, E. (2004). "The Rise of Third Parties in the 1993 Canadian Federal Election: Pinard Revisited." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 37 (3) p 585. 30 Ibid p 582. Black, J. (1978). "The Multicandidate Calculus of Voting: Application to Canadian Federal Elections." American Journal of Political Science, 22 (3) p 631.

12 Quebec during the 1960s and 70s. The rest of the provinces remained very much against Quebec gaining any special autonomy.31 The separatists formed the Parti

Quebecois in 1968 at the provincial level in order to contend with Liberals and advance Quebec autonomy. While the PQ began with a solid militant base, they shockingly overwhelmed the Liberals and swept into office by taking the provincial parliament in 1976.32 This is largely attributed to mass negative opinions of the Liberal Party and the increasing saliency to voters of the PQ platform to voters. The PQ began with mainly voters that favored secession, but soon established a platform that appealed to moderates and non-separatists as well.33 It would be this strategy that the Bloc Quebecois would adopt at the federal level in order to remain a strong presence in Parliament.34

PQ voters during this period were typically better educated and had a higher socio-economic status than the average Quebec voter.35 This proved to be a significant expansion of the voting base because the Creditistes were only successful in the poor and rural ridings. Pinard claims that this is due to the different characteristics of each. The Creditistes were a protest party while the

PQ was an ideological party.36 The appeal of the Creditistes would depend on

Pinard, M.; Hamilton, R. (1978). "The Parti Quebecois Comes to Power: An Analysis of the 1976 Quebec Election." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 11 (4) p 748. 32 Ibid p 744. 33 Ibid p 739. 34 Young, L. Belanger, E. (2008). "BQ in the House: The Nature of Sovereigntist Representation in the Canadian Parliament." Nationalism & Ethnic Politics, 14 (4) p 502. 35 Hunter, A.A. (1982). "On Class, Status and Voting in Canada." Canadian Journal of Sociology, 7 (1) p 26. 36 According to Pinard a protest party is one simply seeking economic changes, while an ideological party has a greater agenda (like separatism); Belanger, E. (2004). "The Rise of Third Parties in the 1993 Canadian Federal Election: Pinard Revisited." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 37 (3) p585.

13 the economic conditions at the time while the issue of Quebec separatism was independent of economic context. Modern research about the Bloc Quebecois does not show a statistical significance between high SES and electoral support, yet they are not disproportionately voted against by the better educated either.37

Ornstein and Stevenson suggest that the 'rich' are split on separatism based upon their professions and interests.38 Unsurprisingly, federal government officials are overwhelmingly against separatism while provincial officials are heavily in favor of it.39 Businesspeople are split as well due to a conundrum between sympathizing with the ideology and the real economic ramifications of separation.40 The only obvious distinction on separatism is between

Francophones and Anglophones. Language has been a constant issue in

Canada and those who speak French generally feel more culturally distinct from the rest of Canada. Yet this should not be overstated as a much stronger correlation exists between separatism and a Francophone living in a homogenous area compared all Francophones living in Quebec.41

37 Lublin, D.; Voss, D.S. (2002). "Context and Francophone Support for the Sovereignty of Quebec: An Ecological Analysis." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 35 (1) p 93. 38 Ornstein, M.D.; Stevenson, H.M. (1981). "Elite and Public Opinion before the Quebec Referendum: A Commentary on the State in Canada." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 14 (4) p 762. 39 Ibid p 762. 40 Ibid p 751. 41 Lublin, D.; Voss, D.S. (2002). "Context and Francophone Support for the Sovereignty of Quebec: An Ecological Analysis." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 35 (1) p 92. 14 Decline of the Liberals in Quebec

While the Liberal Party was dominant for most of the 20 century in

Canada, it was particularly dominant within the province of Quebec. Prior to the

1984 election, the Liberals had held the majority of Quebec seats in all but one election (1962) and in the 1980 election, they won 74 of 75 seats. Yet it is in this short four-year period that the fortunes of Liberals would forever change in

Quebec.

The transformation began when the Parti Quebecois provincial government called a referendum in 1980 to determine whether Quebeckers desired independence from the rest of Canada. The measure was defeated handily as the 'No' side won by a vote of 59.56%-40.44%.42 This prompted then-

Prime Minister to seek to bring Quebec into the fold through the

1982 Constitution Act. Yet this measure angered Quebeckers as it framed

Canada as a centralized, bilingual country as opposed to Quebec as a distinct society.43

It worsened for the Liberals in Quebec and the rest of Canada when

Trudeau's successor, , stated that he lacked an option when following through with last-minute Trudeau patronage appointments at the 1984

42 Ornstein, M.D.; Stevenson, H.M. (1981). "Elite and Public Opinion before the Quebec Referendum: A Commentary on the State in Canada." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 14 (4) p 747. 43 Dyck, R. (2008). Canadian Politics: Critical Approaches p 110.

15 Leader's Debate. Progressive Conservative leader and Quebec native Brian

Mulroney responded

"You had an option sir. You could have said, 'I am not going to do it. This is wrong for Canada, and I am not going to ask Canadians to pay the price.' You had an option sir - to say no- and you chose to say yes to the old attitudes and the old stories of the Liberal Party. That sir, If I may say respectfully, that is not good enough for Canadians."

Table 4 Liberal Dominance and Downfall in Quebec Election Seats % of Seats Election Seats % of Se< 1900 57 88% 1963 47 63% 1904 53 82% 1965 56 75% 1908 52 80% 1968 56 75% 1911 36 55% 1972 56 75% 1917 62 95% 1974 60 80% 1921 65 100% 1979 67 89% 1926 59 91% 1980 74 99% 1930 40 62% 1984 17 23% 1935 59 91% 1988 12 16% 1940 62 95% 1993 19 25% 1945 47 72% 1997 26 35% 1949 68 93% 2000 36 48% 1953 63 88% 2004 21 28% 1957 62 83% 2006 13 17% 1958 50 67% 2008 14 19% 1962 35 47% 2011 7 9% Note: The number and percentage of seats represent the share that the Liberal Party won in each election in the province of Quebec. All election data used is from Elections Canada.

A reeling Turner once again exclaimed that he had no option. In a moment that solidified his image with Canadians, Mulroney said, "this is an avowal of failure and a confession of non-leadership. You had an option sir, you could have done better."44 Mulroney's Conservatives would win in a landslide. A stunning 57 of their 108 seat gains came from Quebec.

1984 Leaders Debate CBC Archives

16 Emergence of the Bloc Quebecois

Events leading up to the 1993 federal election appeared to cultivate the proper conditions for a dramatic change in the House of Commons. The 1980 referendum represented a solid win for the federalists. Yet much unrest still existed between Quebec and the rest of the country. Two attempts by the

Mulroney government at reconciling Quebec (the Meech Lake Accords and the

Charlottetown Accords) not only failed, but conjured up further anti-government sentiment.45 The two major parties weakened as Conservative Prime Minister

Brian Mulroney became very unpopular due to unemployment and an economic downturn. Many Quebeckers felt equally alienated by the Liberals.46 This trend permeated the rest of Canada as well, as the New Democratic Party picked up an unprecedented 43 seats in 1988. The Conservative party began to splinter.47

After Meech Lake failed, the Conservative Party splintered as a majority of

Western MPs broke away and started the Reform party. Prominent Quebeckers on both sides of the aisle made their move. The Bloc Quebecois formed as many

Conservative and Liberal MPs in Quebec had lost hope that the federal

45 The Meech Lake Accords in 1987 and the Charlottetown Accords in 1992 were both failed attempts and amending the , with each make certain endorsements and statements about Quebec as a distinct society. Lublin, D.; Voss, D.S. (2002). "Context and Francophone Support for the Sovereignty of Quebec: An Ecological Analysis." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 35 (1) p 92. 46 Belanger, E. (2004.) 'The Rise of Third Parties in the 1993 Canadian Federal Election: Pinard Revisited." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 37 (3) p 586. 47 The New Democratic Party is a prevalent third party that is generally regarded as the most liberal in Parliament (Ironically the Liberal Party is moderate). Belanger, E. (2004). The Rise of Third Parties in the 1993 Canadian Federal Election: Pinard Revisited. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 37 (3) p 587.

17 government would ever give Quebec a remedy it desired.48 The desperate, second solution of the Mulroney government, the , was therefore also dead in the water. The Bloc felt the accord did not go far enough while the Reform Party refused to recognize Quebec as a distinct society.49

Led by former Mulroney minister , the Bloc Quebecois filled the power vacuum in the 1993 election and won 54 seats. By narrowly beating out the Reform party, the BQ became the Official Opposition in only its first election.50 This initial wave is consistent with Black's theory. Quebec voters believed in the legitimacy of the new party in part because prominent political figures led the movement. The provincial success of its sister party, the PQ, was also a factor.51 While the rise of Creditistes required an economic crisis, public opinion polls showed that the reason for support of the BQ was largely due to longstanding government alienation.52

Forming a uniquely Quebec party was an interesting experiment in itself because, as Bakvis & Macpherson found, Quebec historically voted as a

48 Belanger, E. (2004). "The Rise of Third Parties in the 1993 Canadian Federal Election: Pinard Revisited." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 37 (3) p 586. 49 Dyck, R. (2008). Canadian Politics: Critical Approaches p 111. 50 The Reform Party was established as a right-wing protest party to the increasingly unpopular Conservatives. It would later re-merge to form the Conservative Party in 2000. 51 Pinard, M.; Hamilton, R. (1978). "The Parti Quebecois Comes to Power: An Analysis of the 1976 Quebec Election." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 11 (4) p 739. Black, J. (1978). "The Multicandidate Calculus of Voting: Application to Canadian Federal Elections." American Journal of Political Science, 22 (3) p 632. 52 Belanger, E. (2004). "The Rise of Third Parties in the 1993 Canadian Federal Election: Pinard Revisited." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 37 (3) p 589.

18 "block." Quebec voters had the second strongest electoral cohesion in a province (second only to Newfoundland) and were a much better indicator than

Ontario (the second biggest province) in predicting which party would run the government.54 Such research is helpful in explaining Canadian voting behavior when one considers that Quebec supported the Liberal party and contributed to its dominance for most of the 20th century. When the Quebeckers shifted heavily to the Conservatives in the 1980's, Canada had Conservative Prime Minister

Brian Mulroney. This block theory is strengthened by the fact that no significant difference existed in voting behavior between Francophones and Anglophones in

Quebec.55 While the direction of voting amongst Anglophones and Francophones deviated since the Bloc Quebecois, it is this distinct voting history that helps explain why a party focused solely on the province of Quebec was so successful at the federal level.56

With the Bloc Quebecois surging, the PQ provincial government decided to organize another sovereignty referendum in 1995. While the 1980 referendum was devastating for the movement, the emergence of the BQ and the failed accords were indicators that public sentiment shifted.57 Even though the results had in fact indicated a significant change, the separatist movement was handed

53 Bakvis, H., Macpherson, LG. (1995). "Quebec Block Voting and the Canadian Electoral System." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 28 (4) p 660. 54 Ibid p 666. 55 Ibid p 665. 56 Lublin, D.; Voss, D.S. (2002). "Context and Francophone Support for the Sovereignty of Quebec: An Ecological Analysis." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 35 (1) p 92. 57 Ornstein, M.D.; Stevenson, H.M. (1981). "Elite and Public Opinion before the Quebec Referendum: A Commentary on the State in Canada." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 14 (4) p 747.

19 a crushing blow. The referendum was defeated once again, this time by a margin of 50.6%-49.4%.58 Still this result indicated just how tumultuous things had gotten in Quebec and why the Bloc's emergence in this period was so logical. While the separatist movement was reeling after this result, and the BQ lost the title of

Official Opposition in the 1997 election, new leader did not allow the party to disintegrate. Instead, the Bloc Quebecois followed the example of the

Parti Quebecois and established a center-left platform that appealed to

Quebeckers who were moderate and non-sovereigntist as well.59

Political Survival After the Failed Referendum

The Bloc Quebecois' platform and strategy following the failed referendum was essential to its survival. Since then, rather than fight against the federal system, the BQ has adopted the moderate strategy of acting as a standard party in Parliament while not abandoning separatist rhetoric.60 By continuing to opt to make changes within the system, it had remained politically relevant and legitimate. A content analysis of BQ members in the Question Period of the

House of Commons shows that the Bloc intensifies or tones down its discussion

Young, L. Belanger, E. (2008). "BQ in the House: The Nature of Sovereigntist Representation in the Canadian Parliament." Nationalism & Ethnic Politics, 14 (4) p 511. 59 Ibid p 488. Pinard, M.; Hamilton, R. (1978). "The Parti Quebecois Comes to Power: An Analysis of the 1976 Quebec Election." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 11 (4) p 739. 60 Young, L. Belanger, E. (2008). "BQ in the House: The Nature of Sovereigntist Representation in the Canadian Parliament." Nationalism & Ethnic Politics, 14 (4) p 498.

20 of separatism based upon public opinion within the province at the time. The strategy of choosing not to follow the obstructionist example led by the only separatist party to be successful, the Sinn Fein in Ireland, was a double edged sword.62 The Bloc won victories for Quebec by doing business in a "respectful, constructive fashion" which comes at the cost of partially compromising its separatist endgame by accepting the legitimacy of Parliament.63 Such successes include the increased use of the in Parliament and disproportionately favorable funding to Quebec.64 The utilization of such strategies not only maintains and increases the nationalist sentiment of its supporters but also has secured compromise from the federal government, as these minor concessions are much less 'dangerous' to Canada as a whole.65

As much as theory helps us understand why the Bloc Quebecois remains, the BQ's regional nature also shatters many longstanding theories used to explain Canadian voting behavior. The value of Bakvis & Macpherson's voting block theory declined. It asserts that the majority of Quebec voters would predict the national government. Yet the Bloc Quebecois won Quebec in all six elections

Young, L. Belanger, E. (2008). "BQ in the House: The Nature of Sovereigntist Representation in the Canadian Parliament" Nationalism & Ethnic Politics, 14 (4) p 506. 62 Ibidp 491. 63 Coyne, A. (2010, May 31st). "A Long Declining Force." Maclean's. 64 Tremblay, M.; Pelletier, R. (2000). "More Feminists or More Women? Descriptive and Substantive Representations of Women in the 1997 Canadian Federal Election." International Political Science Review; 21 (4) p 397. 65 Young, L Belanger, E. (2008). "BQin the House: The Nature of Sovereigntist Representation in the Canadian Parliament." Nationalism & Ethnic Politics, 14 (4) p 497.

21 until 2011. However, when one looks at the election results since 1993, it appears that Quebec continues to be a vehicle for political change as its voters profoundly impact the make-up of the House of Commons. A study by Bastien and Loewen is also problematic in understanding Quebec.67 While these scholars found a significant correlation between the popular opinion of the party in power and how the candidate from that party did in such elections, this effect was significantly weaker in Quebec.68 The research linked special election data of every contest in the last 45 years and had essentially established a relationship of voting for a Conservative or Liberal candidate based upon favorable/unfavorable perceptions of those in power. From 1993-2011 the Bloc

Quebecois had become the main party in Quebec, yet it held a minimal chance of ever forming the national government, which makes the government- opposition party relationship very different. This theory is important in explaining by-election behavior. The Bloc Quebecois (and now the NDP) complicated what used to be a much simpler, dichotomous Conservative-Liberal relationship.69 The

Bloc's status as an anomaly among political parties changed the way political scientists study federal election behavior across Canada, in part, because it encourages them to focus on regional interests as opposed to national parties.

Bakvis, H., Macpherson, L.G. (1995). "Quebec Block Voting and the Canadian Electoral System." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 28 (4) p 666. 67 Loewen, P.J.; Bastien, F. (2010). "(In) Significant Elections? Federal By- 1963-2008." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 43 (1) p 91. 68 Ibid p 99.

22 The Bloc Quebecois and Liberal Party as the two main parties in the province frustrate Cutler's theory of local economic conditions affecting voting behavior. Cutler intensively studied two very diverse elections (1993 and 1997) as each had a different party in power and a very different economic situation.70

Across the board, this study indicates that voters would either punish or reward the party in power based upon their current economic conditions. Once again, the province where this theory weakened was in Quebec due to the Bloc

Quebecois.71 It is the separatist ideology that complicates this binary way of thinking. For many BQ voters, the Liberal and Conservative Parties are one in the same due to their federalist perspective on Canadian separatism. In the 2011 election, evidence presented will suggest that the NDP and Green Party like the

Bloc Quebecois in become outlets for Quebeckers to show displeasure for the

Conservative and Liberal Parties. This is addressed below in the second hypothesis.

