ESPI Report 64: Security in Outer Space: Rising Stakes for Europe

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Security in Outer Space:

Rising Stakes for Europe

Report 64 August 2018

Short title: ESPI Report 64 ISSN: 2218-0931 (print), 2076-6688 (online) Published in August 2018

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ESPI Report 64 2 August 2018 Security in Outer Space: Rising Stakes for Europe

Table of Contents

1. Introduction 5 1.1 Background and Rationale for the Study 5 1.2 Research Objectives and Approach 6 1.3 Research Scope 6 1.3.1 ‘Security in Outer Space’ and other Dimensions of ‘Space Security’ 6 1.3.2 Security of the Space Infrastructure 7 1.3.3 Security in Operation 8

2. Increasing Need for Space Security in Europe: Policy Drivers 9 2.1 European Space Infrastructure: a Substantial and Continuous Investment 9 2.2 Socio-Economic Value of the European Space Infrastructure 13 2.2.1 Considerable Economic Benefits 13 2.2.2 Instrumental for Policy Implementation 14 2.2.3 A Promising Future ahead 15 2.3 2021: A Turning Point for the European Union Space Programme 16 2.3.1 Space Security, a Key Component for a ‘Service-Driven’ Policy 16 2.3.2 ‘Outer Space for Security’ Nurturing the Need for ‘Security in Outer Space’ 16 2.4 European Autonomy and Freedom of Action 20 2.4.1 Strategic Stakes 20 2.4.2 The U.S.: a Leader in Space Situational Awareness Capabilities 20 2.4.3 U.S. SSA Sharing Agreements 21 2.4.4 European Autonomy and American Leadership 22

3. Rising Threats to the European Space Infrastructure Security 24 3.1 Passive Man-Made Threats: an Increasingly Congested Space Environment 24 3.1.1 Space Debris 24 3.1.2 Accidental Interferences 27 3.2 Active Man-Made Threats: an Increasingly Contested Space Environment 28 3.2.1 Anti-Satellite Weapons 29 3.2.2 Malicious Interferences: Satellite Signals Jamming and Spoofing 31 3.2.3 Cyberattacks 32 3.3 Natural Threats, Space Environment Hazards 34 3.4 Key Takeaways 36

4. European Approach to Space Security 37 4.1 Securing the European Space Infrastructure: a Multi-Fold Challenge 37 4.1.1 Core Components of the ‘Security in Outer Space’ Challenge 37 4.1.2 Main Fields of Action 38 4.1.3 Security in Outer Space: Action Matrix 39 4.1.4 The Case of Space Traffic Management 40 4.2 Countries: the Core Actors of Space Security in Europe 40 4.2.1 A National Defence and Security Domain 40 4.2.2 Between Sovereignty and Cooperation 41 4.3 ESA: a Key Actor of Space Security Capacity-Building 45 4.3.1 Space Security in the ESA Portfolio 45 4.3.2 ESA Capacity-Building Programmes 45 4.3.3 Additional ESA Activities: Regulatory and Cooperation Frameworks 48 4.4 EU: Cross-Fertilization of Security and Space Policies 49 4.4.1 A Domain at the Crossroad of the EU’s Growing Engagement in Space and Security 49 4.4.2 Capacity-Building through EU Research and Innovation Programmes 50 4.4.3 EU Initiatives in the Field of Diplomacy and Cooperation 52 4.4.4 EU Space Surveillance & Tracking Support Framework 53

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5. Way Forward for an Enhanced Role of Europe in Security in Outer Space 60 5.1 Rising Stakes for Europe 60 5.1.1 Short-Term Policy Rationales 60 5.1.2 Long-Term Strategic Stakes 61 5.2 Way Forward: Key Elements for Consideration 62 5.3 Toward a New Framework for 2021-2027 64 5.3.1 European Commission’s draft regulation 64 5.3.2 Proposed further developments in light of ESPI conclusions 66

Annex 69 A.1 Risk Management Concepts 69 A.2 Space Security Concepts 70 A.3 Threats to Space Infrastructure 71 A.4 Projects Related to ‘Security in Outer Space’ Supported by EU R&D Support Frameworks 72 A.5 Overview of European Actions in the Field of Space Security 76 A.6 List of Interviewees 77

List of Acronyms 78

About ESPI 81

About the Authors 81

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1. Introduction

delivered a keynote speech on the role of space in security and defence matters. Her 1.1 Background and Rationale presence at this high level policy event, for the second consecutive year, along with five other for the Study commissioners, holds out the prospect of an even greater political acknowledgement of the The ecosystem of the space sector has shifted socio-economic and strategic significance of drastically over the past decades with new space infrastructures within the broad EU pe- technical concepts and business endeavours rimeter of action, in particular while the EU is building on a changing institutional and eco- increasing its activities in the fields of defence nomic environment. Now a pillar of the mod- and security. ern economy and society, the global space in- The growing importance of space infrastruc- frastructure enables key services across vital ture raises new stakes concerning its protec- sectors, and directly supports public actions to tion from harm. Experts routinely caution gov- address economic, societal, environmental ernments and operators about the rising and security issues at a national and global threats to space infrastructure security, un- level. This ever-growing use of space-based derlining that space is increasingly congested data and services by a variety of public and and contested, which poses an intensifying private actors/users has created a virtually in- challenge to safely deploying, operating and visible dependence on space technologies, exploiting space assets. Driven by a variety of which closely relates to Information and Com- trends from inside and outside the space sec- munication Technologies (ICT). As the use of tor, challenges to the security of space infra- space applications becomes more pervasive, structure include the proliferation of space de- brings more benefits, and becomes part of the bris, accidental or malicious radio interfer- business-as-usual routine, dependence on ences, cyber-attacks, anti-satellite technolo- space infrastructure intensifies, which creates gies (ASAT), and natural space hazards such new vulnerabilities for the economy and soci- as geomagnetic and solar radiation storms. ety at large. A disruption or shutdown of space systems - intentional or not - would cause dis- This deteriorating situation has already been astrous knock-on effects on other key infra- widely acknowledged by European stakehold- structures and sectors, leading to possible ers including Member States from the Euro- waves of crises. In the European Union only, pean Space Agency (ESA) and the European at least 10% of the GDP depends to some ex- Union (EU). Recently, the EU identified the re- tent on space assets.1 Thus, even a partial in- inforcement of ‘Europe´s autonomy in access- capacitation of these assets could lead to a ing and using space in a secure and safe envi- substantial economic loss of up to EUR 50 bil- ronment’ as a top priority of its Space Strategy lion per year, and would put up to 1 million for Europe.2 Accordingly, European stakehold- jobs at risk. Other impacts, more complex to ers have taken steps in this field. Organised at measure, would also arise in the fields of en- national, intergovernmental and European vironmental protection or security and de- level, efforts encompass capacity-building in fence, putting human life at risk of harm or the field of Space Situational Awareness loss. (SSA), development of technologies and standards, reinforcement of space pro- At the 10th European Space Policy Conference grammes security architecture, establishment in January 2018, Mrs. Frederica Mogherini, of legal and regulatory regimes but also diplo- High Representative of the European Union for matic initiatives and cooperation frameworks. Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice- President of the European Commission (EC),

1 PwC (2017). Dependence of the European Economy on The European Economic And Social Committee And The Space Infrastructures. Brussels: EU Publications. Retrie- Committee Of The Regions. Space Strategy For Europe. ved from: http://www.copernicus.eu/sites/default/files/li- COM (2016) 705 final. Brussels: https://ec.eu- brary/Copernicus_SocioEconomic_Impact_Octo- ropa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/COM-2016- ber_2016.pdf 705-F1-EN-MAIN.PDF 2 European Commission (2016). Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament, The Council,

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Despite multiple initiatives, European efforts,  Provide a comprehensive overview of in particular in the field of capacity-building, threats challenging the security of Euro- remain limited in comparison with other pean space infrastructure space-faring nations and especially with the  Investigate the European approach and United States. Across the Atlantic, securing effort in the field of space security and as- space assets has long been a strategic priority sess achievements and limitations includ- as underlined by the development of an ambi- ing: tious SSA programme by the U.S. Department of Defence. Recent developments, including o European objectives and resources the launch of the $1.6 billion U.S. Space Fence programme3 aiming to further increase do- o European initiatives (e.g. capacity- mestic SSA capabilities and the recent publi- building, legal framework, standards) cation of a Space Traffic Management (STM) o International cooperation and diplo- policy demonstrate the desire of the U.S. gov- macy ernment to accelerate its effort in this domain.  Identify and discuss European stakes, As the space security dialogue gains momen- ambitions, and means for short- to long- tum, Europe sits at the crossroads of im- term space policy developments. portant decisions with far reaching consequences. Among these decisions, the priorities The analysis provided in this report is based and budget envelopes of the post-2020 Multi- on publicly available information and on inter- annual Financial Framework (MFF) will be de- views with stakeholders and experts, under cisive to shape the role that Europe will play in Chatham House rules. this field in the coming years. 1.3 Research Scope 1.2 Research Objectives and Approach 1.3.1 ‘Security in Outer Space’ and other Dimen- sions of ‘Space Security’ The European Space Policy Institute ranks space security as a short-term priority for Space Security is defined by the Space Secu- space policy development and considers it one rity Index as ‘the secure and sustainable ac- of the key challenges for the future of Eu- cess to, and use of, space and freedom from 4 rope´s activity in space. In this context, the space-based threats’. This definition ‘encom- purpose of this ESPI research project is to pro- passes the security of the unique outer space vide a comprehensive overview of the state of environment, which includes the physical and affairs in the current European approach to operational integrity of man-made assets in space security, and to discuss possible devel- space and their ground stations, as well as se- opments. In investigating the rationale for a curity on Earth from threats originating in 5 strong European role in space security and ex- space’. This definition can be expanded fur- amining European achievements and short- ther to encompass the crucial role played by comings in this field, this report seeks to iden- space systems in support of defence and se- tify possible pathways to shape a coherent Eu- curity activities on Earth. ropean space security strategy. The overarch- Here, three conceptual dimensions of Space ing objective is to raise awareness about the Security can be delineated as shown in Table evolving situation and to contribute to the fu- 1. 6 ture of European space security policies. In this report, ‘Space Security’ is understood More specifically the study aims to: primarily as ‘Security in Outer Space’ referring  Assess the rationale for space security in to the protection of space infrastructure from Europe by reviewing the key stakes for threats so that this infrastructure can fulfil its Europe specific functions as expected. In this case, activities in the field of Space Security encompass the set of political, legal, economic and

3 The Space Fence will utilise S-band ground-based ra- 5 West, J. Space Security Index 2017. Waterloo, Ontario, dars. http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/space- Canada: Space Security Index. fence.html 6 Mayence J-F (2010). ‘Space security: transatlantic ap- See also: http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineAr- proach to space governance’, Prospects for transparency chive/Pages/2017/August%202017/A-Closer-Watch-on- and confidence-building measures in space . (ESPI, Vi- Space.aspx enna, p 35) 4 West, J. Space Security Index 2017. Waterloo, Ontario, Canada: Space Security Index.

ESPI Report 64 6 August 2018 Security in Outer Space: Rising Stakes for Europe

technical provisions required to ensure an ‘Ac- the Earth against space-based threats), are cessible’, ‘Affordable’ and ‘Safe to Operate’ not directly addressed in this study. space environment. Notwithstanding this, the three dimensions of Security in Outer Space Security Space Security are strongly entangled and in- Outer Space for Security from Outer terdependent. For example, users of space Space systems for ground security and defence operations have strong requirements in terms of service resilience, which reinforce the need to The protec- The use of The protec- protect space assets from threats. In this case, tion of the space sys- tion of human it is ‘Outer Space for Security’ that nurtures space infra- tems for se- life and the the need for ‘Security in Outer Space’. Some structure curity and de- Earth envi- aspects of ‘Outer Space for Security’ and ‘Se- against natu- fence pur- ronment curity from Outer Space’ that have an impact ral and man- poses. against natu- on ‘Security in Outer Space’ may therefore be made threats ral threats mentioned in this report, but special efforts or risks, en- and risks were made to preserve the scope of the study. suring the coming from sustainability space. of space ac- 1.3.2 Security of the Space Infrastructure tivities. The space infrastructure can be described as a Table 1: Complementary dimensions of Space Security network of space-based and ground-based systems interconnected by communication The topics of ‘Outer Space for Security’ (i.e. channels and enabled by access to space ca- the use of space-based capabilities to support pabilities. It includes: security and defence activities), and of ‘Secu- rity from Outer Space’ (i.e. the protection of

Figure 1: Representation of the GNSS infrastructure components7

 A space segment, composed of all sys- the different elements of the ground seg- tems of the infrastructure located in orbit, ment between each other and with other namely satellites required for the conduct ground systems such as internet and mo- of operations and delivery of intended ser- bile networks); vice;  A user segment, sometimes addressed as  A ground segment, composed of all sys- a sub-part of the ground segment and tems of the infrastructure located on the composed of complementary ground- surface of the Earth and necessary for the based systems required for the delivery of conduct of operations in space and deliv- full-fledged space services accessible by ery of data and signals (i.e. stations to in- end-users (i.e. service monitoring cen- terface with the space segment, mission control centres to manage operations in space, networks and terminals to connect

7 National Research Council. (1995). The Global Position- ing System. Retrieved from National Academies Press. Retrieved from https://www.nap.edu/read/4920/chapter/9

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tres, data processing facilities, user equip- intentional and unintentional threats to down- ment such as terminals or navigation sys- links and uplinks. The report does not address tems); security challenges specific to the ground segment, such as Earth natural hazards, physical  Down-links and up-links to interface be- attacks on facilities or eavesdropping (e.g. tween the space and ground segments sabotage). (i.e. including users’ equipment) and to operate the space system and receive its data.8 The uplink refers to signals trans- 1.3.3 Security in Operation mitted from the ground to space and the downlink refers to signals received on the From a wider angle, a comprehensive review ground from space. of space security challenges faced by space infrastructure would require taking into account As the present report focuses on ‘Security in the entire system lifecycle including develop- Outer Space’, the analysis addresses predom- ment, production, deployment, and operations inantly security threats and challenges to the up to disposition. Indeed, space security is the ‘space segment’ of the space infrastructure. result of measures applied throughout the in- Whenever relevant, the report also discusses frastructure lifecycle: threats and challenges affecting other components of the space infrastructure, in particular

Supply Chain Access to Space Security by Design Security in Operation Security Security

Development Production Deployment Operation

Figure 2: Security challenges throughout system lifecycle

This study focuses primarily on security chal- the security architecture of space programmes lenges to space infrastructure in operation, in- (e.g. Security Accreditation, Threat Response cluding system disposal. Security challenges Architecture), which requires to be adapted to at earlier stages of space programmes (e.g. the specificities of each infrastructure, is not security-by-design, supply chain security) are addressed in this study which focuses on com- mentioned whenever relevant but have not mon and external dimensions of security in been investigated specifically. By extension, outer space.

8 National Research Council. (1995).The Global Position- ing System. Retrieved from National Academies Press: https://www.nap.edu/read/4920/chapter/9

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2. Increasing Need for Space Security in Europe: Policy Drivers

to partner organisations including the Eu- ropean Space Agency, the European 2.1 European Space Infra- GNSS Agency (GSA), EUMETSAT, Frontex, the European Union Satellite Centre (EU structure: a Substantial SatCen), the European Maritime Safety Agency and other public and private en- and Continuous Invest- trusted entities. ment  The European Space Agency, as an intergovernmental organisation, develops, It is undisputed that today Europe has ac- owns and operates a variety of space sys- quired the status of a full-fledged space tems and ground infrastructures funded power. With a diversity of space programmes from annual contributions by its Member for scientific and operational purposes and an States; autonomous launching capability resulting from substantial and continuous investment,  EUMETSAT, as the European operational Europe has joined with full-rights the small satellite agency for monitoring weather, club of space powers. As a result, Europe is climate and the environment, operates a equipped today with a complete and opera- system of meteorological satellites. It re- tional space infrastructure, including orbital lies on ESA for the design and develop- systems (i.e. spacecraft), ground stations, ment of its space segment; launchers, spaceports and, in general, all sys-  Member States9, who conduct both civil tems and facilities required to develop, manu- and military programmes and whose na- facture, deploy, operate and exploit space sys- tional institutions (e.g. space agencies, tems. department of defence) own, operate and For the purposes of this study, European space exploit national space infrastructures; infrastructure is understood as the sum of  Commercial Operators, such as Eutelsat, space and ground assets owned and operated SES or Inmarsat, own, operate and ex- by European public and private stakeholders. ploit private space infrastructures for a Ownership of European space infrastructure, commercial purpose. encompassing space and ground components but also access to space facilities, is shared Together, these European actors own and op- among five main actors: erate a wide space infrastructure comprised of numerous space systems and related ground  The European Union, as a supranational segments. Focusing on the space component, institutional actor, owns the space infra- 219 European satellites, excluding cubesats structures of the current flagship pro- and other smallsats below 15 kg, were opera- grammes Galileo, EGNOS and Copernicus. tional as of end 2017. The following figure, ex- Development, operation and exploitation tracted from ESPI database, provides an over- of EU space infrastructures are delegated view of the number of operational European satellites by owner/operator.

9 Note: Member States include here a broad coverage of European countries active in space and in particular Mem- ber States of the European Union and of the European Space Agency.

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Figure 3: Number of operational European satellites per operator/owner as of end 2017 (source: ESPI database)

Interestingly, in Europe, the number of satel- Satellites operated by European institutions lites operated by private entities (124) ex- include a total of 44 space systems: 17 oper- ceeds the number of satellites operated by ated by ESA (including 5 EU Sentinel satel- public civil and military institutions (95). This lites), 5 operated by EUMETSAT and 22 Galileo is a direct consequence of the leading position satellites owned by the EU and operated by the occupied by European satellite operators on GSA with the support of private operators. global markets, in particular for satellite tele- Satellites operated by national civil and mili- communication. Among key European players, tary institutions include 45 space systems: 23 SES, a private telecommunication satellite op- operated by national space agencies (i.e. ASI, erator with headquarters in Luxembourg (in- CNES, DLR, INTA, UKSA) and 22 by military- cluding several branches: O3b, Astra, AMC, related organisations. NSS and QuetzSat) operates 52 satellites. Eu- The remaining 23 satellites include mostly telsat, another private satcom operator, with smaller private operators such as Airbus, headquarters in France, operates 33 satellites. Skynet (for the UK Ministry of Defence), Avanti Other key private operators include Hispasat Communications Group, Telenor, Bulsatcom and Inmarsat operating respectively 9 and 13 and DMC International Imaging, for example. satellites.

Figure 4: Number of operational European satellites per mission as of end 2017 (source: ESPI database)

With the recent deployment of new systems, In addition to this orbital component, Euro- in particular Galileo, EGNOS, and Copernicus, pean actors rely on an extensive ground seg- European space assets cover a rather large set ment to operate and exploit these satellites of scientific and operational missions including and deliver data and services to users. The telecommunication, Earth observation and sci- ground segment includes a large range of sta- ence, meteorology, navigation, astronomy and tions, positioned across the globe and used for military intelligence, and deliver data and ser- various purposes. For example, the ground vices for a multitude of civil and military appli- segment of Galileo, among the most complex cations. systems, is composed of the following centres:

ESPI Report 64 10 August 2018 Security in Outer Space: Rising Stakes for Europe

 Two Galileo Control Centres (GCC), in Fu-  The Galileo Service Centre (GCS) in Ma- cino Italy (GCC-I) and in Oberpfaffenho- drid, Spain, and Galileo SAR Centre pro- fen Germany (GCC-D), each one hosting: vide end-users with additional data for the Open Service, the Commercial Service o A Ground Control Segment (GCS) ded- and the Search-And-Rescue services. icated to the control of the satellites on-orbit. This manages five Telemetry Each individual European space infrastructure Tracking & Control (TT&C) stations comprises ground stations that can be iso- distributed globally. The GCS handles lated, co-located in hubs, or shared with other spacecraft housekeeping and constel- systems. Another example of a broad ground lation maintenance. segment is that deployed for EGNOS, which includes two Mission Control and Processing o A Ground Mission Segment (GMS), Centres (MCC), two Central Processing Facility dedicated to the Galileo mission and (CPF), 2 Central Control Facilities (CCF), 40 the generation of Navigation and Tim- Ranging and Integrity Monitoring Stations ing signals. It manages a network of (RIMS), 8 Navigation Land Earth Stations Galileo Sensor Stations (GSS) and 5 (NLES), and the EGNOS Wide Area Network Up-Link Stations (ULS) distributed (EWAN). globally. Lastly, Europe has an autonomous access-to-  Two Launch and Early Orbit Phase (LEOP) space capability comprising the required in- Operation Control Centres (LOCC), one dustrial setup, an operational spaceport, and hosted by CNES in Toulouse (France), and a broad family of launchers covering small, the other hosted by ESOC in Darmstadt medium and heavy lift capacities. (Germany). The two centres are used al- ternatively for each dual launch to operate The European space infrastructure is the result the satellites from launcher separation of a substantial and continuous investment until reaching the final target orbit. The from public and private actors. European insti- LOCCs include a dedicated ground station tutions (EU, ESA and national governments) network used for tracking, commanding mobilize, every year, a sizeable space budget. and controlling the satellites (LEOP TT&C). In 2016, the consolidated European space budget reached € 7,726 million.10 This consol-  One In Orbit Test (IOT) ground station ex- idated value for the year 2016 encompasses € ecutes In-Orbit Test campaigns for each 6,035 million in civil and military national satellite to verify the in-orbit performance space budgets, including contributions to ESA of the payload signals, ensuring that no budget, and € 1,691 million from the budget degradation has occurred during launch of the European Union. The management of with respect to the signal performances as this budget comprises a complex multi-layered measured during ground testing. After structure involving various actors in charge of IOT has been successfully completed, the managing a share of this budget to conduct spacecraft is declared officially opera- various space programmes. tional and transmits its L-band ranging signal. Figure 5 provides an overview of the European space budget flow with sources and managing  The Galileo Data Dissemination Network entities. (GDDN) is a Wide Area Network, connect- ing the Galileo Ground Stations (GSS, In general, this budget corresponds to the an- ULS, TT&C) to the GCCs, the LOCCs, and nual investment of public stakeholders to de- the IOT station. velop, deploy and operate space infrastructure as part of public programmes. Beyond the di-  Two Galileo Security Monitoring Centres rect investment in industry for procurement of (GSMC), one in Saint-Germain, France, space and ground systems or launch services, and one in Madrid, Spain, ensure the se- this public budget also encompasses a range curity of the Galileo infrastructure. The of activities to support a competitive and ca- centre monitors and takes action regard- pable European industrial base, in particular ing security threats, security alerts and through Research & Development pro- the operational status of systems compo- grammes such as ESA Basic and General Tech- nents and ensures that sensitive infor- nology Research Programmes and the EU Hori- mation relating to the use of the Public zon 2020 programme. Finally, a part of the Regulated Service (PRS) is suitably man- budget includes necessary expenditures for aged and protected. programme management and other activities part of agency portfolios.

10 Lionnet, P. (2017). (Upstream) economic space data

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Figure 5: European public space budget sources and management flow11

From a top-down perspective, the annual in- 2014 – 2020 period.13 For the Copernicus pro- vestment of public stakeholders provides a gramme, a total investment of € 7,500 mil- good metric of the value of the European pub- lion14 is established for the period 2008-2020. lic space infrastructure. This metric is not per- In both cases, amounts exclude complemen- fect since it includes a share of activities that tary Horizon 2020 budgets dedicated to sup- are not directly related to the European space porting R&D efforts related to the pro- infrastructure itself (e.g. investment in the grammes. These amounts also exclude ex- downstream sector, international pro- penditures made as part of previous programmes…) and does not provide for an esti- grammes to develop industrial facilities and mate of the cumulative investment related to capacities re-used for these programmes (e.g. the operational infrastructure currently in or- clean rooms, vacuum chambers, test-beds, bit. This being said, and although the financial generic technologies, and know-how…). value of operational public space infrastruc- Alongside those considerations, the long-term ture could be estimated (with considerable continuation of EU programmes, a prerequisite analysis effort and access to classified data), it to achieving programme objectives, will re- is important to note that such metric would quire further financial support beyond 2020 as also not provide a complete picture of the total proposed by the European Commission in the intrinsic value of the infrastructure. From this proposal for a regulation establishing the standpoint it is to be noted that the European space policy programme of the European Un- space infrastructure as it stands is the result ion for the period 2021-2027.15 of a long and constant efforts by public stake- In addition to public budgets, a substantial in- holders. These efforts started long ago, with vestment is also made each year by private the initial setup of European industrial capabil- operators to deploy, maintain, upgrade and ities, carry on today with current programmes expand the infrastructure they exploit com- and will endure in the future to ensure pro- mercially. Estimating this investment is com- gramme continuity and further expand Euro- plex exercise. In 2016, Eurospace estimated pean space infrastructure. that sales of space and ground systems from Looking into individual programmes of the Eu- the European space manufacturing industry to ropean Union, for example, the total budget European private operators reached € 485 mil- allocated up to 2020 to finance activities re- lion.16 This figure excludes an important share lated to Galileo and EGNOS programmes of private expenditures such as purchase of amounts to € 10,500 million, including € 3,405 systems from third country industry, internal million allocated during the 2007 – 2013 pe- running costs, and complementary expenses riod12 and € 7,071 million allocated during the

11 Lionnet, P. (2017). (Upstream) economic space data 12 European Commission (2011). REGULATION (EC) No 683/2008 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 9 July 2008 on the further implementation of the European satellite navigation programmes (EGNOS and Galileo). Brussels: European Commission. Retrieved from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008R0683&from=EN 13 European Union (2013). Regulation (EU) No 1285/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council. Retrieved from EUR- Lex: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013R1285 14 European Commission. (2016). Copernicus: Market report. Retrieved from Copernicus. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union: http://www.copernicus.eu/sites/default/files/library/Copernicus_Market_Report_11_2016.pdf 15 European Commission. (2018). Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing the space policy programme of the European Union, relating to the European Union Agency for Space and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1285/2013, No 377/2014 and No 912/2010 and Decision 541/2014/EU. Brussels 16 ASD-Eurospace. (2017). Facts and Figures press release. Retrieved from Eurospace: http://www.eurospace.org/Data/Sites/1/pdf/eurospacefactsandfigures2017pressrelease.pdf

ESPI Report 64 12 August 2018 Security in Outer Space: Rising Stakes for Europe

for network control centres and teleports, space infrastructure provides a broad range of among others. unique capabilities that are essential for a variety of strategic domains and economic sec- Europe can therefore rely on a wide space in- tors. frastructure comprised of numerous space and ground systems functioning together to pro- When looking at the space value chain, models vide end-users with a broad range of space- show that the exploitation of space infrastruc- based data and services. When adopting a top- tures has two sequential impacts. First, it fos- down approach and looking into the financial ters the development of a vibrant downstream resources mobilized by public and private sector comprising numerous companies spe- stakeholders, it appears quite clearly that this cialized in processing raw space data and ca- infrastructure is the result of a substantial and pabilities to deliver turnkey services to end- continuous effort. Estimating precisely the fi- users. Then, the use of these space-based so- nancial value of the European space infra- lutions, with the emergence of new applica- structure in terms of investment is not tions, generates considerable benefits for end- straightforward as the current infrastructure users including institutions and businesses builds upon decades of investment and will re- widespread across numerous sectors (i.e. de- quire continuous effort for future mainte- fence, agriculture, energy, insurance, bank- nance, upgrades and evolutions to accommo- ing…), and a vast majority of European house- date new emerging needs. For this reason, es- holds and citizens that use space-based solu- timating the value of the infrastructure at a tions in their daily lives. given moment by summing the cost of each These benefits are complex to estimate at a component would not provide a fair assess- macro-economic level but specialists tend to ment of its actual value. point out that space related benefits are often underestimated simply because, at user-level, the use of space infrastructures, although per- 2.2 Socio-Economic Value of vasive, is often transparent. It was recently estimated that, thanks to a fertile ecosystem the European Space Infra- for the development and adoption of space- based solutions, more than 10% of European structure Union Gross Domestic Product (GDP) depends today, somehow and in different ways, on the space infrastructure.17 The total economic 2.2.1 Considerable Economic Benefits benefit for the EU is estimated to be as large Another, probably more suitable, way to esti- as € 53.5 billion per year in Gross Value mate the value of the European space infra- Added, supporting directly and indirectly about structure is based on a bottom-up approach, 1 million jobs in the European Union. This looking into the various benefits arising from value includes economic activities in the Euro- the exploitation of this infrastructure. By pean space downstream sector and economic means of comparison, the intrinsic value of a benefits (e.g. increased output, reduced inter- highway, or of an airport for example, does not mediate costs, improved productivity) materi- lie in the financial resources mobilized to build alizing in end-user sectors. Comparatively, and operate it but actually in the fulfilment of this economic impact is highly cost-effective, the infrastructure objective which is, in gen- with limited European spending in comparison eral, to support the socio-economic develop- to other spacefaring nations (0,1% of Euro- ment of a region. Infrastructures can also sup- pean public budgets / €12,5 per European cit- port the achievement of other strategic objec- izen per year). From this perspective, the tives such as reducing the environmental im- space infrastructure actively contributes to the pact of human activities or improving safety. economic development of Europe by improving the competitiveness and productivity of The socio-economic and strategic value of the numerous European industrial sectors. European space infrastructure has already been investigated in the frame of various stud- The following figure provides a simplified rep- ies ordered by the European Commission, ESA resentation of the chain of economic benefits and EUMETSAT, among others. In general, enabled by the European space infrastructure. these studies underline that, driven by the de- In this figure additional non-economic benefits velopment of space and ground technologies, (e.g. job creation, environmental impact, dig- in particular ICT, the role of space systems has ital divide mitigation) are not represented. radically progressed. Today, the European

17 PwC (2016). Study to examine the socioeconomic im- Copernicus programme. Brussels: European Commission. pact of Copernicus in the EU. Report on The socio-eco- Retrieved from European Commission: http://www.coperni- nomic impact of the cus.eu/sites/default/files/library/Copernicus_SocioEco- nomic_Impact_October_2016.pdf

ESPI Report 64 13 August 2018

- Satellite operators value added €8-11 billion €50 billion (GVA) - Downstream sector value added per year per year - End-users economic benefits: productivity gain, increased output, reduced costs Space segment Ground segment Public institutions Private operators *Additional non-economic benefits not included here

