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Key EU space programmes

By Susie Wright

v POSTbrief 37, June 2020 Introduction 4 Galileo 6 N Copernicus 15 EU Space Surveillance and h Tracking (EUSST) 23 2 Key EU space programmes post.parliament.uk Suggested Citation POST (Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology). 2020. POSTbrief 37, Key EU space programmes. UK Parliament

POST is an office of both Houses of Parliament, charged with providing independent and balanced analysis of policy issues that have a basis in science and technology. POSTbriefs are responsive policy briefings from the Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology. This POSTbrief is based on a literature review, interviews with external stakeholders and peer review. For further information on this subject, please contact the co-author, Dr Susie Wright. Layout and design Lef Apostolakis. Parliamentary Copyright 2020. Cover image by JAXA/ESA 4 Key EU space programmes post.parliament.uk

INTRODUCTION

The EU operates space programmes that provide services to European citizens and support European infrastructure. The outputs from these programmes enable Europeans to navigate during their travels, communicate with each other and monitor the and its climate.1 The UK space sector has made considerable contributions to the development and delivery of the EU’s space programmes over the past few decades.2 This POSTbrief discusses three of the key EU space programmes that have involved the UK:

Galileo

The EU’s global navigation system (GNSS).3 This is similar in principle to the USA’s global positioning system (GPS) and, once fully operational, will allow users on Earth to navigate and accurately measure their local time and position. Many Earth-based industries are reliant on GNSS information, from emergency services trying to minimise response time to banks time stamping financial transactions.4,5 Galileo is part of the European GNSS programme, which also supports the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay System (EGNOS). EGNOS is a satellite based augmentation system (SBAS) which increases the accuracy of GNSS systems (such as GPS and Galileo) over .6

Copernicus

The EU’s Earth observation programme7 consisting of numerous and ground based sensors that track and measure different features of Earth’s atmosphere, and oceans (see POSTnote 566). These data can be used for a range of applications, including monitoring the impacts of and coordinating the response to floods and forest fires.8

EU Space Surveillance and Tracking (EUSST)

The space surveillance and tracking system9 monitors in around the Earth. Space debris is man-made material left over from previous space missions and satellites (see POSTnote 355). EUSST monitors the risk of collision between active satellites and debris, as well as hazards posed by debris re-entering the Earth’s atmosphere.10 5 Key EU space programmes post.parliament.uk

These European programmes have provided UK-based companies and researchers with data, work contracts and funding. This has contributed to the UK space sector’s annual growth rate of 3.3% from 2014/15 to a total income of £14.8bn in 2016/17, accounting for 5.1% of the global space economy.11 The Government has expressed ambitions to grow the sector to 10% of the global space economy by 2030.12 The applications of satellite data are increasing in scope and are of increasing interest to UK industry, including a growing number of SMEs (small and medium sized enterprises).11 The Government has also expressed growing interest in the use of data from space programmes and, in 2014, established the Space for Smarter Government Programme (SSGP) to drive the uptake of space derived products across government departments.13,14

The UK has now left the EU and access to the EU space programmes will change following the transition period.15 The Government has published advice on how the three space programmes listed above will be affected from 1 January 2021.15 Potential impacts on the UK include:15–18 • UK companies and academics may lose access to some funding and the ability to bid for contracts offered by the EU. • UK access to certain data may be restricted, limiting the ability of UK industry and academia to develop products based on existing space data. • UK access to facilities and specialist skills could be restricted. • Introduction of trade tariffs could affect the UK space supply chain.

The impact on the individual programmes will depend on what is negotiated between the EU and the UK Government during the transition period.15 The Government has expressed interest in continued participation in Copernicus and continued access to the services of EGNOS and EUSST.19 The EU has said it is open to establishing a relationship that allows the UK access to, or participation in, some EU programmes, including space programmes.20 Currently, a number of countries, including the US and Australia, have data access agreements with Copernicus,21 and and Iceland are able to participate fully in the programme despite not being EU members.22 It is unlikely that UK involvement in Galileo will continue as the EU does not allow non-member states to be involved in developing security Queensland captured by the systems for the programme.20 The Copernicus Sentinel 2 mission UK Government has said it will Image: contains modified not pursue access to Galileo as Copernicus Sentinel data it is unwilling to rely on Galileo’s (2019), processed by ESA, CC security systems without being BY-SA 3.0 IGO 6 Key EU space programmes post.parliament.uk involved in their development.23 Instead, the Government is exploring options to build the UK’s own GNSS system and has provided £92m for initial feasibility studies.24

The UK will maintain access to parts of these programmes and some funding for the space sector through its membership of the (ESA).25 Membership of ESA is not linked with EU membership and thus the UK will continue to have access to ESA space programmes and funding regardless of what is negotiated with the EU. However, access to programmes that are co-funded by ESA and the EU, such as Copernicus, could become more limited.25 Both Norway and are existing examples of non-EU countries that hold ESA membership.25

The following sections of this POSTbrief provide a technical overview of each of the three space programmes listed above and the involvement of the UK in these programmes to date. The future of each of the programmes is discussed in the context of as well as in light of the impact of emerging technologies and requirements.

GALILEO

Galileo is the EU’s global navigation satellite system (GNSS),3 which provides users with an accurate measure of the time and their geographical location.26 It consists of a constellation of satellites and is a type of position, navigation and timing (PNT) system.4 GNSS has been described as ‘the invisible utility’,4,27 and a reliable and resilient GNSS signal is relied upon across many sectors, including areas of the critical national infrastructure (CNI, see Box 1). Many people in the UK use GNSS-derived services multiple times a day to check the time or navigate from A to B using their smartphones.28 In 2017, it was estimated that a 5-day disruption to GNSS would cost the UK £5.2bn.27

The Galileo programme was established by the EU to allow greater control over their access to GNSS.29 Currently, GPS (managed by the US and available since 1994) is used globally and other countries cannot influence decisions governing the availability of the signal. Galileo allows the EU more autonomy. Another benefit of operating a system in addition to GPS is that it improves the resilience of the GNSS service as there is a back-up available if one of the systems fails.4,30,31 System failure could occur for a number of reasons, including technical issues or a malicious attack.27 In July 2019, Galileo experienced an outage of 6 days due to technical issues.32 In January 2016, GPS was impacted by a technical problem that caused errors in its timing measurements.33 Once Galileo is fully operational it is expected that 7 Key EU space programmes post.parliament.uk individual devices will be able to use signals from a combination of GPS, Galileo and other services (Box 2).30,34

