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Volume 9 | Issue 17 | Number 1 | Article ID 3519 | Apr 25, 2011 The -Pacific Journal | Focus

Pan-Asianism as an Ideal of Asian Identity and Solidarity, 1850–Present アジアの主体性・団結の理想としての汎アジア主 義−−１８５０年から今日まで

Christopher W. A. Szpilman, Sven Saaler

Pan-Asianism as an Ideal of Asian Attempts to define Asia are almost as old as the Identity and Solidarity,term itself. The word “Asia” originated in ancient Greece in the fifth century BC. It 1850–Present originally denoted the lands of the Persian Empire extending east of the Bosphorus Straits Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. but subsequently developed into a general term Szpilman used by Europeans to describe all the lands lying to the east of . (The point where This is a revised, updated and abbreviated Europe ended and Asia began was, however, version of the introduction to the two volume never clearly defined.) Often, this usage collection by the authors ofPan-Asianism. A connoted a threat, real or perceived, by Asia to Documentary History Vol. 1 covers the years Europe—a smaller in area, much less 1850-1920; Vol. 2 covers the years 1850- populous, poorer, and far less significant than present, link. Asia in terms of global history.

The economic and political power of Asia, the The term “Asia” arrived in relatively world’s largest , is increasing rapidly. late, being introduced by Jesuit missionaries in According to the latest projections, the gross the sixteenth century. The term is found, domestic products of and , the written in Chinese characters 亜細亜( ), on world’s most populous , will each Chinese maps of the world made around 1600 surpass that of the United States in the not-too- under the supervision of Matteo Ricci distant future. China’s , like Japan’s, is (1552–1610), one of the founders of the Jesuit already larger than that of any single European mission in China. However, it took two more country. With this new economic might comes centuries before the name gained wide growing diplomatic influence. The twenty-first currency in the region. For it was only with the century, many pundits agree, will be an Asian resumption of European colonialist expansion century. This undisputed Asian success story, in the nineteenth century that “Asia” ceased to together with its accompanying tensions and be a technical term used by East Asian discontents, has attracted much media and cartographers and, in reaction to the threat of scholarly attention. Yet for all this talk of Asia, Western , came to represent a there is no consensus on what Asia actually specific geopolitical space bound together by stands for as a whole. Is the vast Asian such commonalities as a shared history, close landmass a single entity? There has never cultural links, a long record of diplomatic been—and perhaps never will be—universal relations, exchanges, and the notion of a agreement on this question. “common destiny.” Although the definitions of Asia were diverse and often contradictory, the Where is Asia? real or perceived Western threat caused an

1 9 | 17 | 1 APJ | JF increasing number of , politicians, down to the present—a pattern discussed and activists throughout Asia to argue for below. strengthening “Asian” solidarity in relation to “the West.” In this way, then, a pan-Asian worldview or “style of thought” became established and diffused throughout the region. It can be identified in the writings of intellectuals, political statements, popular slogans, and even in songs and poems in a number of Asian states and nations. A representative selection of such texts, all of which are of great significance in the history of Pan-Asianism and Asian , are included in this collection. They were written or collected in various parts of Asia, from Japan, through , China, , and India to the Ottoman Empire, over the past 150 years. These texts, most of which have been translated into English from a number of Asian languages, are brought to the Western reader for the first time in an easily accessible form. Each source is accompanied 1808 map of Asia by a commentary that provides essential information, such as a biographical sketch of These arguments about the definition and the author and the historical context of the nature of Asia in reaction to the impending document under consideration. Western threat marked the beginnings of Pan- Asianism as an and a movement. A number of collections of pan-Asian texts have Vague sentiments about strengthening Asian been published in Japanese. The most solidarity were gradually developed intoimportant of these is Takeuchi Yoshimi’s concrete policy proposals for a united defense (1910–1977) volume Asianism, which, in of Asia against the encroachments of Western addition to providing a selection of sources, . In many cases, such calls for Asian examines the significance of Pan-Asianism and solidarity, integration, and unity wereattempts to place it in its historical context. accompanied by endeavors to create an Asian Much less useful is the recently published identity by postulating commonalities and three-volume anthology, Ajiashugishatachi no identifying traditions of interaction andKoe (Pan-Asianist Voices), which merely interrelationship. Some thinkers took for reproduces snippets of texts seemingly at granted the existence of an Asian identity. random without any critical contextualization. Others argued that such an identity must be Pan-Asianism, however, receives scant deliberately forged as a necessary condition for attention in widely available English-language realizing the ultimate objective of unifying Asia. source collections on Asia such as the volumes Although individual writers in different places in the Introduction to Asian Civilizations and at different times advocated a wide variety series—Sources of Japanese Tradition, Sources of strategies and views on the nature of Asian of Chinese Tradition, Sources of Korean unity, we can nonetheless observe a certain Tradition and Sources of Indian Tradition. degree of uniformity in the development of pan- Asian rhetoric from the nineteenth century The end of the in 1989 produced a

2 9 | 17 | 1 APJ | JF surge of interest in issues of regionalism and in on Asian regionalism. transnational identity in contemporary East Asia. This new interest in contemporary The Origins of Pan-Asianism: regionalism was followed only a decade later by Macronationalism and the recognition of the long-term historical developments underlying the geopolitical The term “Asia” came into common use in East formation of the East Asian region and the idea Asia only in the mid-nineteenth century in of Asian solidarity (i.e., the ideology of Pan- response to the increasing diplomatic, , Asianism) as important research subjects. Few and economic presence of the Western powers, works on Pan-Asianism were published before and their territorial expansion in East Asia. The 2000 in any language. But since the beginning Opium War of 1839–1842 was a watershed in of the twenty-first century there has been an the history of Asian–European encounters. The upsurge of interest in the historicalBritish victory led to the recognition, development of Pan-Asianism, reflected in a throughout East Asia, of Europe as a common stream of book-length publications on various threat, and it was at that time that intellectuals aspects of Pan-Asianism. In addition, a number and politicians throughout the region began to of important articles have been published on consider the questions of “Asia” and Asian the subject over the years. Notwithstanding solidarity. With a view to giving the concept of these publications, however, knowledge of Pan- solidarity substance, they began exploring Asianism and its role in modern Asia remains Asian cultural commonalities and the common fragmented, unsystematic, and unbalanced. historical heritage of the continent. It is of course true that, as Hamashita Takeshi and This collection aims to remedy the situation by other scholars have pointed out, East Asian providing readers with the seminal documents countries had a long history of interaction of Pan-Asianism and thus a comprehensive before the nineteenth century. This took the overview of the development of the ideals of form of an interstate system, centered on Asian solidarity and regionalism in the hope of China. It was this Sinocentric system stimulating further research and providing the (sometimes also known as the tributary system) foundations for a synthesis of earlier work. The to which the Western powers had to major difficulty with researching Pan-Asianism accommodate when they first came into contact is a linguistic one, for it would be very difficult, with East Asian states. But it was the acute if not impossible, for any one scholar to master sense of crisis brought about by the Chinese all the languages necessary for defeata in the Opium War that forced Asian comprehensive study of the subject. So, while writers and thinkers actively to pursue the the community of scholars interested in issues agenda of a united Asia, an Asia with a common of Asian regionalism continues to grow,goal—the struggle against Western linguistic difficulties and the barriers ofimperialism. specialization have prevented them from studying Pan-Asianism as an ideology that Ideas of Asian solidarity came in a large variety transcends linguistic boundaries and national of forms, as did the geographical definitions narratives and examining the processes of underlying claims for regional solidarity. Some in East Asia from the forms of the concept were based on perspective of the longue dureé. We hope that assumptions of racial unity, following, curiously this collection, with its comprehensiveenough, racial notions that had originated in approach, will help scholars to look beyond the the West (Hannaford 1996; Dikötter 1997). scope of their narrow specializations and open Others tended to emphasize commonalities in new possibilities for transnational cooperation and language (more accurately written

3 9 | 17 | 1 APJ | JF language). This was especially the case in East Western colonialism and over time developed Asia, often referred to in the West as the into national independence movements. Yet “” (Japanese: Tōyō; Korean: Tong’yang; again, these nationalist aspirations and the Chinese: Dongyang), a region which, for independence movements they spawned were thousands of years, had been under the characterized by strongtrans national links, powerful influence of Chinese civilization. (The alliances that were apparent in the activities of term “East Asia” was used from the late Asian revolutionaries described in this volume: nineteenth century on [Japanese: Tōa; Korean: Indians, Vietnamese, Indonesians, Filipinos, Dong-a; Chinese: Dong-ya].) In this context, and activists from other Asian countries who some thinkers saw the new quest for solidarity went into exile in Japan, where they exchanged as a strengthening of the existing networks of ideas, promoted pan-Asian solidarity, developed economic and cultural exchange. Others were networks, and worked together to achieve inspired by pan-movements emerging almost national independence. Benedict Anderson has simultaneously in Europe and America. The brilliantly traced the process by which the various approaches to Pan-Asianism, however, elites of colonized nations developed a sense of all shared a common emphasis onnational identity and a desire for independence transnationalism and Asian unity. from their colonial masters during periods of residence in the metropole. It could be argued Pan-Asianism was at times used to legitimize that a similar process was at work in the case Japan’s territorial aggrandizement and colonial of the revolutionary members of Asian elites. expansion. One of the few detailed studies of Particularly those who found themselves in pan-movements in general, Louis Snyder’s Japan, whether as students or exiles, interacted Macro-, characterizes pan-with other Asians and in this way developed a movements as “ Writ Large” or common Asian consciousness. “extended nationalisms.” However, as the present volume shows, advocacy of Pan- In Japan they came also into contact with Asianism also reflected reservations about the Japanese pan-Asianists, many of whom concepts of and nationalism, which were supported independence movements also imported in their modern forms to Asia throughout Asia. The Japanese triumph in the from the West in the nineteenth century. The war with in 1904–1905 was an popularity of a transnational Pan-Asianism and important turning point, an event that the transnational political activities ofaccelerated the spread of pan-Asian ideas revolutionaries show that the nation was not, as throughout the continent. Many Asians now is often believed, an absolute and unquestioned believed that Japan would soon assume in Asia. (The rise of pan-movements in leadership in the struggle against the tyranny other parts of the world, too, has been seen as of the Western imperialist powers. Even in an expression of skepticism over the absolute distant Egypt, a delighted Arab announced the character of the “nation.”) To be sure, in a news of the Russian defeat to the Chinese number of Asian countries protonationalism revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), had already developed before the arrival of the who was traveling by boat through the Suez European powers in the region. Within the Canal. “The joy of this Arab, as a member of the Sinocentric international order, the elites of great Asiatic race,” Sun recalled many years tributary states in East Asia had developed later, “seemed to know no bounds”. However, their own sense of nationhood. However, in the disillusionment with Japan soon set in when it nineteenth century new forms of nationalism embarked on a program of carving out its own developed in East Asia. In the same way as Pan- colonial empire at the expense of other Asian Asianism, they represented a reaction to nations and justified these expansionist policies