Figure 6: Simplified space infrastructure benefits chain

Focusing on EU programmes, Copernicus, Space capabilities are instrumental for the im- alone, is expected to enable more than € 13,5 plementation of key European policies. The billion of cumulated economic benefits in gross space infrastructure can either contribute di- value added by 2020. This impact includes the rectly to the implementation of policies (i.e. investment impact on the upstream industry, space-based solutions are used directly by the enabled revenues from European downstream EU to achieve flagship objectives), or indirectly actors, and the estimated economic benefits at (i.e. space-based solutions are used by actors end users’ level, value which is expected to in- of target sectors to improve productivity or re- crease significantly as more Sentinels and reduce the environmental footprint, for example, lated services become operational.18 An ex- which supports the achievement of EU objec- ante cost-benefits analysis of EGNOS for the tives). aviation sector19 estimated that cumulated un- Examples of space infrastructure contributions discounted benefits could be as high as € 2.4 to EU sectorial policies include, among others, billion between 2008-2030 with € 1.1 billion of the EU Digital Agenda to bridge the digital di- benefits for commercial and general aviation, vide in Europe, the Common Fisheries Policy € 350 million for airports and air navigation (CFP) to support the sustainable exploitation service providers, and € 1 billion for the gen- of fisheries resources, EU Road Safety to ena- eral public and other sectors. The socio-eco- ble competitive, sustainable, secure and safe nomic impacts of Galileo have yet to be as- transport services, the Common Agricultural sessed but, since the programme is not fully Policy (CAP) to foster agricultural productivity, operational despite declaration of initial ser- viable food production, reduction of agricul- vices20 in December 2016, the potential of Gal- ture environmental footprint and farmers’ ac- ileo in terms of benefits has not yet been max- cess to ICT or the Energy Union to give con- imised. Nevertheless, given the size of the sumers secure, sustainable, competitive, and programme and the fast-growing downstream affordable energy.22 In the domain of security industry for GNSS services21 it can already be and defence, the space infrastructure also anticipated that the programme will enable supports multiple policies and activities within considerable benefits for Europe. and outside European borders including, among others, civil protection and police mis- 2.2.2 Instrumental for Policy Implementation sion, maritime security (e.g. traffic monitoring, surveillance of illegal activities, Search & Beyond measurable economic benefits, the Rescue missions), border surveillance or hu- use of space-based solutions also brings no- manitarian aid. ticeable benefits to European society at large, and to the fulfilment of a variety of European These are only a few of many examples. In Union and Member States governmental ob- fact, space infrastructure is used or could be jectives. Indeed, space systems are, before used, in a vast majority of EU policy areas that all, strategic assets that contribute to many require EU intervention, ranging from border European sectorial policies and support in mul- control to sustainable forestry strategy. The tiple ways the European effort to tackle mod- magnitude of benefits enabled by space assets ern societal and environmental challenges. varies between policy areas but can be critical

18 European Commission (2016). Copernicus: Market re- 21 European GNSS Agency. (2016). Security Accreditation. port. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Un- Retrieved from European GNSS Agency: ion. Retrieved from http://www.copernicus.eu/sites/de- https://www.gsa.europa.eu/security/accreditation fault/files/library/Copernicus_Market_Report_11_2016.pdf 22 PwC (2016). Study to examine the socioeconomic im- 19 GSA (2010). EGNOS Cost Benefit Analysis in Aviation. pact of Copernicus in the EU. Report on The socio-eco- 20 European Commission (2011). Mid-term review of the nomic impact of the European satellite radio navigation programmes. Retrieved Copernicus programme. Brussels: European Commission. from EUR-Lex: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-con- Retrieved from European Commission: http://www.coperni- tent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0005 cus.eu/sites/default/files/library/Copernicus_SocioEco- nomic_Impact_October_2016.pdf

ESPI Report 64 14 August 2018 Security in Outer Space: Rising Stakes for Europe

when space assets provide a particularly effi- development of new applications and the inte- cient, and sometimes irreplaceable, means to gration of space-based data and capabilities in achieving policy objectives. a growing number of ground technologies. The transition currently being observed in the 2.2.3 A Promising Future ahead space sector is usually referred to as New Space and encompasses a broad range of di- In the context of the digital revolution, the verse, interrelated trends. In a recent study of space sector is undergoing a major transition the rise of private actors in the space sector, and seems to have a bright future. In this re- ESPI isolated the following trends as drivers of spect, analysts agree that the socio-economic the New Space dynamics: and strategic value of European space infrastructure is poised to increase, driven by the

Innovative public procurement and support schemes Increasing number of New entrants space fairing nations

New Space New industry Innovative verticals and industrial space markets approaches

Substantial Disruptive private market investments solutions

Figure 7: Key trends driving the New Space sectorial dynamic

 New entrants in the space sector, includ-  Involvement of an increasing number of ing large Information and Communication space-faring nations investing in the ac- Technology (ICT) firms, start-ups, and quisition of turnkey space capabilities or new business ventures; even in the development of a domestic space industrial base.  Innovative industrial approaches with an- nouncements and initial development of Overall, ESPI defines New Space as a disrup- ambitious projects based on new pro- tive sectorial dynamic featuring various end- cesses; to-end efficiency-driven concepts driving the space sector towards a more business- and  Disruptive market solutions offering, for service-oriented paradigm. This dynamic is example, integrated services, lower embedded in the cross-fertilisation of space prices, reduced lead times, lower com- technologies with ground technologies. From plexity or higher performance, among this perspective, it is anticipated that space other value proposition features; data and capabilities will become central com-  Substantial private investment from dif- ponents of promising technologies that are ferent sources and involving different part of the on-going digital transformation, funding mechanisms; such as 5G networks, precision agriculture and forestry, next-generation air traffic manage-  Innovative public procurement and sup- ment systems, smart energy grids, and auton- port schemes involving new R&D funding omous vehicles, to name a few. Investors are mechanisms and costs/risks sharing ar- confident that the global space economy, esti- rangements between public and private mated in 2016 already at around $350 billion, partners; will continue to grow substantially to reach  New industry verticals and space markets $1.1 trillion by 2040, according to the financial such as miniature systems (micro-launch- services firm Morgan Stanley, and possibly up ers, cubesats) or in-orbit servicing in the to $3 trillion by 2050, in the view of Bank of upstream part of the space value chain America Merrill Lynch estimations. and global connectivity or near-real time geoinformation in the downstream part;

ESPI Report 64 15 August 2018

 Encourage the uptake of space services 2.3 2021: A Turning Point for and data the European Union Space  Ensure the protection and resilience of Programme critical European space infrastructure  Reinforce synergies between civil and se- Beyond the socio-economic rationale, the ris- curity space activities ing need for space security in Europe is also In other words, the significant progress of EU driven by recent developments in the Euro- programmes and the introduction of new initi- pean space policy landscape and, more specif- atives such as GOVSATCOM, have amplified ically, by advancements in EU space pro- the importance of a service-oriented space grammes and new initiatives, as well as the policy aimed at ensuring that all conditions for growing importance of synergies between civil the delivery of operational space-based ser- and security related space activities. vices conforming to user needs are met, including for users in the security sector. This is 2.3.1 Space Security, a Key Component for a ‘Ser- a prerequisite to building users’ confidence, vice-Driven’ Policy encouraging the uptake of space services, and consequently maximising the benefits of Euro- Looking at the substantial progress achieved pean space infrastructure for civil and security by EU space programmes since their inception, purposes. As underscored above, this is also a and at the additional progress expected to be key area of space policy development in light achieved by the end of the current multiannual of the growing dependence of the European financial framework, the period 2014-2020 will economy and society on space infrastructure, mark a turning point for the Galileo, EGNOS including critical infrastructure such as tele- and Copernicus programmes. Whereas at the communications, energy and transport. beginning of the period, in 2014, programme The conditions to guarantee an appropriate partners were focusing primarily on ensuring Quality of Service (QoS) to meet user needs in the successful development and deployment the long-term, include: of the infrastructure, the spotlight is gradually shifting to the provision of services to end-us-  Performance through a proven or certified ers and to maximising benefits enabled by the level of performance infrastructure.  Stability through the long-term availabil- The European Commission recently published ity of services and data the results of mid-term evaluations of the Gal- Security through comprehensive protec- ileo, EGNOS and Copernicus programmes,23,24  which highlight the considerable progression tion of the service against threats of these programmes, shifting from develop- From an infrastructure standpoint, these con- ment to exploitation phases, and underline the ditions translate into 1) operational capacities new challenges raised by this advancement. In that meet user performance requirements, 2) parallel, the EU, in close collaboration with ESA continuity of programmes to ensure infra- and EDA, is moving forward with the structure maintenance and upgrade, and 3) GOVSATCOM initiative that aims ‘to ensure re- appropriate measures to protect the infra- liable, secured and cost-effective satellite structure against threats. communication services for the EU and national public authorities and infrastructure.25 The challenges that lie ahead of the European 2.3.2 ‘Outer Space for Security’ Nurturing the Union space programme are multiple but, in Need for ‘Security in Outer Space’ accordance with the space strategy for Eu- rope, can be summarised as follows: The rising need for space security also lies in the increasing areas of application, in particu-  Further advance EU space programmes lar in the field of (ground) security. This stra- and meet new user needs tegic area encompasses various activities such

23 European Commission (2017). REPORT FROM THE /publication/86fe47d6-c501-11e7-9b01-01aa75ed71a1/lan- COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND guage-en/format-PDF/source-65409384 THE COUNCIL on the implementation of the Galileo and 25 European Commission (2016). Communication From EGNOS programmes and on the performance of the Euro- The Commission To The European Parliament, The Coun- pean GNSS Agency. Brussels. Retrieved from European cil, The European Economic And Social Committee And Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/transpar- The Committee Of The Regions. Space Strategy For Eu- ency/regdoc/rep/1/2017/EN/COM-2017-616-F1-EN-MAIN- rope. COM (2016) 705 final. Brussels: European Commis- PART-1.PDF sion. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/transpar- 24 PwC (2017). Interim evaluation of Copernicus. Brussels: ency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/COM-2016-705-F1-EN- European Commission. Retrieved from Publications Eu- MAIN.PDF ropa: https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-

ESPI Report 64 16 August 2018 Security in Outer Space: Rising Stakes for Europe

as civil protection, police forces, border con-  The European External Action Service trol, peace keeping, external actions and crisis (EEAS), managing EU's diplomatic rela- management, to name a few.26 Because of the tions with third-countries and conducting nature of these activities, space-based ser- the EU Common Foreign & Security Policy vices users in the security domain have strin- (CFSP) of which the CSDP is an integral gent requirements and needs in terms of ser- component. For space, the EEAS plays a vice availability, reliability, safety, integrity, central role in a number of areas. Among and confidentiality. Here the concepts of ‘Se- other things, the EEAS is in charge of co- curity in Outer Space’ and ‘Outer Space for Se- ordination with Member States, external curity’ cross-fertilize each other, as it is the relations in cooperation with DG GROW nature of the use of space infrastructure (i.e. and of space policies in relation with secu- for ground security) that nurtures the ra- rity and defence. In the Galileo pro- tionale to ensure its protection against threats. gramme, the EEAS, and especially its Head, the High Representative for Foreign In fact, although European countries’ invest- Affairs and Security Policy (HR), have ma- ment in military space activities has remained jor responsibilities in the management of rather limited in comparison to the United infrastructure security and emergency re- States, space infrastructure has always pro- sponse according to the Joint Action de- vided services and data to defence and secu- fined by Regulation 2014/496.27 The EEAS rity actors in Europe. Space-based capabilities has organized itself for these purposes, sought by users in the security sector range notably by setting up a GNSS Threat Re- from high-resolution imagery to secured tele- sponse Architecture (GTRA) including a communications through signal intelligence group of experts in charge of organising a and early warning, among others. These ser- response in case of security issues related vices and data can be provided by space as- to the functioning of Galileo on a 24/7 ba- sets owned/operated by national military bod- sis. In the future, the EEAS will likely be ies, by commercial companies, or by civil in- further integrated within the institutional stitutions. framework of the EU space programme Although space infrastructure has long been with new responsibilities related to the ex- used for a variety of security-related applica- tension of the Regulation 2014/496 scope tions, recent developments in the European to the whole European Union space pro- foreign, security and defence policy landscape gramme (i.e. Galileo, EGNOS, Copernicus, are bringing new challenges and needs to the GOVSATCOM, SSA) and, in general, new fore. The institutional setup is also evolving roles to support security architectures, with the European Union taking an increas- synergies with security and defence poli- ingly more prominent role in these fields, with- cies and coordination with other European out undermining the role of Member States. actors, Member States and third-par- Over recent years, the EU has developed var- ties.28 ious instruments and policy documents delin-  A European Agenda on Security setting eating its role, objectives and actions in the out European Union priorities for security field of Security and Defence: and underlining how the European Union  A Common Security and Defence Policy can bring added value to support the (CSDP) reinforced with new provisions re- Member States in ensuring security; sulting from successive amendments to  A European Defence Action Plan29 propos- the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and ing to: the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro- pean Union (TFEU). The EU CSDP com- o Set up a European Defence Fund to prises an institutional structure, instru- support investment in joint research ments and agencies to enable the Euro- and the joint development of defence pean Union to assume new responsibili- equipment and technologies (estab- ties. lished in June 2017 – see below)

26 Darnis, J. P., Veclani, A., & Nones, M. (2011). Under- OF THE COUNCIL establishing the space policy pro- standing the European Space Policy. Paris: Fondation gramme of the European Union, relating to the European pour la recherche stratégique. Union Agency for Space and repealing Regulations (EU) 27 European Union. (2014). Council Decision No 1285/2013, No 377/2014 and No 912/2010 and Deci- 2014/496/CFSP of 22 July 2014 on aspects of the deploy- sion 541/2014/EU. Brussels ment, operation and use of the European Global Naviga- 29 European Commission. (2015). The European Agenda tion Satellite System affecting the security of the European on Security. Brussels. Retrieved from European Commis- Union and repealing Joint Action 2004/552/CFSP. Brus- sion: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaf- sels. fairs/files/e-library/documents/basic-docu- 28 European Commission. (2018). Proposal for a ments/docs/eu_agenda_on_security_en.pdf REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND

ESPI Report 64 17 August 2018

o Foster investments in SMEs, start-ups, Commission objective to ‘ensure the protec- mid-caps, and other suppliers to the tion and resilience of critical European Union defence industry space infrastructure’. o Strengthen the Single Market for de- These considerations, although made more fence visible in the latest strategy document, are not new and multiple actions and steps have al-  A European Defence Fund30 to coordinate ready been taken in the frame of European Un- and increase national investment in de- ion space programmes. fence research and improve interoperability between national forces. The fund was Starting with Galileo, the system will answer a proposed in September 2016 and estab- variety of security needs of European govern- lished in June 2017 with two components mental actors, both at a national and European level (e.g. FRONTEX and peace-keeping oper- o Research: €90 million until the end of ations). GNSS systems are already extensively 2019, and €500 million per year after used to support defence and security opera- 2020 tions, such as localisation and navigation for o Development & Acquisition: €500 mil- troops and vehicles (both on the ground and lion in total for 2019-20, then €1 bil- in the air), mission planning, delivery of car- lion per year after 2020 gos, and search and rescue, among others 32. During a conflict, GNSS-based services can be As a result of these developments, security essential for the guidance of munitions, im- and defence aspects took a noticeable place in proving strike effectiveness and avoiding the space strategy for Europe endorsed by the friendly fire, as well as for the navigation of 31 European Union. Addressed extensively Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) or for other throughout the document, the European Com- operations such as rescue and evacuation.33 mission highlighted, in general, that ‘space Intentional, but also unintentional, interfer- services can strengthen the EU’s and Member ences with GNSS signals such as jamming or States’ capacity to tackle growing security spoofing can have dramatic consequences for challenges’, that ‘most space technologies, in- defence and security operations. This is true frastructure and services can serve both civil- for open and restricted signals that are often ian and defence objectives’ and that ‘synergies used in combination even by users in the se- between civilian and defence areas can reduce curity field.34 costs, increase resilience and improve efficiency’. More specifically the strategy explains In anticipation, security concerns gave way to that ‘additional services will be considered to several measures within the Galileo pro- meet emerging needs in specific priority areas, gramme including in particular the establish- including […] (ii) security and defence to im- ment of an independent Security Accreditation prove the EU's capacity to respond to evolving Board (SAB) within the European GNSS challenges taking into account ‘the need to en- Agency (GSA). The SAB is in charge of verify- sure adequate level of security of the infra- ing the compliance of the programme with the structure and services’. This strategic frame- applicable security rules and regulations es- work is aligned with the European Union de- tablished by the Council and the European fence action plan, which also highlight space’s Commission, and of initiating and monitoring crucial enabling role for civilian and defence the implementation of security requirements capabilities. Key actions in the field include the to verify a high, robust and uniform level of GOVSATCOM initiative and efforts to security for EU GNSS systems.35 Galileo Open strengthen security requirements when devel- Service will also will soon provide a Navigation oping EU space systems. This last element in- Message Authentication feature, known as the cludes, or at least builds on, the European Open Service Navigation Message Authentica- tion (OS-NMA) which will eventually make it

30 European Commission. (2017). A European Defence 32 Mutschler, M. M. (2010). Keeping Space Safe. Towards Fund: €5.5 billion per year to boost Europe's defence ca- A Long-Term Strategy to Arms Control in Space. Frankfurt: pabilities. Brussels. Retrieved from European Commission Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. Press release: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17- 33 Sitruk, A., & Plattard, S. (2017). The Governance of Gal- 1508_en.htm ileo. Vienna: European Space Policy Institute. Retrieved 31 European Commission (2016). Communication From from ESPI: https://www.espi.or.at/im- The Commission To The European Parliament, The Coun- ages/Rep62_online_170203_1142.pdf cil, The European Economic And Social Committee And 34 Ruegamer, A., & Kowalewski, D (2015). Jamming and The Committee Of The Regions Space Strategy For Eu- Spoofing of GNSS Signals – An Underestimated Risk?! rope. COM (2016) 705 final. Brussels: European Commis- Retrieved from FIG: https://www.fig.net/resources/proceed- sion. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/transpar- ings/fig_proceedings/fig2015/pa- ency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/COM-2016-705-F1-EN- pers/ts05g/TS05G_ruegamer_kowalewski_7486.pdf MAIN.PDF 35 European GNSS Agency (2016). Security Accreditation. Retrieved from European GNSS Agency: https://www.gsa.europa.eu/security/accreditation

ESPI Report 64 18 August 2018 Security in Outer Space: Rising Stakes for Europe

more robust and resistant to jamming & spoof-  Land: Copernicus Land Monitoring Service ing attacks. Galileo High Accuracy Service will (CLMS) provided by the European Envi- provide additional features to enhance the ronment Agency (EEA) for the pan-Euro- quality and resilience of the signals and there- pean and local components and to the Eu- fore services. Among Galileo services, the ropean Commission Joint Research Centre Public Regulated Service (PRS) meets even (JRC) for the global land component; more stringent security needs by providing an  Climate Change: Copernicus Climate encrypted navigation service for governmental Change Service (C3S) provided by the authorised users and sensitive applications ECMWF; that require high continuity including in case of malicious interferences such as spoofing  Emergency Management: Copernicus (i.e. transmission of counterfeit GNSS signals) Emergency Management Service (CEMS) and jamming (i.e. intentional interference with provided by the European Commission GNSS signals). The Galileo infrastructure also JRC; includes the Galileo Security Monitoring Centre (GSMC), which is in charge of monitoring and  Security: Copernicus Security Service taking action regarding security threats, man- (CSS) provided by FRONTEX for Border aging PRS access on system level, implement- Surveillance, by the European Maritime ing ‘joint action’ instructions in case of crisis, Safety Agency (EMSA) for Maritime Secu- and providing PRS and Galileo security exper- rity, and by the EU SatCen for Support to tise and analysis. External Action. For Copernicus, also, protection supports cru- Copernicus data, through the Copernicus cial strategic interests, affecting the imple- Emergency Management and Security Ser- mentation of several national and European vices, are actively used at all stages of disaster policies and operations including in the field of management (i.e. prevention, preparedness, defence and security. In fact, from a historical response and recovery) and support a variety perspective, the Global Monitoring for Environ- of security operations conducted by national ment and Security programme (GMES, re- and European organisations. In these fields, named Copernicus) was primarily conceived as Copernicus products and services are used to a strategic asset with the objective of ensuring support interventions inside and outside EU Europe´s autonomous access to information borders, for example in the frame of assis- on its environment and security (i.e. ground tance of third countries in situations of crisis, situational awareness),36 and supporting flag- through peacekeeping operations, conflict pre- ship European environmental and security pol- vention and resolution activities, as well as in icies.37 This objective is still current today, and risk assessment of global and trans-regional is covered by the numerous services enabled threats that might bring political destabilisa- 38 by Copernicus assets (i.e. Sentinel satellites) tion. that are grouped in six main thematic areas: Finally, the upcoming GOVSATCOM initiative  Atmosphere: Copernicus Atmosphere to ensure reliable, secure and cost-effective Monitoring Service (CAMS) provided by satellite communication services for EU and the European Centre for Medium-Range national public authorities and infrastructure Weather Forecast (ECMWF); will encompass, by design, a central and strong security dimension. In fact, security  Marine Environment: Copernicus Marine needs held a central position in both the ‘Study Environment Monitoring Service (CMEMS) on Satellite Communication to support EU Se- provided by Mercator Océan (i.e. the curity Policies and Infrastructures’ and in the French centre for analysis and forecasting subsequent ‘Study in support of the impact as- of the global ocean); sessment of an EU GOVSATCOM initiative’,39 which investigates various options for the implementation of the initiative. GOVSATCOM

36 Note: As the Commission stated in the 2008 European https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homep- Working document (European Space Policy Progress Re- age/19135/9th-conference-european-space-policy_en port): ‘European space capacities have become critical in- 38 Regulation n. 911/2010 of the European Parliament and formation tools in addressing a diversity of environmental, the Council of the 22nd of September 2010 on the Euro- economic and security challenges of a global or regional pean Earth Monitoring Programme (GMES) and its initial scale. Autonomous access to information derived from operations (2011 to 2013) space is thus a strategic EU asset. The EU will need to fur- 39 PwC(2016). Satellite communication to support EU se- ther strengthen its ability to respond to these challenges, curity policies and infrastructures. Brussels: European including in the security and defence domains, both Commission. Retrieved from Publications Europa: through improved coordination and through the develop- https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publi- ment of own capacities’. See: http://ec.europa.eu/transpar- cation/92ce1a30-0528-11e6-b713-01aa75ed71a1/lan- ency/regdoc/rep/1/2008/EN/1-2008-561-EN-F1-1.Pdf guage-en 37 EEAS (2017). 9th Conference on European Space Pol- icy. Retrieved from European Union External Action:

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will, itself, support security aspects of other and efficient action in the field of space secu- components of the EU space programme by rity. Notwithstanding, Europe must ensure a providing secure communication links between capacity to control the level of reliance on its remote parts of European space systems partners and to maintain it within acceptable ground segments. In particular, GOVSATCOM boundaries. will allow to connect remote sites requiring satellite communication links (e.g. sites located on islands in the Pacific, in the Arctic, 2.4.2 The U.S.: a Leader in Space Situational etc.) and that are, currently, dependent on ca- Awareness Capabilities pabilities provided by commercial operators, sometimes from third countries. Security in Outer Space has long been a strategic interest of the U.S., compelled by the military stakes of the Cold War related to ballistic missiles development and nuclear deter- 2.4 European Autonomy and rence. Today, the U.S. SSA system is the most advanced in the world and relies on a wide na- Freedom of Action tional infrastructure called the U.S. Space Sur- veillance Network (SSN), a network of 30 surveillance sensors,43 including radars and opti- 2.4.1 Strategic Stakes cal telescopes, operated by military and civilian entities. Another essential driver is related to the strategic need for Europe to guarantee the secu- It is the Joint Force Space Component Com- rity of its space infrastructure autonomously mand (JFSCC since December 2017 - formerly through independent capabilities, in particular the Joint Functional Component Command for for space situational awareness (i.e. systems, Space), a component of the U.S. Strategic data, technologies). European autonomy and Command (USSTRATCOM), which, through freedom of action in the field of security in the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC - outer space is a condition to fully achieving the recently renamed the 18th Space Control ‘independence’ objective that initially moti- Squadron (SPCS)44, operates the SSN to vated the launch of programmes such as Gali- gather, catalogue and analyse SSA data. The leo.40 Failing this, dependence on third coun- Centre is one of the ten joint command centers tries would persist even though there would be of the U.S. Department of Defense (Unified a shift from direct dependence on foreign Combatant Commands of the United States space systems (e.g. GPS) to dependence on Department of Defense, DoD) and is funded by foreign capabilities to secure European sys- the U.S. military programme.45 In this regard, tems. the SSN system was originally conceived to detect objects of military significance, even This necessity is acknowledged and addressed within the European Union’s pillar objective of though it quickly moved towards monitoring a diversity of other space objects. With ground- ‘reinforcing Europe’s autonomy in accessing based radars and optical sensors located in 25 and using space in a secure and safe environment’.41 Although the strategy does not elab- sites worldwide, SSN surveillance allows the U.S. to have unmatched mapping of orbiting orate precisely on the details in the field of security in outer space, the Commission clearly objects and predict their trajectory, making interventions in advance possible, in case colli- states its intention to ‘ensure [Europe’s] freedom of action and autonomy’42 in accessing sions can be predicted, or to foresee the re- entry of a body, as well as to monitor launches and using space safely. led by other states.46 Such autonomy is not planned to be sought at the expense of cooperation with third coun- Currently, the JSpOC is able to track approximately 22.000 objects about 10 cm in LEO and tries, which is actually essential for effective

40 Kinnock, Neil. European Strategy for GNSS. 44 Phillips, C. (2017). Time for common sense with the sat- SPEECH/98/210 of 20 Oct. 1998. Toulouse. ellite catalog. The Space Review. Retrieved from 41 European Commission (2016). Communication From http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3215/1 The Commission To The European Parliament, The Coun- 45 B. Weeden, P. Cefola, J. Sankaran (2013). Global cil, The European Economic And Social Committee And Space Situational Awareness Sensors, paper presented at The Committee Of The Regions Space Strategy For Eu- the Advanced Maui Optical and Space Surveillance Con- rope. COM (2016) 705 final. Brussels: European Commis- ference, Maui,p. 13. Retrieved from https://www.re- sion. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/transpar- searchgate.net/publication/228787139_Global_Space_Sit- ency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/COM-2016-705-F1-EN- uational_Awareness_Sensors MAIN.PDF 46 Briani, V. (2011). La Sicurezza nello Spazio: Risvolti Ital- 42 Ibid iani e Internazionali, in Osservatorio di politica interna- 43 International Academy of Astronautics (2017). Space zionale, n.29,p. 5. Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali Traffic Management: Towards a Roadmap for implementation. Paris: IAA Cosmic Study

ESPI Report 64 20 August 2018 Security in Outer Space: Rising Stakes for Europe

1m in GEO. However, these performances are USSTRATCOM. Today, the U.S. has more than expected to be improved to 200.000 objects 70 unclassified SSA Sharing Agreements with including debris as small as 5 cm in LEO 47 with commercial and institutional organisations. the deployment of the U.S. Space Fence, a These SSA Sharing Agreements aim to support $1,594 million programme48 expected to be transparency on operations in outer space, operational in 2019.49 The U.S. Space Fence promote cooperation for security and safety, will cover a large majority of the 500.000 es- enhance the availability of information among timated items between 1 and 10 centimetres, the partners, and improve the quality of U.S. which are so far not trackable, and increase SSA information.52,53 In practice, SSA sharing the accuracy of payload identifications and risk agreements provide selected organisations, conjunction predictions.50 This significant up- which are not affiliated to the Federal govern- grade will bring U.S. capabilities even further ment, including foreign institutions and private ahead of other space powers, including Eu- operators, with free access to authorised data rope, and will likely play a crucial role in en- stemming from SSN sensors. suring the safety of space assets in particular A vast majority of European public and private thanks to the continuation of U.S. cooperation operators resort to this opportunity to meet schemes confirmed by the last 2011 National their own needs. As a result, a share of Euro- Security Space Strategy.51 pean capabilities relies/depends on a series of Sharing Agreements with the U.S. signed by 2.4.3 U.S. SSA Sharing Agreements European intergovernmental organisations (i.e. ESA and EUMETSAT), Member States in- Partial access to American SSA data is granted stitutions (i.e. France, Germany, UK, Italy, to selected partners through a worldwide co- Spain, Belgium) and a number of European operation scheme. The American approach to commercial satellite operators and launch ser- cooperation was updated, formalised and ex- vice providers. panded in 2004 by the Commercial and For- eign Entities (CFE) Pilot Program and gave JSpOC provides different levels of access to way, in 2009, to a full-fledged SSA Sharing SSN data as shown in the following graph: Program under the responsibility of the

Figure 8: Data access to the U.S. SSA System

http://www.parlamento.it/application/xmanager/pro- 50 NASA (2010). What Is Orbital Debris? Retrieved from jects/parlamento/file/repository/affariinternazionali/osserva- https://www.nasa.gov/audience/forstudents/5-8/fea- torio/note/Nota_29_IAI_Spazio.pdf tures/nasa-knows/what-is-orbital-debris-58.html 47 Gruss, M. (2016). Good (space) fences make for good 51 Department of defense, Office of intelligence of national (orbital) neighbors. Retrieved from http://space- intelligence (2011). National Security Space Strategy. Re- news.com/good-space-fences-make-for-good-orbital- trieved from https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=10828 neighbors/ 52 Helms, S. (meeting of June 3, 2010) Space Situational 48 GAO (2015). Defense Acquisitions Assessments of Se- Awareness. Power Point presentation for the United Na- lected Weapon Programs. United States Government Ac- tions Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space countability Office (COPUOS). Report to Congressional Committees: Washington. Re- 53 USSTRATCOM Public Affairs (2017). U.S. Strategic trieved from https://www.gao.gov/as- Command, Norway sign agreement to share space ser- sets/670/668986.pdf#page=133 vices, data. Retrieved from U.S. Strategic Command 49 Note: Just for needs of completeness, it should be no- Peace is our Profession. Retrieved from http://www.strat- ticed that the current Space Fence project goes to replace com.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Arti- the previous Air Force Space Surveillance System, one of cle/1142970/us-strategic-command-norway-sign-agree- the SSN components active from 2008 to 2013. ment-to-share-space-services-data/

