The Identity Dilemma and the Road to the Pacific War by Daisuke Minami

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Identity Clash: The Identity Dilemma and the Road to the Pacific War

by Daisuke Minami

B.A. in Political Science, May 2013, Macalester College

A Dissertation submitted to

The Faculty of The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

May 19, 2019

Dissertation directed by

Eric Grynaviski Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University certifies that Daisuke Minami has passed the Final Examination for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy as of April 8, 2019. This is the final and approved form of the dissertation.

Identity Clash: The Identity Dilemma and the Road to the Pacific War

Daisuke Minami

Dissertation Research Committee:

Eric Grynaviski, Associate Professor of Poiltical Science and International Affaris, Dissertation Director

Mike M. Mochizuki, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Committee Member

Michael N. Barnett, University Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Committee Member

Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Committee Member

iii Acknowledgements

This dissertation would have not been possible without the help of numerous people. I owe tremendous gratitude to those who have supported me.

I first would like to thank the members of my dissertation committee: Eric

Grynaviski, Mike Mochizuki, Michael Barnett, and Charlie Glaser. Eric Grynaviski has been crucial at every stage of my doctoral program. As a first-year faculty mentor, he helped me weather through the first two years of the coursework and develop my research agenda. In fact, this dissertation builds on on a term paper I wrote for his course as a second- year student. As a dissertation committee chair, he has been the best advisor I could ask for. He has read every draft of my dissertation chapters and gave me extensive and constructive feedback every time. I am deeply grateful for his professional and personal guidance these past six years. Mike Mochizuki has also provided tremendous intellectual and moral support throughout these years. When I was forming my dissertation committee three years ago, he said that he would still help me as a friend even if he was not part of the committee. I knew then that I was in good hands. Michael Barnett has consistently offered incisive criticism of my draft chapters. His feedback has been helpful in developing and refining many parts of the theoretical and empirical arguments in the dissertation.

Charlie Glaser has added unique and valuable perspectives to my dissertation. Coming from a different theoretical tradition than mine, his comments have pushed me to see my research from different viewpoints and think through how it could speak to broader audiences.

I am also grateful to many people at The George Washington University and other institutions. I first thank Daqing Yang and Bentley Allan for serving as outside examiners

iv for my dissertation defense and providing insightful comments. I also thank the professors at GWU, including Marty Finnemore, Yon Lupu, Celeste Arrington, and Alex Downes, who taught me and provided feedback on my research in seminars and workshops. I am also greatful to my cohorts, including Vanes Ibric, Nik Kalyanpur, Brian Radzinski, Aparna

Ravi, Kendrick Kuo, Shahryar Pasandideh, and Amoz Hor, who gave me constructive comments to improve my dissertation and moral support to maintain my sanity these past years. I also appreciate the generous research assistance from the Sigur Center for Asian

Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs, Mitsuyo Sato at the Japan Resource

Center of the GWU Gelman Library, and Toyomi Asano at Waseda University. Moreover,

I thank David Blaney, Andrew Latham, and Erik Larson at my alma mater, Macalester

College, for encouraging me to seek a doctoral degree in the first place.

Lastly, and most importantly, I thank my parents, Hatsuyo Minami and Kazumasa

Minami. They have always been understanding when it comes to my educational pursuits—allowing me to participate in a high school exchange student program in the

United States, sending me to Macalester for my undergraduate degree, and supporting me throughout the last six years of the doctoral work at GWU. I am truly grateful to them for all these years.

v Abstract of Dissertation

Identity Clash: The Identity Dilemma and the Road to the Pacific War

My dissertation offers a new way to study international conflicts from identity politics perspectives. Conventional wisdom is that hostilities, arms races, and wars result from the security dilemma, a situation in which states perceive the other’s security-seeking actions as threats and take retaliatory measures. I challenge this view and offer an alternative way to explain conflicts by theorizing the “identity dilemma,” a situation in which one’s action to enact its identity challenges the other’s identity. States form identities based on the roles they play in international society and feel secure about their identities by enacting those roles. The identity dilemma occurs when two states have incompatible identities and an event exposes this incompatibility and leads the states to defend their identities. Due to the incompatibility, each state views the other’s action as a challenge to its own identity and develops hostility against the other. As hostility deepens, states seek confrontational actions, possibly leading to conflicts. The identity dilemma is escalatory because it is more emotional than rational. It impedes coolheaded discussions and negotiations because passion and nationalism trump reason and pragmatism.