Since 2016, Galileo has been in its initial operational capability phase but it is expected to reach full operational capability in 2020.35 Once it is fully operational there will be an open signal for use by anyone, as well as a more secure signal for authorised users. There will also be a dedicated search and rescue service and a higher accuracy signal to complement the open signal.36

Funding for the Galileo programme is provided by the EU.37 The (EC) oversees the management of the programme on behalf of the EU.38 The EU delegates deployment, research and development aspects to ESA.38 Rules for contract procurement are decided by EC regulations.39

Box 1. Use of GNSS within critical national infrastructure GNSS is widely used across a number of sectors and underpins aspects of the critical national infrastructure (CNI).27 Examples of CNI relying on GNSS include: • Defence. GNSS is used across a range of defence applications including search and rescue in combat situations and directing drones.4 • Emergency services. The emergency services use GNSS to navigate as quickly as possible to an emergency.4 GNSS is also used to manage and schedule vehicles to enable faster response times.27 Furthermore, if a call to the emergency services is made from a mobile phone, GNSS data from the phone may be passed to the call centre to locate the caller more accurately.4,27 • Energy. Timing information from GNSS is used to find faults on the National Grid.27 Different parts of the National Grid must operate on the same synchronised time, ensuring supply and demand are matched so that power can be distributed reliably.40 Reliable time synchronisation across the grid is becoming increasingly important as the grid becomes more decentralised (POSTnote 587).41 • Finance. In the financial sector prices can fluctuate in time and the correct price must be charged at the time of a particular transaction. GNSS can provide timing down to an accuracy of billionths of a second. GNSS timing is also traceable, meaning it can be used for auditing.4 • Transport. Road, rail, marine and air transport use GNSS for navigation and additional services such as air traffic control and container tracking.4 It is also widely used in transport planning, for example by surveyors and in road tolling.42 8 Key EU space programmes post.parliament.uk

Box 2. GNSS around the world In addition to Galileo there are three operational, or almost operational, fully global GNSS systems across the world. • GPS: The American global positioning system became fully operational in 1994 with 24 operational satellites; it now has 31.43 It was initially a military project that gave civilian users access to an inferior service, but civilian access to the high quality signal was allowed from 2000.44 As well as the open signal there is a higher security signal (GPS M-code) for use by the military.45 • GLONASS: The Russian global navigation satellite system consists of 24 operational satellites and four spares.46 The system was completed in 1995 but subsequently fell into disrepair until funding recommenced and it reached full operational capabilities in 2011.27 It consists of a standard open signal (the standard positioning service) and a more accurate signal (the precise positioning service) for authorised users such as the military.47 GLONASS and GPS are complementary systems and their performances are similar.47 • BeiDou: The Chinese navigation system is still under development and is expected to be fully operational in 2020 with 30 satellites.48 BeiDou is designed to be compatible with the other GNSS systems.34 BeiDou has both an open and a restricted military signal, similar to the American and Russian systems.49 In 2018, more than 6 million Chinese vehicles were fitted with BeiDou compatible receivers.48

Technical overview

Galileo consists of three segments:

Space segment The space segment will consist of a constellation of 24 operational satellites (and six spares) orbiting the Earth at an altitude of 23,222km.50 The satellites carry atomic clocks to provide an accurate measure of time and their position can be calculated very accurately from their known orbital parameters.51 These time and position measurements are emitted as encoded signals. Receiver devices receive the signal from four different satellites and use this to triangulate their position (Box 3).4

Ground segment The consists of two control centres and a global network of ground stations. The two control centres are located in and .52 They control satellite operations and coordinate communication throughout the whole system. The ground stations collect and distribute monitoring data from the satellites. 9 Key EU space programmes post.parliament.uk

User segment The user segment consists of all receivers and devices that are compatible with Galileo signals.52

Box 3. How works

GNSS services use satellites to provide time and position measurements. The satellite’s position is calculated from its orbital path around the Earth and an onboard provides a very accurate time measurement. This time and position information is coded, broadcast and then received by devices, such as mobile phones, on Earth. The receiver compares the time the signal left the satellite with the current local time to find out how long the signal has travelled for. Using this travel time, and knowing that the signal travels from the satellite to the receiver at approximately the speed of light, the distance between the receiver and the satellite can be calculated. Using this method to calculate the distance to four different satellites, the receiver is able to triangulate its own position.

The Public Regulated System (PRS)

The public regulated system (PRS) is the encrypted signal provided by Galileo for use by government authorised bodies such as the military and the emergency services (see POSTbrief 19 for more details on encryption).53 The PRS signal is only available to the governments of EU member states and third countries who have negotiated an access agreement. Currently no third party access agreements exist but there are ongoing negotiations with Norway and the US.54 As well as being encrypted, the signal is delivered through two different frequency bands and it is more resilient to spoofing and jamming than the open signal (Box 4).55 However, PRS could still fail as a result of satellite or receiver malfunction, or problems with signal propagation. PRS is expected to reach full operational capability in 2020.32

Europe’s Galileo constellation Image: ESA-P. Carril 10 Key EU space programmes post.parliament.uk

Box 4. Threats to GNSS GNSS signals are typically transmitted with a power of about 50W from a satellite that is orbiting the Earth at a distance of approximately 23,222km. 56,57 This means the signal is very weak when it reaches the Earth. Detecting such a weak signal is challenging,4 and receivers can be vulnerable to interference in a number of different ways: • Jamming. On reaching Earth GNSS signals are weaker than background noise and must be identified amidst the noise by numerical algorithms. A receiver could become jammed and be unable to pick up a signal if the background noise within the same frequency band as the signal is too high. Jamming could occur accidentally, due to signals from other sources, or deliberately, as jamming devices can be used to transmit noise over the frequencies used by GNSS. It is a criminal offence to deliberately jam GPS in the UK without a licence, although owning a jamming device is not illegal.4,27,42 • Spoofing. The technical details of open GNSS signals are freely available to allow manufacturers to develop receivers. However, these details can be used to build devices, which transmit false signals that appear to be genuine and hence deceive the GNSS receiver, causing it to calculate the wrong time or position.4,42 • Meaconing. This is similar to spoofing but rather than the spurious signal being entirely artificial it is created by rebroadcasting a genuine signal. This causes a time delay and the receiver to record its position as the position of the device that is rebroadcasting. Meaconing can be accidental or deliberate.4 Anything that poses a threat to the satellite or receiver operation also represents a danger to the GNSS system. For example, space debris could damage a satellite, a receiver could malfunction or a cyberattack could disrupt communication with the satellite. The signal itself is also vulnerable as it travels from the satellite to the receiver. It could be disrupted by (POSTnote 361) or reflection off buildings.27,42