ESPI Report 64 21 August 2018

JSpOC regularly tracks 22.000 objects in 2.4.4 European Autonomy and American Lead- space and, comparing these predictions with ership other information, feeds a catalogue of about 16.000 of those objects, made available pub- Cooperation on security in outer space is una- licly and free of charge on the Space Track voidable for the overall success and efficiency Platform accessible online at www.space- of a variety of actions and measures including, track.org. The Space Track catalogue provides in particular, the development of advanced the orbital position of space objects through SSA capabilities and safety of operations in the Two-Line Element sets (TLEs), the Satellite outer space. From this standpoint, transpar- Catalogue data and the Satellite Decay & Re- ency, data sharing and coordination between entry Data. This constitutes the ‘Basic service’ international partners bring clear benefits for offered by JSpOC. The ‘Emergency notification all, ranging from improved monitoring capaci- service’ seeks to identify close approaches for ties (e.g. quantity of objects tracked, precision active payloads in orbit (between 20 and 30 of measurements) to enhanced security (e.g. per day) and to notify operators about the risk, collision avoidance, monitoring of proximity through e-mails or Conjunction Summary operations). Messages (CSMs). Last, the ‘Advanced service’ From a strategic perspective however, cooper- requires the setup of an SSA sharing agree- ation with third countries, as beneficial as it ment and involves two-way information ex- may be, cannot become the sole corner stone. change for a variety of activities including con- In other words, although access to foreign SSA junction assessment, anomaly resolution, data and services is a relevant way to augment electromagnetic interference investigation, domestic SSA capabilities. Such access, even and support to launch, disposal, deorbit and deemed unrestricted, free and guaranteed, re-entry.54 cannot constitute a critical input on which they The U.S. also recently set up a series of part- depend. Assessing the criticality of U.S. SSA nerships with companies involved in commer- data and services for European stakeholders is cial SSA data collection (e.g. ExoAnalytic So- challenging as there is no clear threshold iden- lutions Rincon, Lockheed Martin, LeoLabs) and tifying a minimum, required, level of capabili- in SSA value adding services (e.g. Analytical ties that would be strategically acceptable. Graphics Inc., Boeing, Schafer Corp., Applied Notwithstanding, the discrepancy between Eu- Defence Solutions). ropean and American capabilities in the field of SSA, expected to increase substantially with Lastly, the U.S. has made an outstanding the deployment of the U.S. Space Fence, move toward the establishment of a civil space somehow creates a situation of reliance/de- traffic management framework that will be en- pendence for European stakeholders and an trusted to the Department of Commerce (DoC) imbalance in cooperative arrangements. instead of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as was expected.55 Although “space sit- Beyond this general strategic principle, this uational awareness and space traffic manage- state of affairs also brings the following issues, ment are distinct concepts with different tech- including: nical requirements and policy implications”,56  SSA data and service restrictions: Even they are entangled in a number of ways and though JSpOC grants access to SSN- the construction of such a civil STM framework based data and services to commercial will imply a partial and progressive transfer of and foreign partners, restrictions exist. responsibility, not yet determined, between Because of its intrinsic military nature, a the U.S. DoD and DoC. This transfer of respon- lack of transparency or a delay in infor- sibility and overall governance change will mation provision can occur for a variety of likely impact cooperation agreements, includ- motives related to U.S. national secu- ing with European partners, and will open the rity.58 Although open, Brian Weeden of the market for SSA data and added-value services Secure World Foundation notes that ´the to private companies.57 SSA sharing strategy unveiled by the

54 Major Courtland B. McLeod. Space Situational Aware- Awareness (SSA). Washington: scienc e & technology pol- ness (SSA) Sharing. United States Strategic Command icy institute. Retrieved from https://www.ida.org/idame- Space Policy. Retrieved from dia/Corporate/Files/Publications/STPIPubs/2016/P- http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/pres/stsc2012/tech-40E.pdf 8038.ashx 55 White House. (2018). Space Policy Directive-3, National 57 INFRASTRUCTURE & TECHNOLOGY (2018). Remarks Space Traffic Management Policy. Washington. Retrieved by Vice President Pence at the 34th Space Symposium, from https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-ac- Colorado Springs, CO. Colorado. Retrieved from tions/space-policy-directive-3-national-space-traffic-man- WhiteHouse.gov. Retrieved from agement-pol- https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks- icy/?mc_cid=c4111beda6&mc_eid=8b6815cdba vice-president-pence-34th-space-symposium-colorado- 56 Nightingale, Bhavya, Weeden, Picard, Eisenstadt springs-co/ (2016). Evaluating Options for Civil Space Situational 58 Specifically, the DoD resistance to open SSA data sets, algorithms, and processes to external review and scrutiny

ESPI Report 64 22 August 2018 Security in Outer Space: Rising Stakes for Europe

USSTRATCOM in 2014 has led to re- amount for any user, to deny access to moval of more SSA data from public ac- SSA data and information, and to change cess, including data on the estimated or modify the terms and conditions at any size of space debris objects in the public time, and without prior notification.61 The satellite catalogue, and limitations on U.S. Government also has the option to what data is provided privately to satel- change the ‘free access’ policy and to start lite operators, due to national security charging SSA services.62 Yet, the involve- concerns´.59 ment of the U.S. Government in the field of civil SSA is being challenged and the  Reliability and accountability: Although current open policy may progressively and advanced, the U.S. system is not flawless partially give way to commercial agree- and may provide wrong information due ments based on services offering by public to measurements or processing errors, in agencies, or, more likely, by private pro- particular for smaller objects that Europe viders.63 cannot track.60 Sharing agreements dis- charge U.S. organisations of any liability In a nutshell, although cooperation is a neces- for the information provided, which raises sity in the field of space security, and Europe the necessity for Europe to be able to ver- benefits greatly from the open policy of the ify the data that are provided or to find U.S., it should not be relied upon at the ex- itself fully exposed to errors of foreign pense of European autonomy and freedom of systems. action. From this perspective the current state of affairs does not provide a sustainable solu-  Uncertainty on future access: The U.S. tion for Europe. Government holds the right to terminate the user account at any time for any reason, to limit both access duration and data

results in the uncertainty of the data and in possible false http://www.intelsat.com/news/blog/greater-industry-cooper- positive rates. See: https://www.ida.org/idamedia/Corpo- ation-needed-to-avoid-space-collisions/ rate/Files/Publications/STPIPubs/2016/P-8038.ashx 61 Space-Track. User agreement. Retrieved from 59 Weeden, B. (2016). Time for the U.S. military to let go of https://www.space-track.org/documentation#/user_agree the civil space situational awareness mission. Retrieved 62 Ibid from SpaceNews: http://spacenews.com/time-for-the-u-s- 63 Nightingale, Bhavya, Weeden, Picard, Eisenstadt military-to-let-go-of-the-civil-space-situational-awareness- (2016). Evaluating Options for Civil Space Situational mission/ Awareness (SSA). Washington: scienc e & technology pol- 60 Froeliger, J. L. (2017). Greater Industry Cooperation icy institute. Retrieved from https://www.ida.org/idame- Needed to Avoid Space Collisions. INTELSAT dia/Corporate/Files/Publications/STPIPubs/2016/P- 8038.ashx

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3. Rising Threats to the European Space Infrastructure Security

To build a comprehensive picture of space se- Space debris, also known as orbital debris, are curity challenges to the European space infra- defined by the Inter-Agency Space Debris Co- structure, the following section seeks to char- ordination Committee (IADC) as ‘all man- acterize the threats affecting the safety of made objects, including fragments and ele- space infrastructures and the long-term sus- ments thereof, in Earth orbit or re-entering the tainability of space activities. atmosphere, that are non-functional’64. Alt- hough measures can be taken to mitigate the These threats are grouped in three categories: creation of these non-functional elements,  Passive man-made threats, including un- space debris remain, first, a natural by-prod- intentional man-made hazards to space uct of space exploration and exploitation ac- infrastructures such as space debris or tivities. Today, it is estimated that 29,000 ob- unintentional interferences to signals; jects larger than 10 cm are orbiting the Earth along with 750,000 objects from 1 to 10 cm  Active man-made threats, including inten- and roughly 166 million from 1 mm to 1 cm.65. tional attacks on space infrastructures Debris include launcher upper stages, inoper- such as anti-satellite capabilities, mali- ative spacecraft, mission-related debris - such cious interferences and cyberattacks; as paint fracks or parts of release mechanisms  Natural threats, including space weather - and fragmentation debris stemming from ex- hazards such as geomagnetic storms, so- plosions or collisions. These last events, that lar radiation storms or disturbance of the can happen intentionally, for example during ionosphere. anti-satellite technology tests, or unintentionally, when satellites collide, are rare but have Security challenges specific to the ground seg- dramatic consequences, creating hundreds or ment, such as Earth natural hazards, physical thousands of debris. attacks on facilities or eavesdropping (e.g. sabotage) were not included in this overview. The following figure shows the evolution of the space debris population regularly tracked by the U.S. Space Surveillance Network (>10cm on Low Earth Orbit and >1m in other orbits). 3.1 Passive Man-Made Threats: Only the largest debris are counted here which an Increasingly Congested represents a small portion of all debris in orbit. On the graph, the continuous and steady evo- Space Environment lution of rocket bodies, inoperative spacecraft and mission-related debris can be explained by the fact that these objects are direct con- 3.1.1 Space Debris sequences of regular space activities. Spikes Among rising threats to an accessible and safe in recent years are the results of two major to operate space environment, the growing events in 2007 and 2009 – respectively, a Chi- number of space debris and the resulting con- nese ASAT kinetic test on the decommissioned gestion of some orbits has become a central weather satellite Feng Yun 1C and a collision topic raising major concerns in the space com- between the Russian satellite Cosmos 2251 munity. In various venues, experts routinely and the American satellite Iridium 33. To- caution governments and operators about the gether, these two events increased the space escalating threat of space debris to space op- debris population by 40%. The collision be- erations, which, if not addressed properly and tween Cosmos 2251 and Iridium 33 created timely, could seriously jeopardize the long- 1,366 pieces larger than 10 cm set to remain term sustainability of space activities.

64 Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee 65 ESA (2017). Space debris. Darmstadt: ESA's Space De- (2013). Key Definitions of the Inter-Agency Space Debris bris Office at ESOC. Retrieved from European Space Coordination Committee IADC. Retrieved from Agency: http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Opera- http://www.iadc-online.org/Documents/IADC-2013- tions/Space_Debris/Space_debris_by_the_numbers 02,%20IADC%20Key%20Definitions.pdf

ESPI Report 64 24 August 2018 Security in Outer Space: Rising Stakes for Europe

Figure 9: Count evolution by object type between 1957 and 2017 (Source: NASA)

in orbit for 20 to 100 years.66 In 2017, and the International Space Station performed an despite growing efforts to mitigate space de- emergency avoidance manoeuvre because of bris creation, the number of space debris a 14cm chunk of space debris.69 reached an all-time high. Although congestion of the space environment Although large objects account for the vast by orbital debris is a broad concern affecting majority of the total debris mass and present all systems in orbit, space infrastructures are an obvious threat, they are simpler to track not equally threatened by space debris. In- and account for a very small share of the over- deed, a number of factors must be taken into all debris population. Smaller fragments of account to assess the threat more precisely. satellites or launchers are, in contrast, much For example, all orbits are not impacted by more numerous and difficult to track, creating space debris in the same way according to the a more persistent threat that is difficult to de- altitude (i.e. which impacts the re-entry time tect. Regardless of the debris size and mass, of space debris, for example), the intensity of the consequences of a collision with a space the activity on the orbit, and the efforts in debris for an operational satellite can be dra- maintaining the orbit free from orbital debris matic: when orbiting at high velocity, even the (e.g. satellite end-of-life requirements). Low smallest piece of debris can have devastating Earth Orbit, which is the region of space with consequences as it can reach a relative speed the most intense activity but also the region of of 27,000 km/h.67 An object as small as 5 mm space where collisions and explosions have oc- can disrupt or even completely incapacitate a curred, counts the largest share of orbital de- satellite.68 This means that each debris is a se- bris. In this region, which includes a variety of rious hazard to operational systems in orbit, orbits below 2,000 km of altitude, specific or- and also to astronauts. In 2014, for example, bits can be more affected than others. The

66 (Kelso, 2009). It should be added that it is after this acci- 68 Bonnal, C. (2016). IAA Situation on Space Debris. Inter- dent that the U.S. Strategic Command put in place a new national Academy of Astronautics. Paris: International programme called Space Situational Awareness (SSA) Academy of Astronautics (IAA). Retried from Sharing. See: https://armedservices.house.gov/legisla- http://www.iaaweb.org/iaa/Scientific%20Activity/sg514fi- tion/hearings/hearing-space-posture-review-and-fy2011- nalreport.pdf national-defense-authorization-budget 69 Pigoni, L. (2015). Space: The New Frontier of Security 67 Moon, M. (2017). The Space Domain and Allied Defence Policy’. CSS Analysis in Security Policy. Retrieved from Report. Brussels: Sub-Committee on Future Security and https://www.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-inter- Defence Capabilities, NATO Parliamentary Assembly. est/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAna- lyse171-EN.pdf

ESPI Report 64 25 August 2018

Figure 10: Count evolution by object orbit between 1957 and 2017 (Source: ESA)70

following figure, extracted from ESA’s DISCOS debris population.71 As the number of space database (Database and Information System debris grows, the risk of collisions also in- Characterizing Objects in Space) shows the creases. Therefore, as space debris beget distribution of space debris by orbit. space debris, further collisions between debris would create evermore debris eventually ren- The multiplication of space debris is raising dering orbital slots impossible to use. Yet growing concerns among experts for many space activity, both in terms of launches and reasons: it is unavoidable, indiscriminate, and satellites in orbit, is expected to increase very uncontrollable, especially in very crowded or- rapidly in the coming years as suggested by bits such as LEO. FAA’s forecast provided below, making the On the longer-term, sustainability of space ac- problem of space debris more pressing. This is tivities could be seriously jeopardized, notably explained by several factors including the by the intensification of space activities and by growing popularity of smallsats, in particular the so-called ‘Kessler syndrome’, the former cubesats, new concepts such as LEO mega- aggravating the latter. Theorized by NASA sci- constellations and, in general, growing invest- entist Donald Kessler in 1978, the Kessler syn- ment in the space sector. drome predicts a cascading effect on the space

Figure 11: Historical and projected number of commercial orbital launches (Source: FAA Commercial Compendium of Space Transportation 2018)

70 Orbits: GEO (Geostationary Orbit); IGO (Inclined Geosynchronous Orbit); EGO (Extended Geostationary Orbit); NSO (Navi- gation Satellites Orbit); GTO (GEO Transfer Orbit); MEO (Medium Earth Orbit); GHO (GEO-superGEO Crossing Orbits); LEO (Low Earth Orbit); HAO (High Altitude Earth Orbit); MGO (MEO-GEO Crossing Orbits); HEO (Highly Eccentric Earth Orbit); LMO (LEO-MEO Crossing Orbits); UFO (Undefined Orbits); ESO (Escape Orbits) 71 Kessler, D., & Cour-Palais, B. (1978). Collision Frequency of Artificial Satellites: The Creation of a Belt Debris. Journal of Ge- ophysical Research vol.83, 2638-2648. Retrieved from Webcharter: http://webpages.charter.net/dkessler/files/Collision%20Fre- quency.pdf

ESPI Report 64 26 August 2018 Security in Outer Space: Rising Stakes for Europe

‘‘harmful interference’, however, can ‘endan- 3.1.2 Accidental Interferences ger the functioning of a radio navigation service or of other safety services or seriously de- The radio frequency spectrum is an essential grades, obstructs, or repeatedly interrupts a component of space activities. Indeed, a vast radio communication service operating’72. majority of satellites use a fraction of it to Such RFI can have severe consequences both communicate with the ground or other satel- at user level, temporarily affecting the quality lites. The radio frequency spectrum is used by of space-based services including for critical space infrastructures for two main functions: applications such as air traffic management,  Telemetry, Tracking and Control (TT&C): and at system level, causing long-term degradation of services.73 A variety of RFI exist, By using long, medium, short, ultra-, and stemming from natural causes (e.g. space micro-waves, satellites can receive in- weather events or Earth atmosphere effects), structions from the ground-controller (up- or from human activity in space and on the link) and return information to the ground. In the latter case, interferences can ground-controller (down-link). be intentional (malicious) or unintentional (ac-  Satellite payload mission: Space systems, cidental). such as telecommunication and naviga- Looking into unintentional and accidental in- tion satellites among others, use the radio terferences (i.e. natural and malicious inter- spectrum as part of their mission to references are addressed later in this chapter), ceive and transmit signals (e.g. PNT sig- a variety of sources exist: technical and plan- nals, broadcast channels…). ning errors (e.g. uplink personnel mistakes), Although it is a crucial element of the space equipment (e.g. bad installation of devices, infrastructure, that spectrum can be altered by poor equipment, equipment failure…), adja- so-called Radio Frequency Interferences (RFI). cent satellite interference, and terrestrial ser- RFI can be defined as events or activities vice interference on shared bands74. Acci- which disturb or disrupt communication chan- dental interferences account for almost 90% nels. While ‘permissible or accepted interfer- of satellite interference (i.e. a majority arises ences’ are normal, expected, and tolerated, in from technical errors) and pose a threat to the frame of nominal satellite operations, space infrastructures in multiple ways.

Figure 12: Share by type in interferences

72 Matas, A., (2016). CONFLICTS RELATED TO RADIO 74 Öz, I. (2013). Harmful Interference: Regional Security FREQUENCY INTERFERENCE ABUSE OF ITU Consequences. Astana: Turksat. Retrieved from UNIDIR: REGULATORY PROCEDURES http://www.unidir.ch/files/conferences/pdfs/harmful-interfer- 73 Canzian, L., & al. (2017). Interference Localization from ence-regional-security-consequences-en-1-933.pdf Space.

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Although the vast majority of accidental interferences are part of business-as-usual and re- 3.2 Active Man-Made Threats: sult from the efforts of operators to continu- an Increasingly Contested ously improve the quality of their service, the growing number of Adjacent Satellite Interfer- Space Environment ences (ASI) is, however, a direct result of the increasing congestion of the space environ- Comparable to other critical infrastructures, ment. Every satellite into orbit has the poten- space systems are strategic targets for a range tial to cause ASI and the multiplication of ob- of actors including governments, military and jects in space therefore irremediably leads to intelligence agencies, armed groups and ter- a growing threat of ASI75. rorists, but also individuals such as hackers. For a variety of motivations, these organisa- Intelsat’s Galaxy 15, or ‘Zombiesat’, is a fa- tions and individuals can seek to incapacitate, mous example.[3] In 2010, Intelsat lost contact exploit or take control of space assets with the with this satellite in GEO preventing the com- objective of disrupting space-based services or pany from performing manoeuvres. The satel- accessing protected information. Such attack lite started drifting past other working satel- against space infrastructure can have a range lites in that orbital region. As Galaxy 15 on- of potentially dramatic consequences. These board equipment was still operational, the sat- threats, referred to in this report as ‘man- ellite could still receive and re-broadcast sig- made active threats’, are not limited to mili- nals meant to be received by other functioning tary space assets in the event of open conflicts satellites. Eventually, Intelsat managed to re- and on theatres of operations. Although the establish contact with Galaxy 15 thanks to the threat may vary in intensity according to sys- cooperation of other satellite operators. An- tems or geopolitical conditions, it remains other example of that problem happened in ubiquitous and inclusive, menacing any sys- 2002 when a poorly installed CCTV camera on tem, anywhere, anytime. the Isle of Man (Douglas) blocked the GPS signal within a kilometre. Unintentional interfer- Here, civil and military dimensions coexist with ence was reported by the Engineering section concerns over assets protection shared by of the Stanford University campus in 1999. governmental, military and commercial stake- The GPS signal went missing in that area with holders who may, however, perceive threats a radius of 1 kilometre, also affecting helicop- differently and pursue different objectives. ters transporting severe cases to Stanford The overarching objective to protect national Hospital.76 The designers of the offending de- space infrastructure remains, nevertheless, vice were not aware of their capability to dis- with governments as part of national security rupt the GPS signal. and defence strategies. From this standpoint, the integration of space infrastructures as as- Comparable to space debris, interferences, sets of interest in defence and security strate- and in particular accidental ones, pose a per- gies is not new, as space activities have always sistent threat to space infrastructures in gen- had strategic implications. However, as space- eral as most spacecraft are equipped at least based capabilities gain in importance for the with TT&C subsystems. However, systems us- economy, society and security, space infra- ing the radio spectrum for payload operations structure becomes an increasingly central can be more vulnerable than others. For ex- component and its protection a growing con- ample, Global Navigation Space Systems cern. This has led to the development of doc- (GNSS) such as Galileo, which involve numer- trines, capabilities, and technologies around ous up-link and down-link channels for contin- the concept of space control, which encom- uous signal corrections and global broadcast of passes both defensive (i.e. capacities to pro- signals. tect space assets) and offensive (i.e. capacities to strike space assets) dimensions with the ultimate objective to gain ‘space superior- ity’77. The concept of ‘space warfare’, which was dominant during the Cold War but lost significance after that, is currently being rehabil- itated. In August 2017, Gen. John ‘Jay’ Ray- mond, commander of the U.S. Air Force Space

75 Intelsat General Corporation (2015). Battling Satellite In- 76 Pullen, S., Gao, G., Tedeschi, C., & Warburton, J. terference — A View from the Front Lines. Retrieved from (2017). The Impact of Uninformed RF Interference on. Re- SpaceNews: http://spacenews.com/battling-satellite-inter- trieved from citeseerx: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/view- ference-a-view-from-the-front-lines doc/download?doi=10.1.1.224.6672&rep=rep1&type=pdf [3] SWF (2015). Radio Frequency Interference. Retrieved 77 Hostbeck, L. (2015). Space Weapons´ Concepts and from Secure World Foundation: https://swfound.org/space- Their International Security Implications. In K. U. Schrogl, sustainability-101/radio-frequency-interference/ Handbook of Space Security (pp. 955-983). New York: Springer.

ESPI Report 64 28 August 2018 Security in Outer Space: Rising Stakes for Europe

Command summarized the situation by ex- Counter-space capabilities that could poten- plaining that, today, ‘space is a war-fighting tially be used against European space assets domain just like air, land and sea’78. include: In a nutshell, with the growing importance of  Ground-based kinetic weapons are ‘weapons that use kinetic energy, or energy of space systems, two complementary dynamics 85 79, 80 motion, to kill an object.’ Instead of us- have recently gained momentum : ing explosive material, the energy re-  The development of offensive capabilities leased by high-speed collision neutralizes to attack space systems the space asset. This method is considered as relatively low tech. ASAT testing  The development of defensive capabilities reached a peak in 2007 when China, Rus- to detect and act against such attacks sia, and the United States all performed Offensive means, i.e. man-made active tests in real conditions. The People’s Re- threats from a space security standpoint, in- public of China, after two non-destructive clude three main categories: tests in 2005 and 2006, intentionally destroyed one of its old non-operational  Anti-Satellite Weapons, including means weather satellites, Fengyun-1C, with a to physically incapacitate space systems; land-based ballistic missile –the SC-19 direct-ascent antisatellite missile. Before  Malicious interferences, including means that event, the last ASAT test dated back to interrupt or disturb radio uplinks and to 1985 and was performed by the United downlinks; States.86 Even though a great number of  Cyberattacks, including means to breach space debris were created during the ex- space infrastructure networks and sys- plosion, the legitimacy of the test per se tems software, including taking control of was not questioned. In February 2008, one and/or several satellites simultane- the destruction of the defunct satellite ously81. USA 193, described as a public safety measure motivated by the danger posed by the toxic hydrazine stocked in the fuel 3.2.1 Anti-Satellite Weapons tank,87 was presumably an ASAT test. Several military technologies able to strike as- This latter, however, was conducted un- sets in space (i.e. ‘space denial’ or ‘counter- der safer and less polluting parameters. In 2010, 2013,88 and 2014, China conducted space’ capabilities) have been developed by 89 various governments since the Cold War. As of land-based interception tests that the 82 U.S. considered to be ASAT tests, using today, the United, States, Russia and China, 90 have reportedly tested counter-space capabil- the same missile. This time, fortunately, ities which could already, or soon, translate the missile was on a suborbital trajectory, into full operational capacity to make direct at- causing less pollution than the explosion tacks against space assets.83,84

78 Fabey, M. (2017). U.S. Space Command develops oper- 85 Office of Technology Assessment. (2014). Strategic De- ational concepts for waging war in orbit. Retrieved from fenses: Two Reports by the Office of Technology Assess- SpaceNews: http://spacenews.com/u-s-space-command- ment. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. develops-operational-concepts-for-fighting-war/ 86 Weeden, B. (2014). Through a glass, darkly: Chinese, 79 Pasco, X. (2015). Various Threats of Space Systems. In American, and Russian anti-satellite testing in space. Re- K.-U. S. al., Handbook of Space Security (pp. 673-674). trieved from The Space Review: http://www.thespacere- New York: Springer. view.com/article/2473/1 80 Weeden, B. (2013). Radio frequencies Spectrum, Inter- 87 National Research Council. (2011). Limiting Future ference and Satellites Fact Sheet. Retrieved from Secure Collision Risk to Spacecraft: An Assessment of NASA's World Foundation: https://swfound.org/me- Meteoroid and Orbital Debris Programs. Washington D.C.: dia/108538/swf_rfi_fact_sheet_2013.pdf National Academies Press 81 Note: Malicious interferences and cyberattacks overlap 88 Wright, D. How High Did China’s May 2013 Launch Go? to some extent as rogue signals can be used as a mean to Retrieved from Union of Concerned Scientists: http://all- access the space infrastructure network, in particular sys- thingsnuclear.org/dwright/how-high-did-chinas-may-2013- tems in space to conduct cyberattacks. launch-go 82 Weeden, B. (2014). Through a glass, darkly: Chinese, 89 Gertz, B. (2015). China Tests Anti-Satellite Missile New American, and Russian anti-satellite testing in space. Re- ASAT interceptor threatens U.S. spy satellites. Retrieved trieved from The Space Review: http://www.thespacere- from The Washington Free Beacon: http://freebea- view.com/article/2473/1 con.com/national-security/china-tests-anti-satellite-missile/ 83 Johnson-Freese, J. (2014). Space Warfare in the 21st See also: Vasani, H. (2017). How China Is Weaponizing Century: Arming the Heavens. New York: Routledge. Outer Space. Retrieved from The Diplomat: http://thediplo- 84 Under Trump, GOP to Give Space Weapons Close mat.com/2017/01/how-china-is-weaponizing-outer-space/ Look. Retrieved from Roll Call: http://www.roll- 90 Rose, F. (2015). Written Remarks Delivered to the Fed- call.com/news/politics/trump-gop-give-space-weapons- eration of American Scientists. Washington D.C: Bureau of close-look Arms Control, Verification and Compliance.

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of Fengyun-1C.91 Russia joined the race in technical challenge), RFW can be ground- 2016 – the Soviet Union already had sev- based, space-based or fitted on missiles, eral ASAT R&D programmes during the posing a more serious threat than laser Cold War, using the direct ascent anti-sat- beams. It is believed that China fired a ellite missile A-235 Nudol,92 but without high-powered laser at a U.S. satellite in destroying any target.93 2006, with the intent to either locate or blind it, temporarily degrading the satel-  Ground-based non-kinetic weapons, or lite’s functionality.97 soft weapons, do not involve the destruction of the space asset but are used to in-  Space-based weapons, involve manoeu- capacitate them and therefore do not gen- vrable spacecraft (i.e. spacecraft erate space debris. A handful of states are equipped with advanced mobility sub-sys- pursuing the development of such capaci- tems – propulsion, attitude and orbit con- ties. These threats mainly consist of direct trol) used for ASAT purposes through: energy weapons (DEW) using a laser o Deliberate Collision with a target sat- beam against the target, and Radio Fre- ellite, resulting in a total, or partial, quency Weapons (RFW) using microwave destruction of the two objects. Such techniques. They can produce three types operations can be conducted by space- of effects (organized by intensity of the craft specifically designed and de- threat)94: ployed for this purpose but could also o Jamming effect, when the disturbance be hypothetically conducted by stand- is limited in time and stops when the ard satellites hijacked and directed to weapon is not focusing the target; collide with another spacecraft. o Disruption effect, when the disturb- o Hostile Proximity Operations (RPO) ance is permanent - even though there disrupt a target satellite in close dis- is no definitive destruction - and an tance through the use of devices such external intervention or reset is re- as blinding laser beams or jammers. quired to repair the system; Various cases of passive hostile RPO have been reported recently, but gen- o Destructive effect, when there is a de- eral uncertainty remains with regards finitive disruption requiring external to the goals being pursued (i.e. pas- intervention. sive observation and intelligence, DEW have an impact on receivers or spe- technology tests and demonstra- cific kinds of sensors, their effects de- tion…). So far, a handful of space-far- pending on their functionalities.95 DEW, ing nations such as China, Russia, and directing concentrated energy towards a the United States, have displayed an target on a line-of-sight trajectory, can al- interest in developing such technology most instantly disrupt or destroy equip- as part of their deterrence strate- ment and facilities. When set at low en- gies.98 ergy level, they can blind or damage sat- From a technical standpoint, a parallel can ellites’ optical sensors; when set at high be made between such ASAT capabilities energy level, they can cause physical and the on-going development of technol- damage. RFW can damage or destroy ogies such as on-orbit servicing or Active electronic components of satellites by Debris Removal, which build on compara- overheating or short-circuiting them. 96 ble key technologies. This suggests that, While existing DEW are mostly ground- in the future, such technologies could be- based (i.e. placing them into orbit being come more and more available on the too expensive and representing a bigger

91 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. ter.com&utm_cam- (2015). China's Space and Counterspace Programs. paign=buffer%20See%20also:%20http://www.washington- Washington: USCC. Retrieved from times.com/news/2016/dec/21/russia-test https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Annual_Re- 94 Pasco, X. (2015). Various Threats of Space Systems. In port/Chapters/Chapter%202%2C%20Section%202%20- K.-U. S. al., Handbook of Space Security (pp. 673-674). %20China%27s%20Space%20and%20Counter- New York: Springer. space%20Programs.pdf 95 Ibid 92 Lewis, P., & Livingstone, D. (2016). What to Know About 96 US-China Economic and Security Review Commission Space Security. Retrieved from Chatham House: (2015). Report to Congress of the US-China Economic and https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/what- Security Review Commission. Washington: US Govern- know-about-space-security ment Printing Office. 93 Gerty, B. (2016). Retrieved from Washigton Free Bacon: 97 Ibid http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russia-conducts- 98 Note: As a matter of fact, manoeuvrability of spacecrafts fifth-test-new-anti-satellite missile/?utm_con- is not only limited by fuel availability, but especially in case tent=buffer94877&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twit- of non-cooperative targets, the rendezvous success also requires precise orbit data and trajectory calculations.