4 9 | 17 | 1 APJ | JF with pan-Asian rhetoric. sympathetic to the ideals of Asian solidarity and Pan-Asianism. At the center of pan-Asian Pan-Asian cooperation was institutionalized in activities in Japan at the end of World War I the form of numerous pan-Asian associations stood the now obscure French mystic, Paul founded all over Asia and was also reflected in Richard (1874–1967), whose works were pan-Asian conferences that took place in Japan, published in Japan, India, and the United States China, and in the 1920s and 1930s. and certainly widely read, at least in Japan. In These developments showed the diversity and the 1920s and 1930s, the famous editor of the interconnectedness of anti-Western movements Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, Karl Haushofer throughout Asia. A few examples will suffice to (1869–1946), paid tribute to the pan-Asian illustrate this phenomenon. In 1907, socialists movement, seeing it as proof of his theory that and anarchists from China, Japan, and India would come to be joined forces to found the Asiatic Humanitarian dominated by regional blocs. Haushofer Brotherhood in . In 1909 Japanese and introduced to his readers the writings and Muslim pan-Asianists in Japan established the activities of pan-Asianists such as Sun Yat-sen, Ajia Gikai (Asian Congress) with the goal of (1861–1941), and Benoy promoting the cause of Asian solidarity and Kumar Sarkar (1887–1949). These Asian liberation. It was almost certainly this Ajia activists and revolutionaries, Haushofer was Gikai that a British intelligence report referred convinced, reflected a trend toward a future to when it mentioned “an Oriental Association world order that would be dominated by large, in Tokyo attended by Japanese, Filipinos, regional blocs, replacing the existing order Siamese, Indians, Koreans, and Chinese, where characterized by the sovereign nation-state. Count Okuma [Shigenobu, 1838–1922] once Another proponent of pan-ideas, Richard delivered an anti-American lecture”. In 1921, Nikolaus Count von Coudenhove-Kalergi the Pan-Turanian Association was founded in (1894–1972), the founder of the pan-European Tokyo to rally Japanese support for themovement and the publisher of the journal Pan- unification of the Turks of and Europa, also praised the pan-Asian movement; their liberation from Russian rule. Thea Japanese translation of an enthusiastic article association cooperated closely with the Greater by him appeared in the journal Dai Ajiashugi Asia Association (Dai Ajia Kyōkai) and other (Greater Asianism). Japanese pan-Asian organizations. As a final striking example of the appeal of Pan- The transnational character of Pan-Asianism Asianism to Westerners, in 1934 an anonymous was also apparent in its publishing activities. Greek wrote a letter addressed “to the Eastern Indian pan-Asianists published material in Asiatic people of the Mongolian race and Japan, China, the United States, and Germany; colour,” which he sent to the Japanese Japanese pan-Asianists published in China, consulate at in the Dutch East Indies India, and the United States. Koreans, too, such (present-day Indonesia). The letter called on as the court noble An Kyongsu (1853–1900), Asians to published their works in Japan. Journals with a clear pan-Asian message—the source of many of the documents in this collection—were cultivate the Pan-Mongolian published in Japan, China, and . consciousness, in feeling, in thought and above all in action; Although such writings might be dismissed as harmonize, cultivate and facilitate mere “propaganda”, there is no doubt that a in every possible way the Inter- significant number of Westerners were Mongolian race intercourse and

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understanding by adopting an East Asia such as the political scientist Rōyama official and compulsory taught and Masamichi (1895–1980) and Kada Tetsuji used Inter-Mongolian language (1895–1964). composed of Words of Chinese, Japanese and Siamese languages; While the West was important as a reference Eliminate from your mind and from point, Pan-Asianism as an ideology also posed a your dictionaries the word significant challenge to the earlier Sinocentric FOREIGNER, and cultivate the order—an order not limited to but Inter-Mongolian fellowship and also appropriated by the nomadic conquerors community of interest; Harmonize of China and by states on the periphery such as your national, political, social, Korea and Japan. In this context, the seemingly economic and religious life. . . . “more modern” ideology of Pan-Asianism [F]orm and organize THE INTER- served as an integrating force, helping to fulfill MONGOLIAN AND INTER- the requirement for the “de-centering of CONTINENTAL HARMONIZED China.” AWAKENING, in every city, town, village and hamlet. Arguably, in many cases the Sinocentric hierarchical view of the world influenced the thinking of some Japanese pan-Asianists who This bizarre letter was apparently inspired by appropriated it faithfully with one significant the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s so-called Amau change. For them it was Japan, not China, that Statement, which declared “specialwas to be the new “Middle Kingdom” and the responsibilities for Japan in East Asia” and leader of Asia. Although, as we show, early which was often interpreted as a declaration by forms of Pan-Asianism often envisioned Japan of an “Asian Monroe Doctrine,” that is, a cooperation on equal terms, insistence on call for noninterference by Western powers in Japanese leadership (meishu) in Asia increased China. As far as one can tell, this appeal to an in proportion to the growth and expansion of inter-Asian consciousness elicited no reaction Japan’s power in East Asia. either in Japan or elsewhere in Asia. Nevertheless, Pan-Asianism was stimulated, For advocates of this “Meishuron” Asianism, both positively and negatively, by Western Japan’s leadership was justified on moral influences. For example, the Japanese politician grounds as well as by the realities of Kodera Kenkichi (1877–1949), who had studied international relations. Japan qualified as the international relations in Europe and the leader of Asia because it was morally superior United States for almost a decade, justified his to China, which was in political turmoil, and advocacy of Pan-Asianism by constantlyhad always been as a result of its frequent referring to the positive role of pan-movements dynastic changes. In contrast, Japan, many in the West. In contrast to Kodera, Prince Japanese elites believed, was qualified to lead Konoe Fumimaro (1891–1945) chose to stress Asia because of its divine imperial dynasty that the negative aspects of the West by rejecting was “unbroken through ages immemorial.” the universalist pretensions of the League of Japan, in this view, was a “chosen” country, the Nations (founded 1919) when he proclaimed “Land of the Gods”—qualities that uniquely the need for Asian solidarity under Japanese fitted it for a special “mission” to liberate Asia leadership. Both Kanokogi Kazunobufrom Western oppression, become the leader of (1884–1949) and Hirano Yoshitarō (1897–1980) the region, and, as its more imaginative were strongly influenced by German ideas, as supporters asserted, unite the whole world were the 1930s proponents of a regional bloc in under the benevolent rule of the Japanese

6 9 | 17 | 1 APJ | JF , following the ancient sloganhakkō programs of conquest outlined by the pan- ichiu, or “The Eight Corners of the World movements before and during the [United] under One Roof.” Rather than drawing War . . .”. Although it would be an exaggeration on the foundational myths, other pan-Asian to claim that Pan-Asianism formed an important writers justified Japan’s leadership of Asia on component of any totalitarian developments in the grounds of Japan’s successfulmodern Asia, one cannot overlook the modernization program, an effort theyconnection between Pan-Asianism and Japanese contrasted with the failure of the rest of Asia in ultranationalism (discussed below) and also the this regard. From this perspective, Japan’s contribution of this ideology to the technological advances served as evidence of legitimization of Japanese colonial rule and Japanese superiority. But whatever the grounds empire building in Asia in the first half of the for such claims, the fact remains that many twentieth century. Japanese pan-Asianists, in various ways, consciously or unconsciously, providedAs early as 1910, pan-Asian rhetoric was used justification for Japan’s colonial rule and by the Japanese government to legitimize the territorial expansion in Asia. annexation of Korea. The Annexation Treaty referred specifically to commonalities between Pan-Asianism and Empire Japanese and Koreans, such as racial origins, a common history and culture, and a shared One of the reasons why, for a long time after destiny. This remained the orthodox way of 1945, Pan-Asianism was largely ignored by justifying and legitimizing Japanese rule in researchers—not to mention politicians and Korea throughout the colonial period and was diplomats—was its fateful connection toreiterated time and again in both public and Japanese imperialism and the role it played as private statements. The same pan-Asian an ideology that legitimized Japan’s empire- rhetoric was continuously reaffirmed and building project in the first half of the twentieth applied to other colonial territories. For century. While some commentators insist that example, in 1939, in the semi-official journal Japan never officially pursued a pan-Asian Contemporary Japan, a writer insisted that foreign policy before or even during the Asia- (1931–1945), it is undeniable that the Japanese government frequently utilized contrary to the general assumption pan-Asian rhetoric in the 1930s and 1940s in held abroad, and even entertained order to bolster claims to Japanese leadership by some Japanese, Chosen [Korea], in East Asia and legitimize its colonial rule over , and even are parts of Asia. not Japanese colonies according to the Western way of thinking. . . . In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah “To make the world one Arendt suggested a close link between household” is an expression used nineteenth-century Pan-Germanism and Pan- by the Japanese to indicate their Slavism and twentieth-century totalitarianism moral principle of co-existence and and expansionism. “Nazism and Bolshevism,” co-prosperity. . . . Although their she contended, “owe more to Pan-Germanism languages and customs are now and Pan-Slavism (respectively) than to any different, Japan and Korea were other ideology or political movement. This is especially close to each other until most evident in foreign policies, where the about thirteen centuries ago, there strategies of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia having been a large intermixture of have followed so closely the well-known both blood and culture before that

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time. . . . Japan’s annexation of the might be taken as a reversion of the two countries to their ancient status of being one homogeneous whole.