Platform and Demographics of BQ Voters

The literature on the Bloc Quebecois also refutes some perceptions about the party's platform, influence and voter base. First of all, while BQ supporters are predominantly French speaking, the amount of Francophone support depends on the particular demographics of the riding. Lublin & Voss provide rather convincing evidence that BQ support by Francophones is stronger in

70 Cutler, F. (2002). "Local Economies, Local Policy Impacts and Federal Electoral Behaviour in Canada." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 35 (2) p 349. 71 Ibid p 365.

23 culturally homogenous districts as opposed to ones with a mix of English and

French-speakers.72 They explain this shift based on the 'contact hypothesis' which states that an area with a multitude of cultures will be less likely embrace separation.73 The cultural diversity of Montreal combined with a significantly smaller Francophone to Anglophone ratio contrasted to the rest of province, indicates why certain ridings in the city seem unwinnable for the BQ.

The second myth about the Bloc is that because its base is largely

Francophone, that it is also composed predominantly of devout Roman

Catholics. The classic demographic is that Liberals are often Roman Catholic and the Conservatives are often Protestant. An obvious consequence of the BQ sweeping through Quebec would be the siphoning of Liberal support.74 Yet, interestingly enough while the Bloc and Roman Catholicism have the strongest party-religion connection in the country, the more devout a Catholic in Quebec is, the more likely he/she is to support the Liberal party.75 Therefore conversely, the

Bloc Quebecois is supported strongly by nominal Roman Catholic voters.

Ironically, this appears to be a strategic advantage due to the global trend of increased secularism, even in Quebec, giving the BQ a demographic edge. In

72 Lublin, D.; Voss, D.S. (2002). "Context and Francophone Support for the Sovereignty of Quebec: An Ecological Analysis." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 35 (1) p 92. 73 Ibid 74Guth, J.L.; Fraser, C.R. (2011). "Religion and Partisanship in Canada." Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 40 (1) p 61.

24 light of the 2011 election, it is also important to note that the NDP has the strongest tie to non-religious people.76

The Bloc Quebecois' anti-war stance is also well-known. The

Conservatives often scapegoat the BQ for imposing 'undue influence' on

Canada's involvement in . Yet, statistically, the public opinion on

Afghanistan in Quebec was and continues to be similar to the majorities in most other provinces.77 Therefore, it appears that the Bloc's staunch anti-war stance is exaggerated by the Conservatives due to the BQ's strained relationship with the rest of Canada.78 Afghanistan is a controversial conflict in many NATO countries and therefore the anti-war position supports the Bloc's continued success. The

Bloc is also known for its negative stance on missile defense. Federal parties, including 's Conservatives, are said to "to trim [its] sails in the area of defense and security so as not to alienate vote-rich Quebec, which often seems out of step with the rest of Canada when it comes to things military."79

While some Quebec separatists would embrace NORAD and NATO for Quebec as an independent country, the near-consensus of the province's voters prevented Canada from accepting a continental missile defense system.80

Guth, J.L.; Fraser, C.R. (2011). "Religion and Partisanship in Canada." Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 40 (1) p 61. 77 Massie, J.; Boucher, J.; Roussel, S. (2010). "Hijacking a Policy? Assessing Quebec's 'Undue' Influence on Canada's Afghan Policy." American Review of Canadian Studies, 40 (2) p 267. 78 Ibid pp 260. 79 Haglund, D.G.; Roussel, S. (2008). "It's a Long Road from Fort Greely to Chicoutimi: Quebec Sovereignty and the Issue of Missile Defense." Comparative Strategy, 27 (4) p 361. 80 Ibid p 362.

25 The Bloc's stance on defense, combined with the promotion of social programs and welfare, put the Bloc in a very advantageous place on the , to the left of the Liberals and to the right of the NDP.81 BQ support has expanded based upon its platform tailored to Quebeckers. MPs have the leverage of sacrificing Canada's interests because of uncompromising support of the interests of Quebec. Considering the long-standing alienation of the Quebec people from the government, it has only helped the Bloc when the Harper government alienates voters by singling the BQ out in foreign policy matters.82

Figure 1: Spectrum of Canadian Political Ideology 83

(Left) | New Democratic—Bloc Quebecois—Liberal—Conservative | (Right)

The Quebec Nation

Whether the Bloc Quebecois resurges or withers away, something that will not change is the distinctness of the electorate, the "Quebec nation." Based upon its heavily Francophone nature, most Quebeckers view themselves as a distinct society from the rest of Canada. While this feeling of distinction leads some to desire separatism from the country, many others feel that Quebec should be

81 Tremblay, M.; Pelletier, R. (2000). "More Feminists or More Women? Descriptive and Substantive Representations of Women in the 1997 Canadian Federal Election." International Political Science Review; 21 (4) p 385. Belanger, E. (2004). "The Rise of Third Parties in the 1993 Canadian Federal Election: Pinard Revisited." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 37 (3) p 589. 83 Tremblay, M.; Pelletier, R. (2000). "More Feminists or More Women? Descriptive and Substantive Representations of Women in the 1997 Canadian Federal Election." International Political Science Review; 21 (4) p 385.

26 allowed a certain amount of autonomy as a province. While the Quebec Nation has previous longstanding periods of political loyalty, the lesson of federal elections is that the Quebec Nation is not afraid to vote out a party if it feels betrayed. The Liberal Party's electorate changed after its loss of Quebec seats in

1984. The Progressive Conservative Party barely held onto its political life after being thrown out of Quebec in 1993. The Bloc Quebecois in the 2011 election appears to be the latest casualty of the will of the Quebec Nation.

Death of the BQ?

After a particular party suffers an embarrassing loss in an election, it is tempting to speculate about that party demise. Yet this is usually a rare circumstance, especially in Canada. In fact, the only party in recent memory that ceased to exist after heavy electoral loss was the Social Credit party. The once- dominant Liberals declined after the 1984 election based upon the patronage scandal and John Turner's non-response to it. Yet, only nine years after their worse loss in electoral history, they would find themselves back in power with a majority government. The Conservatives suffered the worst electoral loss in

Canadian history, yet they rose from the ashes to a win in the 2006 election.

They continue to hold the government to this day. While a definite possibility exists that the Bloc Quebecois will cease to be a political force, a prediction of its demise may be too hasty.

27 The 2011 Canadian Federal election represented a dramatic shift in federal and regional politics. The Conservatives gained a majority in Parliament and the New Democratic Party became the Official Opposition. The Liberal Party and the Bloc Quebecois hit an all-time low. The majority of the electoral shift in the election occurred from the Orange Crush of the NDP in Quebec (with most victims being incumbent Bloc Quebecois MPs). Therefore, in order to understand the 2011 election, it is vital to understand what exactly happened to the Bloc.

The NDP surge appears to partially support the theory of "dyadic representation" in an SMP parliamentary system.84 It states that MPs not only follow party discipline when voting in the House of Commons but that they also represent the constituency of the riding that elects them. Research indicates that this dyadic relationship is limited in Canada as party discipline reigns supreme.

However, it is still relevant in the popularity and success of certain Canadian politicians.85 This relates to voting behavior in Quebec because it appears that

MPs were elected for both reasons. While certain NDP MP candidates such as

Thomas Mulcair, and enjoy individual popularity and have a bond with the people that elected them, it appears that many MPs were elected based upon the approval of Jack Layton and the mass acceptance of the NDP platform and label. This helps to explain the election of the McGill Five and many other NDP freshmen MPs. may be the most pertinent example. Brosseau vacationed in Las Vegas during the

^Soroka, S.; Penner, E.; Blidook, K. (2009). "Constituency Influence in Parliament." Canadian Journal of Political Science; 42 (3) p 563. 85 Ibid p 566.

28 campaign cycle and does not speak French fluently.86 This is despite the fact that her riding of Berthier-Maskinonge is composed of over 98% francophones.87

The analysis of the BQ losses also indicates why dyadic representation leans in the direction of the party platform and leadership. If there were a large constituency connection with the riding and the candidate, then Quebeckers likely would not have thrown out so many of their longstanding MPs. Six of them, including party leader Gilles Duceppe, were Bloc MPs elected in 1993.

Meanwhile when you consider the obscure range of NDP candidates elected,

(described by the Economist as a motley group of students, ex-Communists, teachers, activists and a few seasoned politicians) the platforms, perception of parties and leadership were much more important to the Quebec electorate.88

Table 5: Incumbent Bloc MPs who lost in 2011 Incumbency # of MPs Average Loss Margin 6-Time 6 14.9% 5-Time 1 18.2% 4-Time 4 14.2% 3-Time 15 17.1% 2-Time 6 20.0% 1-Time 8 20.9% 0-Time 1 17.0% Note: This table represents the incumbent BQ MPs who lost re-election in 2011. Only full-terms are counted for the purpose of this table, not partial terms due to winning a by-election. All election data used is from Elections Canada.

86 Curry, B. (2011, Apr 26). "NDP Candidate Takes Mid-Campaign Vacation in Vegas." . 87 2006 Canadian Census 88 (2011, May 3). "Canada's Federal Election: An Orange Wave delivers a Conservative Majority." The Economist.

29 Conclusion

While this literature creates a sharper picture of voting tendencies in

Quebec, this most recent election result leaves many questions unanswered.

The Bloc Quebecois arose as a unique phenomenon, especially amongst the history of separatist or regional parties around the world. Its approach is also unique for a separatist party because it advances its interests by working within the system rather than protesting against it. Unlike the other three major parties, the BQ is not looking for cross-country appeal and has constructed a platform tailored to the interests and needs of Quebeckers (Young & Belanger, p.490).89

These factors kept the BQ as the winner of province of Quebec in its first six elections and established it as a mainstay in the House of Commons.

Research on the Bloc Quebecois is particularly necessary because its anomalistic quality has disrupted many longstanding theories on Canadian voting behavior.90 We certainly do not have the same system that Cairns was disgruntled about as both the Bloc and the NDP have created an 'effective

Young, L. Belanger, E. (2008). "BQ in the House: The Nature of Sovereigntist Representation in the Canadian Parliament." Nationalism & Ethnic Politics, 14 (4) p 490. 90 Cairns, A. (1968). "The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921-1965." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 1 (1) p 57. Bakvis, H., Macpherson, L.6. (1995). "Quebec Block Voting and the Canadian Electoral System." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 28 (4) p 660. Cutler, F. (2002) "Local Economies, Local Policy Impacts and Federal Electoral Behaviour in Canada." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 35 (2) p 365. Loewen, P.J.; Bastien, F. (2010). "(In) Significant Elections? Federal By-Elections in Canada 1963-2008." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 43 (1) p 99.

30 opposition' to the Liberal and Conservative parties. Quebeckers felt alienated by the federal government over economic issues during the Quiet Revolution and protested the Liberal party by supporting the Creditistes.91 Frustration with the federal government combined with the desire for Quebec sovereignty helped spawn the first ideological party in the Parti Quebecois.92 The Bloc Quebecois used the PQ's model. Its 1993 emergence took over a respectable proportion of support in Canada's second most-populous province. Because of the Bloc, it is no longer valid to assess the relationship simply between the Liberals and

Conservatives in general elections or in by-elections in Quebec.93 Nor is it true to suggest that Francophones and Roman Catholics automatically support the Bloc, as the demographics of the voting base are much more complex.94

The way that the Bloc Quebecois maintained support from 1993-2008 was indeed quite remarkable. Investigating the causes of their sudden downfall is also compelling. The easy answer would be to say that Quebeckers just simply are tired of separatism and embraced federal Canada. Facts and analysis do not endorse this view. The body of literature on Quebec politics explains the

Belanger, E. (2004). 'The Rise of Third Parties in the 1993 Canadian Federal Election: Pinard Revisited." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 37 (3) p 582 92 Pinard, M.; Hamilton, R. (1978). "The Parti Quebecois Comes to Power: An Analysis of the 1976 Quebec Election." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 11 (4) p 749. 93 Cutler, F. (2002). "Local Economies, Local Policy Impacts and Federal Electoral Behaviour in Canada." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 35 (2) p 365. Loewen, P.J.; Bastien, F. (2010). "(In) Significant Elections? Federal By-Elections in Canada 1963-2008." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 43 (1) p 99. 94 Lublin, D.; Voss, D.S. (2002). "Context and Francophone Support for the Sovereignty of Quebec: An Ecological Analysis" Canadian Journal of Political Science, 35 (1) p 92. Guth, J.L.; Fraser, CR. (2011). "Religion and Partisanship in Canada." Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 40 (1) p 61.

31 continued presence of the Bloc. I will add to this body of literature by providing answers to the question of why the Bloc was unsuccessful in the 2011 election. CHAPTER III

METHODS AND PROCEDURES

The methodology for this thesis integrates both qualitative and quantitative evidence into the understanding of this election. Qualitative information from newspapers and other periodicals is essential in constructing the context of the campaign cycle and the election. Quantitative information from electoral data and polling data is essential to tracking the opinions of voters on political parties and issues. This two-dimensional approach allows the research to get a more complete picture of the election, which in turn creates a better understanding of the electoral loss.

Research Question: What caused the Bloc Quebecois to suffer such heavy losses in the 2011 Canadian Federal Election?

33 Hypothesis 1: The loss of Bloc Quebecois support in the 2011 election was caused by a dramatic shift of voter support in Quebec to the New Democratic

Party.

Null Hypothesis 1: There is no relationship between the Bloc Quebecois loss of seats and New Democratic Party's support.

Hypothesis 2: The loss of Bloc Quebecois support in the 2011 election was due to the spreading of support amongst protest parties in heavily Francophone ridings.

Null Hypothesis 2: The loss of Bloc Quebecois support was not because of the spreading of support amongst protest parties in heavily Francophone ridings.

Hypothesis 3: The loss of Bloc Quebecois support in the 2011 election was caused by particular events in the campaign cycle, including decisions by the

New Democratic Party and the Bloc Quebecois, particularly leaders Jack Layton and Gilles Duceppe.

Null Hypothesis 3: There is no relationship between Bloc Quebecois support and the particular events in the campaign cycle, including decisions made by the

NDP and BQ, particularly leaders Jack Layton and Gilles Duceppe.

34 Hypothesis 4: The loss of Bloc Quebecois support in the 2011 election was caused by declining support for Quebec separatism.

Null Hypothesis 4: There is no relationship between Bloc Quebecois support and views on separatism

Hypothesis 5: The loss of Bloc Quebecois support in the 2011 election was caused by Canada's use of the Single Member District Plurality System as opposed to Proportional Representation.

Null Hypothesis 5: There is no relationship between Bloc Quebecois support and the SMDP system.

The first hypothesis will look at the effect of the New Democratic Party surge in Canada with a particular emphasis on how it affected the losses of seats and votes for the Bloc Quebecois in the 2011 election. This will be done using

Election Canada's electoral data from the 2011 election and previous elections at the riding, provincial and national level. The national level statistics will be used to understand the NDP surge on a complete scale. This will be then compared and contrasted to its impact just on the province of Quebec. Riding-level data are used to analyze and determine where the NDP surge took place and whether it was localized or widespread within Quebec.

35 The second hypothesis will involve the analysis of both the original and my revised version of Lublin and Voss' contact hypothesis. Their research reveals that the more homogeneously francophone a riding is, the more likely voters there would be to support the Bloc Quebecois. Yet in light of the 2011 election result, I will test the contact hypothesis with the support of "protest parties" as well as just the Bloc Quebecois. This will be done by analyzing electoral data from both the Bloc Quebecois and all Protest Parties and riding Francophone statistics from the 2006 Canadian Census. Quantitative data will be obtained using single and multiple linear regressions with SPSS.

The operationalization of Quebec votes is necessary based upon the historical disdain that Quebec voters have shown for the Canadian government.