ESPI Report 64 30 August 2018 Security in Outer Space: Rising Stakes for Europe

market and that operators will increas- emitters, transponders…) and by interfering ingly need to be able to detect and identify locally with radio signals at any point between the intentions of manoeuvring objects space and ground systems. thanks to ‘optical tracking, [the] interpre- Numerous examples of satellite jamming have tation of ground communication data and occurred in recent years. For example, in [the] interception of the payload’s telem- 2010, the UN leading communication agency etry signals’99. When hostile manoeuvres called on Iran to end jamming of satellite are detected, protecting the asset against broadcasts101. During the Arab Spring in 2010- this threat will likely be as important as 2012 satellite jamming rose dramatically in identifying the source of the threat (i.e. quantity and duration, targeting news agen- spacecraft operator or owner). cies notably BBC Middle East, France 24, Deutsche Welle and the Voice of America,102 3.2.2 Malicious Interferences: Satellite Signals and GPS signals were regularly under siege 103 Jamming and Spoofing during the Crimean crisis in 2014 . These are only a few notable examples among many oth- Among RFI techniques, malicious interfer- ers. Overall, there were 75 times more jam- ences include all intentional disruptions or de- ming cases in 2011 than in 2010, in particular ceptions of uplink or downlink signals aiming because of the various geopolitical conflicts at to disturb space systems’ operations and/or the time. delivery of space-based services100. Even Spoofing is a type of signal-based attack (i.e. though this kind of interference makes up only software-based spoofing is addressed later as 11% of all reported interferences, it is becom- a type of cyberattack) that aims to deceive a ing more frequent. Motivations behind such receiver by broadcasting incorrect signals obstruction or misinformation attempts are structured to resemble genuine signals, or by multiple, ranging from governmental censor- re-broadcasting genuine signals captured at a ship to deny a population access to satellite- different location or time. Spoofed signals tar- based information services, to logistics profes- get the receiver part of the communication sionals seeking to block or deceive the moni- channel, which can include satellites in the toring of their position. Malicious interferences case of spoofed uplink signals or, more com- are also a growing component of warfare with monly, ground stations and user equipment in opponents seeking to deny or exploit satellite the case of spoofed downlink signals. support to ground operations (e.g. positioning and navigation, telecommunication). One of the most notable examples of spoofing took place in the Black Sea when the U.S. Mar- Malicious interferences include two main cate- itime Administration reported 20 affected gories of threats: Jamming and Spoofing. ships near the coast of Novorossiysk104. An- Jamming is a type of signal-based attack that other manifestation of such activity targeted aims to disrupt authorized radio communica- the popular location-based applications Poke- tion signals. From a technical perspective, ma- monGo and Uber in Moscow. Several areas of licious interferences usually involve the emis- spoofing around the Kremlin have been re- sion of rogue radio signals that disrupt a target ported, with users being wrongfully geo-local- signal by decreasing its signal-to-noise ratio. ised in the city´s Domodedovo airport instead Jamming can be done at any point of the com- of the Kremlin.105 The spoofing system in the munication channel: at both ends, in space, or Kremlin area is believed to be intended to pre- on the ground, by directly targeting satellites, vent the use of unauthorised drones relying on ground stations or user equipment communication sub-systems (i.e. antennas, receivers,

99 Bhalla, P. (2014). Weaponisation of Space. New Delhi: 103 Pomerlau, M. (2016). Threat from Russian UAV jam- KW Publishers Pvt Ltd. ming real, officials say. Retrieved from C4isrnet: 100 Eutelsat. (2013). Satellite Interference: an Operator's https://www.c4isrnet.com/un- Perspective. Retrieved from ITU: manned/uas/2016/12/20/threat-from-russian-uav-jamming- https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-R/space/workshops/2013- real-officials-say/ interference-geneva/presentations/Ethan%20Lavan%20- 104 Hambling, D. (2017). Ships fooled in GPS spoofing at- %20Eutelsat.pdf tack suggest Russian cyberweapon. Retrieved from New 101 Nebehay, S. (2010). U.N. tells Iran to end Eutelsat sat- Scientist: https://www.newscientist.com/article/2143499- ellite jamming. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reu- ships-fooled-in-gps-spoofing-attack-suggest-russian- ters.com/article/us-iran-jamming-itu/u-n-tells-iran-to-end- cyberweapon/ eutelsat-satellite-jamming-idUSTRE62P21G20100326 105 Oliphant, R. (2016). Is Kremlin cyber warfare behind 102 Director General's Office. (2012). EBU Deplores Middle Moscow GPS quirk sending Uber cars and Pokemon Go East SAtellite Jamming. Retrieved from EBU: players to strange destinations? Retrieved from The Tele- https://www.ebu.ch/contents/news/2012/10/ebu-deplores- graph: Is Kremlin cyber warfare behind Moscow GPS quirk middle-east-satelli.html sending Uber cars and Pokemon Go players to strange destinations?

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Figure 13: Number of deliberate interferences (Source: Eutelsat)

GNSS signals for flight guidance. Another ex- The EU recently funded the STRIKE3 project ample is the disruption by North Korea of PNT through Horizon 2020 with the objective to im- signals used by South Korean aircrafts and prove awareness of existing and continuously ships. The most acute attacks occurred in increasing threats to GNSS signals, develop March 2016 when more than 1,000 aircraft and validate new international standards for and 700 ships were affected. Interestingly, the monitoring and reporting of GNSS signal these repeated attacks influenced the recent attacks and eventually mitigate the criminal decision of South Korea to invest in a national use of jammer technology. positioning system.106 From a legal standpoint, both jamming and 3.2.3 Cyberattacks spoofing are a violation of the ITU Convention. However, loopholes in enforcement mecha- Comparable to other infrastructures relying on nisms make it difficult to either prevent or ICT to operate, space infrastructure can be the punish them107. While production, commerce target of cyberattacks, which include a range and/or use of jamming and spoofing devices of offensive manoeuvres against computer are illegal in various countries, reports suggest and information systems to steal, disrupt or that these devices are becoming increasingly destroy a specified target (e.g. data, service, simple to procure via dedicated websites, very system) by hacking into the network. Cyberat- often Chinese made, and use. GNSS and sat- tacks can be led by governments, organisa- com signals appear to be the two main targets tions, groups or individuals for a variety of mo- of jamming and spoofing attacks but, in gen- tivations and objectives, and can be run from eral, any communication channel between the outside or the inside. Here it is important space and ground can be vulnerable to such to note that an overlap exists between mali- hazards. These threats can seriously affect the cious interferences and cyberattacks, with quality of space-based services and therefore rogue signals being used as a means to access lead to substantial impacts on operations de- the space infrastructure network. This hap- pendent on these services such as road, rail, pened in October 2007 and July 2008, when air, and water transport, and civil protection LandSat-7 and Terra AM-1, two earth obser- among many others. Here again, the threat is vation satellites operated by NASA, were ubiquitous and inclusive. hacked, possibly by China’s military, via a

106 Kim, J., & Saul, J. (2016). South Korea revives GPS 107 Jakhu, S. (2013). Satellites: Unintentional and Inten- backup project after blaming North for jamming. Retrieved tional Interference. Retrieved from Secure wold foundation: from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-shipping- https://swfound.org/media/108687/jakhu-satellite%20inter- southkorea-navigation/south-korea-revives-gps-backup- ference%20and%20space%20sustainabil- project-after-blaming-north-for-jamming-idUSKCN0XT01T ity%20(17jun13).pdf

ESPI Report 64 32 August 2018 Security in Outer Space: Rising Stakes for Europe

rogue signal sent by a satellite station located capacity to execute arbitrary commands in Norway.108 or to gain a foothold in the network to carry out other attacks; In recent years, both the level of magnitude of cyberattacks and their occurrence have been  Service Disruption, to prevent a system raising concern across ICT reliant sectors, in- from performing as expected with conse- cluding the space sector. This unprecedented quences ranging from reduced quality of level of threat is driven by increasingly sophis- service to total system failure; ticated cyberattacks from a growing number of  Data Exfiltration, to steal sensitive infor- cyber-capable entities. In January 2018, John mation from a target for reconnaissance, Drzik, President of Global Risk and Digital at strategic intelligence, theft, or to expose Marsh, evaluated the aggregate cost of global secret information; cyberattacks at USD 1 trillion per year and subsequent economic losses at USD 300 bil-  Bad Data Injection, to submit incorrect lion, comparing them to natural catastrophes data (e.g. erroneous TT&C data) to a sys- in scale.109 In the World Economic Forum´s tem without detection with a range of pos- Global Risks report of 2018, cyberattacks sible consequences; ranked as the third most likely global threat this year.110  Advanced Persistent Threat (APT), to gain extended access to a system and get per- In a recent report on space cybersecurity, manent and undetected capacity to access Chatham House, the Royal Institute of Inter- system information or take control of the national Affairs, evaluated that ‘the intersec- system. tion of space security and cybersecurity is not a new problem, but it has remained largely un- From a more general perspective, the Chat- recognized as a potentially significant vulner- ham House report classifies cyber threats 113 ability [and] remains unaddressed in practical against space-based systems as follows: mechanisms’.111 This situation is not specific  States setting out to create military ad- to the space infrastructure as ‘even outside vantages in space, or seeking to steal the space domain, cybersecurity cultures strategic quantities of intellectual prop- across national and international communities erty and having sufficient computing are immature and inconsistent in their devel- power to crack encryption codes; opment’.  Well-resourced organized criminal ele- From a practical perspective, cyberattacks tar- ments seeking financial gain; geting space infrastructure include a variety of possible manoeuvres in pursuit of the general  Terrorist groups wishing to promote their objective to 1) steal information (e.g. data, causes, even up to the catastrophic level communications) and/or 2) disrupt space in- of satellite collisions with space debris infrastructure (e.g. systems, operations, capa- cluding a cascade of collisions denying the bilities, services). Threats also include use of space for all actors; cyberattacks that do not target directly the  Individual hackers who simply want to space infrastructure but rather exploit its vul- prove and fanfare their skills; nerabilities as a means to reach other infrastructures and systems. Cyberattacks can be  Any combinations of the organizations grouped in the following categories, with the and individuals above. most sophisticated attacks resulting from a 112 The report also underlines the following poten- combination of different types of attacks: tial methods:114  System Compromise, to obtain temporary control of a system and consequently the

108 Wolf, J. (2011). China key suspect in U.S. satellite 111 Livingstone, D., & Lewis, P. (2016). Space, the Final hacks: commission. Retrieved from Reuters: Frontier. London: Chatham House. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usa-satel- Lu, M. (2014). Types of Cyber Attacks. Retrieved from lite/china-key-suspect-in-u-s-satellite-hacks-commission- TCIPG: https://tcipg.org/sites/default/files/rgroup/tcipg- idUSTRE79R4O320111028 reading-group-fall_2014_09-12.pdf 109 Strategic Risk. (2018). Global Risks Report 2018: Cyber 112 Lu, M. (2014). Types of Cyber Attacks. Retrieved from risk growing faster than mitigation efforts, says John Drzik. TCIPG: https://tcipg.org/sites/default/files/rgroup/tcipg- Retrieved from Strategic Risk Europe: https://www.strate- reading-group-fall_2014_09-12.pdf gic-risk-europe.com/analysis/global-risks-report-2018- 113 Livingstone, D., & Lewis, P. (2016). Space, the Final cyber-risk-growing-faster-than-mitigation-efforts-says-john- Frontier. London: Chatham House. drzik/1426075.article Lu, M. (2014, September 12). Types of Cyber Attacks. Re- 110 World Economic Forum. (2018). The Global Risks Re- trieved from TCIPG: https://tcipg.org/sites/de- port 2018, 13th Edition. Geneva: World Economic Forum. fault/files/rgroup/tcipg-reading-group-fall_2014_09-12.pdf Retrieved from World Economic Forum: http://www3.wefo- 114 Ibid rum.org/docs/WEF_GRR18_Report.pdf

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 Attacks on satellites, by targeting their experts underline the importance of control- control systems or mission packages, per- ling the provenance of software, firmware and haps taking control of the satellite to ex- components as part of a comprehensive cyber- ploit its inherent capabilities, shut it down, security strategy.118 These aspects are ad- alter its orbit (perhaps thereby ‘weapon- dressed as part of a cybersecurity-by-design izing’ it), or ‘cook’ or ‘grill’ its solar cells approach. through deliberate exposure to damaging Space infrastructure must be also protected levels of highly ionizing radiation; after its deployment, during operations. Bob  Attacks on the ground infrastructure, such Gourley, a leading cybersecurity expert, ex- as satellite control centres, the associated plains that ‘the most modern platforms have a networks and data centres, leading to po- high degree of security engineered into them tential global impacts (for example on [but] operate with legacy systems that are weather forecasting systems, which use very vulnerable, especially to a well-resourced large quantities of space-derived data). adversary’. He also explained that ‘ground stations have a mixed degree of protection’. This  Hacking attacks on, for example, commu- situation will persist, even with new systems nication networks, by using space infra- safeguarded from cyber threats by design. In- structure; deed, the level of cybersecurity of any system A few examples of noteworthy cyberattacks tends to decrease during its operational life- can already be provided. In 2002, a SinoSat time as the nature of cyber threats develops satellite was hacked to broadcast contents with new, more sophisticated attacks. promoting the cult of Falun Gong, forbidden in China, on national television for four hours.115 In 2007, the Sri Lankan terrorist group, Tamil Tigers, managed to broadcast on TV and radio 3.3 Natural Threats, Space in Europe and Asia through Intelsat satellite Environment Hazards transponders.116 The Russian speaking Turla Group, a notorious group developing Ad- Besides intentional and unintentional man- vanced Persistent Threats (APT), have been made threats, the space environment per se exploiting satellite links on stealth mode by can pose serious hazards to the safety of space using hijacked satellite IP addresses belonging objects and space activities. These natural to well established companies such as Telesat, hazards, which can be more intense during Teleskies, Skylinks Satellite Communications specific events such as geomagnetic storms, Limited, Lunasat, Emperion, SkyVision Global solar radiation storms or disturbances of the Networks, Orioncom, Intrasky, IABG GmbH ionosphere, are commonly referred to as and Sky Power International, to conduct ‘space weather’. According to ESA, space cyberattacks since at least 2007 with their weather can be defined as ‘the environmental main targets being diplomatic and military conditions in Earth's magnetosphere, iono- stakeholders in the United States, Europe, sphere and thermosphere due to the Sun and Middle East and Central Asia.117 Other hacker the solar wind that can influence the function- groups such as HackingTeam, Xumuxu Group, ing and reliability of space-borne and ground- and Rocket Kitten ATP group, resort to the based systems and services or endanger prop- same procedure. erty or human health’.119 Vulnerabilities of space infrastructures to Studying and monitoring space weather in- cyberattacks can arise from a variety of factors volves the examination of ambient plasma, throughout the system lifecycle including dur- magnetic fields, radiation or particle flows in ing development and production. Indeed, space and their influence on the outer space loopholes in some satellite hardware (e.g. environment and effects on man-made sys- electronic components) or software can be in- tems. Space weather can have severe conse- tentionally added and/or exploited by offend- quences on space assets, potentially deterio- ers to conduct cyberattacks. This technique is rating satellite components - such as sensitive referred to as ´back doors´. For this reason,

115 Hogg, C. (2004). HK probes Falun Gong 'hacking'. Re- Washington Post: https://www.washing- trieved from BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pa- tonpost.com/world/national-security/russian-hacker-group- cific/4034209.stm exploits-satellites-to-steal-data-hide- 116 McCoy, J. (2007). Intelsat Shuts Down Transponder Hi- tracks/2015/09/08/c59fa7cc-5657-11e5-b8c9- jacked By Terrorists. Retrieved from Via Satellite: 944725fcd3b9_story.html?utm_term=.f8ab230f1530 http://www.satellitetoday.com/uncatego- 118 Wood, P. (2012). Cyber Attacks: An Emerging. Re- rized/2007/04/26/intelsat-shuts-down-transponder-hi- trieved from Swri: http://flightsoft- jacked-by-terrorists/ ware.jhuapl.edu/files/2012/FSW12_Wood.pdf 117 Nakashima, E. (2015). Russian hacker group exploits 119 ESA. (2018). About space weather. Retrieved from Eu- satellites to steal data, hide tracks. Retrieved from The ropean Space Agency: http://swe.ssa.esa.int/what-is- space-weather

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electronic equipment or solar panels, their weather element of the programme)122 and in- communication network, performances, and vestigates the chain of effects of a selection of reliability, which ultimately will have a nega- space weather perturbations on space systems tive impact on their operational lifetime.120 In and space-based services in economic sectors. turn, these effects can pose a serious threat to The study addresses three main space space-based services such as telecommunica- weather events: tion, broadcasting or PNT signals. Even though  Geomagnetic storms, resulting from coro- in principle space weather does not directly af- nal mass ejection and high-speed solar fect our planet as the Earth’s natural magnetic winds field protects us from solar and radiation phenomena, some extreme events can also affect  Solar radiation storms, resulting from so- some ground systems, such as electrical lar energetic particle events power grids or radio communication infrastructures. Although important, these effects  Ionosphere disturbances, resulting from are not addressed here. solar flares The results of a study recently conducted by The study investigates the impact of these ESA and PwC121 provide an overview of the events on space systems, the resulting dis- cascading effect and potential socio-economic ruption of space-based services, and ensuing impact of space weather events on space in- socio-economic impacts in selected economic frastructure. This cost-benefit analysis com- sectors. pares a ‘do nothing’ with a ‘do ESA SSA programme’ scenario (i.e. focusing on the space

Figure 14: Extract of cascading impact of space weather events on space systems and services (ESA)123,124

120 Eastwood, J., & al, e. (2017). The Economic Impact of 123 Del Monte, L. (2017). Ex-ante cost benefit analysis of Space Weather: Where Do We Stand? Risk Analysis: An the Space Weather. Retrieved from UNOOSA: international journal, 206-2018. http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/psa/activi- 121 Luntama, J.-P. (2017). Report on the ESA Space- ties/2017/ISWI%20Boston/ISWIBostonDay1/05.pdf Weather. Retrieved from NOAA: 124 SEU: Single Event Upset is a change of state caused https://www.swpc.noaa.gov/sites/default/files/im- by one single ionizing particle (ions, electrons, photons...) ages/u33/%281130%29%20Session%202%20Lun- striking a sensitive node in a micro-electronic device. The tama%20SSA%20SWE%20CBA%20Study.pdf resulting error in device output or operation is called an 122 Ibid SEU or a soft error.

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Cost/Benefit ‘Do nothing’ ‘Do ESA’ Value added of ESA Scenario (€M) Scenario (€M) services (€M) User domain benefits Satellite operations - 293 - 267 26 Launch operations - 0.3 - 0.1 0.2 Resource exploitation - 327 - 135 192 Power grid operations - 5,771 - 4,546 1,225 Aviation - 3,312 - 3,066 246 Logistics/Road transport - 3,432 - 2,888 544 Investment benefits GDP impact None - 952 952 Total benefits - 13,135 - 9,950 3,185 Programme costs None - 529 - 529 Total net benefits - 13,135 - 10,479 2,656

Table 2: Cost/Benefit analysis of ESA space weather programme (adapted from ESA)

As shown in the table above, the implementa-  Ubiquitous and inclusive, although some tion of a space weather component in the systems are less exposed or vulnerable to frame of a full-fledged SSA programme can specific threats. contribute to mitigating, at least partially, the  Intensifying, driven by endogenous and consequences of space weather events with a exogenous trends including: net benefit estimated around €2.7 Billion for a €529 Million programme.  Increasing space activity in terms of the number of launches and objects in orbit but also in the number of governmental and commercial actors owning and oper- 3.4 Key Takeaways ating space systems;

The review provided above underlines that se-  New concepts, technologies and capabili- curity challenges and threats faced by the Eu- ties; ropean space infrastructure are:  An ever more connected space infrastruc-  Multiple and diverse in nature and origin ture, including with other ground net- and as a consequence require a set of dif- works and systems; ferent mitigation and protection  The increasing importance of space infra- measures. Although this report focuses on structure, which makes it a key target for ‘Security in Outer Space’, and therefore a variety of actors pursuing different ob- on threats in orbit, it can be established jectives; that a share of space infrastructure vulnerabilities during operations in space can  The rehabilitation of a ‘space warfare’ doc- result, at least partially, from earlier trine encompassing activities to develop stages (e.g. system development and ‘space control’ capabilities. production). To conclude, space is an increasingly con-  Interrelated and interdependent, with gested and contested resource. This situation, space infrastructure being vulnerable to expected to further deteriorate in the future, some hazards that have the potential to results from a variety of factors consistent create new threats. For example, vulner- with the growing strategic and socio-economic ability to cyberattacks aiming to take con- significance of space infrastructure, as dis- trol of a satellite to weaponize it (e.g. by cussed previously. From this standpoint, the commanding it to collide with another sat- pervasive dependence on space systems sug- ellite) can create new ASAT threats. Sim- gests that rising threats to the space infra- ilarly, challenges and threats to space se- structure mean, ultimately, potential risks for curity depend on the approach of all space the modern economy, society, security and, stakeholders, underlining the relevance of more generally, modification of the geopoliti- the OSCE’s underlying premise that, com- cal scene. parable to other security domains, space security is indivisible.125

125 OSCE. (2009). The OSCE Concept of Comprehensive and Co-operative Security. Vienna: OSCE Secretariat. Re- trieved from OSCE: https://www.osce.org/secretariat/37592?download=true

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4. European Approach to Space Security

o Space Weather to study, monitor and predict natural events which can affect 4.1 Securing the European space-borne systems or even ground infrastructure; Space Infrastructure: a o Near Earth Objects (NEO), i.e. aster- Multi-Fold Challenge oids or comets, to monitor, predict and assess potential threats to life and property on Earth and eventually issue 4.1.1 Core Components of the ‘Security in Outer warnings to mitigate damages. Space’ Challenge With a wider scope, including ‘Security from From a general standpoint, ensuring ‘Security Outer Space’, SSA can also be used for Near- in Outer Space’ is a multi-fold challenge en- Earth Objects (NEOs) and space weather compassing three main areas. events. Ensuring ‘Security in Outer Space’ therefore  Space Environment Protection and Preser- requires a variety of measures targeted to 1) vation (SEPP) through means and monitor the space environment, 2) mitigate measures to prevent and mitigate the ef- threats to space infrastructure, and 3) reduce fect of human activity on the space envi- vulnerability of space infrastructure:126 ronment and ensure it remains safe on the long-term. In the context of ‘Security in  Space Situational Awareness (SSA) en- Outer Space’, this line of action includes compasses all means and measures to measures to promote, facilitate or enforce monitor, detect, predict and inform about the responsible behaviour of organisa- man-made and natural, intentional and tions conducting activities in space (i.e. unintentional, threats to operations in governmental and commercial operators, space (i.e. threats originating from the launch service providers…), and in partic- space environment). More specifically, ular to limit debris generation but also the SSA includes three main components: development of solutions to make the space environment safer to operate (e.g. o Space Surveillance and Tracking (SST) Active Debris Removal). of man-made objects including operational systems and orbital debris;

Security in Outer Space

1- Space Situational 2- Space Environment Awareness (SSA) 3- Space Infrastructure Protection and Security (SIS) Current and predictive Preservation (SEPP) knowledge and Assurance of the Preventive and curative understanding of the outer infrastructure ability to mitigation of negative space environement deliver a service that can effects of human activity in including space weather justifiably be trusted outer space on the safety and location of natural and despite a hazardous and sustainability of the manmade objects in orbit environment. outer space environment. around the Earth.

Table 3: Core components of the ‘Security in Outer Space’ challenge

126 Note: Complementary measures targeting directly the space disarmament policies or radio spectrum manage- source of the threats such as actions against cybercrime, ment are not included here.

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 Space Infrastructure Security (SIS) to re- o Space Surveillance & Tracking capabil- duce vulnerabilities of space systems to ities, including networks of ground- intentional and unintentional threats. This and/or space-based assets (radar, tel- includes protection measures aimed at escope, laser, spacecraft, data pro- guaranteeing systems dependability and cessing facilities…) providing the range resilience. ‘Dependability’ is defined here of technical capabilities required to de- as a measure of a system´s availability, tect and monitor objects in space as reliability, safety, integrity, confidentiality well as prediction tools and services to and maintainability. ‘Resilience’ is defined identify potential threats to operations as the persistence of system dependabil- in space; ity when facing functional, environmental, o Space Weather capabilities, including or technological changes. SIS includes scientific models of space weather two main components: events and of their potential impact on o Security-by-design: Implementation space (and ground) systems, space of appropriate measures during sys- weather monitoring assets, and pre- tem development and production. This diction and forecasting tools and ser- encompasses systems and supply vices; chain compliance with security re- o CleanSpace technologies, including quirements and procedures; technologies to enable environment- o Security in operation: Implementation friendly space systems supporting of appropriate measures during sys- Space Environment Protection and tem operations. This encompasses a Preservation. This includes, for exam- variety of procedures and capabilities ple, the development of effective and to detect, characterize, and respond to affordable solutions for space systems threats to ground and in orbit systems end-of-life control and debris removal. operations.127 o Security enhancing technologies, in- Some complementary measures, involving ac- cluding technologies to improve space tivities beyond the space sector or focused on infrastructure dependability and resili- military objectives, (e.g. actions against cy- ence. Such technologies include, for bercrime, disarmament policies, radio spec- example: secure links (encryption, ro- trum management) are not addressed here. bustness…), debris shielding materials, autonomous collision avoidance, and fault-tolerant electronic compo- 4.1.2 Main Fields of Action nents. The implementation of this set of measures re-  Legal and regulatory regimes: Prepara- quires a variety of actions across multiple do- tion, ratification and application of a set of mains. laws, regulations, rules, procedures and The initial and overarching action is the elabo- standards supporting space operations security and space environment protec- ration and endorsement of a comprehensive tion and preservation. Such framework, space security strategy and policy framework which aims to foster the implementation including clear objectives and associated ac- of diverse security-related rules, is the re- tions supported by a coherent governance framework and the allocation of appropriate sult of actions conducted at international, regional and national level. For this rea- resources. son, initiatives in this field often overlap Key space security actions include: with measures in the field of “diplomacy and operational collaboration”. It includes  Capacity-building programmes: Setting in particular: up technical capabilities required for the implementation of space security o Binding space legislation measures. Capacity-building covers the entire lifecycle from research & develop- o Non-binding guidelines and rules ment to operations and delivery of ser- o Standards and procedures vice, through acquisition, deployment, and upgrade of assets. In the field of se-  Diplomacy and cooperation frameworks: curity in outer space, key technologies Setting up of co-operative political and and capacities include:

127 Note: The detection and characterization of threats orig- may be required for ground-based threats such as mali- inating from the space environment is covered by Space cious interferences. Situational Awareness. However, additional capabilities

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operational frameworks supporting a col- o Cooperation agreements to provide lective approach to space security the foundations for multilateral actions through: including, for example, information and data sharing, or coordinated space o Multilateral discussions between gov- operations procedures. ernments, and with commercial stakeholders, to raise awareness and promote a common understanding and 4.1.3 Security in Outer Space: Action Matrix assessment of space security challenges; The following table, based on a categorization matrix applied to security in outer space, pro- o Collective engagements to tackle se- vides a list of examples of actions and curity challenges through common ap- measures related to ‘Security in Outer Space’ proaches and frameworks (e.g. trans- organised by domain and field of action. parency measures, international guidelines); The list is intended to be illustrative rather than comprehensive:

ness (SSA) • Space weather models tion obligations and pro- ments Monitor space en- development cedures • Transparency and Confi- vironment threats • SSA services delivery dence-Building Measures

Space Environ- Examples: Examples: Examples: ment Protection • CleanSpace technologies • Space law (e.g. end-of- • Endorsement of Space and Preservation development (e.g. active life obligations) Debris Mitigation Guide- (SEPP) debris removal solu- • Standards for space en- lines Keep the space tions) vironment-friendly satel- • Code of Conduct negoti- environment safe lite design (e.g. pas- ations to operate in sivation devices)

Space Infra- Examples: Examples: Examples: structure Secu- • Security enhancing tech- • Space programme secu- • Collision avoidance pro- rity (SIS) nologies development rity rules and procedures cedures and coordina- Protect the (e.g. secure links) • Security standards tion space infrastruc- • Security-by-design • Supply chain control

Security in Outer Space subdomain Space Outer in Security ture from threats know-how processes (e.g. export/import rules, testing procedures)

Table 4: Examples of ‘Security in Outer Space’ measures by field and domain category

In a nutshell, the concept of ‘Space Security’  Coherent: following consistent principles actually encompasses diverse objectives and and building on synergies between the dif- challenges. Guaranteeing secure and sustain- ferent actions; able access to and use of space also requires  Co-operative: structured around, and the implementation of a broad range of contributing to, a multilateral approach. measures spread across political, diplomatic, operational and legal dimensions. The various This chapter provides an overview of the Eu- aspects of space security can be viewed as in- ropean approach to space security on the basis terconnected and interdependent, which un- of this matrix organisation and for each key derlines that an effective approach to space stakeholder: Member States, the European security should be: Space Agency and the European Union.  Comprehensive: covering a broad and multidimensional scope;

