The Future of European
Flagship Programmes in Space
Report 53 November 2015
Marco Aliberti Arne Lahcen
Short title: ESPI Report 53 ISSN: 2218-0931 (print), 2076-6688 (online) Published in November 2015
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ESPI Report 53 2 November 2015 The Future of European Flagship Programmes in Space
Table of Contents
Executive Summary 4
1. Introduction 7
2. The EU and the Space Endeavour 9 2.1 The European Union: An Emerging Global Actor 9 2.1.1 What Kind of Actor? 9 2.1.2 From Coal to Space 11 2.2 The EU in Space: The Institutional Framework 12 2.2.1 A Complex Framework 13 2.2.2 First Steps: From the Joint Task Force to the European Space Policy 14 2.2.3 Toward a More Pro-Active EU Action: The Lisbon Treaty and the EC Communications. 16 2.3 The Current Flagship Programmes in Space 19 2.3.1 Galileo: Europe’s Independent Global Navigation Satellite System 19 2.3.2 Copernicus as an Operational Environmental Monitoring Programme 22
3. Copernicus and Galileo: Priorities for Operational Governance 24 3.1 Optimising the Benefits of the Current Generations 25 3.1.1 Copernicus 25 3.1.2 Galileo 29 3.1.3 Validating Benefits at the Policy Level 31 3.2 Creating an Innovative Ecosystem for Operational Services 32 3.2.1 The Components in an Innovation Ecosystem 32 3.2.2 The Flows in an Innovation Ecosystem 35
4. Towards a New EU Flagship Programme in Space? 38 4.1 Debating a New Flagship Programme 38 4.1.1 Flagship Constituencies 39 4.2 Identifying Potential Candidates: Space Exploration 40 4.2.1 Status of Europe’s Space Exploration Programme 40 4.2.2 Is there Added Value in EU Involvement? 43 4.3 Identifying Potential Candidates: The Launcher Option. 46 4.3.1 European Launchers: Past, Present and Future. 46 4.3.2 Is There Added Value in EU Involvement? 51 4.4 Identifying Potential Candidates: Space Security 54 4.4.1 Status of Europe’s Space Security Efforts 55 4.4.2 Is there Added Value in EU Involvement? 59 4.5 Assessment of the Future Flagship Options 61
5. Conclusions 64
List of Acronyms 66
About the Authors 69
ESPI Report 53 3 November 2015
Executive Summary
For over sixty years the European integration evaluated and coordinated continuously and project has been expanding and deepening that in some cases the possibility to under- immensely. From an original narrow – yet take further initiatives with regard to benefit historic – cooperation in the production of optimisation should be considered. More spe- coal and steel, EU policies and actions of to- cifically, it turns out to be the case especially day affect nearly all segments of the Euro- in the Copernicus programme, which is char- pean social, economic and political landscape. acterised by a degree of uncompensated de- At the moment, the European Union is in the centralisation in its various operational re- middle of asserting a stronger role in space. sponsibilities. It is doing so because its mandate and com- As a second step, the report assesses how petences have now become so broad that the two current flagship programmes can space activities and policies are crucial ele- play a central role in spurring innovation eco- ments in supporting and addressing them. An systems in their respective sectors. Here, it is additional motivation is the fact that strategic advocated that four essential components assets like space capabilities, would benefit should be addressed in terms of critical mass from validation at a high political level. Fur- and innovation flows. More specifically, inno- thermore, space provides the EU with a tool vation should be pursued in both the up- and to further the European integration project, downstream segments and, both by institu- increase its political weight vis-à-vis Euro- tional and private actors. In this respect it is pean Member States and assert its role as an demonstrated that Europe has already actor on the international stage. It is thus achieved a remarkable position in the grow- likely that EU involvement in space will con- ing markets of satellite navigation and Earth tinue to expand both within and beyond its Observation. Nonetheless, a number of issues current undertakings. and sub-optimised flows remain. The report The aim of this report is to assess how this shows how addressing them could result in expanding role in space could be enhanced more performant, competitive and innovative from a policy and governance perspective sectors that would in turn spur future sus- and to support the reflection process for the tainable growth in Europe. European Commission and other European EU ambitions in space are not solely ex- stakeholders in determining whether, in pressed by the current flagship programmes. which area, and in what way the will to in- Considerations are also made on how EU crease EC involvement in space activities involvement can be taken further in the fu- could be channelled. ture. However, before elaborating on the After demonstrating how the explicit choice possibility and opportunity for the EC to ex- for involvement in the fields of environmental tend its involvement in space matters beyond monitoring and global satellite navigation has Earth Observation and satellite navigation by to be understood over time, the focus is first means of a new flagship programme, another on the governance challenges and priorities more fundamental question should be raised, for the operational phases in the current Co- namely whether per se the flagship model pernicus and Galileo programmes. As provides the most appropriate framework for Europe’s new and autonomous all-round the conduct of the EC’s future space activi- Earth Observation and global navigation sat- ties. After all, the financial and administrative ellite systems will achieve full operational difficulties encountered over the years by status in the near future, it has to be assured both the Galileo and Copernicus programmes that the data and services provided by the have shed some doubt on the long-term suit- constellations can be reaped in an optimal ability and sustainability of current schemes fashion. Key elements in doing this for the and could therefore induce the Commission first generation of systems turn out to be the to prefer an alternative approach to space, different institutional support functions put in for instance, that of having a dedicated place and their structures. It is argued that budget item for space to be allocated to a although important steps have been taken for plethora of undertakings. It is, however, con- both programmes, this remains an ongoing cluded that in the short-term it is more likely effort for which many initiatives need to be
ESPI Report 53 4 November 2015 The Future of European Flagship Programmes in Space
that EU involvement in space will take the prolonged political commitment spanning form of new flagship programmes. over multiple decades. In order to outline in which area and to which • In the launcher domain, an active EU in- extent a new flagship programme by the EC volvement would be mainly justifiable could be channelled, the report set out gen- because the EU could critically comple- eral considerations on the criteria defining EU ment existing launcher capabilities in flagships and the underlying benefits ex- Europe. More precisely, it is argued that pected from their implementation and opera- the EU would be in a good position to tion. On the basis of this assessment, three pursue more radical innovation in the different candidates are identified as potential launcher market segments, innovation candidates for future EU space efforts, that is currently not addressed or re- namely: (1) space exploration, (2) access to searched with anything close to sufficient space and, (3) space for security. funds. This option would therefore mainly be justifiable through a combination of This particular selection is based on a number commercial and geopolitical drivers. The of considerations. For one thing, the three associated socioeconomic benefits might domains are among the most substantial be less pronounced compared to the ex- elements in the programme of any spacefar- ploration option. This mainly stems from ing nation, and thus constitute elements to- the fact that ESA has already achieved wards the possible creation of an EU-led an invaluable position in the sector. The “European Space Programme”, as explicitly EC involvement scenario for launchers contemplated by article 189 of the Lisbon does score significantly in that it would Treaty. Second, in the first two cases, they potentially give Europe a stronger, per- were already indicated by European Union haps cutting-edge advantage in terms of institutions as interesting areas for Europe in long term competiveness and innovation. which to take a leading role. Finally, in all The latter is especially relevant consider- three cases there is – to a certain extent at ing the many game-changing technolo- least – room for added value generated by gies in this global and rapidly evolving EU involvement that intergovernmental ap- field. In addition, EU involvement could proaches could not bring. For each of the allow Europe to leverage launchers in a candidates the context and rationales are more geopolitical fashion on the interna- discussed and, at the end, an overall com- tional stage thus providing a political parative assessment is provided based upon profile to this highly strategic field. a set of benefit indicators and feasibility con- Autonomous access to space is a strate- siderations. This resulted in the following gic good, and also, as such, well in line findings: with the defined role of the EU. The level • In space exploration the key rationale of financial commitment and operational behind Commission involvement lies in complexity associated with the imple- the need to embed space exploration in a mentation of this flagship candidate wider political perspective, thus comple- would all-in-all be manageable, albeit menting the science-driven and technol- with considerable risk of eventual failure ogy-focused approach so successfully – as with most investments in disruptive pursued by ESA over the past 40 years. innovation. In addition to providing the political di- • The space security option in this report mension that is required to fully capital- refers to the utilisation of space-based ise on the political benefits stemming systems to ensure security on Earth. The from exploration, the initiation of a flag- initiation of a flagship programme inte- ship initiative in this domain is justified grating Earth telecommunication, Earth by a right mixture of scientific, techno- Observation and navigation capabilities logical and socioeconomic reasons. More would respond to the need for pan- specifically, this scenario would allow the European space-based infrastructure in EU to invest and create spill-over effects support of the ongoing capability re- that create smart, sustainable and inclu- quirements of the Common Foreign and sive growth. In addition to this, the pres- Security policy of the Union. As an EU tige and soft power associated with hav- flagship programme, the socioeconomic ing an ambitious space exploration pro- benefits of the security option might per- gramme would enable the EU to reap a haps have a lower degree of visibility. variety of strategic and political benefits. Nonetheless, a solid security architecture Although this candidate would score well does, over the long term, generate de- in terms of political consensus as com- monstrable paybacks, especially consid- pared to the other scenarios, it is associ- ering that it would provide impetus to ated with high costs, a high degree of the European R&D communities and that operational complexity and requires a
ESPI Report 53 5 November 2015
it would bring about stronger cross- • What is however recommendable is to fertilisation among the currently fairly define a coherent and transparent stove-piped networks in the security do- mechanism to support the selection main. Moreover, from a strategic and po- process in an optimal manner. One pos- litical perspective a space security flag- sible path would be for the Space Advi- ship programme would complement a sory Group of the EC to establish a dedi- whole range of existing EU policy do- cated committee on future space flagship mains and make the EU more competent programmes. The specific feature of such in addressing its foreign policy actions. ‘flagship committee’ would be to com- Although the political feasibility of this pare and contrast a number of scenarios option is low, given member states’ re- and options rather than focusing on just luctance to integrate their defence poli- one domain as it was done in the past cies and programmes, a space security with regard to space exploration. As flagship programme could pave the way there are many valid arguments under- towards the creation of a truly integrated pinning the case for each candidate, do- pan-European security architecture, the ing so would allow decision makers to flagship programme serving as a trail- better weigh and familiarise themselves blazer. This in turn would be of para- with the different socio-economic, stra- mount importance for consolidating the tegic and political benefits involved in longstanding efforts of the European in- each option as well as the political, finan- tegration project. In other words, rather cial and operational effort required. than being considering unfeasible, it • It is also recommended that the work of might be regarded as an opportunity to such a flagships committee should be provide a first step in this historically dif- based on wide-scope hearings engaging ficult field. representatives of ESA, EU Member • While it is clear that each scenario has States, the EU Parliament, the EEAS, and very particular characteristics that entail industry. One of the major advantages of different pros and cons, selecting one an open approach is that it would identify candidate over another eventually comes how the relevant stakeholders assess down to the relative weight decision- each given option, as well as prepare the makers will attribute to the different so- distribution of tasks and responsibilities cioeconomic, strategic and political bene- of the different actors throughout the fits as well as the challenges related to implementation process. Such a broad EC involvement for each scenario in participatory approach could be also ex- terms of political, financial and opera- tended to engage the public as an active tional feasibility. In this sense, the com- stakeholder. This would have the addi- parative assessment included in this re- tional advantage of creating a strong link port does not aspire to provide a conclu- with society even before the conception sive answer regarding the best area for of a programme, thereby increasing out- further EU involvement as any specific reach, awareness and societal support selection can only play out in actual po- litical discourse.
ESPI Report 53 6 November 2015 The Future of European Flagship Programmes in Space
1. Introduction
Over the last decades the socioeconomic and icy and governance perspective, the overall strategic importance of space for society has situation with regard to the two current flag- increased considerably. The EU flagship pro- ship programmes. grammes in space in the areas of Global In the second instance, the scope of the re- Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) and port will be opened up to the future. Since Earth Observation (EO) – called Galileo and the growing importance of space for society Copernicus, respectively – mark a major can be expected to continue, and considering milestone in this evolution. In fact, they will that the EU might eventually decide that a significantly increase the strategic and socio- more extended role in space affairs is neces- economic value of space for Europe once sary to pursue its objectives, the question is their operational capacities are up to speed – whether and how future EU flagship pro- a feature that will materialise in the next few grammes in space should be conceived. years. Although there have been some issues and delays during their establishment – To perform the analyses and assessments which is not uncommon for projects of this required to address the two main objectives order of magnitude – it is fair to say that identified above, this report will follow the overall capacity development is now proceed- structure of a typical lifecycle curve of large ing at a steady pace. infrastructure projects such as Galileo and Copernicus. This is illustrated in figure 1 be- Yet, large-scale programmes such as Galileo low, in which the green curve represents the and Copernicus are complex in every phase efforts related to the implementation of the of their life cycle, from their conception to two programmes as a function of time. The operations, and every specific phase is asso- different life cycle phases are separated by ciated with particular challenges. A first ob- vertical dotted lines. jective of this report is to assess, from a pol-
Figure 1: The Lifecycle Phases and Related Efforts of the Space Flagship Programmes as a Function of Time.1
1 Authors’ own visualisation based upon the typical development of large programmes.
ESPI Report 53 7 November 2015
Since both programmes have witnessed a sponding to the dotted green line. This im- very similar development in terms of timing, plies that socioeconomic benefits are maxi- they can, for simplicity’s sake, be repre- mised, but also that both programmes are sented by the same curve. The conception governed in such a way that their strategic phase of Galileo and Copernicus occurred importance can be valorised sufficiently given throughout the second half of the 1990s, the current institutional framework. An im- when ideas for EU involvement in GNSS and portant element in this respect is the link to operational EO were growing, were fine- be made between the first generation of op- tuned and started having a political dimen- erational satellites and the definition of re- sion. Roughly at the turn of the millennium, quirements for the second generations. These the ideas for both flagship programmes questions will be addressed in Chapter 3. turned into more concrete plans, in which the Second, given the increasing strategic and scope and missions of the constellations were socioeconomic value of space for Europe and defined, and assessments done of the associ- the fact that the EU’s mandate is more com- ated budgets and expected socioeconomic prehensive than ever, can future flagship benefits. Between 2005 and 2010, both pro- programmes in space fulfil other needs – grammes witnessed the beginning of their besides GNSS and operational wide-scope implementation, as the first instruments and EO? In which cases would this be relevant satellites were built, integrated and tested. and, how can potential candidates be evalu- After 2010, the first satellites for both con- ated? Given that establishing a flagship pro- stellations were launched into orbit. gramme in space is a rather costly and Following a general introduction on the role lengthy process, especially if one takes into of the EU and its expanding mandate in outer account the complexity of the European insti- space affairs, Chapter 2 describes the historic tutional landscape, it is important to stimu- aspects of the current flagship programmes. late the idea forming process in that direction Understanding their particular history is in- in a timely manner. This is visualised by the strumental in understanding how the situa- new project lifecycle curve in red. The associ- tion might, or not, be similar in the future ated questions will be addressed in Chapter when other scenarios are on the table. More- 4, where the potential for a new flagship pro- over, the path-dependency in these two large gramme will be discussed and three potential programmes is important for understanding fields for EU involvement will be identified the challenges of the present and the future. and assessed, namely in the fields of: (1) Space Exploration, (2) Launchers and, (3) Regarding the future situation of EU space Space Security. flagship programmes, Europe – and the EC in particular – is currently confronted with two Finally, Chapter 5 puts forward the main con- main questions. clusions and recommendations of this report and proposes a way forward as to how the First, how can it be assured that the opera- decision-makers could take the relevant steps tional phases of the current flagship pro- in establishing a reflection process on future grammes are managed so that the objectives EU involvement in outer space through flag- formulated at their inception will materialise ship programmes. to the fullest extent possible? This relates to the operational phases of Galileo and Coper- nicus and can be situated in the area corre-
ESPI Report 53 8 November 2015 The Future of European Flagship Programmes in Space
2. The EU and the Space Endeavour
This scene-setting chapter sets out consid- coming together and pooling the valuable erations on the European Union’s (EU) in- resources and intellectual capital already volvement in space activities. It first presents possessed by its constituent states, Europe a concise overview of the EU integration could regain some of the power to shape process, which is used as a basis to discuss global dynamics that it had exercised for the progressive development of the European much of modern history.3 Commission (EC) competence in space mat- Premised on this political vision, European ters. The legal and political framework for EU countries decided to set up common institu- policy action in space is subsequently de- tions to which they gradually entrusted por- scribed and its main programmatic initiatives tions of their sovereignty and delegated the are discussed. role to implement common policies in a num- ber of areas. After more than 50 years of economic and political coopera- 2.1 The European Union: An tion/integration, not only has the idea of an intra-European armed conflict has become Emerging Global Actor virtually unthinkable, but Europe has – in spite of all its continuous difficulties and chal- The establishment of the European Union, an lenges – been emerging as a collective whole economic and political entity currently com- on the international scene. posed of twenty-eight member states, is the latest successful result of a lengthy and com- plex project of integration initiated more than 2.1.1 What Kind of Actor? half a century ago with the creation of a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Although the existence of a European actor- Although its origins were modest, from its ness has been widely acknowledged, it is also inception the European integration project clear that Europe is not a nation-state in a has been of groundbreaking geopolitical in- Westphalian sense, nor has a polity emerged from a single, authoritative source like in tent. In the words of Jean Monnet in 1953, 4 one of the founding fathers of the European other countries. It is a unicum on the inter- project: “we can never sufficiently emphasise national stage and, in a sense, “a renuncia- that the six Community countries are the tion of the Westphalian system […] that it had created, spread across the world and forerunners of a broader Europe, whose 5 bounds are set only by those who have not defended over the past three centuries”. yet joined. Our Community is not a coal and steel producers’ association; it is the begin- 3 2 For a detailed analysis on this interpretation, see: Kup- ning of Europe”. chan, Charles A. The end of the American Era. U.S. For- eign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century. While the immediate logic behind the en- Vintage Book. New York. 2002: 65 hancement of economic, political and social 4 According to the definition of William Wallace, the EU can cooperation among European states was to be regarded as a “partial, multi-layered polity”, that is a create a de facto solidarity that would make “political entity which lacks, however, many of the features war between France and Germany “materially that one might expect to find in a traditional state”. See: impossible”, the political evolution of Europe Wallace, William. “Post-Sovereign governance: the EU as a partial polity”. In Horace Wallace et al. Policy Making in was also perceived as essential for Europeans the European Union. Oxford University Press, Oxford: 483 to be able to act effectively in the interna- -503 tional arena. The Cold War, after all, was 5 Cit. Kissinger, Henry. World Order. Penguin Press. New making it clear that only continental struc- York. 2014. As Kissinger notes, Europe represents in tures like the U.S. and USSR had the ability some sense a renunciation of Westphalia, or alternatively, its transformation into a new international system based on to design the global order. Taken individually, regional, not national, units. “The outcome has combined France, Germany and the UK clearly lacked aspects of both national and regional approaches without, sufficient critical mass to deal on a peer-to- as yet, securing the full benefits of either. The EU dimin- peer basis with the two juggernauts. But by ishes its Member States ‘sovereignty and traditional gov- ernment functions, such as control of their currency and borders. On the other hand, European politics remains 2 Cit. Monnet, Jean. Memoirs. Doubleday & Company. primarily national, and in many countries, objections to the New York. 1978: 378 EU policies have become the central domestic issue. The
ESPI Report 53 9 November 2015
Many debates and much analysis have been amounted to the equivalent of €81.3 million8, produced through the years in the attempt to while for the year 2014 the EU has an agreed understand what particular kind of actor the budget of €134.3 billion and of €959.9 billion EU is. As correctly pointed out by Christopher for the 2014-2020 period.9 This amount still Hill and Michael Smith: represents little more than the 1.0% of the EU’s Gross National Income (GNI) for the » “Empirically the EU can be seen as one of considered period. Its growth, however, is a the world’s two economic ‘superpowers’, good indication of the Union’s enhanced pol- and an increasingly significant influence icy responsibilities as well as of its continuing in the realms of international diplomacy, process of enlargement from the original 6 ‘soft security’, and broader world order. 10 Analytically, the Union poses major chal- founding states to the current 28 members. lenges by virtue of its status as some- In short, the EU’s budget has gradually be- thing more than an intergovernmental come a symbol of growing unity among an organisation but less than a fully-fledged increasing number of countries wishing to European ‘state’.”6 create a union that would go far beyond the tasks of a traditional international organisa- The EU, indeed, is not a federal state with a tion.11 strong central government, and it might never become one. But even if it remains an It is thus interesting to see that in some ar- institutional hybrid, this fact should neither eas EU member states have completely re- overshadow the complexities behind the re- nounced any capacity to legislate, while still alisation of such an unprecedented geopoliti- retaining all powers not explicitly handed to cal engineering project, nor the invaluable the Union. The former are areas in which the achievements it has so far accomplished. EU enjoys so-called exclusive competence. In After all, it was clear from the beginning that other areas the EU and its member states “Europe will not be made at once, or accord- continue to share the competence to enact ing to a single plan”, as Robert Schuman legislation. While both can legislate in shared stressed in the well-known declaration of 9 competence situations, normally member May 1950.7 With modest origins, the EU has states can only legislate to the extent to come a long way in terms of continuous re- which the EU has not. Finally, in yet other forms that have progressively europeanised policy areas the EU can only co-ordinate, traditional government functions, such as support and supplement Member-State ac- control of trade tariffs, borders and currency. tions but cannot enact legislation with the As member states have accepted to delegate aim of harmonising national laws. The distri- to the EU increasing portions of what was bution of competences in various policy areas once part of their sovereign authority, the between member states and the Union is Union’s governing bodies in Brussels, Stras- thus divided in the following three categories: bourg and Luxemburg have progressively seen their resources and authority increase. In terms of resources, it suffices to note that back in 1958 the Community expenditure
result is a hybrid, constitutionally something between a state and a confederation, operating through ministerial meetings and a common bureaucracy… Yet, the EU struggles to resolve its internal tensions in the quest for the principles and goals by which it is guided. In the process, it pursues monetary union side by side with fiscal dispersion 8 See: Spence, James. “A high price to pay? Britain and and bureaucracy at odds with democracy. In foreign policy the European budget”. International Affairs 88. No 6. 2012: it embraces universal ideals without the mean to enforce 1238 them, and a cosmopolitan identity in contention with na- 9 For more information on the EU budget see: European tional loyalties – with European unity accompanied by Commission. 5 Feb. 2014 “The Multiannual Financial east-west and north-south divides and an ecumenical Framework explained”. 20 Nov. 2014. Web. attitude toward autonomy movements (Catalan, Bavarian, http://ec.europa.eu/budget/mff/introduction/index_en.cfm Scot) challenging the integrity of States”. In short, the EU 10 While in 1958 more than 85 per cent of the Community can be seen as a hybrid of contending aspirations and expenditure was on the Coal and Steel Community, in contradictory trends. Ibid: 92-93 2014 the EU budget is split in the management of policies 6 Cit. Hill Christopher and Michael Smith. International and programmes in over 30 areas, ranging from Agricul- Relations and the European Union. Oxford University ture to Energy, to Human Rights, Transport and External Press: Oxford. 2005: 4. Relations. Space research and applications are catego- 7 Declaration of 9th May 1950 delivered by Robert Schu- rised as part of the Research and Innovation policy. man. Foundation Robert Schuman. Web. 11 See: Spence, James. “A high price to pay? Britain and http://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/doc/questions-d- the European budget”. International Affairs 88. No 6. 2012: europe/qe-204-en.pdf 1239
ESPI Report 53 10 November 2015 The Future of European Flagship Programmes in Space
Exclusive Com- Supporting Shared Competence petence Competence “The Union has “Member States “Union exercise of “The Union coor- “The Union can exclusive compe- cannot exercise competence shall dinates Member carry out actions tence to make competence in not result in Mem- States policies or to support, coor- directives and areas where the ber States being implements sup- dinate or supple- conclude interna- Union has done prevented from plemental to theirs ment Member tional agreements so.” exercising theirs in common policies, States’ actions in when provided for …” not covered else- …” in a Union legisla- where” tive act.” • Customs union • The internal • Research, • Coordination of • The protection • Establishing market technological economic, em- and improve- competition • Social policy, development ployment and ment of human rules necessary for the aspects and outer social policies health for the func- defined in this space • Common for- • Industry tioning of the Treaty • Development eign, security • Culture internal market • Economic, so- cooperation, and defence • Tourism • Monetary policy cial and territo- humanitarian policies • Education, for Eurozone rial cohesion aid. youth, sport Member States • Agriculture and and vocational • Conservation of fisheries, ex- training marine biologi- cluding the • Civil protection cal resources conservation of (disaster pro- under the com- marine biologi- tection) mon fisheries cal resources • Administrative policy • Environment cooperation • Common com- • Consumer pro- mercial policy tection • Conclusion of • Transport certain interna- • Trans- tional agree- European net- ments works • Energy • The area of freedom, secu- rity and justice • Common safety concerns in public health matters, for the aspects defined in the Treaty.
Table 1: EU Competences as Outlined in Title I of Part I of the Consolidated Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).12
ened tremendously.13 From an initial narrow concern with the removal of barriers for coal 2.1.2 From Coal to Space and steel production and trading, the Com- In the progression from the European Coal mission’s policy responsibilities later ex- and Steel Community, to the European Eco- panded to manage the creation of a common nomic Community, to the European Union, market for the trade in goods among the six the policy areas in which the European Com- founding states. With the signing of the Eura- mission (EC) – as the executive arm of the tom and Rome Treaties in 1957, the collabo- EU – has extended its mandate have broad- rative development of commercial nuclear
13 Originating in 1951 as the High Authority in the Euro- 12 Table based upon: Consolidated Version of the Treaty pean Coal and Steel Community, the Commission has on the Functioning of the European Union, Official Journal undergone numerous changes in power and composition of the European Union: OJ C 326. 26 October 2012: 47– under various presidents, and involving three Communi- 390. ties.
ESPI Report 53 11 November 2015
power – which however never worked out – tivities deemed necessary by virtue of other and the creation of a common market that chapters of this treaty”.16 would eliminate internal tariffs and establish In acquiring the powers to take the lead in a common external tariff were launched. RTD policies to support other policy areas of During the 1960s, European institutions the Commission’s mandate, the way for EU worked to consolidate this common market involvement in space issues was eventually by acquiring a broader range of economic paved. competences and policy responsibilities. The newly introduced agricultural policy soon became a key focus of the Commission’s ac- tivities, as demonstrated by the agriculture 2.2 The EU in Space: The In- share of all Community expenditure, which stitutional Framework rose from 8.5 percent in 1965 to 86.9 per- cent in 1970, in figures from €28 million to Although EU involvement in space affairs 14 €3 billion. The next step came in the early formally started as early as 1970 with its 1970s, with the inclusion of social and mone- participation as an observer at the European tary policies within the spectrum of the Space Conference (ESC), it was not until the Commission’s competences. As early as late 1980s that the EU fully realised the rele- 1972, an Exchange Rate Mechanism was vance of space technologies and applications introduced, paving the way for the successive to support its policy actions in a number of establishment of the European Monetary Sys- other areas determined at European level. tem and for the eventual introduction of the Euro. Environment, energy, transport and In its first “space communication” of July external policy issues followed closely. 1988, The European Community and Space: A Coherent Approach, the Commission recog- By the mid-1980s, Science and Technology nised that space was an area with leverage (S&T) policy would also become subject to potential in social, economic and political the Commission’s competence. As noted by projects and EC involvement was deemed Nicolas Peter, although cooperation in the necessary.17 At least initially, however, space field of S&T “was part of the integration was not considered a subject matter for a agenda from the very beginnings of the European policy in its own right, but recog- European project, […] research programmes nised as a tool for reaching multiple policy were implemented on an ad hoc non- objectives, in areas such as agriculture, envi- 15 systematic basis”, and no explicit EC S&T ronment, energy, foreign and security policy, policy was formulated for a long time. A legal information society, research and innovation, basis for an explicit S&T policy at EC level transport, etc. was only sanctioned with the Single European Act (SEA) of 1987, which added a new “Re- The subsequent 1992 Communication, The search and Technological Development” title European Community and Space: Challenges, to the 1957 Rome Treaty, conferring the Opportunities and New Actions, clearly urged competence upon the EC to develop and im- the Union to develop a comprehensive space plement its own set of S&T strategies. The policy to better seize the precious opportuni- Framework Programmes has since become ties offered by the development of space 18 the major instrument to support and foster technologies and applications. The release Research and Technological Development of this second space communication led the (RTD) in Europe. Although the budget spent Commission to set up a Space Advisory within the FP has grown significantly over the Group (SAG) in 1992 to facilitate inter Direc- past 30 years, it should be noted that it is torate-General (DG) discussions and formu- still is much smaller than the resources spent late a coherent space policy for the Commis- on R&D on member state level. The RTD sion. competence of the EC was further strength- In the EC’s third space communication of ened with the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992, 1996, The European Union and Space: Fos- clearly stating in its provisions that EC com- petence now applied to “all the research ac- 16 See: Treaty on European Union. Official Journal of the European Communities No. C 224, 1992, Item 1 – Docu- ment 1/4 (1992/C 224/01-1). 17 European Commission. The European Community and 14 The agricultural policy was set out at the Stresa Confer- Space: A Coherent Approach. July 1988. ence of 1958 and implemented in 1962, financed through 18 European Commission. The European Union and the EC budget and confirmed by the Merger Treaty of Space: Fostering Applications, Markets and Industrial 1965. See: Spence, James. “A high price to pay? Britain Competitiveness. See Smith, Lesley Jane, and Kay-Uwe and the European budget”. International Affairs 88. No 6. Hörl. “Constructing the European Space Policy: Past, 2012: 1239 Present and Future. Commerce in Space: Infrastructures, 15 Cit. Peter, Nicolas. “The EU’s Emergent Space Diplo- Technologies, and Applications. Phillip Olla. Hershey: macy” Space Policy 23. Issue 2. May 2007: 98 Information Science Reference. 2008: 12.