UK involvement in Galileo

UK industry and academia have been heavily involved in the development of the Galileo system.58 UK expertise lies within both upstream activities (building and developing the system itself) and downstream applications (developing applications and services derived from the space-based technology). Some examples of UK involvement in building the system include: • Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd (SSTL), in partnership with German company OHB System, have built 22 (the equipment and instruments which fulfil the satellite’s function) for the Galileo constellation to date and won a €140m contract to build eight more in 2017. 59 This work is due for completion in 2020.60 11 Key EU space programmes post.parliament.uk

• The largest supplier of security systems for Galileo is CGI UK who have procured contracts worth over €100m.61 They have been involved with designing encryption for the PRS and designing the ground segment. • Defence and Space in the UK were the prime contractor for the Ground Control Segment of Galileo until 2018.62 • QinetiQ have been involved with the development of receivers for the PRS system.63 • One of the Galileo Security Monitoring Centres was hosted by NATS (National Air Traffic Services) Swanwick near Southampton.64 In 2018 this was moved to in anticipation of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.65

Between 2000 and 2016 the UK contributed €1379m to the European GNSS budget.27 This accounts for approximately 12.5% of the upstream programme funding.27 UK industry has procured over 20% of all upstream Galileo contracts.27 In 2018, the Government estimated that the potential market for Galileo-derived applications and services could have a value of €6bn by 2025.39

The future of position, navigation and timing in the UK

A reliable source of PNT information is needed for critical national infrastructure,4 and emerging technologies are likely to increase our reliance on PNT in the future. For example, autonomous vehicles and drones must be able to navigate, the internet of things (IoT) requires location information, and the rollout of 5G mobile networks requires accurate timing and position information (POSTbrief 32).4,5 The following sections outline future PNT options for the UK, including a continued relationship with Galileo, a sovereign UK system and alternatives to GNSS.

The future relationship between the UK and Galileo After the transition period the Galileo open signal will continue to be freely available to all, including users in the UK.66 From January 1 2021, individuals and organisations in the UK with Galileo-enabled devices will not notice a difference in the service.15 However, by default, the PRS signal will not be available to users within the UK, and UK-based companies will not be able to bid for new contracts to work on any aspect of Galileo.15 The Government has suggested that exclusion of UK industry from Galileo could delay the programme by 3 years and increase the cost by €1bn.58

In their initial negotiating position, the EU suggested that the UK could negotiate access to the PRS signal. However, this agreement would not allow the UK to participate further in the development of the PRS system.20 The 12 Key EU space programmes post.parliament.uk

UK Government have declined to consider an agreement where they cannot have access to the technical details of PRS as this would not allow them to guarantee its reliability or resilience. In their approach to negotiations, the UK Government does not make any provisions for a future relationship with the Galileo programme.19 Instead, they have expressed interest in pursuing a sovereign GNSS programme.24

A sovereign UK system In the absence of a deal to maintain access to Galileo it has been proposed that the UK could build its own GNSS system. Some stakeholders consider this preferable to continuing to rely solely on the American GPS system, as was done in the past. This is because a sovereign system would allow the UK greater autonomy and improved resilience if used in combination with GPS.23 However, critics suggest that the cost of a sovereign system cannot be justified if GPS is able to provide a sufficient service.67 In their 2020 manifesto, UKspace, the trade body in the UK, recommended that the Government must secure participation in a GNSS programme, either through ESA or via a sovereign system, rather than relying solely on GPS in the future.68

The Government has already spent £92m on an initial 18-month feasibility study to look at the design and development of a UK system.24 In March 2020, the Financial Times reported that the publication of this study had been delayed by 6 months due to disagreements over the cost and scope of the project.69

In 2018, the Common’s Exiting the Committee was told that the estimated cost of building a sovereign GNSS system would be £3–5bn and would take 4–5 years.67 It is estimated that the EU and ESA will have spent over €13bn on Galileo over the 21 years from definition of the programme in 1999 to planned completion in 2020.70 A UK sovereign system is forecast to be cheaper and quicker to build because the UK has gained expertise from its involvement in Galileo.67 However, some stakeholders have pointed out that the current total annual budget for the UK space agency is only £370m71 and there would also be significant running costs for a sovereign GNSS system. The EC have estimated that the running costs for Galileo will be around €800m annually.70

Alternative PNT technology A 2018 report, commissioned by the Government Office for Science, suggested that the UK is heavily reliant on GNSS but users generally lack an awareness of this dependence, so sufficient contingency plans for potential GNSS failure often do not exist.4 Although the likelihood of a total failure is low, the impact could be significant.27 Satellite navigation is not the only available source of PNT information.4 Many stakeholders highlight the importance of involving a wide range of technologies in the future UK 13 Key EU space programmes post.parliament.uk strategy for PNT, rather than relying solely or predominantly on GNSS, to improve resilience.4,27,42,72–74 Emerging applications of PNT mean that these alternative technologies may become increasingly necessary in the future. For example, autonomous vehicles or drones will require a means of navigating if they are in an area with poor satellite coverage.74,75

Different alternatives to GNSS may be suitable for different applications.4 When used in combination, different types of PNT can offer improved accuracy and resilience. Examples of alternative PNT are given in Box 5. A limitation of some alternatives to GNSS is that currently only satellite-based PNT can offer global coverage.4

Box 5. Examples of alternative PNT infrastructure Examples of other infrastructure that can provide PNT include:

• National Timing Centre. The UK currently relies on a single source of Coordinated Universal Time (the national time scale, UTC(NPL)) which comes from a group of atomic clocks hosted by the National Physical Laboratory (NPL) in Teddington.76 In February 2020, the Government announced that they would be investing £36m in the world’s first National Timing Centre (NTC) programme.72 The programme will be led by NPL and will develop a geographically distributed national timing capability. This will consist of multiple secure sites hosting atomic clocks, as well as access points at key locations across the UK. Access points will be deployed from 2023.77 These sites will be connected in multiple ways, including fibre, ground-based signal broadcast and satellite communications, as appropriate.78 The NTC will offer accurate, traceable and resilient measures of time and frequency that are entirely independent of GNSS.72 • eLoran (Enhanced long-range navigation). eLoran uses signals from ground-based radio masts to provide PNT information. The working principle is similar to GNSS in that the receiver triangulates the position by receiving signals from three or more masts.79 However, eLoran signals are stronger than GNSS and therefore less vulnerable to threats such as jamming.4 From 2012 to 2015, the UK General Lighthouse Authority used a prototype eLoran system to measure positions to better than 10m at UK ports, and a number of transmitters were operational in other European countries, forming a network, before being decommissioned in 2015.80 A single operational eLoran station in Cumbria is still able to provide UTC traceable time at a standard similar to GPS.81 • Satellites in . Satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO), rather than the higher altitude used by GNSS, may be used to provide a navigation signal.82–84 The commercially owned Iridium constellation (originally built for communications and the only LEO constellation with global coverage) has offered a PNT service since 2016.85 By virtue of being closer to Earth, the signal from these satellites is stronger but their proximity also means a larger number of satellites is needed to provide coverage – the Iridium constellation consists of 66 satellites.82 A stronger signal would improve resilience but the trend towards large satellite constellations in LEO contributes to increasing space traffic and debris.86 These satellites share some vulnerabilities with GNSS such as space weather. 14 Key EU space programmes post.parliament.uk