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4.1.4 The Case of Space Traffic Management A possible international approach to STM is also regularly discussed, looming over the Several definitions of Space Traffic Manage- horizon. Nevertheless, space traffic management (STM) exist. A common definition is “the ment is still at a very early stage, including in set of technical and regulatory provisions for Europe, and the boundaries of this concept are promoting safe access into outer space, oper- still undefined, making it complex to analyse ations in outer space and return from outer practically today. For this reason, space traffic space to Earth free from physical or radio-fre- management is not addressed directly in the 128 quency damage”. overview and analysis of the European ap- In this study, and taking into account exclu- proach to space security. sively civil space activities, space traffic management is understood as an operational and organisational concept encompassing systems 4.2 Countries: the Core Actors assisting operators for safety of operations in orbit, practices ensuring the sustainability of of Space Security in Europe the use of outer space (e.g. regulations, standards, procedures, protocols), and frameworks governing the exploitation of these sys- 4.2.1 A National Defence and Security Domain tems and the implementation of these practices. Historically, activities in the field of security in outer space have been primarily organised at Space traffic management is therefore a con- national level, comparable to other security cept covering part of the elements included in and defence domains, and in close relations the space security matrix (e.g. SSA systems, with military space programmes. Here again, collision avoidance procedures, system stand- ‘Outer Space FOR Security’ remains the pre- ards, international regulations…) and bringing dominant driver for ‘Security IN Outer Space’, them together, under a common-roof. which has led the most active countries in the field of military space (i.e. France, Germany, The U.S. is taking initial steps toward a na- Italy, United Kingdom, Spain) to also engage tional civil space traffic management frame- in a variety of actions in the field of space se- work. U.S. VP Mike Pence’s declaration at the curity. 34th Space Symposium in Colorado Springs clearly demonstrated the intention of the U.S. In these countries, security in outer space is to move fast in this direction to promote Amer- being addressed, first, as a national security ican leadership, ensure national security, and strategy domain. In France, for example, promote commercial solutions. More specifi- space security is addressed in multiple occa- cally, the new policy “directs the Department sions in the White Paper on Defence and Na- of Commerce to provide a basic level of space tional Security (2013),131 declaring that ‘with situational awareness for public and private the multiplication of debris in space and the use, based on the space catalog compiled by emergence of potential direct attacks on sat- the Department of Defense, so that military ellites, the protection of outer space is now a leaders can focus on protecting and defending major challenge given the importance of the national security assets in space”129 and to services and missions carried out by space- “encourage the commercial space industry to craft.’132 These concerns were echoed in the partner with the government to develop data- 2016 report on the future of the French space sharing systems, technical guidelines, and sector of Mrs. Fioraso, former French minister safety standards to apply domestically and be for higher education and research.133 Germany promoted internationally that will help mini- also extensively addresses space security in mize debris, avoid satellite collisions during the White Paper on German Security Policy launch and while in orbit.”130 and the Future of the Bundeswehr (2016).134 In this document, the German Federal Ministry

128 International Academy of Astronautics (2017). Space https://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/down- Traffic Management: Towards a Roadmap for implementa- load/215253/2394121/White%20paper%20on%20de- tion. Paris: IAA Cosmic Study fense%20%202013.pdf 129 Infrastructure & Technology (2018). Remarks by Vice 132 Ibid President Pence at the 34th Space Symposium, Colorado 133 Fioraso, G. (2016). L´Overture Comme Réponse Aux Springs, CO. Colorado. Retrieved from WhiteHouse.gorv: Défis De La Filiére Spatiale. Open Space. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks- http://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/docu- vice-president-pence-34th-space-symposium-colorado- ment/document/2016/07/rapport_vf_- _remise_du_rap- springs-co/ port_de_genevieve_fioraso_sur_lavenir_du_secteur_spa- 130 Ibid tial.pdf 131 Ministère de la Défence. (2013). Defence And National 134 Germany Federal Government (2016), White Paper on Security. French White Paper. Retrieved from German Security Policy and the Future, Retrieved from: http://www.gmfus.org/publications/white-paper-german-security-policy-and-future-bundeswehr

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of Defence explains that ‘Germany’s security domains has actually given rise to a variety of policy […] expressly includes space’135 and un- national governance models across European derlines that ‘space security is becoming a key countries involving a number of ministries and issue’, concluding that ‘Germany must there- organisations concerned by space security fore work towards ensuring the unhindered matters among which, of course, are national use of […] space.’136 These documents also set space agencies. The cross-domain aspect of the direction for activities in this field includ- space security is best illustrated by the United ing, among others, support to international in- Kingdom’s National Space Security Policy itiatives promoting sustainable exploitation of (2014),137 which resulted from cooperation space, development of space surveillance ca- between the Ministry for Universities and Sci- pabilities to preserve an independent assess- ence, the Ministry for Defence Equipment, ment of the situation in space, and promotion Support and Technology, the Ministry of State, of confidence-building measures for transpar- and the Ministry for Immigration and Security. ency in the use of space. The following table provides a summary of Although prevalent, the national security di- strategy documents addressing space secu- mension is not the only one in the space security: rity domain. The convergence of interests between defence, science, space and non-space

France Germany Italy United Kingdom Spain

National Centre national Deutschen Agenzia Spa- UK Space Agency Centro para space d'Etudes Spa- Zentrums für ziale Italiana (UKSA) el Desarrollo agency or tiales (CNES) Luft- und (ASI) Tecnologico research or- Raumfahrt Industrial ganisation (DLR) (CDTI) Last space French Space The Space ASI Strategic UK National Strategic Plan policy / Strategy Strategy of Vision Docu- Space Policy for the Space strategy (2012) the German ment 2016- (2015) Sector 2007- document Federal Gov- 2025 2011 ernment (2016) (2006) (2010) Other policy White Paper for White Paper White Paper UK National National Se- / strategy Defence and on German for Interna- Space Security curity Strat- document National Secu- Security Pol- tional Security Policy egy addressing rity (2013) icy and the and Defence (2014) (2013) space secu- Future of the (2015) rity Bundeswehr (2016) Authority for Ministry of the Ministry of Ministry of De- Foreign & Com- Department space secu- Armed Forces Defence fence monwealth Of- of the Na- rity matters fice, Ministry of tional Secu- Defence, UK rity Space Agency, Home Office

Table 5: Selected national strategy documents for Security in Outer Space and organisations involved

framework and 3) diplomacy and cooperation. 4.2.2 Between Sovereignty and Cooperation Efforts in the field of space security remain un- equal among countries with a few countries More concretely, security in outer space, which that are active in military space programmes has been recognised as a key component of having made a more substantial effort, in par- national security by a handful of European ticular in the field of SST capacity-building. countries, has given way, since the early 2000s, to a variety of actions in the fields of 1) capacity-building, 2) legal and regulatory

135 Ibid 137 HM Government (2014). National Space Security Pol- 136 Ibid icy. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/307648/Na- tional_Space_Security_Policy.pdf

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4.2.2.1 National Capacity-Building Programmes Switzerland, whose main mission is laser telemetry, can be used to monitor GEO and pro- National governments are the owners and op- duce precise trajectography. The ZIM SMART erators of the main European SST systems. telescope of the University of Bern, is used to ESA also funded the development of comple- identify orbital elements in GEO, GTO and mentary systems as part of its SSA pro- MEO. The Italian system Croce del Norte, gramme (addressed later in this report) such ASI´s multistatic radar system, was built to as a space debris test radar located in Spain detect debris and Near Earth Objects (NEO). and designed to test new methods for finding The TFRM telescopes at the Montsec Astro- 138 orbital debris. nomical Observatory and the Sagra Sky of the In France, the GRAVES radar (Grand Réseau Observatory of Mallorca can be used for the Adapté à la Veille Spatiale) is operated by a same purposes. The nature of organisations special military division of the CDAOA (Com- involved in space security, for example for SST mandement de la Défense Aérienne et des systems, underlines the importance of cooper- Opérations Aériennes). Designed by the ation between military and scientific commu- French Aerospace Lab (ONERA) and opera- nities but also between Member States. tional since 2005, this bistatic radar relies on These national SST systems (non-exhaustive two ground stations located in France (i.e. list) are operated in very different ways ac- near Dijon and on the Albion plateau) and co- cording to the nature of ownership (civil/mili- vers a database of over 2,000 orbiting objects. tary) and to their purpose (scientific/opera- In Germany, the TIRA (Tracking and Imaging tional). The diverse data they produce are also Radar) system is operated by the Research Es- handled according to different protocols and tablishment for Applied Science (FHR) in data policy. A substantial effort of networking Wachtberg, near Bonn. TIRA can track objects has been conducted by a consortium sup- in L and Ku Band and its imaging capability ported by the EU that is addressed later in this ably complements the French system by con- report with elements on the overall SST capa- tributing to the identification of objects spot- bility achieved as a result. ted by GRAVES. The French Monge ship, equipped with five radars including ARMOR, National efforts in the field of capacity-building which was designed for missile tracking, is oc- for security in outer space are not limited to casionally used to provide more precise data SST capabilities. In the context of military, on objects in LEO. dual-use, and to a more limited extent, civil space programmes, national space agencies, The British Chilbolton Facility for Atmospheric in collaboration with industry, develop ad- and Radio Research, operated by the Ruther- vanced technologies, standards, procedures ford Appleton Laboratory, can also support the and other measures to continuously improve characterization of orbital objects thanks to a dependability and resilience of space infra- 25-meter steerable parabolic dish meteorolog- structures and operations (e.g. resilient archi- ical S-band radar called the CAMRa. Other sys- tectures, secure links and electronics…). Na- tems include the Starbrook wide-field tele- tional space agencies may also proactively scope based in the Royal Air Force Troödos promote or support similar developments in station in Cyprus, funded by the UK Space the field of space environment protection and Agency and the EISCAT (European Incoherent preservation (e.g. space environment-friendly Scatter Scientific Association) system, featur- design, de-orbiting technologies…). ing a monostatic VHF radar in Tromsø with two reception stations in Sweden (Kiruna) and Fin- 4.2.2.2 National Legal and Regulatory Regimes land (Sodankylä) able to monitor orbits, especially polar ones. Other noticeable undertakings by European countries include the ratification of national Additional optical capabilities complement this space legislative regimes governing activities list with, among others (non-exhaustive list), in space. the French systems SPOC (Système Probatoire d’Observation du Ciel), ROSETTE and TAROT A number of European countries have recently (Télescope à Action Rapide pour les Objets adopted national space laws, such as Belgium Transitoires) and the British PIMS (Passive Im- (Act on the Activities of Launching, Flight Op- aging Metric Sensor) using a telescope at eration or Guidance of Space Objects of 2005), Herstmonceux in the United Kingdom, another the Netherlands (Space Activities Act of 2007), in Gibraltar and a third one in Cyprus, which France (Act on Space Operations of 2008), have the potential to contribute to space tracking. The astrometric telescope Zimlat in

138 ESA. (2012). ESA deploys first orbital debris test radar ties/Operations/Space_Situational_Aware- in Spain. Retrieved from http://www.esa.int/Our_Activi- ness/ESA_deploys_first_orbital_debris_test_radar_in_Spai n

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Austria (Outer Space Act of 2011), and Den- the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR), mark (Danish Outer Space Act of 2016). 139 among others. Focused on promoting international diplomacy and cooperation frameworks, Based on different rationales and approaches, these international engagements address a among other things, these legal regimes set variety of space security topics (i.e. Space Sit- the requirements, conditions and restrictions uational Awareness and Space Traffic Manage- for licenses authorizing organisations to con- ment, Space Infrastructure Security, Space duct launch and space operations. Some of Environment Protection and Preservation) with these legal regimes contain provisions that viewpoints on capacity-building and on legal contribute actively to space environment pro- and regulatory regimes. tection and preservation through obligations in the domain of space objects registration, Among international agreements to which Eu- space debris mitigation or space systems re- ropean countries actively contributed to, the entry. 140 report of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Transparency and Confidence-Build- 4.2.2.3 Diplomacy and Cooperation Frameworks ing Measures (TCBMs) in Outer Space Activi- ties certainly represents a noticeable achieve- Although autonomy remains an important ment. This initiative, launched in 2011 by the component of national space security strate- UN General Assembly, brought together a gies (as it does for all defence and security do- small group of experts (15 international ex- mains), this objective is not pursued at the experts nominated by Member States141) with pense of coordination and cooperation, in par- the objective to improve international cooper- ticular with other European countries. ation and reduce the risks of misunderstand- ing, mistrust, and miscalculations in outer From this standpoint, national approaches to space security have been flanked, since the space activities. In addition to internal discussions, the GGE also consulted with the UN early stages, with the development of a num- COPUOS, the UN CD, other international or- ber of bi- and multi-lateral agreements for ganisations such as the International Telecom- data sharing, resources pooling, technology munication Union (ITU and with other relevant transfer, operational coordination, and development of an international framework com- entities such as the European External Action Services (EEAS). prising legally-binding treaties, Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures (TCBMs) The final report of the GGE, which was en- and best practice guidelines. dorsed at the 68th session of the UN General Assembly in late 2013, outlines the need for Incentives to develop diplomatic and coopera- TCBMs in space as “means by which govern- tive initiatives in the field of security in outer ments can share information with an aim of space are numerous including: creating mutual understanding and trust, re-  Share efforts and results between part- ducing misperceptions and miscalculations ners to enhance efficiency and perfor- and thereby helping both to prevent military mance; confrontation and to foster regional and global stability.” The report also proposed TCBMs for  Coordinate actions among partners to en- consideration and implementation on a volun- sure coherence and complementarity; tary basis:  Converge on best practices to conduct ac-  Information exchange on national space tivities in outer space; policy and goals, and exchange of infor-  Share information to build confidence mation on military space expenditures; among actors and foster regional and  Information exchange on activities in global stability. outer space, including orbital parameters, On the international scene, European coun- possible conjunctions, natural space haz- tries proactively contribute to a range of mul- ards, and planned launches; tilateral discussions and activities related to  Notifications on risk reductions such as space security taking place under the aegis of scheduled manoeuvres, uncontrolled international committees such as the Inter- high-risk re-entries, emergency situa- Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee tions, intentional orbital breakups; and (IADC), the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN COPUOS), and the Conference on Disarmament (CD) or

139 Froehlich, A., Seffinga, V. (2018). National Space Leg- 141 Note: Representatives of China, France, Russia, the islation. Vienna: European Space Policy Institute (ESPI). United Kingdom and the United States as permanent Springer. members of the UN Security Council and representatives 140 Ibid of Brazil, Chile, Italy, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Romania, South Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka and Ukraine.

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 Voluntary visits to launch sites and com- result of this Working Group is the production mand and control centres, and demon- of a report providing voluntary best-practice strations of space and rocket technolo- guidelines in this field. The document will be gies. finalised and provided for review and endorsement at the occasion of the 61st session of the Overall the GGE stressed the importance of in- COPUOS in June 2018. If successful, this re- ternational dialogue and received a strong port will be the result of a long diplomatic pro- support from the international community. cess initiated by France when Mr. Gérard Another important work in progress is con- Brachet, former director of CNES, was chairing ducted within the Working Group on the Long- the COPUOS. Along this process, France and term Sustainability of Space Activities (WG- other European countries actively contributed LTS), established by the UN COPUOS in 2010, to the progress of the WG-LTS and to the pro- with the objective to examine and propose motion of international dialogue around long- measures to ensure the safe and sustainable term sustainability of space activities. use of outer space for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all countries. The expected

Figure 15: Timeline of UN COPUOS Long-Term Sustainability Working Group (source: Secure World Foundation)142

On the European scene, dispositions to coop- resources that could serve as a basis to de- erate stem from a geopolitical environment velop a European space surveillance capabil- promoting cooperation between European ity.’144 countries but also from practical considera- The step-up of European institutions in the tions concerning the capacity of countries to field of space security, namely the European conduct, alone, ambitious space security pro- Union and the European Space Agency, has grammes. also given a new dimension to European coop- Current national strategies highlight a growing eration, beyond ad-hoc bi-lateral agreements. readiness and willingness of European coun- Two main drivers can be identified here: the tries to build further upon European coopera- rise of security as an integral component of tion in space security. France has declared, in engagement in space, including for suprana- this regard, that ‘a European approach to this tional and intergovernmental actors, and the topic of mutual interest will be promoted, tak- growing relevance and legitimacy of the Euro- ing advantage of existing resources and devel- pean Union in the areas of defence and secu- oping new concrete projects’143 and has af- rity. firmed that ‘France and Germany possess the

142 Secure World Foundation, (2017), The UN COPUOS 143 Ministère de la Défense. (2013). Defence And National Guidelines on the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Security. French White Paper. Retrieved from Activities Fact Sheet, Retrieved from https://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/down- https://swfound.org/me- load/215253/2394121/White%20paper%20on%20de- dia/205929/swf_un_copuos_lts_guide- fense%20%202013.pdf lines_fact_sheet_july_2017.pdf 144 Ibid

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the financial participation of 19 ESA Member 4.3 ESA: a Key Actor of Space States, ESA aims to support the development Security Capacity-Building of an independent European capability to assess space-based threats to systems in orbit or on the ground. Focused on research and de- 4.3.1 Space Security in the ESA Portfolio velopment activities, the programme complements and supports coordination of European According to its convention, ratified in 1975, national capabilities in various ways. In addi- ‘the purpose of [ESA] should be to provide for tion, the Agency also established the and to promote, for exclusively peaceful pur- CleanSpace initiative in 2012 which supports poses, cooperation among European States in and promotes space environment protection space research and technology and their space and preservation through the development of applications, with a view to their being used an eco-friendly approach to space activities. for scientific purposes and for operational space applications systems’.145 The Agency’s ESA involvement in space security is not lim- scope did not completely hinder activities in ited to these two initiatives and actually en- the field of security and safety in and from compasses a variety of other contributions, outer space, but rather confined ESA under- such as participation in the IADC, activities in takings to a scientific and research dimension the field of cybersecurity, development of with limited connection to national defence standards for space sustainability (i.e. ECSS U and security strategies. Branch) and other activities directly embedded within space programmes managed by ESA. Since then the role of the Agency has progres- Notwithstanding, with the endorsement of an sively evolved, first in the domain of space en- SSA programme by its Member States, ESA vironment protection and preservation with has become an official operational actor of the the adoption of a resolution on the protection European approach to space security, giving a of the space environment in 2000 by ESA pan-European dimension to the domain. Council. The resolution established a task force, coordinated by ESOC (European Space From a general standpoint, and as highlighted Operations Centre) in Darmstadt, with the ob- in a paper describing elements of ESA’s policy jective of working on the definition of stand- on space and security, the Agency “has ards for the safety of orbiting satellites. The evolved to conduct security related projects task force brought together ESA and national and programmes and to address the threats to 148 agency representatives and in 2002 intro- its own activities”. Concretely this evolution duced preventive measures covering the en- has been marked by the setting up of a com- tire space activities lifecycle and the principle prehensive regulatory framework including of orbit protection. ESA’s Security Agreement and Security Regu- lations and implementing procedures and fa- Focusing on scientific and operational consid- cilities. As a result, ESA has developed a capa- erations, ESA funded a feasibility study in bility to receive, store, and produce classified 2005 for a space surveillance mission based on information and exchange classified infor- secondary optical payloads on board space- mation with third parties such as the EU Coun- craft in LEO and GEO to detect small debris.146 cil, marking a step forward in the role that the A report on space surveillance, ´Europe´s Agency could play in the field of space security eyes on the sky´147, was also produced by the in the future. European Coordination Group on Space De- bris, composed of members from BNSC, ESA, CNES and DLR, using studies presented by the 4.3.2 ESA Capacity-Building Programmes Space Surveillance Task Force in 2006. The report exposed that Europe had no systematic 4.3.2.1 ESA Space Situational Awareness Pro- operational capability in the field of space sur- gramme veillance and heavily relied on non-European sources of information. The findings were en- Approved in November 2008 by the ESA Min- dorsed by the ESA Council in November 2008, isterial Council, the SSA programme officially leading to the establishment of ESA’s Space Situational Awareness (SSA) Programme. Through this optional programme, counting on

145 ESA (2003). Convention For The Establishment Of A space-based optical architecture. Advances in Space Re- European Space Agency & ESA Council Rules Of Proce- search, Volume 47, Issue 6, p. 1029-1042. dure. The Netherlands: ESA Publications Division. Re- 147 “Europe’s eyes on the Skies. The proposal for a Euro- trieved from http://www.kosmos.gov.pl/down- pean Space Surveillance System. ESA Bulletin n° 133 - load/ESA_Convention.pdf February 2008, p. 42-48. 146 Flohrer T., Krag H., Klinkrad H., Schildknect T. Feasibil- 148 Giannopapa. C, Adriaensen. M, Antoni. N, & Schrogl. ity of performing space surveillance tasks with a proposed K-U. (2018). Elements of ESA’s policy on space and security. Acta Astronautica 147 (2018) 346–349

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kicked-off in 2009.149 The objective of the pro- information from various observation an- gramme is ´to support the European inde- gles, and ensure the dissemination of that pendent utilisation of, and access to, space for data to relevant stakeholders in a timely research or services, through the provision of manner. Recent developments are build- timely and quality data, information, services ing on a solid foundation of already exist- and knowledge regarding the space environ- ing assets and expertise producing high ment, the threats and the sustainable exploi- quality scientific output in both the public tation of the outer space surrounding our and private sector. planet Earth.´150 In developing such capabili-  Near-Earth Objects (NEO): The pro- ties, the SSA programme aims to strengthen gramme aims to provide data on NEOs the reliability, availability and security of Eu- (asteroids or comets with a size ranging ropean space assets, produce critical data on from one meter to tens of kilometres the status of highly strategic orbits, create op- whose orbitography takes them close to portunities in the industry, and develop Eu- the Sun and, more importantly, to Earth), rope’s role on the international scene with in- make impact likelihood estimations, as- dependent data channels.151 sess the consequences of such impact, The programme is optional and has been and develop deflection methods. A rough funded by 19 ESA Member States through estimate of their number, from existing 2020 at approximately €200 million for the pe- databases, is about 17 000, while the total riod 2009-2020. A total budget of €95 million number of asteroids in the solar system is was allocated on the period 2017-2020 alone. estimated at around 700,000. However, This budget is dedicated to a variety of capac- the Chelyabinsk incident in Russia in ity-building projects including research and 2013, where an unknown object with a technology, set-up and operation of data and velocity of 66,000 km per hour and a 20- coordination centres, and systems develop- meter diameter exploded above the city ment and procurement. Notwithstanding, ESA damaging infrastructure and causing mul- is primarily building on existing capabilities, tiple injuries in the region, highlighted the from ESA itself but also from European and in- need for an enhanced catalogue with reg- ternational stakeholders, working on enhanc- ular updates. ing and integrating these capabilities. The SSA ESA SSA activities include the coordination of Programme is coordinated from ESOC in centres and data integrity processes, studies Darmstadt (Germany) but various ESA centres on the deployment of hosted payloads, aster- are actively working on the programme, such oid impact mitigation-related studies, sensor as ESRIN and ESTEC, in collaboration with in- development studies – notably for Lagrange dustry. Between 2009 and 2016, the pro- point space weather missions, and similar re- gramme gave way to over 100 industrial con- lated activities. Part of the programme budget tracts. goes to developing new infrastructure such as The ESA SSA Programme includes three main databases, software tools, applications, and segments: also hardware such as optical survey telescopes and radars. The possibility of including  Space Surveillance & Tracking (SST): The dedicated satellite missions is being discussed. programme aimed to develop European A few examples of noteworthy results of the SST capabilities in close collaboration with SSA programme are provided below: ESA Member States. The core activity of the SST segment is the maintenance of a  Funding for preliminary studies of a future data catalogue documenting orbiting space weather satellite monitoring solar space objects. Following a series of dis- activity was approved by the 2016 Minis- cussions with ESA Member States this terial Council, component was scaled down to focus on  Two new radars were built, respectively, R&D and operational activities were trans- in Spain (monostatic test radar) and ferred to an intergovernmental consor- France (bistatic test radar) to support fu- tium supported by the EU (addressed later ture SST for civilian purposes, in this report).  ESA´s Proba-2 solar observatory satellite  Space Weather (SW): The programme was incorporated into the SSA pro- seeks to enhance European capabilities to gramme, monitor solar activity by producing critical

149 ESA. Space Situational Awareness. Retrieved from http://www.proteccioncivil.es/docu- https://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Operations/Space_Situ- ments/20486/4c58f134-cb8e-41fc-a473-960568bf9b31 ational_Awareness 151 Suzuki, K. Space Security: Is Europe a Credible Diplo- 150 Luntama, J. P.,(2011). ESA SSA Services Helping to matic Actor? Hokkaido University / Princeton University. Mitigate the Risks of Space Weather Events. Madrid: ESA. Retrieved from https://swfound.org/media/91262/su- zuki_kazuto.pdf

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 Establishment of the ESA Space Security In the frame of this programme, ESA works and Education Centre (ESEC) at Redu, in- closely with European and international part- cluding a space weather data centre, ners. ESA coordinates its efforts with Euro- pean Member States, interacting with minis-  Establishment of the Space Surveillance tries of defence, space agencies and other na- and Tracking Data Centre at European tional institutions, as well as with foreign insti- Space Astronomy Centre (ESAC) in Ma- tutions, in particular in the U.S., such as NASA drid, and NOAA.  New coordination centres were inaugu- rated – notably at Space Pole in Brussels, 4.3.2.2 R&D and Standards: ESA CleanSpace Ini- for space weather, and at ESRIN in Fras- tiative cati (Italy) for NEOs, as well as another at ESOC in Darmstadt (Germany), The main objective of the ESA CleanSpace In- itiative is to promote an eco-friendly and sus-  Test-bed optical telescopes were installed tainable approach to space activity through at ESA´s ground station in Cebreros the development of industrial materials, pro- (Spain) and are being installed at La Silla cesses and technologies that are both Earth in Chile. These will be used for observa- and space environment-friendly. tion software and techniques testing, Established in 2012, the initiative addresses  An initial automated telescope called the entire lifecycle of space systems from con- ‘FlyEye’ with high tech European optical ceptual design to end of life, and up to removal hardware will be deployed in 2018 that of debris. With the objective of covering all as- will constitute the core technology of a pects of the environmental footprint of space global asteroid survey system that will be activities, CleanSpace comprises three updated on a daily basis. branches:

Figure 16: Overview of the CleanSpace Initiative activities (source: ESA)

 EcoDesign: designing to address environ- tems to evaluate and mitigate the environmental impacts and foster green technol- mental impact of space programmes and also ogies to verify and ensure compliance with existing laws and regulations. Focused on mitigating Through the establishment of a common eco- the impact of space activities on human health design framework for the European space sec- and Earth environment, this segment is not re- tor, ESA is seeking to develop tools and sys- lated to “Security in Outer Space”. However,

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the approach of ESA to EcoDesign and the the fields of target characterization, capture tools developed to evaluate environmental im- mechanisms and disposal methods. pact (e.g. Life Cycle Assessment) and compli- More specifically, CleanSpace is studying a ance with legal frameworks (e.g. RoHS di- mission called e.deorbit that will capture an rective, REACH regulation) constitute interest- ESA-owned derelict satellite in low orbit and ing practices that could be expanded to equiv- then safely burn it up in a controlled atmos- alent activities for security in outer space. pheric reentry. Two concepts are being consid-  CleanSat: designing to reduce the produc- ered: using a net or a robotic arm. The mission tion of space debris is expected to take place in 2023 and will be the world’s first active debris removal mission, CleanSat deals with the development of tech- attempting an automated capture and deorbit nical solutions and standards to mitigate the of an uncooperative object. production of space debris by future satellites in line with regulations, guidelines and re- Beyond the development of ADR capabilities, quirements. Concretely, ‘CleanSpace investi- this capacity-building effort is also expected to gates technologies that enable, simplify and support the European space industry to de- make the mission compliance with mitigation velop new concepts, such as in-orbit servicing requirements more efficient, and oversees ef- using non-cooperative rendezvous, capture, forts to comply with mitigation objectives, and control of large objects. Moreover, spin- seeking to plug current technological gaps in offs from such technological developments this area.’152 could give Europe a clear competitive advantage in the ADR market that is expected to A variety of solutions is being investigated as develop in the coming years. part of CleanSat:  End-of-life passivation: to avoid spacecraft break-ups, the passivation of propul- 4.3.3 Additional ESA Activities: Regulatory and sive systems and power systems must be Cooperation Frameworks considered – that is to say ´the action to ESA also leads or contributes to several other permanently deplete or make safe all on- activities closely related to the field of security board sources of stored energy in a con- in outer space. Additional activities include, trolled way in order to prevent break- among others: ups´;153  Setting up a framework (Security Agree-  Design for Demise: an engineering pro- ment, Security Regulations and Imple- cess allowing the disassembly, by design, menting Procedures and Facilities) build- of a given spacecraft once it enters the ing a capability to receive, store, and pro- Earth´s atmosphere to prevent harm to duce classified information and exchange people or property on Earth;154 classified information with third parties;  Space debris environmental modelling:  Development of standards for space pro- this involves studying the behaviour of the ject management, assurance, and system space debris population and developing engineering. For example, a branch re- technical means to measure man-made lated to space sustainability was added to objects between 1mm and a few centime- the ECSS set of standards incorporated in tres in diameter (invisible to current de- ESA projects; tection methods).  Establishment of the European Space Se- CleanSat is the leading programme of ESA in curity and Education Centre at Redu the field of capacity-building for Space Envi- (ESEC) as a centre of excellence for space ronment Protection and Preservation. cyber security services;  eDeorbit: removing a large piece of space  Contributions to security aspects of EU debris from orbit space programmes such as Galileo and Complementing CleanSat, the eDeorbit branch Copernicus; aims to develop solutions for Active Debris Re- moval covering technologies and research in

152 ESA. Clean Space: Cleansat. Retrieved from ESA: 154 Peter M.B. Waswa , Michael Elliot, Jeffrey A. Hoffman http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Space_Engineer- (2012). Spacecraft Design-for-Demise implementation ing_Technology/Clean_Space/CleanSat strategy 3 & decision-making methodology for low earth or- 153 Austin J., Ferreira I., Gernoth A., Goody N., Soares T. bit missions. ScieVerse Science Direct. Retrieved from (2017). System impacts of propulsion passivation. Re- Scinece Direct: https://aiaa.kavi.com/apps/group_pub- trieved from ESA: https://indico.esa.int/in- lic/download.php/4546/Design%20for%20De- dico/event/181/session/1/contribution/42/mate- mise%20JASR_11188_PRINT.pdf rial/slides/0.pdf