The assertion of racial and cultural commonalities presented here went hand in hand with the legitimization of Japanese superiority on the grounds that Japan was a country chosen by the gods. As early as the late 1910s, a number of writers, such as Kanokogi Kazunobu, Kita Ikki, and Ōkawa Shūmei, spoke of a divine Japanese “mission” to liberate Asia. This high-sounding objective was often difficult to distinguish from the substitution of one form of colonial oppression (by Europeans) for The Asian Monroe Doctrine another (by fellow Asian Japanese). And a belief in Japan’s divine mission was by no means limited to radical reformists. Even mainstream In the 1930s, claims that Japan’s empire was an writers who eschewed ideologically driven embodiment of pan-Asian ideals were voiced rhetoric and sought to explain international more frequently and openly than before. This relations in terms of , such as was due to the impact of “regional bloc Tokutomi Sohō (1863-1957), urged Japan to thinking” that was highly influential at the establish an “Asian Monroe Doctrine.” In doing time. For example, Rōyama Masamichi insisted so, Tokutomi may have been applying an idea in 1934 that “the Pan-Asiatic movement” was a of Western provenance to international“decisive influence responsible for the relations in East Asia, but he still believed, like establishment of the Empire.” Though he Kita and Kanokogi, that Japan had a special lamented that this movement lacked “any “mission” to accomplish in East Asia. coherent programme under any prominent leader,” he nevertheless regarded it as full of promise for the future. As evidence, he noted with satisfaction that “many small groups of so- called Pan-Asianists loosely affiliated through study organizations . . . have sprung up like mushrooms during the past two years in both Japan and ”. Rōyama’s notion of an “East Asian bloc” gained wide prominence in Japan in the late 1930s, amplified by a fusion with the geopolitical ideas of Karl Haushofer and Carl Schmidt (1888–1985) and with earlier concepts of an “Asian Monroe Doctrine.” The notion of an “East Asian bloc” was also popular with Marxists and socialists, as can be seen in the writings of Takahashi Kamekichi (1894–1977) and some members of the Shōwa

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Kenkyūkai, the brain trust founded by Prince not in use in China, Korea, and Japan before Konoe Fumimaro, prime in 1937–1939 the 1890s and occurs only infrequently prior to and 1940–1941. the 1910s.

The intimate connection of Pan-Asianism with Around the turn of the century, Western Japan’s empire-building ambitions leads to writers who were clamoring about the threat of another central problem of Pan-Asianism—the the Yellow Peril occasionally used the terms inherent ambiguity of the concepts involved. It “Pan-Asianism” or “pan-Asiatic league” in is clear that, from the outset, pan-Asian warning of the dangers a united Asia would thought was riddled with ambiguity and pose for Western supremacy. The Japanese contradictions that made this ideology capable government was quick to lay any Western of being used to legitimize both the anticolonial suspicions on this score to rest, particularly struggle against the West and the domination after the start of the war with Russia, a of one Asian nation by another. This ambiguity Western power, in 1904. It took this popular is also inherent in the terminology used to Western agitation so seriously that on many describe the ideology. occasions it officially disclaimed any interest in promoting closer relations with its (weak) Asian Problems of Terminology neighbors. Japanese diplomats were dispatched As stated at the start of this introduction, Pan- to Europe and the United States expressly to Asianism poses a problem as a topic of dispel any Western suspicions as to Japan’s scholarly inquiry even at the level ofpan-Asian ambitions. For example, in the terminology. The object of inquiry is hard to United States, Harvard-educated Baron Kaneko define and is almost as elusive as aKentarō (1853–1942) dismissed rumors voiced continuously shifting target. There is no in the “yellow” press that Japan was aiming to scholarly consensus on the definition of “Asia,” form an Asian federation, as did diplomat on pan-movements, or on with a Suematsu Kenchō (1855–1920) in Europe. As transnational focus that have evolved over late as 1919, Takekoshi Yosaburō (1865–1950) time. Likewise, the question of how Pan- ridiculed the idea of a Japanese-led Asian Asianism is related to other pan-movements is alliance against the West in a publication far from settled. funded by the Japanese government:

As we have seen, the emergence of Pan- Asianism was inseparable from the rise of Among our own people, there are Japan as a major power and Japan’s struggle some who do not rightly interpret with China for leadership in Asia. But Pan- the history of their own country, Asianism also reflected attempts by East Asian and who do not take their national elites to forge Asian unity by bringing Japan strength into proper consideration and China together. Thus, early manifestations and who, being prompted by of the movement were characterized by the certain fanatical ideas, advocate close cooperation of ideologues, activists, and the alliance of the yellow races politicians from Japan, China, and Korea. But against the white, an alliance of the need for cooperation and, thus, compromise which Japan should be the leader, resulted in pan-Asian ideas being characterized and with that object in view, they by a marked lack of specific content. Although favour the partition of China. the concept of Pan-Asianism can be traced from Those who argue in this strain the mid-nineteenth century on, the term “Pan- have evidently lost their mental Asianism” (or Asianism, Greater Asianism) was balance.

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Just as the government went to great lengths to Society) was founded in Tokyo in 1880. Its deny any association with Pan-Asianism, the membership was predominantly Japanese—they opposition placed a strong emphasis on Pan- had chosen the group’s name—but it included Asianism, calling for the unification of the some Koreans and Chinese who objected to the “yellow race,” that is, the Asian peoples. As name on the grounds that it implied—in early as 1874, Ueki Emori (1857–1892), a contrast to successful, modern Japan—that Asia prominent member of the opposition freedom was backward, oppressed, and downtrodden, and peoples’ rights movement jiyū( minken and could be saved only by “raising” it through undō), had attacked what he considered the Japanese leadership and advice. Following such pro-Western policy of the government and, criticism, the Kōakai was renamed Ajia Kyōkai insisting that the West was Japan’s enemy, (Asia Association) in 1883. But it was not only called for the formation of an Asian League Japanese pan-Asianists who believed in (Ajia rengō). Ueki held a version of Pan- Japanese superiority; many Asians also Asianism that assumed equality among Asian acknowledged their political and economic nations. He even advocated independence for backwardness in relation to Japan. Many the Ryukyu (present-day Okinawa Chinese recognized the failure of Prefecture), a previously independent kingdom modernization, at least implicitly, in their that was annexed by Japan in the 1870s. An nation, accounting for the formation of political anonymous writer in the journal Ajia (Asia) and associations with names such as the Raise the antigovernment activist and politician Tarui China Society (Xingzhonghui), founded by Sun Tōkichi (1850–1922) made similar proposals in Yat-sen in 1894, and the China Revival Society the 1880s. It was not until 1903 that the first (Huaxinghui), founded in Hunan 1904. acknowledgment of the potential of Pan- Asianism as a significant factor in international Another early term used to describe pan-Asian relations was made, when the art criticsolidarity was the classical Chinese phrase Okakura Tenshin (1862–1913), famous for fuche chunchi (Japanese: hosha shinshi; coining the phrase “Asia is one,” stated in his Korean: poch’a sonch’i), which means “mutual book The Awakening of the East that a “Pan- dependence” or, literally, “a relationship as Asiatic Alliance” would “in itself constitute an close as that between the lips and the teeth or immense force.” However, the impact of this between the chassis and the wheels of a cart.” statement may have been somewhat reduced in This image implied a high degree of Japan by the fact that Okakura had written his interdependence, but, in contrast to the book in English for an Indian and not a potentially hierarchical Kōa, it presumed equal Japanese audience. relations among Asian nations. Its origin also indicates the influence of Chinese classical While the term “Pan-Asianism” entered the scholarship on early Pan-Asianism. This phrase mainstream political vocabulary only in the was used by early pan-Asianists particularly in 1910s, in the nineteenth century advocates of the 1870s and 1880s, but it can be found in Asian unity could draw on a number of terms many of the texts presented in this collection and slogans when propagating their ideals. In well into the twentieth century. the 1880s, the termKōa , or “Raising (or Developing) Asia,” was the most widely used A third influential slogan used to express pan- slogan, implying the need for Asia to modernize Asian sentiment and activism that was very in order to catch up with the technologically popular at the turn of the century was “Same advanced West. The term was not without Culture, Same Race” (Japanese: dōbun dōshu; problems, however. For example, anChinese: tongwen tongzhong; Korean: tongmun organization called the Kōakai (Raising Asia tongjong), which likewise did not imply

10 9 | 17 | 1 APJ | JF hierarchical relations between Asian nations or 1921–1922, when it was superseded by the make claim to the superiority of any one Washington treaty system, the Anglo-Japanese country. In Japan, the term was usedAlliance was always at the heart of Japan’s particularly often by Prince Konoe Atsumaro foreign policy. The alliance, however, would be (1863–1904), who, uncharacteristically for an in jeopardy if it transpired that Japan was early pan-Asianist, was a member of Japan’s supporting an independence movement in India ruling elite, and by the Tōa Dōbunkai (East as part of a pan-Asian foreign policy. On several Asian Common Culture Society). The term also occasions, Britain showed suspicion over appears frequently in Japanese journals of the Indian–Japanese relations, particularly during day and seems to have received someWorld War I when members of the Indian acceptance in other Asian countries. Closely independence movement were cooperating related to the rise of racial thinking in Japan with Germany. For example, the visit of the and East Asia, this slogan also has to be seen as celebrated poet and first Asian Nobel laureate, an expression of the growing fear in Japan of a Rabindranath Tagore, to Japan in 1916 caused future “clash of races,” that is, a war fought “considerable uneasiness in London” over “a along racial lines in which Japan would have no Japanese–Indian understanding that could choice but to side with the Asian, or “colored,” eventually take a political and anti-British peoples against the white powers of the West. form”. The British intelligence service kept Parallel with the development of this kind of close tabs on Indian independence activists in racial thinking in Asia, the idea of the “White Japan (and China) and their Japanese Peril” also gained ground. It was an inversion sympathizers. of the “Yellow Peril” hysteria that affected Europe at the time. The proponents of the If only to avoid alienating its British ally and “White Peril,” including some Europeans (e.g., other Western powers, both the Japanese Gulick 1905), believed that the threat to government and the press tended to be highly civilization came not from the “yellow” peoples critical of pan-Asian schemes. The hostile tone of Asia but from the predatory European adopted by Japanese newspapers during a powers. public debate on Pan-Asianism in 1913 well illustrates this point. In a debate with the It was only in the 1910s that the term “Pan- British journalist and diplomat Sir Valentine Asianism” made its debut in intellectualChirol (1852–1929), the celebrated American discourse. Japanese political scientist Ōyama naval strategist Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan Ikuo (1880–1955) used the term for the first (1840–1914) defended the 1913 California time to describe Chinese political associations “Alien Land Bill”, which would prevent Asian which were promoting “Greater Asianism” (Da immigrants from owning land or property in the Yazhouzhuyi) “in secretly published pamphlets” state on the grounds that America would not be with the intention of spreading anti-Western able to “digest and assimilate the strong sentiment in China”. Ōyama himself rejected national and racial characteristics which Asianism because he saw the emergence of this distinguish the Japanese.” Mahan seemed ideology as a sign of increasing nationalistic moreover to believe that in excluding the and xenophobic tendencies in Japan. While Japanese, Californians were acting in the Ōyama criticized Asianism from his position as interests not only of the United States but also a liberal , the Japanese government of “the whole community of European remained wary of pan-Asian proposals because civilization”. In the debate Chirol, who had it feared that such tendencies might undermine retired from his position atThe Times two Japan’s good relations with the Western years before and joined the Foreign Office, powers. Between its signing in 1902 and criticized the Land Bill. However, it appears