EGNOS: A satellite-based augmentation system

Galileo is part of the European GNSS programme that is funded and managed by the EC.87 Also part of this programme is EGNOS (European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service), the European satellite-based augmentation service (SBAS), which improves the accuracy and integrity of the US GPS signal over Europe.6

EGNOS consists of a space-based section and a ground-based section.88 On the ground there are reference stations at fixed, known positions. These record the GPS signal and forward it to a computing facility where the GPS calculated position is compared with the known position of the reference station. This comparison is used to compute the error in the GPS signal.89 The error measurement is then broadcast to the three geostationary satellites that make up the space section. These receive the correction to the GPS signal and broadcast it to receivers within the area with SBAS coverage. The receivers apply the correction to their own time and position measurements so the user benefits from higher accuracy.26 EGNOS is a regional system for Europe rather than a global system such as GPS or Galileo. It does not improve the accuracy of GPS outside of Europe. Other countries around the world have developed GPS augmentation systems for their own regions.6

As for Galileo, the basic EGNOS signal is free and open for use by all.88 Since 2011, EGNOS has also operated a more accurate safety of life service.90 This was primarily designed to support civil aviation by providing more accurate vertical positioning for use by aircraft when landing. However, it can also be used in other transport sectors to ensure that the GPS signal quality does not degrade below a certain threshold.90 EGNOS does not provide a GNSS signal of its own and so cannot be used in the absence of the GPS signal.26

UK industry and academia played a major role in developing EGNOS. For example, CGI UK was involved in building the system that validates the integrity of the EGNOS signal,61 and NATS Swanwick hosts some of the ground infrastructure for EGNOS.64 The UK Government’s initial position for negotiating a future relationship with the EU advocates continued cooperation with Europe on EGNOS.19 In the draft Air Transport Agreement published by the UK in May 2020, which proposes an initial legal text for negotiations, it states that UK users of air traffic management services will have ‘fair and equal access’ to EGNOS. However, this draft has not been agreed with the EU at the time of writing.91 15 Key EU space programmes post.parliament.uk

COPERNICUS

Copernicus is the EU’s Earth observation (EO) programme. Satellites are used to measure a wide range of physical, chemical and biological parameters on the Earth’s surface and in the oceans and atmosphere.7 These data are used for many applications, from monitoring climate change to border security and agriculture (see Box 6 for more).8 The EU invested €4.3bn in Copernicus from 2014–202092 and the EC has proposed spending a further €5.8bn on the programme between 2021 and 2027.93 Parts of the programme are also funded by ESA.94 Within the UK, Copernicus data are used across Government (examples of departments include Defra, BEIS, MoD and DfID), extensively in academia and also widely across industry.95–97 Defra leads government policy on Copernicus while the UK Space Agency leads on space infrastructure.98 UK industry and academia have been heavily involved with development of the hardware and software used to deliver the programme.95

Box 6. Applications of Copernicus data Copernicus data are widely used across a range of applications.8 Some specific examples of applications with relevance to UK policy include: • Pandemic monitoring. Environmental data from Copernicus can be used to monitor environmental factors that favour disease spread in humans, livestock or crops. For vector-borne diseases, such as malaria or West Nile virus, satellite data can be used to improve forecasts of spread (see POSTnote 597).102 Once an epidemic has occurred, data from Copernicus can be used to help monitor and contain further spread within a region.103 • Flood monitoring and forecasting. Floods are the frequently occurring natural disaster in Europe.104 Copernicus data are used for flood prediction and for monitoring existing floods and response coordination. In 2019, 80% of flooding events in Europe were forecast and mapped by the Copernicus Emergency Management Service, including the floods around Fishlake in South Yorkshire in November 2019.8,105 • Air quality. The World Health Organization estimates that air pollution kills about 7m people every year (see POSTnote 458).106 In situ sensors provide good local measures of air pollution but the Copernicus Atmospheric Monitoring Service can provide regional measures. These can be incorporated into forecasting models and used to look at regional effects.103 Copernicus air quality data have been used to monitor pollution change in the UK and abroad as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.107 • Fishing regulation. Copernicus data contribute to maritime surveillance. Satellite images can be used to suspicious vessels or unauthorised fishing grounds. Estimates suggest that services derived from Copernicus data could increase the revenue of the European fishing industry by €3–5m by 2030.103 16 Key EU space programmes post.parliament.uk

Technical overview

Copernicus consists of three main parts: the space segment, the in situ component and service provision. For more general information on the science behind EO, see POSTnote 566.

Space segment Instruments making continuous measurements from space are carried on dedicated satellites called Sentinels.108 Each satellite carries one or more instruments designed to fulfil a set of mission objectives.109 The first Copernicus satellite, Sentinel 1A, was launched in 2014.110 There are currently three pairs of Sentinel satellites and one single satellite in orbit. One further pair and two new sets of instruments are currently under construction.110 Each Sentinel mission uses pairs of satellites to increase spatial coverage over the Earth’s surface.111 The single satellite currently in orbit is Sentinel-5P, a precursor to Sentinel 5, which is dedicated to measuring air pollution.112 The three missions that are currently operational (Sentinels 1, 2 and 3) collect radar data, image Earth’s surface and monitor land and water properties.113–115 The forthcoming missions (Sentinels 4, 5 and 6) will measure the composition of the atmosphere, air quality and sea levels.116–118 Sentinel 6 consists of a satellite pair but Sentinels 4 and 5 are sets of instruments that will be carried by European meteorological satellites.119,120

Data from the Sentinels are supplemented by data from contributing missions (such as satellites owned by the intergovernmental European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites [EUMETSAT] or private companies).121 The contributing missions provide complementary data. For example, they might fill gaps in the Sentinel data or provide higher resolution measurements over a particular area.110

The funding for the space segment is provided in two stages. The development stage, where the first pair of satellites (A and B) in each Sentinel mission are researched and built, is funded and managed by ESA. The second stage, where recurrent satellites (C, D, etc.) are built, is funded by the EU .122,123 The operation of the Sentinels is also funded by the EU Copernicus programme.