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Lastly, ESA also plays an important role in the European Union priorities. In 2007, the Euro- promotion of outer space security and sustain- pean Commission’s European Space Policy ability at the international level by being par- (ESP) outlined goals for space programmes, ticularly proactive in international forums that enhanced coordination, and promoted free work in different ways on security in outer and independent access to space. The use of space including the International Astronautical European space assets for the fulfilment of se- Congress (IAC), Committee on Space Re- curity missions, confirmed by the Council of search (COSPAR), IADC, IAA, and UNCOPUOS the EU’s meeting on ‘Taking forward the Euro- of which ESA became an observer in 1972. pean Space Policy’, led to the conclusion that the “economy and security of Europe and its Noticeable international activities include par- citizens are increasingly dependent on space ticipation in the IADC, with other European na- based capabilities which must be protected tional space agencies (i.e. ASI, CNES, DLR, against disruption.”156 It is this underlying UKSA), ‘to exchange information on space de- principle that fostered a natural expansion of bris research activities between member the EU perimeter, initially focused on ‘Outer space agencies, to facilitate opportunities for Space for Security’, to also encompass ‘Secu- cooperation in space debris research, to re- rity in Outer Space’ as shown in table 6. view the progress of ongoing cooperative activities, and to identify debris mitigation op- In this frame the European Union launched tions.’155 IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guide- several actions including, among others: lines formed the basis of the Space Debris Mit-  Support to Research & Development, with igation Guidelines of the Committee on the projects funded under FP7-Space Area Peaceful Uses of Outer Space that were en- 9.2.3 ‘Research into reducing the vulner- dorsed by the UN General Assembly on De- ability of space assets’ (e.g. cember 22nd 2007. SPA.2013.2.3-01: Space-weather events and SPA.2013.2.3-02: Security of space assets from in-orbit collisions)157 and un- 4.4 EU: Cross-Fertilization of der H2020-Space ‘Secure and safe space environment’ (e.g. SU-SPACE-22-SEC- Security and Space Policies 2019: Space Weather).158  Support to European operational coopera- 4.4.1 A Domain at the Crossroad of the EU’s tion, with the establishment of a Space Surveillance and Tracking (SST) Support Growing Engagement in Space and Security Framework in 2014159 to support the net- The interest and role of the European Union in working and operations of SST assets space security has grown within a broader and owned by EU countries and provide EU more political context, as the result of cross- SST services with the EU Satellite Centre fertilization between, on the one hand, devel- acting as front-desk and interface with us- opments in the EU mandate in the space do- ers. main, and on the other, in the security and de- Diplomacy and international cooperation, with fence domain. In this regard, the Lisbon Treaty EU proposal to establish an International Code (2009) was a stepping stone for both domains, of Conduct for Outer Space Activities in 2008 establishing shared competences between aiming to enhance safety and security in outer Member States and the European Union. space through the development and imple- In fact, the EU had started considering these mentation of transparency and confidence- domains long before the Lisbon Treaty. At the building measures and with additional activi- crossroad of these two domains, space secu- ties in international fora. rity progressively grew in importance within

155 Krag, H. An overview of the IADC annual activities. Re- 158 European Commission (2017). EN Horizon 2020 Work trieved from: Programme 2018-2020 5.iii. Leadership in Enabling and http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/SLW2016/Panel4/1._Krag_IAD Industrial Technologies – Space. European Commission C-16-03_UNCOPUOS_Space_Law_Workshop.pdf Decision C (2017)7124. Retrieved from European Com- 156 Official Journal of the European Union (2007). Commu- mission: http://ec.europa.eu/research/partici- nication from the Commission to the Council and the Euro- pants/data/ref/h2020/wp/2018-2020/main/h2020-wp1820- pean Parliament, COM(2007) 212. Retrieved from EUR- leit-space_en.pdf Lex: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-con- 159 DECISION No 541/2014/EU OF THE EUROPEAN tent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52008AE0260 PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 157 European Commission C (2013). Work Programme of 16 April 2014 establishing a Framework for Space Sur- 2013 Cooperation Theme 9 Space. Retrieved from veillance and Tracking Support. Retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/por- https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-con- tal/doc/call/fp7/common/1567643- tent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014D0541&from=en 9._space_upd_2013_wp_27_june_en.pdf

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Table 6: European space policy priorities in Commission communications 160

More recently, the Space Strategy for Europe (2016) highlighted the central place that the 4.4.2 Capacity-Building through EU Research 161 EU now gives to space security. In this doc- and Innovation Programmes ument, references to space security are made transversely across the five EU strategic pil- EU R&D framework programmes have pro- lars, but are addressed more specifically in the gressively supported the development of tech- frame of the EU objective to ‘reinforce Eu- nologies in the field of ‘Security in Outer rope’s autonomy in accessing and using space Space’. in a secure and safe environment’. From this standpoint, the European Union aspires to de- Although the FP7 work programme 2007-2008 velop EU SST services further so that they did not include specific calls related to ‘Secu- could evolve into a more comprehensive space rity in Outer Space’, it already stated the in- situational awareness service to ‘ensure the tention of the EU to support projects to ‘reduce protection and resilience of critical European the vulnerability of space assets’ through space infrastructure’. The EU aims to conduct ‘techniques for the identification, inventory, these activities in close cooperation with Mem- monitoring and early warning of events that ber States and European partners such as ESA could affect the space assets’ as part of that 162, and EUMETSAT, taking into account interna- future work programmes. This being said, tional cooperation frameworks, in particular and although not directly called for, in 2007 with the U.S. the EU funded a €5 million project called SOTERIA, which aimed to provide new data from ground based and space-borne observa- tions and models crucial for space weather forecasting.163 The 2009 work programme gave further details of ‘external events’, by listing risks such as ‘space debris, hostile laser

160 Official Journal of the European Union (2007). Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parlia- ment, COM (2007) 212. Retrieved from EUR-Lex: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52008AE0260 161 European Commission (2016). Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament, The Council, The Euro- pean Economic And Social Committee And The Committee Of The Regions Com(2016) 705 Final. Brussels. Retrieved from EURO-Lex: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016DC0705 162 European Commission (2007). Work Programme 2007-2008 Cooperation Theme 9 Space. European Commission C (2007)2460 of 11 June 2007. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/fp7/88321/j_wp_200702_en.pdf 163 European Commission (2008). Solar-TERrestrial Investigations and Archives. Retrieved from European Commission: https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/89460_en.html

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or Anti SATellite systems (ASAT), jamming, vi- Space Debris Evolution, Collision risk and Mit- ruses, natural or man-made electro-magnetic igation / STARDUST, the Asteroid and Space disturbances.’164 The FP7 work programme Debris Network169). Within Horizon 2020, the 2010 eventually covered ‘Security from and in SME Instrument, designed to enable small and Outer Space’. Concretely, the work pro- medium industries to competitively take part gramme opened calls for ‘security of space as- to R&D calls, also includes a space security sets from space weather events’ and for ‘Se- project. curity of space assets from on-orbit collisions’, To conclude, since 2010, the EU has almost thus supporting fifteen R&D projects. continuously supported R&D projects directly Since then the EU has almost continuously165 linked to ‘Security in Outer Space’ as part of included calls for projects aimed at enhancing FP7-SPACE and H2020-SPACE, but also the security of space infrastructures, covering through other non-space instruments. In total, successively different areas of ‘Security in the EU has supported at least 35 R&D projects Outer Space,’ including Near Earth Objects in this domain for a total of €66 million over 7 (NEOs), as part of FP7 work programme years (i.e. excluding funding to the EU SST 2011166, and space weather and space debris support framework). These projects have cov- as part of FP7 work programme 2013. Follow- ered a wide scope of activities including topics ing FP7, Horizon 2020 continued to support such as space debris mitigation, in-orbit colli- R&D activities related to space security with a sion avoidance, and space weather. specific line for ‘Protection of European assets The evolution of the EU contribution to ‘Secu- in and from space’ (H2020-PROTEC) in the rity in Outer Space’ projects is provided in the work programme 2014-2015167, and for ‘Se- figure below. A spike in EU contributions can cure and safe space environment’ in the work be observed in 2010 corresponding to financial programme 2018-2020168. H2020 calls fo- support to a number of large projects. It is im- cused on supporting projects in the field of portant to note that since 2014, the EU has space weather, space debris, and in funding also funded the SST support framework the Space Surveillance & Tracking support (roughly for around €28 million per year) framework, which is addressed in more detail through H2020-SPACE and H2020-SECURITY later in this chapter. grants, and also through funds allocated to Interestingly, FP7-SPACE and H2020-SPACE Copernicus and Galileo programmes. Contri- are the only instruments that have supported butions to the SST support framework are not projects in the field of ‘Security in Outer included in this figure. The decrease observed Space’. Complementarily, some projects have since 2013 actually indicates that EU support also been funded under other focus areas that has switched from R&D projects to operational are not specific to space. Within FP7, some capacity-building. space security projects can be found under the A list of projects supported by EU R&D frame- 'PEOPLE' programme, which provides individ- works between 2007 and 2017 is provided as ual grants for training and career development Annex C of this report. of researchers (e.g. SpaceDebEMC project for

164 European Commission (2008). Work Programme 2009 167 European Commission (2016). EN Horizon 2020 Work Cooperation Theme 2 Food, Agriculture and Fisheries, and Programme 2016 - 2017 5 iii. Leadership in Enabling and Biotechnology. European Commission (2008)4598 of 28 Industrial Technologies – Space. European Commission August 2008. Retrieved from European Commission: Decision C (2016)4614. Retrieved from European Com- http://ec.europa.eu/research/partici- mission: https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/fp7/88711/b_wp_200901_en.pdf pants/data/ref/h2020/wp/2016_2017/main/h2020-wp1617- 165 Note: FP7 work programme 2012 did not include spe- leit-space_en.pdf cific calls in the area 9.2.3 ‘Research into reducing the vul- 168 European Commission (2018). EN Horizon 2020 Work nerability of space assets’ Programme 2018-2020 5.iii. Leadership in Enabling and 166 European Commission (2010). Work Programme 2011 Industrial Technologies – Space. European Commission Cooperation Theme 10 Security. European Commission Decision C (2017)7124 of 27 October 2017. Retrieved C(2010)4900 of 19 July 2010) Retrieved from http://ec.eu- from European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/re- ropa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/fp7/89287/k-wp- search/participants/data/ref/h2020/wp/2018- 201101_en.pdf 2020/main/h2020-wp1820-leit-space_en.pdf 169 See Annex for projects list

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In Millions € MillionsIn 5

0 2007-2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016-2017

Figure 17: EU contribution to 'Security in Outer Space' R&D projects - FP7 and Horizon 2020

prevent confrontation and foster national, re- 4.4.3 EU Initiatives in the Field of Diplomacy and gional and global security and stability’.170 Cooperation With these overarching objectives, the Code provides a set of rules and measures to be fol- EU actions in the field of security in outer lowed by subscribing states in the field of space also integrate a variety of legal and dip- ‘Outer Space Operations and Space Debris lomatic initiatives, with the aim of asserting its Mitigation’, ‘Notification of Outer Space Activi- role in the international framework for space ties’, ‘Information on Outer Space Activities’ activities. and a ‘Consultation Mechanism’.171 More concretely, measures promoted by the Code have The EU has established a number of Space Pol- the following objectives:172 icy Dialogues with key partners including the United States, Russia, China, Japan and South  Promoting space safety and sustainabil- Africa to address a number of civilian and se- ity; curity issues such as GNSS interoperability,  Pursuing strategic stability; partnerships in the field of Earth Observation, research and development agenda or cooper-  Minimizing the risk of accidents, collisions, ation in the domains of security in outer space and harmful interference in space; and space for security. The EU also actively  Refraining from deliberate damage or de- contributes to the work (including activities re- struction of spacecraft, unless in self-de- lated to security in outer space) of interna- fence or to mitigate debris; tional organisations and committees such as the International Telecommunication Union  Taking appropriate measures such as (ITU), the International Committee on Global prior notification and consultations to Navigation Satellite Systems (ICG) and the UN minimize collision risks COPUOS.  Improving adherence to and implementa- Over the past decade, the leading action of the tion of the International Telecommunica- European Union has been the preparation, ne- tions Union (ITU) regulations; gotiation and tentative adoption by third countries of an International Code of Conduct for  Minimizing the creation of long-lived Outer Space Activities (ICoC). As a non-legally space debris and implementing the United binding and voluntary-based complement to Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses the existing legal framework regulating outer of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) Space De- space activities, the purpose of the Code is ‘to bris Mitigation Guidelines. enhance the safety, security, and sustainabil- The preparation of the Code started as early ity of all outer space activities’ and to ‘estab- as 2007, as a first exercise at the crossroads lish transparency and confidence-building of the new responsibilities given to the EU by measures, with the aim of enhancing mutual understanding and trust and helping both to

170 Code of conduct Working Document 21 (2014). Draft In- 172 Johnson, C. (2014). Draft International Code of Conduct ternational Code of Conduct For Outer Space Activities. for Outer Space Activities Fact Sheet. Retrieved from Se- Retrieved from https://eeas.eu- cure Word Foundation: https://swfound.org/me- ropa.eu/sites/eeas/files/space_code_con- dia/166384/swf_draft_international_code_of_con- duct_draft_vers_31-march-2014_en.pd f duct_for_outer_space_activities_fact_sheet_febru- 171 Ibid ary_2014.pdf

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the Lisbon Treaty in space and foreign and se- Long Term Sustainability of Outer Space curity policies. A first draft, based on the input Activities (WG-LTS); of EU Member States, was released to the in-  Contribution to the Group of Governmen- ternational community in December 2008 to tal Experts (GGE) on Transparency and solicit feedback from non-EU countries and to Confidence-Building Measures in Outer negotiate the adoption of an international Space Activities (TCBMs), and support to code. Multiple expert meetings took place, and their adoption; the code was amended several times, with the latest draft produced in March 2014.  Support to UN General Assembly Resolu- tion 71/42 regarding the Prevention of an Although the Code has received support from Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) and a large number of countries, others, including contribution to the GGE on PAROS that emerging space-faring nations and established will be kicked-off in July 2018; space powers, have expressed concerns about the negotiation process and the lack of in-  Negotiations with third countries regard- volvement of non-EU countries in the producing draft treaties and initiatives in the field tion of the Code. Some countries have also of ‘Prevention of the Placement of Weap- openly criticised the contents of the Code and, ons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of in particular, the lack of definitions, the level Force against Outer Space Objects’ of restrictions, and the scope of the document (PPWT) and ‘No First Placement of Weap- in addressing both civil and military space ac- ons in Outer Space’ (NFP); tivities. The latest draft of the Code was intended to be negotiated at the United Nations  Promotion of initiatives such as the Princi- in New York in July 2015, outside the official ples of Responsible Behaviour for Outer UN structure, but the meeting that had been Space (PORBOS), which provides a set of organised by the EU, and to which represent- principles ‘preventing an arms race in atives from over 100 countries were invited, outer space and preventing outer space was cut short by procedural moves.173 from becoming an area of conflict to safe- guard the long-term use of the space en- This failed exercise highlighted the complexity vironment for peaceful purposes.’175 of diplomatic procedures in the field of security in outer space, the discrepancy of views in the international community, and the unsolved 4.4.4 EU Space Surveillance & Tracking Support ambiguity between civil and military aspects. Framework On the international scene, the EU and its Member States have demonstrated their read- 4.4.4.1 Genesis iness and willingness to move forward with more restrictive frameworks promoting secu- In 2012, at the end of the Preparatory Phase rity, safety, and sustainability for the conduct of the ESA SSA programme, several Member of space activities. This is, however, not the States decided to withdraw or reduce their case with a number of other countries, includ- contribution to the programme component re- ing major space powers reluctant to agree on lated to SST, with the objective of managing it a limitation of their freedom of action in outer through a consortium, under the aegis of an space, in particular for military purposes, and EU framework. The two other domains, space emerging space-faring nations concerned by weather and NEOs observation, remained un- additional obligations that could hamper their der the responsibility of the European Space access and use of outer space. Agency, with a preponderant budgetary focus on space weather. Today, the European Union engagement in the advocacy of responsible behaviour in the con- The main reason behind this decision was re- duct of outer space activities continues, in lated to the prominence of military and opera- close collaboration with its Member States. tional aspects in this field and the limited ca- Noticeable activities include, among others:174 pacity of ESA, an R&D agency, to properly manage security aspects. In this regard, some  Recognition and support to UN COPUOS Member States expressed concerns about activities such as the Working Group on

173 Listner, M., J., (2015). The International Code of Con- 175 EEAS (2017). Conference on Disarmament - Working duct: Comments on changes in the latest draft and post- Group on the "Way Ahead" - EU Statement on the Preven- mortem thoughts. Retrieved from Space Review: tion of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Retrieved from Euro- http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2851/1 pean Union-External Action: https://eeas.europa.eu/head- 174 EEAS (2016). Conference on Disarmament – Working quarters/headquarters-homepage/28329/conference-dis- Group of the “Way Ahead”. Geneva. Retrieved from Euro- armament-working-group-way-ahead-eu-statement-pre- pean Union External Action: https://eeas.europa.eu/head- vention-arms-race-outer-space_en quarters/headquarters-homepage/28329/conference-disarmament-working-group-way-ahead-eu-statement-prevention-arms-race-outer-space_en

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compliance with defence and security require- 2014 establishing a Framework for Space Sur- ments. Indeed, many systems used for SST veillance and Tracking Support.177 are owned or operated by military organisa- Today, the SST component of the ESA SSA tions and SST data to be processed, ex- programme still exists but is disconnected changed or distributed may be classified, re- from the EU SST Consortium.178 The pro- quiring all entities involved to comply with gramme now focuses mostly on the Space specific requirements and to follow strict pro- Weather component with around 50% of the cedures. The prominence of military aspects budget allocated to it.179 also raised some concerns related to national sovereignty and some Member States, especially France and Germany, stressed the im- 4.4.4.2 General Presentation portance for them of maintaining control over On 16 April 2014, after two years of discus- their assets and data produced by these as- sion, the European Parliament and the Council sets. of the European Union adopted Decision No To tackle this situation, German and French 541/2014/EU. The document outlines the fol- military organisations negotiated and pre- lowing: 180 pared a non-paper submitted to the Commis-  Purpose: The general purpose of the sup- sion in December 2012. The document report framework is to ensure the long-term quested the establishment of a new mecha- availability of the European and national nism at EU level with a specific governance space infrastructures, services and facili- scheme where Member States could maintain ties and to contribute to ensuring the control over their assets while cooperating in peaceful use and exploration of outer SST activities. The objective pursued by Ger- space. Specific goals include: many and France was to promote a framework that would foster pan-European cooperation o Assess and reduce the risks of collision and improve cost-efficiency (e.g. by avoiding to enable operators to carry out and duplication of efforts) to deliver EU SST ser- plan mitigation measures; vices while complying with national concerns o Reduce risks related to launches; resulting from the specific nature of SST systems and data. Well-suited to the Lisbon o Survey uncontrolled re-entries of treaty regime of shared competences between space objects to Earth atmosphere; the European Union and Member States in the field of security and space, the framework pro- o Prevent the proliferation of space de- moted by France and Germany would also en- bris. able transference to the European Union of a  Objective: The objective of the support share of the financial burden of SST operation framework is to pool and network national and coordination activities. and European assets to provide SST ser- Accordingly, in 2013 the Commission pub- vices. lished a first communication mentioning its in- o These services should be driven by ci- tention to ´come forward with a proposal vilian user requirements defined in the sketching the organisational framework for the ‘European space situational awareness setting up and operation of a European SST high-level civil-military user require- service in partnership with Member States ments’ working paper; building on their existing assets and expertise´.176 The Space Working Party in Brussels o These services should be complemen- started to negotiate the contents of what be- tary to research activities related to came Decision No 541/2014/EU of the Euro- the protection of space-based infra- pean Parliament and of the Council of 16 April structure carried out under Horizon 2020;

176 European Commission (2013). Communication From 178 ESA. 7th European Conference On Space Debris. The Commission To The European Parliament, The Coun- Space Surveillance and Tracking in ESA's SSA pro- cil, The European Economic And Social Committee And gramme. Retrieved from https://confer- The Committee Of The Regions EU Space Industrial Pol- ence.sdo.esoc.esa.int/proceedings/sdc7/paper/242 icy. COM (2013) 108 final. Brussels: European Commis- 179 ESA. Space Situational Awareness. Retrieved from sion https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-con- http://swe.ssa.esa.int/ tent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52013DC0108&from=EN 180 European Commission (2014). DECISION No 177 European Commission (2014). DECISION No 541/2014/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 541/2014/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 16 April 2014 establishing a Frame- OF THE COUNCIL of 16 April 2014 establishing a Frame- work for Space Surveillance and Tracking Support. Re- work for Space Surveillance and Tracking Support. Re- trieved from EUR-Lex: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-con- trieved from EUR-Lex: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014D0541&qid=1535031 tent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014D0541&qid=1535031 889695&from=en 889695&from=en

ESPI Report 64 54 August 2018 Security in Outer Space: Rising Stakes for Europe

o The development of new sensors or  Sensor Development (3SST): To under- the upgrading of existing sensors op- stand the evolution and future perfor- erated by Member States should be mance of EUSST, a roadmap lays out R&D encouraged afterwards; actions for prioritizing, upgrading, and developing new sensor assets (radars, tele- o Cooperation with international part- scopes, laser stations). ners, in particular the United States of America, should be addressed to avoid According to the report from the European collisions in space and to prevent the Commission to the European Parliament and proliferation of space debris. the Council on the implementation of the Space Surveillance and Tracking (SST) sup-  Activities: The activity is organised around port framework (2014-2017) published in May three project lines: the Sensor Function, 2018, “a total of EUR 167.5 million has been the Processing Function and the Service allocated for 2015-2020 through various Provision Function.181 grants financed by the Copernicus, Galileo and o The establishment and operation of a Horizon 2020 programmes, out of which sensor function consisting of a net- around EUR 70.5 million to implement the ac- work of Member States and European tions of the SST Decision (1SST and 2SST ground and space-based sensors to grants) and EUR 97 million for the sensors' up- survey and track space objects, creat- grades (3SST).”182 ing then a database; In this framework, Member States are directly o The establishment and operation of a responsible for the operation of their sensors processing function to process and an- and the processing of data, as well as for the alyse SST data (at national level) in or- implementation of the data policy in coopera- der to produce SST information, i.e. tion with the EU SatCen. The role of the Com- processed data readily meaningful to mission is to manage the SST Support Frame- the recipient; work, as well as monitor and ensure its implementation. For this purpose, a first report on o Set up a function to provide SST ser- the implementation of the SST Support vices of civilian nature, i.e. services of Framework is expected by the European Par- collision avoidance, fragmentation and liament and the Council by July 1st 2018. The re-entry, to users including all Member Commission also defines the general guide- States, the European Commission and lines for the governance of the SST Support Council, the EEAS, public and private Framework and facilitates the broadest partic- spacecraft owners and operators and ipation of Member States. The EU SatCen co- public authorities concerned with civil operates with the consortium and acts as the protection. EU SST Front Desk, providing SST services to The EU SST Consortium SST Users. (http://www.eusst.eu/) outlines that to estab- In March 2015, five Member States (i.e. lish, operate, and evolve these three func- France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United tions, EUSST consists of three incremental Kingdom) represented by a national entity projects: (i.e. respectively CNES, DLR, ASI, CDTI and  Initial Service Delivery (1SST): Based on UKSA) were deemed compliant with the crite- current operational national SST assets ria for participation in the SST support frame- within the SST Consortium, early SST ser- work and designated national entities to make vices are provided to European users in up the SST Consortium. In line with the ambi- cooperation with the EU SatCen. tion to develop a broad European SST capability benefiting all Member States, the Consor-  Service Provision (2SST): To consolidate tium is open to enlargement. In this regard, SST Services, a European SST network is applicant states, after having presented their constructed that connects national sen- national assets to the Consortium, have to sors to national operations centres (NOCs) and NOCs between each other.

181 Note: The Sensor Function consists in a network of the the SST data, collision avoidance, fragmentation and re- five member States ground-based sensors, survey ing and entry services. tracking space objects and feeding, for the moment, a na- 182 European Commission. REPORT FROM THE tional database thereof; The Processing Function consists COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND of processing and analysing the SST data at national level, THE COUNCIL on the implementation of the Space Sur- producing SST information and services for transmission veillance and Tracking (SST) support framework (2014- to the SST Service Provision Function; The Function to 2017). Retrieved from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/re- provide SST Services consists of providing, on the basis of source.html?uri=cellar:fbafc703-4eb8-11e8-be1d- 01aa75ed71a1.0021.02/DOC_1&format=PDF

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submit a formal application to the Commis- consortium, and a growing number of coun- sion, demonstrating their compliance with the tries has expressed their interest in joining the two following criteria: consortium.  Applying states must own or have access to adequate SST sensors, already availa- 4.4.4.3 Governance ble or under development, as well as to The governance scheme in which the Consor- the human resources to operate them. tium currently operates is outlined by the Con-  Applying states must establish and pre- sortium Agreement among the five Member 183 sent an action plan for the implementation States. The Consortium governance system of the objectives set out in the Decision is segmented in three layers: the decision- including the modalities of cooperation making level, the management level and the with other Member States. operational working level. A broader descrip- tion of that working scheme is provided below. To date, Romania, Portugal and Poland have already submitted their applications to join the

Figure 18: EU SST support framework governance

The decision making level provides for the nor- Committee itself, the Coordination Committee malisation of the relationship between the and the Technical and Security Committees. Consortium and the EC, notably the Direc-  The Steering Committee is the organisa- torate-General for Internal Market, Industry, tion that takes the main decisions, at pre- Entrepreneurship, and SMEs (DG GROW) and sent chaired by France. Germany was the Member States. Decision-making processes first country to be in charge. The Steering are ruled by the Consortium Agreement, the Committee has to meet other committees formal agreement that governs cooperation at least 4 times per year, not including its and the action of the Member States, and the working meetings. Implementing Arrangement, which governs the interaction of the five Member States and  The Technical Committee is involved in all the SatCen. Currently, decisions are taken on the technical aspects of the Consortium, a consensus basis, which means that one veto mainly producing technical analyses and can potentially stop the entire decision pro- studies. This committee reports to the cess. The decision-making layer includes the Steering Committee. Chair of the Steering Committee, the Steering

183 ASI (2015). SST Consortium agreement signed Signa- along with a national ASI-INAF-Defence agreement. Re- ture of the EU initiative to guarantee the long-term availa- trieved from http://www.asi.it/en/news/sst-consortium- bility of space structures for the security of EU citizens, agreement-signed

ESPI Report 64 56 August 2018 Security in Outer Space: Rising Stakes for Europe

 The Security Committee is in charge of after which the Consortium must develop new monitoring all the security data and infor- applications for projects and new projects mation policies. This committee reports to within the three core areas to move forward the Steering Committee. with. The advancement and the outlining of projects must include reporting to the EC to  The Coordination Committee is chaired by justify the use of funds. In this regard, it could the Chair of the Steering Committee and be argued that the EC intervention currently gathers delegate from SatCen and the mainly lies in the budgetary dimension of the Steering Committee. It coordinates the SST initiative. collaboration schemes of Member States and with SatCen.184 The Commission and, The operational working level refers to the if relevant, aspiring Member States who management of the sensor function and the want to join the Consortium, participate to national operational centres that produce SST the Steering Committee as observers. data. This level constitutes the foundation of the Consortium architecture. The management level refers to the coordination of projects and encompasses the three main projects undertaken by the Consortium, 4.4.4.4 From Networking to Delivery of SST Ser- reflecting the three budgetary lines that fund vices the EU SST Support Framework. Each project So far the evolution of the EU SST System Ar- includes six work packages, each of which has chitecture (operational phase) has mainly from 5 to 6 specific tasks executed by the been segmented in three phases: working group of each state or SatCen.185 Fi- nally, each project has a lifetime of 18 months,

Phase 1: 2016-2018 Phase 2: 2018-2020 Phase 3: 2020-2028 Networking Upgrade Roll out

Figure 19: Phases of the EU SST System Architecture

 Networking (2016-2018): The Consortium  Upgrade (2018-2020): Along with pursu- has been working on networking national ing sensor networking objectives, the sensors and operational centres with a Consortium will incorporate new Member view to delivering services through its States and create the nucleus of a Shared front-desk, namely SatCen. So far there is European Catalogue – aside from U.S. no service entirely based on European in- data based services, to support the Amer- digenous SST data and most services are ican catalogue. based on U.S. data complemented with  Roll out (2020-2027): The Consortium will data generated from national capabilities. create an integrated EU – U.S. catalogue At the start of the current phase, the Con- of space objects and deliver regular ser- sortium and SatCen have already vices based on this Shared European Cat- achieved the first milestone - the delivery alogue. of initial services. By the end of 2018 it is expected to have improved services, and Depending on the time, budget, technical chal- the basis for a shared European database. lenges, system performances and reliability, as well as user satisfaction, the consortium An Action Plan, proposed by the European has structured possible pathways ahead with Commission (under negotiations), building on an incremental approach to reach an appropri- the assessment and gap analysis of the cur- ate SST capability. Key parameters are the rent European SST capabilities will lay the budget, the upgrade of sensors, the develop- steps forward - in terms of capacity building, ment of new sensors, and the signing of new geographical coverage and budget allocation - Sharing Agreements. to achieve maximum risk reduction by the end of the next multi-annual financial framework Current capacities (2017) and expected capac- (2021-2027). After that, the decision on the ities (2021) of the sensor function are pro- level of autonomy to reach among the differ- vided in the table below:186 ent Member States will be left up to them.

184 European Satellite Union. Space Situational Awareness 186 European Commission (2018). REPORT FROM THE (SSA). Retrieved from The EU Satellite Centre: COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND https://www.satcen.europa.eu/services/ssa THE COUNCIL on the implementation of the Space Sur- 185 Note: In total, there are about 70 to 80 different tasks to veillance and Tracking (SST) support framework (2014- be performed by the Consortium.