ESPI Report 53 12 November 2015 The Future of European Flagship Programmes in Space
tering Applications, Markets and Industrial diversity of national policy interests and mo- Competitiveness, the willingness to become tivations. Since its creation in 1975 through an active player in the space arena became the merger of ELDO and ESRO, the European even more marked. The document high- Space Agency (ESA) had been entrusted with lighted that the EU should use its competence the role of coordinating and implementing ‘‘in terms of external trade, internal market European policies and programmes in the and international cooperation to cover hori- space sector. With the exception of autono- zontal aspects such as ensuring a vigorous mous human spaceflight, ESA has been suc- presence in space launch services, in the cessful in providing for the whole spectrum of standardization of space components, and in space assets Europe needed. establishing cooperative activities with for- Therefore, when the EU decided to develop eign nations”.19 It should also be noted that its space activities, it did so as a new actor in with this third space communication, the the European space field, although the activi- awareness about the strategic significance of ties of the EU in the space field did not start space activities for the construction of Europe from scratch – they were built upon existing and its cohesion became more apparent. technological and industrial capabilities. The With the Treaty of Nice (2001), the EU’s com- governance of the space sector has nonethe- petence over space matters was finally intro- less become more complex. In fact, while for duced. Although the Treaty does not mention a long time the institutional framework was space policies and programmes, its provisions essentially based on two pillars – a national provide a first formal legal basis for space- pillar and ESA – since the EU’s decision to based relevant technologies to be used in the position itself as an effective actor in Euro- implementation of existing EU policies. The pean space activities, the space governance following Constitutional Treaty (2004), for the diarchy has turned into an “institutional tri- first time, made an explicit reference to angle”, simultaneously comprising national, space. Article 1-14, in particular, confers on intergovernmental and communitarian ap- the EU the competence to define and imple- proaches. ment space programmes, as long as the ex- Each player in this structure has its own com- ercise of that competence does not result in petences and interests. While member states member states being prevented from exercis- or national space agencies mainly coordinate ing theirs. space activities at national level without a Notwithstanding the missing ratification of European scope, and ESA is a research and the Constitutional Treaty, the EU’s increasing development agency, the EU is a strong po- interest in space and progressive financial litical player that has the legitimacy to take involvement in the implementation of two political leadership: the goal of such leader- major space initiatives (see chapter 2.3) did ship being to ensure political coherence and not change. Indeed, to emphasise its growing proper policy coordination. space ambitions, the Commission decided to However, the interplay between national, transfer control over EU space matters from intergovernmental and communitarian frame- the DG Research/Joint Research Centre (JRC) works has created institutional misalignment, to the DG for Enterprise and Industry, clearly leading to cumbersome decision-making showing the strong industrial and strategic processes.21 In particular, the relationship dimension assigned to space activities, as between the EU and ESA has been a rather well as the EU’s interest in emerging as a complex one. Such complexity not only stems future leader of the European space land- from the different nature of the institutions, scape.20 but also from the fact that the two organisa- tions have different ranges of competences 2.2.1 A Complex Framework and different member states.22 In addition to that, it must be noted that ESA and the EU When the EU formally decided to step into are two institutions that have constitutional the space arena, pan-European collaborative provisions and principles that may conflict. schemes already had a consolidated tradition that had run in parallel to the processes of 21 “Resolution on the European Space Policy. ESA Direc- broader European political integration. Unlike tor-General’s Proposal for the European Space Policy.” other policy areas, the space sector had, in June 2007. European Space Agency 29 Oct. 2013 fact, already created a functioning institu-
ESPI Report 53 13 November 2015
The most important one concerns financing nesses in the space sector in order to launch and industrial policy. While ESA’s modus op- a debate on Europe’s space policy with all erandi is based on a geographical return prin- players including national and international ciple, according to which ESA awards contrib- organisations, the European space industry uting member states with industrial contracts and its users, and Europe’s scientific commu- commensurate with their financial participa- nity and citizens.25 Besides providing a set of tion, the EU is based on pure best-value-for- recommendations for a more efficient organi- money procurement. As discussed by many sation and framework for space activities in analysts, the simultaneous existence of EU’s Europe, the Green Paper laid the foundation competition law and ESA’s geographical re- for the subsequent release of the White Paper turn principle understandably creates some in November 2003 and for the concomitant institutional and operational divergences that signature of an EU-ESA Framework Agree- currently divide the two organisations. ment.26, 27 However, in recent years the ties between The signature of the EC-ESA Framework the two institutions have been reinforced by a Agreement in November 2003 conferred a number of elements. Beyond the fact that legal basis to EU-ESA cooperation. The they share a common basis of 20 members, agreement, which entered into force in May there is the increasing role that space plays 2004 and was subsequently renewed until in supporting Europe’s social, political and 2016, attempts to deal with all aspects rele- economic policies. Second, there is recogni- vant for cooperation between the two institu- tion that they are working towards a common tions: “its provisions address the areas and objective: to strengthen European cohesion overall objectives of cooperation, the rules and economic growth to benefit its citizens. governing the implementation of joint pro- Third is the fact that each partner needs the grammes, the establishment of common ad other to fulfil public policy objectives to pro- hoc structures for harmonising the European vide an appropriate political profile and a Space Governance, as well as the exchange more coherent framework for space activities of personnel, public relations”, etc.28 The in Europe. In this regard, it should be recalled Framework Agreement recognises that both that some 23% of the funds managed by ESA parties have specific complementary and now originate from the EU budget.23 With a mutually reinforcing strengths, and commits budget of €1030.5 million in 2015, the EU is them to working together for the implemen- the largest contributor to ESA, followed by tation of space projects that are beneficial for Germany and France. both and to avoid duplication of efforts, in order to optimise available resources.29 As also noted in a previous study by the Euro- 2.2.2 First Steps: From the Joint Task Force to pean Space Policy Institute, the framework the European Space Policy has two main objectives:30 The process of bringing ESA and the EU closer together has long-standing roots, with parallel EC Communications and ESA Council 25 See: “European Milestones.” 24 Jan. 2012. European Resolutions as early as the 1990s, but it “of- Space Agency 29 October. 2013. Web ficially” started with the creation, in January
ESPI Report 53 14 November 2015 The Future of European Flagship Programmes in Space
• To establish a common basis and appro- and ESA and the need for Europe to have a priate practical arrangements for efficient strong space policy and an “enlarged” pro- and mutually beneficial cooperation be- gramme.34 tween ESA and EU; • To progressively develop a European The European Space Policy Space Policy (ESP) to link the demand for In the light of the increasing involvement of services and applications in support of EU the EU in space activities, the need for a policies with the supply, through ESA, of comprehensive space policy has turned out to the space systems and infrastructure be of crucial importance. The ESP could in needed to meet that demand. fact provide support for a host of Europe’s objectives, including Europe’s continued con- Institutional Arrangements struction and social cohesion, and generally enhance the benefits for the Union, its mem- With respect to the first objective, the Frame- ber states and citizens. It could also enable work Agreement foresees in its articles the Europe to respond to competition from highly establishment of a High-Level Space Policy ambitious and capable emerging space pow- Group (HSPG) and a Ministerial-level Space ers and safeguard its interests in remaining Council. The institutionalisation of both the an indispensable international partner by Space Council and the HSPG is based on the providing a more coherent and effective provisions of Article 8 and replaces the previ- framework for its activities and, equally im- ous ad hoc structures for coordina- portant, a stronger political profile in this tion/cooperation (in particular the ESA-EC field. The joint recognition of these factors by Joint Task Force).31 the EU, ESA and their member countries has The HSPG is made up of high-level represen- fuelled the process eventually leading to the tatives of the EC, ESA and the responsible ESP. The ESP is the culmination of this dec- Ministries of the member states. Jointly ade-long process, characterised by a series of chaired by the ESA Director-General and a milestones such as the aforementioned adop- high level representative of the Commission, tion of the Green Paper and White Paper, as the HSPG’s main goal initially encompassed well as the orientations given by the Space the elaboration of the different elements and Council, and the initiation of major flagship strategic objectives to be contained in the programmes to be delivered jointly by the EU ESP. Following the eventual release of the and ESA (see chapter 2.3). ESP in April 2007, its task has become that of The drafting and implementation of a strong reaching a shared understanding for its effi- and coherent space policy is a complicated cient implementation and for defining the task in itself and in the case of Europe it is future directions of the European space pro- even more challenging. The multitude of ac- gramme. The HSPG is also involved in pre- tors involved (ESA, EC, and member states) paring the meetings of the Space Council.32 makes the process of crafting a coherent The Space Council, a concomitant meeting of framework a very complex task at best.35 the Council of Ministers of the EU and the Despite its flexibility, the system lacks the ESA Council at Ministerial Level, was set up stability, certainty and coherence needed for for coordinating and facilitating cooperative a strong European Space Policy. A coordi- activities between the EU and ESA.33 The nated and consolidated European Space Pol- Space Council has become the common con- icy therefore also needs evolution of its gov- ference of the high-level representative ernance. This would require that Europe re- boards of both organisations, allowing all ESA aligns its relevant institutions and focuses its and EU member states, including cooperating political and technical expertise. states, to get together and discuss the devel- Recognising the need for a stronger political opment of a coherent overall European space profile in the space sector, the EU and ESA programme. To this end, the Space Council finally decided to adopt “the path of rap- issues orientations and resolutions. Lacking a prochement and to combine their political, concrete mandate, its orientations need to be social, and technological expertise”, in order approved by the two composing Councils in to develop a comprehensive European Space the joint meetings. Since its inception in 2004, eight Space Council meetings have taken place, all intended to further the effec- 34 tiveness of the shared competence of the EU Cit. http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/space/policy/instituti onal-relations/index_en.htm 31 See: Peter, Nicolas. “The EU’s Emergent Space Diplo- 35 Smith, Lesley Jane, and Kay-Uwe Hörl. “Constructing macy” Space Policy 23. Issue 2. May 2007: 102 the European Space Policy: Past, Present and Future. 32 Rathgeber, Wolfgang. The European Architecture for Commerce in Space: Infrastructures, Technologies, and Space and Security. ESPI Report 13. August 2008: 22. Applications. Phillip Olla. Hershey: Information Science 33 Ibid: 22 Reference. 2008: 12.
ESPI Report 53 15 November 2015
Policy.36 In May 2007, twenty-nine European dance with the rules of the European countries at the Fourth Space Council ex- Community. pressed their support for the implementation In addition to this, the Resolution invites of a European Space Policy, unifying the ap- member states – under the coordination of proaches of ESA and the EU with those of ESA – and in the case of significant European their respective member states.37, 38 Prepared Community activities, in close cooperation jointly by the European Commission and with the European Commission:41 ESA’s Director-General and then adopted through a Resolution of the Space Council in • To provide the best expertise for Euro- May 2007, the European Space Policy sets pean space programmes (such as GMES- out a basic vision and strategy for the space Space Component, exploration pro- sector and addresses issues such as security grammes and future launcher pro- and defence, and access to space and explo- grammes), and ration. This was the first time that a common political framework for space activities was • To increase synergy between national, created in Europe. The significance of the ESA and EC contributions to these pro- European Space Policy lies in the fact that “it grammes leading progressively to an in- is the first wholly joint document addressing tegrated programmatic approach while all dimensions of space activities, compiled respecting national sovereignty. and adopted after extensive consultations According to the resolution, closer ties and an with member countries of the EU and ESA, as increase in cooperation between ESA, the EU well as industry and other key stakeholders, and the member states will bring substantial and given an endorsement by those member benefits to Europe by guaranteeing Europe’s 39 countries.” Through this resolution, the EU, full and unrestricted access to services pro- ESA and their member states have commit- vided by space systems in support of its poli- ted to increasing coordination of their activi- cies. Furthermore, it must be noted that the ties and programmes and their respective Resolution of the Space Council of May 2007 roles relating to space. invited the European Commission and the In order to take advantage of ESA experience ESA Executive to establish a process of regu- and its institutional setting, the ESP calls on lar monitoring and priority setting through an the EC to draw on the management and implementation plan for the ESP. Accordingly, technical expertise of ESA for managing the consultations between the EU, ESA and mem- EC-funded R&D space infrastructure pro- ber countries started immediately to define grammes, with ESA coordinating the relevant modalities and priorities of implementation. agencies and entities in Europe. This ESA role As far as the industrial policy is concerned, should include:40 the Resolution recognises that ESA has a flexible and effective industrial policy based • Supporting the European Commission as on cost-efficiency, competitiveness, fair dis- the technical expert in the elaboration of tribution of activities and competitive bidding, European Community initiatives involving which secures adequate industrial capacities, space-related activities and relevant global competitiveness and a high degree of work programmes, and in the selection inner-European competition for efficient and monitoring of relevant work contrac- European cooperation on joint space projects, tors, thus providing the basis for the successful development of space in Europe. It also in- • Management by ESA of European Com- vites the EC to develop adequate instruments munity space-related activities in accor- and funding schemes for Community actions in the space domain, taking into account the 36 Commission of the European Communities. Communi- specificities of the space sector, the need to cation from the Commission to the Council and the Euro- pean Parliament: Establishing Appropriate Relations be- strengthen its industry's competitiveness and tween the EU and the European Space Agency. the necessity of a balanced industrial struc- COM(2012) 671 final of 14 November 2012. Brussels: ture. To conclude, with the release of the European Union. ESP, the way for more substantive policy 37 Ibid: 13. action by the Commission was paved. 38 Council of the European Union. Outcome of Proceed- ings of the Council (Competitiveness) on 21-22 May 2007. Resolution on the European Space Policy. 10037/07 of 25 May 2007. Brussels: European Union. 2.2.3 Toward a More Pro-Active EU Action: The 39 Cit., “European Space Policy”. 13 Aug. 2013. European Lisbon Treaty and the EC Communications. Commission 10 Dec. 2013
ESPI Report 53 16 November 2015 The Future of European Flagship Programmes in Space
the EU in this field, and by putting “space” at zens”.44 Beyond the traditional EU fields (i.e. the highest level on the political agenda.42 agriculture, fisheries, transport, etc.), space The Treaty contains two substantial articles can be an instrument at the service of the that explicitly mention space: Article 4.3, and common foreign and security policy. Article 189 Article 189, the text of which is set out here- deals with the specific competence of the EU in after.43 the space domain, which entails mainly actions of support to R&D, coordination and promotion Article 4.3 of joint space initiatives. » In the areas of research, technological development and space, the Union shall However, the Treaty does not provide guidance have competence to carry out activities, on the definition of appropriate instruments and in particular to define and implement mechanisms (for example the funding sources) programmes; however, the exercise of for the future actions of the EU concerning that competence shall not result in Mem- space, and does not exactly specify what the ber States being prevented from exercis- “necessary measures” cited in the second para- ing theirs. graph could be, what instruments will be devel- oped and what industrial policy will be fol- Art. 189, found under Title XIV of the lowed.45 Article 189.3 states that the EU should » Treaty headed “Research and technologi- establish appropriate relations with ESA, but cal development and Space” 1. To promote scientific and technical does not provide elements to qualify what “ap- progress, industrial competitiveness and propriate relations” with ESA entail. the implementation of its policies, the Thanks to the provisions of the Treaty, not only Union shall draw up a European space ESA but also the EU has the competence to policy. To this end, it may promote joint initiatives, support research and techno- draw up “a European Space Policy and to im- logical development and coordinate the plement a European Space Programme”. As efforts needed for the exploration and was noted in an Information Document by ESA exploitation of space. “the utilisation of the indefinite article “a” in 2. To contribute to attaining the objec- both the TFEU and ESA Convention” could im- tives referred to in paragraph 1, the ply the coexistence of more than one policy (an European Parliament and the Council, ESA policy and a separate EU policy with its acting in accordance with the ordinary member states, thus also including the non- legislative procedure, shall establish the 46 necessary measures, which may take the members of ESA). In practice, however, this form of a European space programme, did not occur because the EC and ESA jointly excluding any harmonisation of the laws elaborated the ESP in 2007. Nevertheless, and regulations of the Member States. some issues remain to be resolved in terms of 3. The Union shall establish any appro- alignment. With the EU a political giant exists priate relations with the European Space that has great legitimacy and indeed the possi- Agency. bility to enforce a space policy from a political 4. This Article shall be without prejudice and regulatory point of view, but does not have to the other provisions of this Title. the technical capacity. ESA, on the other hand, With the aim of resolving some of the previous has the technical competences and instruments uncertainties, the provisions of the Lisbon to realise complex space projects. Bearing this Treaty specify the EU’s space competence as in mind, the goal now must be to combine one that operates together with that of the EU these strengths in order to optimally utilise the member states. In this context, the provisions available resources and to promote economic of Article 4.3 confirm the parallel and support growth. In general, there should be a balance competences of the EU in different fields in of relative strength in the triangle between the which space-based applications can serve as a EU, ESA and their respective member states. tool “to help address the major challenges of If it is true that recent developments have rein- the Union and which is at the service of citi- forced ESA–EU governance, they have also deepened the complexity surrounding their respective roles over space affairs. Through a comparative reading of the ESP, the Lisbon 42 The Treaty of Lisbon was signed on 13 December 2007 Treaty and the resolutions of the Space Council, by the Heads of States and Government and entered into these different roles and competences ESA and force on 1 December 2009, amending the Treaty on Euro- the EU respectively have can be summarised as pean Union (TEU), and the Treaty establishing the Euro- in the following table: pean Community (TEC), which is renamed the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 43 Council of the European Union. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 44 European Space Agency. European Space Technology 6655/1/08 REV 1 of 30 April 2008. Brussels: European Master Plan 2012. Paris: ESA. 2013: 66. Union. Document available at: 45 ESA Council, “Information Document – Space in the
ESPI Report 53 17 November 2015
EU’s Role Includes: ESA’s Role Includes:
• To carry out activities, in particular to define • To manage European Community space- and implement programmes, in the different related activities in accordance with the fields in which space-based applications can rules of the European Community; serve as a tool for addressing the EU’s general • To support the EC as technical expert in policies; the elaboration of European space-related • To promote joint initiatives, support Research activities and in the selection and monitor- and Technology Development (RTD) and coor- ing of work contractors; dinate the efforts for the exploration and exploi- • To develop and implement space technolo- tation of space; gies, in particular access to space, science • To ensure the availability and continuity of ser- and exploration, and to support technical vices supporting EU policies by funding relevant specifications of the space segment. up-stream research activities; • To lead the process of harmonising tech- • To create an optimum regulatory environment nology development programmes, since and facilitate innovation; the EC recognises that the ESA system • To promote coordination of the European posi- provides transparency on research across tion in international cooperation; Europe and increases coordination; • To develop and implement the European Space Policy (ESP)
Table 2: Distribution of EU-ESA Roles in EU-Funded Space Activities.47
By looking at this framework, what eventu- peratives for EU involvement in space, the ally becomes more evident is the increasing document defines the EU space competences authority and influence the EU aims to exer- and the role of the EU in the European space- cise within the European space governance. related decision making process.50 It ad- In this respect the EU has made use of the vances the EU position towards a coordinated momentum created by the Lisbon Treaty to European Space Strategy and explicitly asks further develop and implement the ESP by ESA and the EU to establish a coordinated issuing a series of EC Communications. industrial policy and a coordinated govern- ance scheme. In that respect, the Communi- One of the most relevant documents in this cation emphasises, in particular, “a re- regard is the EC Communication entitled “To- assessment of ESA–EU relations, with the ward a space strategy for the European Union view to a gradual adaptation of ESA in accor- that benefits its citizens”, released on 4 April dance with the increasing role of the EU” in 2011.48 The Communication sets the basis for the space domain.51 To sum up, the Commu- an EU space strategy. Despite the fact that it nication collects the results of the discussions is a non-binding document, the Communica- that have taken place in recent years in the tion is a strong political statement that begins context of space, and contains a list of prior- to address the real scope of EU space compe- ity measures and instruments. It is not a tence, as enabled by the Lisbon Treaty. It strategy in itself; rather it is another step in lays down, in fact, a whole set of policy ra- the direction of defining the role of space in tionales, priority actions as well as a govern- Europe as well as the role of the EU in the ance and financial framework that prepare space field. Therefore, the Communication the basis for EU actions under its space com- leaves open the questions of follow-through petence.49 After identifying the political im- and necessary further steps to be taken. As the Communication and various other docu- ments make clear, the EC sees space not as a 47 Based upon: Klock, Erich and Marco Aliberti. “ESA goal in itself but rather as a tool to achieve Enlargement. What Interesting Countries Can Do to Pre- economic, social and strategic goals through pare Themselves to Ultimate Accession – With a Special its support of other policy areas. Focus on the CEE Region”, ESPI Report 47. January 2014. 48 European Commission. Communication from the Com- mission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Lisbon Generation Competence?” ESPI Perspectives 46. European Economic and Social Committee and the Com- May 2011: 1. mittee of the Regions. Towards a Space Strategy for the 50 The EC document states that “space policy is an instru- European Union that Benefits its Citizens. COM(2011) 152 ment serving the Union’s internal and external policies and final of 4 April 2011. Brussels: European Union. Document responds to three types of need: social, economic, and available at the European Commission website: strategic”.
ESPI Report 53 18 November 2015 The Future of European Flagship Programmes in Space
This emphasis becomes even more visible in likely why the “Conclusions towards a shared the Communication issued by the Commis- EU-ESA vision for space fostering competi- sion to the Council and the European Parlia- tiveness” adopted by the Council of the Euro- ment on 14 November 2012.52 The docu- pean Union in May 2014 explicitly recognises ment, entitled “Establishing appropriate rela- that “transforming ESA into an agency of the tions between the EU and the European EU would require political consensus which Space Agency”, explicitly suggests that given may be difficult to achieve in the foreseeable the mismatch of financial rules, membership future”.56 asymmetry, and security and defence-related All in all, an eventual assimilation of ESA asymmetry, “ESA could make the necessary within EU bodies appears still far from taking structural adaptations [...] and make the place, but – as the same document subtly necessary changes allowing unrestricted ac- implies – it has to be acknowledged that the cess to ESA's relevant statutory bodies...”.53 current and future EU-led space initiatives, in The document clearly states also that the EU particular its flagship programmes, can be can provide the political dimension (including instruments to serve this ultimate purpose. at the international level) and legitimacy, as well as links with other policy areas. “The need for greater operational efficiency, sym- metry in defence and security matters, politi- 2.3 The Current Flagship Pro- cal coordination and accountability can only be resolved, in the long term, through the grammes in Space rapprochement of ESA towards the European Union”.54 The previous section focused on the legal milestones and political trends associated It thus became manifest that the EU’s inten- with the EU’s mandate for space activities. tion was to gradually “morph” ESA to become The main objective of this report is, however, part of the EU, as a kind of space agency of somewhat more practically orientated, the EU similar, for instance, to the European namely, to assess the need and options re- Defence Agency (EDA). To date, ESA–EU garding governance of the current flagship relations are far from being determined but it programmes and the identification and as- goes without saying that an eventual trans- sessment of potential future flagship candi- formation of ESA into an EU agency would dates. This section describes the nature of also seriously alter the current governance of the current EU flagship programmes in space space activities with far-reaching conse- and throws light on the rationale behind their 55 quences for the entire system. This is most establishment as explicit EU flagship pro- grammes in space. 52 European Commission. Communication from the Com- Overall the European Commission has been mission to the Council and the European Parliament. expanding its involvement in aeronautics, Establishing Appropriate Relations between the EU and the European Space Agency. COM(2012) 671 final of 14 telecommunication, Research and Develop- November 2012. Brussels: European Union. Document ment (R&D) related to satellite applications available at:
ESPI Report 53 19 November 2015
manity for millennia. The earliest efforts stations throughout Europe, EGNOS transmits were, among other techniques, based upon a signal giving information on the reliability the positions of the stars in the night sky and and accuracy of positioning signals stemming the angular measurements derived there- from the GPS and GLONASS systems, thus from. During the Imperial Age new technolo- augmenting the quality of satellite navigation gies, such as the maritime chronometer, coverage over the European continent. The were devised to improve navigation at sea for EGNOS Open Service has been operational military and trading purposes. At the end of since 2009, the year in which ownership of the 19th century another major revolution in the system was transferred to the EC.59, 60 this area followed after the discovery of radio signals and the establishment of the radar At the same time as the start of the EGNOS principle. Ironically, the latest and most accu- project, the pendulum also began to swing in rate facility came full circle since it provides a the direction of overall support for a fully- fledged independent GNSS system for solution again relying on outer space – the 61 deployment of operational Global Navigation Europe, then referred to as GNSS-2. The Satellite Systems (GNSS). These are systems factors driving this change were that satellite comprising a constellation of satellites capa- navigation signals had started to offer in- ble of providing global and autonomous geo- creased pay-offs, both in terms of socioeco- spatial positioning and timing.57 nomic benefits and geopolitical strategies. During that time GNSS signals, and GPS in The U.S. military was the first actor to deploy particular, became increasingly used by non- a satellite navigation system in the mid- military users worldwide for location tracking 1960s, which was designed mainly with the and traffic navigation, with ever more people, objective of supporting its naval operations. businesses and public services relying on This system, however, worked on a rather their availability and quality. A major driving indirect basis by monitoring frequency shifts force prompting the worldwide access to the caused by the movement of the satellites in American GPS signals was related to the their orbit. This approach is based upon the safety in airspace management following the Doppler Effect and not so precise by today’s disaster with Korean Air Lines Flight 007 dur- standards. Nevertheless the technology was ing the Reagan Administration in 1983. Later, successfully demonstrated and because of the trend of opening access continued when the need for even better accurate positioning the U.S. government saw interesting com- capabilities in a Cold War era characterised mercial opportunities to further invest in the by geopolitical tensions, investments in area of satellite navigation. In 1998 then U.S. newer systems were made shortly after, both Vice President Al Gore announced plans to in the U.S. and the Soviet Union. By the late further upgrade the American system, which 1970s the Americans had started launching gave rise to a GPS system with two new civil- their first Global Positioning System (GPS) ian signals for enhanced user accuracy and satellites, with the Soviets deploying their reliability.62 In contrast, the Russian GLONASS system shortly after. Both systems GLONASS started degrading around that time were considered fully operational as of 58 because of poor programme management 1995. and budget issues following the collapse of Although the European Space Agency, as well the Soviet Union. Later, however, it was de- as some national space agencies such as cided with the impulse of Vladimir Putin’s CNES, started to realise the opportunity for a presidency in 2001 to revive the GLONASS civil GNSS constellation already in the 1980s, system and make this a top government pri- the first concrete actions remained limited to the execution of technical studies and the deployment of a European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS), which was initially known as GNSS-1. It was the EU 59 “EGNOS Open Service” 18 Sep. 2014 European Space in 1995 that oversaw the start of develop- Agency 15 Oct. 2015 ment and actual deployment of this service, http://www.navipedia.net/index.php/EGNOS_Open_Servic e which is a project in cooperation with the 60 “About EGNOS” European GNSS Agency 15 Oct. 2015 European Space Agency and the European http://www.egnos-portal.eu/discover-egnos/about-egnos Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation 61 An important milestone in this respect was the speech (EUROCONTROL). By using multiple geosta- “European Strategy for GNSS” given by then Member of tionary satellites and a network of ground the European Commission responsible for Transport and Trans-European Networks, Neil Kinnock, at the GNSS 98 Symposium in Toulouse in 1998, which can be consulted at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-98- 57 Hofmann-Wellenhof, Berhard, Lichtenegger, Herbert 210_en.htm and, Wasle, Elmar, eds. GNSS Global Navigation Satellite 62 The plan eventually translated into a formal decision in Systems. Vienna: SpringerWienNewYork. 2008. 2000 when the United States Congress authorised the 58 Ibid. effort, referring to it as GPS III.