In situ component The in situ component makes localised measurements using instruments that are on the ground, in the sea or airborne. For example, ocean buoys, weather stations and soil samples may be used.124 As well as providing data in their own right, these measurements can be used to validate data from the space segment.125 17 Key EU space programmes post.parliament.uk

Service provision The Copernicus programme processes data to provide services to users within six themes – atmosphere, ocean, land, climate change, emergency management and security.126 For example, the emergency management service uses land surface temperature data to identify areas of wildfire.127 The development and building of the space and in situ components are carried out by upstream industries, whereas service provision is a downstream activity.8

Copernicus data infrastructure Sophisticated computing infrastructure is required to move, store and analyse the large volumes of data produced by the Sentinel satellites. General challenges associated with analysing large quantities of data were discussed in POSTnote 468.

Data collected by the satellites are downloaded to ground stations where it undergoes initial processing in near real-time.128 One of these ground stations is located in Harwell in Oxfordshire.129 The data are currently distributed from the ground stations by a dedicated network, which transfers it to mission performance centres (MPCs) and processing and archiving centres (PACs).129 MPCs are responsible for quality control and PACs store the data and perform non-time-critical data processing.40

The data can be accessed by users through four different hubs and five cloud-based services: • Open access hub. This hub offers full, free and open access to all registered users.130 There are no restrictions on who can register as a user, but a maximum of two datasets can be downloaded simultaneously to ensure bandwidth is shared fairly.21 The other hubs allow a maximum of ten simultaneous downloads.21 • Collaborative hub. This hub enables countries participating in Copernicus to download data and distribute it to their users. This generally makes data transfer more efficient, as a state can download all data to a national site where internal users can access it. As a participating state, the UK has had access to the collaborative hub.21 • International hub. This hub is open to states outside the Copernicus programme who have signed an agreement with the EC. These countries can use the hub to download data to their national centres for redistribution. Current users include the US and Australia.21 • Services hub. This hub provides access to EU institutions and providers of the Copernicus services.21 • Data and Information Access Services (DIAS). There are currently five DIAS platforms that provide cloud computing and storage for Copernicus data. These were established by the EC to standardise data access and are currently available to all users, including those outside the EU.131 Data processing tools can be developed and shared on the cloud platform, removing the need for users to download large quantities of data.8 In 18 Key EU space programmes post.parliament.uk

2018, closed its collaborative hub access in favour of access to data through DIAS.21

Data produced by the Copernicus programme are governed by a free and open data policy.130 This means that Sentinel and in situ data are free of charge at the point of access for anyone, including those outside of EU member states. However, non-member states without an agreement with the EC can only access data through the open access hub or DIAS, which may not offer sufficient performance for some applications.21 Furthermore, contributing mission data is not covered by the open data policy. Distribution of data from contributing missions is governed by licences agreed with the contributor which may not allow access by states outside the EU.132

UK involvement in Copernicus

The UK was a founding member of the Copernicus programme and has been involved in many different aspects of it, including building instruments for the Sentinel satellites. Involvement in upstream activities has included: • Sentinel 1: Astrium UK (now part of Airbus) built the central radar electronics for Sentinel 1.133 • Sentinel 2: UK companies contributed batteries and some imaging equipment to Sentinel 2.134 • Sentinel 3: RAL Space calibrated the device for measuring sea and land surface temperatures on board Sentinel 3,135 and a UK-based team at Airbus contributed a cooling system.136 • Sentinel 5P: UK was the prime contractor for Sentinel 5P.137 • Data infrastructure: The UK hosts the processing and archiving centre (PAC) for Sentinel 1 and 2 data in Newport.129 This facility is run by Airbus UK via an ESA contract. Algorithms for Sentinel 3 and Sentinel 5P have been provided by scientists in the National Centre for Earth Observation (NCEO) and other research bodies.138,139

UKspace has estimated that the UK has received about 20% of the total Copernicus budget for service provision during the funding period of 2014– 2020.122 The UK has made contributions to each of the six service themes, examples include: • Atmosphere. The atmosphere service is managed by the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF), which is based in Reading.140 The UK , academia and industry carry out data processing for the atmosphere service to produce products such as air quality forecasting apps for mobile phones.141 • Climate change. The climate change service is also managed by ECMWF. Since 2014, Copernicus has created 50 new UK-based jobs at ECMWF.122 Academia, industry and the Met Office are involved in 19 Key EU space programmes post.parliament.uk

developing climate change services, including seasonal weather forecasts.142 • Marine. The Met Office, industry and academia are involved in the marine service, producing datasets that can be used for planning marine renewable energy programmes or responding to oil spills amongst other things.143 • Land. The main product of the land service is mapping of land use and natural features for a range of applications, such as agriculture or ecosystem modelling.144 UK academia and industry played a role in the initial development of these services and academia continues to play a role in the operational service.122 • Emergency Management Service. UK industry provides mapping services for the preparedness and recovery parts of the emergency service.122 These maps are used to monitor and respond to events such as flooding and forest fires in Europe.105 • Security Service. UK industry led the development of part of the border security service.145

The UK hosts two national `mirror sites’ to support the dissemination of large quantities of Sentinel data to UK users.21 These mirror sites copy large quantities of Copernicus data via the collaborative hub and this is subsequently disseminated to UK users. This reduces traffic on the central Copernicus hubs and makes data access more efficient. One of the mirror sites is funded by the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) and operated by the NCEO at RAL Space in Oxfordshire and the intended audience is academic users.146 The other accesses data through Airbus in Farnborough, Hampshire and is principally intended for commercial users. It is managed by the Satellite Applications Catapult.147

The future of Earth observation for the UK

There is continuing uncertainty about the relationship the UK will have with Copernicus following the transition period.19 Some existing UK interests in the EO sector will be supported by continued membership of international bodies such as ESA and ECMWF.25,148 However, without an agreement with the EU, the UK could lose high performance data access and commercial opportunities.15 The following section considers the UK’s future requirements for Earth observation and how these might be met by Copernicus or other programmes.

