Global Governance 3 (1997), 329–348

ASEAN ’s Pivotal Role in Asian-Pacific Regional Cooperation Michael Haas

egional cooperation in Asia and the Pacific is undergoing a funda - mental transformation. Some four to five decades ago, external powers attempted to organize the region by forming such organiza - tions as the South Pacific Commission, the Colombo Plan, and the South- REast Asia Treaty Organization ( SEATO ), but these efforts eventually fal - tered. Regional cooperation flourished, however, when smaller countries within the region became leaders in developing such organizations as the Association of South East Asian Nations ( ASEAN ) in 1967 and the South Pacific Forum in 1971. Since the mid-1970s, Asian regional cooperation has become “ ASEAN ized”; that is, ASEAN has formed the core of most suc - cessful organizational initiatives. 1 A similar development has occurred among Pacific Island states, which rallied around the South Pacific Forum and then “Forumized” regional cooperation among Pacific Island states. 2 Currently, however, external powers are attempting to organize the re - gion once again. In the South Pacific, financial support from Australia, Britain, the United States, and New Zealand is dwindling, leaving France, the remaining colonial power, as the only reliably generous contributor. As for Asian regional cooperation, ASEAN is in danger of being eclipsed by the transregional Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ( APEC )3 organization, which has a membership that stretches from ASEAN to Northeast Asia and the American hemisphere, with strong leadership on the part of the United States. With claims that the economic health of the United States is de - clining, while that of Asia is increasing, a new tension between external and internal countries has risen in the region during the post–Cold War era. The future of regional cooperation depends upon how this dialectic plays out. Two schools of thought paint different scenarios for future regional cooperation in Asia and the Pacific. The first is a sociocultural argument. It maintains that the “Asian Way” and the “Pacific Way,” innovative styles of loose consultation developed by ASEAN and the South Pacific Forum from cultural approaches to human relations, will continue to prevail, thereby protecting the smaller states in Asia from being overwhelmed by the industrial states of the larger Asian-Pacific transregion. 4 A second view is that recent regional organizations of Asia and the Pacific have 329 330 ASEAN ’S Pivotal Role in Asian-Pacific Regional Cooperation been successful because they constitute an “open regionalism” rather than an exclusivist or culturally based regionalism, such that there is no incom - patibility between smaller and larger states. 5 Within the ongoing dialectic, therefore, there are two alternative ex - pectations for the future. One follows the sociocultural argument: that cul - turally based regional cooperative efforts will tame transregional organi - zations promoted by external powers. An alternative expectation, following the open-regionalism argument, is that external powers will take advantage of open regionalism to superimpose a new transregional order on smaller Asian and Pacific countries. That is, organizations that are ex - clusively Asian or South Pacific are building blocks that will be super - seded by Asian-Pacific bodies in which the United States and other devel - oped countries will exercise a large measure of control. This essay will explore to what extent ASEAN countries have set the agenda for the Asian- Pacific transregional dialogue, and how they might contribute to the dia - logue in the future. Because of its desire to maintain a sociocultural ap - proach to problem-solving in southeast Asia, ASEAN experienced an identity crisis—in economic cooperation, membership, and organizational structure—over the past decade which set the stage for a change. The change came with the adoption of military and security issues as a subject for dialogue. This forced ASEAN to accept open regionalism as an alterna - tive. Yet, by insisting that it remain at the center of the dialogue in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the group has ultimately been able to hold onto aspects of “Asian way,” emphasizing my ultimate contention that the alternative approaches are not necessarily contradictory.

ASEAN ’s Identity Crisis

ASEAN ’s formation in 1967 served to focus Southeast Asian countries (in - cluding at this time Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singa - pore, and Thailand) on common interest, economic development, and re - gional solidarity. Operated primarily as a club of non-Communist foreign ministers in the early years, efforts to promote intraregional economic co - operation began in the 1970s, but the pace was cautious. This loose “Asian” approach was interrupted by the desire of APEC to forge a transre - gional common market by the year 2020, as well as the uncertain security implications at the end of the Cold War. This has resulted in a crisis of identity for ASEAN involving issues of (1) economic cooperation, (2) mem - bership, and (3) organizational structure.

Economic Cooperation

During the 1980s, ASEAN countries felt increasingly vulnerable economi - cally. The European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Free Trade Area