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ority. The system was restored and eventu- European GNSS had first gained impetus ally became fully operational again in 2011.63 during the First Gulf War, when the realisa- tion was made that Europe was lacking In order to fully understand the nature of the autonomy in certain areas of its military and dynamic at the time it is necessary to con- defence set-up and that GNSS signals are a sider what happened to a number of inter- strategic and indispensable asset in carrying connected interests. Following the fall of the out air force operations. An autonomous Iron Curtain, the structure of international GNSS constellation would make Europe less relations was transformed from a bipolar dependent on the U.S. in performing its own model to a temporarily unipolar one; a re- security-related operations.66 In parallel to gime order with only one remaining super- the security arguments, economic arguments power at the centre of the global regime. In also started to become significant around this phase, however, the seeds of a multipo- that time. The very outspoken ideological lar world order were already present and the struggle characterising the playing field of most powerful states started acting upon this international relations during the Cold War evolution shortly thereafter. In this new real- era had vanished and created a vacuum that ity the position of Europe was changed in a was rapidly being filled by increased power way that entailed two major opportunities. projection through economic mechanisms. First, from an internal perspective, the divi- During the 1990s international trade wit- sion that had separated Europe into two nessed an accelerated wave of globalisation blocks since the end of the Second World War and the neo-liberalism paradigm extended ceased to exist, which in turn offered the both in terms of reach and grip on a global opportunity of a spatial continuation of the scale. As a result the concepts of competi- pan-European integration process – with a tiveness and the ability to innovate in con- strong focus on eastern expansion. Second sumer products and services became more and related hereto, albeit from a more out- important. In this context it was felt that ward point of view, the collapse of the USSR Europe’s space sector should not only excel in indirectly altered the relative geopolitical scientific research and technology develop- weight of Europe on the global stage in the ment, but that it should also be competitive sense that it offered the EU the prospect of and innovative, thereby creating wealth and developing a stronger influence on the inter- 64 economic growth. The creation of this added national agenda. value was envisaged through the develop- To harvest opportunities and thus to increase ment of commercial downstream applications its political weight, the EU had to develop the and by fostering spillover effects and cross- capacities that would ensure this – something fertilisations with regard to industrial sectors 67 it saw fit doing through the use of soft power. outside the field of space. With these stra- As opposed to hard power soft power relies tegic objectives and socioeconomic benefits on non-military tools such as the use of dip- in mind for the long term, the European Com- lomatic influence and the establishment of mission called upon the European Council and international institutions, but it can also take the European Parliament to approve the de- the form of initiatives aimed at closing eco- velopment of a European GNSS in 1998.68 nomic and technological gaps between sec- 65 Hence ESA and the EU jointly decided to ond-tier players and the hegemon. The study the feasibility of a fully-fledged and development of a strong and autonomous independent European GNSS. The results space sector, supported by own capabilities showed that there were considerable eco- such as GNSS, was at the time considered a nomic pay-offs to be reaped from an strategic element in strengthening EU influ- autonomous European GNSS system and ence in international affairs. This was so be- thus the programme was approved in 1999.69 cause the EU planned to engage in space diplomacy, i.e. using space programmes as a It was decided, as envisaged from the begin- tool to establish international cooperation and ning, to develop Galileo as a civilian pro- wider partnerships, but also because the ca- gramme under civilian control – notwith- pacities to be developed would benefit Europe standing that it would serve dual use pur- in a number of tangible ways, namely in the areas of security and defence. The idea of a 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid. 68 Communication from the Commission to the Council and 63 “GLONASS Future and Evolutions” 12 Apr. 2015 Euro- the European Parliament. Towards a Trans-European pean Space Agency 15 Oct. 2015 Positioning and Navigation Network including a European http://www.navipedia.net/index.php/GLONASS_Future_an Strategy for Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS). d_Evolutions Brussels 21.01.1998 COM (1998) 29 final. 64 Johnson-Freese, Joan, and Erickson S. Andrew. “The 69 Nicola Casarini. Remaking Global Order: The Evolution emerging China–EU space partnership: A geotechnologi- of Europe-China Relations and its Implications for East cal balancer” Space Policy 22. 2006: 12-22. Asia and the United States. Oxford University Press. Ox- 65 Ibid. ford. 2009: 244 .
ESPI Report 53 21 November 2015
poses. In March 2002 the European Council ject to space programme development and of Transport Ministers approved a package of mission planning in the United States. Rela- €450 million to initiate the development tively soon thereafter, in the mid-1970s, phase of the Galileo programme. Although Europe also got involved in satellite meteor- the programme experienced a very turbulent ology when the Meteosat programme was set-up and implementation phase because it initiated by CNES and ESA, with Meteosat was wrongly conceived as a commercial and later being brought under the auspices of the industrial venture initiated and sponsored by newly created European Organisation for the public funding, the so-called Galileo Joint Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites Undertaking, it was brought back on the right (EUMETSAT).71 track following a thorough reorientation when the programme’s focal point became the The deployment of public remote sensing GNSS Supervisory Authority. In this reorien- satellites with broader environmental moni- tation process towards Galileo as a strategic toring applications for civil purposes started infrastructure for public service with commer- somewhat later, when it was realised that cial applications, the development of Galileo this field would also benefit from space based continued successfully, albeit with a delay. observations. The first milestones in this re- The entire constellation, which will consist of spect were the U.S. launches of the first civil- 30 satellites in Middle Earth Orbit (MEO) in- ian Earth Observation satellite Landsat in cluding three spares, is now expected to be- 1972, the first oceanography satellite Seasat come fully operational around 2020.70 The in 1978 and, a number of satellites to meas- ure atmospheric pollution (SAGE). In the issues that occurred during the first phases of following decades, environmental monitoring programme implementation demonstrate that from space evolved, just as meteorology did, projects of this scale are complex and that all into a mature technological field. In this aspects have to be considered and addressed process the diversity of Earth Observation properly in order for them to become suc- measurements increased as imaging, radar cessful. remote sensing, atmospheric composition monitoring, ocean altimetry and others were 2.3.2 Copernicus as an Operational Environ- added to the list of capabilities. In Europe mental Monitoring Programme major progress was made during the 1990s and 2000s, with the launch of Topex- In the area of Earth Observation a number of Poseidon, Envisat, the MetOp series, the spe- evolutions, spanning over multiple decades, cialised Earth Observation satellites in the have contributed to the decision to establish ESA Living Planet programme, and a number what is now known as the Copernicus pro- of smaller national proof-of-concept missions. gramme. As opposed to global satellite navi- These developments vastly increased the gation, Europe, and ESA in particular, had socioeconomic and strategic benefits that been actively developing EO capabilities for could be derived from Earth Observation and quite a long time – in line with technology gave Europe skills and expertise in develop- developments in this area on the other side ing state-of-the-art capabilities. Yet, wide- of the Atlantic. scope environmental monitoring from space Initially, the first experimental remote sens- was not directly translated into a truly opera- ing efforts in space were focused on weather tional service the same way that meteorology monitoring only. The first country to invest was during the second half of the 20th cen- heavily in space-based meteorological capaci- tury. One of the reasons was that the users ties was the United States with its Television of environmental satellite data are more het- Infrared Observation Satellite Program erogeneous and have different operational (TIROS), followed by the Soviet Union. After requirements and priorities. Because of this, a number of promising technology demon- environmental monitoring has a smaller cen- strations and successful proof-of-concept tralised demand compared to meteorology. missions in the early 1960s, it became clear Moreover environmental monitoring was for a that remote sensing satellites for meteorol- long time considered as an issue of secon- ogy would translate into truly operational dary priority. It was deemed not to offer con- services. The path-breaking polar orbiting siderable direct socioeconomic and strategic services were complemented by geostation- benefits, unlike meteorology, and there was ary coverage about a decade later and both less institutional demand because environ- services quickly became a critical part of mental issues were not at the top of the po- weather forecasting and therefore also sub- litical agenda. The latter, however, had
70 “Galileo Future and Evolutions” 7 July 2015 European 71 Lahcen, Arne “EUMETSAT-NOAA Collaboration in Space Agency 21 July 2015 Meteorology from Space: Review of a Longstanding Trans- http://www.navipedia.net/index.php/Galileo_Future_and_E Atlantic Partnership” ESPI Report 46. September 2013: volutions 12-15.
ESPI Report 53 22 November 2015 The Future of European Flagship Programmes in Space
started to change by the end of the 20th cen- mission released a Communication with a tury. concrete Action Plan aimed at establishing a working GMES capability by 2008.74 The sys- During the 1980s a number of global envi- ronmental problems started receiving atten- tem’s data input would be provided by two tion in different parts of the world. Issues main sources. In-situ observations would such as ozone depletion, acid rain, deforesta- come from ground-based stations and air- tion of tropical rainforests and climate borne and seaborne measurements and change, started to reinforce ecological would be managed by the European Envi- awareness in many industrialised countries. ronment Agency (EEA). The space component Supported by academic research the ecologi- would consist of new infrastructure in the cal movement – which had already grown form of the Sentinel satellites, procured considerably during the 1970s – was able to jointly by the EU and ESA, complemented by channel this awareness to become an impe- contributing missions. The overall Copernicus tus to move environmental monitoring and constellation would increase operational ca- protection up the political agenda. In many pacity until the 2020s. In addition to the data parts of the world, high-level meetings, World streams generated by the constellation, out- Summits and scientific conferences continued put would be provided in the form of the- to call on the international community to matic services in six predefined fields: (1) monitor the environment more carefully in land monitoring, (2) marine monitoring, (3) order to increase understanding of its proc- atmosphere monitoring, (4) emergency man- agement, (5) security and, (6) climate esses and facilitate mitigation measures.72 As change.75 a consequence, the need to establish better Earth Observation capabilities became a po- litical priority in Europe and beyond during the 1990s. The first formal milestone in the establish- ment of what eventually would become the Copernicus programme was the creation of the “Baveno Manifesto”. The Manifesto, signed in 1998, called on the European Commission and the European Space Agency to enter into a long term commitment to set up a global observation capacity to support agriculture, environmental monitoring and national security.73 GMES became the pro- gramme acronym. At that time GMES stood for Global Monitoring of Environmental Secu- rity, as full awareness and acknowledgment of the security dimensions of the project only followed a year later. The document was adopted in the margins of a users’ seminar organised by the Space Applications Institute (SAI), whose primary mission is to develop and promote the use of space-derived data in the service of EU policies, especially those relating to agriculture, fisheries, transport and anti-fraud. In this sense, in contrast with many other space programmes and initia- tives, the initiative had strong ecological roots. In February 2004, after a five year reflection and preparation period following the signing of the Baveno Manifesto, the European Com-
72 “GEO History” 11 Aug. 2015 European Commission 18 74 Commission of the European Communities. Global Aug. 2015 Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES): Estab- http://ec.europa.eu/research/environment/index_en.cfm?se lishing a GMES capacity by 2008. COM(2004) 65 final of 3 ction=geo&pg=history#1 Feb. 2004. Brussels: European Union. 73 “Global Monitoring for Environmental Security: A Mani- 75 Allgeier, H., Eyres, H., Gibson, R., Hulsroj, P. and festo for a New European Course of Action”, reaffirmed by Lahcen, A. “Optimising Europe’s Benefits from the Coper- ASI, BNSC, CNES, DLR, EARSC, ESA, EUMETSAT and nicus Programme: Addressing the Structural Gaps in the European Commission in Baveno, Italy on 19 May Operational Earth Observation” ESPI Report 50. April 1998. 2015.
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3. Copernicus and Galileo: Priorities for Operational Governance
The previous chapter already mentioned that necessary that their programme structures several factors substantiated the decisions to become conducive to the generation of these establish the Galileo and Copernicus flagship benefits in the most optimal fashion. Al- programmes. A major element in this regard though this is desirable for any type of in- was the variety of expected socioeconomic vestment, it is even more important in this and strategic benefits envisaged under the case considering that both constellations will programmes. Now that both programmes are be providing what is known in economic moving towards their operational phase it is terms as ‘public goods’ (see table 3).
Rivalry
rivalrous non-rivalrous
excludable Private Goods Club Goods Access non-excludable Common Resources Public Goods
Table 3: Classification of Goods.76
As opposed to many other areas of space came about. The civil access to GNSS signals utilisation – such as, for example, human was initiated in the mid-1990s by the United spaceflight, telecommunication and launchers States. Although initially in Europe the idea – the Copernicus data and Galileo signals will was to finance Galileo through a public- be both ‘non-rivalrous’ and ‘non-excludable’ private partnership, difficulties in negotiating types of provisions. Non-rivalrous means that the concession contracts, as described above, use by one does not reduce availability to called for a larger role of the public sector in others, regardless of the number of simulta- establishing an independent GNSS system. neous users. This is the case because GNSS Hence the door was open for a decision in signals do not decrease in strength as a func- favour of open access.78 Furthermore, in the tion of the number of users and because it is field of remote sensing, full and open data digital information, Earth Observation data access became a political trend, in line with can be copied and distributed at virtually no the data sharing principles formulated by the cost once downloaded. Both are also non- intergovernmental Group on Earth Observa- excludable because of the explicit choice to tions (GEO).79 The idea behind the open ap- establish systems for civil use, with open proach in Earth Observation is to support access to as many users as possible – at evidence-based policy and have the greatest least for most of the applications and only possible use of the data. Landsat experience with certain reservations under national law shows that data is used much more, both in and security restrictions. Open access was terms of numbers of users and applications, not self-evident, since there was also the when made available at no cost compared to option of commercialising these services, when imposing significant charges. This is making them ‘club-goods’ – provisions avail- because only liberal data access will encour- able on a non-rivalrous yet excludable basis, age academic, government and, commercial like satellite television for instance.77 scientists to start using the data, thereby elevating the number of users to the level The commercialisation of Copernicus and Galileo did not materialise because of the context and time in which the programmes 78 For more info, see: “Galileo public-private partnership crashes to earth” 5 Sept. 2007 Politico 5 Feb. 2015 76 Authors’ visualisation. http://www.politico.eu/article/galileo-public-private- 77 For an analysis on the qualification of GNSS signals as a partnership-crashes-to-earth-2/ public good see: Plattard, Serge. “Can GNSS Signals 79 “GEO Data Sharing Principles Implementation” Group Qualify to Become a World Public Good?”. IAC-14- on Earth Observations 5 Feb. 2015 E3.3.12. Toronto, Canada. 2014. https://www.earthobservations.org/geoss_dsp.shtml
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required for the maturing of analytic tools, 3.1.1 Copernicus which is in turn to the benefit of all parties.80 Thus, free and open access fosters the devel- Maximising the benefits from Copernicus’ opment of a value adding industry, as the data is currently pursued through two chan- intense use of free services is more prone to nels. The decision to adopt a full, free and stimulate the development of downstream open data access policy for users was an applications and services because of the important first pillar in allowing the data to higher ultimate demand and smaller financial be used widely. The preference for a data risk of brokers.81 All of these elements also policy that would give away much of the gen- have a positive impact on the innovation dy- erated information for free was already namics of the GNSS and EO markets. stressed in the early policy documents of the European Commission, such as the Action One important feature of public goods is that Plan of 2004, which referred to the Aarhus commercial mechanisms cannot properly Convention.82 Following the findings of a so- guarantee their provision and thus govern- cioeconomic benefit study and a Downstream mental involvement is required for longer Services Market Study, the European Com- periods of time. Since the capabilities are mission adopted the full and open access to established with taxpayers’ money, it is key data policy via a Delegated Regulation in that European citizens, enterprises and gov- December 2013.83 By doing so the EC wanted ernmental players get a proper return on to strengthen the commercial market for their investment. In the case of the flagship downstream Earth Observation applications programmes in space, it is the EU in particu- while at the same time offering support to lar which must ensure that mechanisms are the European research, technology and inno- in place assuring that benefits can be maxi- vation communities. In turn this particular mised and that the governance structures for business model is expected to create the both flagship programmes are adapted to highest growth and job creation compared to accommodate this accordingly. This chapter other data policy scenarios. For most end- will focus on the major elements in this re- users, however, unprocessed data is of little spect. use and therefore the six thematic services were created in addition to the specific data policy. As illustrated in the table below, the implementation and operation of the services 3.1 Optimising the Benefits are managed by different institutions in of the Current Generations Europe.
The first question regarding the optimisation of potential benefits of Copernicus and Galileo is a near term one. Namely, how can it be assured that under the programmes’ first generation of satellites, once sufficiently op- erational, European actors will be in a posi- tion to reap the maximum amount of strate- gic and socioeconomic benefits from the overall system? To shed light on this ques- tion, the current mechanisms for the genera- tion and propagation of benefits foreseen in these programmes will be considered first. Doing so reveals which elements in the value chain have been addressed adequately and which issues merit further attention.
82 Commission of the European Communities. Communi- cation from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES): Establishing a GMES capacity by 2008 - (Action Plan (2004-2008)). COM (2004) 0065 final of 16 Apr. 2004. Brussels: European Union. Document available 80 National Research Council of the National Academies, at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- ed. Earth Observations from Space – The First 50 Years of con- Scientific Achievements. Washington DC: The National tent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52004DC0065&from=EN Academy Press. 2008. 83 Regulation (EU) No 377/2014 of the European Parlia- 81 EARSC Position Paper “Industry Access to Copernicus ment and of the Council of 3 April 2014 establishing the Sentinel Data - The practical aspects of Copernicus Data Copernicus Programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No Policy” – February 2013 911/2010, Document available at: http://eur- http://earsc.org/file_download/143/EARSC+Position+Paper lex.europa.eu/legal- +on+Industry+access+to+GMES+_+Copernicus+Data+fin con- al.pdf tent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014R0377&from=EN
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Components and/or Service Status Projects
Global Component (coordinated by the JRC)
Pan-European Component (imple- Land Monitoring Operational mented by the EEA)
Local Component (implemented by the EEA)
Copernicus Emergency Management Service (GIO EMS) Emergency Management Operational European Flood Awareness System (EFAS) (implemented by the JRC)
Monitoring Atmospheric Composition Atmosphere Monitoring Pre-Operational and Climate – Interim Implementation (MAC-II)
Marine Monitoring Pre-Operational MyOcean2
Border Surveillance: G-MOSAIC
Maritime Surveillance:
• Development of Pre-operational Services for Highly Innovative Maritime Surveillance Capabilities (DOLPHIN) Security Under Development • New Service Capabilities for Inte- grated and Advanced Maritime Surveillance (NEREIDS) • Simulator for Moving Target Indi- cator System (SIMTISYS) Support to EU External Action: G- MOSAIC
Development is supported by a series Climate Change Under Development of FP7 projects
Table 4: The Six Copernicus Services, their Status and Components and/or Projects.84
The Land Monitoring and Emergency Man- across a wide range of global biophysical agement services are already operational. variables describing the state of vegetation, The land monitoring service consists of three the energy budget and the water cycle. The components with different geographical fo- pan-European component produces five high cus.85 The global component produces data resolution data sets describing the main land cover types: artificial surfaces, forest areas, agricultural areas, wetlands, and small water 84 Allgeier, H., Eyres, H., Gibson, R., Hulsroj, P. and bodies. The local component provides de- Lahcen, A. “Optimising Europe’s Benefits from the Coper- tailed information on land cover and land use nicus Programme: Addressing the Structural Gaps in Operational Earth Observation” ESPI Report 50. April for European hot spots such as cities. The 2015. emergency management service aims to pro- 85 The preparations for the Land Monitoring service were made in projects Geoland and Geoland2. Based upon the experience acquired by the European remote sensing the JRC is responsible for the coordination of the global consortia, the EC and the EEA agreed to redistribute the component. This gradual transition assured that the ser- responsibility for implementation of the different compo- vice portfolios previously developed were to a large extent nents. In 2011, the EEA took over the implementation of taken up on the GMES Initial Operations (GIO), bridging the pan-European and the local components. As of 2013, the gap between research and operations.
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vide timely and accurate geo-spatial informa- range of data sources and other services. tion to all actors involved in the management Ultimately, the service will help to support of natural disasters, man-made emergency climate adaptation and mitigation.89 situations, and humanitarian crises. It con- From an analytical perspective, the road sists of two components: a mapping service taken with regard to benefit optimisation as (EMS) and a European Flood Awareness Sys- described in the above is heading in the right tem (EFAS), both of which have been devel- direction. Major progress has been made in oped by the EC’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) the development of the six services, espe- since 2002. Both components have been op- cially for those currently in operational or erational since 2012.86 pre-operational mode. Still, in the overall The Atmosphere Monitoring and Marine Moni- scheme of things, there seems to be room toring services are currently in a pre- left for further optimisation. This is true for operational mode. The first element is pro- the actions that are being implemented at the vided by the Monitoring Atmospheric Compo- moment, but also regarding the need for sition and Climate - Interim Implementation future initiatives that should go beyond what (MACC-II). By combining state-of-the-art is currently being addressed. atmospheric modelling with observation ca- The approach of channelling demand around pabilities, MACC-II provides data on atmos- six centralised thematic services is expected pheric composition for recent years, data for to strongly support institutional demand for monitoring present conditions, and forecasts environmental monitoring, security and sci- of the distribution of key constituents up to a entific research. The six services themselves few days ahead. The Marine Monitoring ser- will not be sufficient alone to stimulate the vice provides regular and systematic refer- uptake of Copernicus data among all poten- ence information on the state of the physical tial users in the European setting, however. oceans and regional seas around the world. European public awareness of the EO flagship Currently the MyOcean2 project, the succes- programme remains low and it lacks suffi- sor to MyOcean and Mersea, is responsible cient exposure among its targeted end-users for the development of the pre-operational – even among institutional users within EU functions.87, 88 structures. Before its termination, the GMES All Copernicus services for security applica- Bureau, which had the task of promoting user tions and climate change are still under de- uptake, made efforts to improve this situation velopment. The security applications will sup- by creating awareness across EC services and port the EU in three major policy areas: bor- by launching a number of relevant joint initia- der surveillance, maritime surveillance and tives with several DGs of the EC. In spite of support to EU External Action. Border surveil- its success in increasing institutional aware- lance and support to EU External Action are ness, a consultancy report of 2009 stated being developed by the services for Manage- that the GMES Bureau was less successful in ment of Operations, Situation Awareness and actually engaging those institutional users Intelligence for regional Crises project (G- and creating direct links with industrial us- MOSAIC). The Maritime Surveillance service ers.90 At the same time the study noted that has the objective of ensuring the safe use of this shortfall should not be attributed to the the sea and securing Europe’s maritime bor- Bureau itself, considering its limited scope ders. The Climate Change service is sup- and mandate. As a recommendation it stated ported by a various European projects that that the creation of awareness on a pan- focus on different aspects and variables that European scale would require the involve- affect the evolution and modelling of the cli- ment of intermediate levels such as the mate. As climate is a complex interplay of member states. After all, once informed, they terrestrial, marine and atmospheric compo- are in a better position to identify and con- nents, the service is supported by a wide nect to the variety of potential users within their territory and to federate the needs of their domestic users. 86 “Copernicus Products and Services” FDC 5 Feb. 2015 http://www.copernicus.eu/main/services In order to validate the full market potential, 87 In terms of substance this includes the elaboration of a it would be beneficial to set up additional governance model for the Marine Service and the prepara- user uptake schemes aimed at informing tion of a long term roadmap for the Marine Service for the market players of the economic potential of future. Until recently, most European Member States had the data stream and services that are / will built their own operational oceanography capacities and so an important task of MyOcean2 is to build a system of be generated by Copernicus. Providing the systems and avoid duplication of efforts. To this effect the project has established intense cooperation with major European centres in oceanography, and has involved 89 Ibid. users since its inception. 90 Clark, J., Pitsaros, E. and, Simmonds, P., Evaluation of 88 “Copernicus Products and Services” FDC 5 Feb. 2015 the Activities of the European Commission’s GMES Bu- http://www.copernicus.eu/main/services reau, Final Report, Technopolis Group. February 2009.
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data in an accessible way is the first major to advance the design and delivery of geo- step in spurring the development of down- spatial information applications to custom- stream applications, but bringing (potential) ers.92 This demonstrates that in order for entrepreneurs and users to engage and proc- private industry to grow and develop a ma- ess the data to create profit or benefits is a ture set of products and services, govern- second key component that merits additional ment funding and demand are often crucial. action. In some instances certain initiatives Besides that, the NGA also provides services have been put in place to achieve this, but for disaster management relief and the plan- they remain rather fragmented and lack the ning of large ad-hoc events such as the critical mass required for efficient and effec- Olympics. Of course the European situation is tive functioning. Consideration should there- distinct from the American one, because of fore be given to further integrating the pro- the differences in military and security uses motion and use of Copernicus capabilities into and the differences in markets and govern- the wider scope of policy support related mental set-ups. The question, however, is activities of the EU, such as, for example: whether Europe could learn from this ap- common fisheries policy, conclusion of inter- proach to establish other, European-strength national agreements, commercial policy, eco- based applications and services. These would nomic, social and territorial cohesion, envi- be based upon Copernicus and data from ronment, transport, tourism, energy, trans- other European assets, beyond the strict European networks. But, importantly, Coper- thematic distribution that forms the basis for nicus data should also be promoted much current Copernicus services. Interestingly, it more for purely commercial and private pur- was also argued in the same ESPI report that poses in fields such as agriculture, tourism, this would also offer the opportunity of lever- and energy. aging what can be learned from EO for the benefit of society as a whole. In the current In addition to the reinforcement of current political debate on the health of the Earth, user uptake practices, the Copernicus con- there is a serious lack of distinction between stellation will be in a position to reap certain scientific fact and political assessment. There less self-evident – or at least less tangible – is a need to clearly communicate this impor- benefits. These issues have been reflected tant distinction. One of the issues of most upon by ESPI in a previously published report concern today is that the political debate on dealing with the question of European benefit the environment and climate is a debate that optimisation from the Copernicus Pro- allows the best scientific assumptions to be gramme.91 One of the assertions in that replaced by political convenience arguments. analysis is that Copernicus will be in an excel- There is an urgent need to communicate lent position to gauge unaddressed societal Earth Observation science results in such a needs related to EO data beyond the core fashion that incontrovertible boundaries are purposes of environmental monitoring and set for political discussion. For this to happen security. The examples of the U.S. Geological the body politic must progressively get a Survey (USGS) and the U.S. National Geo- better understanding of the results provided spatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) illustrate by Earth Observation. It is important to note that there are strong arguments for more that this is not a problem unique to Coperni- holistic approaches to data management to cus and therefore it should not necessarily be broaden benefits and stimulate their propa- expected to resolve this issue in isolation. gation through society. For instance, such a centralisation could ensure better that data The creation of these less tangible benefits is, analysis expertise is pooled with other fields however, complicated by the institutional set- of expertise such as software development, up in the current Copernicus programme environmental sciences and various voices architecture. As can be noted from table 4, from societal fields that could benefit from there is a high degree of decentralisation more accurate data and information on the present in the provision of the services, for environment and security. In addition, a cen- instance. They are compartmentalised into tral agency would be better positioned to six and for many of them actual operations ensure the development of private down- are split into subservices with different opera- stream business and service providers. The tors. This was chosen explicitly because the NGA, for instance, has been instrumental in EC wanted to make best use of existing the development of software tools such as strengths, as there is a lot of valuable exper- Google Earth and it cooperates with Microsoft tise present in the European institutional landscape. The challenge in terms of benefit maximisation here is thus not the high de- 91 Allgeier, H., Eyres, H., Gibson, R., Hulsroj, P. and Lahcen, A. “Optimising Europe’s Benefits from the Coper- nicus Programme: Addressing the Structural Gaps in 92 Shorrock, Tim. Ed. Spies for Hire: the Secret World of Operational Earth Observation” ESPI Report 50. April Intelligence Outsourcing. New York: Simon and Schuster. 2015. 2008: 247 – 250.