It is reasonable to assume that if the 2011 election results were simply a referendum of the Bloc Quebecois and its decreasing popularity, the Quebec voters would turn to the parties that they previously supported, the Conservative and Liberal Parties. The New Democratic Party (and its predecessor the Co­ operative Commonwealth Federation) have been in the House of Commons nearly a century, but only had one from Quebec prior to

2011 (Thomas Mulcair in 2008). Furthermore, the NDP had never held the title of the Official Opposition prior to 2011. This means its previous impact in Canadian

Parliament was severely limited. Maurice Pinard had already labeled the Bloc as an ideological party, yet perhaps we should think of them more as a protest

36 party. To be clear, one may define a protest party as one that has yet to form the government but has the potential of doing so.

Every active party that has previously elected an MP in the House of

Commons except for the Liberals and Conservatives (and their predecessor the

Progressive Conservatives) falls under this category. Therefore, the second prong of this definition is whether this protest party has the ability to elect MPs to the House of Commons. The three parties that fall under this definition for the

2011 election are the Bloc Quebecois, the New Democratic Party, and the Green

Party.95 While it is certainly debatable whether any of these three parties has the potential to form the government, all three have proven themselves to be legitimate contenders.96 Canadians have rewarded them with a significant percentage of the popular vote. While their ideologies and platforms differ, they all share the similarity that their voters would like to see a change in Parliament as opposed to the traditional two main parties.

Due to the toxic relationship between Quebec citizens and the Canadian government, it appears vital to analyze how much the citizens still rejected the

Liberals and Conservatives while at the same time rejecting the Bloc Quebecois.

Those who stuck with the Bloc certainly are making their voice heard through the traditional route. However, a Quebecker's vote for the New Democratic Party or

95 Parties such as the , Marxist-Leninist Party, and the were excluded because of their consistently low support. 96 The strongest cases being for the regional nature of the Bloc Quebecois and the track record for low seat totals for the Green Party.

37 the Green Party also signifies that that individual is also looking for change in

Ottawa.

The third hypothesis involves important events during the campaign cycle leading up to the 2011 election. This section will include quantitative polling data from EKOS and Nanos polling to understand popularity and party preference over the course of time. It will also provide qualitative evidence from newspaper and periodical coverage of the campaign that helps better understand the context and the decisions made by both the Bloc and the NDP campaigns, as well as how they were perceived.

The fourth hypothesis involves looking at views of Quebec separatism going into and directly after the 2011 election. Angus Reid and NANOS polling will be used to get a better understanding of the popular opinion regarding separatism. A quantitative comparison will be done between the Bloc Quebecois and the Parti Quebecois over this period to look at the differences in support. The reasoning behind this is the idea that there are different constituencies (of course with a large amount of overlap) for these two parties, based upon how radical they are perceived to be and what legislative tools they have at their disposal.

The fifth hypothesis is a test of Duverger"s Law and will involve an analysis of previous election data (obtained from Elections Canada) to look at how political parties are influences by the Single Member District Plurality

38 System. The analysis will reach back to the 1993 election with a specific focus on the Bloc Quebecois and New Democratic Party. This will be done by making calculations that project how electoral results would be different under a system of proportional representation. This will be meshed with qualitative historical information to examine the Bloc's current and past influence.

This research certainly possesses more internal validity than external validity. Not many situations across the globe exist that are similar to the

Quebec-Canada relationship. This is largely due to the high concentration and population of Francophones within the province. Most separatist elements are relatively small groups compared to the country's populace. However, the internal validity to this thesis is strong as this is a pressing question to the body of literature on Canadian Federal Politics. In particular, this research provides a pressing example of how electoral decisions in Quebec shape (and in many ways, hold hostage) the structure of the Canadian House of Commons. In order to understand the volatility of Canadian elections in the future, this is a question which must be answered.

39 CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

Hypothesis 1: The NDP Surge

In the 2004 Canadian Leaders' Debate, Prime Minister framed the debate and claimed that the Canadian people had only two choices to form the government in Canada, either the Conservatives or the Liberals. In an almost prophetic fashion NDP leader Jack Layton responded to Martin with: "I've got to take issue with a claim that you are making. That there are only two parties with the capability of governing. What kind of arrogance gives you that kind of proposition? You are taking for granted the Canadian people."97 While many probably rolled their eyes at Layton's comments when he made them, in just seven short years the Canadian people provided Layton's New Democrats with the title of Official Opposition. At the same time, they sank the Liberal party to an all-time low.

97 2004 Canadian Leaders Debate CBCArchives

40 Table 6: NDP Percentage of Vote 2006-2011 Province/Territory 2006 2008 2011 11.6% 12.7% 16.8% 28.6% 25.0% 32.5% 25.4% 24.0% 25.8% 21.9% 21.9% 29.8% Newfoundland & 13.6% 33.9% 32.6% 42.1% 41.5% 45.8% 29.8% 28.9% 30.3% 17.6% 27.6% 19.4% 19.4% 18.2% 25.6% 9.6% 9.8% 15.4% Quebec 7.5% 12.2% 42.9% 24.0% 25.6% 32.3% 23.9% 9.0% 14.4% Total 17.5% 18.2% 30.6% Note: This table represents the populai• vote of the New Democratic Party at the provincial level in the 2006, 2008 and 2011 election. All election data used is from Elections Canada.

A significant NDP electoral surge occurred in 2011 as it increased its percentage of the popular vote and seat total from previous years. The NDP topped 30% of the national popular vote for the first time in their history. The party also improved its popular vote in all provinces and territories except for the territory of Nunavut and province of Newfoundland & Labrador. However, one major shift came from the province of Quebec as the NDP increased its share of the vote from 12.2% in 2008 to a whopping 42.9% in 2011. Conversely, the Bloc

Quebecois only received 23.4% of the vote in Quebec with its previous low mark being 37.9% in 1997. Therefore, without Quebec drastically shifting its support in

2011 it would be reasonable to suggest that the NDP would continue to have its

"third party curse" and the Bloc Quebecois would have maintained the level of seats and support that it had grown accustomed to over the years.98

98 Mavrikkou, M. (2009). "The NDP and the Third Party Curse in Canada." University of Waterloo Publications p 4.

41 Table 7: NDP Seat Changes (2008-2011) Province/Territory 2008 2011 Seat Change Alberta 1 1 0 British Columbia 9 12 +3 Manitoba 4 2 -2 New Brunswick 1 1 0 Newfoundland & Labrador 1 2 +1 Northwest Territories 1 1 0 Nova Scotia 2 3 +1 Nunavut 0 0 0 Ontario 17 22 +5 Prince Edward Island 0 0 0 Quebec 1 59 +58 Saskatchewan 0 0 0 Yukon 0 0 0 Total 37 103 +66 Note: This table represents the seat totals for the NDP in the 2008 and 2011 elections with the third column showing the net gains/losses of seats for each province/territory. All election data used is from Elections Canada.

The actual seat totals by the NDP show that a definite correlation exists between seats and the popular vote. While small gains were made in multiple provinces, the big difference was the 58 seats that the NDP picked up in Quebec.

No other party was able to gain a seat in Quebec that it had not previously held in 2008. While the Bloc was certainly the most affected as it lost 45 of the 49 ridings that it held in 2008, the Liberals and Conservatives lost a combined 13 of

25 seats to the NDP wave.

42 Table 8: Changes in Quebec Representation from 2008 to 2011 Party Ridings Gained Ridings Held Ridings Lost Conservative 0 5 6 Liberal 0 7 7 New Democratic 58 1 0 Bloc Quebecois 0 4 45 Note: This table represents the partisan changes in Quebec's 75 House of Commons Seats. A riding gained indicates that the party won a seat that it did not have in 2008. A riding held means that the party won the seat in both 2008 and 2011. A riding lost means that the party held the seat in 2008 but lost it in 2011. All election data used is from Elections Canada.

While the 2011 election in Quebec showed that the Bloc Quebecois was completely overwhelmed by the New Democratic Party's "Orange Crush," it is not the only conclusion that should be drawn. The Bloc Quebecois had the most to lose as it held a majority of Quebec seats in the House of Commons and were only able to hang on to four of their ridings. However, the Liberals and

Conservatives too, suffered major blows to their presence in Quebec. In fact all

Bloc Quebecois candidates, all but eight Conservatives, and all but one Liberal candidates running in 2011 received a lower percentage of the vote compared to their totals in 2008 in the province."

Based upon the election statistics in 2011, it is clear that the NDP surge significantly hurt the Bloc Quebecois. Voters abandoned the Bloc in great numbers but did not run back to their former keepers, the Liberals and

99 Out of the 225 Bloc, Liberal and Conservative candidates in Quebec, there were nine who performed better in ridings from 2008 to 2011: Conservative Minister of Industry (Megantic- L'Erable), Conservative Minister of State Dennis Lebel (Roberval—Lac-Saint-Jean) failed candidates Liberal Claude Morin (Beauce), Conservative Larry Smith (Lac-Saint-Louis), Conservative Bernard Genereux (Montmagny—L'lslet—Kamouraska—Riviere-Du-Loup), Conservative (Mount Royal), Conservative Agop Evereklian (Pierrefonds-Dollard), Conservative Dennis Galiatsatos (Saint-Laurent— Cartierville), Conservative Neil Drabkin (Westmount—Ville-Marie). Full data available in Appendix A.

43 Conservatives. Instead, Jack Layton's NDP, the leftist party that was fresh and untested in the province, became the beneficiary of the will of the Quebec Nation.

Based upon this electoral data I reject the null hypothesis, as it appears that the

NDP surge partially caused the BQ's loss of seats. With this relationship established we can now investigate the remaining four, more complex hypotheses.

Hypothesis 2: The Modified Contact Hypothesis

As we have seen, the contact hypothesis suggested by Lublin and Voss appears to be relatively accurate when assessing the Bloc Quebecois support in the 2004, 2006 and 2008 federal elections. The eight ridings (Lotbiniere—

Chutes-de-la-Chaudiere, Levis—Bellechasse, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-

Charles, Megantic—L'Erable, Jonquiere—Alma, Louis-Saint-Laurent, Portneuf—

Jacques-Cartier, Beauport-Limolou) that have over 95% Francophones, shifted from supporting the Bloc Quebecois in 2006 to supporting the Conservative party. This is explained by the voters choosing a viable ideological alternative in

Stephen Harper's revived Conservative Party. In addition, Quebec separatism at that time did not appear to be as salient as in the 1990's.

Despite the Conservative encroachments in Quebec, the contact hypothesis appears to be valid: the more homogenously francophone a riding is, the more likely it is to support the Bloc Quebecois. A regression on the electoral

44 data from 2004-2011, showed that the Francophone percentage of a riding is statistically significant in relation to voting for the Bloc. Despite a definite decrease in this percentage for the 2011 election, the contact hypothesis is still statistically robust. Therefore, despite the massive loss in the number of seats,

Lublin and Voss' contact hypothesis is still helps explain Francophone voting behavior.

Table 9: Contact Hypothesis - Bloc Quebecois Data Set R R Square Adj R Square Siq BQ 2004 0.826 0.682 0.677 .000 BQ 2006 0.673 0.453 0.445 .000 BQ 2008 0.715 0.511 0.504 .000 BQ 2011 0.640 0.410 0.402 .000 All 0.902 0.814 0.804 .000 Note: This table represents the data from a linear regression done with the independent variable being the amount of Francophones in a riding and the dependent variables being the percentage of the popular vote that the BQ gained in 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2011. The Francophone statistics are from the 2006 Canadian Census' report of French being a home language for each riding. All election data used is from Elections Canada. Refer to Appendix B for the full data set.

Despite this consistency in the legitimacy of the contact hypothesis, the francophone population certainly went in a different direction in 2011. As discussed in Hypothesis 1, this direction was not towards the Bloc, nor was it towards the Liberals and Conservatives. Francophone Quebeckers have felt varying levels of alienation from the Canadian government throughout its history, and clearly mistrust the two traditional parties. Therefore, it is relevant to revise the contact hypothesis to state that the more homogenously Francophone a riding is, the more likely it is to support a protest party (The Bloc, the NDP or the

Green Party).

45 Table 10: Contact Hypothesis - Protest Parties Data Set R R Square Adj R Square Sig PP 2004 0.771 0.594 0.589 .000 PP 2006 0.562 0.316 0.306 .000 PP 2008 0.555 0.308 0.299 .000 PP 2011 0.587 0.344 0.335 .000 All 0.883 0.779 0.766 .000 Note: This table represents the data from a linear regression done with the independent variable being the amount of Francophones in a riding and the dependent variables being the percentage of the popular vote that protest parties gained in 2004,2006, 2008 and 2011. Protest Parties for this statistical test was the combined totals of the Bloc Quebecois, the New Democratic Party, and the Green Party. The Francophone statistics are from the 2006 Canadian Census' report of French being a home language for each riding. All election data used is from Elections Canada. Refer to Appendix B for the full data set.

The analysis of this revised contact hypothesis also is statistically significant. While the numbers are slightly lower than they are for the original contact hypothesis, this provides a strong explanation of Francophone voting behavior. The statistical relationship became slightly stronger in 2011 as the original became slightly weaker. Therefore, while the BQ was decimated, the

Francophone Quebeckers continued their support of protest parties. While a large amount of Francophones decided in 2011 that the New Democratic Party was a better option than the Bloc Quebecois, one thing remains the same: the

Quebec Nation is not endorsing Canada's ruling parties and seeks an alternative.

Canadian federal politics are increasingly volatile in the past three decades. The 2011 election was unprecedented as it signaled major declines of two political parties, the Bloc and the Liberals, while elevating the consummate minor third party, the New Democratic Party, to the Official Opposition. Yet there were two previous federal elections indicating an unstable political environment.

In 1984, Brian Mulroney's Progressive Conservatives crushed the Liberals who

46 had dominated most of the 20 century. The same Progressive Conservative party was handily defeated (with the NDP taking a sizable loss) in the 1993 election due to resurgence of the Liberals, as well as the emergence of the Bloc

Quebecois and the Reform Party.

While the results of these three elections had a lot to do with the national electorate, it is interesting to note just how influential Quebec was in all three outcomes. Mulroney won the hearts of Quebeckers in 1984 enough to persuade them to throw out the only federal party they supported, the Liberals. Yet, the

Progressive Conservatives would end up failing in many ways. They fragmented by 1993, with many Western conservatives joining the Reform Party and Quebec

MPs leaving to join with Liberal MPs to form the Bloc Quebecois. In all, 53% of the Progressive Conservative new seats in 1984 and 37% of their lost seats in

1993 came from Quebec.100

Further evidence supports the revised contact hypothesis, that Quebec was the only province to deviate from national election trends in 2011. Stephen

Harper's attainment of a majority government was helped by Conservative candidates received an increase of the popular vote in 205 of 307 ridings. Jack

Layton's New Democrat surge amounted to 291 candidates receiving an increase in the popular vote. The Liberal decline was marked by only 21 candidates receiving an increase in support.

100 Ironically one of the two members of the Progressive Conservative caucus to survive the 1993 election was who is currently the leader of the provincial Liberal Party and serves as the of Quebec.

47 Table 11: Total and Quebec Seat Changes in "Watershed Elections" Election Party Seat Changes Quebec Seat Changes 1984 Liberal -107 -57 Progressive Conservative +108 +57 New Democrat -2 0 1993 Liberal +94 +7 Progressive Conservative -167 -62 Bloc Quebecois +54 +54 New Democrat -34 0 Reform +52 0 2011 Conservative +23 -5 New Democrat +67 +58 Liberal -43 -7 Bloc Quebecois -45 -45 Green +1 0 Note: This table represents the seat changes in 1984,1993 and 2011 at both the national level and in the province of Quebec. All election data used is from Elections Canada.

. Quebec followed the rest of Canada in propelling the NDP and shunning the Liberals but only increased its support for 8 out of 75 Conservative candidates. This deviation from the national trend seems quite peculiar (Also refer to Appendix D). While Quebec voters' ideological position may be a factor in this phenomenon, this explanation has limitations. It is the same province that once overwhelmingly supported Brian Mulroney. It also appears that Quebec rejects the two main parties to a greater extent than the rest of the provinces do.