11 9 | 17 | 1 APJ | JF that he was a voice in the wilderness. Even the Yet, little by little, the negative connotations of editors of The Times seemed to support Mahan the term “Asianism” were lost in the aftermath when they criticized Japan for what they of World War I. The bloodbath in Europe made regarded as contradictions in its foreign policy: Japan the dominant power in East Asia and brought about an upsurge in Japan’s self- confidence. At the same time, it stimulated On the one hand, she [Japan] international attempts to establish a new world demands recognition because her order after the war, an order that would people are not as other Asiatics. guarantee peace—if not permanent peace, then On the other hand, . . . her at least peace for the foreseeable future. Within publicists are now asserting that these developments, Japan’s newly found self- “to Japan is assigned the confidence resulted in an outpouring of pan- leadership in the claim of the Asian writings during the last two years of the ‘coloured’ races against the ‘non- war. These writings should be seen as a coloured.’” These two sets are Japanese contribution to the debate on how a mutually destructive. Japan cannot new international order could guarantee peace. have it both ways. . . . She must But Japanese writers were not alone in arguing make up her mind whether she for the necessity of regional integration. There wishes to present herself as aloof were also notably some Chinese commentators from other Asiatic races, or as the who, while critical of Japanese Pan-Asianism, avowed champion of Pan-Asiatic nonetheless advocated regional integration on ideals. the grounds that only a regional, pan-Asian order would result in the achievement of a permanent peace. When the idea of a League of Such criticisms clearly struck a sensitive chord Nations surfaced during World War I, pan- in Japan. Throughout June and July 1913, these Asian writers in Japan reacted by proposing an statements were discussed at great length by East Asian League (Tōa renmei) that would Japan’s leading newspapers, including the guarantee peace on a regional basis. Osaka Asahi Shinbun, the Osaka Mainichi Shinbun, and the Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun. By the war’s end, pan-Asianist visions of The Asahi unequivocally declared that it regional integration had thus come to be considered “Pan-Asianism an illusion kūsō( ),” accepted, at least by public opinion and some while the Nichinichi ridiculed the notion that politicians, as a realistic scenario for future Japan would “lead the Asian peoples to fight international relations in East Asia. Certainly, against the -American white powers” as in contrast to the vague professions of pan- “useless and reckless.” It was in these articles Asian unity that had been the norm up until the dismissing the accusations made by Mahan and beginning of the twentieth century, the the Times that the terms Han-Ajiashugi (“Pan- ideology of Pan-Asianism had by 1918 become Asianism,” Mainichi and Nichinichi) and Zen- concrete and well defined. It had gained Ajiashugi (“All-Asianism,” Asahi) made their recognition in public discourse and was no first appearance in the . longer confined to the political fringes. Terms They were coined specifically to express the such as Pan-Asianism (Han Ajiashugi), Greater English term “Pan-Asianism,” which previously Asianism (Dai Ajiashugi), All-Asianism (Zen had had no exact Japanese equivalent. At this Ajiashugi), and the “Asian Monroe Doctrine” stage, as indicated by the critical, derisory tone (Ajia Monrōshugi), largely absent from public of the newspaper articles, these neologisms discourse until then, now began to appear were used in a derogatory sense. frequently in newspapers and journals. This

12 9 | 17 | 1 APJ | JF proliferation of neologisms reflected a growth resurfaced in later years, often in different of diverse and sophisticated approaches to the contexts. The notion of an “East Asian League,” issue of Asian solidarity in all its ramifications. for example, exemplified the entrenchment of The wide range of responses can be gleaned the term “East Asia” in Japanese public from the flood of articles on Pan-Asianism that discourse around the turn of the century. appeared during and after the war. While these However, after the wave of anti-American works indicated the spread and acceptance of protests subsided in 1924, “East Asia” receded the term “Pan-Asianism” in Japanese discourse, from public discourse, only to return to the perhaps more important they also defined mainstream discussion in the late 1930s, in Asianism in concrete terms and demanded that somewhat modified form, as the “East Asian Japan act in accordance with pan-AsianCooperative Community” (tōa kyōdōtai or tōyō principles in international relations. kyōdōtai). The formation of a “Greater Asian League” (Dai Ajia rengō) was also proposed in The new popularity of Pan-Asianism inthe founding manifesto of the Dai Ajia Kyōkai Japanese intellectual discourse and (Greater Asia Association) in 1933. This received a boost when news of a newmanifesto, drafted a year after Japan had left immigration law that would bar Japanese from the League of Nations, insisted that such a immigration to the United States (part of the league was necessary given the global trend 1924 Immigration or Johnson-Reed Act)toward the formation of regional blocs. reached Japan. Protests against the act were held through the length and breadth of Japan, “All-Asianism” (Zen Ajiashugi), another term events that in many cases turned intofor Asianism or Pan-Asianism, was launched by demonstrations of pan-Asian solidarity. Ōkawa Shūmei in the wake of the 1913 Chirol–Mahan debate in articles he contributed In this climate of anti-American agitation a to Tairiku (The Continent). However, the term number of new associations sprang up whose did not catch on and vanished from public names—such as the Federation of East Asian discourse in the early 1920s. In any event, all Races (Ajia Minzoku Gikai, founded in 1923) or these terms were used largely interchangeably. the Oriental Co-Existence Society (TōyōEven Ōkawa on occasion used Han Ajiashugi in Kyōzonkai)—proclaimed their pan-Asianthe same context as Zen Ajiashugi, and he orientation. The invigoration of popular interest appears to have made no distinction between in Pan-Asianism as a result of America’s the two. exclusionist policies was also attested to by a slew of articles on the subject in the Japanese The term “Kōa” perhaps enjoyed the most press. For example, the influential journal remarkable career of any pan-Asian term. Kōa Nihon oyobi Nihonjin (Japan and the Japanese) first appeared in the 1880s, when it was used brought out a special issue on “Greater as the main slogan to express pan-Asian Asianism” (Dai Ajiashugi) in October 1924, and solidarity. However, it was quickly discarded the Asian Newspaper Company published a call because it implied Japanese leadership of the for the “Foundation of a Greater East Asian pan-Asian movement. But the term was not Federation”. forgotten completely, as it reappeared in the 1930s at a time when Japan was adopting a Not all pan-Asian slogans andform of Pan-Asianism in its foreign policy. By catchphrases—like some of the newthen, Japan had begun to abandon its policy of associations—survived. Many enjoyed a brief cooperation with the Anglo-American powers popularity and then quickly disappeared from and was openly pursuing a strategy of public discourse. Some terms, however,destroying the political status quo in East Asia.

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The unity of Asia and, at the same time, the Nihon Kōa Dōmei (Greater Japanese League for establishment of Japanese hegemony in East Raising Asia) was founded. Its members and Asia had become Japan’s ultimate objective. advisers included venerable pan-Asianists such Although no government decrees contained the as Tōyama Mitsuru (1855–1944) and Kuzuu terms “Asianism” or “Pan-Asianism” even in the Yoshihisa (1874–1958), party politicians well 1930s, the Japanese government demonstrated known for their pan-Asian sympathies such as its commitment to the pan-Asian cause in 1938 Nagai Ryūtarō (1881–1944), as well as a large by creating the Kōa-in, the Agency for the number of senior military figures, such as Araki Development of Asia (sometimes also known in Sadao (1877–1966), Yanagawa Heisuke English as the East Asia Development Board). (1879–1945), Koiso Kuniaki (1880–1950), Ōi The Kōa-in was a cabinet-level agency with the Shigemoto (1863–1951), Hayashi Senjūrō primary task of coordinating political,(1876–1943), Honjō Shigeru (1876–1945), economic, and cultural activities in regard to Matsui Iwane (1878–1948), and Abe Nobuyuki China. While it engaged in research on Chinese (1875–1943). This impressive lineup, which affairs and published its findings in the Kōa-in included two former (Hayashi and Abe) and one Chōsa Geppō (Kōa-in Monthly Research future prime minister (Koiso), reflected a Bulletin), some scholars argue that it was also growing interest in the potential of Pan- involved in the recruitment and management of Asianism in military circles. In the atmosphere forced labor and even in the opium trade in of social mobilization that thickened as the war China. Such were the powers of this agency escalated, the League became a central that only formal diplomatic relations with China organization, incorporating fifty-three remained within the jurisdiction of the Ministry associations and institutions of pan-Asian of Foreign Affairs. The Kōa-in was integrated character under its umbrella. These included into the Ministry of Greater East Asia (Daitōa- the Tōa Dōbunkai, the Dōjinkai (Comrades’ shō) in 1942, which from that time on directed Society), the Tōa Renmei Kyōkai (East Asian Japan’s political and diplomatic relations with League Association), the Tōa Kensetsu Kyōkai the members of the newly declared Greater (Association for Constructing East Asia), the East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Tōa Kyōkai (East Asia Association), and the Tōyō Kyōkai (Oriental Association), in addition This official endorsement of what is probably to think tanks engaged in research on East the oldest pan-Asian term caused a veritable Asia, such as the Dōmei Tōa Kenkyūkai boom in the use of Kōa. Newspapers used the (Alliance East Asia Research Association), the term frequently; journals incorporating it in Tōa Chōsakai (East Asia Investigation their title—such as Kōa Kyōiku ( to Association), the Tōa Kenkyūjo (East Asia Raise Asia) or simply Kōa—were founded, while Research Institute), and the Tōa Chitsujo politicians, diplomats, and intellectualsKenkyūkai (East Asian Order Research discussed the new Kōa policy. These figures Association). included a foreign minister, and a prime minister who proclaimed the “Raising of Asia” a These wartime efforts to “raise Asia” had also “holy task”. Under the circumstances it is no an international dimension. A year before the surprise to learn that, in Japanese schools, founding of the League, a “Raising Asia Welfare children were taught from a “Colonial Kōa Congress” (Kōa kōsei taikai) was held in Osaka Textbook”. Newly founded politicalin October 1940 that was attended by organizations and a number of politicalrepresentatives of eleven countries, including conferences held in the late 1930s and early Japan’s Asian and also its two European allies, 1940s also were characterized as contributing Germany and Italy. Even today, the name of a to the policy of “Raising Asia.” In 1941, the Dai Japanese insurance company, Nippon Kōa