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gree of decentralisation of the services. safeguard the strategic value of Galileo in the Rather, it is the fact that, for the time being, interest of member states.95 The PRS will no mechanism is in place to tackle the atten- have controlled access. dant management and optimisation chal- lenges that follow from decentralisation. Thus, there is no operational function or Service Description mechanism in existence that coordinates the six services and involves all the relevant Free of charge for all users, stakeholders, notably those with the most Galileo Open featuring excellent posi- direct link to the users. If the European Service (OS) tioning and timing per- Commission wants to ensure that all strategic formance. benefits materialise in the long term, this issue must be addressed in a way that is Will deliver guaranteed supported by all other institutional stake- enhanced performance, holders in the Copernicus programme: ESA, Galileo Safety including a key integrity EUMETSAT, EEA and the member states. of Life (SoL) function, i.e. a warning of Service system failure alarming 3.1.2 Galileo users when certain accu- For Galileo, the mechanisms developed to racy levels cannot be met. encourage user uptake and benefit optimisa- Access to two additional tion were also conceived in the form of differ- ent services. Whereas the services in Coper- Galileo Com- encrypted and guaranteed nicus are segmented thematically, those for mercial Service signals, delivering a higher Galileo will be tailored to the requirements (CS) data throughput rate and and demands of users. This has resulted in increased accuracy. the definition of four different services as summarised in table 5 below. The Galileo Will provide position and Open Service (OS) will be the most used Galileo Public timing to specific users service of the four as it will offer excellent Regulated Ser- requiring a high continuity positioning and timing performance to all vice (PRS) of service, with controlled users worldwide free of charge. For critical access. transport applications such as aviation and maritime navigation, the Galileo Safety of Life Will help to forward dis- (SoL) Service was devised. It will deliver, on Search and tress signals to a rescue a guaranteed basis, enhanced performance Rescue Service coordination centre by over the OS through its key integrity function that will warn users when it fails to meet (SAR) detecting emergency sig- certain accuracy margins.93 This allows users nals. to correctly estimate the accuracy and thus 96 reliability of their exact location fix. The Gali- Table 5: Overview of the Different Galileo Services. leo Commercial Service (CS) will enable the creation of value added services through its Although the implementation of the Galileo higher performance. To achieve this, the ser- programme witnessed some delays in its vice uses a combination of two encrypted early planning phase, the deployment phase signals for a higher data transmission rate is now steadily progressing and full opera- and higher accuracy authenticated data. The tional capacity is expected around 2020. service will be available for a fee.94 Finally, Since the overall capacity is highly dependent the Galileo Public Regulated Service (PRS) upon the integrity of the constellation, Gali- will make use of interference mitigation tech- leo’s implementation is following a phased nologies in order to provide a higher level of approach. During the In-Orbit Validation protection against threats to Galileo signals (IOV) phase the satellite’s Middle Earth Orbit such as those coming from jamming or (MEO) was characterised and the perform- spoofing. This will make PRS signals more ance of the critical payloads’ capacities was robust during crisis times and is intended to tested in outer space for the first time. At the end of the IOV phase, in March 2013, ESA managed to get a first position fix using four 93 “Galileo Safety of Life” 2011. European Space Agency satellites. The transition from IOV to Initial 11 March 2015. http://www.navipedia.net/index.php/Galileo_Safety_of_Life _(SoL) 95 “Galileo Public Regulated Service” 2011. European 94 “Galileo Commercial Service” 2011. European Space Space Agency 11 March 2015. Agency 11 March 2015. http://www.navipedia.net/index.php/Galileo_Public_Regula http://www.navipedia.net/index.php/Galileo_Commercial_S ted_Service_(PRS) ervice_(CS) 96 Authors’ visualisation.
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Operational Capability (IOC) is now taking business development, such as the non-profit place. Once the IOC phase is reached, the organisation Galileo Services.98 Open Service, Search and Rescue and Public Because of the actions taken by the European Regulated Service will become available with Council, the GSA seems now to be in an ex- initial performances.97 As the constellation is cellent position to perform its assigned tasks expanded in the following years, the services under the EU mandate. The question of gov- will be further validated and made available ernance in the European context is, however, until Full Operational Capability (FOC) is wider than taking care of operational tasks reached. and outreach. Similar to the situation in the The development of four services with differ- case of Copernicus, the governance of Galileo ent performance characteristics was a very with respect to benefit optimisation is also sensible decision from the perspective of very much linked to the involvement of play- benefit optimisation. Not only does it respond ers at international level as well as the gov- to the differentiated needs of various user ernance support for Galileo coming from categories, it also enables Europe to generate within the EU itself – in particular the policy direct revenues on a commercial basis whilst designed by the European Commission. offering a free public GNSS service. In order In terms of the latter, it is key that the EU to link Galileo signals with the needs of users develops a strategic roadmap to build on its and to stimulate user uptake, the European Galileo programme that goes beyond merely GNSS Agency (GSA) was established by the stimulating user uptake through the devel- European Council in 2004. The GSA runs a opment of certain services and business de- number of initiatives to achieve this purpose. velopment support as currently offered by First, it stimulates user uptake by increasing the GSA itself. The EU, for example, could, in awareness of European GNSS Programmes various economic fields, ensure that ambi- and applications in User Forums and beyond tious binding targets are defined at EU and and it develops tools (i.e. best practices, Member State level thus requiring new ter- roadmaps, harmonised user cases, user re- restrial technologies to be developed and quirements etc.) to be used in advisory ser- integrated into European society and the vices and education to improve awareness economy. To this effect, adequate R&D and among users about how GNSS technology implementation funds should be made avail- can contribute to their business. Second, it is able. This is especially necessary for certain responsible for the design and the enabling of areas of investment where private markets services corresponding to the needs of Euro- will not easily go because of the high invest- pean users. In addition to this, it also takes ment cost and uncertain return on invest- on the role of an intermediate body. It pro- ment. Examples in this category include vides, for instance, grants to support the automated farming (which is becoming in- development of applications in certain areas creasingly relevant due to the declining work- and it oversees the procurement of certain force in the agricultural sector) and inte- services related to Galileo operations such as grated safety systems for air, road, rail and security, ICT support and quality manage- maritime transport. These kinds of R&D areas ment services. This is closely related to the will require considerable institutional de- development of a sustainable and commer- mand-pull to materialise, even in the long cially viable downstream industry that bene- term. fits from support in the development of new applications and value added services. The For the proper functioning of Galileo the in- latter is key in the generation of pan- ternational governance aspect is essential. In European socioeconomic benefits. Now that fact, a key element in the expected accuracy the constellation is being deployed in orbit, for end users is the fact that Galileo signals the GSA is steadily increasing its operational will be compatible with existing GPS and capabilities and acquiring expertise in the GLONASS signals.99 The range of radio fre- fields relevant for these operational tasks. quencies to be used by different GNSS con- Interestingly, some further organisations stellations was defined by the International were also established with the objective of Telecommunications Union’s (ITU) Bureau for stimulating downstream technologies and Radio Communications. International consul-
98 “What is GS?” 2015. Galileo Services 11 March 2015. http://www.galileo- services.org/what_is_gs/what_is_gs.html 99 “The Results are In: Galileo Increases the Accuracy of Location Based Services” 27 May 2014 GSA 11 Mar. 2015 97 “What is Galileo” 2015. European Space Agency 27 Aug. 2015 http://www.gsa.europa.eu/news/results-are-galileo- http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Navigation/The_future_- increases-accuracy-location-based-services _Galileo/What_is_Galileo
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tations between representatives of GNSS neurship (SUNRISE) initiative.100 This raises providers, however, take place in the context the question as to whether and how Europe of the International Committee on GNSS could use this capacity in the long run by (ICG). This informal body was established by leveraging it into an ICG context so that the GNSS Action Team within the COPUOS European users and other users worldwide framework following the recommendations of can be involved in the formulation of re- the UNISPACE III Conference held in 1999. quirements for the global coordination of GNSS constellations. So far decisions within the ICG have been taking place through consultations based upon a ‘best practices’ approach. This implies 3.1.3 Validating Benefits at the Policy Level that the different GNSS providers coordinate their systems on a voluntary basis, bearing in In parallel to the optimisation of socioeco- mind that all systems have to coexist with nomic benefits downstream for citizens, en- each other. A first priority of the ICG will be terprises and governments at national and the phase of operations in which all GNSS local level, it is also crucial that the European systems currently under deployment will be Union reaps the full potential of Galileo and working in conjunction. It will need to be Copernicus services for its more strategic assured that all systems are compatible with policy objectives. Such benefits generally rely each other on an interoperable basis, free of on more hybrid forms of GNSS and EO capa- interferences. In the long run, in the post bilities and they are more centralised within 2020 time frame, it seems advisable that the the European institutions. different GNSS providers around the world Since the EU consists of different institutional reflect on the possibility of pooling expertise actors, the roles the operational programmes to increase global GNSS performance – on a can fulfil play out differently in each case. For voluntary basis. Currently, GNSS capabilities the European Commission the relevance is are considered a strong strategic advantage mainly in the areas of policy monitoring and and thus related security constraints exist. As reinforcement and the identification of needs multiple players deploy trusted GNSS constel- for new actions to achieve EU objectives. For lations, however, the dynamic for consulta- the European Parliament, as for the EC, the tion and coordination changes for the better. operational flagships in space could also be Currently, the various players are building up helpful in identifying needs and proposing experience, know-how and, not insignifi- related policies based upon state-of-the-art cantly, the comparative advantage of one and updated information in a whole range of partner having a specific strategic capability fields such as, for instance, security, envi- decreases, which in turn affects the security ronment, energy, resources and mobility. For dynamic underlying systems that have dual the European Council and the Council of the use applications. In this sense, it can be European Union, the constellations will be hoped that in the long term certain systems relevant for the evolution of EU mandates will at least be coordinated to improve per- over time, for instance in the areas of foreign formance. In the much longer term, certain affairs and the common defence and security systems might even be integrated in one way policy. or another, in order to save costs of what by then will be continuous global operational For this to materialise in an optimal fashion, services. the operational programmes must be able to feed information back to the political level. Looking at the architecture of the ICG it is More specifically, the question to be asked is striking that there is no clear methodology how the possibilities opened up by both sys- for interfacing with users yet, which is sur- tems, both individually and jointly, can be prising given the widespread commercial and communicated clearly to the political level, private use of navigation services. The ICG including: the President of the European would be well advised to introduce mecha- Council, the High Representative of the Union nisms allowing user communities to be con- for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the sulted in the decision-making process to relevant EU Commissioners, the Members of make sure that important voices are heard, the European Parliament, National Ministers such as the ones of end-users. In this re- of the European Council and the Heads of spect, it is very positive that the GSA is ac- Government/State of member states). Up to tively involved in engaging users in the iden- today, the programmes have witnessed a tification of user requirements through its development that has been mainly politically Strengthening User Networks for Require- driven since they were conceived and ap- ment Investigation and Supporting Entrepre- proved by politicians based upon the general
100 “About SUNRISE” SUNRISE 16 Dec. 2014. Web. http://www.sunrise-project.eu/index.php/about-sunrise
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needs they had identified as described in the at the forefront of technological development previous chapter. As the programmes are in these fields. The point is, however, that for becoming operational, it would be beneficial programmes of this order of magnitude the to bring more clarity to politicians on the innovation strategy should be developed in a following technical and practical specificities: holistic fashion in which the different compo- (1) which policy related support functions are nents – which are managed by different ac- currently being served by use of the data tors – are properly attuned. The latter implies from the flagship programmes (2) which pol- that each component within the innovation icy related support functions have become ecosystem disposes of a critical mass and possible by using the data and services pro- that the right channels for interaction with vided by the flagship programmes in space other components are established. (but are not yet in place), (3) which policy related support functions are not possible due to the architecture of the current constella- 3.2.1 The Components in an Innovation Ecosys- tions, (4) what might become technically tem possible in future generations and, (5) what To see how this plays out in operational pub- cannot ever be provided by space-based in- lic programmes of this size and with such a frastructure in the fields of GNSS and EO. potential impact, one should distinguish the Doing so would ensure that policy actions four components in an innovation ecosystem enabled by the operational Galileo and Co- based upon the actor pursuing innovation pernicus constellations will find their way (top-down versus bottom-up) and the seg- more easily to the political level where deci- ment in the value chain (upstream or down- sions are made, and that more opportunities stream). This gives rise to a matrix that is are identified overall, which in turn increases displayed in table 6 below. the benefits derived from the systems.
Top-Down Bottom-Up 3.2 Creating an Innovative Approach Approach Ecosystem for Operational Upstream Innovation Innovation Segment for new in- performed by Services frastructure, the private hardware or sector and From an overall perspective, Galileo and Co- system con- users on the pernicus will be able to cover the fields of figurations constellation’s GNSS and Earth Observation with state-of- planned and infrastructure, the-art capabilities. Therefore, no dedicated managed by hardware and new programmes will be necessary for either the system’s components or domain. But there will be questions as to how (co-) pro- additional best to ensure programme evolution, espe- prietors. hardware using cially because both will be operational con- its output. stellations with a long term outlook and thus follow-up generations of infrastructure. Downstream Innovation Innovation Segment for new ser- performed by As opposed to the channels for benefit opti- vices and SMEs and us- misation discussed in the previous section applications ers on services (which are concerned with the current poten- planned and and applica- tial of the flagship programmes), the innova- managed by tions based on tion dynamic underlying the constellations the system’s the constella- focuses on the long term. From a sustainabil- (co-) pro- tion’s output. ity perspective, it should be ensured that prietors. both flagship programmes are able to evolve and increase in performance over time and Table 6: Innovation Matrix Based upon the Type of Actor 101 that they become an engine in spurring and Segment in the Value Chain. strong, diverse and competitive GNSS and EO sectors in Europe. Without proper avenues Top-Down Innovation in the Upstream Segment for moving in this direction, the constellations The upper left box in the table refers to the risk becoming obsolete and Europe would no kind of innovation concerned with the up- longer be in a position to reap the full socio- stream segment of the value chain that is economic and political benefits of Copernicus pursued on a top-down basis. It is top-down and Galileo. Clearly, the partners involved in in the sense that its planning and execution the establishment of both programmes are processes are decided and managed by the highly aware of the importance of innovation and are using their expertise to keep Europe 101 Authors’ own visualisation.
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actors responsible for the provision of the required to ensure strong innovation potential flagship programmes and therefore it is situ- in the evolution of the Copernicus services. ated in the institutional sphere. In the case of One of the main reasons for this concern GNSS and EO, this type of innovation is taken goes back to the high degree of decentralisa- care of mainly by ESA. More specifically, the tion, as discussed in the previous section on Agency runs an optional Earth Observation the maximisation of socioeconomic and politi- Envelope Programme through which it takes cal benefits. Since there is no central opera- care of the development and launch of new tional authority that can pull the threads to- types of EO spacecraft that meet the needs of gether, much of the tacit knowledge related the scientific community and by which it to operational activities and the daily interac- takes care of all general preparatory activities tion with users would not be captured in a for future EO missions.102 This programme is holistic fashion. In turn, this complicates con- not specifically focused on innovation for tinuous evaluation of the services on a fully Copernicus per se, but the innovation in informed basis, and might result in the op- terms of remote sensing technologies to portunities for new or hybrid services in the which it gives rise might eventually, over the future being left unidentified or designed with very long term, be included directly or indi- an incomplete scope. rectly in the programme’s constellation. ESA’s European GNSS Evolution Programme under- Bottom-Up Innovation in the Upstream Seg- takes R&D intended to sustain, evolve and ment broaden GNSS-related technological know- how in Europe and prepares the replenish- The upper right quadrant in the table, which ment, evolution and upgrades of the Euro- refers to the bottom-up innovation in the pean EGNOS and Galileo constellations to upstream segment, deals with technological meet future needs, as identified in coordina- innovation created by parties other than sys- tion with the EC and other stakeholders.103 tems’ proprietors. This type of innovation is This type of centralised and planned innova- not necessarily only directly related to the tion is essential for the programmes’ long- technical innovation in the flagships constel- term evolution for two reasons. First, ESA lations. In fact, it is mainly relevant for creat- has the level of expertise to develop technol- ing an overall environment for innovative EO ogy demonstrator missions and test them and GNSS sectors in Europe. In terms of ac- well before they eventually translate into tors the most direct example in this category components of the operational constellations. is private sector involvement but, to a certain Second, the Agency’s scope enables it to extent, some academic research is also work- continuously evaluate the systems’ overall ing through this bottom-up approach. From architecture and to define, steer and imple- an overall perspective, Europe has a fair ment structural changes over the course of number of innovative space hardware manu- multiple generations of satellites. facturers performing R&D activities on GNSS and EO satellites and components. As these Top-Down Innovation in the Downstream Seg- are relatively new sectors and thus are still ment maturing, however, some elements are still of concern, as described below. The lower left quadrant in the matrix regards In Earth Observation the trend towards innovation in services and applications taken commercialisation in the manufacturing in- care of by the institutions that manage the dustry in Europe – which is essential in creat- flagship programmes. In the case of Galileo ing an innovative ecosystem – started taking this task is mainly fulfilled by the GSA, which hold in the 1980s, after operational activities – as indicated in the previous section – over- in the field of imaging were leveraged to the sees the provision of the four predefined Gali- (semi-) private sector. The growing commer- leo services and manages and outsources cial and institutional demand for EO in turn R&D activities related to new applications and instigated market reforms as a result of services. For Copernicus the situation is dif- which many companies became subsidiaries, ferent. In terms of the operational govern- merged or became part of consortia. Conse- ance tasks provided under the auspices of the quently, Europe’s three major System Inte- EC, some major steps have been taken in- grators (Airbus Group, Thales Alenia Space cluding the distribution of operational tasks and OHB) now manage diverse portfolios, all among different service providers. Still, there of which include intense R&D activities in the seems to be an understanding within the area of remote sensing technologies. In fact European EO community that more action is they are strongly involved in the Copernicus constellation, either by manufacturing and 102 European Space Agency, European Space Technology integrating components, or by providing Co- Master Plan 12th Edition. Noordwijk: ESA Communication pernicus-qualified contributions to the system Production Office. 2014. from other sources. In spite of the strong 103 Ibid.
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European involvement in EO hardware inno- as a result of the overall increase of innova- vation, a remaining issue is that Small and tion. For these reasons the upstream seg- Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) remain ment will require a stronger SME involvement fairly underrepresented and far from reaching in the European EO sector. their full potential. This is due to a number of In the field of GNSS the upstream market entry barriers. Entry barriers are a general segment too is mainly taken care of by the issue in the space industry. A couple of years large system integrators. The innovation dy- ago, it was estimated that of the 700,000 namics in this area of satellite navigation, SMEs in Europe that are developing high however, play out differently compared to technology, only about 1600 are registered EO. The space segment of Galileo, being an with ESA as potential suppliers.104 Although it integrated constellation of similar satellites, is is very hard to assess the overall situation much more characterised by monolithic sys- accurately because of the complexity in the tems and thus less modular in structure than added-value chain with its mix of contractors, the Copernicus constellation – in which addi- subcontractors and suppliers, it demonstrates tional or new components can be changed, a recognised need for increased SME in- updated or added. Therefore SME involve- volvement in space. For remote sensing a ment in space hardware manufacturing will reinforcing element is that most EO hardware remain more relevant for subcontracting, and consists of space qualified components and less for the creation of fast-paced innovation therefore is less conducive for mass produc- in additional independent space systems. The tion – as opposed to GNSS receivers or satel- European Commission is aware of the limited lite telecom and broadcast devices. Still, the room for manoeuvre in terms of innovation market dynamic for SME involvement is and is trying to address it in a more indirect changing for the better. First, the market for fashion. In January 2010 the EC awarded the Earth Observation services and applications is contract for the first 14 Galileo satellites growing at a steady pace and this trend is within the frame of initial operational capabil- expected to persist for the foreseeable future. ity. The EC stated that the procurement of Second, the miniaturisation trend in remote the Galileo satellite series would be done in sensing technologies will bring the manufac- tranches and that the winner of each tranche turing process of EO satellites within reach of would be selected based on which company more SMEs, both in terms of the scope of provides the best value for money. At the engineering and cost. At the same time, same time, however, the EC also added that these Nano-, Pico- and Femto-satellites will it would follow a strategy of double sourcing often fly in constellations with a higher num- so as to lower risks in terms of delivery tim- ber of satellites, which reduces the necessity ing and, at the same time, increase flexibility. of large system integrator involvement, and By doing so, the EC is pursuing a procure- makes it possible for multiple SMEs to manu- ment strategy that favours industrial diversi- facture small satellites in parallel. From an fication as part of its industrial policy of com- innovation point of view, this development is petitive dialogue. The latter assures that over highly desirable and should therefore be fos- time multiple large system integrators will tered. As new types of EO infrastructure and remain involved in the development of GNSS capabilities complement the current middle technologies and therefore Europe will draw and large scale R&D missions and operational on diverse innovation channels. This central- systems, technological diversity within the ised innovation of GNSS upstream technolo- remote sensing sector will increase and more gies is in strong contrast to the decentralised cross-fertilisation between systems and their innovation dynamics further downstream. output will arise. Also the increasing impor- tance of smaller missions (in terms of satel- Bottom-Up Innovation in the Downstream lite price, mass and size) will impact how innovation is done, since it means that pro- Segment duction cycles will become shorter. This The downstream bottom-up approach is part makes it possible to narrow the gap between of the lower right quadrant, which refers to terrestrial and space-based technology inno- innovation created by the private sector in vation, make it possible for needs to be ad- applications and services. The increasing dressed faster and, it might increase the demand and use of satellite navigation sig- number of innovation iterations over a given nals has spurred development in the manu- time. Finally, the number of players within facturing of GNSS chipsets, devices and ser- the market for EO manufacturing will increase vices and content in Europe. As a result this sector is maturing at a very fast pace and competition and product innovation have 104 “Improving SME Participation in Europe’s Space Busi- increased significantly over the last decade. ness” 4 Apr. 2007 European Space Agency. 11 April 2015. According to a GSA study on the GNSS mar- http://www.esa.int/About_Us/Industry/Improving_SME_part icipation_in_Europe_s_space_business/%28print%29 ket, this trend is expected to continue and a
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result, Galileo will be able to offer added improve the public-private interface, optimise value in the growing GNSS market segments the existing approach of research and devel- of location-based services, road, aviation, opment in EO and, increase awareness and rail, maritime, agriculture, and surveying.105 understanding of the potential of EO data and The commercial potential of GNSS services services so as to restructure the market and 107 and applications and the related hardware stimulate further user uptake. have strongly spurred the downstream pri- vate sector in Europe. A database compiled by the GSA reveals strong pan-European SME 3.2.2 The Flows in an Innovation Ecosystem involvement and capabilities within compo- In addition to having both critical mass and nent manufacturing, value added services capabilities in each segment as described and system integration, ensuring that GNSS above, it is also necessary to ensure that signals can be used in daily activities and for technological innovation and the information 106 a whole range of socioeconomic activities. required hereto can flow easily between dif- ferent actors and segments. This gives rises In Earth Observation, the markets for prod- to hybrid forms of innovation that are more ucts and services are perhaps more seg- open, less stove-piped and thus combine the mented and structured around more differen- best of many worlds. To this effect proper tiated types of use. The largest players in this mechanisms to make the borders between field are mainly private and active in im- the quadrants permeable need to be present. agery. This trend of commercialisation in remote sensing, which took off when the In many respects communication between French space agency CNES founded SPOT the different types of actors works very well. Image in 1982, has now resulted in a number The biggest challenge is to make communica- of operators with constellations that can offer tion between industrial and scientific actors high resolution imagery from orbit to institu- and the system proprietors more effective. tional and private players in Europe and be- This requires draw-in mechanisms, i.e. how yond. Most notable providers in this respect well can the institutional players involve, or include Airbus Defence and Space (which now take into account, the private players and operates the SPOT satellites and is the exclu- end-users in their top-down innovation plan- sive distributor of data from the very-high ning processes. Thus a crucial issue in terms resolution dual use Pleiades satellites), the of the flagship programmes is how opera- German company BlackBridge AG, a geospa- tional user experiences and user require- tial information company using its SSTL-built ments can be formulated, gathered and satellite constellation to deliver rapid scan- communicated to the (co-) proprietors of ning services, and DMC International Imag- Galileo and Copernicus in a transparent and ing, an SSTL-owned company managing the efficient way. Time is both an essential driver Disaster Monitoring Constellation serving the and constraint in this respect. International Charter for Space and Major Disasters. Thanks to digitalisation in remote Galileo will start offering its first services sensing technology and society in general, from 2016 and full completion of the system more companies are now integrating and in its 30-satellite configuration (24 opera- processing data from different sources to tional and 6 active spares) is expected by offer added value geo-information services 2020. With an expected individual satellite and consulting. Although a number of Euro- lifetime of over 12 years and the first satel- pean companies are active in this area and lites of full operational capability having been have interesting growth perspectives, in launched in 2014, a new generation of satel- Europe as a whole has there is still room for lites should be placed in MEO around the further improving the exploitation of invest- mid-2020s. Because of the considerable lead- ments in this area in terms of mass market time, the European Commission has therefore penetration and turnover – especially when now started the process of reflection on the compared to the EO services and applications requirements for Galileo Second Generation. industry in the United States. Although ac- More precisely, the Research and Technology cording to a 2015 EARSC paper European Development phase is currently taking place, companies and actors should not necessarily consisting both of mission and system evolu- try to copy the business models of American tion. By the end of 2015 or early in 2016, a players in this respect, it suggested that decision regarding the second generation is Europe should leverage Copernicus more and
105 GSA, GNSS Market Report, Issue 4 – March 2015. 107 “European Geospatial services: Developing the Private 106 For a complete overview, see: GSA Database Public Sector Capability” April 2015 European Association of with Descriptions, online: Remote Sensing Companies. 4 May 2015 http://www.gsa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/GSA_Extract_ http://earsc.org/file_download/238/EARSC+views+on+dow database_public_with_descriptions.xlsx nsteam+development+final.pdf
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Figure 2: European GNSS Evolution.108
expected, which should then be translated the same time stimulating a process of con- into concrete mission requirements by 2017, vergence within the community. The latter paving the way for the infrastructure devel- makes it easier for the EC (and ESA) to in- opment phase afterwards. corporate user requirements into the design of later generations of constellations and in The task of organising user communities and the development of new applications and interacting with them on a structural basis services. was assigned to the GSA, which undertakes a number of activities with this objective. Sup- For Copernicus, drawing-in downstream re- ported by FP7 funds, the GSA is building user quirements to plan for innovation and later communities in a number of ways, includ- generations of Sentinels is slightly more com- ing:109 plex because of the involvement of a number of proprietor institutions and organisations • By uniting key stakeholders in specific and the greater diversity of the space com- user groups represented through user fo- ponent. The consultation of Copernicus’ data rums; users and user communities for the purpose • By encouraging these stakeholders to of involving them in the requirement gather- cooperate in order to collect, consolidate ing processes is also funded through several and share views and formulate require- FP7 programmes. Still, the situation is quite ments; different from the approach taken in GNSS. Because of the high degree of decentralisa- • By encouraging users to issue advice and tion among the operators of different Sentinel recommendations to the GSA and the satellites and the services provided, the European Commission on technical is- mechanisms for user involvement are also sues, business development, regulation diffuse. For the programmes dedicated to and standardisation; atmosphere, climate and marine monitoring, • By creating a European network of GNSS efforts that are currently managed through based innovation initiatives in certain ap- FP7 initiatives will be merged into the Part- plication areas such as agriculture. nership for User Requirements Evaluation (PURE), a programme managed by • By supporting the development of a Gali- EUMETSAT for the EC. For imagery and radar leo “applications store”, which can be the EC has decided to outsource the user found at: http://galileo-apps.sunrise- requirements guiding processes to industry project.eu/ through ITTs rather than leaving it with ESA, leaving the ESA role somewhat undefined and This integrated approach with regard to com- putting industry in a potentially compromised munity building among users and user groups position. has a number of particular benefits in terms of innovation. First, it makes the users more Issues arise as a result of such a decentral- connected and better networked, which is ised gathering of user requirements. Since essential in creating an innovation ecosystem the systemic integrity of the system must be that is characterised by intense interaction guaranteed when reconciling new and exist- and exchange of information. Second, it ing continuity requirements, a decentralised makes the users’ voices more heard while at method of gathering them risks thwarting the definition of overall system priorities and the constellation’s composition in the long term. 108 Zegers Tanja, “EGNSS Evolution, infrastructure related The structural segmentation also creates a R&D activities” Presentation. Horizon 2020 Space Info barrier for the many users that have trans- Day. Vilnius, Lithuania. 12 December 2013 versal requirements. The presence of a cen- 109 Ibid.