UK requirements for Earth observation The Government updated their 10-year Earth observation strategy at the end of 2019 and expressed a vision of the UK becoming a world leader in new EO technologies within 10 years.96 To meet this goal, stakeholders agree that access to high quality Earth observation data is necessary, as is maintenance and development of EO expertise in the UK. UK expertise within 20 Key EU space programmes post.parliament.uk the space sector is developed by participating in missions and this can be done nationally or through international collaborations.11,95 Data access hinges not only on data production, but also the availability of infrastructure to store, process and disseminate the data.149 Building data infrastructure for the large quantities of data produced by EO is challenging.150 An increasing focus on policies to combat climate change and a need to mitigate the effects of climate change are likely to increase demand for EO derived products.8

The future of Copernicus The next EU funding period for Copernicus begins in 2021 and will last until 2027.110 Plans for developing the space component involve both an expansion of current capabilities through the addition of new Sentinels and an upgrade of Sentinels 1–6 to the next generation (such as replacing satellites A and B with satellites C and D).151 Deployment of the expansion satellites is expected to begin in 2025 and the first of the next generation Sentinels will be launched between 2030 and 2032.151 Contracts for the next generation will be procured through the EU and the first expansion satellites will be procured via an ESA process, on behalf of the EU.123

The expansion of the Sentinel family is centred on six high priority candidate missions. These include instruments that will measure the properties of sea ice,152 and carbon dioxide from human activities,153 both important parameters for understanding climate change. There is also a mission to measure land surface temperature, which will help to manage water supplies and monitor natural disasters such as fires and volcanic eruptions.154 In addition, there are missions designed to monitor soil moisture, soil types and vegetation that will support agriculture and biodiversity monitoring.155,156

It is likely that the Copernicus free, full and open data policy will remain in place for the foreseeable future.157 A study investigating potential alternative data policies for Copernicus after 2020 concluded that the free, full and open data policy was more beneficial than alternative options of restricting data access, charging for data access or limiting redistribution rights.150 This view is also supported by the European EO downstream industry,158 and Nitrogen dioxide the intergovernmental Group on concentrations over India Earth Observations.159 Data access Image: contains modified restrictions could be imposed on Copernicus Sentinel data the basis of legal requirements (2019-20), processed by ESA, for data protection, security CC BY-SA 3.0 IGO 21 Key EU space programmes post.parliament.uk requirements or technical challenges.150 Technical challenges could become an issue if demand for data exceeds the capacity of the data distribution infrastructure.150 The infrastructure has evolved significantly over the programme’s lifetime and will probably continue to do so, but demand is also likely to increase, as will volumes of data.110 The processing of the data is likely to benefit from the growth of advanced computing techniques, such as machine learning and cloud computing.160–163

The future relationship between the UK and Copernicus After the transition period, the UK will cease full participation in Copernicus by default (though it will maintain some access to the programme via membership of ESA and other non-EU organisations). This means that UK companies would not have access to contracts tendered by the EC.15 UK companies have been able to bid for the high priority candidate mission contracts as they are development stage contracts managed by ESA.122 However, if the UK wins any of these bids, they will not be able to continue working on the recurrent models or other EU funded aspects of the contracts without negotiating full access to the Copernicus programme as a third party.123 Industry stakeholders have expressed concerns about this, as the contracts for recurrent satellites involve effectively rebuilding an existing satellite. This provides better returns than researching and developing a completely novel technology.96,122 It may also be more difficult or unviable for UK industry to participate in ESA research and development contracts if the follow-on work has to be moved to an EU member state.123 The UK academic community may also lose the opportunity for scientific and technical leadership on these missions.15

If the UK leaves the Copernicus programme, access to some types of data and high bandwidth data access may be lost.15 Access to most Copernicus data would still be available because of the free and open data policy.130 The open access hub and DIAS could provide the infrastructure for UK users to access this data in the absence of an agreement between the UK and the EU. However, some stakeholders have expressed concerns that the performance of these systems may not meet UK demand and user requirements. They advocate government investment in national data facilities.21 The future of the UK-based mirror sites accessed through the collaborative hub and the UK-based processing and archiving centre is uncertain and will depend on what is negotiated by the EU and UK.21 It is still possible for the UK and the EU to come to an agreement that would allow the UK to participate in the programme to a greater degree than the default.19

In the Government’s outline of their approach to negotiations with the EU they state that they would consider a deal that allows the UK to participate as a third party in Copernicus.19 This would probably require the UK to provide a funding contribution to the programme. Iceland and Norway (both within the but not EU member states) provide funding for Copernicus and are able to fully participate in the programme in 22 Key EU space programmes post.parliament.uk return.22 The EC recommendation for opening negotiations with the UK does not explicitly mention Copernicus.20 However, it does express openness to allowing the UK to participate in, and contribute to, some EU programmes, including the space sector explicitly. UKspace has expressed a strong preference for the UK to negotiate sustained membership of the Copernicus programme.122 Copernicus data and development of Sentinel satellites and instruments is a significant part of the Earth observation sector in the UK.96 The sector is growing rapidly with an average annual growth rate of 25% from 2015–2017.95

An alternative to a deal securing full participation is that the UK may be able to contribute in-kind to Copernicus by investing in national EO capabilities and offering data from these to the EU programme as part of an exchange.122 A bilateral programme with another nation or taking the lead on an ESA programme could also be an alternative.95 Developing a national programme could help to maintain and grow EO expertise within the UK.164 However, it would take time to develop and deliver a new programme that could contribute to Copernicus.

Making an in-kind contribution would probably not allow the UK any influence in the governance or development of Copernicus.122 One particular issue with this is that Copernicus satellites can be programmed to prioritise specific geographic locations for data collection.165 If the UK was not involved in the programme’s governance, data collection in line with UK interests may not be prioritised.166 This could result in reduced data quality over the UK and dependent territories for applications such as emergency response and agriculture.122

The UK space industry favours a combination of these solutions: securing full participation in Copernicus, maximising the UK’s participation in ESA programmes and developing a national programme with opportunities for bilateral agreements with other nations.68

Other Earth observation programmes The UK is currently involved in several other Earth observation programmes.95 In general these programmes consist of a single satellite designed to make measurements of a specific feature of the Earth (see examples in Box 7). Therefore, their individual remit is much narrower than that of the Copernicus programme and this is reflected in smaller budgets, shorter operating timescales and more limited production of data. Due to the cost and substantial infrastructure of Copernicus, stakeholders agree that it would not be feasible for the UK to pursue a national replacement of Copernicus.