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Sonpo, which was founded in 1944, reminds us attempts to establish their leadership of East of the former popularity of this pan-Asian term. Asia, anxiety over a future “race war” with the West was just as widespread in Korea as in Another term pan-Asianists began to use in the Japan. In fact, one of the first concrete pan- late 1920s was “Kingly Way” (Chinese:Asian policy proposals was penned by a Korean, wangdao; Japanese: ōdō). In the 1930s it was An Chung-gŭn (Ahn Choong Kun, 1879–1910), a used with increasing frequency as a way of member of the anti-Japanese movement in emphasizing the region’s legacy of Confucian Korea. In 1910, while imprisoned on death row values and the significance of as for assassinating Prince Itō Hirobumi a potential basis for the unification of Asians. (1841–1909), Japan’s minister-resident in The “Kingly Way” implied benevolent rule and Korea, he wrote a visionary essay in which he was used as a fundamental concept to help talked of a united Asia facing the reality of a legitimize Japan’s construction of the new state coming war between the yellow and white of Manchukuo after 1932. Japanese “guidance” races. In order to prepare for this conflict, An of this new, ostensibly independent state—in advocated a transnational military force and reality it was a puppet state—was seen in even a single currency for an East Asian paternalistic, Confucian terms as the kindly . However unrealistic in the direction and advice offered to a younger climate of the time, An’s vision testified to the brother (Manchukuo) by his elder brother increasing importance of Pan-Asianism in (Japan). In fact, as is well known, under Japan’s international relations in East Asia. “benevolent” guidance Manchukuo became a cornerstone of the Japanese Empire. It was ruthlessly exploited to provide materiel for the Japanese war effort, and this economic exploitation, carried out under the cloak of paternalistic benevolence, contributed significantly to the discrediting of pan-Asian ideology—the subject to which we turn next.

Pan-Asianism and the Asians

As we have argued, Pan-Asianism was particularly important in the framework of intellectual debate and policy formulation in Japan, but other Asians also made an important contribution to the discussion—comment that was sometimes supportive, sometimes critical. While in China the term apparently made its debut in the 1910s, in Korea similar terms were used to express similar sets of ideas a decade or so earlier. At the turn of the century, the term “Easternism” (Tong’yangjuyi) was first found in Korean writings on the subject to describe the idea of close cooperation between Korea, China, and Japan. Although Koreans were on the whole suspicious of Pan-Asianism as a concept that served to cloak Japanese An Chung-gŭn

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As official and public support for Pan-Asianism outbreak of war with the United States in 1941 as a tool for establishing Japanese hegemony in (or the “Greater East Asian War,” as it was East Asia grew stronger in Japan, the likelihood officially called in the Japanese Empire) as the of the acceptance of pan-Asian ideals waned in beginning of “a real war of races—the Yellow other Asian countries. This distrust of Pan- against the White”. For these Koreans it was Asianism was particularly pronounced in East clear that Korea, as an Asian nation, had to side Asia, where the Japanese threat was most (temporarily at least) with Japan in this war of palpable. In Korea, for example, Pan-Asianism the races, even though Koreans were unhappy was marginalized. Korea was a special case with Japanese colonial rule. because of its geographical proximity to Japan. Most Korean intellectuals and political activists Some Chinese intellectuals and activists also had been fairly skeptical about the idea of continued to adhere to Pan-Asianism in the first Asian solidarity even in the nineteenth century, decades of the twentieth century, as is evident even if some pro-Japanese modernizers, such as from the quotation by Sun Yat-sen discussed Kim Ok-kyun (1851–1894), had promoted Pan- above. However, open criticism of Japanese Asianism as a useful tool for cooperation with Pan-Asianism as a tool of Japanese Japan against the threat posed by imperial expansionism was voiced as early as 1907, Russia. In spite of Korean suspicions over when the scholar and revolutionary Zhang Japanese ambitions for the Korean peninsula, Taiyan (1868–1936) described Japan as the many Korean intellectuals, strongly influenced “public enemy” (kōteki) of Asia. Zhang gave by social Darwinism during the final years of vent to his conviction that Japan was an the nineteenth century, were convinced that for imperialist predator rather than a victim of historical reasons the Koreans—“a backward imperialist oppression to which calls for Asian and thus inferior race”—had no choice but to solidarity could properly be directed. Zhang form an alliance with China and Japan as a also questioned the validity of pan-Asian result of Korea’s proximity to its two neighbors. discourse in general. Rejecting the simplistic Others, who feared the much-trumpeted scheme of “oppressed yellow Asians” and Western peril much more than any alleged “white oppressors,” he stressed the “double racial inferiority, reached the sameenslavement of the Chinese”—bondage by conclusions. Western imperialism and by “foreign,” that is, Manchu, rule. His argument led him to After Korea became a Japanese protectorate in emphasize the urgent need to establish Chinese 1905 and a Japanese colony in 1910, as a counterforce to Manchu rule. writers naturally became highly suspicious of However, these views did not prevent him from their powerful neighbor and advocatedforming the Asiatic Humanitarian Brotherhood resistance and “self-strengthening” as a way of to promote cooperation with other Asian regaining their independence. Under Japanese peoples. rule, the appeal of Pan-Asianism to Koreans was greatly limited. But it was not extinguished Another revolutionary leader of modern China, completely. Some Korean pan-AsianistsLi Dazhao (1888–1927), also rejected Pan- continued to advocate a more or less equal Asianism as advocated by its Japanese “union of the Korean and Japanese exponents. In 1919, he harshly criticized within the context of a broader Asian alliance,” Japanese pan-Asian writings as an expression or within “a pan-Asian community,” until the of Japanese expansionism. However, while end of Japanese colonial rule in 1945. Some rejecting Japanese forms of Asianism, Li Koreans who continued to adhere to the ideal nevertheless conceded that some kind of of pan-Asian solidarity even interpreted the regional cooperation was necessary to counter

16 9 | 17 | 1 APJ | JF the threat of Western imperialism and called of Asia, for as late as 1941 he insisted that for the formulation of a “New Asianism” that Japan was “the only Eastern Power which can presumably would be untainted by Japanese challenge the mighty forces of the West. . . . distortions. The tense atmosphere of pan- of the East . . . have set their eyes on conferences organized by Japanese and[Japan] as their possible saviour.” Rash Behari Chinese groups in Nagasaki in 1926 and Bose (1886–1945), who was naturalized as a Shanghai in 1927, however, clearlyJapanese subject in 1923, also used his demonstrated that Chinese hostility to Japanese Japanese contacts to campaign on behalf of versions of Pan-Asianism had undermined any Pan-Asianism and Indian independence. He was realistic expectation of close Sino–Japanese an influential advocate of a Japan-centered Pan- cooperation in an atmosphere of trueAsianism and remained so until his death in solidarity. 1944. His compatriot Subhas Chandra Bose (no relation, 1897–1945), who met Hitler in his Some Chinese, such as Sun Yat-sen (until his attempt to marshal support for Indian death in 1925) and his confidant Wang Ching- independence, also entertained great hopes for wei (1883–1944), remained hopeful that Pan- Japan as Asia’s savior. He held meetings with Asianism might yet play a constructive role in Japanese leaders to encourage their support for Asia’s fight against Anglo-Saxon imperialism, his nationalist cause and participated in the and a group of Chinese pan-Asianists published Assembly of the Greater East Asiatic Nations in a journal, Asiatic Asia, in Shanghai from 1941. 1943. However, in the end Japanese efforts to legitimize its various forms of aggression, including the war against China (1937–1945), as a pan-Asian “holy war” completely discredited the idea of Asian solidarity in China for many years to come.

In India, by contrast, Pan-Asianism left few negative legacies, probably because, unlike Korea and China, that country had never come under Japanese rule. In India, attempts to secure Japanese support for the national independence movement had a long tradition Greater East Asia Conference, 1943. Tojo and resulted in close connections with Japan. A Hideki (center), Subhas Chandra Bose number of Indian revolutionaries found asylum (right), Wang Ching-wei (third left), José there, and some even used Japan as a base for Laurel (third right) their pan-Asian activities. Among them was Taraknath Das (1884–1958), who frequently published in Japan under the pseudonym “An The celebrated writer and cultural nationalist Asian.” In works published in Japan and China, Rabindranath Tagore was a longtime friend of Das called on “Asian Youth” to resist the West: Okakura Tenshin and visited Japan several “Every Asian youth . . . who possesses even a times in the 1910s and 1920s. During his first tiny bit of the feeling of self-respect should visit, Tagore condemned strive to achieve the goal of assertion of Asia to as an imitation of Western practices. However, the fullest sense of its meaning.” Clearly in 1924, when demonstrations against the Japan’s invasion of China did nothing to United States Asian Exclusion Act erupted in dampen Das’s hopes for Japan as the liberator Japan, Tagore spoke out on a number of