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tral operational authority would be able to satellite navigation, the Horizon 2020 pro- address the management challenges that gramme uses simplified rules, managed by result from this high degree of decentralisa- the GSA, to provide opportunities for the tion, but, as was indicated earlier, a cohesive development of applications for use with central authority is not yet present in the EGNOS and Galileo. Copernicus programme architecture. This For the Geo-Information service industry absence impedes a proper flow of information some issues remain of concern. As indicated from the users to the institutions that take in the table on the Copernicus Services at the care of the technical, managerial and opera- beginning of this chapter, the EC has dele- tional components in Copernicus. Moreover, a gated the authority of procurement for the cohesive operational function would help a different services to various “entrusted enti- great deal in managing and supporting the ties” in the European institutional landscape. commercialisation of applications and the This approach was intended to make the de- general creation of benefits – acting as a velopment and implementation processes centralised node in the entire EO ecosystem. efficient by making best use of the technical Setting the stage for the next generation of knowledge and competences in Europe. From Copernicus infrastructure in the right way, an effectiveness point of view, however, it is making sure that users and those closest to questionable whether the road taken so far the users are involved in the decision-making will result in strong stimulation of the down- process in the best possible manner, is ur- stream EO sector. In a position paper pub- gent. The benefits of Copernicus are for today lished in September 2014, the European As- and for tomorrow. To optimise both requires sociation of Remote Sensing Companies fresh thinking and new structural approaches. (EARSC) expressed its concerns in this re- How this can be done is the purpose of the spect.111 It stated that without clear guidance ESPI Report “Optimising Europe’s Benefits and imposed rules, strong private sector in- from the Copernicus Programme”, published volvement, and especially by SMEs, will be- in April 2015 - its recommendations remain come unlikely in current circumstances. It 110 valid. recommended that the procurement of Co- A second essential flow for innovation optimi- pernicus Services should be able to benefit sation is determined by the amount of de- from all European strengths: public, private mand pull; the different market support and academic and that to this effect specific mechanisms for R&D in applications and ser- measures needed to be introduced in terms vices set up by the institutions that own and of harmonisation and stimulation of bidding operate the Galileo and Copernicus constella- by more actors. By this approach the EC tions. For GNSS the dynamics of commercial should be able to create hybrid services in markets are more conducive for strong inno- which different actors can leverage their vation. In contrast, the market for EO appli- strengths and expertise to produce more cations and services is still young and thus innovative services that benefit both the pub- lic and private sector, and the European pub- fragile, and therefore governmental initiatives 112 have a role to play in ensuring private sector lic. growth. Over time this stimulation should result in a mature EO sector which should be in a better position to link to the GNSS (and other) sectors, ensuring that both have enough critical mass to become self- sustaining entities within their respective ecosystems. In this regard several initiatives have been established in Europe. ESA has taken an important step by means of its ARTES 20 initiative: the Integrated Applica- tions Promotion (IAP) programme. IAP fos- ters the use of multiple space assets in order to create new solutions and as such is exactly aiming at the creation of space related ser- vices and applications in many areas, includ- ing GNSS and EO. In addition to this, the EC has established a number of initiatives. In
110 Allgeier, H., Eyres, H., Gibson, R., Hulsroj, P. and 111 EARSC Position Paper “EARSC Views on the Pro- Lahcen, A. “Optimising Europe’s Benefits from the Coper- curement of the Copernicus Services” – September 2014, nicus Programme: Addressing the Structural Gaps in http://earsc.org/file_download/211/Copernicus+service+pro Operational Earth Observation” ESPI Report 50. April curement+final.pdf 2015. 112 Ibid.
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4. Towards a New EU Flagship Programme in Space?
With Copernicus and Galileo slated to become candidates have to be explored in more de- fully operational in the near term, institu- tail. tional room will arise to contemplate new EU For Galileo and Copernicus the benefits of EU flagship programmes in space. Considering involvement in the establishment of opera- the long lead time from conception to opera- tional services were fairly clear and straight- tions and the EU desire to get involved more forward in nature. As illustrated in the previ- strongly in outer space, it is advisable to ini- ous chapter, investments in the fields of tiate reflection and discussion on the possible GNSS and operational EO suit the socioeco- options soon. This chapter elaborates on the nomic needs associated with EC’s many pol- possibility and opportunity for the European icy domains. An additional element that sup- Commission to extend its involvement in ported those specific choices is that their outer space beyond Earth Observation and development would in turn spur the devel- global satellite navigation by means of a new opment of industrial capabilities, expertise flagship programme. First, it debates the and non-dependence in these areas. Until the case for and against the initiation of a new initiation of Galileo, Europe had not devel- programme. In doing so, it also explains the oped much technical expertise in the area of generic characteristics of EU flagship pro- satellite navigation systems. In the case of grammes. Subsequently three different can- Copernicus there was a lot of expertise pre- didates for flagship projects are defined, dis- sent in the European institutional landscape cussed, and assessed. and the private sector, but the introduction of broad-based operational EO monitoring ser- vices would increase demand – further spur- 4.1 Debating a New Flagship ring what was already becoming a growing sector with a lot of innovation potential. An- Programme other important fact was that both pro- grammes are operational in nature and as Before addressing the different options for a such they would fall outside ESA’s normal new EU involvement in space, the question mandate of research and development. All should be raised whether the EU should go these elements pointed to EC involvement in down the road of a new flagship programme terms of mandate and expected socioeco- at all. After all, the financial and administra- nomic, strategic and political benefits. tive difficulties that have surrounded the exe- cution of the Copernicus and Galileo pro- The surrounding context and driving forces grammes have cast serious doubts on the for possible new flagship programmes will be viability of the flagship model. Indeed, flag- different from those in the current ones, how- ship programmes are complex undertakings ever. Before one can see how this would play that require prolonged political support and out, a more general question should be ad- financial commitment at the highest levels, dressed. Namely, which elements specifically both at Member State and at EU level. This constitute an EU flagship programme? In implies that new EC initiatives in space answering this question the focus should be should provide demonstrable net benefits for on the generic features that would apply to Europe and that those benefits would be diffi- any flagship programme within an EU con- cult, if not impossible, to achieve in a more text. Although the term “flagship” is an ad- effective way with other actors. In other jective used in EU documents and pro- words, more EC involvement in outer space is grammes of diverse kinds, the concept has not necessarily a given and will have to be never been explicitly defined in an EU policy justified substantively. That said, it should be context. In fact, the use of the term flagship noted that the EC is an actor that is able to in the EU context is not limited to projects leverage political clout and critical mass and and programmes only. The European Com- that therefore it is very well positioned to mission also defines a number of “flagship take up a leading role in certain scenarios. In initiatives”, the thematic focus areas on the order to see whether this would be true for broader level around which its programmes new scenarios of involvement in outer space, are structured. the specificities and context of new flagship
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In terms of funding, like many other signifi- have security implications and thus in turn cant programmes, space is categorised as help the EU in strengthening its role as a part of the Research and Innovation Policy. global political actor. Therefore, involvement The space budget is placed in the commit- and capacity development in this field is ment appropriation “Competitiveness for something to be considered carefully and in a Growth and Jobs”, which is in turn part of the sensitive way. “Smart and Inclusive Growth” section of the Multiannual Financial Framework, in which space has acquired a growing importance 4.1.1 Flagship Constituencies over time. Currently, budgets for space ac- In the following, parameters that should ide- tivities are provided under Framework Pro- ally be served through the establishment gramme 8, also known as Horizon 2020. and/or operations of a new flagship pro- In a generic sense, flagship programmes gramme are described. These parameters will address grand scientific and societal chal- later be used as benchmarks to assess and lenges, which require a common European compare the relevance of potential flagship research effort and sustained support for a candidates. All parameters are captured in development period of at least ten years. Table 7, which makes a distinction between They represent science-driven, large-scale, economic and social benefits on the one hand multidisciplinary research initiatives oriented and, strategic and political benefits on the towards a unifying goal, which is expected to other. The first category comprises the pa- have a transformational impact on science rameters that relate to the generation of and technology and substantial benefits for more tangible benefits and how citizens, European competitiveness and society. The commercial companies and governmental goals of such initiatives are visionary and actors throughout Europe would enjoy them. highly ambitious in terms of scientific chal- The second category contains indicators that lenges, resources required and coordination are less tangible in terms of monetary value of efforts. In terms of implementation and but are crucial in that they capture degree to operations, they require cooperation between which the benefits would propagate through a range of disciplines, communities and pro- the web of EU policies and interests. In this grammes, including national and European sense they are benefits that would mainly – initiatives. In this respect they are typically or even entirely – arise as a result of explicit established through partnerships that enable EU involvement and thus they are important effective coordination of joint efforts feeding in assessing whether further EU involvement the whole value-chain and boosting European in space through flagship programmes would innovation.113 be a sensible decision. It should be noted that the distinction between the two catego- There is a considerable difference between ries is not absolute as certain parameters of non-space and space related flagship pro- one category also have features of the other. jects. Whereas in general R&D projects in the This, however, is not necessarily problematic EU can receive flagship status if they match a for the assessment because the benefits are 114 number of strategic criteria, the flagship not added-up, merged or calculated. Rather, projects in space – together with some other they are illustrated and assessed in a com- wide-scope initiatives – have grown much parative and narrative fashion. more from a top-down perspective. There are multiple reasons for this centralised ap- Based on the above, the following sections proach. First, flagship programmes in space will discuss whether and to what degree fu- are not only objectives, they are – in the first ture candidates for EU flagship programmes instance – means to support the EU in the in space can be identified. For the practical creation, monitoring, evaluation and en- purpose of this study three potential candi- forcement of many of its policy domains. dates were selected: (1) Space Exploration, Second, space programmes– in contrast to (2) Access to Space and, (3) Space for Secu- some other flagship programmes – have a rity. This selection is based on a number of special status in that they generate capabili- interrelated considerations. First, all three ties that serve strategic purposes that also candidates– together with the current flag- ship capabilities – are part of every compre-
113 hensive space programme as pursued by European Commission. “Future Emerging Technology – major geopolitical actors worldwide. There- FET Flagships”. European Commission Directorate Gen- eral for Communications Networks, Content and Technol- fore they would reinforce the political objec- ogy. Brussels. 2013. tives the EU has set for its space ambitions, 114 For an overview of the requirements, funding condi- namely the creation of a “European space tions, and procedures for the submission of flagship pro- programme”. Second, in all three cases– to a jects see FFG “Technical Guidelines for Flagship Projects”. certain extent at least – there is room for May 2013. https://www.ffg.at/sites/default/files/dok/guidelines_flagship added value generated by EU involvement _projects_v20.pdf that could not be fully brought by an inter-
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governmental approach. Third, exploration 4.2 Identifying Potential and access to space were already identified by European Union institutions as areas in Candidates: Space Explora- which Europe could be interested in taking on a leading role or at least expanding its cur- tion rent role. Finally, the rationale for an EU in- With the EC already actively involved in sev- volvement is different in each of these do- eral aspects of the policy planning process, mains. For all three candidates the following space exploration appears on paper to be the sections will describe their current status, as most favoured candidate for a new flagship well as the possible rationale for EU involve- programme.116 The commitment of the Union ment by means of a new flagship pro- to playing a more active and visible role in gramme. international space exploration initiatives is rooted in a number of EU-ESA Council Reso- lutions and EC Communications, all of which Economic and Social Benefits consider space exploration as one of the main Bring benefits to a large number of users in priorities for the European Space Policy. The society and the economy. case for the inclusion of space exploration within the space mandate of the Commission Support diverse segments and regions of has been reinforced by the EC’s Space Advi- European society and the economy. sory Group (SAG), which in 2010 issued a Become a tool in spurring economic growth in policy proposal strongly recommending the the long run. introduction of Space Exploration as a new European Flagship programme for the 2014- Contribute to making the European scientific 2020 period.117 research and engineering communities more productive and efficient, and establishing new networks. 4.2.1 Status of Europe’s Space Exploration Pro- gramme Strategic and Political Benefits Europe has a rich and longstanding tradition Give Europe a strong or leading role in the of space exploration, be it with robotic or domain and offer a cutting-edge advantage. manned missions. Over the past 40 years, Serve geopolitical objectives: autonomy, non- European activities in this field have been dependence and strengthen EU international mainly led by the efforts of ESA, in addition presence. to those of several national space agencies. ESA has embarked on several successful pro- Advance Europe’s diplomatic goals and sup- grammes on its own or in partnership with port the foreign policy action of the EU. other space agencies (SMART-1, Mars Ex- Enable the EU to become more competent in press, Venus-Express, Cassini-Huygens, addressing a range of policy needs. Rosetta, etc.), gaining key competences and demonstrating that it is a trustworthy partner Drive advances and innovation in science, in large space exploration endeavours. In the technology, engineering and programme manned spaceflight field the significant con- management. tributions provided by Europe to the ISS pro- gramme such as the Automated Transfer Stimulate European integration. Vehicles (ATVs), the Columbus Orbital Labo- Create a strong European brand that could ratory and other ISS infrastructures elements stimulate a European sense of identity and like the Node 2, the Node 3,118 the Cupola – citizenship. and the European astronaut corps – should be mentioned. Importantly, all these activi- Table 7: Parameters for Flagship Constituencies.115 ties have created an excellent “heritage” permitting serious consideration of future European involvement in human missions beyond LEO. An additional and complemen- tary asset for Europe is the wide and robust
116 Within this report, the term “space exploration” is used 115 See, among the others, European Commission. “Future to indicate both robotic and human activities for the dis- Emerging Technology –FET Flagships”. European Com- covery of extra-terrestrial environments. mission Directorate General for Communications Net- 117 Space Advisory Group of the European Commission. works, Content and Technology. Brussels. 2013. Space “Space Exploration, a new European flagship Programme. Advisory Group of the European Commission. “Space European Commission Framework Programme 7 – Space Exploration, a new European flagship Programme. Euro- Theme. 10 October 2010. pean Commission Framework Programme 7 – Space 118 The Node 3, also known as Tranquillity, although not a Theme. 10 October 2010. European module, was built for NASA by ASI.
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network of cooperative relations ESA has Ambitious new plans for a European space built through the years with all other space exploration programme re-emerged in 2001, actors worldwide, which has put Europe in a with the presentation of the Aurora pro- strong position to promote and harmonise gramme at the ESA ministerial Council in broader international initiatives in space ex- Edinburgh. The objective of the Aurora pro- ploration. gramme was to formulate and then imple- ment a European long-term plan for the ro- As noted by several analysts, European suc- botic and human exploration of the solar sys- cesses and reliability as a partner can to tem. The programme was intended as the some extent be explained by the different European building block in a broader interna- nature of the objectives it has pursued in its tional effort for the robotic and human explo- space programmes: unlike other leading ration of Mars, with the Moon as an important space nations that have made space explora- stepping-stone.121 tion a national priority to suit political and strategic agendas, European space pro- The long-term vision embedded within the grammes have been traditionally science- Aurora programme was to be derived from based and technologically-focused with little the human spaceflight experience on the ISS political concern. This pragmatic approach and the development of robotic planetary has in turn typically protected public funds exploration. While the former was to be con- and space projects from the political volatility tinued and enhanced so that human space- experienced in other countries.119 However flight could be extended beyond LEO, the the programmatic stability typically ensured latter was to be pursued throughout the by this approach has not allowed Europe to Aurora Programme with the aim of extending take the next step and pursue even more capabilities towards larger spacecraft, suit- ground-breaking initiatives, such as an able for exploration of the solar system. Ac- autonomous human spaceflight programme. cording to ESA, the intertwined development of capabilities in the two strands would have That Europe aspired to become the third eventually resulted in Europe being able to space power, after the USSR and the US, to play a key role in a future international hu- have an independent human spaceflight ca- man mission to Mars.122 The proposed road- pability is evident from the plans for the de- map was rather ambitious and contemplated velopment of the Hermes space-plane a number of robotic missions as well as a adopted by the ESA Council in November human mission to the Moon to demonstrate 1987. In 1992, however, the programme was key life support and habitation technologies, terminated due to the lack of solid financial as well as aspects of crew performance and and political backing: no Hermes shuttle was adaptation, and in situ resources utilisation ever developed and the ambition to possess technologies. independent human space transportation capabilities was put on hold indefinitely.120 As Of this ambitious plan, however, only the a result, Europe depended on NASA’s Space ExoMars mission – an exobiology mission to Shuttle and Roscosmos’ Soyuz to launch its send a rover to Mars to search for traces of astronaut corps. ESA utilisation of the ISS life and characterise the nature of the surface currently comprises a number of experiment environment – was formally approved at the series in medical, biomedical and physiologi- ESA Ministerial Council of December 2005. cal sciences that are also intended as pre- This mission has subsequently been much paratory activities to pave the way for future delayed (also due to NASA´s withdrawal), re- human spaceflight beyond LEO. In this re- defined as two missions, and is currently gard, ESA is making progress in the study being implemented in collaboration with and development of the EXPErimental Re- Roscosmos and slated to launch in 2016 and entry Testbed (EXPERT) and of the Micro- 2018.123 As for the human part of the pro- Ecological Life Support System Alternative (MELiSSA). 121 Messina, Piero; et al. “The Aurora Programme: Europe’s Framework for Space Exploration”. ESA Bulletin No. 126 May 2006. 119 Thépaut, Jean-Baptiste. “Analysis of Cooperation Op- 122European Space Agency. “Aurora Roadmap to Mars”. portunities for Europe in Future Space Exploration Pro- 19 December 2003. Web. grammes (COFSEP)”. IAC-12-A3.1.3. Naples.2012. http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Human_Spaceflight/Explo 120 Hermes was to have been part of a manned space flight ration/Aurora_s_roadmap_to_Mars programme and would have been launched using an 123 The 2016 mission will carry the ESA-provided Trace Ariane 5 launcher. The project, as approved in November Gas Orbiter (TGO) and the Entry descent and Landing 1987, had an initial pre-development phase from 1988 to Demonstrator Module (EDM), and will be launched by a 1990, with a green light for full-rate development depend- Russian Proton launcher. The 2018 mission will consist of ing on the outcome of the phase. The project suffered an ESA-provided Carrier Module, bringing the Russian numerous delays and funding issues. It was cancelled in Descent Module and Surface Platform and the ESA Rover 1992 since neither cost nor performance goals could be to Mars. The Rover will investigate the Mars surface achieved. searching for past and present signs of life. The scientific
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gramme, this was not sufficiently backed with sider a possible contribution to space explo- high-level political commitment (and financial ration and to provide political backing for its support) and did not move beyond the study development. In May 2009 the Space Advi- phase of the Crew Space Transportation Sys- sory Group (SAG) of the EC formed a Sub- tem (CSTS).124 committee on space exploration (SAG-SP) with the aim of providing expert advice to the With the Aurora programme placed on the Commission on Europe’s future role in a back burner, ESA’s efforts have been directed global space exploration strategy. The group to RTD activities intended to prepare the recommended that the EU should take a cen- European participation in future exploration tral role in order to ensure the success of missions. Three different programmes – sub- future European space exploration.126 scribed by Member States on an optional basis – in particular constituted ESA’s core A first important step in this direction was focus: the European Life and Physical Science taken with the organisation of the first EU- Programme (ELIPS), the European Transpor- ESA Conference on Human Space Explora- tation and Human Exploration Preparatory tion, which was held in Prague in October Activities (ETHEP), the Exploration Technol- 2009. On that occasion, Ministers expressed ogy Programme (ETP).125 their support for a major financial investment in space exploration and agreed on the need While awaiting a new political commitment for active EU involvement in this domain to for the implementation of more ambitious ensure an appropriate political profile and programmes, the Agency has promoted ex- financial framework. ploration through a paradigm of “interde- pendence and partnership”. In addition to the A second ESA-EU Conference was held in two ExoMars missions, this approach is also Brussels in October 2010, co-organised by evident in the agreement with NASA to de- the EC, the Belgian Presidency of the EU, velop and supply the Orion Multi-Purpose Italy (as the Chair of the ESA Ministerial Crew Vehicle (MPCV) with the ATV-derived Council) and ESA. Among its major conclu- Service Module, which will provide the space- sions, the conference identified the need for craft with propulsion, power and thermal policy discussion at international level and control. thus called for the organisation of a first meeting of an international, high-level space A new political impetus towards the elabora- exploration platform, in which future direc- tion of a long-term vision for space explora- tions and cooperation schemes could be dis- tion has been gradually emerging thanks to cussed.127 the increased involvement of the EU. Starting with the adoption of the European Space Accordingly, the third Space Exploration Con- Policy in 2007, the EU has increasingly ac- ference transformed the proceedings into a knowledged the political dimension of space high-level global discussion involving 28 exploration and thus the necessity to become countries. To highlight this evolution, the more actively involved in this domain in order conference was renamed the First High-Level to ensure a higher degree of political visibility International Exploration Platform. The first of space in Europe and of Europe in the meeting took place in Lucca in November global arena. 2011, while a second conference was held in Washington in January 2014. The next round Although the Union in 2007 identified satellite of discussions is scheduled to take place in systems and applications – specifically Galileo Japan in 2016 or 2017. and Copernicus – as its policy priority areas, the expansion of its mandate over space mat- In the meantime, building on the recommen- ters sanctioned by the Lisbon Treaty has dations of the SAG and the conclusions of the eventually influenced the Commission to con- different conferences, the EC issued a work- ing document entitled, “A Role for Europe within a Global Space Exploration Endeav- instruments of the two missions will be provided by both our”. The document, released on 20 August partners. 2013, emphasises the importance of an inte- 124 The CSTS was specifically intended for use in human grated approach (both at European and in- exploration missions to the Moon (both in orbit and on the surface) via LEO assembly, in addition to supporting mis- sions to the ISS. The decision to develop the CSTS can be 126Space Advisory Group of the European Commission. seen as the European answer to the NASA-led Orion Crew “Space Exploration, a new European flagship Programme. Vehicle, which was initially not intended for international European Commission Framework Programme 7 – Space cooperation. Aware that not being involved in the next Theme. 10 October 2010. See also: Horneck, Gerda et al. generation transportation systems would have meant to “Towards a European vision for space exploration: Rec- remain forever a second-class partner, ESA has eventually ommendations of the Space Advisory Group of the Euro- succeeded in participating to the development of Orion, pean Commission”. Space Policy No. 26. 2010: 109-112. after the cancellation on the CSTS programme. 127 Ehrenfreund, Pascale; et al. “Toward a global space 125 See: European Space Agency. “European Space Tech- exploration program: A stepping stone approach”. Ad- nology Master Plan”. 11th Edition. ESA-ESTEC: 58. vances in Space Research No. 49. September 2011.
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ternational level) in the field of space explo- tions and harvest a number of valuable bene- ration and proposes to build the current fits.130 European long-term vision, consistent with The myriads of benefits stemming from space international plans, in a three-step se- exploration have been widely acknowledged quence:128 and documented in several publications and • 1st step, 2015-2020 (now 2024): utilisa- policy analysis documents.131 Space explora- tion of the ISS, robotic missions (includ- tion endeavours are, inter alia, a catalyst for ing ExoMars), R&D for preparing the next the emergence of new technologies and sci- step, and demonstration of human trans- entific results with a potentially huge impact portation capabilities; in terms of innovation, economic growth and job creation. In addition to delivering value • 2nd step, 2020-2030: continued robotic across a number of areas and enlarging the missions including Mars Sample Return, sphere of economic activity, space explora- human missions beyond low Earth orbit, tion also possesses an inherent cultural value R&D for preparing the next step; and provides inspiration and motivation for • 3rd step, >2030: sophisticated robotic the younger generations and European citi- missions in the Solar System, continued zens in general.132 human exploration missions, including Given these demonstrated paybacks, space possibly human missions to Mars. exploration is an area of great interest for the In the light of these developments, it appears EU and for Europe as a whole. Importantly, clear that for European countries any ambi- the benefits stemming from space exploration tious space exploration scenario can only be match well the objectives and goals set by achieved through both the involvement of the the Commission as priority policy actions for EC and the establishment of international the Union. As also stressed by the SAG, sub- partnerships. While the latter issue is ad- stantial EU support to exploration would in dressed in international fora such as the In- particular contribute to reach the general EU ternational Space Exploration Coordination target for R&D intensity and contribute to the Group (ISECG) and the aforementioned concept of the Innovation Union, where ideas Space Conference, the former might be con- can be turned into products and services that ceived in the form of a new European Flag- create growth and jobs, as the Europe 2020 ship programme. strategy states. It would lead to smart, sus- tainable and inclusive growth. 4.2.2 Is there Added Value in EU Involvement? Although the combination of scientific, tech- nological, economic, and inspirational drivers The need for more active involvement of the would in themselves fully justify the initiation EU in space exploration is rooted in a number of a new flagship programme, the discussion of Space Council Resolutions and EC Commu- needs to be more properly centred on the nications, which all consider space explora- unique values that a flagship initiative could tion as a political priority for the effective bring in complementing ESA’s long-standing implementation of the ESP and the pursuit of efforts in a more synergistic fashion. the Union’s objectives across a broad spec- trum.129 According to the aforementioned Over the past 40 years, as mentioned above, policy proposal of the SAG, space exploration ESA’s science-based and technologically- has all the ingredients (goal, impact, ambi- focused approach to exploration activities has tion, inter-disciplinary research, resources enabled Europe to acquire a state-of-the-art needed, plausibility and sustainability) neces- technological level and a solid set of critical sary to constitute a European flagship, and capabilities, which often contribute to make it setting up such a European flagship is thus a so-called “partner of choice” for interna- instrumental for Europe to realise its ambi- tional cooperation. While this pragmatic ap-
130 Space Advisory Group of the European Commission. “Space Exploration, a new European flagship Programme. European Commission Framework Programme 7 – Space Theme. 10 October 2010. 128 European Commission. A Role for Europe within a 131 Among the various publications and analyses, see in Global Space Exploration Endeavour. Commission Staff particular: Benefits Stemming from Space Exploration”. Working Document. SWD (2013) 301 final. Brussels 20 International Space Exploration Coordination Group. Au- August 2013. gust 2013. http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/EU/XXIV/EU/12/33/EU_ 132 European Commission. A Role for Europe within a 123382/imfname_10413860.pdf Global Space Exploration Endeavour. Commission Staff 129 See in particular the Resolutions of the Sixth, Seventh Working Document. SWD (2013) 301 final. Brussels 20 and Eight Space Councils as well as the EC’s 2011 Com- August 2013. munication Towards a Space Strategy for the European http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/EU/XXIV/EU/12/33/EU_ Union that Benefits its Citizens. 123382/imfname_10413860.pdf
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proach has typically served as a source of ing European geopolitical skills and values on strength for Europe, it has also brought a the international stage and a precious in- downside, namely the lack of a strong politi- strument for both reinforcing Europe’s foreign cal dimension within the current governance policy actions and making Europe a centre of of space exploration activities. This political gravity in global S&T affairs. Space explora- dimension is however an indispensable ele- tion can be leveraged by Europe to both rein- ment for defining a long-term vision in space force existing external relations and to estab- exploration and becoming involved in new lish new strategic partnerships. It can con- major undertakings, which will inevitably tribute to building bridges among countries entail a large degree of cooperation with non- and ultimately improve international rela- European countries. It is no coincidence that tions. Cooperation in this field is thus not the most ambitious European programmes simply a matter of scientific and technological such as Hermes and Aurora have ultimately collaboration aimed at avoiding duplication of failed. Nor it is a coincidence that, in spite of efforts and optimising the utilisation of re- the considerable efforts put in through the sources, but more accurately an enabler for years by ESA, a comprehensive and long- valuable political objectives. term vision for space exploration and human The skilful crafting of a major cooperative spaceflight in the post-ISS period is still lack- space endeavour in exploration could thus be ing. Indeed, it could be argued that Europe’s instrumental for Europe to realise a number inability to define its long-term priorities and of “high politics” goals. Space exploration is to develop a clear vision of its future role in inherently linked to the concept of national exploration mainly stems from the dearth of power and accordingly should be seen as an a strong coupling between the space commu- indispensable element for a region with nity and policy makers as well as the lack of global ambitions.134 a political grand vision in support of explora- tion activities. As emphasised by the abovementioned Com- munication Toward a space strategy for the The implementation of space exploration European Union that benefits its citizens, needs the backing of a motivated and fully- Europe “is not making the most of its poten- fledged political player. EU involvement could tial because its actions are too piecemeal and arguably bring to exploration the political because of the lack of linkage between space dimension that is currently lacking in Europe, exploration and the political, economic and in addition to more solid financial support for social challenges it faces”.135 The message the implementation of a major undertaking in implied in the Communication is that only this domain. It is in fact clear that that the through the more active involvement of the big financial investments required for Euro- EC, which would complement ESA’s technical pean participation in large-scale space explo- expertise, can Europe build up a more coher- ration programmes makes the EU contribu- ent framework for space exploration activities tion and political support indispensable. and be able to fully reap the political benefits. The role of the EU, however, should not only It is undeniable that the EU, as a strong po- be seen as important for providing the neces- litical player, is better equipped to embed sary political backing for Europe’s way for- space exploration in a wider political dimen- ward as well as for mobilising the significant sion. Another fact is that, unlike ESA, which, investment needed, but also for embedding understandably, can only be reactive to the space exploration in a wider political perspec- overall geopolitical context, the EU can be tive and to better seize the full spectrum of more proactive on the international scene, benefits stemming from space exploration. Space exploration and human spaceflight are not simply scientific and technological under- takings but also political endeavours bearing a marked geopolitical value. As such, space exploration can (and should) also be in the sory Group of the European Commission”. Space Policy service of advancing broader political objec- No. 26. 2010: 109-112. tives. To echo the EC’s Space Advisory 134 Peter, Nicolas. Space Exploration 2025: Global Per- Group, space exploration is a field where spectives and Options for Europe. ESPI Report 14. August 2008: 64. Europe can assert itself globally and where 135 European institutions can bolster their image European Commission. Communication from the Com- mission to the Council, the European Parliament, the and status in the eyes of their citizens and of 133 European Economic and Social Committee and the Com- the world. It is a political driver for project- mittee of the Regions. Towards a Space Strategy for the European Union that Benefits its Citizens. COM(2011) 152 final of 4 April 2011. Brussels: European Union. Document available at the European Commission website: 133 Horneck, Gerda et al. “Towards a European vision for
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and it is able to cooperate at different levels made at once but through concrete achieve- with different actors.136 ments that will create an increasing solidarity among European countries and citizens”. It Besides advancing Europe’s diplomatic goals can be argued that a major undertaking in and supporting Europe’s foreign policy ac- exploration could be one of these achieve- tions in a more coherent fashion, an impor- ments. It could help promote the awareness tant added value that the political dimension of a common European identity among citi- offered by the Commission could bring, lies in zens and demonstrate increased political the possibility of producing a stronger impact confidence.139 More than Copernicus and on Europe’s long-standing efforts to promote Galileo, the setting up of an ambitious Euro- a “meta-national” European perspective and pean flagship programme in exploration could reinforce the sense of European identity. thus have a dramatic impact on the long- It is well known that the space exploration standing efforts of the EU to promote a programmes of all the major spacefaring “meta-national” European perspective. nations have traditionally served as a unify- Finally, the case for setting up an EU flagship ing cause, strengthening national cohesive- programme in the field of exploration is made ness and providing a source of pride for citi- more compelling by looking at the undesir- zens and governments. There is however able rifts and drawbacks that the lack of in- little evidence that this has also been the volvement by the Commission would gener- case for Europe. Quite to the contrary, ESA- ate. Opting not to invest in costly and de- led space efforts have arguably proved inca- manding domains like space exploration pable of profoundly reaching and impacting would of course save precious resources. the imagination of Europeans beyond the However, as also openly warned by the SAG, confines of their home states, and thus to any delay in “the launching of a space explo- ultimately act as a catalyst for further Euro- ration programme (could) lead to a loss of pean integration.137 The success of Rosetta the present technical competences, difficul- (demonstrating the power of exploration) ties to exploit European facilities and the might have slightly altered this situation, yet difficulty to retain the European talent in our the basic conclusion remains. It is important private and public entities”.140 Furthermore, to note that such inability does not stem from there is the risk that European strategic part- a fallible outreach strategy, but more simply ners in space will not wait for Europe and from the inherent difficulty of the public iden- that this will in turn bring a loss of leadership tifying ESA efforts as European efforts. The in future space activities, thus compromising reason is that nationalism is still the over- European future ability to shape the priorities whelming perspective: it is no coincidence and timing of international endeavours and to that even the most visible achievements in attract the best partners and reap the bene- this field such as the flight of an ESA astro- fits. naut to the ISS have been mostly celebrated through national – not European – lenses.138 Europe currently enjoys a strong position within the international space pecking order, This is not to say that an involvement of the but its future status appears now at a critical Commission would automatically alter this juncture as other space powers are develop- perspective. It would, however, provide the ing ambitious space exploration programmes. EU with another element that would respond In the end, the question should be raised consistently to the overarching EU objectives whether Europe is willing to take the risk of with regard to European identity. In other excluding itself a priori from the revitalisation words, undertaking space exploration within of human spaceflight ambitions beyond LEO, the frame of a European flagship programme especially considering its longstanding efforts could provide the EU with an element of the to develop many of the critical technologies European construction as well as a building required. Failing to exercise a more pro- block to further the sense of European iden- active and assertive role in this field would tity. To echo the well-known statement of inevitably make Europe just a follower of the Robert Schuman, “Europe will not be all major players and, perhaps more dramatic, help condemn Europe to political and cultural decline on the international stage. 136 Peter, Nicolas. Space Exploration 2025: Global Per- spectives and Options for Europe. ESPI Report 14. August 2008: 64. 137 Venet, Christophe, and Blandina Baranes (eds.). Euro- pean Identity through Space. Space Activities and Pro- 139 Peter, Nicolas. Space Exploration 2025: Global Per- grammes as a Tool to Reinvigorate the European identity. spectives and Options for Europe. ESPI Report 14. August Springer. Wien. 2012. 2008: 64. 138 For a detailed analysis on the impact of nationalism on 140 Space Advisory Group of the European Commission. the emergence of a pan-European identity, see: Woolf, “Space Exploration, a new European flagship Programme. Stuart. “Europe and its Historians” Contemporary Euro- European Commission Framework Programme 7 – Space pean History: 12, 3 (2003): 323–337. Theme. 10 October 2010.