Alongside extensive involvement in ESA programmes (Box 7), the UK collaborates internationally on several other EO initiatives. The UK is a member of the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites (CEOS) which 23 Key EU space programmes post.parliament.uk coordinates international, civil EO programmes and encourages data sharing between programmes across the world.167 Since 2014, the UK and have had a bilateral agreement that has seen collaboration across a number of missions monitoring weather and climate.95

Box 7. Ongoing UK/ESA EO missions Much of the UK’s international work is in collaboration with ESA.95 Some examples of current and future research missions the UK is leading in collaboration with ESA are: • CryoSat. CryoSat is an ESA mission that was proposed and led by UK scientists at University College London.168 CryoSat was successfully launched in 2010 and continues operations at the time of writing.169 The mission aims to measure changes in ice sheet thickness and how this contributes to sea level rise. • TRUTHS. TRUTHS is a climate mission conceived by NPL, proposed by the UK Space Agency and recently accepted for implementation by ESA.170 TRUTHS will measure the energy balance of the Earth to high accuracy. These data can also be used for in-space calibration of measurements from other satellites (as opposed to comparing with in situ data).171 Climate change is driven by changes in Earth’s energy balance,172 and so an accurate measure of this enables better understanding of climate models and more informed policy decisions.95 • Aeolus. Aeolus is an ESA mission for which Airbus UK was the prime contractor.173 It carries an instrument that measures wind velocity through the atmosphere. These measurements are already being used by ECMWF in their forecasts and have been found to improve them.174 • Biomass. This is an ESA mission, led by a UK scientist at the University of Sheffield and NCEO, for which Airbus UK are the prime contractor. It is due for launch in 2022.95 The mission aims to measure changes in the biomass of the world’s forests over multiple yearly cycles. This will feed into understanding of carbon uptake by forests, land use change and deforestation.175

EU SPACE SURVEILLANCE AND TRACKING (EUSST)

EUSST is the EU’s programme for surveying and tracking man-made space debris in orbit around the Earth.9 A collision with a piece of space debris can be fatal for a satellite and thus space debris presents a danger to the infrastructure that relies on space, for example PNT, Earth observation and telecommunications (space debris was covered in POSTnote 355). The need for safeguarding these critical services from hazards in space was acknowledged by the National Space Security Policy in 2014,176 and the 24 Key EU space programmes post.parliament.uk

Strategic Defence and Security Review of 2015.177 Space debris can also present a danger to humans on the Earth’s surface as large pieces can re- enter the atmosphere and fall to the ground.178

The amount of space debris in orbit is increasing for a number of reasons: • Satellites are launched into space continuously. The number of objects being launched is increasing rapidly due to advances in technology which reduce cost as well as current trends towards the launch of satellite constellations.86,179 • The age of the existing satellite population is increasing. Satellites near or past the end of their working life that are not properly disposed of are more likely to break up and produce debris.180 • As space becomes more congested the risk of collisions becomes higher. A collision between working satellites or debris can produce further fragments of debris.180,181

By surveying and tracking potentially dangerous pieces of debris, satellite operators can be warned in advance of a potential collision so that they can reposition their satellite out of harm’s way.182 Currently, debris down to a size of about 10cm can be tracked but smaller fragments can also cause damage (see Box 8 for an example).10

The EUSST consortium was set up in 2014 by the UK and four other EU member states (France, Germany, Spain and Italy).183 In 2018, , and joined as members.10 EUSST has been partly operational since July 2016.10 The consortium aims to improve European SST capabilities by combining the SST capabilities of the participating states and centralising data cataloguing.184 The services of the programme are provided to all EU member states, not only those involved in the consortium.183

Box 8. Collision of Sentinel 1A with space debris On 23 August 2016 a sudden power reduction and a slight change in position of the satellite was measured onboard Sentinel 1A, one of the Copernicus programme satellites.185 Engineers at ESA assessed that the drop in power was probably caused by the collision of a particle, a few millimetres in size, with one of the satellite’s panels. This size of particle is too small to be tracked by radar and optical telescopes but can still cause damage, because they travel at very high speeds.186 The drop in power onboard the satellite was not large enough to significantly affect operations.185 25 Key EU space programmes post.parliament.uk

Technical overview

The EUSST programme uses ground-based sensors to collect data on space debris and active satellites.10 These data are then processed so that warnings and advice services can be provided to EU member states.

Data collection The data for EUSST are collected by radars, telescopes and laser ranging stations.10 Laser ranging measurements are taken by sending a laser pulse towards a satellite. This pulse is reflected back and the time the reflection takes to arrive is measured. Using the fact that the laser pulse travels at approximately the speed of light, this time interval can be used to calculate a distance, giving the satellite’s position up to millimetre precision. Laser ranging can be used to track objects orbiting at altitudes of 300km to 42,000km.187

Survey radars are used to keep watch of the sky for potentially hazardous debris. If a hazard is spotted, its orbit is tracked by radars, telescopes or laser ranging. Radars are useful for tracking fragments in low Earth orbit (less than 2000km altitude) because they allow continuous observations (optical telescopes on the ground are only useful at night), have high sensitivity and are less affected by atmospheric conditions.188 Optical telescopes are generally more useful for detecting objects in higher orbits as radars need to be very powerful to detect these far away objects. There are very few sufficiently powerful radars in existence, and they come at great expense.189

Most of the existing sensors are provided by member states and are often repurposed from other applications.10 For example, the UK contributes data from the Chilbolton radar in Oxfordshire to the project. This radar was originally designed for studying atmospheric physics.190 However, currently, most of the data for EUSST comes from the US SST programme rather than the European sensors.184

By measuring the position, speed and size of a debris fragment its orbital parameters can be calculated and used to predict where the debris will be in the Sentinel-1A impact near future. This calculation can Image: ESA 26 Key EU space programmes post.parliament.uk be challenging and hence there is often a large degree of uncertainty in forecasting the object’s trajectory.191 Data describing the trajectory of the debris and its properties are saved into the EUSST catalogue, managed by Germany,10 by each of the member states. This is regularly updated and when new objects are detected they are checked to see whether they are already in the catalogue or not. This process is called correlation.192

Service provision EUSST uses the data in the catalogue to provide three services to government, business and academia within EU member states:10 • Conjunction analysis: predicting whether a collision between and debris will occur. • Fragmentation analysis: monitoring the breakup of bodies in orbit and the trajectories of the resulting fragments. • Re-entry warnings: predicting the re-entry of objects into Earth’s atmosphere. Providing these services requires data from the sensors to be stored and processed. France and Spain lead on conjunction analysis and Italy manages fragmentation analysis and re-entry warnings.10

Programme management Funding for EUSST is provided by the EU as a series of rolling grants that typically last for 2–3 years.184 EUSST funding consists of two streams:193 • 1sst: this pays for operating the sensors and for data delivery and processing by national centres. • 2sst and 3sst: this pays for research into and development of new technology for the programme, for example upgrades to radars or telescopes.