17 9 | 17 | 1 APJ | JF occasions in favor of pan-Asian unity toJose Alejandrino (1870–1951), who had gained audiences of several thousand. Announced at his rank in the struggle against the United these rallies as “The Pride of the Orient,” States and, after surrendering in 1901, went on Tagore called on his fellow Asians to “awake, to enjoy a career as a senator. British arise, agitate, agitate and agitate against this intelligence reported that “he speaks and monstrous and inhuman insult which America writes Japanese and speaks with the authority has heaped upon us.” He hoped that the of the Japanese Foreign Office.” To the British, discriminatory U.S. immigration law would the anti-Western position of the Pan-Oriental “unite the Asiatic races who will awake from Society was clear. At its meetings “speeches their long sleep and . . . prove invulnerable are made favoring an ‘Oriental Monroeism’ against the attacks of the White Races” and headed by Japan.” But it would be wrong to motivate them to erect an “Empire of Asia . . . dismiss the society as nothing more than a [that would] spring roaring into the arena of front for Japanese propaganda. Alejandrino the world’s politics.” took a wider interest in Asian affairs and wrote newspaper articles in which he mentioned the Indian Independence Party and even discussed the possibility of a free India. And there was some evidence of contacts with other Asian pro- independence movements. According to the British intelligence report, “an intercepted letter, written by a Filipino student returned from Tokyo, shows that there might be a danger of a connection between these Filipino students and disaffected Indians in Japan.” In Malaya, too, some looked to Japan as a liberating force. For example, the nationalist journalist Ibrahim bin Haji Yaacob (1911–1979) founded, with Japanese support, the pro- Japanese and pan-Malay (if not pan-Asian) Kesatuan Melayu Muda (League of Malay Rabindranath Tagore in Japan, 1916 Youth). Its members cooperated with the Japanese forces during the invasion of the against the British and South East Asians became suspicious of continued to do so throughout the Japanese Japanese Pan-Asianism only in the lateoccupation. 1930s—much later than the Koreans and Chinese. The main reason for this was, unlike The Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia in in Korea and China, the Japanese were not the wake of Pearl Harbor and the economic perceived as a threat to a region dominated by exploitation of the region that followed called the Western powers. Consequently, Japanese- into question the sincerity of pan-Asian directed Pan-Asianism enjoyed great appeal rhetoric. However, even under the Japanese throughout Southeast Asia. In the , occupation, Pan-Asianism remained an Japanese pan-Asianists had already supported important factor in Japan’s relations with the independence movement under Emilio Southeast Asia. The Japanese certainly milked Aguinaldo (1869–1964) as early as 1898. In pan-Asian sentiment to help mobilize the 1915, a Pan-Oriental Society was formed in region’s resources for the war effort. At the . The society was headed by General same time some Southeast Asians, such as the

18 9 | 17 | 1 APJ | JF contributors to the Greater Asia newspaper in Ajia Gikai discussed here. During World War II, Indonesia embraced the anti-Westernhopes for Japanese support were strongly component of pan-Asian rhetoric. expressed throughout the Arab world; they were fueled by the founding of the Greater However, relations between Japan and the Japan Islamic League (Dai Nippon Kaikyō leaders of independence movements inKyōkai) in Japan in 1938. However, although a Southeast Asia remain a controversial subject number of influential individuals, including in Asian historiography. The position of those Ōkawa Shūmei and General Hayashi Senjūrō, Southeast Asians who supported the Japanese were sympathetic to the Arab cause, the failure war effort was much more ambivalent than is of the Japanese to advance west of India during generally believed. The Indonesianthe course of the war precluded any effective independence activist Mohammed Hattacooperation. (1902–1980) is a case in point. Hatta is known for his collaboration with the JapaneseThe “Greater East Asian War” and Pan- occupation authorities during the war, but even Asianism at that time he was no Japanese puppet. And even before the war, in the 1930s, he was capable of a sober critique of the problems inherent in the Japanese version of Pan- Asianism. This is made clear by an article that he published in 1934, shortly after returning from a visit to Japan, where he was wined and dined by members of the Dai Ajia Kyōkai. In the article, pointedly titled “Does Japan Desire to Return to Asia?,” Hatta predicted the failure of Japanese Pan-Asianism because, in his view, the two conditions necessary to ensure its success—a permanent peace between Japan and China and the achievement of perfect equality between the Asian nations—could not be realized in the foreseeable future. Indeed, Pan-Asian gathering in Tokyo in the late notwithstanding his enthusiastic reception in 1930s (participants include Tōyama Japan, Hatta regarded Asianism as tainted by Mitsuru, a central figure in the Japanese fascist tendencies, among which he included nationalist movement, General Hayashi Japan’s ambition to become the leader of Asia. Senjūrō and Tatar pan-Islamist Abdurreşid Ibrahim) In , hopes for Japanese leadership in the struggle against Western imperialism were growing, but in the end no significant The use of pan-Asian ideology to legitimize war cooperation between Japan and any western and Japanese colonial rule discredited the Asian nation materialized. Japanese contacts movement. As a result, Pan-Asianism came to with the Ottoman Empire, official andbe widely identified as an ideology of colonial unofficial, went back to the late nineteenth rule—specifically, Japan’s colonial rule over century. In the first decades of the twentieth Asian countries and peoples, which, the century, pan-Islamic activists came to Japan, Japanese rulers insisted, was more where (among other things) they cooperated “benevolent” than Western colonial rule with Japanese pan-Asianists in founding the because Japanese were fellow Asians. Yet, as

19 9 | 17 | 1 APJ | JF much recent research has shown, Japanese the war emphasized the pan-Asian character of colonial rule was as oppressive as that of any the conflict. However, it should be noted that it European power. Like the Europeanwas only several months after the outbreak of imperialists, the Japanese ruthlessly exploited hostilities that the Japanese government the territories they ruled. They mobilized their officially included the “liberation of Asia from subject populations for the Japanese war effort, Western imperialism” in its list of war and, unlike most Western powers, they made objectives. Pan-Asian propaganda intensified as efforts to assimilate the populations of at least the war continued. In 1942, the Ministry of some of the colonial territories they controlled. Greater East Asia was founded in order to For the populations of Japanese-controlled coordinate and strengthen intra-Asian territories, Japanese colonial rule was not cooperation. This move was intended primarily substantially different from Western colonial to underline the rhetoric of pan-Asian rule, even if the Japanese proclaimed pan-Asian liberation—but, at this point in the war, “brotherhood” and professed to save them from “strengthened cooperation” meant, above all, the evils of colonial rule by non-Asians. the mobilization of resources for Japan’s war effort. The worse the military situation became Many prominent Asians, however—politicians, for Japan, the more the Japanese government diplomats, intellectuals, and writerstended to draw on pan-Asian rhetoric. In this alike—were forced to choose sides, particularly context, the declaration of the “Assembly of the after the outbreak of the “Greater East Asian Greater East Asiatic Nations” issued in 1943 War.” China, where people were also forced to sounds like a last, desperate appeal for pan- choose sides, was a special case. For the Asian unity. overwhelming number of Chinese “the war” meant not an “Asian” war of liberation against “the West” but a war against Japanese aggression in which Western countries including the United States and Britain were allies. The war in China had started much earlier than in the rest of Asia: it had broken out in 1931 in northeastern China (Manchuria), spreading to the rest of China by 1937. The different terms to name the conflict that were used by the opposing sides are instructive. While the Japanese term “Greater East Asian The Assembly of the Greater East Asiatic War,” used for the war against the , 1943, with Japanese Prime States and Britain from December 1941, Minister General Tōjō Hideki in the center implied some pan-Asian notion of liberation of and representatives from China, the whole region, the Chinese term rejected the Manchukuo, , India, the notion that this was a racial war and had Philippines and Burma. anything to do with pan-Asian ideals. It was—and still is—simply the “War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression” At that time even a liberal intellectual like (kangri zhanzheng). Hasegawa Nyozekan (1875–1969), seemingly oblivious to the looming disaster ahead, was The Japanese government made concerted still insisting that the “Greater East Asian War” efforts to stress the pan-Asian character of the must be the starting point for the establishment war. Numerous government statements during of “a united cultural sphere [by] the races of

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East Asia.” In similar vein, Nishida Kitarō allied to the United States and thus in effect (1870–1945), one of Japan’s leadingpart of “the West.” In the 1960s, however, the philosophers, in 1943 characterized the war as emergence of the nonaligned movement (NAM) a holy, pan-Asian struggle to liberate and unify led to the resurgence of pan-Asian ideals. The Asia: NAM was founded in 1961 under the leadership of India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), President Gamal Abdul Nasser The Great East Asian War is a (1918–1970) of Egypt, and Yugoslav President sacred war, because it is the Josip Tito (1892–1980). However, Asian and culmination of the historical African countries played the central role in the progress of Asia. . . . The task of activities of the movement, which had its roots the liberated peoples is now to win in the 1955 Conference. The Bandung the war and establish the Great Conference and the NAM assumed a firmly East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, in anti-imperialist stance and objected strongly to co-operation with the Germans, the domination of international relations by the Italians, and other peoples in United States, just as the pan-Asian movement Europe, who are engaged in a before 1945 had opposed (and even fought) heroic struggle to create a new Anglo-American world hegemony. order in Europe. . . . Japan’s victory will save Asia and will offer Although Japan did not play a leading role in a new hope for mankind. these developments, in Japan the sense of a pan-Asian “mission” was preserved in other So, even though schemes for pan-Asian unity forms. After the devastation wrought by the became more and more unrealistic as the war had nullified the achievements of the fortunes of war turned against Japan, the prewar era and, as some suggested, turned official espousal of Pan-Asianism by theJapan into an agricultural economy, Japanese government and military resulted in a intellectuals like Shimizu Ikutarō (1907–1988) further wave of publications on Asian solidarity felt impelled to proclaim that “now, once again, and brotherhood. the Japanese are Asians”. Pan-Asian themes also survived in leftist critiques of Western Pan-Asian Solidarity and the Legacies of and in the related claims that Japan Pan-Asianism in the Postwar Period must side with the oppressed nations of Asia in their resistance to the continuing Western Japan’s surrender and the advent of the Cold imperialist domination of the non-European War resulted in the disappearance of pan-Asian world. Variations on the pan-Asian theme have ideals from the international relations arena. continued to inform ideas of solidarity, both in Japanese proponents of Pan-Asianism were left-wing circles and among those who became purged from office, and pan-Asian associations ultranationalists after giving up hope in the were disbanded by the occupation authorities. possibilities of socialism, such as the writer Pan-Asianism no longer figured in debates on Hayashi Fusao (1903–75). foreign relations, in Japan or elsewhere. Clearly, there was no room for pan-Asian However, postwar Pan-Asianism was tainted by schemes in the new bipolar world order. This its association with Japanese imperialism and situation did not change even after theaggression. Indeed it became synonymous with estrangement between China and the Soviet it. For the most prominent political scientist of Union in the 1950s because Japan, once again the postwar period, Maruyama Masao an important Asian nation, was now closely (1914–1996), Pan-Asianism, together with