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2017 (initial architecture) 2021 (expected architecture) MS architecture Total observed (%)* Total well -ob- Total observed Total well -ob- (orbit and object served (% of the (%)* served (% of size) total) ** the total)** LEO (> 7 cm) 19% 14% 35% 19% LEO (> 50 cm) 79% 72% 95% 80% LEO (> 1 m) 96% 95% 98% 97% MEO (> 40 cm) 18% 7% 62% 7% GEO (> 50 cm) 40% 30% 66% 42% * Observed objects are objects that were observed at least once during the 14-day period of the simulation. ** Well-observed objects are those observed objects that were observed every day in LEO and every three days in MEO/GEO

Table 7: Estimated level of coverage by size of object and orbit of the initial architecture (2017) and expected architecture (2021)

tial steps towards a full-fledged European Un- 4.4.4.5 Achievements and Challenges ion SST service, while complying with both civil and military frameworks. An important On the basis of a documentation review, achievement of the consortium, difficult to stakeholders’ consultations (including member measure but often praised by consortium part- states, users and other public stakeholders) ners, has been the reinforcement of European and with the support of independent experts, coordination and the confidence-building the European Commission identified the fol- among partners. Achieving consensus among lowing key achievements of the support France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK – framework: 187 which speak today with a clear and unified voice – has been a challenge that the consor-  availability of the EU SST services (i.e. collision avoidance, in-orbit fragmentation tium successfully took on. Today, EU Member States established national databases and are and re-entry services) since July 1st 2016, through the EU SST portal to all European currently building a common European database of unclassified data. The consortium also institutional users and spacecraft owners continues its efforts to promote the exchange and operators free of charge and on a of classified data through bilateral agreements 24/7 basis; and the construction of a secure data sharing  outreach to users including identification exchange network. From this standpoint the of potential users, documentation of their consortium is certainly achieving its purpose. needs and awareness raising of space risks and the need to protect space infra- Nevertheless, stakeholders also underline that various issues remain and that serious chal- structure; lenges lie ahead of the consortium to take a  cooperation and collection of shared more prominent role, and achieve more ambi- know-how with the establishment of reg- tious objectives in line with the rising space ular communication between NOCs and security stakes in Europe. Key stakes ahead of increased cooperation between national the consortium identified by the European experts through working groups; Commission assessment include: 188  mapping and pooling of European assets  effectiveness and European added-value with 33 sensors contributing to the initial optimisation to avoid duplication of efforts EU SST operations, a complete mapping and support an efficient development of of national and European sensors and be- EU SST capabilities; ginning of national sensors upgrades;  achievement of an acceptable level of Eu-  outreach to other Member States to col- ropean autonomy based on further net- laborate with or to join the SST Consor- working and development effort in line tium. with a level of ambition to be decided by the European Union and with, as a first Stakeholders interviewed by ESPI unani- step, the delivery of a common EU data- mously acknowledged the multiple achieve- base of orbital objects building on national ments of the consortium so far, particularly for data; the complex systems networking and the ini-

2017). Retrieved form EUR-Lex: https://eur-lex.eu- 187 Ibid ropa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:fbafc703-4eb8-11e8- 188 Ibid be1d-01aa75ed71a1.0021.02/DOC_1&format=PDF

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 development of EU SST services in compliance with users’ needs requiring additional outreach effort to raise awareness and collect feedback but also the development of common operational procedures and standards;  synergies with other components of security in outer space to cover the range of space hazards over the entire space mission lifecycle;  governance optimisation to accommodate a broader Member State participation, an enhanced role of the European Commis- sion for guidance and monitoring at the strategic, policy and organisational levels and to explore of the role of EU SatCen as EU SST services front-desk. With regards to financial management, other issues will have to be addressed by future arrangements revision including:  simplification of funding sources to avoid unnecessary burdens affecting the results achieved by the consortium and  budget allocation, to adapt current rules (i.e. sharing on an equal base between the members of the consortium, independently from their current capabilities) to the enlargement of the consortium. These challenges, and other short- and long- term stakes identified as a result of ESPI analysis, are discussed in more details in the following chapter on the way forward for an enhanced role of Europe in Security in Outer Space.

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5. Way Forward for an Enhanced Role of Europe in Security in Outer Space

 Space infrastructure security: continue, 5.1 Rising Stakes for Europe consolidate and further enhance the Euro- pean effort to ensure the security of the 5.1.1 Short-Term Policy Rationales space and ground components of space infrastructures; The value of the European space infrastruc-  Alternative solutions and redundancy: ture, which is the result of a continuous and consider different approaches to reduce substantial investment by public and private the risks of relying on a single system, for actors, lies first and foremost in the substan- example ground-based complements or tial socio-economic benefits it enables across substitutes; a multitude of economic and strategic sectors for Europe. Recent studies have captured the  Crisis management and Emergency Re- sizeable impact of space infrastructure on the sponse: guarantee access to satellite ser- European economy and society. This already vices during crises and emergency situa- considerable socio-economic value can rea- tions, at least for relevant governmental sonably be expected to increase in the future. actors. Indeed, fostered by the digital revolution, and In line with these concerns and in the field of stimulated by a transition of the space sector GNSS, the European Commission published in characterised by intense innovation and con- March 2018 the first edition of the European siderable private investments, new space ap- Radio Navigation Plan, which aims to identify plications are being continuously developed, and mitigate risks associated to dependence also contributing to promising terrestrial tech- on GNSS.190 nologies. The significant progress of EU programmes Interestingly, benefits enabled by the space over the period 2014-2020 is also amplifying infrastructure can be looked at from another the importance of a service-oriented space angle: as the use of space-based solutions be- policy to build user confidence, encourage the comes more pervasive and part of business- uptake of space services, and consequently as-usual, the dependence of governments, maximise the benefits of the European space businesses and individuals on space infra- infrastructure. In the future, the potential in- structure grows, creating new risks. Incapaci- troduction of new initiatives such as tation, even partial, of space assets could lead GOVSATCOM will further amplify this need. to a dreadful chain of impacts for the European economy and society. From this standpoint, Conditions to guarantee an appropriate quality the socio-economic rationale (i.e. secure the of service include 1) operational capacities space infrastructure to protect the benefits it meeting user performance requirements, 2) enables) can be considered, alone, as a rea- continuity of programmes to ensure infra- sonable argument for Europe to position secu- structure maintenance, upgrade and evolu- rity at the top of the space policy agenda. tions, and 3) appropriate measures to protect the infrastructure against threats. Such re- In fact, ‘Identify and mitigate risks associated quirements are even more stringent for gov- to dependence on critical space assets’ is the ernmental and defence and security users that first recommendation of a PwC study con- the EU seeks to support to reinforce and lev- ducted for the European Commission on the erage synergies between the civil and defence dependence of the European Economy on domains. To do so, protecting the space infra- Space Infrastructures.189 The study identifies structure and meeting the most stringent se- three main options: curity requirements is a prerequisite.

189 PwC (2017). Dependence of the European Economy on 190 European Commission (2018). European Radio Naviga- Space Infrastructures. Brussels: EU Publications. Retrie- tion Plan: https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/docu- ved from: http://www.copernicus.eu/sites/default/files/li- ments/28325/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/na- brary/Copernicus_SocioEconomic_Impact_Octo- tive ber_2016.pdf

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Europe also needs to guarantee the security of rope’s willingness to work with the interna- its space infrastructure autonomously through tional community on space issues. The exer- independent capabilities (i.e. systems, data, cise has positioned the European Union and its technologies). From this perspective, although Member States as the principal advocates of cooperation with third countries is essential in the preservation of a safe and secure space the field of space security, Europe must ensure environment and of the peaceful use of outer a capacity to control the level of reliance on its space. The unsuccessful outcome, however, partners and to maintain it within acceptable has revealed the need for Europe to reinforce boundaries. bilateral and multilateral relations with international partners on this matter, including To conclude, the rising need for enhanced both established space powers and emerging space security in Europe is driven in the short- spacefaring nations. term by four key policy rationales: Second, building European autonomy and au-  Secure the results of the continuous and thority in the field of space security will also be substantial investment made by public essential to foster European leadership on the and private actors; global scene. Today, Europe acts as a trail-  Protect the European economy and soci- blazer in the adoption of best practices for ety against risks related to its pervasive Space Environment Protection and Preserva- and sizeable dependence on the space in- tion (e.g. legislation, standards) and in the de- frastructure; velopment of related technologies (i.e. passive de-orbitation, active debris removal), but lags  Contribute to a service-oriented policy by behind in the field of Space Situational Aware- assuring the ability of the infrastructure to ness with a gap that is poised to grow in the deliver a service that can justifiably be next decade if Europe does not make a more trusted, in particular for users in defence substantial effort in this field. From this per- and security; spective, equipping Europe with a system  Guarantee European autonomy and free- providing comprehensive and independent dom of action in the field of security in SSA capabilities is a priority to position Europe outer space, and in the space domain at as a credible interlocutor on the international large. scene; hence capacity-building alike in SSA. Such effort is also essential in view of the development of a civil space traffic management 5.1.2 Long-Term Strategic Stakes framework. Stakes for Europe are high to develop its own approach to STM and play a Beyond these short-term policy stakes, the prominent role in the construction of an inter- need for a reinforced approach to space secu- national framework taking into account that, rity is also driven by longer-term considera- in the long run, 1) the globalization and intentions stemming from the strategic ambition of sification of space activity will make the devel- Europe to “promote its position as a leader in opment of an international STM framework space, increase its share on the world space necessary, and 2) that the U.S. is already markets, and seize the benefits and opportu- 191 moving forward with preliminary steps. From nities offered by space.” In many ways, the this standpoint, equipping Europe with ad- level of European engagement in the space se- vanced SSA capabilities, compulsory to fully curity domain will be a determining factor in monitor operations in orbit, would be a prereq- the position that Europe can expect to hold in uisite to build the required credibility and ca- the global space arena in the future. pacity to participate to the development of First, space security now holds a central posi- rules and norms of an international STM tion in space diplomacy. To be recognised as a framework. leader in space, Europe must therefore play a Last but not least, space security will play an prominent role in international dialogues and increasing role in commercial space markets: negotiations, as a promoter of a clear, united and consistent “European way”. In this re-  Commercial SSA data and value-added spect, European activities and initiatives on services: the growing need for SSA data the international scene, and in particular the and services of public and private satellite elaboration of a Code of Conduct for Outer operators is a formidable business oppor- Space Activities and subsequent international tunity that a handful of private actors are diplomatic efforts, have demonstrated Eu- already trying to seize. Supporting the

191 European Commission (2016). Communication From rope. COM (2016) 705 final. Brussels: European Commis- The Commission To The European Parliament, The Coun- sion. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/transpar- cil, The European Economic And Social Committee And ency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/COM-2016-705-F1-EN- The Committee Of The Regions. Space Strategy For Eu- MAIN.PDF

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emergence of European champions, offering solutions to European and foreign us- 5.2 Way Forward: Key Ele- ers, is an important parameter for consid- ments for Consideration eration.  Competitive bias: the implementation of Security in Outer Space is intrinsically a com- new practices (e.g. laws, regulations, plex issue because of the diversity of potential standards, procedures) promoting space threats to the various European space infra- security but constraining the way space structures and to the provision of associated activities are conducted inevitably creates services, as well as of the complexity of miti- competitive bias: gation or remediation measures. o Between industries that are con- As far as Europe is concerned, the multiplicity strained and those that are not; of stakeholders brings an additional layer of complexity. In one way or another, this issue o Between industries that are prepared impacts all European space actors. Therefore, to implement such constraints and they would undoubtedly benefit from sharing those that are not. experiences and concerns, as well as from Supporting the preparation of the Euro- pooling resources to, at the minimum, cope pean space industry for the impact of with the security challenges that are trans- space security practices on international verse to all space systems, such as the prolif- competition is another important parame- eration of space debris or space weather haz- ter for consideration. ards. This encompasses: The Space Data Association (SDA) is an inter-  Private operators and public bodies, esting case study. Described as a ´formal,  Civil and military entities, non-profit association of civil, commercial and military spacecraft operators that supports the  National agencies, intergovernmental and controlled, reliable and efficient sharing of supranational organisations. data that is critical to the safety and integrity What is first at stake is the capacity of Europe 192 of satellite operators´ , the association was to efficiently mobilize the substantial re- founded in 2009 as a response to the limita- sources required to deal with this complex is- tions of JSpOC. SDA was originally launched as sue, which implies: an initiative of Inmarsat, Intelsat, and SES, which, together with Eutelsat, are currently its  Reaching a broad political consensus on Executive Members. The Association has 35 the objectives to be set for a “joint” Euro- members with 279 GEO satellites as part of pean Security in Outer Space policy. Such the network, making up 70% of all active com- policy should be based on a joint over- mercial GEO satellites.193 In 2010, SDA estab- arching threat analysis and on interna- lished the Space Data Centre (SDC) - its own tionally recognised standards; automated SSA system designed and operated  Devising, accordingly, technological by Analytical Graphics, Inc. It became fully op- roadmaps for the development and the erational in April 2011. SDA and AGI will soon maturation of required technologies and launch an upgraded Space Data Centre (SDC systems, at affordable conditions, and 2.0) Space Traffic Management (STM) Service, with the appropriate level of European au- powered by ComSpOC, as announced in March tonomy; 2017. SDC 2.0 will independently supply a highly accurate catalogue of space objects,  Assessing the associated programmatic gathered by ground-based telescopes, radars, provisions and schedules in all available or and potentially space-based optical sensors,194 potential sources of funding (MFF, Secu- to include objects larger than 20 cm in GEO – rity Fund, national and ESA programmes, the current capability being 1 m.195 private funding); Developing a fruitful cooperation framework  Achieving a sufficient level of coordination with private industry (consultation, partner- of activities among various stakeholders ships, distribution of responsibilities…) based in order to avoid gaps and useless dupli- on mutual benefits should be a central axis of cation of efforts. development on the long-term.

192 The Space Data Association (SDA). SDA Overview. 194 Froeliger, J., L. (2017). Greater Industry Cooperation Retrieved from SDA: http://www.space- Needed to Avoid Space Collisions. Retrieved from data.org/sda/about/sda-overview/ INTELSAT: http://www.intelsat.com/news/blog/greater-in- 193 Rawlins, M. (2017). IAA Space Debris Committee. Re- dustry-cooperation-needed-to-avoid-space-collisions/ trieved From SDA: http://iaaweb.org/iaa/Scientific%20Ac- 195 Dickinson, M. Preparing for Congested Space. An SDA tivity/debrisminutes031711.pdf Focus. Retrieved from Sat Magazine: http://www.satmaga- zine.com/story.php?number=1486837251

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Second comes the implementation of such pol- driven primarily by Member States. For icy, which implies the definition of agreed gov- that, two scenarios can be envisaged: ernance schemes building on the existing ar- o Bottom-up approach building on exist- eas of expertise readily available throughout ing intergovernmental frameworks (in Europe, as well as on the integration of estab- particular ESA and the EU SST consor- lished best practices and respective compe- tium) and seeking a progressive en- tencies of key stakeholders. These governance largement of partners and scope to- schemes shall, for each system concerned, ward, first, a comprehensive SSA propose an appropriate organisation and pro- framework and, ultimately, the con- vide for the breakdown of responsibilities struction of a European Space Traffic among the various entities in the processes, Management structure; aimed at ensuring: o Top-down approach with the introduc-  The definition of security requirements tion of a full-fledged programme es- based on specific threat analysis, tablishing the European Union as the  The setting up and implementation of risk main owner and operator of European management schemes, civil SSA capacities with the necessary reinforcement of security protocols  The elaboration and implementation of and risk management. operational procedures,  Development and distribution of key in-  The monitoring of compliance of opera- dustrial capacities and adequate involve- tions, ment of industry as a core contributor to  The coordination of the various entities. capacity-building in the following strategic areas of activity. (i.e. such involvement A central challenge for these governance would require the setting up of stringent schemes will be to find the appropriate mech- security protocols and should be condi- anism to accommodate a more prominent Eu- tioned on the expected benefits in terms ropean leadership for which the European Un- of cost savings, improved competitiveness ion is the most suitable candidate, further and business development, including on building on the existing centres of expertise, international markets): and the need for Member States to maintain control over national systems and data. Not- o Data production, relying on privately- withstanding the considerable progress operated sensors and processing ca- achieved by Europe in both Space and Security pabilities and reinforcing/substituting & Defence domains over the period 2014- governmental capacities in carefully 2020, an in-depth reassessment of stakehold- selected fields of a lesser sensitivity ers’ views, in particular with regards to the re- such as the GEO orbit, space weather spective roles of Member States and the EU in or NEO. space-related matters, would be timely and o Value-added services, elaborating on opportune in order to move further. publicly available data, possibly com- With a view to building a reinforced, compre- plemented by private data, for govern- hensive, coherent and cooperative European mental and commercial users. Ulti- approach to security in outer space, various mately, such services could be embed- sensitive issues are at stake: ded in an EU programme to augment SSA services, including for security  Capacity-building for SSA (integrating all and defence governmental users. related components: SST, SWE and NEO), o Standards, for in-orbit operations and  Space environment protection and preser- spacecraft design supporting a Euro- vation including, in particular, relevant pean approach to the preservation of technology developments, common a safe and secure space environment. standards and guiding principles for diplomacy and international cooperation,  Sharing of clearly identified ambitions to achieve European autonomy and freedom  Space programme security architecture of action in space and, subsequently, mo- and risk management procedures for Eu- bilisation of the required resources. As the ropean space programmes. crux of every political issue, the level of The success of the European approach to se- funding allocated by the different stake- curity in outer space will rely on key enabling holders including the European Union, factors: Member States and ESA will be a determining factor of Europe’s capacity to meet  Setting up consensual European leader- the rising challenges in the field of secu- ship in a domain that, so far, has been rity in outer space. Here, two aspects shall be considered:

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o Use of complementary public funding programme with several components (gov- including, in particular, the new Euro- erned by a single regulation), the horizontal pean Defence Fund which is a particu- extension of GSA mandate to cover executive larly appropriate mechanism to sup- and security activities for all components of port EU and national efforts for devel- the integrated programme (GSA to become opment and acquisition of systems. the EU Agency for the Space Programme) and an increase of the overall programme budget o Leverage private investment, provided to EUR 16 Billion (segmented as follows: that more prominent involvement of EGNOS/Galileo: EUR 9.7 billion, Copernicus: private actors is sought. EUR 5.8 billion, SST and GOVSATCOM: EUR  International diplomacy and cooperation, 0.5 billion). in synergy with European efforts in other The regulation establishes that “the Commis- areas, for both: sion shall implement the Union space policy o Operational concerns about the way and shall assume responsibility for the Union forward to an international space traf- space programme, including in the field of se- fic management framework (e.g. data curity. It shall determine the overall objectives sharing, in-orbit operations, SWE and and priorities of the programme and shall su- NEO warnings) pervise its implementation, in particular in terms of costs, timetable and results, including o Fostering of a global approach to over the funds and tasks it entrusts to other space activities in line with Europe’s entities.” 198 This general provision clarifies vision on the preservation of a safe that, although tasks related to security (e.g. and secure space environment and for accreditation, SSA, rules and standards imple- the peaceful use of outer space. mentation…) can be entrusted to other entities such as ESA, Member States or agencies of the EU, the European Commission is ultimately ac- 5.3 Toward a New Frame- countable for the security of the EU space programme. This responsibility encompasses: work for 2021-2027  The protection of infrastructure, both ground and space, and of the provision of 5.3.1 European Commission’s draft regulation services, particularly against physical or cyber-attacks; An important step toward the preparation of a  The control and management of technol- renewed European framework for security in ogy transfers; outer space lies in the current preparation of the future Multiannual Financial Framework  The development and preservation within 2021–2027 of the European Union, which will the Union of the competence and know- set a number of important parameters for mid- how acquired; term developments in this domain including  The protection of sensitive non-classified ambitions, means and organisation. and classified information. To provide a baseline for negotiations with Member States, the European Commission is- 5.3.1.1 Space Infrastructure Security sued in June 2018 a draft regulation for the Space Programme of the European Union.196 The draft regulation provides a number of pro- When finalised and adopted, 197 the new regu- visions related to the security architecture of lation will repeal previous decisions for the EU space programme (Title V) including EGNOS/Galileo, Copernicus and the SST sup- security activities and governance (Chapter I), port framework covering the period 2014- security accreditation (Chapter II) and man- 2020 and provide a legal basis for activities on agement of classified information (Chapter the period 2021-2027. III). Overall, the draft regulation establishes that the EC shall determine policy measures to Stakes are high. ensure a high degree of security for each com- From a general standpoint, the draft regula- ponent of the EU space programme and tion proposes the integration of the different stresses the importance of building on Member space programmes of the EU into a single EU States experience and expertise in this field.

196 European Commission. (2018). Proposal for a No 1285/2013, No 377/2014 and No 912/2010 and Deci- REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND sion 541/2014/EU. Brussels OF THE COUNCIL establishing the space policy pro- 197 Note: at the time of this report publication, the draft reg- gramme of the European Union, relating to the European ulation is still under negotiation with member states. Union Agency for Space and repealing Regulations (EU) 198 Ibid

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Here, the most substantial proposed evolution Nations instrument), Space Traffic Manage- with regards to the 2014-2020 framework is ment (monitoring of international develop- related to the reinforcement of security ac- ments) and active/passive debris removal. creditation procedures, in particular with regards to independence from operational func- 5.3.1.3 Space Situational Awareness tions of the programme and to the enlargement of GSA role across all components of the Space Situational Awareness is proposed as a programme (so far limited to Galileo and component of the EU space programme sup- EGNOS programmes). porting “a global approach towards the main space hazards” and includes activities in the Noticeably, measures to organise a European field of SST, Space Weather and NEOs. This response to military threats or deliberate at- SSA component aims: tacks are not addressed by the regulation. At this point in time, such move would be quite  “to enhance SST capabilities at the EU premature since it implies some pre-requi- level, reduce the risks of spacecraft colli- sites, including a European space defence doc- sions during all its operational phases trine or a formal governance scheme to deal from the launch to the decommissioning, with such issues. This shall be addressed in the survey uncontrolled re-entries of space- framework of the further development of the craft or space debris in order to provide EU’s Foreign and Security Policy and European early warnings to mitigate damage to EU Defence Action Plan. citizens and terrestrial infrastructure and seek to prevent proliferation of space de- 5.3.1.2 Space Environment Protection and bris;” Preservation  “to monitor the relevant observational parameters related to space weather Space Environment Protection and Preserva- events” and tion is not directly addressed in the draft regulation with concrete measures and activities  “to establish and inventory of NEO Euro- (e.g. standards, technology developments…), pean capacities, to network them with an however, a number of mentions delineate the aim of supporting the exchange of NEO vision of the European Commission in this data and information;” field: The introduction of an SSA component within  Consistency with existing space hazards the EU space programme with a dedicated mitigation measures and with an initiative budget (corresponding to a share of the leading to a non-legally binding instru- 500M€ allocated to GOVSATCOM/SSA) repre- ment to be negotiated within the frame- sents a substantial step towards a more ambi- work of the United Nations, as a way to tious and integrated capacity-building effort. foster increased international coopera- This new SSA component will build on past action, establishing standards of responsible tivities in the field of SST (essentially on the behavior across the full range of space ac- EU SST support framework) and in the fields tivity, strengthening commitments to of Space Weather and NEOs (essentially on non-interference in the peaceful explora- Space Weather prediction services for GNSS, tion and use of outer space, facilitating H2020 grants for R&D in these fields and on a equitable access to outer space and in- number of complementary activities). creasing transparency of outer space ac- With regards to SST, the cornerstone of SSA tivities. and main capacity pillar of the European ap-  Monitoring of international initiatives and proach to security in outer space, a few developments in the area of the space changes are proposed. The most noticeable traffic management to be taken into con- change lies in the enlargement of the scope to sideration in the context of the mid-term encompass a financial support to the develop- review of the MFF. ment of new sensors (i.e. today, the SST support framework should only “encourage” the  Synergies of SST with initiatives of active development of new sensors and financial sup- removal and passivation measures of port should be addressed either nationally or space debris with a view to reducing risks through a European research and develop- of collision. ment programme). The SST component shall, With these mentions, the regulation highlights now, “support the establishment, develop- the importance of these topics for Europe but ment and operation of a network of ground- does not elaborate on the ways to ensure that and/or space-based sensors of the Member EU will be in a position to weigh in space-re- States, including sensors developed through lated international negotiations in order to ef- ESA and EU sensors nationally operated”. The fectively contribute to future potential initia- notion of “EU sensors nationally operated” is tives in the field of space diplomacy (United further developed in the introduction of the

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draft regulation: “in case new assets are fi-  set relevant standards applicable to civil nanced by the programme, the Union should and military systems respectively; be co-owner of these assets with due consid-  and prioritise the associated develop- eration of various ownership and governance ments of critical capabilities. models”. The possibility of co-owned sensors and of EU sensors operated by Member States Accordingly, the overall effort to achieve these are the main steps forward in the direction of objectives should be translated into a broadly a more prominent role of the EU in this field. agreed roadmap allowing for budget planifica- European leadership could also be supported tion and phased scheduling of developments. by the 7-year multi-annual plan mentioned in Actually, roadmapping of activities is neces- the draft regulation and which will probably sary to avoid a “Go As You Pay” approach, have to be validated by the EC as well as by which is not appropriate for a controlled de- additional changes in the governance struc- ployment of capacities. ture that could arise from future arrangements revision. Considerations for the next MFF

5.3.2 Proposed further developments in light of  The introduction of a multiannual plan defining clear objectives for the SST ESPI conclusions component is an important feature of In its current state, the proposed regulation the proposal. Eventually, the European does not introduce radical changes in the do- Commission shall endorse this plan as main of security in outer space but still makes part of its responsibility over the secu- some noticeable steps towards the consolida- rity of the EU space programme. tion of a European programmatic approach.  The level of budget included in the EC Although much is left to implementing ar- proposal for the period 2021-2027 will rangements to be established or revised ac- increase available resources. However, cordingly by the different stakeholders, the additional funding from Horizon Europe regulation certainly provides for a more cohe- (i.e. FP9) and other instruments, such sive framework in a number of important ar- as the European Defence Fund, will be eas. essential to reach the level of funding Overall, the increasing importance awarded to necessary to progressively bridge the security features of the EU space programme capability gap through the deployment is striking. In this regard, the draft regulation of additional EU sensors. fits well within the strategy framework set  Avoid unnecessary duplication of ef- forth by the European Union in both space forts and foster complementarity (Space Strategy for Europe) and security and should be set as a core principle in or- defence sectors (Global Strategy for the Euro- der to optimise budget efficiency. pean Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, Eu- ropean Defence Action Plan) which call for further developments in the domain of security in  Governance outer space. However, if the current strategy The governance scheme that has been set clearly sets a number of key principles, it does through the Consortium has allowed to accom- not provide for concrete objectives. In this re- modate the requirements of different commu- spect, setting up a comprehensive European nities by recreating the conditions of an inter- policy in the domain of space security seems a governmental model within the supranational necessary step to ensure smooth and con- framework of the EU. In such governance trolled implementation. scheme the role of the European Commission Such policy should clarify the approach to a is rather limited, even though it is the sole number of pressing issues. funding source and holds the responsibility over the security of the EU space programme.  European ambitions and means In essence, the intergovernmental model is First, the policy should establish clear, meas- meant to mitigate two conflicting objectives: urable, objectives to be achieved in the short- medium- and long-term. In particular, it  On one hand, leverage cooperation should: among the most motivated Member States to foster a regional approach for  clarify the notion of “European autonomy the sake of the protection of the European and freedom of action”; Union space assets,  set the required level of autonomy for Eu- rope in these matters;

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 On the other hand, preserve national in- in 2017 may provide new ways to better ac- terests by safeguarding national sover- commodate national interests and EU added- eignty over capabilities development and value. control over SST systems and data. Anyhow, getting close to the 2020 turning The argument for an intergovernmental model point, a reassessment of Member States con- also lies in the inherent dual nature of SST and cerns and of the role that the EU intends to in the discrepancy between Member States’ play in the field of space security would be capabilities and strategic interests across Eu- timely. Such discussion should take into ac- rope. Indeed, the model promotes cooperation count the substantial progress: between capable states and use/upgrade of  of EU space programmes; existing national capabilities (systems, know- how, facilities) resulting from prior invest-  of confidence-building among consortium ments of a handful of European countries to partners; protect, first and foremost, their national/military space assets. This situation, which can-  SST systems networking and service de- not be overlooked, is at the core of the gov- livery; ernance debate which eventually boils down to  of the most appropriate institutional the question of the weight of national concerns framework (including GSA, ESA, national and interests against European added-value agencies, etc…); and to the sharing of responsibilities between Member States and the EU.  and of the developing mandate and new instruments of the EU in Security & De- The draft regulation proposes to maintain this fence. model, seeking enlargement of contributing Member States and progressive reinforcement Considerations for the next MFF of the EU role through co-ownership of new sensors, along with revision of the governance  Working on a clear identification of each scheme and the introduction of a multi-annual parties’ concerns and requirements plan monitoring key performance indicators. would certainly support the identifica- Although these are necessary steps forward on tion of an appropriate solution accom- the way to a more prominent European lead- modating national/European and mili- ership, such intergovernmental scheme might tary/civil perspectives. reach its limits with specific risks of:  An enhanced role of the EU, with spe-  Divergence of interests among stakehold- cific mandates, could be considered to ers, hindering the capacity to implement reinforce European leadership, in par- a coordinated policy in the field of security ticular on the international scene. in outer space;  A permanent structured cooperation for  Duplication of efforts and reduced cost-ef- security in outer space, supported by fectiveness, if motives to develop specific the European Defence Fund and allow- national capabilities surpasses the willing- ing future participation of third-states ness (and readiness) to focus on distribu- (e.g. United Kingdom, U.S.) could be tion and complementarity across Europe. considered. To tackle these issues, and with the announced objective to involve more contrib-

uting states (including some with limited SST capacities or that may not operate satellites, but have a national space agency, or a security protocol of data processing and sharing), there is a pressing need to build further on EU added-value and reinforce European leadership, management and coordination. This might imply the introduction of some supranational provisions giving mandate to the EU in specific areas, in particular to negotiate international arrangements. Interestingly, SST is not the only domain where EU Member States seek improved cooperation within the Union framework and new instruments such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation on Defense (PESCO) introduced

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 Exploitation  give way to a potentially promising commercial market, Smooth and efficient exploitation of such sophisticated and critical systems requires a  foster competitivess from supposedly number of conditions: more cost-effective economic agents,  Adequate and stable budget properly as-  avoid diverting valuable public assets sessed according to clearly identified op- from their strategic missions. erational objectives, Such approach supposes a strict delineation of  Pooling of expertise available either at na- the limits of the respective roles of public (mil- tional or European institutional level. This itary) actors focusing on strategic security-re- raises in particular the question of the in- lated activities and of the private actors volvement of ESA, which has invested for providing services on a commercial basis in a its own needs in these matters and has number of less-sensitive areas. gained substantial internal expertise. It From this perspective, on the European side, remains to be seen how such capabilities the elaboration of a comprehensive space-se- could be exploited in a closely military-re- curity policy is probably a prerequisite to a lated environment and how it might inter- clear identification of the potential role of the cact with the proposed enlargement of the European industry in the domain of security in GSA. outer space, taking into account the impacts of future developments (e.g. SSA services, se-  Role of the private sector curity standards, STM…) on business. Another important consideration is the in- However, advanced reflections should be initi- volvement of the private sector as a user and ated given the short-term risk of emergence provider of SSA capabilities but also as an in- of a de facto US industry monopoly on these dustry whose business and competitiveness is services, or the creation of parallel SST data impacted by developments in the field of se- channels, making EU efforts redundant. From curity (e.g. standards, regulations). this standpoint, involving the private sector is at the crossroads of space security and indus- With the intensification of global space activity try competitiveness objectives. and an expected growth of the space economy, the provision of SSA data and services Considerations for the next MFF will likely become a new sizeable commercial market. This trend is marked by a growing number of SSA private providers. For example  In the short-term, a first step to favour ExoAnalytic solutions, Rincon, Lockheed Mar- a greater involvement of private actors tin, LeoLabs or ArianeGroup sell data produced could consist in the establishment of an by private sensors and Analytical Graphics, enhanced dialogue with commercial Boeing, Schafer Corp., Applied Defence Solu- stakeholders for example in the frame tions use commercial SSA data to develop and of the preparation of the SSA multian- sell value-added services to governmental and nual plan with the objective to: 199 commercial operators. o map European private capabilities, So far, and despite noticeable national devel- o evaluate business opportunities and opments (e.g. integration of ArianeGroup’s challenges in this domain and, GEOTracker service by France), the involvement of industry in space security matters o in general, assess the needs and does not seem to be perceived as a priority in views of private industry on poten- Europe. In the meantime, the U.S. adopted a tial future developments in this do- policy encouraging the involvement of private main. companies. The rationale behind this move is to:

199 Weeden, B. (2017). Space Situational Awareness Fact Sheet. Retrieved form Space World Foundation: https://swfound.org/media/205874/swf_ssa_fact_sheet.pdf

ESPI Report 64 68 August 2018 Security in Outer Space: Rising Stakes for Europe

Annex

- Likelihood is defined, here, as ‘a weighted risk factor based on an analysis A.1 Risk Management Con- of the probability that a given threat is capable of exploiting a given vulnerabil- cepts ity’. This notion ‘combines an estimate of the likelihood that the threat event will Risk management is the process of identifying, be initiated with an estimate of the likeli- quantifying and prioritizing the risks that as- hood of impact’. sets face. The following chart introduces a basic risk management model that brings to- - Impact is defined as the magnitude of gether various security-related concepts and harm that can be expected to result from highlights the relationship between them: the consequences of a threat exploiting a vulnerability. The different concepts included in this model are defined more thoroughly below: Risk, as a combination of the above, is therefore defined as the likelihood of potential loss - Threat is defined as ‘any circumstance or or damage resulting from the exposure of a event with the potential to adversely im- system to a threat. This model, initially applied pact operations or assets’. A threat can to information systems,200 shows that risk, lead, purposefully or unintentionally, to which is the essential variable that space se- the alteration or destruction of the asset curity activities aim at mitigating, is the prod- and/or of its operations. uct of three specific factors: threat, vulnerabil- - Vulnerability is defined as ‘a weakness in ity and consequence (or impact). Risk mitiga- a system, security procedures, internal tion can therefore be performed through a va- controls or implementation that could be riety of actions targeted toward threat exploited by a threat source’. Vulnerabil- reduction, vulnerabilities protection or impact ity is a characteristic of a system that mitigation. A preliminary step in risk manage- must be identified, and then eliminated, ment is risk assessment, which implies the limited or protected against. identification of threats and vulnerabilities, together with the possible ensuing impact in case of damage.