48 Table 12: Electoral Support Trends from 2008 to 2011 Province NDP CP LP BQ Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down Alberta 28 0 24 3 4 24 British Columbia 35 1 25 11 3 33 Manitoba 11 3 14 0 2 12 New Brunswick 10 0 3 7 0 10 Newfoundland & Labrador 3 4 7 0 0 7 — Northwest Territories 1 0 0 1 1 0 Nova Scotia 5 6 10 1 2 8 Ontario 104 2 96 10 7 99 Prince Edward Island 4 0 3 1 0 4 Saskatchewan 14 0 13 1 1 13 — Yukon 1 0 1 0 0 1 Quebec 75 0 8 67 1 74 0 75 Rest of Canada 216 16 197 35 20 212 Total 291 16 205 102 21 286 0 75 Note: This table represents the changes in partisan support from 2008 to 2011 at the riding level. The amount of ridings in the "Up" column signifies how many had an increase in the popular vote for that particular party. The amount of ridings in the "Down" column signifies how many had a decrease in the popular vote for that particular party. All election data used is from Elections Canada. Refer to Appendix E for a full riding-by-riding list.

Therefore, I reject the null hypothesis in this case as well. The loss in BQ seats was not due to a decrease in the support of protest parties. Instead, this support increased as the popular vote for both the Liberals and Conservatives decreased in the province. But the protest vote was spread out and favored the

NDP instead of the Bloc, which had traditionally relied on this support. The contact hypothesis is still relevant when broadening it to include protest parties, rather than just the Bloc.

49 Hypothesis 3: Campaign Decisions And Events

Leadership of Gilles Duceppe

While Lucien Bouchard was the powerful, credible figure to get the Bloc

Quebecois off the ground (being a former Conservative minister under PM Brian

Mulroney), Gilles Duceppe should receive most of the credit for maintaining the support of the BQ from the 1997 election to the 2008 election. Yet, many question whether Duceppe had the energy that the campaign needed in 2011.

The wear and tear would not be surprising considering Duceppe is the fifth longest-serving party leader in Canadian history. Approval of Duceppe's handling of the party was compromised when considering that a long-standing Bloc MP like Louis Plamondon survived re-election while Duceppe was beaten handily in the Laurier-Saint-Marie riding. This was the same riding that made him the first ever Bloc MP to win an election back in 1990. While the status of dyadic representation leaning towards the party rather than the individual, the loss of a party leader in his/her own riding is telling. Duceppe and Ignatieff losing in their respective "safe ridings" of Laurier—Saint-Marie and -Lakeshore were major indicators of campaign failure.

50 Table 13: Longest Tenure For Party Leaders Leader Party Tenure Years in Office Wilfred Laurier Liberal 1887-1919 32 William McKenzie King Liberal 1919-1948 29 John Macdonald Conservative 1867-1891 24 Pierre Trudeau Liberal 1968-1984 16 EdBroadbent New Democrat 1975-1989 14 Gilles Duceppe Bloc Quebecois 1997-2011 14 Note: This table shows the six longest tenured party leaders in Canada's history. Data was from the 's Website.

When considering the amount of time and effort that Duceppe put into the

Bloc Quebecois and the relative ease that most Bloc MPs had in getting elected, it seems very plausible that the BQ under Duceppe's leadership could start the campaign lacking energy. Polling did not help this complacency. At the start of the campaign, EKOS projected the Bloc gaining seats and referring to Duceppe as the only opposition leader "looking good" going into dissolution of Parliament.

While the BQ did lose a bit of ground to the Conservatives in the 2006 Election, there were no serious threats to its legitimacy since its first appearance in 1993, despite the crushing loss in the sovereignty referendum of 1995.

Before he knew it, Duceppe was blindsided by Layton in Quebec. Based upon similar liberal ideologies and never campaigning against one another in the past, Duceppe had often referred to Layton as 'my friend Jack.' Yet, it appeared at every turn it was the charismatic figure of Layton in Quebec that gave

Quebeckers confidence in the NDP. Duceppe looked run-down in comparison.

One good example is when Duceppe made a popular political move by calling for the postponement of the French language debate scheduled on the same night

51 as the Montreal Canadiens NHL playoff game.101 Layton echoed this sentiment and further claimed that if he wasn't involved in the election he would probably want to watch the hockey game over the debate.102 Layton then boosted his image by being the only leader in attendance. Layton, the Montreal native, became the topic of discussion in Quebec when an iconic photograph surfaced of him in a Canadiens' jersey hoisting a pint amongst Canadien fans. Soon Layton would be regarded as the most popular party leader in Quebec.103

Based upon the increased popularity of Layton in Quebec, the NDP shifted campaign resources to the province. The NDP had never mounted a legitimate campaign in Quebec, as it was a party that originated in Western

Canada and has maintained a staunch federalist attitude. Yet Layton's message of "higher corporate taxes, more social spending, and a withdrawal of Canadian troops from Afghanistan resonated in pacifist, big-government Quebec."104 The

NDP was starting to make small gains into a province that it had hardly tapped in the past.

101 La Haye, Dominique (2011, Apr 10). "Habs fever prompts debate date change." . 10? Dowd, A. (2011, Apr 10). "Canada's Love of Hockey Trumps Election Debate." Reuters. 103 According to NANOS on April 12th Jack Layton scored 73.2% on their Leadership Index in Quebec. Stephen Harper scored 57.7%, Gilles Duceppe 48.2%, Michael Ignatieff 41.9% and 5.5% 104 (2011, Apr 28). "Canada's General Election and The Elusive Majority." The Economist.

52 Table 14: EKOS Seat Projections Date CP LP NDP BQ IND GP 3/14/2011 140 86 29 52 0 3/28/2011 139 86 29 53 0 4/11/2011 144 89 29 45 0 4/15/2011 131 93 38 45 0 4/19/2011 146 69 44 48 0 4/21/2011 134 82 60 32 0 0 4/25/2011 131 62 100 14 0 4/26/2011 133 64 97 13 0 4/28/2011 139 56 98 14 0 5/1/2011* 130-146 36-46 103-123 10-20 0 1 5/2/2011** 166 34 103 4 0 1 Note: This table shows the series of EKOS polling seat projections that start from before the dissolution of Parliament to the 2011 election. EKOS "offers seat projections based on its opinion polling. The projections are based on regional and, in some cases, sub-regional polling projected onto the results of the last election. They do not pretend to predict individual ridings." The May 1 figures are a range of seats predicted as opposed to a single number. **The May 2 figures are the actual election results.

In what became the turning point of the election, Gilles Duceppe decided to respond to the decline in support with a political power play. He enlisted the support of high-profile former and current Parti Quebecois members. These

"hard-core sovereigntists" included the bombastic and controversial former

Premier of Quebec Jacques Perizeau, the current leader of the PQ Pauline

Marois and activist Gerald Larose.105 Instead of stopping the slow bleeding of

Bloc Quebecois support, the measure appeared to open the wound as the corresponding EKOS seat projection dropped from 32 seats to 14 in a matter of just four days.

105 Chung, A. (2011, May 3). "Duceppe Resigns as Bloc Quebecois Drowns in an Orange Tsunami." .

53 Duceppe's fatal error appeared to be his overt attempt to appeal to the militant separatists. By doing so, he alienated moderates who either supported the Bloc based upon its platform or those who merely felt that Quebec should be granted a special status. Duceppe's approach to make the election in Quebec a referendum on sovereignty was clear when he said, "For Quebec, the federal election is not a choice between left and right. The choice of Quebeckers is between parties for whom it's Canada first, and a party for whom it's Quebec before all."106 Such a statement resonated in the Lucien Bouchard era when tension in Quebec was at its height. Yet, Duceppe's "born-again separatist" rhetoric abandoned and contradicted the 'big-tent' base of Quebec autonomists and separatists that he had created in his tenure.107 The alienation of voters by the Bloc worsened when activist Gerald Larose referred to Layton as a fake and a scoundrel, in a time when Layton was the most popular leader in the province and the country.

Jack Layton's unfortunate and untimely death does give us insight on just how instrumental his leadership was on the NDP success in the 2011 election.

During the election cycle Jack Layton easily surpassed all other leaders

(including Prime Minister Harper) in popularity, not only in Quebec but nationwide. This popularity stayed consistent after Layton's ascension to the leader of the opposition and through the remainder of the parliament session.

Almost immediately after Layton's death in August, the approval of the NDP

106 Chung, A. (2011, May 3). "Duceppe Resigns as Bloc Quebecois Drowns in an Orange Tsunami." Toronto Star. 107 Wells, P. (2011, May 16). "The Orange Wave Rises." Maclean's.

54 leadership dropped back to pre-campaign levels (Figure 2). This is despite NDP Nycole Turmel being Layton's handpicked successor. While there were certainly Quebec NDP candidates that enjoyed popularity on the individual level, this data strengthens the hypothesis that Quebec was voting based upon its approval of Jack Layton, his platform, and his campaign.108 Despite a member from Quebec being chosen to replace him, it appears voters thought of Jack

Layton as irreplaceable. Before interim leader Turmel even had a chance to show competence, voters had already soured on the NDP.

Figure 2: CTV/Globe/Nanos Leadership Data

>»o ® NANOS

Stephen Harper Ben KM Nvcoit Turme! cotes DiKfppc Uiaabemnoy

Note: This figure represents CTV/Globe/Nanos polling on Canadian Leadership from February 2008 to October 2011. The poll had been conducted weekly during this period through phone interviews with randomly selected Canadians. Questions assessed the leadership qualities of each party leader on three main aspects: Trust, Competence, and a Vision for Canada. From this data, Nanos developed a leadership index score, displayed above. In case this figure is difficult to see in grayscale, the following lines top to bottom (using the Feb2008 point): Stephen Harper (Conservative), Jack Layton/Nicole Turmel (NDP), Dion/lgnatieff/Rae (Liberal), Elizabeth May (Green), and Gilles Duceppe (BQ).

One good example of a NDP Quebec member enjoying a great deal of individual popularity is Romeo Saganash. Saganash is a local leader representing the riding of Abitibi—Baie-James—Nunavik— Eeyou, which is known for its indigenous population.

55 Lack of a polarizing issue?

The Bloc Quebecois lost support after the 1995 referendum as the Bloc lost seats in both the 1997 and the 2000 federal elections. In 2004, the Bloc resurged, for reasons unrelated to separatism. The Bloc played an instrumental role in starting to uncover the Liberal Sponsorship scandal.109 By the 2006 election, pressure had really mounted on the Liberals as the scandal reached

Prime Minister Paul Martin. While the Bloc did lose seats to the Conservatives in

Quebec City, many felt the party spearheaded the uncovering of the Liberal scandal and was rewarded with another strong mandate of 51 seats. In 2008,

Stephen Harper made some disparaging remarks about cutting major government funding of the arts, a major issue for Quebeckers.110 The Bloc used this as a defining issue in the campaign and once again rewarded with a majority

(49) of Quebec seats.

Polling proved a liability for Gilles Duceppe and his campaign strategy. As the only leader of an opposition party to have a high approval rating after the dissolution of Parliament, he had reason not to be too concerned about the upcoming election. This was probably natural when considering that the Bloc

Quebecois had a solid and steady performance in all six general elections that it had participated in. In hindsight, this passive and lackluster start out of the gates directly led to the opportunist Layton stealing the spotlight in the province.

109 Dyck, R. (2008). Canadian Politics: Critical Approaches pp 392. 110 (2011, Mar 24). "Canada's Politics: Here We Go Again." The Economist. 56 Meanwhile the 'panic in the Bloc camp' led to moving from "relative calm and a quasi-absence of talk on the Bloc's founding principle -sovereignty- to an all-out frontal assault with all sovereigntist guns firing."111

While the provincial Parti Quebecois is generally regarded as the sister party to the federal Bloc Quebecois, the conclusion drawn from this election is that the Bloc continued success was by adopting a more moderate route than its principal counterpart, the PQ had. The Bloc is a federal party that advocates for

Quebec. Its main goal is separatism. Yet, it is essentially powerless to achieve this goal in the House of Commons. Both the 1980 and the 1995 on sovereignty were sponsored by the Parti Quebecois when it held power of the

Quebec National Assembly. Another indication that the provincial government is the true vehicle for separation was the speculation that the well-respected

Duceppe would take over the PQ after the 2011 election.

Table 15: Polling in Quebec prior to the 2011 election Party 3/25 4/1 4/8 4/15 4/22 4/29 Actual BQ 39.7% 36.0% 33.0% 31.0% 27.2% 25.6% 22.8% CP 18.5% 18.9% 16.7% 17.9% 18.4% 14.5% 14.6% GP 8.6% 8.0% 6.5% 6.8% 5.6% 4.7% 4.5% LP 18.0% 19.1% 22.7% 20.5% 15.5% 14.7% 15.2% NDP 12.8% 12.8% 18.6% 22.1% 31.4% 38.8% 39.9% Note: This table represents EKOS polling of party preference for decided voters in the province of Quebec for the 6 weeks prior to the 2011 election.

111 Chung, A. (2011, May 3). "Duceppe Resigns as Bloc Quebecois Drowns in an Orange Tsunami." Toronto Star.

57 When looking at the electoral success of the BQ and the PQ since 1993, there is not a direct relationship of support. While the federal and provincial elections take place at different times, it is the same electorate. It appears that

Quebec voters have different views of the BQ and PQ. Because of the Bloc serving as more of an active advocate of Quebec with no real ability to achieve separation, it makes sense that they receive the support of those who desired for special status for Quebec, as well as those who simply want to see Quebec better represented in the House of Commons.

Table 16: Parti Quebecois/Bloc Quebecois Election Performance Election BQ Seats % of Vote Election PQ Seats % of Vote 1993 54 49.3% 1989 29 40.2% 1997 44 37.9% 1994 77 44.8% 2000 38 39.9% 1998 76 42.9% 2004 54 48.9% 2003 45 33.2% 2006 51 42.1% 2007 36 28.4% 2008 49 38.1% 2008 51 35.2% 2011 4 23.4% Note: This table represents the electoral success of both the federal Bloc Quebecois and provincial Parti Quebecois since 1989 in terms of percentage of the popular vote and seats won. All electoral data used is from Elections Canada.

Second Choice Voting and the Open Letter

As Black illustrated in his multi-candidate calculus of voting, a voter's second-choice party can be critical in multiparty elections. Despite considering themselves a member of a particular party, voters may often pick a second choice if they feel that they can get that party elected or prevent another party

58 from getting elected.112 The data of second-choice parties in Quebec status during the final week of the campaign cycle is telling. While the data does appear to follow the ideological spectrum for the three main parties (Conservative voters would choose the Liberals as their second-choice, Liberals would choose either

Conservatives or NDPers), the surprising statistic lies with the Bloc Quebecois voters. 62.5% of Bloc voters viewed the NDP as their second-choice.

Furthermore, the Bloc had by far the lowest amount of "hard-core" voters who declared that they had no second choice at a lowly 5.2%.

Table 17: Quebec Second Choice Parties in 2011 Second Choice Party CP Voters LP Voters NDP Voters BQ Voters Conservative N/A 25.5% 18.6% 9.6% Liberal 23.1% N/A 35.7% 17.3% New Democrat 28.4% 43.7% N/A 62.5% Bloc Quebecois 0.8% 2.6% 11.9% N/A None 43.4% 23.1% 21.1% 5.2% Note: This graph represents CTV/Globe/Nanos polling on second-choice electoral preferences in the week prior to the 2011 election. The columns represent party identification of the voter with the percentages being the second choice of those particular voters for the party listed on the left.

Just three days before the election, two former Bloc members, Maxime

Bellerose and Benoit Demuy, released an open letter. They hoped to persuade second-choice voters to vote for the NDP.113 Their main contention is that the

Bloc mutated and is out of touch with its base and would not be able to grant the ultimate goal of separation. On the other hand, Jack Layton not only had a platform of social justice with which Quebeckers could agree, but the NDP also

Black, J. (1978). "The Multicandidate Calculus of Voting: Application to Canadian Federal Elections." American Journal of Political Science, 22 (3) p 631. 113 The translated open letter is in Appendix E.

59 represented the best chance for Canada to break the cycle of Stephen Harper's

Conservative minority governments. Although the goal of unseating Harper as

Prime Minister was not completed, it appears that the NDP benefitted from many last-minute Quebec votes, which propelled the party to its lopsided victory.