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“familism” (kazokushugi) and “agrarianism” practices or political norms. It was a natural, if (nōhonshugi), was one of the three fundamental deplorable, consequence of the westernization components of Japanese ultranationalism. of Japan. This misguided attempt by Japan to Perhaps because of this association, there was depart from pan-Asian principles was no serious scholarly attempt to deal with Pan- corrected, to some extent at least, by the war Asianism as a subject of historical inquiry in the Japan waged from December 1941 on the 1950s and the 1960s. One scarcely need colonial powers of the United States, Britain, mention that in Korea and China Pan-Asianism and the Netherlands. It was little wonder that was completely discredited as an ideology of Takeuchi welcomed this war enthusiastically. collaboration with the enemy and theTakeuchi is difficult to locate on the ideological colonizers. This was the direct consequence of spectrum. Although he would not classify the use of pan-Asian rhetoric to justify Japanese himself as a rightist, his attempts to restore colonial rule in Korea, and (in wartime China) legitimacy to the discredited term Pan-Asianism to justify Japanese aggression and legitimize were unusual. Those on the left preferred to the Nanjing puppet government. There are talk of Asian solidarity, brotherhood, or signs, however, that this situation is changing, cooperation, which often overlapped with as indicated by recent efforts by high-level socialist or communist forms of international Chinese diplomats to present Pan-Asianism in a solidarity, or the solidarity of the nonaligned more positive light. movement. For the Japanese left, the term “Pan-Asianism” was (and perhaps still is) In Japan, the first serious attempt to grapple practically synonymous with Japanese with the thorny question of the legacy of colonialism and aggression. Asianism was made by the Sinologist and literary critic Takeuchi Yoshimi. Takeuchi, who Yet, whether or not they eschewed the term in his youth had enthusiastically embraced pan- itself, in postwar Japan the left incorporated Asian ideals, had his beliefs shaken by Japan’s pan-Asian elements into its own views. And the defeat. Yet although some aspects ofcontinuity between prewar pan-Asian rightists Takeuchi’s faith were undermined, he had no and postwar left-wing circles should not be doubt that there were positive features that overlooked in this context. This (at first sight) were worth preserving. Pan-Asianism, he never surprising continuity has only rarely been ceased to believe, was much more than mere discussed in previous research. The prewar window dressing for Japan’s Greater Asian Co- flirtation with national socialism and Japanism Prosperity Sphere. In Takeuchi’s view, there by socialists like Asanuma Inejirō (1898–1960) was a core of pan-Asian ideals that retained is well known. It is less widely known, however, validity and therefore needed to bethat Marquis Tokugawa Yoshichika remembered and even cherished. Interestingly, (1886–1976), one of the major sponsors of the Takeuchi regarded Japan’s aggression in China rightist movement in the prewar period and a not as a consequence of Pan-Asianism but close friend of pan-Asianists such as Ōkawa rather as Japan’s “shedding” of Asia (datsu-A), Shūmei, became a benefactor of the newly a concept that emerged in the 1880s and founded Socialist Party of Japan after the war. became highly influential as the antithesis to It appears that Tokugawa’s support for the Pan-Asianism throughout the course of modern Socialist Party was motivated to some extent, Japanese history. From this perspective,at least, by pan-Asian motives. These motives Japan’s aggression was in effect an application were also apparent in an extraordinary of inauthentic (and therefore culpable) Western statement by Tokugawa’s erstwhile comrade in methods to Asia and thus had nothing to do the rightist movement, Ōkawa, who in 1949 with the “Eastern spirit” or Eastern cultural detected a “close resemblance between today’s

22 9 | 17 | 1 APJ | JF communists and the early Muslims” and wished agree with his support for the downtrodden for “a second battle of Tours-Poitiers” to be peoples of Asia. fought between the communists and the West, which this time would result in victory for the Leftists might find the case of the politician and communists (i.e., Asia). parliamentarian Utsunomiya Tokuma (1906–2000) even more ambiguous. The son of Another right-wing Pan-Asianist, Tsukui Tatsuo General Utsunomiya Tarō (1861–1922), (1901–1989), well known in the postwar period commander of the Japanese army in colonial as an “ultranationalist historian,” is known to Korea, Utsunomiya was one of the founding have lavished praise on communist China. In members of the Liberal Democratic Party in the mid-1950s, a U.S. counterintelligence 1955 but cannot be categorized simply as a report accused Tsukui of bringing a large sum conservative politician. In the 1980s of money from mainland China, funds that were Utsunomiya emerged as a stern critic of the eventually given to the member party he had helped to found but no longer and former army colonel, Tsuji Masanobu supported, and, on a number of occasions, he (1902–1961?), “for safe keeping.” appeared to be closely allied with the Socialist Party. He was a fervent proponent of It should be noted that, like Tsukui, the disarmament and ran successfully in elections recipient of this unspecified largesse, Colonel against the retired Self-Defense Forces Tsuji, who had achieved notoriety during the general, Kurisu Hiroomi (1920–2004), an war, made no secret of his pan-Asianadvocate of rearmament. In the 1960s sympathies in the postwar period. According to Utsunomiya had been a prominent supporter of Tsuji, on matters of regional solidarityAlgeria’s struggle for independence. He went ideological differences were less important out of his way to support all expressions of than blood ties. At a gathering of former “Asian and ” and never hid generals on 20 November 1954, Tsuji is his pan-Asianist sympathies. It could be argued reported as arguing that Japan should work that Utsunomiya’s pro-Asian attitudes were with India to achieve neutrality and with inseparable from his anti-Western and, more communist China to maintain peace. Noting his specifically, anti-American, sentiments. friendship with officials such as (1898–1976), he This same set of attitudes has characterized explained that, communist or not, “[a]fter all, many on the left, one of whose major criticisms they’re Asians.” An American intelligence of the Japanese government is its pro- analyst concluded, “Tsuji, head of the neutralist American, pro-Western stance. Most left-wing Self-Defense League (Jiei Dōmei), has long commentators would never admit to been a vigorous exponent of ‘the Asia for entertaining pan-Asian sentiments, for, as we Asiatics,’ doctrine of the late Ishihara Kanji. have seen, in their view Pan-Asianism was Like right wing critic Tsukui Tatsuo, who also irredeemably besmirched by Japan’s wartime returned from Communist China, Tsujiaggression. But whether they recognize it or considers the ties that bind Asians together not, the political left in Japan is heir to the pan- stronger than those between Communist China Asian tradition. This is abundantly clear both and the USSR”. A Japanese biographer of Tsuji from the activities of the Japanese pacifist agreed that he was “harsh on the Soviet Union movement in general and the movement and soft on communist China.” For members of against the War (organized by the the Japanese left, Tsuji, as an army colonel Citizens’ League for Peace in Vietnam; blamed for a number of wartime atrocities, was Japanese: Betonamu ni Heiwa o! Shimin Rengō, beyond the pale. However, they would no doubt Beheiren) in particular. Numerous statements

23 9 | 17 | 1 APJ | JF by members of these movements condemning have converged in these respects. In Japan, American imperialism and American aggression from as early as the 1980s, a “New Asianism” have been issued over the years and continue has begun to resurface, partly as an offshoot of today. the so-called debate of the 1980s, a discussion initiated by ’s Prime The pan-Asian undertones of these criticisms Minister (1925–) and the are generally revealed in their appeals to Asian prime minister of , brotherhood and Asian solidarity. This(1923–), supported by the xenophobic populist tendency is also seen in gestures made by politician, writer and governor of Tokyo prominent left-wing politicians such as Doi Ishihara Shintarō (1932–). Despite his frequent Takako (1928–), the one-time leader of the “Asian-bashing” outbursts, Ishihara is also Japan Socialist Party; in statements by activists known for his advocacy of pan-Asian such as Dr. Nakamura Tetsu (1946–), who has views—which, essentially, are an expression of devoted his life to the cause of helping the his strong anti-Americanism. needy and sick in Afghanistan; and in lawsuits challenging Japanese logistical assistance to In the 1980s these politicians—and others like U.S. military activities in Afghanistan, Iraq, and them—advocated a set of common “Asian elsewhere. Most recently, in a remarkable values” (always vaguely defined), based on example of this tendency to pan-AsianConfucian virtues, as a counter to the solidarity, in late 2009 the Japanese cabinet, universalist claims of liberalism, , led by Hatoyama Yukio (1947–), the leader of and , values that were dismissed the Democratic Party of Japan in coalition with as alien to the region and inauthentic for the Social Democratic Party, halted Japanese Asians on account of their allegedly Western military support for American-led operations in provenance. However, many Asian politicians Afghanistan and recalled the Maritime Self- and writers, such as the future president of Defense Forces from the Indian Ocean. , Kim Dae-jung (1925–2009), strongly rejected the idea of a common set of Recent Developments “Asian” values, and the debate has made little headway since. Recent work by Chinese As stated at the outset, issues of regionalism scholars suggests an attempt to find some and regional integration in East Asia have kernel of truth in the legacy of Pan-Asianism received considerable attention since the with the objective of criticizing “Western” (i.e., 1990s. In Korea, for example, pan-Asian unity is United States) policies or the West’s claim to identified as a promising path to avoidthe universality of democratic values. The domination not only by Japan but also by China. recent trend in Chinese academia to deal more In 2002, for example, former South Korean openly with the once completely discredited President Roh Moo-hyun (1946–2009) declared ideology of Pan-Asianism, in combination with that “the age of is arriving.” At statements by high-ranking diplomats the same time, regional approaches in East acknowledging the potential of the region’s Asia, especially since the beginning of the pan-Asian legacy, arguably reflects a change in present century, have been an expression of attitudes in China. increasing discontent with American-led and a developing unilateral world In Japan, the rise of a “New Asianism” has system. In South Korea, pan-Asianistreflected diplomatic and economic efforts to regionalism is thus “seen as an attractive stimulate regionalist approaches. These efforts alternative to Korea’s dependence on America.” were, however, always placed under strain by South Korean and Japanese interests seem to the strong priority given by the Japanese