Figure 20: Security-related concepts and the relationship between them201

200 National Institute of Standards and Technology (2012). 201 Van Impe, K. (2017). Simplifying Risk Management. NIST Special Publication800-30, Revision 1. Retrieved Retrieved from Security Intelligence. Retrieved from from NIST: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Leg- https://securityintelligence.com/simplifying-risk-manage- acy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-30r1.pdf ment/ ESPI Report 64 69 August 2018

A.2 Space Security Concepts

Concept Definition Space Infrastructure A network of spacecraft and ground stations interconnected by communication channels. Ground Segment The ground segment architecture of a satellite includes all the elements on the ground necessary to control the spacecraft and ensure its good functioning. Uplink and Downlink The satellite link is a radio link between a transmitting Earth station and a receiving Earth station through one satellite. Satellite link comprises one up-link and one down-link. Space Segment The space segment is composed of all the assets of the space architecture located in space, namely the satellites in orbit and any other spacecraft required to the completion of space operations. Access to space capa- That segment is composed of the required launch infrastructure including bility spaceports – launch pad, integration facilities, and protection fences – but also the shipping facilities and vehicles. Space Security The secure and sustainable access to, and use of, space and freedom from space-based threats. Security in Outer The protection of space assets and systems against natural and man- Space made threats or risks, ensuring the sustainability of space activities. Outer Space for Secu- The use of space systems for security and defence purposes. rity Security from Outer The protection of human life and the Earth environment against natural Space threats and risks coming from space. Main lines of action in Security in Outer Space Space Situational Means and measures to monitor, detect and inform about man-made and Awareness (SSA) natural, intentional and unintentional, threats to operations in space. Space Environment Means and measures to reduce short- to long-term impacts of human ac- Protection and Preser- tivity in outer space and in particular impacts constituting a threat to op- vation (SEPP) erations in space. When taking a longer-term perspective, this concept is referred as ‘Space sustainability’. Space Infrastructure Means and measures to ensure space systems’ availability, reliability, Security (SIS) safety, integrity, confidentiality and maintainability and to prevent un- wanted, be it intentional or unintentional, disruption of intended operations or access to system information. Space Traffic Manage- Operational and organisational concept encompassing systems assisting ment (STM) operators for safety of operations in orbit, practices ensuring the sustainability of the use of outer space (e.g. regulations, standards, procedures, protocols) and frameworks governing the exploitation of these systems and the implementation of these practices Other risk management concepts Safety The risk of a system of being harmed, damaged, destroyed or compromised. A system is safe when it is in the condition of not being harmed or the risk of a system of being harmed has been sufficiently mitigated. Dependability Ability of a system to deliver a service that can justifiably be trusted. De- pendability is a measure of a system´s availability, reliability, safety, integrity and maintainability. Resilience The ability of a system to withstand the harmful impact of unexpected negative events, such as system failure, environmental challenges or adversary conditions, while mitigating damage and enabling the rapid recovery of original functionality. The notion itself can be divided in several sub-elements as such: Disaggregation, Distribution, Diversification, Pro- tection, Proliferation, and Deception.

ESPI Report 64 70 August 2018 Security in Outer Space: Rising Stakes for Europe

A.3 Threats to Space Infrastructure

Source: Schrogl, K.-U., Hays, P.L., Robinson, J., Moura, D., & Giannopapa, C. (Eds.) (2015). Hand- book of Space Security: Policies, Applications and Programs. Vienna: Springer. Type of threat Threat Hazard Mitigation measures Priority (ESPI categories) Space segment Space debris Passive man-made threat Physical damage TCBMs, hardening, shielding, SST High Space weather Natural threat Bugs, damage SSA, software, EEE components, monitor- High ing Unknown space Natural threat Failure Redundancy, hardening, resilience, R&D Medium phenomena KEW/ASAT Active man-made threat Partial/Total destruction International law, ITAR, rules, TCBMs, de- Very low terrence EMP (h alt nuc.) Active man-made threat Destruction, Van Allen International law, ITAR, rules, TCBMs, de- Low terrence DEW (energy) Active man-made threat Signal disturbance, mechani- Various Medium cal destruction Laser-based ASAT Active man-made threat Sensors/mechanical damage Classified High HPM ASAT (mcrw) Active man-made threat Sensors blinded, receivers Self-protecting devices Medium and electr. Degr. EW (E-war) Active man-made threat Signal loss, satellite control Various Very high loss Jammers Active man-made threat Radarsat/satcom incapacita- Waveforms, nulling antennas, beamform- Very high tion ing, jam Cyberattacks Active man-made threat Transponder hijack, sat degr, Cryptography, secured software, process Very high info loss standard Ground segment Natural disaster Natural threat Loss of com w/sat, ground Redundancy, hardening, physical security Medium segment disrupt measures Physical attacks Active man-made threat Loss of com w/sat, ground Redundancy, hardening, physical security Medium segment measures Sabotage Active man-made threat Loss of com w/sat, ground Hardening Medium segment Cyberattacks Active man-made threat Denial of service, info sto- Cryptography, authenf. Proced., integrity Very high len/comprised check Back doors Active man-made threat Info compromised Cryptography, authenf. Proced., integrity High check Data Links Interference Passive man-made threat Denial of service/comms/ra- Radio-frequency coord. at national/inter- Medium dar systems national, null ant, wvfrm Jamming -Active man-made threat Denial of service/comms/ra- Radio-frequency coord. at national/inter- High dar systems national, null ant, wvfrm Spoofing -Active man-made threat Wrong information provided Cryptography, authenf. Proced., integrity Medium check Cyberattacks -Active man-made threat Denial of service Cryptography, secure software Very high Interception -Active man-made threat Information compromised Cryptography, specific waveforms High Technology/Industry capabilities – not addressed in this report Tech transfer Not addressed in this report 3rd party space progr compe- Coordinate export control, space indus- High tition trial policy Supply shortage Not addressed in this report No system deployed Space industrial policy High Lack of launch op- Not addressed in this report Satellite grounded European launch policy, framework con- Medium portunities tracts Loss of industry Not addressed in this report No system deployed Space industrial policy, space R&D pro- Medium know-how grammes Loss of spectrum Not addressed in this report No system deployed Coordinated European position at Euro- High and orbital re- pean and ITU levels sources Firmware, supply Not addressed in this report Hack Industrial policy ? chain under stress

ESPI Report 64 71 August 2018

A.4 Projects Related to ‘Security in Outer Space’ Supported by EU R&D Support Frameworks

*The following list of projects is not exhaustive Frame- Project coor- Project EU contrib. Project title Research Aim work dinat. cost (EUR) (EUR) 2007-2008 Provide new and existing SOlar-TERrestrial data from ground based Katholieke Uni- FP7-SPACE- Investigations and and space-borne obser- versiteit Leuven, 5.161.155 3.922.966 2007-1 Archives vations and models cru- Belgium (SOTERIA)202 cial for space weather forecasting Aim to facilitate a structured dialogue amongst International Con- Centro para el FP7-Adhoc- all actors involved in se- ference Space and Desarollo Tecno- 2007-13 154 600 150 000 curity-related Space mat- Security 2010 logico Industrial (FP7-Space) ters embedded in two (EUSPACE2010)203 (CDTI), Spain main programmes: GMES and SSA 2010 Define and assess differ- Reducing the Vul- ent satellite architecture FP7-SPACE- nerability of Space Astrium SAS, 3 191 059 1 971 271,75 solutions to minimise the 2010-1 Systems (Re- France impacts of small debris Vus)204 on satellites Calculate the risks that Prediction, Protec- space debris poses for tion & Reduction of FP7-SPACE- Europe’s satellite infra- OrbiTal Exposure Onera, France 2 933 485,60 1 995 781 2010-1 structure, and proposes to Collision Threats new means to mitigate (P2-PROTECT)205 such risks Propellant-less de- orbiting of space Universidad Developing an efficient FP7-SPACE- debris by bare Politécnica de 2 337 317,40 1 772 801 deorbit system for future 2010-1 electrodynamic Madrid, Spain spacecraft tethers206 Provide a coherent and Alignment of Capa- rigorous mechanism for bility and Capacity communicating the effi- University of FP7-SPACE- for the Objective of cacy of current debris Southampton, 560 744,60 425 114,21 2010-1 Reducing Debris mitigation practices and UK (ACCORD)207 opportunities for strengthening European capability Studies the tracking of Support to Precur- European Union FP7-SPACE- space objects, preparing sor SSA Services Satellite Centre, 735 600 500 000 2010-1 the way for a European (SPA)208 Spain system for SSA Small debris removal by laser illu- CILAS , Compa- Develop a concept allow- FP7-SPACE- mination and com- gnie Industrielle 2 882 883,80 1 976 440 ing for removal of small- 2010-1 plementary tech- des Lasers, sized space waste nology France (CLEANSPACE)209 University of FP7-SPACE- De-Orbiting of Sat- Develop and tests a novel Surrey, United 2 830 728,40 1 997 342,75 2010-1 ellites using Solar device for de-orbiting of Kingdom

202 Project ID: 218816 203 Project ID: 262587 204 Project ID: 262156 205 Project ID: 262820 206 Project ID: 262972 207 Project ID: 262824 208 Project ID: 262930 209 Project ID: 263044

ESPI Report 64 72 August 2018 Security in Outer Space: Rising Stakes for Europe

Sails Low Earth Orbit space- (DEORBITSAIL)210 craft Advanced Forecast Provide advanced early For Ensuring Com- University of FP7-SPACE- space weather warning to munications Göttingen, Ger- 2 550 245 1 999 893 2010-1 protect communication Through Space many systems (AFFECTS)211 Advanced Thermo- Creation of a new ther- FP7-SPACE- sphere Modelling DEIMOS Space mosphere model, 2 217 243,16 1 563 980,36 2010-1 for Orbit Prediction S.L.U., Spain enabling more precise (ATMOP)212 space weather forecasts Coronal Mass Ejec- Develop new tools to mit- tions and Solar En- Institut d’Aéro- igate the negative im- FP7-SPACE- ergetic Particles: nomie Spatiale pacts of 2 518 021,40 1 798 718 2010-1 forecasting the de Belgique, geomagnetic storms and space weather im- Belgium solar energetic particle pact (COMESEP)213 events Develop 30-60 minute European Risk forecast warnings of from Geomagneti- Finnish Meteoro- FP7-SPACE- geomagnetically induced cally Induced Cur- logical Institute, 1 561 175,40 1 056 184 2010-1 currents (GIC) threaten- rents Finland ing critical (EURISGIC)214 infrastructure Protecting space assets from high energy particles by developing Eu- British Antarctic Deliver a European space FP7-SPACE- ropean dynamic Survey, United 2 539 991,31 1 965 071,25 weather forecasting 2010-1 modelling and Kingdom capability forecasting capabilities (SPACECAST)215 Space Weather In- Develop a physics-based Katholieke Uni- FP7-SPACE- tegrated Forecast- simulation basis for space versiteit Leuven, 1 991 474,08 1 559 005,56 2010-1 ing Framework of the space weather Belgium (SWIFF)216 forecasting A new, ground based data-assimi- lative modelling of Measure plasmaspheric Earth’s plasmas- electron and mass densi- Eötvös Loránd FP7-SPACE- phere – a critical ties University, Hun- 2 626 262,80 1 972 049,75 2010-1 contribution to Ra- to monitor the changing gary diation Belt model- composition of the plas- ling for Space masphere Weather purposes (PLASMON)217 Data Services and Analysis Tools for Solar Energetic Establish an integrated FP7-SPACE- Particle Events and Helsingin ylio- web-based interface to 2 484 125,80 1 932 172,70 2010-1 Related Electro- pisto, Finland solar energetic particle magnetic Emis- data and analysis tools sions (SEPServer)218 2011 Solar and Helio- Improve the knowledge spheric Collision- Queen Mary and FP7-SPACE- of less Kinetics: Ena- Westfield Col- 2 602 739,60 1 998 104 2011-1 the Sun to Earth plasma bling Data Analysis lege, environment of the

210 Project ID: 263248 211 Project ID: 263506 212 Project ID: 261948 213 Project ID: 263252 214 Project ID: 260330 215 Project ID: 262468 216 Project ID: 263340 217 Project ID: 263218 218 Project ID: 262773

ESPI Report 64 73 August 2018

Sun to Earth University of using kinetic computer Plasma System London, United simulations with Kinetic Model- Kingdom ling (SHOCK)219 Aim at shedding light on Monitoring, Analys- the ways the dynamic ing and Assessing National Obser- evolution of the Earth’s FP7-SPACE- Radiation Belt Loss vatory of Ath- 2 845 504,37 1 995 042,90 radiation belt is influ- 2011-1 and Energization ens, Greece enced by ultra low fre- (MAARBLE)220 quency electromagnetic waves in geospace Investigate the orbital Space Debris Evo- dynamics of space debris FP7-PEOPLE- lution, Collision Politecnico di through semi-analytical 185 763,60 185 763,60 2011-IEF risk, and Mitigation Milano, Italy models of their motion (SpaceDebEMC)221 under the effect of orbit perturbations 2012 Physikalisch- First European Meteorologische Provide a complete and Comprehensive s Observatorium consistent time series of FP7-SPACE- SOLar Irradiance Davos / World 2 579 598,40 1 994 373,60 solar spectral radiation 2012-1 Data exploitation Radiation incident on (SOLID)222 Center, Davos, the Earth’s atmosphere Switzerland Solar system plasma Turbu- Develop and apply a full lence: Observa- Belgian Institute FP7-SPACE- package of advanced tions, inteRmit- for Space Aero- 2 655 900 1 998 200 2012-1 analysis methods on tency and Mul- nomy, Belgium plasma data tifractals (STORM) 223 Support action contrib- Support for the de- utes from a technical per- European Union FP7-SPACE- velopment of a Eu- spective to the develop- Satellite Centre, 746 772 500 000 2012-1 ropean SSA capa- ment of a Data Policy for Spain bility (STEP)224 a future European SSA capability Stardust-The As- Develop new tools to bet- FP7-PEOPLE- teroid and Space University of ter understand the mo- 4 049 908,72 4 049 908,72 2012-ITN Debris Network Strathclyde, UK tion and orbit of space (STARDUST)225 objects 2013 Demonstrate technologi- Improving Low cal feasibility of a first ac- Earth Orbit Secu- SENER In- FP7-SPACE- tive removal mission to rity With Enhanced generia y Siste- 2 905 380,41 1 999 447 2013-1 “kick-start” large-scale Electric Propulsion mas S.A, Spain active debris removal ac- (LEOSWEEP)226 tivities Aim to demonstrate key A Low Cost Active technologies for ADR Debris Removal University of three main domains by FP7-SPACE- Demonstration 15 321 Surrey, UK 6 999 867 performing in-orbit 2013-1 Mission 258,79 demonstrations repre- (REMOVEDEBRIS) sentative of an ADR mis- 227 sion Modelling space Assess the impact of Natural Environ- FP7-SPACE- weather events space weather and de- ment Research 2 544 144,52 1 981 301,49 2013-1 and mitigating velop mitigation strate- Council, UK their effects on gies

219 Project ID: 284515 220 Project ID: 284520 221 Project ID: 302270 222 Project ID: 313188 223 Project ID: 313038 224 Project ID: 312249 225 Project ID: 317185 226 Project ID: 607457 227 Project ID: 607099

ESPI Report 64 74 August 2018 Security in Outer Space: Rising Stakes for Europe

satellites (SPACESTORM)228 Merging lie pertur- Merge lie perturbation bation theory and theory and DA and TM FP7-PEOPLE- Taylor Differential Universitad de techniques with the goal 230 036,60 230 036,60 2013-IEF algebra to address la Rioja, Spain of applying the resulting space debris chal- methodology to practical lenges (HOPT)229 problems in SSA 2014 Prediction of Geo- space Radiation Develop an accurate and H2020- Environment and University of 2 359 235 2 358 230,50 reliable forecast system PROTEC-2014 solar wind parame- Sheffield, UK for space weather ters (PROGRESS)230 High Energy Solar Produce two novel opera- Particle Events National Obser- H2020- tional forecasting tools foRecastIng and vatory of Ath- 1 208 956,25 1 101 456,25 PROTEC-2014 based upon proven con- Analysis ens, Greece cepts (UMASEP, REleASE) (HESPERIA)231 Develop an advanced Flare Likelihood flare prediction system H2020- And Region Erup- Academy of Ath- that is based on auto- 2 416 651,25 2 416 651,25 PROTEC-2014 tion Forecasting ens, Greece matically extracted physi- (FLARECAST)232 cal properties of the active region First European Aim to validate by testing H2020- System for Active and qualify for space a SMEINST-2- Debris Removal STAM SRL, Italy 1 730 000 1 211 000 scaled-up demonstrator 2014 with Nets of ADR1EN (ADR1EN)233 2015 Propose a universal post mission disposal module Technology for Self Airbus Defense H2020- to be carried into orbit by Removal of Space- and Space 2 840 490,75 2 840 490,75 PROTEC-2015 any S/C to ensure its craft (TeSeR)234 GMBH, Germany proper disposal after ending its service lifetime Provide a complete debris Revolutionary De- mitigation analysis of a sign of Spacecraft Consiglio Nazio- mission, using existing H2020- through Holistic In- nale della Ri- 3 230 295 3 230 294 debris evolution models PROTEC-2015 tegration of Future cerche, Italy and lessons learned from Technologies theoretical and experi- (ReDSHIFT)235 mental work 2016-2017 Develop a unique new Space Weather At- DEIMOS Space whole atmosphere model, H2020- mosphere Model Sociedad Limit- by extending and blend- COMPET- and Indices 1 198 363,75 1 198 363,75 ada Unipersonal, ing the Unified Model 2017 (SWAMI)236 Spain (UM), and the Drag Tem-

perature Model (DTM)

228 Project ID: 606716 229 Project ID: 627111 230 Project ID: 637302 231 Project ID: 637324 232 Project ID: 640216 233 Project ID: 666758 234 Project ID: 687295 235 Project ID: 687500 236 Project ID: 776287

ESPI Report 64 75 August 2018

A.5 Overview of European Actions in the Field of Space Security

The following table, based on the ESPI security in outer space matrix, provides a list of European actions and measures related to ‘Security in Outer Space’ organised by domain and field of action. The list is intended to be illustrative rather than comprehensive:

Field of action Capacity-building pro- Legal and regulatory re- Diplomacy and coopera- grammes gimes tion frameworks Develop and deploy opera- Establish a reference Harmonise and coordinate tional capacities to ensure framework to conduct space security efforts security in outer space space activities in compli- among stakeholders ance with space security requirements Space Situa- Examples: Examples: Examples: tional Aware- • ESA SSA programme • Compliance with space • SSA data sharing agree- ness (SSA) (SST, SWE and NEO objects registration obli- ments Monitor space en- components) gations and procedures vironment threats • EU FP7 and H2020 grants (research into space-weather events, security of space assets from in-orbit collisions) • EU SST Support Frame- work (sensor, processing and service delivery functions) • Member state SST systems development and upgrade Space Environ- Examples: Examples: Examples: ment Protection • ESA CleanSpace initia- • National space legisla- • ESA and national space and Preservation tive (EcoDesign, tion in European Member agencies contribution to (SEPP) CleanSat and eDeorbit States (e.g. end-of-life IADC and vote on space Keep the space components) obligations) debris mitigation guide- environment safe • ECSS standards – lines to operate Branch U (space sustain- • European Union proposal ability) for an International • EU FP7 and H2020 Code of Conduct for grants (research into se- Outer Space Activities cure and safe space en- • Contribution to vironment) UNCOPUOS and Confer- ence on Disarmament initiatives (LTS guidelines, PAROS, GGE, PORBOS) • Space debris mitigation

Security in Outer Space subdomain Space Outer in Security guidelines endorsement Space Infra- Examples: Examples: Examples: structure Secu- • EU FP7 and H2020 • European space pro- • Collision avoidance pro- rity (SIS) grants (research into re- gramme security rules cedures and coordina- Protect the space ducing the vulnerability and procedures (e.g. in- tion with foreign agen- infrastructure from of space assets, security dependent Security Ac- cies and operators threats of space assets from in- creditation, Galileo Se- orbit collisions) curity Monitoring Centre) • Development of technol- • Supply chain control ogies, standards and processes (e.g. ex- procedures by a range of port/import rules, test- stakeholders (ESA, na- ing procedures) tional space agencies, commercial operators, industry and non-space governmental actors)

ESPI Report 64 76 August 2018 Security in Outer Space: Rising Stakes for Europe

A.6 List of Interviewees

Name Organisation Asbeck, European External Action Service Former Principal Advisor for Space and Frank (EEAS) Security Policy Bobrinsky, European Space Agency (ESA) SSA Programme Manager Nicolas Braun, Ger- German Space Agency (DLR) Head of SSA Department ald Buenneke, U.S. Department of State Senior Space Policy Advisor Richard H. Delsaux, European Commission (EC) Deputy Director General at DG Internal Pierre Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs Dickinson, Space Data Association (SDA) Chairman Mark East, UK Space Agency (UKSA) UKSA Delegate to the EU SST Consortium Alastair Faucher, EU SST Consortium Chairman Pascal Gerard, GGE Report Space Policy Consultant Brachet Legai, Pas- European Union Satellite Centre Director cal (SatCen) Pasco, Xa- Fondation Pour la Recherche Straté- Director vier gique (FRS) Peldszus, German Space Agency (DLR) DLR Delegate to the EU SST Consortium Regina Pellegrino, United Nations Institute for Disarma- Research Fellow Massimo ment (UNIDIR) Portelli, Italian Space Agency (ASI) Dirigente Tecnologo Claudio Rivasseau, European External Action Service Director for Security and Space Policy Francois (EEAS) Robinson, Prague Security Studies Institute (PSSI) Space Security Programme Manager Jana Weissen- European GNSS Agency (GSA) Senior Advisor to the Executive Director berg, Paul

ESPI Report 64 77 August 2018

List of Acronyms

Acronym Explanation A ACCORD Alignment of Capability and Capacity for the Objective of Reducing Debris ADR Active Debris Removal AFFECTS Advanced Forecast For Ensuring Communications Through Space AFFECTS APT Advanced Persistent Threat ARMOR Advanced Radar for Meteorological and Operational Research ASI Agenzia Spaziale Italiana (Italian Space Agency) ATMOP Advanced Thermosphere Modelling for Orbit Prediction C CAMRa Chilbolton Advanced Meteorological Radar CD Conference on Disarmament CDAOA Commandement de la Défense Aérienne et des Opérations Aériennes CFPS Common Foreign & Security Policy CNES Centre Nationale D’Etudes Spatiales (French Space Agency) ComSpOC Commercial Space Operations Center UN COPUOS United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space COSPAR Committee on Space Research CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy CSMs Conjunction Summary Messages D DEW Direct Energy Weapons Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship, and DG GROW SMEs DLR Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt (German Space Agency) U.S. DoC United States Department of Commerce U.S, DoD United States Department of Defense E EC European Commission ECSS European Cooperation for Space Standardization EDA European Defence Agency EEAS European External Action Services EGNOS The European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service ESA European Space Agency

ESPI Report 64 78 August 2018 Security in Outer Space: Rising Stakes for Europe

Acronym Explanation EU European Union EU SST European Union support framework for Space Surveillance & Tracking F FAA Federal Aviation Administration G GDP Gross Domestic product GEO Geostationary Orbit GGE Group of Governmental Experts GRAVES Grand Réseau Adapté à la Veille Spatiale GSMC Galileo Security Monitoring Centre GTRA GNSS Threat Response Architecture GVA Gross Value Added H H2020 Horizon 2020 HEO Highly Eccentric Earth Orbit I IADC Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee ICoC International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities ICT Information and Communication Technologies ITU International Telecommunications Union JFSCC Joint Force Space Component JSpOC Joint Space Operations Center L LEO Low Earth Orbit M MEO Medium Earth Orbit MFF Multi-annual Financial Framework of the European Union N NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration NEO Near Earth Objects NFP No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space O OSCE Organization For Security and Co-operation P PAROS Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space PNT Positioning, Navigation and Timing PORBOS Promotion of initiatives such as the Principles of Responsible Behaviour for Outer Space PPWT Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects

ESPI Report 64 79 August 2018

Acronym Explanation PRS Public Regulated Service PSSI Prague Security Studies Institute QoS Quality of Service R RFI Radio Frequency Interferences RFW Radio Frequency Weapons RPO Rendez-vous and Proximity Operations S SAB Security Accreditation Board SatCen European Union Satellite Centre SDA Space Data Association SDC Space Data Centre SEPP Space Environment Protection and Preservation SES Société Européenne des Satellites SIS Space Infrastructure Security SPCS Space Control Squadron SPOC Système Probatoire d’Observation du Ciel SSA Space Situational Awareness SSN U.S. Space Surveillance Network SST Space Surveillance and Tracking STM Space Traffic Management SWAMI Space Weather Atmosphere Model and Indices SWIFF Space Weather Integrated Forecasting Framework T TAROT Télescope à Action Rapide pour les Objets Transitoires TCBMs Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities TeSeR Technology for Self Removal of Spacecraft TEU Treaty on European Union TIRA Tracking and Imaging Radar TLE Two-Line Element sets TT&C Telemetry, Tracking and Control U UKSA United Kingdom Space Agency ULS Up-Link Stations UNIDIR United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research UNOOSA United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs USSTRATCOM U.S. Strategic Command W WG-LTS Working Group on the Long-term Sustainability of Space Activities

ESPI Report 64 80 August 2018 Security in Outer Space: Rising Stakes for Europe

About ESPI

The European Space Policy Institute (ESPI) is ESPI fulfils its objectives through various mul- an association ruled by Austrian Law, based in tidisciplinary research activities leading to the Vienna, funded at its inception (2003) by the publication of books, reports, papers, articles, Austrian Space Agency and ESA, and now sup- executive briefs, proceedings and position pa- ported by 17 members that include European pers, and to the organisation of conferences national space agencies, the European Com- and events including the annual ESPI Autumn mission, and main European space services Conference. Located in the heart of Vienna, companies and manufacturers. the Institute has developed a privileged relationship with the United Nations Office for The Institute provides decision-makers with Outer Space Affairs and with a network of re- an informed view on mid-to-long-term issues searchers and experts in Europe and across relevant to Europe’s space activities. In this the globe. context, ESPI acts as an independent platform for developing positions and strategies. More information on ESPI is available on our website: www.espi.or.at

About the Authors

This report was prepared with contributions Publicly available data and information were from the following ESPI researchers: completed with stakeholders and expert inter- views. The list of interviewees is provided in (in alphabetical order) Annex to this report. - Sebastien Moranta, Coordinator of Stud- ESPI is grateful to the many stakeholders that ies accepted to be interviewed and provided sub- - Giulia Pavesi, Research Intern stantial information for this report. - Lisa Perrichon, Research Intern - Serge Plattard, Senior Resident Fellow - Martin Sarret, Research Fellow

ESPI Report 64 81 August 2018

Mission Statement of ESPI

The European Space Policy Institute (ESPI) provides decision-makers with an informed view on mid- to long-term issues relevant to Europe’s space activities. In this context, ESPI acts as an independent platform for developing positions and strategies.