I test these assertions by analyzing the rise of American-Japanese conflictual relationship during the 1930s, a decade that historians call the “Road to the Pacific War.”

This is a crucial case not only because it is historically important but also because conventional accounts attribute the conflict to strategic factors (i.e., conflict of interests in

China) and domestic factors (i.e., Japan’s anti-Western militarism). Through discourse analysis and process tracing based on primary and secondary sources, I rebut these

vi conventional accounts and show that identity politics explains why the conflict arose during the 1930s and not before.

Before the 1930s, the identities of the United States and Japan were compatible, and there was no identity dilemma. Many Japanese leaders were “moderate internationalists” who thought that Japan as a great power should be a responsible member of the Western community. And many Americans were “isolationists” who believed that the United States should assume its role as a “city upon a hill” and stay aloof from overseas troubles. Unconcerned about Japan’s expansion in East Asia, American isolationists welcomed Japan as a member of the West. Japanese moderates reciprocated by cooperating with the Western countries under the Washington Treaty System. In short, there was mutual recognition of each other’s identity. There was no identity dilemma, and the two countries maintained friendly relations.

During the 1930s, the two countries’ identities became incompatible. The identity dilemma started and caused American-Japanese conflict. Many Japanese leaders believed that Japan must assert its role of a “leader in Asia” and supported the country’s expansion into China. This “pan-Asianist” worldview and policy challenged U.S. “liberal internationalist” worldview that the United States must assume its role as a “crusader nation” to uphold the post-WWI peace system and democratize and Christianize China. For this identity-based reason, many Americans pushed embargoes against Japan to stop its invasion of China, although the United States had no vital strategic interests in China.

These embargoes in turn triggered Japan’s further expansionist measures and ultimately

Pearl Harbor.

vii Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ...... iv

Abstract of Dissertation ...... vi

List of Figures ...... ix

List of Tables ...... x

Introduction ...... 1

Chapter 1: The Identity Dilemma and Interstate Enmity ...... 17

Chapter 2: U.S.-Japan Identity Relations across the Pacific, 1853-1930 ...... 65

Chapter 3: The Manchuria Crisis and the Road to the Pacific War, 1931-1933 ...... 111

Chapter 4: The Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1939 ...... 154

Chapter 5: Road to Pearl Harbor, 1940-1941 ...... 199

Conclusion ...... 247

Bibliography ...... 273

viii List of Figures

Figure 1: The causal mechanism of the identity dilemma ...... 49

ix List of Tables

Table 1: Domestic identity politics and the identity dilemma ...... 38

Table 2: American-Japanese identity relations ...... 54

Table 3: Predictions and observable implications of the identity dilemma ...... 62

Introduction

On December 16, 1949 Mao Zedong arrived in Moscow to commemorate Joseph

Stalin’s seventieth birthday. The Chinese premier had recently won the Chinese civil war, expecting the Soviets to recognize him as the leader of a great communist revolution. But they did not see him as an equal. They treated him as a minor figure, or in historian Adam

Ulam’s words, “as if he were the head of, say, the Bulgarian Party.”1 Soviet leaders greeted

Mao at the station but rejected his offer of a luncheon and a drink. They even refused to accompany him to the residence where he was scheduled to stay.2 They, in fact, knew very little about him, privately calling him “that Chinaman.”3 There was no special party, and the main reception “was given not in the Great Hall of the Kremlin, but in the old Metropole

Hotel, the usual place for entertaining visiting minor capitalist dignitaries.”4 Mao was isolated and had to wait days before a meeting was arranged with Stalin. This humiliating treatment angered the proud Chinese leader. “I am here to do more than eat and shit,” he complained.5 “It is no wonder,” writes Ulam, “that Mao conceived … an abiding hatred of the Soviet Union.”6

This Sino-Soviet rift deepened after Stalin died and Nikita Khrushchev took power.