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Setting up an ambitious EU flagship pro- 4.3 Identifying Potential gramme in the field of space explora- tion/human spaceflight can thus be key to Candidates: The Launcher avoid such a gloomy outcome and enable Europe to promote itself as a centre of grav- Option. ity in the post-ISS exploration context. In Autonomy in space is a catchphrase system- this respect, the idea of a Moon Village re- atically highlighted in the policies of the ma- cently launched by ESA Director General J.-D. jor spacefaring nations, including Europe. Wörner can provide an ambitious framework Developing and maintaining independent for the implementation of such a flagship 141 access to space is the first enabling element programme. towards the achievement of such autonomy While identifying the specific implementation and the full utilisation of space assets. As approach and technical capabilities to be de- also reiterated by the EC in a number of pol- velop by means of a new flagship falls outside icy documents, Europe needs to maintain an the scope of this report, it is clear that a efficient autonomous fleet of launchers and dedicated programme must be based on a the infrastructure to access space. Without strengthening of the cooperation between the these, it would be impossible to pursue a EU and ESA and that the EU part has to be truly European space policy. devoted to the development of new, comple- European accomplishments in this field are mentary technical capabilities that have not noteworthy and the decisions endorsed at the been fully mastered through national and ESA Council at Ministerial level of December ESA programmes, but that are instrumental 2014 bode well for the future. The question to reaching the goal. The Commission has to be addressed is whether the multi-layered, already started to fund advanced space ro- 142 intergovernmental approach so far pursued to botics within the Horizon 2020 framework, secure this strategic need will prove effective and could for instance contemplate to dedi- and beneficial also in the future and whether cate funding to the development and exploi- possible involvement by the Commission tation of additive manufacturing capabilities might not be the best way forward. Accord- (3-D printing in space) as part of this new ingly, after assessing the status of Europe’s programme. Ideally, it could also address the launcher programmes, these considerations issues related to the transportation system, will be laid out. which are key to future space exploration and especially human exploration. ESA is cur- rently developing the ATV-derived service 4.3.1 European Launchers: Past, Present and Fu- module for the MPCV and the successor of ture. the Ariane 5 launch vehicle (see next sec- tion), but the development of autonomous The development of launchers was one of the launch capabilities to send astronauts into very first drivers behind the initiation of pan- space ostensibly remain outside its plans and European cooperative schemes in space. Co- – equally important – financial possibilities. operation in this field predates the establish- An EU space exploration flagship programme ment of ESA. It began as early as 1962 with could address this aspect, mobilise the sig- the creation of the first intergovernmental nificant resources required for the develop- entity devoted to space activities in Europe, ment of a human-rated launch vehicle,143 and the European Launcher Development Organi- eventually link space exploration to another sation (ELDO), which eventually merged in potential flagship candidate: access to space. 1975 with the European Space Research Or- ganisation (ESRO) to form ESA.144 Although at that time European countries already had significantly different views and priorities with regard to space activities, the development of an indigenous European launcher was not a point of contention. All the pioneering Euro- pean space countries agreed that Europe needed to have autonomous access to space. Such necessity was made even clearer by the well-known disagreement with the U.S. over 141 Hollingham, Richard. “Should we build a Village on the Moon?” BBC. 13 July 2015. Web. http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20150712-should-we- build-a-village-on-the-moon 142 See European Commission. Guidelines for Strategic Research Cluster on Space Robotics Technologies Hori- 144 See European Space Agency. “Launcher strategy”. zon 2020 Space Call 2016. Brussels. 2015. Web 143 It is estimated that a budget in the order of several http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Launchers/Launcher_stra billion euros would be required. tegy
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the launch of the French-German Symphonie The European version of the Russian- satellites.145 manufactured Soyuz was introduced to con- solidate Europe’s access to space for me- After the unsuccessful initiative of the Europa dium-size missions, in particular to launch rocket, efforts were revitalised by France, satellites up to 3.2 tonnes into GTO, and con- which in 1972 proposed to bring its Launceur stellations of two or more satellites into LEO a Trois Etages de Substitution (L3S) pro- and MEO. Named Soyuz-ST, it joined the gramme into a common European frame- family of European launchers in 2005, follow- work.146 Work on this launcher programme – ing the signature of a cooperation agreement eventually renamed the Ariane Launcher Pro- between ESA and Roscosmos, which enabled gramme – began as early as 1974 and the Soyuz to use Europe’s spaceport in Kourou. inaugural launch of Ariane-1 took place in The decision to develop a dedicated launch December 1979. Building on this success, in infrastructure at the Guiana Space Centre 1980, Arianespace – the world’s first com- was of interest to both Europe and Russia, as mercial satellite launch company – was es- it enabled the former to complement the tablished to manage and commercialise op- performance of ESA launchers Ariane and erations of Ariane. For more than three dec- Vega, and the latter to benefit from improved ades, Ariane launchers have served a variety access to commercial markets and improved of institutional and commercial missions, performance of the Soyuz launcher when becoming symbols of Europe’s autonomy and being launched much closer to Equator.148 At achievements in space. The five different that time, it was also in the interest of both generations that have succeeded one another Europe and Russia to boost their relationship, in the Ariane family have won a considerable and cooperation in the launcher sector was share of the global market, currently launch- seen as a tool for pursuing this objective. ing half of the world’s commercial satellites Soyuz-ST was launched from Kourou for the and enabling Europe to construct a robust first time in October 2011 and is designed to satellite launch industry and infrastructure. be used for medium-weight communication The Ariane-5 rocket, the most recent and satellites as well as navigation and earth ob- major evolution for the Ariane family, has servation missions. The fact that the GSC can now emerged as a global point of reference operate Soyuz has made it easier to use it for for commercial launches and a cornerstone of dual-use missions, as happened with the European institutional launches. Operational launch of France´s Pleiades constellation and since 1999, Ariane-5 is a heavy-lift launcher, ELISA satellites.149 Since the very beginning, capable of providing either double launches however, it has been in question whether (i.e. two satellites launched simultaneously) Europe should rely on Soyuz for missions or single launches with heavier loads.147 At having a higher political-strategic value (e.g. present, there are two operational configura- Galileo satellites), considering that Soyuz is tions: Ariane-5 ECA, which mainly delivers not a truly European launcher. communication satellites to Geostationary The small launcher VEGA (Vettore Europeo di Transfer Orbit (GTO), with a launch capacity Generazione Avanzata – European Advanced of 10 tonnes, and Ariane-5 ES, which is used Generation Vehicle) was developed as a re- for various missions to the Low Earth Orbit sult of an Italian initiative through an ESA (LEO) with a launch capacity of 20 tonnes. optional programme that began in 1998. The latter configuration was also used for the Vega is a four-stage launcher comprising launches of the five ATVs to the ISS. Ariane-5 three solid motor powered stages (the P80, is launched six to seven times a year, the Zefiro-23 and Zefiro-9) and a liquid-fuelled majority of which are for private customers. fourth stage called AVUM, which is produced As at June 2015, the Ariane-5 launch log by Yuzhnoye in Ukraine.150 As a light-weight stands at a total of 79 launches. launcher, Vega is designed to seize the insti- In addition, in the late 1990s ESA initiated tutional small satellite market (300-2000kg) the diversification of its launchers through as well as to respond to the growing demand the adaptation of the medium-lift launcher Soyuz and the development of the light- 148 The agreement was preceded by the European- weight Vega. Russian company Starsem, which was established in 1996 to commercialise launches with Soyuz. Starsem’s share- holders are EADS-Astrium (35%), Roscosmos (25%), 145 For a detailed assessment and historical analysis of the Samara Space Centre (25%) and Arianespace (15%). Ariane launcher, see Al-Ekabi, Cenan and Panos Mas- 149 Veclani, Anna Clementina, Jean-Pierre Darnis. “Euro- torakis. “The Evolution of Europe´s Launcher and Flagship pean Space Launch Capabilities and Prospects”. In: Space Initiatives”. In: Al-Ekabi, Cenan (ed.). European Schrogl, Kai-Uwe, et al. Handbook of Space Security. Autonomy in Space. Springer, Vienna. 2015: 2-14. Policies, Applications and Programs. Volume 2. Springer. 146 Ibid: 10-12. 2014: 783-800. 147 See European Space Agency. “Ariane 5”. Web 150 See European Launch Vehicle. “Vega Launcher com- http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Launchers/Launch_vehicl position”. Web. http://www.elv.it/en/launcher- es/Ariane_5 vega/composizione-lanciatore/
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for micro-satellites. Vega is capable of placing high degree of vertical integration.152 There is 300-2500 kg into LEOs and, thanks to the re- a handful of large industrial actors and ap- ignitable upper stage, can simultaneously proximately 40 suppliers involved in the de- launch multiple payloads into orbit. Vega´s sign, development and manufacturing proc- inaugural flight took place in February 2012 esses, the majority of which are highly de- from Europe’s spaceport in French Guiana. Its pendent on Ariane business.153 The working exploitation has been supported by the Vega system assigns the responsibility for the Research and Technology Accompaniment whole process to a single industrial prime (VERTA) programme, which inter alia foresaw contractor for each launcher type. The prime the procurement of five demonstration contractor of Ariane-5 is Airbus Space and flights, including ESA’s Intermediate eXperi- Defence, with Safran playing the leading role mental Vehicle (IXV), Proba-V, Aeolus, LISA for the propulsion systems. Soyuz´ prime Pathfinder, and Copernicus Sentinels. By June contractor is the Russian federal space 2015, all the five demonstration launches had agency, Roscosmos, while the European been performed successfully. Launch Vehicle (ELV), a joint venture be- tween Avio (70%) and ASI (30%), manages With the successful introduction of Soyuz-ST the Vega rocket. and Vega, the European family of launchers has expanded to ensure performance and Once the launch systems are qualified, re- flexibility, two features that are increasingly sponsibility is handed over to Arianespace, required in the launch market. The payload which is in charge of executing the opera- segment covered by the three different tional launcher exploitation phase, including launcher categories now allows the entire procurement from the launcher system prime range of launch requirements to be covered contractor, and the commercialisation and (see Figure 3). launch of the rockets. Prime contractors, however, take part, with Arianespace’s staff, in the integration of components at Europe’s Spaceport in Kourou. While designed to avoid duplication of efforts, this framework pre- sents a high degree of complexity, also con- sidering that both ELV and Airbus are at the same time suppliers and shareholders of Ari- anespace.154 Like other spacefaring nations, Europe has been almost constantly facing the challenge of improving and modernising its launchers to ensure the availability and sustainability of autonomous access to space over the long- term. Not surprisingly, the successor of Ari- ane 5 has been under debate since shortly Figure 3:Europe’s Launcher Family (source: ESA) after it entered into service in 1999. A dedi- cated programme, called Future Launchers Ariane, Soyuz and Vega development pro- Preparatory Programme (FLPP), was launched grammes are managed by ESA on the basis by ESA as early as 2003. The programme of optional programmes, with a varying num- was subscribed on an optional basis by 14 ber of ESA Member States for each of the ESA Member States and structured in a series programmes in question. The major contrib- of partially overlapping stages covering the uting countries are France, Germany, Italy, 2004-2018 period. Belgium and Sweden. The overall budget for launcher-related activities has traditionally accounted for a substantial share of the ESA budget: in 2014 the programmes received 152 Hayward, Keith. “The Structure and Dynamics of the 15.1 % of ESA’s budget – or Euro 617.4 mil- European Space Industry Base”. ESPI Perspectives 55. lion.151 Vienna: European Space Policy Institute. December 2011: 3. The prime contractors and suppliers are se- 153 Ibid: 3. 154 lected on the basis of ESA’s geo-return pol- Arianespace´s capital is owned by 21 shareholders icy, which reflects national financial participa- from 10 different countries (France, Germany, Italy, Bel- gium, Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, tion in the project. The European space and Switzerland). In terms of shareholders, the largest has launcher industry is concentrated in a rela- historically been CNES, followed by Airbus. The corporate tively small number of industrial firms, with a governance of Arianespace is, however, currently under- going a strong revision, following the creation of a Joint Venture between Airbus and Safran (see below). The Joint 151 European Space Agency. “ESA Funding”. Web. Venture, operational since 2015, has already expressed http://www.esa.int/About_Us/Welcome_to_ESA/Funding the intention to purchase CNES´ shares of Arianespace.
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Besides fostering the development of new ing itself on the market without requiring technologies capable of delivering improved public support became even more pressing. performance and reliability as well as reduc- As a medium-term solution, at the end of ing operational costs, a major field of activity 2010 it was decided to begin work on the of the FLPP was the development of various development of the Ariane-5 Midlife Evolution launch vehicle concepts and the identification (ME) and start preliminary design work on of the technologies required to make them Ariane 6. Ariane-5 ME was designed to fea- possible. This activity was intended to form ture a new, re-ignitable upper stage that the basis of the key decision to be made on would increase the payload-carrying capacity the characteristics and design of the Next by 20% and thus enable the launch of an Generation Launcher (NGL).155 The objective extra two tonnes to GTO, a crucial market for of the FLPP was thus not the development of Ariane´s business. Ariane-5 ME was intended a new launcher itself, but the selection and “to replace Ariane-5 ECA and Ariane-5 ES to maturation of technologies – the targeted become Europe’s new workhorse launcher Technology Readiness Level (TRL) was 5 – to until the arrival of Ariane 6”.160 pave the way for the development of a new launch system. A key issue was whether to Although at the ESA Council at Ministerial develop another heavy-lift launcher for dou- level held in Naples in 2012 Ministers post- ble launches or a medium-lift launcher for poned a clear decision, initial funding was single launches, which could in the long term secured for both the activities on Ariane-5 ME also become a replacement of the European- and for a detailed definition study of the new ised Soyuz-ST.156 Such technical and opera- Ariane-6, “with the goal of maximising com- tional considerations were to a large extent monalities and avoiding delays in commercial driven by the need to better cope with the exploitation of the two launchers while mini- increasing difficulties encountered by Ari- mising costs for Ariane-6”.161 anespace during the exploitation of Ariane 5.157 However, in the climate of budgetary con- straints imposed by the financial crisis, con- Already in 2003, ESA Member States had sensus among the major players quickly van- approved the European Guaranteed Access to ished and the two launcher concepts started Space (EGAS) to cover fixed production costs to compete against each other. While France of Ariane 5 and provide around €250 million started to strongly advocate a steady com- annually to Arianespace for 6 years (2004- mitment to the development of Ariane 6, 2010).158 While the programme came to an Germany showed a clear preference for Ari- end in December 2010, the persistence of ane 5 ME, inter alia because of higher Ger- financial hurdles started to call for a profound man industrial involvement.162 In an attempt revision of the European launch model, and in to remedy this difficult situation in October particular for a reorganisation and a progres- 2014, the ESA Director-General sent ESA sive streamlining of the whole industrial Member States a policy proposal on the par- process.159 At the same time, the necessity allel development of Ariane-5 ME and Ariane to develop a new launcher capable of sustain- 6, both considered as complementary – not 163 competing – projects. The disagreement 155 See European Space Agency. “European Space Tech- was resolved on the eve of the Ministerial nology Master Plan”. 11th Edition. ESA-ESTEC: 323. Council Meeting in 2014, with Germany and 156 See Al-Ekabi, Cenan. “European Access to Space: France eventually agreeing to skip the Factors of Autonomy”. In: Al-Ekabi, Cenan (ed.). European planned upgrade of Ariane 5 and proceed Autonomy in Space. Springer. 2015: 137-155. directly to the development of a substantially 157 Such difficulties were the direct result of two main reconceived Ariane 6. problems: on the one hand, the fact that launch prices on the commercial market were lower than launch and pro- By the same time, Airbus Space & Defence duction costs (a situation that was primarily driven by the need to cope with the sharp downturn in commercial and Safran had proposed to create a joint launch demand of the early 2000s); and on the other, the venture to lead the development and produc- limited number of institutional launches performed by Ariane 5, which has been preventing the creation of scale economies for spreading fixed operational costs over a 160 Cit. European Space Agency. “Adapted Ariane 5 ME”. higher number of launches. 14 October 2014. Web. 158 See: Al-Ekabi, Cenan. “European Access to Space: http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Launchers/Launch_vehicl Factors of Autonomy”. In: Al-Ekabi, Cenan (ed.). European es/Adapted_Ariane_5_ME Autonomy in Space. Springer. Vienna. 2015: 145 161 Ibid. 159 Various solutions and initiatives were advanced over 162 De Selding, Peter. “DLR’s Woerner Remains Uncon- the last few years to reduce costs. See for instance the vinced Just-unveiled Ariane design Is Right Way to Go”. rationalization of the propulsion sector advanced by As- Space News. 12 July 2013. trium; the establishment of a direct link between Astrium 163 See Dordain, Jean-Jacques. “Answer to Questions of and ESA, without Arianespace as intermediary proposed Germany”. Paris. 29 October 2014: pp. 17-18. The con- by the Academie de l´Air et de l´Espace; and the introduc- cepts developed for Ariane 5 ME were intended to be tion of a tax on satellite operators to finance the European applicable to Ariane 6 as well, thereby reducing costs and launch sector. risks associated with Ariane 6.
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tion of Ariane 6 to streamline industrial or- 167 The payload capacity of the Ariane 62 ganisation, overcome the inefficiencies of the configuration is of 5 tons to GTO, while that industrial cycle and thus reduce the costs to of Ariane 64 is 11 tons to GTO (single pay- be borne by Member States.164 In response load) or 10 tons with dual payload. to this proposal, major stakeholders from The general architecture of Ariane 6 will allow ESA Member States and industry worked it to cover a wide range of missions in GTO, together to outline a joint ESA–industry LEO, MEO and Polar orbits and to respond to scheme for the development of Ariane 6, different market needs in a cost-effective way “based on a balanced responsibility, cost and thanks to the possibility to vary the number risk sharing between the Agency and the of boosters in the configuration. This double industrial Joint Venture”.165 configuration is indeed a key element in the context of the new launcher strategy and The Ministerial 2014 responds to precise goals with respect to The official sanctioning of the new industrial both the commercial and the institutional scheme and the final decision regarding the dimensions of Europe´s future access to complete development of Ariane 6 was taken space. at the ESA Ministerial Council on 2 December Two points deserve particular attention. First, 2014, in the context of the overall launcher the decision has allowed the overcoming of strategy for the next 10 years. The Resolu- the apparent trade-off between developing tion on Europe´s Access to Space acknowl- another heavy-lift launcher for double edges the difficulties faced by the European launches or a medium-lift launcher for single launch sector (inter alia, the economy of Ari- launches. While the double launch-capability ane 5 on the commercial market; the de- will be retained by Ariane 64, Ariane 62 will pendence of a significant part of the Euro- ensure flexibility in availability since it will not pean institutional launches on the Soyuz require efforts in terms of pairing satellites launcher; the deficit of commonalities be- and scheduling of launches. Together, Ariane tween Ariane 5, Soyuz and Vega, which limit 62 and 64 will provide the modularity re- the synergies in their quired to adapt to the uncertainties of the exploitation; the in- future commercial market.168 creasing competition in the worldwide com- In addition to that, because Ariane 62 and mercial market) and Ariane 64 are two configurations of the same calls for the “availability launcher that are intended to be exploited as soon as possible of together, this will allow the enhancement of new European launch the cadence of the production rate and thus services which are not contribute to cost reduction of Ariane 64. All only competitive without in all, “Ariane 64 will make the overall exploi- requiring public support tation of Ariane profitable thanks to the reve- during exploitation, but nues of double launches and provide the also flexible and modular margins for a more competitive pricing policy enough for responding of Ariane 62”.169 to a wide range of In parallel to the commercial logic, the deci- needs, from institutional sion to proceed with a double configuration to commercial re- for Ariane 6 responds to political considera- quirements, as well as to tions as well, particularly the perceived need the uncertainties on the Figure 4: Artist’s to overcome the current dependence of Euro- evolution of the view of Ariane-6 (source: ESA) pean institutional launches on the availability commercial require- and prices of Soyuz. As a medium-lift ments”. 166 launcher, Ariane 62 will cover the same pay- Ariane 6 is conceived as a modular three- load segment as Soyuz and will thus offer the stage (solid–cryogenic–cryogenic) launcher possibility of replacing the Russian- with two different variants using either two manufactured rocket with a truly European boosters (A62) or four boosters (Ariane 64). launcher.170 Indeed, although not officially
167 European Space Agency. “Ariane 6”. Web. 164 Cit. European Space Agency. “Ariane 6”. Web. http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Launchers/ http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Launchers/ Launch_vehicles/Ariane_6 Launch_vehicles/Ariane_6 168 Dordain, Jean-Jacques. “Answer to Questions of Ger- 165 Cit. ESA Council at Ministerial Level. “Resolution on many”. Paris. 29 October 2014: 6 Europe’s Access to Space”. ESA/C-M/CCXLVII/Res. 1 169 Ibid: 7 (Final). 2 December 2014. 170 Besides ensuring autonomy in a strategic payload 166 Cit. ESA Council at Ministerial Level. “Resolution on segment, a key driver here is to help sustaining industrial Europe’s Access to Space”. ESA/C-M/CCXLVII/Res. 1 activities and research capabilities in ESA Member States (Final). 2 December 2014. rather than in Russia. As stated by many, this is an essen-
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formalised, ESA´s commitment to its devel- while the newly-established Airbus-Safran opment makes clear that “Soyuz in Guiana” Launchers (ASL) Joint Venture will bear all will ultimately remain only a transition solu- commercial market risks during exploitation, tion in Europe’s strategy for access to since Member States will no longer provide space.171 public support payments as was done to Ari- anespace in the past. With regard to the scheduling aspect, the upper stage and the P120 boosters will be The new industrial organisation still needs to ready in 2018. The maiden flight of Ariane 62 be consolidated and it thus remains to be is expected in 2020 with entry into the com- seen whether it will be capable of enhancing mercial market (provision of services) around the efficiency of the industrial cycle and en- 2022. suring sufficient margins for the competitive- ness of Ariane. Accordingly, the decisions At the Ministerial Council, investments were endorsed at the Ministerial 2014 will be sub- also secured for the development of an up- ject to final review in June 2016. 175 graded version of the Vega launch system, the Vega-Consolidated (Vega-C), with an inaugural flight scheduled for 2018. The ma- 4.3.2 Is There Added Value in EU Involvement? jor feature of Vega-C will be the utilization of the P120 as a first stage replacing the P80.172 The ESA-based, intergovernmental approach The P120 will also serve as a strap-on so far pursued by European countries to im- booster for the first stage of Ariane 6. This plement the launcher strategy has been suc- common element is considered a key factor cessful by any measure. The Ariane family of for the successful commercialisation of launchers figures as one of the major techno- Europe´s future launchers, as it will enable logical achievements for Europe, and has significantly enhanced production rates and provided independent access to space for the thus decrease the costs for both Vega and last 35 years. More than 400 satellites have Ariane. To this effect, the Ministerial Resolu- been successfully launched from Europe’s tion underlined the mutual benefit in prepar- spaceport in Kourou and more than half of ing the exploitation of Ariane 6 and Vega-C the commercial satellites in service today 176 together, so as to ensure that the overall were launched with Ariane. Thanks to this competitiveness of the future launchers will impressive launch performance and an order be enhanced.173 book of more than 80 satellites to be launched within the next four years,177 Ari- In addition to the numerous synergies be- anespace has emerged as the world’s leading tween Ariane 62, 64 and Vega-C, the suc- launch provider with sales of almost $1 billion cessful exploitation of the new European per year ($930 million in 2014, approxi- launchers on the commercial market will also mately 40% of the global launch reve- be supported by important changes in gov- nues).178 ernance, particularly in the relations between industry and governments. With the new European launchers thus have many arrangements, the Member States and ESA achievements to look back on and, thanks to will have responsibility for guaranteeing five the decisions endorsed at the 2014 ESA Min- institutional launches per year for Ariane 6,174 isterial, the way to a promising future has been paved. Against this pleasing backdrop, the potential involvement of the EC could tial element to ensure the sustainability of future access to space, which indeed requires constant R&D efforts and support to technological and industrial competitiveness. decide its own satellites, but not for the others (there are 171 It is however likely that Arianespace will continue to national, Eumetsat, EU that have not committed to the commercialise Soyuz from the Baikonur launch site, as application of a European preference clause). The Com- evidenced by the signature in June 2015 of a commercial mission can provide comfort through a certain degree of launch contract with OneWeb (a contract to launch roughly preference, but not a guarantee they will use Ariane 6. 700 LEO satellites aboard the Russian Soyuz from the See: De Selding, Peter. “Profile: Antonio Fabrizi”. Space cosmodrome of Baikonur). See De Selding, Peter “Launch News. 27 January 2015. Options were key to Arianespace´s One-Web Win”. Space 175 De Selding, Peter. “Desire for Competitive Ariane 6 News 25 June 2015. Nudges ESA towards Compromise”. Space News. 3 April 172 In addition, the second stage Zefiro 23 will be replaced 2015. by Zefiro 40 (which will have roughly +17 tons propellant 176 European Commission. “Access to space”. Web. loading and an increased diameter). The fourth stage will http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/space/policy/space- also see slight modifications (mainly larger propellant on-earth/access-to-space/index_en.htm tanks) and will be called AVUM+. 177 Arianespace. “World Satellite Business Week 2015: 173 See ESA Council at Ministerial Level. “Resolution on Arianespace headed for business and operational records Europe’s Access to Space”. ESA/C-M/CCXLVII/Res. 1 in 2015”. Press Release. 14 September 2015. Web (Final). 2 December 2014. http://www.arianespace.com/news-press-release/2015/9- 174 As stressed in an interview with former ESA Director of 14-2015-Euroconsult.asp Launcher Antonio Fabrizi “The joint venture will rely, de 178 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Commercial facto, on an ESA-guaranteed market of five institutional Space Transportation: 2014 Year In Review, Washington, launches, but this is not ESA-owned market. ESA can FAA: February 2015.