Ultimately, the data presented in this section suggests that the lead up to this major change occurred in the legally mandated six-week campaign cycle, not between 2008 and 2011. The image and message of Jack Layton resonated with

Quebec voters while the image and message of Gilles Duceppe seemed tired, then erratic, and finally undesirable. By clinging to the PQ for support, the BQ alienated most of its moderate voters. Furthermore, it appears that many heeded the words of Bellerose and Demuy and chose the NDP as a second choice.

The quantitative and qualitative data presented in this section mean that I reject the null hypothesis. In fact, this particular cause seems to have the strongest relationship with the Bloc losing seats. Especially when considering that the Bloc's downfall (according to polls) only occurred during the 6 week campaign cycle. Duceppe's campaign strategies led to second choice voting and the alienation of moderate sovereigntists with Jack Layton and his aggressive campaign strategy being the beneficiary.

60 Hypothesis 4: Separatism

Polling data indicates that the preference for Quebec separatism stabilized just below the levels of the failed 1995 referendum.114 Yet, this does not mean that Quebec is satisfied with the federal government by any means. However, it appears that Quebec voters emphatically supported separatism in the period where the federal government had 'failed' in Meech Lake and Charlottetown.

Aside from the base of the militant separatists (typically synonymous with the PQ base), the 1990's were a time where moderates were frustrated and passionate.

As time progressed and emotions cooled, moderates went back to their beliefs that Quebec should be recognized as a distinct society and/or that they should receive a certain amount of autonomy from the Canadian government.

The Parti Quebecois' has continued to advocate for separatism although the party's perceived decline is essentially conditional. A poll by Leger Marketing showed that support depends upon the leader at the time of election. Under current leader the party would only receive 20% of the vote. If

Gilles Duceppe were to take the reins, the PQ would receive support 37% of

Quebeckers.115 Meanwhile, directly after the 2011 election, another Leger marketing poll showed that the support for separatism remained around 40%.

Martin, P. (2011, May 12) Sovereignty Movement is Down But Not Out. Toronto Star. 115 Muise, M. (2011, Oct 30). "Only Gilles Duceppe Could Defeat Francois Legault: Poll." The Montreal Gazette.

61 Therefore, no change in the level of attachment to Canada affected the results of the election.116

Gilles Duceppe estimated in a 2010 interview that he felt 40% of

Quebeckers were separatists, 40% were federalist and that 20% were moderates.117 A 2009 Angus Reid Poll in provides a detailed picture of where

Quebecker sentiment lies on issues involving Quebec. While a heavy majority believe that Quebec is a distinct society and needs more autonomy, the question of separatism is muddled in this 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 situation. While the inflamed tensions of the early 90's resulted in nearly a majority of Quebeckers wanting to separate from the rest of Canada, since that time, separatism levels are relatively stable.

Table 18: Quebeckers views on Distinctness Belief % of Quebeckers Quebec Is a Distinct Society 82% Quebec Needs More Autonomy 79% Quebec Has Enough Sovereignty 32% Quebec Should Separate from Canada 28% Quebec Needs More Sovereignty But Should Remain in Canada 30% If Referendum Was Held Today: Would Vote Yes 40% If Referendum Was Held Today: Would Vote No 41 % If Referendum Was Held Today: Undecided 19% Believe Quebec Will Separate One Day 20% Note: This table represents Angus Reid polling of Quebecers on various views involving sovereignty/separatism. This poll was conducted with internet-based interviews on June 12 2009.

' Martin, P. (2011, May 12). "Sovereignty Movement is Down But Not Out." Toronto Star. 117 Geddes, J. (2010, May 31). "Is The Bloc Good For Canada?" Maclean's.

62 One must make important distinctions when evaluating the impact of separatism on the electoral support for the Bloc Quebecois. The Bloc Quebecois formed as a federal in order to advocate separation of Quebec from

Canada (or at least some special autonomy) due to the Canadian Federal

Government's perceived inabilities to meet the needs and demand of the Quebec

Nation. Yet, we see over time that the Bloc worked tirelessly within the House of

Commons in order to attempt to achieve its ideological goals. Furthermore, in order to obtain political legitimacy the Bloc created a broad platform and advocates for many types of issues in Parliament. Thus, the Bloc in 2006 was tremendously different from its single-issue nature under the leadership of Lucien

Bouchard in the early 1990's. Due to the diverse base that the Bloc Quebecois attracts, it is important not to think of the separatist movement and the Bloc

Quebecois as interchangeable.

While the two parties were founded based upon the same ideology and look to receive electoral support from the same populace, they have two distinct objectives. The Parti Quebecois seeks support in the Quebec National Assembly so that it can help steer Quebec to separation from the rest of Canada by persuading the Quebec population to vote for the measure in a referendum.

While the Bloc would support this action (and did support the failed 1995 referendum) its job as a federal party is to advocate for Quebec's interests at the federal level. In addition, it exists to persuade the rest of the country that an autonomous partnership between Quebec and Canada would make sense.

63 In the wake of the devastation of the Bloc Quebecois, the Parti Quebecois finds itself in an increasingly difficult situation. The province now appears to be courted by another well-respected and opportunistic politician, former PQ minister Francois Legault. Legault is on the verge of forming a new-centre right party, which is committed to put aside the separatism issue, is leading polls in the province. It appears that this is a filling of a void left by a tired Liberal government, a reeling Parti Quebecois and a near-dead right-leaning Action democratique du Quebec (ADQ). Polling suggests a spike in support for the far- left Quebec Solidaire. This party only holds one seat in the Quebec National

Assembly.118 Yet, based upon the new poll regarding Duceppe's leadership, the

Parti Quebecois popularity has just as much to do with leadership as it does with separatism. The PQ would form the government if Duceppe took the reins of the party (37%), but it would do significantly worse if it stays under the leadership of

Marois (20%).119

Two logical conclusions can be drawn from these particular events. First, the loss of the Bloc Quebecois precipitated the free fall of the Parti Quebecois.

This relationship is not mutually exclusive as the BQ would not necessarily be affected by a decline in PQ support. The Bloc previously maintained its support despite Parti Quebecois ebbs and flows. This is due to support of moderate

118 Rashi, R. (2011). "Bloc Crushed, PQ In Crisis, The Left Resurgent: Whither Quebec?" Canadian Dimension, 45 (5) p 6. 119 Muise, M. (2011, Oct 30) "Only Gilles Duceppe Could Defeat Francois Legault: Poll." The Montreal Gazette.

64 voters who know that the Bloc lacks the power to undertake actual separatist action. Meanwhile it is much easier to argue that voting for a PQ candidate is an active vote for Quebec separatism. The second conclusion is that Quebeckers are as interested in governmental change as they are with ideology. The Federal

NDP seems like a logical fit for Quebec based upon ideology while this new provincial party would be more of a stretch (except for pockets within Quebec

City).120 Both parties bring forth new ideas and have the ability to usher out parties that have disappointed them in the past.

In this case, I fail to reject the null hypothesis. It does not appear that views on separatism played a major factor in the BQ losing seats. While the Bloc is predicated upon separatism, it has no ability to conduct serious actions like holding a referendum, which attracts moderates. The polling data showed that

Quebec still holds the same opinions about separatism that it has had over the past 15 years. Therefore the Bloc may have ultimately hurt itself by appearing

'too separatist' for its electorate.

Hypothesis 5: SMDP vs. Proportional System

Alan Cairns' research unveiled perceived flaws in the first-past-the-post single member district plurality system by showing that the Liberal and

120 In the 2006 election, a rejuvenated Conservative Party took multiple ridings in from the Bloc Quebecois.

65 Conservative Parties both enjoyed inflated majorities with seats compared to the percentage of the popular vote. In addition to the two main parties, third parties had a much better chance of obtaining seats if they had strong regional/sectional support as opposed to parties that has low, nationwide support. Cairns' solution to remedying this problem was to propose a system of proportional representation so that each individual vote will carry more weight in affecting the makeup of the Canadian House of Commons.

When observing the results of all seven elections in which the Bloc

Quebecois participated, it appears clear that Cairns' theory is spot on. The

Liberal majority governments of 1993 and 1997, the Liberal minority governments of 2000 and 2004, the Conservative minority governments of 2006 and 2008 and the Conservative majority government of 2011 all obtained a higher percentage of seats than their percentage of the popular vote. The most exaggerated example of this took place in the 1993 election when the Liberals won 60% of the seats in Parliament with only 41% of the vote.

Cairns' assertion about third parties also appears to be true from 1993-

2008. The Bloc Quebecois received an inflated number of seats in all six elections. In fact, over that time, the Bloc would obtain an average of 13.5 fewer seats in Parliament under proportional representation. Meanwhile, two other major parties, the New Democratic Party and the Green Party, were subjected to a disproportionately lower number of seats due to national, yet low overall,

66 support. Under proportional representation the Green Party would have had a seat in Parliament as early as 1997 and would have rivaled the Bloc Quebecois in support in 2008 (the Green Party would've had 21 seats while the Bloc would've had 31). Yet, with the SMDP system, it was not until the 2011 election until the Green Party won its first seat. Meanwhile the New Democratic Party had been around since the 1930's, and due to the SMDP system, mired in a "third- party curse."121 In 1997, 2004, 2006 and 2008, the New Democratic Party garnered a higher percentage of the popular vote than the Bloc. However, it did not even come close in obtaining a similar number of seats.

Another trend that appeared in the past few decades (due to the electoral paradigm shifts beginning in the 1980's) is a political party's decline being hastened by the SMDP system. The best example of this is in the 1993 election with the Progressive Conservative party. While it is not disputed that the once- prominent governing party was on a sharp decline, it still managed to receive over 16% of the popular vote nationwide (which was more than the Bloc popular vote). Despite a sizable share of the vote, the PCs went from 169 seats to just 2.

Under proportional representation, the voters' message to the Progressive

Conservatives would still be loud and clear as that party would have lost 121 seats in Parliament, but not the apocalyptic 167 seats it actually did lose.

Mavrikkou, M. (2009) ."The NDP and the Third Party Curse in Canada." University of Waterloo Publications, p 4.

67 Table 19: Proportional Representation Year Party % of vote Projected Actual % of Seats 1993 Liberal 41.2% 124 177 60.0% Bloc Quebecois 13.5% 40 54 18.3% Reform 18.7% 56 52 17.6% New Democrat 6.8% 21 9 3.1% Prog. Conservative 16.0% 48 2 0.7% National 1.4% 4 0 0.0% Natural Law 0.7% 2 0 0.0% 1997 Liberal 38.5% 117 155 51.5% Reform 19.4% 59 60 19.9% Bloc Quebecois 10.7% 33 44 14.6% New Democrat 11.1% 34 21 7.0% Prog. Conservative 18.8% 57 20 6.6% Green 0.4% 1 0 0.0% 2000 Liberal 40.8% 125 172 57.1% 25.5% 78 66 21.9% Bloc Quebecois 10.7% 33 38 12.6% New Democrat 8.5% 26 13 4.3% Prog. Conservative 12.2% 37 12 4.0% Green 0.8% 2 0 0.0% 2004 Liberal 36.7% 115 135 43.8% Conservative 29.6% 92 99 32.1% Bloc Quebecois 12.4% 39 54 17.5% New Democrat 15.7% 49 19 6.2% Green 4.3% 13 0 0.0% 2006 Conservative 36.3% 113 124 40.3% Liberal 30.2% 94 103 33.4% Bloc Quebecois 10.5% 33 51 16.6% New Democrat 17.5% 54 29 9.4% Green 4.5% 14 0 0.0% 2008 Conservative 37.7% 117 143 46.4% Liberal 26.3% 82 77 25.0% Bloc Quebecois 10.0% 31 49 15.9% New Democrat 18.2% 57 37 12.0% Green 6.8% 21 0 0.0% 2011 Conservative 39.6% 123 166 53.9% New Democrat 30.6% 95 103 33.4% Liberal 18.9% 59 34 11.0% Bloc Quebecois 6.0% 19 4 1.3% Green 3.9% 12 1 0.3% Note: This table is the calculation of what the projected number of seats would be under a proportional representation system along with the actual seats won in the SMDP system. All electoral data used is from Elections Canada.

68 Ironically, it was the Bloc that became a victim of the single member riding system in 2011. Despite registering its lowest share of the vote in party history, the Bloc Quebecois would have won 19 seats under proportional representation as opposed to the mere 4 seats that it did win. Meanwhile, the NDP's gains were relatively proportional to the popular vote. This seat/vote ratio for is hugely disproportional in Quebec. The NDP accumulated 79% of the Quebec seats despite only getting 42.9% of the Quebec vote. Meanwhile the Bloc gained 23% of the vote but only received 5% of Quebec's seats. Therefore, while the Bloc was disproportionately favored for the first six elections in which it had participated in, a hypothetical analysis of a proportional system reveals that the

BQ would have maintained its solid support in all seven elections, even despite the 2011 drop.

Under the proportional system, the Bloc Quebecois would continue to have a solid influence on the political process. This is because Stephen Harper's

Conservatives would not have won an outright majority and fail to do so for the third straight election. The outcome would be an embarrassing one for the Prime

Minister and it would surely have conjured up the possibility of a minority coalition forming a government.122 This would seem even more possible considering it would still be Jack Layton and the leftist NDP as the Official Opposition as opposed to the centrist Liberals who carry serious baggage. The Conservatives

The possibility of a was heavily discussed leading up to the 2011 as pollsters did not project the Conservatives to win a majority.

69 successfully fended off a government-toppling coalition in December 2008 by framing the NDP and Liberals as plotting with the Quebec separatists. It may not be as easy to prevail a second time. An NDP/Liberal coalition could avoid formal

BQ support, but, in this particular scenario, they would need to appease both the

Bloc and the Green Party in order to stave off any Conservative non-confidence motion.123 Regardless of the potential situation that would have ensued after the

2011 federal election in a proportional system, the Bloc Quebecois would still be very alive and relevant with 19 seats in the House of Commons.

The dramatic paradigm shifts that occurred in the 1984, 1993 and 2011 elections do indicate that something unique exists within the Canadian SMDP structure. It provides the vehicle for rapid electoral change and amplifies the rise of surging parties and the death of declining parties. This is particularly interesting when one considers that Canada's counterparts in the United

Kingdom have seen relative stability. For most of Canada's history, it possessed a relatively stable two-party system with a minor third party and very unspectacular elections (similar to that of Conservatives, Labour and Liberal

Democrats in the United Kingdom).124 Yet, the Liberals, Conservatives, Bloc

Quebecois, and New Democratic Party were affected in different ways, mainly by

According to the Canadian Parliamentary process a government will be expected to call for an election after it has been in power for 4-5 years. However a government can be toppled prior to this and a new election would be set up by a majority vote known as a vote of non-confidence. Election Resources UK

70 an unsatisfied Quebec nation.125 The changes in partisanship at the provincial level in Quebec are yet another indication of this tumultuous situation. So, while the NDP is the latest champion of Quebec interests, history and the nature of similar-member districts indicate that it may be just as easily be swept out of office if it neglects its constituents. The BQ's 2011 loss of seats had a lot to do with the Single Member District Plurality system and therefore I am rejecting the null hypothesis.

125 The other influential party in this period, the Reform Party, was also indirectly related to the Quebec voting block as it was created to branch away from the Progressive Conservatives and appeal to , a region that often feels animosity towards Quebec.

71 Chapter V

CONCLUSION

The supposed death of the Bloc Quebecois and the separatist movement in Quebec leaves us with more questions than answers. However, the 2011 election did confirm that Quebec remains influential in shaping electoral change in Canada. Quebec ended the Liberal Party's century-long dominance when it overwhelmingly voted for the Progressive Conservative Party in 1984. While the

Liberals regained control of the government from 1993-2006, their support declined without their base in Quebec and hit an all-time low of seats in the 2011 election. The Progressive Conservatives were also shown the door by

Quebeckers in the 1993 election as they placed their trust in the Bloc Quebecois.

In what became the biggest loss in Canadian history, the Progressive

Conservative party dissolved and split until the unification of a new Conservative party in 2004. The Bloc became the latest victim, with the Quebec voters opting to support an untested but ideologically palatable party in 2011.