24 9 | 17 | 1 APJ | JF government to the US-Japan Treaty. On the academic level, however, considerable Nonetheless, Japan, as a recent study notes, progress has been made over the past two “has been a driving force of Asian regionalism decades, as witnessed by drafts for an “Asian throughout the post-war period,” particularly in Constitution,” proposals for an East Asian the economic sphere. Notable in this regard Common House and a myriad of academic was Japan’s involvement in the founding of the conferences dealing with (and not infrequently Asian Development Fund in 1957 and the advocating) regional integration. This suggests proposal for an in 1997. that attention to the historical legacies of Pan- In addition, Japan has also been relatively Asianism and the identification of positive active in the ASEAN+3 cooperative network, examples of pan-Asian solidarity and regional involving the ASEAN nations plus China, Japan, integration in the past will play an increasingly and South Korea. But as the indicates, significant role in the years to come. the driving force of this new body is Recurrent Pan-Asian Themes ASEAN—the only effective organization working for regional integration in Asia, which Pan-Asian styles of thought have always come has brought a considerable degree of stability most to the fore in debates on foreign policy and economic growth to Southeast Asia. Japan and on Asian identity. If the many varieties of also has been rather passive and reactive with Pan-Asianism had anything in common, it was regard to the development of a their opposition to the West: opposition to the Agreement network in East Asia, and, given its West’s presence in Asia (i.e., Western continuing dependence on the security treaty imperialism), opposition to Western culture and with the United States, it remains questionable values, and, conversely, an emphasis on the whether Japan can play a leading role in the importance (and in many cases, the superiority) integration of the region in the immediate of Asian culture and Asian values. In fact, it future—notwithstanding the outspokencould be argued that anti-Westernism was advocacy of Pan-Asianism by some leading central to Pan-Asianism. In opposition to the politicians. “West”—which was, to a large degree, an invented concept—pan-Asian writers Nor should one forget the historical legacies of constructed their own “Asia.” Images of this World War II and of Pan-Asianism as an constructed Asia varied greatly. They changed ideology. As late as the 1990s, partly because over time and took particular forms in different of the difficulties Japan experienced in coming places and in the works of different authors. to terms with its past, writers in Asia as well as But all pan-Asianists assumed the existence of in the West warned that Japanese regionalist “one Asia” and based this assumption on one or initiatives could be interpreted as a resurgence more of the following categories: of claims for Japan’s leadership in East Asia, with the objective of creating “a new version of • Geography (Asia, East Asia, the the Greater East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere of Orient) World War II.” In recent years, the issue of historical memory has become less contentious • Cultural unity (influence of in Japan, but persistent elements of Indian and Chinese civilization, “retrospective Pan-Asianism”—the religions) rehabilitation of wartime pan-Asian rhetoric to whitewash Japan’s wars of aggression and • Historical interconnectedness colonial rule in Asia—continue to hinder (Sinocentric system, tribute attempts to promote regional integration. relations, trade networks)

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• Racial kinship (the yellow race, external domination. In recent years, these races of color) approaches have once again been attracting attention as a reaction to the emergence of a • The unity of Asian civilization in unipolar world order. terms of its values and spiritual character (Confucianism, Enough has already been said about the and benevolence vs. Western incorporation of the Western ideas of race into materialism and rationalism) pan-Asianist rhetoric. References to “racial kinship” were frequent, as the documents in • A common destiny (the fight this collection make clear. However, the against Western imperialism and Western provenance of the concept of race colonial rule) made it highly questionable that such an ideology could serve as the basis for a regional Nevertheless, there was never a consensus on identity—not least since a Pan-Asianism based the geographical definition of Asia and that on racial motives limited “Asia” to East Asia pan-Asian writers constantly revised their and tended to exclude India, western Asia, and definitions of “Asia,” blurring geographical other areas. Further, the ideal of racial equality exactitude with interpretations that allowed and the reality of racial discrimination within them to extend their definition of Asia even to Asia eventually thoroughly discredited the some European and African nations. racial component within Pan-Asianism, particularly in Korea (after 1910) and other The perception and creation of cultural unity, territories under Japanese colonial rule. brought to an extreme of simplification in the slogan “Asia is one,” also remains an important The complex notion of Asian values—Asian theme of pan-Asian writers over the past one “spirituality” versus the “materialism” of and a half centuries—and down to the present Western civilization—is also highly contested day. In 2010, an Internet search (google.com) and riddled with contradictions. As we have of the term generates a large number of hits. already noted in the discussion of geographical Although it is clear that any particulardefinitions, the “Asia” of the pan-Asianists assertion of what constitutes culturalsometimes included territories that are commonalities (or differences) is highlygenerally classified as “Western” countries, arbitrary and subjective, it is important to such as Germany, Italy, or even Ireland. The acknowledge that such a particularized1920s saw a wave of sympathy for the cause of insistence on the existence of commonalities Irish independence in Asian publications, and has played an important role in thein the 1930s, Japan allied itself with Germany construction of Pan-Asianism, as the texts and Italy—ostensibly since Germany and Italy reproduced in this collection show. had chosen to join the fight against “Western” materialism, now limited to Anglo-Saxon Recent research has stressed the importance of civilization. historical interconnectedness as an authentic foundation for forces encouraging theNotwithstanding the various contradictions development of regional integration. The notion generated by any definition of Asia or the West, of a world system that connected the various pan-Asianists have generally regarded “the states of East and Southeast Asia for centuries, West” as the alien Other. Time and again, as before the imposition of Western-basedthis collection shows, for pan-Asianists Asia international law, had sufficient cogency to represents the antithesis of the West. Indeed, bind indigenous forces against the threat of these writers regularly define Asia in terms of

26 9 | 17 | 1 APJ | JF the West. This is true of such diverse figures as But was everything distinctive about the East Okakura Tenshin, Ōkawa Shūmei and, in the to be denied? Initially there was a tendency to postwar period, Takeuchi Yoshimi, Ishihara discard the whole culture, lock, stock, and Shintarō, and Nakamura Tetsu. The corollary to barrel. In an excess of modernizing enthusiasm, this vision of the West as the Other is the some Japanese even wanted to give up their assumption that there exists a coherent set of native tongue in favor of English. Needless to Asian values and that these values,ex say, such proposals were at best impractical. definitione shared by all Asians, are superior to But were there aspects of Eastern tradition still Western values. This idea is often linked to an of relevance in this Western-dominated world? emphasis on the antiquity of Asian culture, Above all in the realms of ethics, morals, and which is often presented by pan-Asianists as philosophical and religious thought, convincing the cradle of civilization, including European arguments could be made for the relevance, if civilization. In this connection, much has been not the superiority, of Eastern made of the fact that all major religions of the traditions—arguments that the reader will world, including , originated in encounter time and again throughout this what is geographically considered Asia. On collection. these grounds, it is often argued that only “Asian” civilization has the potential toWhile the meaning—and even the existence—of ultimately save mankind, including the West. In “Asian values” remains debatable, the notion of the words of Tagore, “If Asian civilization commonly held Asian values and a common constituted a great reservoir of spiritual power, culture and racial identity, which together and if modern civilization was about to destroy constitute the basis of Pan-Asianism, is closely humanity itself, then it must be from arelated to the sentiment of a “common destiny” regenerated Asia that man’s salvation would for Asian peoples. This latter notion represents come.” Tagore was an outspoken critic of another recurrent theme in Pan-Asianism—one nationalism in at least some of his writings. that perhaps retains much of its appeal even There is no doubt that the kind of Pan-Asianism today, if recent statements by Asian to which he subscribed was “a vision of governments (e.g., the initiative of former community that sought to transcend the Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio to territorial nation-state and redeem andprioritize ) or regenerate the world through Eastern spiritual declarations by transnational organizations morality.” such as ASEAN, are anything to go by. It is impossible to gauge whether such sentiments Yet, for all this cultural tension, the material will contribute to the realization of closer advantages of the West and of modernity in transnational cooperation or even regional general became obvious to most Asians, except integration in the future. To be sure, obstacles for a very small number of reactionaryto regional cooperation in East Asia remain obscurantists. Western-style modernity was an numerous. They include not only strong indispensible condition for success in the expressions of nationalism and the negative nineteenth-century world. For that reason, legacies of World War II but also the geography along with the majority of Asians, most pan- and demographics of Asia. Unlike in the case of Asianists never rejected modernity as such. European countries, the “Other,” or the Many ancient Asian customs and practices “enemy,” for many smaller Asian nations is to were patently useless or anachronistic in the be found within Asia, not somewhere outside. modern world, and, under the circumstances, While Asia will certainly never be “one,” we the chief problem that had to be overcome was may anticipate continued progress in the areas the antiquated structure of state and society. of regional cooperation and integration,

27 9 | 17 | 1 APJ | JF developments that can contribute to the and Pan-Asianism: a Documentary History. stability and the prosperity of the region. Recommended citation: Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman, Pan-Asianism as an Ideal of Asian Identity and Solidarity, About the book: The sources collected are 1850–Present, The Asia-Pacific Journal Vol 9, arranged in chronological order. This allows Issue 17 No 1, April 25, 2011. the reader to trace the development of Pan- Asianism and Asian regionalism from the mid- Articles on related themes: nineteenth century down to the present day and provides an insider’s view of intra-Asian • Mark Selden, Nation, Region and the Global debates. The material discussed in each in East Asia: Conflict and Cooperation chapter falls roughly into three often overlapping and never mutually exclusive • Isabel Hilton, Andreas Schild, Mohan categories: 1) attempts to define Asia and Munasinghe, and Dipak Gyawali, Regional assess the region’s contribution to world Cooperation at the Third Pole: The Himalayan- civilization; 2) calls for Asian solidarity,Tibetan and Climate Change integration, and unity; and 3) debates about Asia’s role in world politics and, above all, • Mark Selden, East Asian Regionalism and its about Asia’s relations with Europe. Enemies in Three Epochs: and , 16th to 21st Centuries Sven Saaler is Associate Professor of Modern Japanese History at Sophia University. He was • H. H. Michael Hsiao and Alan Yang, Soft formerly Head of the Humanities Section of the in the Asia Pacific: Chinese and German Institute for Japanese Studies (DIJ) and Japanese Quests for Regional Leadership Associate Professor at The . His book Politics, Memory and Public Opinion • Mark Beeson, East Asian Regionalism and the examines recent history debates in Japan. End of the Asia-Pacific: After American Together with J. Victor Koschmann, he edited Hegemony Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History, with Wolfgang Schwentker The Power of Memory in • Hamish McDonald, Beyond the Hub-and- Modern Japan and with Christopher W. A. Spoke Security System in East Asia: Australian Szpilman Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History and American Perspectives on East Asian (Rowman & Littlefield, 2011). Regionalism

Christopher W. A. Szpilman is professor of • Guillaume Gaulier, Francoise Lemoine and modern Japanese history and international Deniz Ünal-Kesenci, China’s Rise and the relations at Kyushu Sangyo University. He is Reorganization of the Asian Regional and co-editor of Kita Ikki’sKokutairon oyobi World Economy junseishakaishugi (On National Polity and Pure Socialism), Mitsukawa Kametarô nikki • Wang Hui, The Politics of Imagining Asia: (Mitsukawa Kametaro Diaries, Ronsôsha 2011) Empires, Nations, Regional and Global Orders

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