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thus be questioned, as it would appear un- tion and orders placed with national space necessary, or even lead to a higher degree of industries.182 complexity. Yet, there are several considera- tions that could make involvement by the Commission both plausible and praiseworthy. To begin with, thanks to the Copernicus and Galileo programmes, the EU is progressively emerging as the biggest institutional cus- tomer for launch services in Europe, as well as one of Arianespace’s most important cus- tomer in general. In addition, given the im- Country/ Region Commercial Launches Non- Commercial launches Total Launches portance of the EU’s space policy for the ef- United 11 12 23 fectiveness of the Union’s internal and exter- States nal action, autonomous, cost-effective and sustainable access to space is a fundamental Russia 4 28 32 and strategic asset for the Union. Launcher Europe 6 5 11 policies, in effect, mirror all the major fea- tures of the ESP, as they deal with political, China 0 16 16 industrial, economic, strategic, and symbolic issues.179 Japan 0 4 4 Activities in this field, in particular, respond India 1 3 4 to two overarching and closely interrelated Israel 0 1 1 elements that explicitly fall within the concern of the EC: market competition and geopoli- Multinational 1 0 1 tics. The strong and visible policy nexus be- Total 23 69 92 tween these two elements creates both op-
portunities and challenges Europe must nec- Table 8: Worldwide Orbital Launch Events in 2014 (source: essarily deal with. FAA) In terms of commercial logic, the launch market is a segment in which Europe is in- While over the past two decades Ariane creasingly bound to compete with other coun- launch services have commanded a de-facto tries and private undertakings. Albeit small duopoly with the Russian Proton launcher, compared to the downstream sector (and in the situation is changing rapidly. New com- particular satellite communications), the petitors have entered or are on the verge of launching business is extremely competitive, entering the market, as demonstrated by the because global demand remains modest abrupt advent of Space X – which in 2014 compared to the availability of supply.180 replaced the International Launch Service as Launch suppliers compete to ensure the most Arianespace’s main competitor for the GTO – cost-effective services mainly to institutional and more broadly by the many launcher de- customers, whose demand today accounts for velopment efforts currently underway in a the largest part of the global market.181 The significant number of spacefaring nations. strongest demand comes from the govern- Also launch service providers that have been ments of Russia, the United States and China mostly inactive, such as the United Launch (see Table 8), but not all launches are com- Alliance (ULA) and Japan´s Mitsubishi Heavy mercially accessible to foreign launch provid- Industries (MHI), are revitalising efforts to ers. This is because access to space is a capture commercial payloads on the global highly strategic sector publicly sustained not market. only by significant government funding, but With new generations of modular launch ve- also by regulations limiting foreign competi- hicles (Angara 5, GSLV Mk III, Falcon Heavy, Long March 5/6/7, Vulcan and H-III) pro- gressing towards operational readiness and 179 See: Al-Ekabi, Cenan. “European Access to Space: offering increased flexibility and reduced Factors of Autonomy”. In: Al-Ekabi, Cenan (ed.). European costs, competitive pressures are expected to Autonomy in Space. Springer, Vienna. 2015: 137-155. 180 further increase and to challenge the position See: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Commer- cial Space Transportation: 2014 Year In Review, Washing- ton, FAA: February 2015. Logsdon, John. “Commercial Launch Industry”. Encyclopaedia Britannica online. 182 See Berteau, David and Gregory Kiley (project direc- http://www.britannica.com/ tors). “National Security and the Commercial Space Sec- EBchecked/topic/332323/launch- tor. An Analysis and Evaluation of Options for Improving vehicle/272750/Commercial-launch-industry>. Commercial Access to Space”. Center for Strategic and 181 Around 75%. See: Federal Aviation Administration International Studies, Washington D.C. July 2010. Web. (FAA). “Commercial Space Transportation: 2014 Year In http://csis.org/publication/national-security-andcommercial- Review.” Washington D.C. February 2015 space-sector.
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of established actors. At the same time, this to a large extent – and perhaps inevitably so growing competition is taking place in a mar- – conservative. For one thing, the new ket where overall demand is projected to launcher strategy fundamentally aims to remain stable over the medium term, bar a achieve cost reductions through efficiency- substantial decrease in launch prices.183 Addi- driven processes, rather than through the tional supply could thus potentially lead to a development of innovative launch service situation of overcapacity, consequently forc- solutions.186 More importantly, it projects the ing launch service providers to adopt more current policy reality over a 15-year period in aggressive stances or withdraw completely the belief that the current strong market from the accessible market. situation of duopoly will last. In doing so, it may not sufficiently appreciate certain key All in all, access to space, albeit far from be- factors such as the determination and focus coming “just another commodity”, seems to of the emerging powers and the eventual be becoming even more responsive to price success of new entrepreneurial efforts in es- pressures, with increased competition ex- tablishing and commercialising game- pected to lead to a further intensification of changing launch technologies and ap- cost reduction efforts, and to the eventual proaches. materialisation of new approaches and dis- ruptive innovative solutions for access to Indeed, the introduction of disruptive innova- space. tion technologies currently pursued by sev- eral launch providers, (most notably the re- Against this background, the success of fu- usability concepts pursued by Space X and ture European launchers on the commercial envisaged by the ULA),187 combined with market will thus primarily depend on the innovative approaches in the manufacturing ability of Ariane to outcompete established sector,188 could dramatically affect Ariane 6’s and emerging players in terms of launch future prospects and blunt its forecasted prices and versatility.184 In this respect, the competitive edge by the time it enters into 2014 Ministerial meeting adopted a multi- service or soon thereafter. pronged strategy aimed at increasing flexibil- ity and reducing costs through a number of The great dynamism of the international levers, including the utilisation of heritage launch industry and the stiffening of interna- hardware, the streamlining of the industrial tional competition thus pose challenges that organisation with a substantial reduction in Europe must necessarily continue to confront. the number of interfaces, the maximisation of Such challenges dictate to Europe a steady common expendable elements and the crea- and constant investment in launch capabili- tion of synergies between different market ties that goes beyond Ariane 6, and a strong segments. All these levers – together with commitment to disruptive innovation and to the guarantee of five institutional launches the leapfrogging of new launch technologies per year – are essentially designed to in- in such a way as to reduce the cost of access crease the production rates so as to generate to space and outcompete the established and economies of scale that will ensure competi- emerging players in the launch sector. How- tive pricing for Ariane 6 and Vega-C without ever, as lamented by many, only a modest the need for public support payments during research effort was approved to advance new exploitation.185 core technologies for cheaper access to While all these measures will presumably prove cost-effective, it is nonetheless undeni- 186 As also stressed by the ESA Director General in the able that the projected way forward remains policy proposal for Ariane 6 released in October 2014, the new Ariane relies upon a substantial heritage which has no equivalent compared to any previous launcher programme. 183 Al-Ekabi, Cenan. “European Access to Space: Factors As a matter of fact, the architecture (and in particular the of Autonomy”. In: Al-Ekabi, Cenan (ed.). European staging) is the same as for Ariane 5. The main stage, Autonomy in Space. Springer. Vienna. 2015: 137-155. which will burning liquid oxygen and hydrogen, is based on 184 Launcher competitiveness is not only determined by the Vulcan engine of Ariane 5 ECA, while the cryogenic price considerations, but by multiple factors: launch price is upper stage will be powered by a Vinci engine, which relies the primary consideration, but performance, reliability, on work made for the Ariane 5ME upper stage. As for the availability and security of the service are likewise impor- P120 solid rocket booster, this is directly derived from the tant, given that the key rationale behind the selection of a first stage of the Vega rocket, the P80, and will be also launch provider is to ensure the success of the mission. utilised as the first stage for the upcoming Vega-C. Needless to say, the possibility of easily integrating the 187 Technical feasibility and commercial viability of re- payload with the launcher is also an indispensable ele- usable systems still have to be proven, but if introduced, ment. this evolution would allow the cost of launches to decline 185 As noted by former ESA Director of Launcher, Antonio significantly. This would in turn be channelled towards a Fabrizi the core objective – not to say the only objective – substantial decrease in launch prices, or alternatively – of Ariane 6 and Vega- C is to eliminate the need of annual though less likely – a mere increase in profitability. support payments during exploitation, while continuing to 188 As an example, see the adaptation of the automobile guarantee a competitive pricing policy. See de Selding, industry’s mass production techniques to selected space Peter. “Profile –Antonio Fabrizi”. Space News. 27 January systems, which could assist the realisation of the currently 2015. envisaged mega-constellations.
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space, and in particular to refine the technol- This approach and type of activities would ogy needed to recover, refurbish and reuse ostensibly be sui generis if compared to the an entire Ariane launcher stage.189 Galileo and Copernicus programmes or other potential flagship candidates like space explo- Arguably, this is a domain where not only ration, and would also be – at least in the ESA but also the EU may wish to take action. short term – less demanding in terms of allo- There are two main reasons supporting com- cation of financial resources. This, however, plementary efforts between the EC and ESA. would not be a reason to abstain from invest- First, the EC might be generally better posi- ing in the development of critical capabilities tioned to initiate institutional programmes that will ultimately guarantee a gateway to that pursue disruptive innovation. As opposed space for Europe and the conduct of its future to sustaining innovation, the outcome of dis- civil, military and commercial space endeav- ruptive innovation is not guaranteed and thus ours. Indeed, an EU/ESA double-track ap- it entails stronger risk and uncertainty in proach could in the long run result in new terms of pay-offs. When successful, however, types of launch services being offered and in disruptive innovation efforts can deliver cut- a more robust and diversified launcher indus- ting-edge advantages and open up roads to try in Europe, which could count on increased establish and dominate new markets. In this support and would be better positioned to sense this type of innovation requires strong face competition in the global market. political commitment and support – some- thing that can more easily be provided by the Now, proactive involvement of the EU in EC, rather than within the traditionally risk- launcher technology development will not in averse ESA framework. Second, the EU as an the short term make the EU ‘the owner’ of actor has an interrelated number of interests the European launch capability – it will not and tools to do so in terms of industrial pol- make the EU the most significant actor. But it icy, promotion of European industrial and would signal political recognition of the im- technological competitiveness and, research portance of launcher capability for Europe’s and innovation schemes, since “its infrastruc- technological goals and as an enabler of ture is already set-up to meet a competitive Europe’s geopolitical aspirations. This could market”.190 then have the consequence that the EU would embrace the potentialities of space as a pol- Possible EU efforts towards ensuring the icy instrument more firmly, and that more competitiveness and sustainability of Euro- consideration would be given to how Euro- pean launch capabilities over the long term pean launchers can be instrumentalised as a should thus be seen as complementary – not tool for international alliance building and alternative – to those of ESA. The EU could S&T based diplomacy. In this sense a flagship for instance launch a dedicated programme project of the EU on disruptive launcher tech- to refine the required technology to reuse the nology would fit the ‘flagship’ criteria very first stage of an Ariane rocket, or even fi- well. Indeed, a flagship project on disruptive nance the development of a completely new launcher technology could be a first step to- reusable launch system, thus complementing wards entirely ‘communitising’ European the too modest research efforts currently launch capability, something that would be undertaken by ESA and industry.191 Alterna- appropriate in the long term considering the tively, a possible EU launcher programme strategic and political significance of what in could be directed to test other potentially the final analysis is a key European infra- disruptive technologies such as non-vertical structure. launch systems, or even ground-breaking space transportation concepts like mass driv- 192 ers, among the others. 4.4 Identifying Potential Candidates: Space Security 189 See De Selding, Peter. “With Eye on Space X. CNES Begins Work on Reusable Rocket Stage”. Space News. 5 January 2015. Space security is another domain where an 190 Cit. Clemens, Rumpf.”Op-ed. Increased Competition EU flagship initiative might be considered. will Challenge ESA´s Space Authority”. Space News. 16 The term needs clarification, however, as it February 2015. simultaneously comprises two distinct, yet 191 See for instance the Advanced Expendable Launcher interconnected, concepts: security of space with Innovative engine Economy (ADELINE), an Airbus project to develop a partially reusable launcher. See de and security from space. While the former Selding, Peter. “Meet Adeline, Airbus’sAnswer To Space X generally indicates “the secure and sustain- Reusability”. Space News. 5 June 2015. able access to, and use of, space and free- 192 Mass driver is a possible non-rocket launch method, dom from space-based threats”, the latter which would use an electromagnetic accelerator to accel- erate payloads to orbital velocity. See Logsdon, John. “Commercial Launch Industry”. Encyclopaedia Britannica EBchecked/topic/332323/launch- online. http://www.britannica.com/ vehicle/272750/Commercial-launch-industry>.
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refers to the utilisation of space-based assets 193 Expenditure Percentage and systems to ensure security on Earth. 2014 in M€ Security in the latter context is generally taken in a wider sense and covers not only France 440 47.8 military operations, but also the environment, Italy 186 20.2 energy and food security, early warning, cri- sis prevention and management, peacekeep- United King- 181 19.6 ing, civil protection and other areas. dom Although both concepts should be acknowl- Germany 49 5.3 edged as an integral part of a comprehensive European space policy, it is the concept of Spain 29 3.1 security from space that is hereby taken into Other 35 3.8 account as a potential candidate for a new EU flagship programme. As will be explained in Total 920 100.0 the following section, it is this domain that Table 9: Government Expenditures on Defence Space could comprise sufficient ingredients in terms Programmes (source: Euroconsult 2015) of goal, impact, novelty and ambition to con- stitute a flagship programme. In terms of the development of military space systems, France is the most advanced Euro- 4.4.1 Status of Europe’s Space Security Efforts pean country, particularly with regard to opti- cal earth observation satellites (Helios-2 and National and Multi-National Programmes Pleiades) and electronic intelligence satellites. It is also planning to launch a space-borne If looked at from a pan-European perspec- ballistic missile early warning system by tive, the utilisation of space assets for secu- 2020. Both Germany and Italy are leaders in rity-related purposes is a relatively new do- Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellites, main in Europe. Indeed, although Europe has respectively with the SAR-Lupe and COSMO made great strides in developing European Sky-Med constellations. Germany also space systems, there has been reluctance on launched five medium-resolution electro- the part of individual Member States to pool, optical satellites in 2008 (the Rapid-Eye con- or share, their individual military space capa- stellation) and is currently developing a re- bilities under a common framework (be it placement for the SAR-Lupe (the SARah con- under the ESA or the EU umbrella), as the stellation), while in 2015 Italy approved the limitations of doing so have been perceived development of the Cosmo Sky-Med second 194 to exceed the benefits. generation.196 France, the UK, Italy and Consequently, most of Europe’s security- Spain operate GEO satellites for military related space programmes have been con- communications. As an indication of the ducted on a national level or through gov- abovementioned duplication of efforts, the ernment-to-government collaboration. This most relevant national activities for dual-use has inevitably brought a high level of duplica- purposes are listed in Table 10. tion and fragmentation of efforts. Similarly, European national preferences continue to influence contract selection and to directly or indirectly define European space technology priorities.195 Noteworthy also is the high de- gree of concentration in terms of capabilities and expenditures. Five European countries alone constitute over 96% of military space expenditures in Europe (see Table 9).
193 Definition of the Space Security Index. See Jaramillo, Cesar (ed). Space Security Index 2013. Waterloo, Canada. October 2013: 5. Web. 196 Other German missions are Terra-Sar X and Tandem http://swfound.org/media/121668/ssi_full_report_2013.pdf X, which are civil/commercial missions but with a strong 194 Robinson, Jana. “Europe’s Key Foreign Policy Objec- potential for security applications. See: Hellman, Martin, tives Via Space”. ESPI Report 30. Vienna: European and Wolfgang Rathgeber. “European Member States Space Policy Institute. February 2011: 26-27. 195 Satellite Programs”. In: Schrogl, Kai-Uwe, et al (eds). Hayward, Keith. “The Structure and Dynamics of the European Space Industry Base”. ESPI Perspective 55. Handbook of Space Security. Policies, Applications and Vienna: European Space Policy Institute. December 2011. Programs. Volume 2. Springer. 2014: 831-841.
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Earth Observation Communication Intelligence/ Early Warning COSMO Sky-Med (Italy) Athena-Fidus (France-Italy) Clementine (France) SAR-Lupe (Germany) Immarsat-4 (UK) Essaim (France) Helios (France-led) SatcomBw 2 (Germany) ELISA (France) Pleiades (France) Sicral 1/2 (Italy-France) Spirale (France) Rapid-Eye (Germany) Skynet 4 (UK) SEOSAT (Spain) Spainsat (Spain) SVEA (Sweden) Syracuse II/III (France) TopSat (UK) XTAR-EUR (Spain)
Table 10: European Dual-Use Satellite System
In addition to individual national pro- vation system for security and defence pur- grammes, a limited number of bilateral and poses. As documented in previous ESPI stud- multilateral cooperative arrangements have ies, the conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghani- been concluded among several European stan and Iraq contributed to altering Europe’s countries, with France acting as the hub of approach to military space and greater efforts major initiatives. The Athena-Fidus communi- emerged to coordinate European military cation satellite, for instance, is the result of space assets, particularly satellite communi- cooperation between France and Italy and cations and remote sensing.199 Consequently, was launched on 6 February 2014. Among in 2006 the six BOC signatory countries initi- the major initiatives in the field of Earth Ob- ated studies for a Multinational Space-Based servation is the ORFEO (Optical and Radar Imaging System for Surveillance, Reconnais- Federated Earth Observation) system. It is sance and Observation (MUSIS) with the goal the result of a Franco-Italian agreement of harmonising future optical and radar ob- signed in 2001, which was intended to com- servation systems.200 To a large extent the bine the radar observation capabilities of the project was ground breaking in nature. Based four COSMO Sky-Med satellites with the opti- on a federation of systems, it was intended to cal capabilities of the two Pleiades satel- enable participating countries (the six BOC lites.197 Germany and France signed another signatories plus Poland and Sweden) to ex- bilateral agreement in the field of EO in 2002 change military intelligence images and pro- for the sharing of the radar and electro- vide access to space-based components in a optical capacities of SAR-Lupe and Helios-2. transparent and coherent manner through a For both the ORFEO and the SAR-Lupe– common ground user segment.201 Although in Helios-2 cooperation schemes, the exchange 2008 the implementation phase was officially of operational image data started only in launched and in 2009 the European Defence 2010. New arrangements between France Agency (EDA) also became involved in its and Germany are in the process of being development, the future of the project is finalised for the deployment of France’s next bleak, as the countries have struggled to generation optical reconnaissance satellites agree on issues such as financial contribu- (Composante Spatiale Optique – CSO).198 tions, technical characteristics of the User Ground Segment, and capacity exchange In terms of multilateral initiatives, in 2001 six rules.202 European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium and Greece) concluded a joint agreement on common operational require- 199 Robinson, Jana. “Europe’s Key Foreign Policy Objec- ments (BOC, from the French Besoins Opera- tives Via Space”. ESPI Report 30. Vienna: European Space Policy Institute. February 2011: 26-27. tionnels Communs). The purpose of the BOC 200 was to develop a common set of require- See European Defence Agency. “Multinational Space- Based Imaging System for Surveillance, Reconnaissance ments for a European global satellite obser- and Observation”. Web. https://www.eda.europa.eu/our- work/projects-search/multinational-space-based-imaging- 197 system Austria, Belgium, Spain and Sweden have signed 201 bilateral agreements with France through which they have For a more detailed description of the MUSIS project been participating to the costs of the two Pleiades satel- Kolovos, Alexander, and Kostas Pilaftis. “European Multi- lites (launched in December 2011 and 2012) in exchange national Satellite Programs”. In: Schrogl, Kai-Uwe, et al for access to data. (eds). Handbook of Space Security. Policies, Applications 198 De Selding, Peter. “Germany to Invest in French Recon and Programs. Volume 2. Springer. 2014: 843-866. Satellite for Access to Full Constellation”. Space News. 9 202 See: French Senate. “Projet de loi de finances pour February 2015. 2015: Défense: équipement des forces”. Web.
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European Actors, Programmes and Policies fied capabilities and capability gaps as well as the operational needs of Europe.205 In parallel to these national developments, over the past decade European-level institu- The topic of space security has increasingly tions have also become increasingly involved gained momentum through such develop- in the field of security from space, although ments as the Resolutions of the EU-ESA none of the programmes in question were Space Council and the Lisbon Treaty of 2009. intended to be purely military space pro- The Resolution on the ESP adopted by the grammes. The European Commission has Space Council in May 2007 introduced a dedi- become the engine of space security initia- cated chapter on security and space. The tives, as demonstrated by its intention that chapter clearly linked space activities with the the services provided by its two flagship pro- European Security and Defence Policy and grammes should serve security and defence outlined how the security of Europe and its policies as well as by the growing number of citizens is increasingly relying upon space- policy initiatives it has undertaken. based capabilities. It also called for a “struc- Both Copernicus and Galileo are intended as tured dialogue on space and security” involv- civil programmes under civil control. However ing the European Council, the EC, and ESA, they both possess an obvious security com- and proposed moving toward more interoper- ponent and, among other tasks, are intended able, coordinated space capabilities among to enhance the management of security- the relevant entities. related challenges. One of the functions of In 2008, the ESP Progress Report empha- the Copernicus programme is to provide sised that European space capacities had dedicated security services in the areas of become critical information tools in address- border surveillance, maritime surveillance ing a diversity of environmental, economic and support to EU external action (e.g. sup- and security challenges on a global and re- port to the planning and conduct of both mili- gional scale. Autonomous access to informa- tary and civilian operations of crisis manage- tion derived from space is thus a strategic EU ment and peacekeeping operations by spe- asset. The EU will need to further strengthen cifically assessing the situation on the its ability to respond to these challenges, ground).203 The Copernicus programme will, including in the security and defence do- however, also provide security services in the mains, through both improved coordination broader sense, for instance by assisting the and the development of indigenous capaci- EU in the prevention of disasters such as ties.206 flooding, forest fires and oil spills that require timely and precise information. As for the The Lisbon Treaty not only created a legal security-related services of Galileo, once op- basis for the stronger action of the EU in erational, the system is intended to provide space but also provided the Union with the the armed forces of the Member States, EU mandate to strengthen its international en- Battle groups and the CSDP with Positioning, gagement in security and defence matters. In Navigation and Timing (PNT) services. Galileo this respect, the Treaty established a Euro- will also offer support to humanitarian search pean External Action Service (EEAS) and and rescue activities and will provide public created the post of High Representative of authorities with encrypted signals as well as the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security warnings if the signal’s integrity is at risk.204 Policy, which has accordingly assumed a number of specific tasks with regard to space In terms of policy initiatives, since the re- security. Assisted by the EEAS, the High Rep- lease of its White Paper on Space in 2003, resentative supervises two fundamental insti- the EU has endorsed the need to consider tutions for space security: the European Un- space as a whole, thus also the possibility of ion Satellite Centre (EU SatCen) and the using space technology in the practical im- European Defence Agency (EDA). plementation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESPD), now a component of The EU SatCen, located near Madrid, was the CFSP. The EC established a Space and founded in 1992 and incorporated as an Security Panel of Experts (SPASEC) that was agency into the EU in January 2002. Its convened in June 2004 and was followed by a stated mission is to “support the decision– SPASEC Report in March 2005, which identi-
205 Report of the Panel of Expert on Space and Security. March 2005. Available on ESPI website. 206 Commission of the European Communities. “Commis- 203 Marta, Lucia. “European Institutional Satellite sion Working Document – European Space Policy Pro- gress Report”. Report COM(2008)561 final of 11 Sep. Programs”. In: Schrogl, Kai-Uwe, et al (eds). Handbook of 2008. Brussels: European Union. 15 December 2012. Space Security. Policies, Applications and Programs.