72 Does this mark the death of the separatist movement? It appears too soon to say. The recent fate of the Bloc Quebecois and the Parti Quebecois are troubling signs for the separatist movement. Can the New Democratic Party maintain support in Quebec? The prognosis has certainly become worse since the untimely death of Jack Layton, a charismatic leader who appeared to be the force to make Quebec believe in the NDP.

When looking towards the future, the NDP needs to keep in mind that it was Quebec that elevated it from a perpetual third-party with marginal support to the vaunted status of Official Opposition. With the mandate comes responsibility.

The man who probably understood this best was the late Jack Layton. The election of his replacement as NDP leader may provide the first test of the

Quebec-NDP marriage. One of Layton's last requests was to have freshman

Quebec MP Nycole Turmel to become the interim leader with Thomas Mulcair as one of her two deputy leaders. While Turmel is not expected to contend for the leadership role, Mulcair is very popular especially in Quebec. He is the only NDP

MP in the province to be elected in a general election prior to 2011. However, his leadership chances are slim based upon large amount of Anglophone eligible voters in the NDP convention.126 The consequence of 2011 is that Quebec will be heavily underrepresented at this convention. An NDP leader will be chosen from a different area of Canada. This could constitute a huge slap in the face to

Quebeckers. Polls have shown that support for the NDP would decrease and

Hebert, C. (2011, Sept 21). "The NDP is failing Quebec's distinct political culture." Toronto Star.

73 return to the Bloc in Quebec should Mulcair not become the leader. The New

Democratic Party preached 'positive change' for the past decade yet it runs the risk of turning its back on the same voters which provided the NDP with the mandate it enjoys.

A strain in the NDP-Quebec relationship coupled with the typical pattern of parties making huge gains in the previous election could provide an opening for the Bloc Quebecois to make a return. While it appears that voters tired of the

Bloc, it had certainly advocated for Quebec much better than the Liberals and

Conservatives had in the past. The Bloc could reap the benefit of NDP's broken promises in the coming years. Due to there being a majority government for the first time since 2000, it appears that the Conservatives will not hold an election until 2015. This will give plenty of time for the NDP to either endear itself to

Quebec or, alternately, fail and allow the Bloc Quebecois to use new energy to reel back in its constituents.

The 2011 Canadian Federal Election in Quebec was not a referendum on separatism. It may represent a referendum on the Bloc Quebecois, at least in comparison to the New Democratic Party. We must think critically and understand that a difference exists between supporting the Bloc Quebecois and the Quebec separatism movement, although both groups have overlapping support. Nor should we assume a direct link between the Bloc and the provincial

Parti Quebecois. While the two parties clearly have the same over-arching

127 Smith J. (2011, Sept 24). "NDP Would do best under Mulcair, Poll Finds." Toronto Star.

74 ideology, election figures and qualitative data show that the people of Quebec thought about the two parties differently, especially going into the 2011 election.

Moderates and non-sovereigntists had a much easier time supporting the Bloc over the past couple of decades based upon its moderate policies and its focus of advancing the interests of Quebec. It filled a void that the Liberal and

Conservative parties had left and provided a vehicle for Quebeckers to voice their frustration with the Harper government.

The view and the leaders of the Parti Quebecois are viewed as much more dangerous. With the capability of holding the majority in the Quebec

National Assembly, the Parti Quebecois has the ability to do much more damage.

They appeal to separatists but not moderates. Duceppe shored up separatist support within his caucus but it came at the cost of alienating moderates. This nearly cost his party its political future. By reaching out to militant separatists like former Quebec Premier and current PQ leader Pauline Marois,

Duceppe went from having a campaign perceived as lackluster and unenergetic, to one looking factionalized, bi-polar and dangerous. This identity confusion had dogged the Bloc over the period of 1993-2011. Yet, it was not until the party faced the adversity of the 2011 election that this problem nearly destroyed them.

We must also realize that Jack Layton and the New Democratic Party's remarkable campaign gave Quebec an alternative outlet to the choices of the past. In a Brian Mulroney-like fashion, Layton gave Quebeckers a reason to

75 throw out the party that they heavily endorsed. The surge and consequent decline in Bloc Quebecois' was due to the realization of an identity crisis between its moderate policies and its separatist ideology.

It is too early to determine what will happen to the Bloc Quebecois after its stunning defeat in 2011. Yet, it is also too early to declare it dead as a political party. The New Democratic Party is only the latest suitor of Quebec after voters there threw out the Social Credit Party in 1980, the Liberals in 1984, the

Progressive Conservatives in 1993, and now the Bloc Quebecois in 2011. While the NDP very well could help repair relations between Quebec and the rest of

Canada, the track record of Quebec certainly does not breed optimism. The NDP

Leadership Race appears to be the first opportunity for the party to alienate

Quebec after the province provided it 59 seats and propelled it to the Official

Opposition. One NDP MP was possibly prophetic when he said Thomas Mulcair doesn't have support outside Quebec and that a majority cannot be achieved strictly in Quebec.128 Yet, he and the NDP must remember that Canadian electoral history has shown that turning ones back on Quebec is a fatal mistake, especially when trying to achieve a majority government on the national level.

The Bloc Quebecois was so successful in Quebec because it did not need to be concerned with building a national consensus. By being limited to representing the province, it is much easier to pander to the needs of the Quebec

Nation. Parliamentary party discipline was very natural for the BQ while proving

128 Smith J. (2011, Sept 24). "NDP Would do best under Mulcair, Poll Finds." Toronto Star.

76 more difficult for Federalist parties, in large part because of Quebec. The

Progressive Conservatives met their defeat as they failed to unite Quebec and the rest of Canada with both Meech Lake and Charlottetown. The New

Democratic Party is already experiencing difficulties as it attempts to make

Quebec and the rest of Canada happy. Its staunch opposition to the Harper government's bill to abolish the Long Gun Registry129 is certainly a move that

Quebec celebrates, as the provincial government wants to create its own registry. Yet, two NDP MPs in particular, (Timmins—James Bay) and (Western Arctic) longtime advocates of scrapping the registry had to contradict personal campaign promises to avoid party discipline.

In closing, the 2011 election exemplifies how Canada is a strong exception to Duverger's Law. The unique cultural and lingual situation that developed between Quebec and the rest of Canada over the past 3 centuries, creates a situation where regionalism matters more than partisanship. The particular historical context does not allow for a great amount of generalization to other situations. This is why Duverger's law remains such a strong influence in the theory of political science. Emerging democracies with strong ethnic diversities could form blocks and follow the path of the Bloc Quebecois.

However, for now, the validity of this thesis lies within the profound impact that the Quebec vote has on the Canadian House of Commons. Any paradigm shift or success of a minor party is because of their endorsement by the Quebec Nation.

In other words, a mundane two-party system would still exist if Quebec were a

129 (2011, Nov 2). "NDPers Who Voted To Kill Gun Registry Punished By Leader." CTVNews.

77 separate . Instead, the province provides both electoral success and failure to Canada's political parties.

Ultimately, the electorate remains unchanged on the issue of separation.

The perception of alienation is also unchanged. Quebec remains a distinct society. The 2011 Canadian Federal Election changed the political landscape. It potentially ended the Bloc Quebecois as a strong federal party. Yet most importantly, it exemplifies the historically consistent rejection of previously popular political parties that lose the confidence of the Quebec Nation.

78 LIST OF REFERENCES

79 Books/Research Articles Bakvis, H., Macpherson, L.G. (1995). "Quebec Block Voting and the Canadian Electoral System." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 28 (4) 659-692.

Belanger, E. (2004) "The Rise of Third Parties in the 1993 Canadian Federal Election: Pinard Revisited." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 37 (3) 581- 594.

Black, J. (1978) "The Multicandidate Calculus of Voting: Application to Canadian Federal Elections." American Journal of Political Science, 22 (3) 609-639.

Cairns, A. (1968) "The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921- 1965." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 1 (1) 55-80.

Cutler, F. (2002) "Local Economies, Local Policy Impacts and Federal Electoral Behaviour in Canada." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 35 (2) 347-383.

Guth, J.L.; Fraser, C.R. (2011) "Religion and Partisanship in Canada." Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 40 (1) 51-64.

Haglund, D.G.; Roussel, S. (2008) "It's a Long Road from Fort Greely to Chicoutimi: Quebec Sovereignty and the Issue of Missile Defense." Comparative Strategy, 27 (4) 361-375.

Hunter, A.A. (1982) "On Class, Status and Voting in Canada." Canadian Journal of Sociology, 7 (1) 19-39.

Loewen, P.J.; Bastien, F. (2010) "(In) Significant Elections? Federal By-Elections in Canada 1963-2008." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 43 (1) 87-105.

Lublin, D.; Voss, D.S. (2002) "Context and Francophone Support for the Sovereignty of Quebec: An Ecological Analysis." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 35(1)75-101.

Massie, J.; Boucher, J.; Roussel, S. (2010) "Hijacking a Policy? Assessing Quebec's 'Undue' Influence on Canada's Afghan Policy." American Review of Canadian Studies, 40 (2) 259-275.

Mavrikkou, M. (2009) "The NDP and the Third Party Curse in Canada." University of Waterloo Publications, 1-87.

Ornstein, M.D.; Stevenson, H.M. (1981) "Elite and Public Opinion before the Quebec Referendum: A Commentary on the State in Canada." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 14 (4) 745-774.

80 Pinard, M.; Hamilton, R. (1978) "The Parti Quebecois Comes to Power: An Analysis of the 1976 Quebec Election." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 11 (4) 739-775.

Rashi, R. (2011) "Bloc Crushed, PQ In Crisis, The Left Resurgent: Whither Quebec?" Canadian Dimension, 45 (5) 6.

Riker, W. (1982) "The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science." American Political Science Review. 76 (4) 753-766.

Soroka, S.; Penner, E.; Blidook, K. (2009) "Constituency Influence in Parliament." Canadian Journal of Political Science; 42 (3) 563-591.

Tremblay, M.; Pelletier, R. (2000) "More Feminists or More Women? Descriptive and Substantive Representations of Women in the 1997 Canadian Federal Election." International Political Science Review; 21 (4) 381-405.

Young, L. Belanger, E. (2008) "BQ in the House: The Nature of Sovereigntist Representation in the Canadian Parliament." Nationalism & Ethnic Politics, 14 (4) 487-522.

Magazines/Newspapers Chung, A. (2011, May 3) "Duceppe Resigns as Bloc Quebecois Drowns in an Orange Tsunami." Toronto Star

Coyne, A. (2010, May 31) "A Long Declining Force." MacLean's

Curry, B. (2011, Apr 26) "NDP Candidate Takes Mid-Campaign Vacation in Vegas." The Globe and Mail

De Souza, M. (2011, Nov 9) " Unhappy With Choice Of Unilingual Michael Ferguson For Auditor General." National Post

Dowd, A. (2011, Apr 10) "Canada's Love of Hockey Trumps Election Debate." Reuters

Dyck, R. (2008) Canadian Politics: Critical Approaches, Laurentian University 2nd ed.

Geddes, J. (2010, May 31) "Is The Bloc Good For Canada?" MacLean's

Hebert, C. (2011, Sept 21) "The NDP is failing Quebec's distinct political culture." Toronto Star

81 La Haye, Dominique (2011, Apr 10) "Habs fever prompts debate date change." Toronto Sun

Martin, P. (2011, May 12) "Sovereignty Movement is Down But Not Out." Toronto Star

Muise, M. (2011, Oct 30) "Only Gilles Duceppe Could Defeat Francois Legault: Poll." The Montreal Gazette

Porter, C. (2011, May 14) "Dose of Reality For Political Junkies..." Toronto Star

Scott, M. (2011, May 4) "McGill 5 Head Off to House of Commons." Montreal Gazette

Smith J. (2011, Sept 24) "NDP Would do best under Mulcair, Poll Finds." Toronto Star

Wells, P. (2011, May 16) "The Orange Wave Rises." MacLean;s (2011, Apr 28) Canada's General Election and The Elusive Majority. The Economist

(2011, Mar 24) Canada's Politics: Here We Go Again. The Economist

(2004, Nov 8) Duceppe Backtracks on the Canadian Flag Flap. CTV News

(2011, Nov 2) NDPers Who Voted To Kill Gun Registry Punished By Leader. CTV News

Polls "Leadership Index" (2011, Oct 24) CTV/Globe/Nanos Polling

"Question Shapes Views on Sovereignty in Quebec" (2009, Jun 12) Angus Reid Polling 6/12/2009

"NDP Registers 2nd Choice Growth Among All Parties" (2011, May 1) CTV/Globe/Nanos Polling

"Seat Projections" (2011, Mar 14 - 2011, May 1) EKOS Polling

"Voters Locking in As Campaign Approaches Conclusion" (2011, Apr 28) EKOS Polling

Video 1984 Leaders Debate CTV Video Archives

82 2004 Leaders Debate CTV Video Archives

Government Resources Elections Canada Data Canadian Census 2006 Riding Data Elections UK Data Canadian Parliament Data

83 APPENDIX A

NDP ORANGE CRUSH

Note: Percentages in bold represent a situation where there is an increase in the popular vote for a Liberal or Conservative candidate from 2008 to 2011. The Bloc Quebecois lost support in every single Quebec riding while the New Democratic Party gained support in every single Quebec riding. All electoral data used is from Elections Canada.

Riding BQ NDP CP LP 2008 2011 2008 2011 2008 2011 2008 2011 Abitibi—Baie-James— Nunavik-Eeyou 39.7% 18.0% 8.2% 44.8% 30.4%22.7%| 18.4% 10.5% Abitibi—Temiscamingue 47.9% 31.6% 9.5% 51.2% 18.9% 9.9% 20.7% 5.9% Ahuntsic 39.5% 31.8% 9.0% 30.3% 10.4% 8.0% 38.6% 27.9% Argenteuil—Papineau— Mirabel 48.1% 29.0% 12.4% 44.3% 17.4% 11.2% 18.2% 12.2% Bas-Richelieu—Nicolet— Becancour 54.7% 38.3%| 8.2% 35 6% 18. 2% 13.0% 16 3% 10.1% Beauce 14.0% 6.7% 8.5% 30 0% 62 4% 50.7% 10 3% 11.0% Beauharnois-Salaberry 50.1% 33.2% 11.6% 43. 8% 20. 2% 12.9% 14. 9% 8.3% Beauport—Limoilou 32.6% 19.4% 12.2% 46 1% 36. 8% 26.2% 14 4% 6.0% Berthier—Maskinonge 45.8% 29.5% 10.4% 39 6% 22 2% 14.0% 18 4% 14.2% Bourassa 25.4% 16.1% 8.0% 32. 3% 13. 5% 8.8% 49 8% 40.9% Brome—Missisquoi 35.2% 21.3% 9.1% 42. 6%| 18. 7% 11.9% 32 8% 22.1% Brossard—La Prairie 32.5% 17.5% 12.7% 41 0% 18. 9% 12.6% 32 6% 27.3% Chambly—Borduas 50.1% 27.7% 14.2% 42. 7% 15. 1% 7.8% 16 8% 8.9% Charlesbourg—Haute- Saint-Charles 29.2% 16.3% 13.1% 45.0% 41.1% 30.3% 14.1% 6.5% Chateauguay—Saint- Constant 45.6% 26.7% 15.0% 52.0% 17.9% 10.3% 18.4% 9.1% Chicoutimi-Le Fjord 41.3% 28.9% 7.8% 38.2% 34.9% 25.1% 13.4% 5.6% Compton—Stanstead 41.9% 26.0% 11.3% 47.6% 19.4% 11.7% 22.5% 12.1 %