As the most senior communist leader, Mao now viewed himself as the head of international communism. He criticized Khrushchev’s “de-Stalinization” and his nuclear détente with the United States as revisionism and led the Great Leap Forward and the Afro-Asian

1 Adam B. Ulam, Stalin: The Man and His Era (New York, NY: Viking, 1973), 695. 2 David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War (New York, NY: Hyperion, 2007), 353. 3 Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1974), 239–40. 4 Ulam, Stalin, 695. 5 Halberstam, The Coldest Winter, 354. 6 Ulam, Stalin, 695.

movement. “The only way Khrushchev could ever be the right in Mao’s eyes,” explains historian Sergey Radchenko, “was if he relinquished his pretensions of a Marxist theoretician and recognized Mao as the world’s number-one Marxist.” The Chinese attitude infuriated the Soviet premier, whose idea of “internationalist solidarity” meant “solidarity of other socialist countries with the Soviet Union … not vice versa.” In Khrushchev’s words, the conflict with the Chinese was “a question of nationalism, a question of egoism.

This is the main thing. They want to play the first fiddle.” And he was unwilling to give up the “first fiddle” to China. This was why, as Radchenko puts it, “Mao’s failure to endorse the implicit Soviet leadership was a cause for Khrushchev’s dissatisfaction with China. It was the main reason for the Sino-Soviet split.”7 As a result of the split, the two communist powers fought many disputes, including a border conflict in Xinjiang in 1969 that almost led to all-out war. When the two nations finally normalized their relations in 1989, Deng

Xiaoping reflected on the nearly three decades of hostility: “The real problem was the inequality. The Chinese people felt humiliated.”8

This study aims to explain conflicts like the Sino-Soviet split. China and the Soviet

Union each viewed itself as the leader of the international communist movement. A conflict arose because their identities were incompatible: both could not be a leader at the same time; only one could be a leader, and the other had to be a subordinate. In situations like this, in which states have incompatible identities, an event or a series of events can expose the identity incompatibility and lead the states to fight over their differences and grow hostilities. Mao’s Moscow visit and Stalin’s death revealed Chinese and Soviet conflicting

7 All the quotes are taken from Sergey Radchenko, Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962-1967 (Washington, DC: Stanford University Press, 2009), 91–92. 8 Radchenko, 206.

worldviews about their place in the communist movement and led the two countries to become enemies. “[T]he Sino-Soviet dilemma,” as Donald Zagoria explains, was that “the

Communist system itself demands one leader, therefore China and Russia could not resolve their differences without one accepting subordination to the other.”9

This study refers to identity conflicts like the Sino-Soviet split as an “identity dilemma.” Identity dilemmas are situations in which one’s action to enact its identity challenges the other’s identity. Because of identity incompatibility, each state views the other’s action as an identity threat, develops hostility, and takes counteraction. Through this action-reaction process, states increasingly view each other as enemies and seek confrontation. The identity dilemma is escalatory because it is emotional rather than rational. It impedes cool-headed discussions and negotiations because passion and nationalism trump reason and pragmatism. This study focuses on how such identity politics contributed to the rise of the American-Japanese conflictual relationship during the 1930s, a decade that historians call the “Road to the Pacific War.” In doing so, it theorizes a novel mechanism through which zero-sum identity contestation leads to hostilities and conflicts, offers a new identity-based historical interpretation of the origins of the Second World War, and draws general lesson about the danger of identity conflicts.