The research and development grant is provided by the Horizon 2020 EU funding programme, which ends on 31st December 2020.193 Horizon 2020 projects based in the UK are unaffected by the transition period.194 1sst funding is provided by grants from the Copernicus and Galileo programmes.193 The Government has said that UK-based organisations will not be eligible to receive EUSST grants following the end of the transition period.15,19

UK involvement in EUSST

The UK has received, and continues to receive, funding from the EU for operational and R&D purposes relating to EUSST. The UK has contributed to the programme in a variety of ways including: 27 Key EU space programmes post.parliament.uk

• Contributing UK sensors10 • RAL Space have contributed the Chilbolton radar that is used for tracking. • The UK-owned Starbrook telescope on Cyprus is used for surveillance. • The NERC space geodesy (shape and area of the Earth) facility near Herstmonceux in Sussex contributes laser ranging.187 • Contributions to data analysis • Data sharing by the UK sensors is coordinated by the UK Space Operations Centre.184 • Research and development • Dstl is involved in a range of research topics including development of data processing algorithms and assessment of current and future sensor technologies.195,196 • Programme governance • As a member of the EUSST consortium the UK has had input into the decisions that govern the EUSST programme.10

Benefits to the UK from the programme include income for the space industry, and skills and technology development that can be exported to other SST programmes and SST services for UK-based satellite providers.

The future of SST for the UK

The environment of space, particularly in low Earth orbit, is becoming increasingly congested with satellites and space debris.180 Earth’s inhabitants are becoming increasingly reliant on satellite-based technology, from navigation to Earth observation to telecommunications.11 This section discusses the UK’s requirements for SST and how these may be met by EUSST or other programmes.

UK requirements for SST

The UK’s requirements for SST are evolving and a future SST strategy will need to meet these requirements. Considerations include: • Increasing amounts of space debris. The number of objects in orbit are increasing, both because of increasing numbers of launches and because existing objects are fragmenting through time and collisions.180 • Space as part of CNI. UK reliance on space for critical national infrastructure is increasing and so building satellite resilience against space debris is important.197 • UK . The UK has committed to building capabilities for launching their own spacecraft (Box 9).198 Launching spacecraft requires specialist SST known as launch collision avoidance (COLA) to ensure the craft makes it into orbit unscathed.199 The UN convention on international liability for damage caused by space objects states that the nation a 28 Key EU space programmes post.parliament.uk

launch occurs from has joint legal responsibility for any damage caused by the object along with the nation to whom the object belongs.200 Therefore, it is in the interest of the UK to have the capability to monitor and reduce the chances of collisions. • Active debris removal. As space debris becomes more numerous there is growing interest in methods to actively remove debris. This may involve developing the capability to lock a spacecraft on to a piece of debris. Safely managing this operation requires good SST.201 • UN and Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) guidelines. UN guidelines for the long-term sustainability of outer- space recommend that countries take measures to protect against the uncontrolled re-entry of their space objects, though this is not enforceable by law.202

Box 9. The UK spaceports In July 2019, the Government provided £31.5m for establishing Space Hub Sutherland in the Scottish highlands.71 This facility will allow spacecraft to be launched from the UK and aims for the first launch to take place in the early 2020s.203 An additional £2m was awarded at the same time to support the development of horizontal spaceports.71 A horizontal achieves launch by attaching a rocket to a plane. The plane takes off from the launch site and once it has reached a certain altitude the rocket detaches, ignites and launches into space.198 This saves on rocket fuel, as less energy is needed than if the rocket is launched from the ground, but it is only feasible for small, light rockets that the plane is able to carry.198 Prestwick Airport near Glasgow204 and Cornwall Airport205 have been proposed as suitable locations for these horizontal launch sites. For more information on UK spaceports see ‘When will UK spaceports be ready for lift-off?’.206

The future of EUSST The EUSST programme is not yet completed and so its final capabilities are not currently known. Research and development into more advanced sensors and improved service provision is ongoing. The longer the programme is operational, the more extensive the data catalogue will become. However, presently, there are no plans to expand the catalogue to debris sizes below the current threshold of around 10cm.10,184

In their outline of the UK’s approach to negotiations, the Government has suggested an interest in maintaining access to the EUSST service as a third party service user rather than continuing participation in the programme development and leadership.19 Currently, there is no precedent for third party participation in EUSST but cooperation with international partners to improve the is encouraged by the EU decision that established the EUSST consortium.183 As of the end of September 2019, EUSST was providing services to 106 users within EU member states.10 Registration of service users outside the EU is subject to approval by the EC.207 29 Key EU space programmes post.parliament.uk

Other programmes The UK is currently involved in several other SST programmes that will offer some provision of SST services even if access to EUSST ceases. Although a single nation can develop some independent SST capabilities, the need for many sensors that are geographically spread across the globe to monitor the entire sky means that, in general, international cooperation is required.208 SST data and facilities are often of military interest and may have national security implications so international cooperation can be a sensitive issue.209 Existing collaborations involving the UK include: • ESA programme. ESA runs its own space situational awareness (SSA) programme independently of EUSST.210 Following EU exit the UK would still be able to participate in this as an ESA member.25 The focus of the ESA programme is somewhat different to EUSST and it encompasses a wider range of hazards than just space debris.210 There is an emphasis on space weather (POSTnote 361). The UK’s space weather work is led by the Met Office.211 ESA’s space debris work is more focused on research into methods for space debris removal but there is some overlap with EUSST in developing SST capabilities.209 • US programmes. The US is currently a world leader in SST. Much of the data that contributes to the EUSST catalogue is provided by the US.184 The UK also has independent access to US data and services through existing data sharing agreements and the US Strategic Command SSA Sharing Programme.208 The US has recently developed a next-generation space surveillance radar programme known as ‘’.212 This is currently in an initial, trial, operational period and is expected to be able to detect space debris down to the 1cm scale.213 It is not yet publicly known exactly how much data from Space Fence will be shared internationally. • Five Eyes collaboration. The UK and its Five Eyes partners (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US) established the Combined Space Operations (CSpO) initiative in 2014.214 This involves coordinating the separate nations’ SSA efforts through existing intelligence agreements.208 Dstl is currently collaborating with Five Eyes allies on the ‘Phantom Echoes’ project that aims to demonstrate the benefits of integrating the SSA capabilities of the individual nations.215

Australian bushfires Image: contains modified Copernicus Sentinel data (2019), processed by ESA, CC BY-SA 3.0 IGO 30 Key EU space programmes post.parliament.uk

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