84 Riding BQ NDP CP LP 2008 2011 2008 2011 2008 2011 2008 2011 Drummond ^ 38.8% 22.0% 16.8% 51.6% 25.3% 15.9% 17.0% 8.4% Gaspesie—lles-de-la- Madeleine 40.1% 31.6% 7.0% 33.8% 22.8% 17.1% 27.0% 15.0% 29.2% 15.1% 26.1% 61.8% 16.8% 8.0% 25.3% 14.0% Haute-Gaspesie—La Mitis -Matane—Matapedia 37.5% 36.1% 4.7% 21 4% 18.1% 15.0%| 35.6% 25.6% Hochelaga 49.7% 31.2% 14.4% 48 2% 9.2% 6.8% 20.7% 10.9% Honore-Mercier 28.1% 18.5% 10.1% 36 4% 15.3% 12.4% 43.7% 30.4% Hull-Aylmer 22.1% 8.4% 19.8% 59 2% 15.1% 10.2% 37.5% 20.3% Jeanne-Le Ber 34.9% 24.2% 15.7% 44 7%| 11.2% 9.0% 32.3% 19.3% Joliette 52.4% 32.9% 10.4% 47 3% 17.8% 9.7% 14.5% 6.2% Jonquiere—Alma 37.6% 18.1% 4.9% 43 4% 52.6% 35.2%| 5.2% 2.0% La Pointe-de-l'lle 56.1% 32.5% 12.9% 48 3% 11.2% 7.7% 16.0% 9.2% LaSalle-Emard 24.5% 14.7% 13.2% 42 2% 16.0% 13.1% 40.6% 26.6% Lac-Saint-Louis 5.7% 3.1% 15.8% 30 0% 23.5% 28.5% 46.4% 34.1% Laurentides—Labelle 47.1% 31.5% 9.2% 43 8%! 13.0% 9.3% 26.7% 12.7% Laurier—Sainte-Marie 50.2% 35.9% 17.1% 46 6% 4.8% 3.5% 18.3% 9.9% Laval 37.8% 22.7% 12.5% 43 3% 18.0% 2.5% 28.1% 18.5% Laval—Les Ties 23.5% 13.0% 11.5% 47 6% 20.6% 15.9% 40.4% 20.6% Levis-Bellechasse 25.5% 14.9% 10.8% 33. 8% 45.9% 44.0% 15.0% 5.8% Longueuil-Pierre-Boucher 46.1% 27.2% 14.0% 51 9% 14.4% 8.3% 21.8% 10.2% Lotbiniere—Chutes-de-la- Chaudiere 24.6% 14.9% 13.2% 38.5% 47 .3% 39.9% 12 .5% 5.1% Louis-Hebert 36.2% 24.2% 9.3% 38.7% 28 2% 21.8% 23 6% 13.4% Louis-Saint-Laurent 26.5% 14.4% 10.5% 39.9% 47 1%37.6% 13 4% 6.4% Manicouagan 49.3% 31.2% 4.8% 48.9% 27 0%11.6% 15 3% 5.6% Marc-Aurele-Fortin 45.5% 26.4% 12.3% 49.7% 13 8% 9.9% 24 5% 12.0% Megantic-L'Erable 27.7% 16.8% 26.3% 9.5% 46 7%49.1%! 14 0% 5.8% Montcalm 55.7% 30.2% 13.9% 53.0%| 13 5% 7.9% 13 9% 5.4% Montmagny-L'lslet—Kamouraska- Riviere-du-Loup |46.0% 20.1% 5.5% 36.4% 30.6% 36.3% 15.4% 5.8% Montmorency—Charlevoix— Haute-Cote-Nord 48.9% 34.9% 7.7% 37.3% 27.4% 20.5% 13.4% 5.6% Mount Royal 4.4% 2.9% 7.7% 17.9% 27.3% 35.6% 55.7% 41.4% Notre-Dame-de-Grace- Lachine 15.9% 8.8% 15.2% 39 7%i 16.2% 14.6% 44 6% 31.9% Outremont 12.6% 8.2% 39.5% 56 .4% 10.5% 8.8% 33 1%23.7% Papineau 38.7% 25.9% 8.7% 28 .3%i 7.6% 4.7% 41 5% 38.4% Pierrefonds—Dollard 9.5% 5.0% 10.6% 34 1% 25.8% 26.9% 46 9% 30.5% Pontiac 22.3% 10.1% 15.4% 45 .7% 32.7% 29.5% 24 2% 12.8% Portneuf-Jacques-Cartier 32.0% 20.5% 12.7% 42 7%i 33.5% 27.8% 16 3% 6.6% Quebec 41.8% 28.0% 11.8% 42 .6% 25.7% 17.8% 17 5% 9.0% Repentigny 53.1% 31.1% 15.2% 51 9% 14.0% 7.4% 15 0% 7.8% Richmond-Arthabaska 46.0% 33.8% 8.7% 32 5% 29.0% 24.7%| 12 7% 7.0%

85 Riding BQ NDP CP LP 2008 2011 2008 2011 2008 2011 2008 2011 Rimouski—Neigette—Temiscouata —Les Basques 44.7% 30.8% 10.3% 43.0% 18.3% 14.6%|2 0 1% 9.6% Riviere-des-Mille-Tles 45.7% 28.5% 13.3% 49.2% 19.5% 9.7% 17.4 % 10.2% Riviere-du-Nord 53.6% 28.2% 14.5% 55.3% 14.4% 8.3% 13.6 % 6.3% Roberval—Lac-Saint-Jean 39.7% 21.3% 4.7% 27.7% 43.5% 45.7%| 10.1 % 4.0% Rosemont-La Petite-Patrie 52.0% 32.9% 16.3% 51.0% 7.4% 4.3% 18.7 % 9.1% Saint-Bruno-Saint-Hubert 45.0% 28.2% 13.5% 44.6% 15.4% 10.8% 22.2 % 13.6% Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot 47.3% 24.6% 14.0% 52.4% 21.2% 15.7% 13.8 % 5.4% Saint-Jean 49.6% 30.5% 10.3% 47.5% 17.4% 10.7% 17.7 % 8.8% Saint-Lambert 37.6% 25.9% 14.5% 42.6% 15.8% 10.0% 28.5 % 19.3% Saint-Laurent-Cartierville 11.3% 7.3% 9.0% 29.3% 17.2% 17.5% 61.7 % 43.4% Saint-Leonard—Saint- Michel 13.6% 9.4% 32.3% 10.7% 14.9% 13.8% 57.3 % 42.3% Saint-Maurice-Champlain 44.0% 29.3% 7.8% 39.1% 23.9% 17.7% 21 0%11.9% Shefford 42.8% 23.4% 12.5% 51.1% 19.6% 14.7% 21.4 % 9.0% Sherbrooke 50.1% 36.0% 13.1% 43.0% 16.4% 9.4% 19 5% 9.5% Terrebonne—Blainville 52.3% 30.8% 13.5% 49.3% 14.0% 9.1% 16 5% 8.5% Trois-Rivieres 45.3% 23.8% 9.2% 53.6% 24.2% 12.3% 18 2% 7.2% Vaudreuil-Soulanges 41.3% 25.7% 9.6% 43.6% 23.7% 16.4% 21 3% 11.6% Vercheres—Les Patriotes 50.8% 36.4% 15.5% 43.3% 16.3% 9.5% 14 3% 8.6% Westmount—Ville-Marie 7.3% 5.5% 22.9% 35.6% 15.8% 17.5%|4 6 5% 37.2%

86 APPENDIX B

CONTACT HYPOTHESIS 2004-2011

Note: This chart is used to evaluate the contact hypothesis over the past four elections by analyzing the percentage of the vote received by the Bloc Quebecois compared to the amount of Francophones in particular ridings. Percentages in Bold mean that the Bloc Quebecois won that particular riding in that year. The percentage of Francophones is based upon the 2006 Canadian Census' statistic of French as a home language in each particular riding. All electoral data used is from Elections Canada.

Riding 2004 2006 2008 2011 French Montmagny—L'lslet-Kamouraska -Riviere-du-Loup 57.1% 52.4% 46.0% 20.1% 99.6% Beauce 36.3% 20.0% 14.0% 6.7% 99.3% Roberval—Lac-Saint-Jean 59.4% 45.2% 39.7% 21.2% 99.2% Haute-Gaspesie-La Mitis—Matane -Matapedia 56.5% 46.1% 37.5% 36.1% 99.2% Rimouski-Neigette—Temiscouata -Les Basques 56.7% 46.4% 44.7% 30.8% 98.8% Bas-Richelieu—Nicolet-Becancour 64.7% 55.9% 54.7% 38.3% 98.8% Lotbiniere-Chutes-de-la-Chaudiere 46.0% 26.9% 24.6% 14.9% 98.8% Chicoutimi—LeFjord 45.3% 38.5% 41.3% 28.9% 98.8% Montmorency—Charlevoix-Haute- Cote-Nord 60.9% 49.1% 48.9% 34.9% 98.6% Levis-Bellechasse 44.3% 29.0% 25.5% 14.9% 98.6% Berthier-Maskinonge 59.9% 48.5% 45.8% 29.5% 98.4% Charlesbourg-Haute-Saint-Charles 48.0% 38.3% 29.2% 16.3% 98.2% Megantic—L'Erable 44.7% 32.6% 27.7% 16.8% 98.2% Jonquiere-Alma 54.9% 39.3% 37.6% 18.1% 98.0% Trois-Rivieres 56.5% 45.9% 45.3% 23.8% 98.0% Louis-Saint-Laurent 38.4% 24.2% 26.5% 14.4% 97.9%

87 Riding 2004 2006 2008 2011 French Saint-Hyacinthe-Bagot 62.4% 56.0% 47.3% 24.6% 97.9% Portneuf—-Jacques-Cartier 42.9% 25.9% 32.0% 20.5% 97.8% Vercheres-Les Patriotes 67.6% 57.4% 50.8% 36.4% 97.4% Repentigny 51.8% 44.3% 53.1% 31.1% 97.1% Drummond 56.3% 49.7% 38.8% 22.0% 97.1% Beauport-Limoilou 49.7% 37.9% 32.6% 19.4% 96.7% Riviere-du-Nord 66.3% 59.1% 53.6% 28.2% 96.6% Montcalm 71.2% 62.2% 55.7% 30.2% 96.5% Saint-Jean 60.1% 54.0% 49.6% 30.5% 96.1% Saint-Maurice—Champlain 55.3% 44.3% 44.0% 29.3% 96.0% Richmond—Arthabaska 55.6% 47.9% 46.0% 33.8% 95.7% Abitibi—Temiscamingue 57.6% 52.3% 47.9% 31.5% 95.6% Shefford 46.6% 43.1% 42.8% 23.4% 95.6% Quebec 50.6% 41.5% 41.8% 28.0% 95.3% Joliette 63.4% 54.0% 52.4% 32.9% 95.2% Chambly-Borduas 60.9% 54.7% 50.1% 27.7% 94.6% Terrebonne-Blainville 68.1% 59.2% 52.3% 30.8% 94.4% Louis-Hebert 43.1% 34.1% 36.2% 24.2% 94.4% Sherbrooke 58.7% 52.2% 50.1% 36.0% 93.7% Laurentides-Labelle 58.4% 53.8% 47.1% 31.5% 92.9% Longueuil—Pierre-Boucher 60.9% 55.2% 46.1% 27.2% 90.5% Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel 57.4% 52.1% 48.1% 29.0% 90.3% La Pointe-De-l'?le_ 66.5% 60.3% 56.1% 32.5% 89.6% Riviere-Des-Mille Ties 61.4% 53.9% 45.7% 28.5% 89.1% Beauharnois-Salaberry 50.7% 47.5% 50.1% 33.2% 88.7% Gaspesie—lles-De-La-Madeleine 55.7% 42.7% 40.1% 31.6% 88.1% Gatineau 40.3% 39.2% 29.1% 15.1% 87.4% Marc-Aurele-Fortin 58.9% 51.0% 45.5% 26.4% 87.1% Compton-Stanstead 46.7% 42.8% 41.9% 26.0% 84.9% Manicouagan 58.5% 51.1% 49.3% 31.2% 84.5% Saint-Bruno—Saint-Hebert 55.1% 50.3% 45.0% 28.2% 83.5% Hochelaga 60.1% 55.6% 49.7% 31.2% 81.9% Chaleauguay—Saint-Constant 57.3% 51.4% 45.6% 26.7% 81.5% Rosemont—La Petite-Patrie 61.8% 56.0% 52.0% 32.9% 81.4% Brome-Missiquoi 39.7% 38.3% 35.2% 21.3% 80.6% Laurier—Sainte-Marie 60.1% 54.7% 50.2% 35.8% 78.7% Alfred-Pellan 49.2% 43.0% 38.8% 22.8% 76.5% Saint-Lambert 48.8% 45.3% 37.6% 25.9% 76.1% Laval 50.1% 44.3% 37.8% 22.7% 73.4% Pontiac 38.4% 28.9% 22.3% 10.0% 72.3% Hull-Aylmer 32.5% 29.4% 22.1% 8.4% 71.8% Vaudreuil-Soulanges 44.3% 43.2% 41.3% 25.7% 70.7% Abitibi—Baie-James—Nunavik -Eeyou 45.2% 46.6% 39.6% 18.0% 67.8% Brossard-La Prairie 41.0% 37.2% 32.5% 17.5% 66.6%

88 Riding 2004 2006 2008 2011 French Bourassa 37.8% 43.4% 25.4% 16.1% 64.9% Honore-Mercier 40.4% 34.8% 28.1% 18.5% 63.4% Ahuntsic 41.3% 38.9% 39.5% 31.8% 62.7% Jeanne-Le Ber 41.1% 40.2% 34.9% 24.2% 61.2% Laval-Les lies 37.1% 33.1% 23.5% 13.0% 56.1% Papineau 40.0% 40.8% 38.7% 25.9% 51.1% LaSalle—Emard 30.7% 28.7% 24.5% 14.6% 47.8% Outremont 33.3% 29.0% 12.6% 8.2% 47.2% Saint-Leonard—Saint Michel 21.9% 18.7% 13.6% 9.4% 42.6% Notre-Dame-de-Grace—Lachine 22.0% 20.3% 15.9% 8.8% 36.4% Saint-Laurent—Cartiervilie 17.3% 14.6% 11.3% 7.3% 35.1% Pierrefonds—Dollard 16.0% 12.4% 9.5% 5.0% 29.0% Westmount—Ville-Marie 14.8% 12.6% 7.3% 5.5% 28.8% Lac-Saint Louis 10.2% 7.7% 5.7% 3.1% 24.2% Mount Royal 7.0% 5.7% 4.4% 2.9% 22.3%

89 APPENDIX C

PROTEST PARTIES 2004-2011

Note: Protest Party in this chart is defined as supporting the Green Party, the Bloc Quebecois and the New Democratic Party. All three parties' percentages of support are compiled for each of the four elections utilized. All electoral data used is from Elections Canada.