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making of the European Union in the field of has been involved in the “Structured Dialogue the Common Foreign and Security Policy on Space and Security”, gathering the EC, (CFSP), in particular of the Common Security the EEAS, the Council Secretariat General, and Defence Policy (CSDP), including Euro- EDA and ESA for regular exchanges of views pean Union crisis management operations, by and coordination of relative space-related providing, as appropriate, products resulting activities. from the analysis of satellite imagery and With regard to ESA, this Agency has for a collateral data, including aerial imagery, and long time been playing a role in supporting related services”.207 The Centre is one of the synergies between space and security key institutions for European Union’s Security through its activities (e.g. launcher develop- and Defence policy, and the only one specifi- ment) which are inherently dual-use in na- cally dedicated to space. ture, even if the corresponding programmes The European Defence Agency (EDA) was have always been designed without any spe- established by a Joint Action of the Council of cific security requirements.212 Indeed, the the EU in July 2004 and completely restruc- Agency has traditionally avoided any direct tured in 2013. The mission of the Agency is involvement in security-related activities. For to “support the Council and the Member many, this was because the ESA Convention States in their effort to improve the EU’s de- states that the Agency should operate for fence capabilities in the field of crisis man- “exclusively peaceful purposes”.213 However, agement and to sustain the CSDP as it stands as explained by ESA in a 2003 position paper, now and it develops in the future”.208 Among this reference cannot be interpreted as re- its various tasks, the Agency is involved in stricting ESA’s capacity to conduct activities the space security domain.209 Its primary of a dual use or military nature.214 In fact, in objective in this respect is to identify defence recent years ESA has become increasingly requirements that could be met by space- involved in the area of space security. based solutions and to promote measures to In terms of security from space, ESA’s in- satisfy those requirements. Following the volvement is visible through its participation Resolution of the Space Council of 25 No- in the Copernicus and Galileo flagship pro- vember 2010 – which called for the estab- grammes, as well as through the European lishment of appropriate mechanisms to effec- Data Relay Satellite System (EDRS), a sys- tively exploit space systems to support the tem of two GEO payloads (to be launched in capability of the CSDP – space has also been 2015 and 2016) that will relay information included in EDA’s Defence Capability Devel- between satellites, spacecraft, UAVs and opment Plan as a core enabler for defence- ground stations, also for security purposes.215 related capabilities.210 In concrete terms, In addition, following the Resolution of the 7th EDA has been entrusted with the manage- EU-ESA Space Council, on 20 June 2011, an ment of a Governmental Satellite Telecom- administrative agreement with the European munication (GOVSATCOM) initiative, with the Defence Agency (EDA) was concluded with objective of providing Member States with the aim of exploring the specific contributions several options for a future collaborative pro- space assets can bring to the development of gramme and to pave the way for the next generation of telecommunication capabilities 211 in the 2025 timeframe. In addition, EDA addressing user needs and to identifying the technical, system and mission requirements. EDA, together with all involved parties, will landscape and assess the ability of 207 European Union Satellite Centre. “Mission”. 15 Decem- various solutions to fulfil these requirements and finally ber 2014. Web. develop the appropriate framework [of a future collabora- http://www.satcen.europa.eu/index.php?option=com_conte tive programme] including governance issues, concept of nt&task=view&id=3&Itemid=11 operations and cooperation framework”. European De- 208 European Defence Agency. “Mission”. Web. fence Agency. “Governmental Satellite Communications”. http://www.eda.europa.eu/Aboutus/Whatwedo 16 June 2016. Web. http://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we- 209 As major tasks, the Agency identifies operational re- do/activities/activities-search/governmental-satellite- quirements and promotes measures to satisfy those re- communications-(govsatcom) quirements needed to strengthen the industrial and tech- 212 European Space Agency Council. “Status of Security- nological base of the industrial sector. It also participates in related Activities in ESA”. ESA/C(2007)111. Paris, 25 defining a European capabilities and armaments policy; it September 2007. promotes harmonisation of operational needs and the 213 The Convention refers to the organisation’s promotion adoption of effective, compatible procurement methods; it of space for exclusively peaceful purposes in both the proposes multilateral projects to fulfil objectives in terms of Preamble and Article II military capabilities; it supports defence and technology 214 European Space Agency Council. “Position paper on research and coordinates joint research activities. ESA and the Defence sector” ESA/C(2003)153. Paris, 1 210 European Defence Agency. “Governmental Satellite December 2003. Communications”. Web. 215 The first EDRS payload will be placed on board the http://www.eda.europa.eu/Aboutus/Whatwedo/capability- Eutelsat 9B communication satellite, while the second programmes/governmental-satellite-communications EDRS will be launched on a dedicated satellite. See Euro- 211 The GOVSATCOM programme is envisioned with a pean Data Relay Satellite System webpage: “sequential approach, consisting of a first step dedicated to http://www.edrs-spacedatahighway.com/
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European capabilities in the area of crisis interests and security. 218, 219 Defence needs management and the CSDP.216 to move beyond the transatlantic paradigm, because Europe cannot be a normative power The Administrative Arrangement foresees the without real power. possibility of launching Implementing Ar- rangements for specific joint projects in ac- The creation of the EEAS and of the post of cordance with the respective rules and proce- the High Representative as well as the adop- dures of ESA and EDA. A first implementing tion of a CSDP and the introduction of the arrangement was signed in December 2011 notion of Permanent Structure Cooperation with regard to a joint demonstration mission (PESCO) initiatives have certainly marked in the area of Unmanned Aerial Systems important steps forward, but much work re- Command and Control over Satellites. Addi- mains to be done on the institutional, military tional identified activities of common interest and technological front in order to materially include intelligence, surveillance, reconnais- improve the security- and defence-related sance, civil-military synergies, Earth Obser- capabilities of the Union. vation, satellite communications, Space Situ- Improving such capabilities is vital to ensur- ational Awareness and critical space technol- ing an effective CSDP, and space assets con- ogy for European non-dependence.217 Several stitute an essential segment of the military joint demonstration projects in those areas means needed. Space-based systems are an are currently in the phase of being imple- integral part of the defence capabilities of any mented. nation aiming to have a strategic presence in All in all, the socio-economic dimension on the world and can be “a force multiplier, which European space undertakings have so which at the very least makes the implemen- far focused has started to be increasingly tation of security policies more effective”.220 accompanied by a security dimension. It re- When looking at the key objectives set by the mains however to be seen whether more EU for security, there appears to be much integrated and ambitious approaches will room for space assets to strengthen these follow to fulfil Europe´s growing space secu- objectives. The objectives as well as the con- rity needs. tribution brought by space to their fulfilment are well known and have been assessed in a 4.4.2 Is there Added Value in EU Involvement? number of policy analysis documents; it thus suffices to mention them only briefly.221 Since the very beginning of the European Space imagery can, inter alia, provide valu- project it was clear that economic integration able support in terms of environmental, en- alone would not be sufficient to realise ergy and food security. In addition, it can Europe’s ultimate goal of creating a unified assist in the planning and conduct of both and strong entity capable of projecting geo- military and civilian aspects of crisis man- political skills and values on the world stage. agement and peacekeeping operations by In order to ensure this goal, by necessity, the specifically assessing the situation on the EU has to become a more coherent, credible ground. Secure and reliable satellite commu- and capable actor also in terms of foreign and nications are essential for exercising political security policy. Without a stronger profile in control and strategic direction over any civil this domain, Europe would perhaps loom or military operation. They are particularly large on an economic map of the world but valuable in external theatres, especially remain a geopolitical blip, reliant on NATO where local infrastructure is deficient, and and ultimately on the U.S. to safeguard its
218 Kupchan, Charles A. The end of the American Era. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century. Vintage Book. New York. 2002: 60-70 216 More specifically, the EDA-ESA Administrative Ar- 219 The conflict in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and more rangement states that cooperation between the two agen- recently Libya have been unfortunate precedents in this cies will seek to: a) Identify those capabilities gaps that regard and have made once again clear the inadequate could be filled by space assets for the sustainable and level of Europe’s defence capabilities and level of integra- effective implementation of the EU policies; b) Investigate tion. whether identified capabilities requirements can be shared 220 Cit. Smith, Lesley Jane, and Kay-Uwe Hörl. “Construct- and thus supported by both ESA and EDA; c) Coordinate ing the European Space Policy: Past, Present and Future. research, technology and demonstration activities, includ- Commerce in Space: Infrastructures, Technologies, and ing access to study results as appropriate and subject to Applications. Phillip Olla. Hershey: Information Science their respective rules.; d) Investigate synergies between Reference. 2008: 12. existing dedicated EDA and ESA programmes and their 221 See for instance: Johnson-Freese, Joan. Space as a future evolution.; e) Explore synergies and coordinate Strategic Asset. Columbia University Press. New York: activities in support of industrial competitiveness and 2007. Academie Nationale de l’Air et de l`Espace. Space European non-dependency issues for defence. A European Vision. April 2005. (Available on 217 European Space Agency. “European Space Technol- ESPI website). Robinson, Jana. “Enabling Europe’s For- ogy Master Plan.” 11th Edition. ESA/ESTEC. October eign Policy Objectives via Space”. ESPI Report 30. Febru- 2014. ary 2011.
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communication capabilities thus exclusively What is also clear is that leaving European dependent upon space-based assets. Also, military space systems to national agencies Navigation, Positioning and Timing (PNT) are and agreements outside a common frame- important to military forces and civilian units work is in contradiction to the policy of con- involved in crisis management and peace- solidation of European space efforts, and keeping operations. more broadly with the project of European integration (also on matters of collective de- An integrated and autonomous access to fence) pursued over the last decades. De- information and services provided by space is fence, to be sure, is an intergovernmental thus a strategic asset for the EU and the im- task and cannot be handed over to the Com- plementation of its policies. While this neces- mission as such.223 Military capabilities will sity per se could justify the initiation of a likely continue to remain within the remit of dedicated flagship programme in the field of Member States also in the future, as they are space security - particularly in the area of understandably still not comfortable enough satellite telecommunications - it is also true to completely merge their defence policies that much of the required technology and and programmes. infrastructure (including telecommunications, optical reconnaissance and radar observation Be this as it may, functional steps can none- satellites) is already in the possession of theless be taken to achieve greater European European countries and ideally could be made integration on security and defence matters, available to the EU. Additionally, valuable and a space flagship initiative could be a services will be offered by adequate exploita- good place to start. Besides accruing material tion of the Copernicus and Galileo pro- payoffs on the operational, technological and grammes. More importantly, all European industrial level, a flagship programme in the actors (namely, the EC, the EU Council, EDA, field of space for security can also be of ESA and Member States) have, since the paramount importance to inducing changes elaboration of the ESP, agreed to systemati- on the institutional and political level. Put cally explore common ways to support cur- simply, it might act as a trailblazer, giving rent and future capabilities needs of the impetus to bolder initiatives within the CSDP CFSP/CSDP through cost-effective access to and Permanent Structured Cooperation, and space assets and services (integrating global creating a positive spillover effect to further satellite communications, earth observation, the process of political integration in the se- positioning and timing and taking full advan- curity domain. After all, Jean Monnet’s func- tage of dual-use synergies). tionalism remains a guiding principle of the European integration project also in the field The rhetoric of official policy documents not- of security.224 Thus, the underlying idea is withstanding, engaging defence decision- that space may again become a domain set- makers in pan-European space is no easy ting broader political trends, rather than a task as there appear to be both objective reflection of current ones. As such, the value difficulties in pooling and sharing strategic of initiating a flagship programme for space assets and an underlying hesitancy by Euro- security is that it would enable the EU to pean Member States to surrender a key part provide both the pan-European space efforts of their autonomy. In fact, it is no coinci- with their currently missing dimension, and to dence that dedicated security space pro- start delivering success in the broader area of grammes have not been initiated at European security, thus fulfilling its mandate and re- level, but have firmly remained based either affirming a leading role in both fields. Put on national or government-to-government simply, should security become the next EU collaboration. As mentioned, this has led to flagship for space, the reverse might also unprofitable duplication and fragmentation, prove to be true: space would become a flag- which appears indefensible, particularly con- ship programme for European security. sidering the period of prolonged austerity faced by most European countries. The re- cent cuts in EU Member States’ defence roadmap for dual-use technologies on the technological budgets have made it clear that it is no level; and the launch of European procurement pro- longer possible to maintain adequate military grammes co-financed by the EU at the industrial level. Cit. capabilities (including in terms of space as- Marrone, Alessandro and Michele Nones. “More Europe on defence or no Europe”. Istituto Affari Internazionali. sets) at national level, meaning that a form June 2013. of pan-European initiative will be neces- 223 Smith, Lesley Jane, and Kay-Uwe Hörl. “Constructing sary.222 the European Space Policy: Past, Present and Future. Commerce in Space: Infrastructures, Technologies, and Applications. Phillip Olla. Hershey: Information Science Reference. 2008: 12. 222 Identified steps forward include: the implementation of 224 According to functionalism, the integration between the pooling and sharing approach on the military level; the states in one specific sector will create stronger incentives establishment of the permanent structure of cooperation for integration in further sectors, in order to fully capture on the institutional level; the definition of a European the peaks of integration in the sector in which it started.
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Ideally, such a flagship programme could be time overcoming the prospect of a restrained primarily devoted to the development of pan- space security programme maintained by a European capabilities in the field of satellite handful of military capable Member States telecommunications, since it at present re- only. In other words, through the implemen- mains an area covered only by the tation of a flagship programme, national ac- GOVSATCOM feasibility study of EDA. The tors could sensibly reduce their long term programme could, however, be designed to investment in security-related space assets in progressively integrate those capabilities with favour of a growing pan-European approach, the EO and PNT services covered by the cur- “able to pull together, in a coherent and con- rent flagships in a more structured fashion sistent way, the weight of all Member States and to develop a dedicated, centralised infra- and of all the European institutions”.226 Great structure for the management of all security- political benefits and material payoffs would related space services. be the result. The opportunity for the EU to take a more pro-active stance in the security domain of- fered by a space flagship programme could 4.5 Assessment of the Fu- also act as a double identity-forming element for Europe, i.e. for both the security and the ture Flagship Options space dimensions.225 Clearly such a pro- gramme would provide just some building The discussion above has revealed that all blocks in the bigger frame of a European three candidates possess specific characteris- identity, but – as previously stressed– flag- tics that could potentially point to added ship programmes are ultimately instruments value resulting from EU involvement. In this designed to further stimulate European cohe- final section they will be compared side by siveness and spur a meta-national European side from an overall perspective against the integration and identity. Like exploration, a benchmark indicators identified in section flagship initiative in the field of space for 4.1. These indicators, however, cannot be security could noticeably push forward the interpreted in isolation from feasibility con- European integration project, the difference siderations in terms of political commitment, being that such a programme would specifi- financial resources and operational complex- cally impact the governmental and political ity. Political feasibility is a measure of how level rather than the level of citizens. well the considered flagship candidate would generate convergence of interests and broad An additional key rationale behind the possi- consensus among European stakeholders. A ble initiation of a Space Security Flagship feasible candidate is thus one that has a high emerges by putting it into the appropriate probability of receiving sufficient political perspective. By definition, a flagship involves push and support to be implemented. Opera- a long-term programme with a first develop- tional feasibility refers to the concrete man- ment period of at least 10-15 years and, as agement challenges the programme would such, it can tackle operational needs in the entail. Finally, financial feasibility refers to long-term only. Whereas in the current con- the amount of European budget to be mobi- text the ideal pathway to ensuring Europe’s lised over a period of at least ten years. In space-related security needs is through the this respect, specific estimates fall outside concrete pooling of national capabilities (and the scope of this report. However, the order in the near future by effective integration of of magnitude is provided to feed political those capabilities with the services provided discussion among stakeholders, particularly by Copernicus and Galileo), the continuity within the Commission. and upgrading of the required assets and services can be fully met only in the long It is important to note that the comparative term perspective of an optimised programme. assessment offered below (see Table 11) is based on a relative approach in two respects. The key advantage in embedding space secu- First, it is relative in that scenarios for the rity within the frame of a long-term flagship three candidates are compared against each is thus that it would provide Member States other for every criterion individually. Second, time to calibrate their national space efforts for each parameter the candidates are rated in the security domain, while at the same according to how well EC involvement would score as compared to the status quo, taking 225 On the role of space and security as forming element into account current initiatives and activities. for European identity see: Remuss, Nina-Louisa. “Space A blank field in Table 11 signals no or negligi- and Security as an identity forming element – meeting ble additional benefits compared to the status Europe´s external and internal security through space applications”. In: Venet, Christophe, and Blandina Baranes (eds.). European Identity through Space. Space Activities 226 Cit. Vasconcelos, Alvaro. “What ambitions for European and Programmes as a Tool to Reinvigorate the European Defence in 2020?”. European Union Institute for Security identity. Springer. Wien. 2012. Studies. July 2009.
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quo, one dot represents a moderate potential integration and identity and, two dots implies a significant potential at political EU level. for added value through EC involvement. In the feasibility heading, the number of dots Create a strong Euro- corresponds to the degree of feasibility. pean brand that could stimulate European ●●
sense of identity and Criterion citizenship. Feasibility Political ●● ●
Exploration Launcher Security Financial ● ●● Operational ●● ● Economic and Social Benefits:
Bring benefits to a Table 11: Assessment of the Future Flagship Programme large number of users Options. ● ● in society and the economy. Generally speaking, involvement of the Commission in the field of space exploration Support diverse seg- is expected to yield a wide range of benefits ments and regions of ●● ● ● in a number of areas. One of the main rea- the European society sons for this is the huge diversity in techno- and economy. logical capabilities required in space explora- Become a tool in spur- tion and human spaceflight in particular. ring structural eco- ● ● ● More specifically, this would allow the EU to nomic growth. invest and create spillover effects that gener- ate smart growth, sustainable growth, and Make European scien- inclusive growth. In addition to this, the pres- tific research and engi- tige and soft power associated with having an neering communities ●● ●● ●● ambitious space exploration programme more productive and would enable the EU to reap a variety of stra- efficient, and establish tegic and political benefits. Although this new networks. option would score well in terms of political Strategic and Political Benefits: consensus as compared to the other scenar- ios, it is associated with high costs, a high Give Europe a strong level of operational complexity and, a pro- or leading role in the longed political commitment, at the highest domain and offer a ● ●● ● levels, spanning over multiple decades. cutting-edge advan- tage. In the launcher option the socioeconomic benefits might be less pronounced compared Serve geopolitical ob- to the exploration option. This is mainly be- jectives: autonomy, cause ESA has already achieved a strong non-dependence and ● ●● ●● position in the sector. Where EC involvement strengthen EU interna- in launchers does score significantly is in how tional presence. it would enable Europe to gain an even stronger cutting-edge advantage in terms of Advance Europe’s dip- innovation and long term competiveness – lomatic goals and sup- ●● ● ●● especially with regard to game-changing port the foreign policy technologies in this ever more rapidly evolv- action of the EU. ing field. It would thus support and foster Enable the EU to be- European industrial capabilities and assist come more competent Europe in maintaining a leading position in ●● in addressing diverse the commercial market. In addition, EU in- policy needs. volvement could encourage Europe to lever- age launchers as a policy tool on the interna- Drive advances and tional stage, thus providing a stronger politi- innovation in science, cal profile to this highly strategic field. The technology, engineer- ●● ●● ● level of financial commitment required for the ing and programme implementation of this flagship candidate management. might be relatively high, but the operational Stimulate European ● ● ●● complexity would be all-in-all conceivably manageable, albeit with considerable risk of
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eventual failure – as with most investments truly European Common Security and De- in disruptive innovation. fence Policy, besides providing European space efforts with their missing dimension. As an EU flagship programme, the socioeco- This in turn would be of paramount impor- nomic benefits of the security option might tance in consolidating the longstanding ef- perhaps have a lower degree of visibility. forts of the European integration project. Nonetheless, over the long term a solid secu- rity architecture would generate demonstra- While it is clear that each scenario has very ble paybacks, especially considering that it particular characteristics, selecting one can- would provide impetus to the European R&D didate over another eventually comes down communities and that it would bring about to the relative weight decision-makers will stronger cross-fertilisation among the cur- attribute to the different socioeconomic, stra- rently fairly stove-piped networks in the se- tegic and political benefits as well as the chal- curity domain. Moreover, from a strategic lenges related to EC involvement for each and political perspective, a space security scenario in terms of political, financial and flagship programme would complement a operational feasibility. Although this report wide range of existing EU policy domains and does not aspire to bring any conclusive an- make security operations more effective and swer regarding the way to go, it is hoped that efficient. Although the political feasibility of it will be an element supporting the reflection this option is low given the Member States’ process for the European Commission and reluctance to merge their defence policies other European stakeholders in determining and programmes, a space security flagship whether, in which area, to which extent, and programme would prove a milestone towards in what way the will to increase EC involve- further and broader steps in the creation of a ment in space activities will be channelled.
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5. Conclusions
For more than sixty years the European inte- a very sensible decision. However, there are gration project has been expanding and no or few defined binding targets to integrate deepening immensely. From the original nar- location based services and navigation row – yet historic – cooperation in the pro- throughout the European economy – al- duction of coal and steel, EU policies and though reflection on how the public sector actions today affect nearly all segments of might complement the private sector in this European social, economic and political life. respect is certainly worthwhile. It is recom- The European Union is currently in the proc- mended that European diplomacy be used to ess of asserting a stronger role in space. It is explore the option of pooling expertise world- doing so because its mandate and compe- wide to achieve interoperability with the aim tences have now become so broad that space of increasing worldwide GNSS performance, activities and policies are becoming a crucial and seeking to establish better user interfac- element in supporting and addressing them. ing mechanisms at the global level. In terms Another motivation is that strategic assets of validating the benefits of both flagship such as space capabilities could benefit from programmes at political level, there is a validation at a high political level. Further- strong need for information to flow back to more, space provides the EU with a tool to the political system. further the European integration project, As a second step, it must be ensured that the increase its political weight vis-à-vis Euro- two current flagship programmes will play a pean Member States and assert its role as an central role in spurring innovation ecosys- actor on the international stage. It is thus tems in their respective sectors. In this re- likely that EU involvement in space will con- spect, it is recommendable that innovation be tinue to expand both within and beyond its pursued in both the up- and downstream current undertakings. segments, and by both institutional and pri- The first aim of this report was to assess how vate actors. Upon closer scrutiny, it seems this expanding role in space could be en- that the current set up is not entirely condu- hanced from a policy and governance per- cive for the creation of a balanced ecosystem. spective. As Europe’s new and autonomous SMEs in particular remain fairly underrepre- all-round Earth Observation programmes and sented and far from reaching their potential, Global Satellite Navigation System will although they will become ever more in- achieve full operational status in the near volved in the EO and GNSS sectors, and future, priority should be given to the opera- therefore will also be a key driver in techno- tional governance of Copernicus and Galileo. logical innovation. To this effect, this report investigated how to Another concern is that Europe faces further ensure that the data and services provided by difficulties in cross-fertilisation between the the current constellations can be reaped in an dot-com sector and EO and GNSS applica- optimal fashion. It was demonstrated that tions because the former is not as strongly many important steps have been taken. developed as, for instance, in the United Some crucial links and elements remain, States. however, to be established. For Copernicus, exposure among potential users within Finally, the decentralised method of gather- Europe remains relatively weak. Furthermore, ing new and existing continuity requirements there is still a structural mismatch between in Copernicus endangers the coherent defini- the current organisational structure of the tion of overall system priorities and the con- services, which is highly decentralised, and stellation’s composition over the long term, the need to also pursue more holistic ap- as well as creating an unnecessary barrier for proaches to data management. The report accommodating users with transversal re- suggests that the current approach of the- quirements. matic services is sensible, but that alone it cannot guarantee full passage of socioeco- The second main objective of this report was nomic and scientific benefits from the scien- to investigate the possibility and opportunity tific community to the public and society as a for the EC to extend its involvement over whole. For Galileo, the creation of different space matters by means of a new flagship services corresponding to various needs was programme. The report set out general con-
ESPI Report 53 64 November 2015 The Future of European Flagship Programmes in Space
siderations on the criteria defining EU flag- One possible path would be for the Space ships programmes and identified three candi- Advisory Group of the EC to establish a dedi- dates that have the necessary appeal and cated committee on future space flagship ingredients to constitute a new flagship pro- programmes. Whereas the practice is not gramme. These are: space exploration, ac- new, as a SAG sub-committee was already cess to space, and space security. formed in 2009 to provide the Commission advice on its potential contribution to space However, consideration should be given as to exploration, the specific feature of ‘flagship whether the flagship model provides per se committee’ would be that of comparing and the most appropriate framework for the con- contrasting a number of scenarios and op- duct of the EC’s future space activities. The tions rather than focusing on just one do- financial and administrative difficulties en- main. As there are many valid arguments countered over the years by both the Galileo underpinning the case for each candidate, and Copernicus programmes shed some doing so would allow decision makers to bet- doubt on the long-term suitability and sus- ter weigh the different socio-economic, stra- tainability of current schemes and could tegic and political benefits involved in each therefore induce the Commission to prefer an option as well as the political, financial and alternative approach to space, for instance, operational effort required. that of having a dedicated budget item for space to be allocated to a plethora of under- It is also recommended that the work of such takings. That being said, it appears quite a flagships committee should be based on clear that if a different approach were to be wide-scope hearings involving all major pursued, this would be closely connected to stakeholders. Ideally, these hearings should major changes within the overall governance be set up to engage representatives of EU of space activities in Europe (including the Member States, the EU Parliament, ESA, and future evolution of ESA vis-à-vis the EU). industry, but also actors - such as the Euro- Therefore, for the time being it is more likely pean External Action Service - that have so that EU involvement will continue to evolve far been less directly involved in the planning by the means of flagship programmes. and conduct of space activities but that can nonetheless play a crucial role. One of the Consideration of the actual implementation major advantages of an open approach is aspects of a new flagship programme will that it would identify how the relevant stake- vary according to the candidate the EC se- holders assess each given option, as well as lects. The comparative assessment included prepare the distribution of tasks and respon- in this report does not aspire to provide a sibilities of the different actors throughout conclusive answer regarding the best area for the implementation process. Such a broad further EU involvement. Each of the candi- participatory approach could be also ex- date flagships possesses unique characteris- tended to engage the public as an active tics, and a specific selection would thus entail stakeholder. This would have the additional pros and cons that can only play out in actual advantage of creating a strong link with soci- political discourse. What is however recom- ety even before the conception of a pro- mendable is to define a coherent and trans- gramme, thereby increasing outreach, and parent mechanism to support the selection awareness and societal support. process in an optimal manner.
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List of Acronyms
Acronym Explanation A ASI Agenzia Spaziale Italiana (Italian Space Agency) ASL Airbus-Safran Launchers ATV Automated Transfer Vehicle B BOC Besoins Operationnels Communs (common operational requirements) C CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy CNES Centre National D’Etudes Spatiales (French Space Agency) CS Commercial Service (Galileo) CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy D DG Directorate-General DLR Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt (German Space Agency) Development of Pre-operational Services for Highly Innovative Maritime Sur- DOLPHIN veillance Capabilities E EARSC European Association of Remote Sensing Companies EC European Commission ECSC European Coal and Steel Community EDA European Defence Agency EDRS European Data Relay System EEAS European Union External Action Service EFAS European Flood Awareness System EGAS European Guaranteed Access to Space EGNOS European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service ELDO European Launcher Development Organisation ELV European Launch Vehicle EMS Emergency Management Service (Galileo) EO Earth Observation EP European Parliament ESA European Space Agency ESC European Space Conference ESP European Space Policy
ESPI Report 53 66 November 2015 The Future of European Flagship Programmes in Space
Acronym Explanation ESPI European Space Policy Institute ESRO European Space Research Organisation EU European Union EUMETSAT European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites EUSatCen European Union Satellite Centre F FLPP Future Launchers Preparatory Programme FOC Full Operational Capability FP Framework Programme G GEO Group on Earth Observations GMES Global Monitoring for Environment and Security GNI Gross National Income GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System GOVSATCOM Governmental Satellite Communications Programme (EDA) GPS Global Positioning System GSA European GNSS Agency H H2020 Horizon 2020 HSPG High-Level Space Policy Group I ICG International Committee on GNSS ICT Information and Communications Technology IOC Initial Operational Capability IOV In-Orbit Validation ISECG International Space Exploration Coordination Group ISEF International Space Exploration Forum ISS International Space Station ITU International Telecommunication Union IXV Intermediate Experimental Vehicle J JRC Joint Research Centre JTF Joint Task Force (ESA-EU) M MAC-II Monitoring Atmospheric Composition and Climate – Interim Implementation MEO Medium Earth Orbit MFF Multiannual Financial Framework Management of Operations, Situation Awareness and Intelligence for regional MOSAIC Crises MPCV Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (Orion)
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Acronym Explanation MS Member State MUSIS Multinational Space-Based Imaging System N NEREIDS New Service Capabilities for Integrated and Advanced Maritime Surveillance NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency NGL Next Generation Launcher O OS Open Service (Galileo) P PESCO Permanent Structure of Cooperation PRS Public Regulated Service (Galileo) PURE Partnership for User Requirements Evaluation R R&D Research and Development RTD Research and Technological Development S S&T Science and Technology SAG Space Advisory Group (EC) SAGE Stratospheric Aerosol and Gas Experiment SAI Space Applications Institute SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar SAR Search and Rescue Service (Galileo) SCG Space Coordination Group SIMTISYS Simulator for Moving Target Indicator System SME Small and Medium-sized Enterprises SoL Safety of Life (Galileo) SSA Space Situational Awareness Strengthening User Networks for Requirement Investigation and Supporting SUNRISE Entrepreneurship T TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union TRL Technology Readiness Level U U.S. United States UK United Kingdom USGS United States Geological Survey USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
ESPI Report 53 68 November 2015 The Future of European Flagship Programmes in Space
About the Authors
Marco Aliberti Arne Lahcen Marco Aliberti works as a Resident Fellow at Arne Lahcen is Resident Fellow at the Euro- the European Space Policy Institute (ESPI) in pean Space Policy Institute in Vienna, Aus- Vienna. He first joined ESPI in October 2012, tria. His research interests include Earth Ob- after completing a Master of Advanced Stud- servation governance, international coopera- ies in Space Policy and Institutions and at- tion schemes, innovation management, and tending the ESA/ECSL Summer Course on the relationship between space and society. Space Law and Policy. Prior to that, he Prior to joining ESPI in 2011, he obtained an graduated in Oriental Languages and Cultures Advanced Master’s degree in Space Studies at the University of Rome “La Sapienza”, and with a specialisation in space law, policy, obtained a Master in International Relations business and management at the Faculty of from the Italian Diplomatic Academy (SIOI). Science of the Catholic University of Leuven, He also pursued an Advanced Master's de- Belgium. He also holds a Bachelor’s and Mas- gree in International Asian Studies at the ter’s degree in Social-Economic Sciences pur- University of Naples “L'Orientale” and a Secu- sued at the Faculty of Applied Economics, rity Studies Program at the Institute of Global University of Antwerp, Belgium. In addition to Studies – School of Government in Rome. ESPI research activities, he is editor-in-chief of the ESPI Perspectives series and co- responsible for the follow-up of the ESPI Au- tumn Conference and the editing of the ESPI Yearbook.
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Mission Statement of ESPI
The European Space Policy Institute (ESPI) provides decision-makers with an informed view on mid- to long-term issues relevant to Europe’s space activi- ties. In this context, ESPI acts as an independent platform for developing po- sitions and strategies.
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