Riding 2004 2006 2008 2011 French Montmagny—L'lslet-Kamouraska -Riviere-du-Loup 61.3% 60.9% 53.7% 57.9% 99.6% Beauce 41.5% 25.1% 27.3% 38.3% 99.3% Roberval—Lac-Saint-Jean 68.1% 55.1% 30.8% 50.3% 99.2% Haute-Gaspesie-La Mitis—Matane -Matapedia 63.3% 54.9% 45.8% 59.4% 99.2% Rimouski-Neigette—Temiscouata -Les Basques 67.3% 58.5% 56.7% 75.8% 99.0% Bas-Richelieu—Nicolet-Becancour 68.5% 63.7% 65.6% 76.9% 98.8% Lotbiniere-Chutes-de-la-Chaudiere 54.4% 40.2% 40.2% 55.0% 98.8% Chicoutimi—LeFjord 51.3% 46.1% 51.6% 68.5% 98.8% Montmorency—Charlevoix-Haute- Cote-Nord 66.8% 58.9% 59.3% 73.9% 98.6% Levis-Bellechasse 53.0% 37.8% 38.8% 50.2% 98.6% Berthier-Maskinonge 65.9% 58.2% 59.4% 71.1% 98.4% Charlesbourg-Haute-Saint-Charles 57.7% 47.0% 44.8% 62.9% 98.2% Megantic—L'Erable 51.9% 39.8% 39.3% 44.5% 98.2% Jonquiere-Alma 59.8% 44.9% 42.4% 62.8% 98.0% Trois-Rivieres 63.2% 56.7% 57.6% 79.3% 98.0% Louis-Saint-Laurent 44.3% 32.9% 39.5% 55.7% 97.9% Saint-Hyacinthe-Bagot 66.9% 65.4% 64.9% 78.9% 97.9% Portneuf—Jacques-Cartier 51.0% 32.6% 47.9% 65.6% 97.4% Vercheres-Les Patriotes 73.3% 69.5% 69.4% 81.2% 97.4% Repentigny 75.9% 73.3% 71.1% 84.8% 97.1%

90 Riding 2004 2006 2008 2011 French Drummond 60.3% 61.3% 57.7% 75.7% 97.1% Beauport-Limoilou 57.2% 49.9% 47.6% 67.3% 96.7% Riviere-du-Nord 71.8% 70.0% 71.4% 85.3% 96.6% Montcalm 77.8% 72.5% 72.6% 86.7% 96.5% Saint-Jean 66.2% 65.5% 64.0% 80.5% 96.1% Saint-Maurice-Champlain 59.5% 55.4% 55.1% 70.4% 96.0% Richmond—Arthabaska 62.4% 57.4% 57.3% 68.4% 95.7% Abitibi—Temiscamingue 63.4% 63.6% 59.6% 84.2% 95.6% Shefford 52.4% 51.8% 59.0% 76.4% 95.6% Quebec 60.4% 55.5% 56.8% 72.8% 95.3% Joliette 69.4% 63.3% 67.7% 84.1% 95.2% Chambly-Borduas 69.7% 68.1% 68.1% 71.9% 94.6% Terrebonne-Blainville 74.7% 71.0% 69.0% 82.3% 94.4% Louis-Hebert 52.5% 47.4% 48.0% 64.5% 94.4% Sherbrooke 64.7% 65.5% 63.2% 80.7% 93.7% Laurentides-Labelle 64.7% 65.1% 60.3% 77.8% 92.9% Longueuil—Pierre-Boucher 68.7% 67.8% 63.6% 81.1% 90.5% Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel 65.5% 63.3% 64.2% 75.85 90.3% La Pointe-De-I'lle^ 72.8% 70.7% 71.9% 82.7% 89.6% Riviere-Des-Mille Ties 69.1% 66.3% 63.1% 90.1% 89.1% Beauharnois-Salaberry 55.3% 58.5% 64.9% 78.8% 88.7% Gaspesie—?les-De-La-Madeleine 60.5% 48.5% 50.2% 67.9% 88.1% Gatineau 49.1% 51.9% 57.9% 78.1% 87.4% Marc-Aurele-Fortin 66.3% 64.0% 61.7% 78.1% 87.1% Compton-Stanstead 53.5% 53.4% 58.0% 76.1% 84.9% Manicouagan 70.2% 66.2% 57.7% 82.8% 84.5% Saint-Bruno—Saint-Hebert 62.2% 63.0% 62.4% 75.6% 83.5% Hochelaga 68.6% 69.4% 68.4% 81.1% 81.9% Chateauguay—Saint-Constant 64.3% 60.9% 63.8% 80.4% 81.5% Rosemont—La Petite-Patrie 73.7% 74.1% 72.8% 85.5% 81.4% Brome-Missiquoi 46.9% 47.7% 47.8% 66.0% 80.6% Laurier—Sainte-Marie 78.2% 79.7% 75.3% 85.2% 78.7% Alfred-Pellan 54.8% 53.5% 54.0% 66.3% 76.5% Saint-Lambert 56.7% 56.6% 55.7% 70.7% 76.1% Laval 56.4% 55.9% 53.4% 68.5% 73.4% Pontiac 39.2% 41.9% 42.8% 57.5% 72.3% Hull-Aylmer 49.7% 49.8% 47.2% 69.5% 71.8% Vaudreuil-Soulanges 52.0% 52.6% 55.0% 72.0% 70.7% Abitibi—Baie-James—Nunavik -Eeyou 52.3% 56.7% 51.2% 66.7% 67.8% Brossard-La Prairie 48.0% 47.9% 48.3% 60.0% 66.6% Bourassa 43.3% 40.3% 36.3% 50.0% 64.9% Honore-Mercier 46.2% 44.0% 41.0% 56.5% 63.4% Ahuntsic 50.1% 50.5% 51.0% 63.4% 62.7% Jeanne-Le Ber 51.9% 54.1% 55.4% 71.5% 61.2%

91 Riding 2004 2006 2008 2011 French Laval-Les lies 43.8% 43.2% 38.3% 62.5% 56.1% Papineau 51.3% 52.1% 50.3% 56.1% 51.1% LaSalle—£mard 37.2% 37.9% 41.4% 59.1% 47.8% Outremont 51.6% 51.0% 56.4% 66.8% 47.2% Saint-Leonard—Saint Michel 30.2% 27.9% 27.1% 43.5% 42.6% Notre-Dame-de-Grace—Lachine 34.9% 38.1% 38.8% 52.8% 36.4% Saint-Laurent—Cartierville 25.6% 26.6% 20.3% 38.7% 35.1% Pierrefonds—Dollard 24.4% 25.6% 27.0% 42.7% 29.0% Westmount—Ville-Marie 32.9% 36.3% 37.2% 44.8% 28.8% Lac-Saint Louis 22.8% 25.2% 30.1% 37.4% 24.2% Mount Royal 14.6% 16.3% 16.5% 22.5% 22.3%

I APPENDIX D

SUPPORT FLUCTUATIONS IN CANADIAN RIDINGS

Note: Quebec is excluded in this chart because the Quebec data with actual percentages in presented in Appendix A. Up signifies that the percentage of the popular vote increased for that particular party in that particular riding. Down signifies that the percentage of the popular vote decreased for that particular party in that particular riding. All electoral data used is from Elections Canada.

Province Alberta Riding NDP CP LP Centre Up Up Down -North Up N/A130 Down Up Up Up Up Up Up Calgary—Nose Hill Up Up Down Up Up Down Up Up Down Up Up Down Crowfoot Up Up Down Centre Up Down Down Up Up Down Edmonton—Leduc Up Up Down Edmonton—Mill Woods—Beaumont Up Up Down Edmonton—St. Albert Up Up Down Edmonton—Sherwood Park Up Up Down Edmonton—Spruce Grove Up Up Down Edmonton—Strathcona Up Down Down Fort McMurray—Athabasca Up Up Down Lethbridge Up Down Down

Conservative MP Michelle Rempel received the exact percentage (56.53%) as her predecessor did in the 2008 election

93 Riding NDP CP LP Macleod Up Up Down Medicine Hat Up Up Up Peace River Up Up Down Red Deer Up Up Down Vegreville—Wainwright Up Up Down Westlock—St. Paul Up Up Down Wetaskiwin Up Up Down Wild Rose Up Up Up Yellowhead Up Up Down British Columbia Abbotsford Up Up Down British Columbia Interior Up Up Down —Douglas Up Up Down Burnaby—New Westminster Up Up Down Cariboo—Prince George Up Up Down Chilliwack—Fraser Canyon Up Down Up Delta—Richmond East Up Down Down Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca Up Up Down Fleetwood—Port Kelis Up Up Down —Thompson-Cariboo Up Up Down Kelowna—Lake Country Up Up Down Kootenay—Columbia Up Down Down Langley Up Up Down —Alberni Up Down Down Nanaimo—Cowichan Up Up Down New Westminster—Coquitlam Down Up Down Newton—North Delta Up Up Down North Up Up Down Okanagan—Coquihalla Up Down Down Okanagan—Shuswap Up Up Down Pitt Meadows—Maple Ridge-Mission Up Up Down Port Moody—Westwood—Port Coquitlam Up Up Down Prince George—Peace River Up Down Down Richmond Up Up Down Saanich—Gulf Islands Up Down Down Skeena—Bulkley Valley Up Down Down South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale Up Down Down Up Down Up Up Up Down Vancouver East Up Up Down Up Up Up Up Up Down Up Up Down Up Up Down

94 Riding NDP CP LP Victoria Up Down Down —Sunshine Coast—Sea To Sky County Up Up Down Manitoba Brandon—Souris Up Up Down Charleswood—St. James-Assiniboia Up Up Down Churchill Up Up Down Dauphin—Swan River-Marquette Up Up Down Elmwood—Transcona Down Up Down Kildonan—St. Paul Down Up Up Portage—Lisgar Up Up Down Up Up Down Saint Boniface Up Up Down Selkirk—Interlake Up Up Down Centre Up Up Down Down Up Up Up Up Down Up Up Down New Brunswick Acadie—Bathurst Up Down Down Beausejour Up Up Down Fredericton Up Up Down Up Up Down Madawaska-Restigouche Up Up Down Miramichi Up Up Down Moncton—Riverview—Dieppe Up Down Down Up Down Down Saint John Up Up Down Tobique—Mactaquac Up Up Down Newfoundland & Labrador Avalon Down Up Down Bonavista—Gander-Grand Falls-Windsor Up Up Down Humber—St. Barbe—Baie Verte Down Up Down Labrador Up Up Down Random—Burin—St. George's Down Up Down St. John's East Down Up Down St. John's South—Mount Pearl Up Up Down Northwest Territories Western Arctic Up Down Up Nova Scotia Cape Breton—Canso Down Up Down Up Up N/A131 Cumberland—Colchester—

The Liberal Party decided not a run a candidate in the riding of Central Nova because they felt it gave Green Party Leader Elizabeth May a better chance at defeating incumbent minister Peter Mackay

95 Riding NDP CP LP Musquodoboit Valley Up Up Up Dartmouth—Cole Harbour Up Up Down Halifax Up Down Down Down Up Down Kings—Hants Down Up Down Sackville—Eastern Shore Down Up Down South Shore—St. Margaret's Up Up Down Sydney—Victoria Down Up Down Down Up Up Nunavut Nunavut Down Up Down Ontario Ajax—Pickering Up Up Down Algoma—Manitoulin— Up Up Down Ancaster—Dundas—Flamborough— Westdale Up Up Down Barrie Up Up Down Beaches—East York Up Up Down Bramalea—Gore—Malton Up Down Down Brampton-Springdale Up Up Down Brampton West Up Up Down Brant Up Up Down Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound Up Up Up Burlington Up Up Down Cambridge Up Up Down Carleton—Mississippi Mills Up Down Up Chatham-Kent—Essex Up Up Down Davenport Up Up Down Up Up Down Up Up Down Dufferin—Caledon Up Up Down Durham Up Up Down Eglinton-Lawrence Up Up Down Elgin—Middlesex-London Up Up Down Essex Up Up Down Etobicoke Centre Up Up Down Etobicoke-Lakeshore Up Up Down Up Up Down Glengarry—Prescott—Russell Up Up Down Guelph Up Up Up Haldimand-Norfolk Up Up Down Haliburton—Kawartha Lakes—Brock Up Up Down Halton Up Up Down Up Up Down Hamilton East—Stoney Creek Up Up Down

96 Riding NDP CP LP Up Up Down Huron—Bruce Up Up Down Kenora Up Up Down Up Up Up Up Up Down Kitchener—Conestoga Up Up Down Kitchener—Waterloo Up Up Down Lambton—Kent—Middlesex Up Up Down Lanark-Frontenac—Lennox & Addington Up Up Down Leeds-Grenville Up Up Down London—Fanshawe Up Up Down Up Up Down Up Up Down Markham-Unionville Up Up Down Mississauga—Brampton South Up Up Down —Cooksville Up Up Down Mississauga—Erindale Up Up Down Mississauga South Up Up Down Mississauga Streetsville Up Up Down Nepean—Carleton Up Down Up Newmarket—Aurora Up Up Down Niagara Falls Up Up Down Niagara West—Glanbrook Up Up Down Up Up Down Nipissing-Timiskaming Up Up Down Northumberland—Quinte West Up Up Down Oak Ridges—Markham Up Up Down Oakville Up Up Down Up Up Down Up Down Down Ottawa—Orleans Up Down Down Up Down Down Ottawa—Vanier Up Down Down —Nepean Up Down Down Oxford Up Up Down Parkdale—High Park Up Up Down Parry Sound-Muskoka Up Up Down Perth-Wellington Up Up Down Peterborough Up Up Down Pickering— Up Up Down Prince Edward-Hastings Up Up Down Renfrew—Nipissing-Pembroke Up Down Down Richmond Hill Up Up Down St. Catharines Up Up Down St. Paul's Up Up Down

97 Riding NDP CP LP a—Lambton Up Up Down Ste. Marie Down Up Up >orough--Agincourt Up Up Down >orough Centre Up Up Down >orough-Guildwood Up Up Down >orough—Rouge River Up Up Down >orough Southwest Up Up Down De—Grey Up Down Down De North Up Up Down lont—Dundas-South Glengarry Up Up Down ury Up Up Down lhill Up Up Down der Bay—Rainy River Up Up Down der Bay—Superior North Up Up Down lins—James Bay Down Up Down ito Centre Up Up Down ito—Danforth Up Up Down 1—Spadina Up Up Down han Up Up Down md Up Up Down lgton—Halton Hills Up Up Down iy—Oshawa Up Up Down vdale Up Up Down sor—Tecumseh Up Up Down sor West Up Up Down Centre Up Up Down -Simcoe Up Up Down South—Weston Up Up Down I/Vest Up Up Down

>ldl IU gan Up Up Down ottetown Up Up Down int Up Up Down jque Up Down Down

sfords-Lloydminster Up Up Down strap Up Up Down JSS Hills-Grasslands Up Up Down sthe—Missinppi—Churchill River Up Up Down er Up Up Down 3 Albert Up Up Down la—Lumsden—Lake Centre Up Up Down la—Qu'Appelle Up Up Down atoon—Humboldt Up Down Down atoon—Rosetown—Biggar Up Up Down

98 Riding NDP CP LP Souris—Moose Mountain Up Up Down Wascana Up Up Down Yorkton—Melville Up Up Up Yukon Yukon Up Up Down

99 APPENDIX E

OPEN LETTER OF FORMER BQ MEMBERS

NOTE: The following is the letter written by Maxime Bellerose and Benoit Dumay on April 28th 2011, in which they call on separatists to vote for the NDP. This is my translation from the original French copy.

Call to Sovereigntists to Vote for the NDP

This letter is co-signed by Maxime Bellerose former president of the Bloc

Quebecois riding association of the district ofHochelaga during the last term of former Bloc MP Real Menard and Benoit Demuy, political aide of the same member until his resignation in 2009. Both are currently members of the Bloc

Quebecois.

Three weeks ago people around us wouldn't have predicted that we would prepare to make the argument that we are making today. Like all interested people to progress and social justice we support the NDP promises and its program. As sovereigntists we have always been convinced that the only option for Quebec was to vote for the Bloc Quebecois during the federal elections. Our

100 analytical framework was binary: «lf you are a sovereigntist you vote for the

Bloc, if not you are a federalist»

The reality is that the campaign has forced us to revise our thinking. The orange wind blowing over the Quebec nation and the rest of Canada leaves open the possibility, the unique opportunity of an official opposition or even an NDP government.

Now for the first time in our political experience, is at the door of Parliament! It would be a shame for Quebeckers not to take this opportunity to send MPs to Ottawa with the values and justice that Quebec supports.

Now we are and will remain deeply convinced that sovereignty remains the best way for Quebec and its people can continue its development but as many say, the sovereignty of Quebec will be in Quebec and not in Ottawa. In the meantime, all our citizens will, willingly or not, live in federal Canada.

Until our referendum win, voting for the NDP is the way out of the cycle of the minority Conservative government. It's the best option currently and actually available to improve the lives of Quebeckers and the most vulnerable among us.

Giving support to the NDP is a vote for a mixture of energetic and experienced

101 candidates. This includes young candidates who are needed for renewal in the political sphere.

We cannot afford to tolerate conservative governments of such a right ideological nature in Ottawa. Despite our aspirations it speaks for us on the international stage and takes advantage of their re-election mandate after mandate, pushing unacceptable laws and will have impacts on the Quebec nation.

We have an intimate knowledge of the organization of the Bloc

Quebecois. We were among the cogs of the organization, but we have seen that the Bloc Quebecois has gradually distanced itself from the ideals that led to its foundation. Candidates removed from people, distant members, away from local concerns and these people were literally placed in their seats by this organization. These candidates have been incompetent to carry the message that should inspire the part of Gilles Duceppe and mutated the party organization that shows his face in his campaign, which allowed us to make our reasoning this: Given the opportunity to choose between two parties, why not vote for the one who has the ideals like us and who has the best chance to win our principles on the federal level.

On May 2nd we will put our mark next to the New Democratic candidate, proud to participate in building a better future for the people of this country,

102 happy to enjoy the unique momentum given to us and realize that exercised our vote without contradiction with our national aspirations for Quebec.

103