The Identity Dilemma and Interstate Conflict

This study examines one of the central questions in international politics: why do states become enemies and fight conflicts? Many scholars answer this question by focusing

9 Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962), 5, 392.

on either power politics or domestic politics. Some emphasize material power and strategic interests. According to them, changes in balance of power and conflicts of interests contribute to hostilities between states. And states are caught up in a negative spiral of hostilities due to the security dilemma, a situation in which one’s defensive military actions are viewed as threatening by the other and trigger counteractions. In this strategic view,

World War I partly resulted from the rise of Germany and its naval buildup that threatened

British naval supremacy and sparked a naval arms race.10 In contrast, others concentrate on domestic politics of warmongering. Political actors purposefully manipulate a sense of hostility against foreign countries to justify militaristic policies that benefit certain interest groups or to divert public attention from domestic problems. In this view, the Cold War had domestic roots. The warmongering in favor of more military spending by the U.S.

“military-industrial complex” contributed to anti-Sovietism in America. Soviet leaders used anti-Americanism to detract public attention from internal issues and to consolidate their power.11

In this study, I turn to identity politics. I argue that interstate hostilities and conflicts arise because of the identity dilemma, a situation in which one’s action to enact its identity challenges the other’s identity. States form identities based on the roles they play in international society (e.g., the leader of the internationalist communist movement) and feel secure about their identities by enacting those roles. The identity dilemma happens when two states have incompatible identities (e.g., both China and the Soviet Union viewed themselves as the leader of international communism) and when an event or a series of

10 Paul Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (London, UK: George Allen & Unwin, 1980). 11 Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), chaps. 6–7.

events (e.g., Mao’s Moscow visit and Stalin’s death) expose the identity incompatibility and leads states to defend their identities. Perceiving identity threats, states develop hostilities and take actions to defend their own identities against the other. This action- reaction process results in interstate enmity. As enmity deepens, states seek confrontation instead of cooperation, and conflicts follow.

The identity dilemma is dangerous because it involves passion politics. In the realist account, states under the security dilemma rationally calculate each other’s intensions and calibrate their foreign policy options. Policy debates are based on reason, and pragmatic considerations shape decision making. This study offers an alternative account. States under the identity dilemma emotionally react to identity threats and debate counteractions.

Such identity debates based on emotion dominate, and nationalistic motivations drive decision making. It is difficult to stop the identity dilemma once such an escalatory dynamic takes hold and becomes entrenched.

Moreover, I argue that enmity developed through identity politics can be unmanageable due to two consequences of an entrenched identity dilemma. First, in an entrenched identity dilemma, states may internalize the zero-sum nature of their identity relations and seek confrontation to defend their identities. Under this high level of enmity, they develop deep mistrust and threat perception, acting according to worst-case assumptions of each other’s motives and intensions. I call this effect “enduring enmity.”

Second, conflicts can become intractable, because identity issues have all-or-nothing quality and are difficult to compromise. In an entrenched identity dilemma, states fight for who they are. They reject compromise because such action undermines their identities. I call this effect “identity indivisibility.”

My claims build on existing studies on the role of identity in international politics.

As elaborated in Chapter 1, many scholars have studied how identity shapes states’ interests and worldviews and promotes cooperation or competition between them. Yet, very few have directly examined how zero-sum identity contestation—that is, the identity dilemma—leads to hostilities between states. Thus, this study offers a new, ideational explanation of international conflicts. For instance, Great Britain and Germany grew hostilities before WWI because the Germans sought to establish themselves as a great power through ambitious naval buildups and these buildups challenged the Britons’ national pride as the naval supreme power.12 The United States and the Soviet Union became enemies because their missions to promote the values that were core to their identities collided, especially in the Third World.13 And, as discussed above, China and the

Soviet Union became foes despite their common ideologies because their aspirations to lead the international communist movement clashed.

The Road to the Pacific War

To test the identity dilemma theory, I analyze the rise of the American-Japanese conflictual relationship during the decade before the Pacific War. What historians call “the

Road to the Pacific War” (Taiheiyo senso e no michi) started with Japan’s invasion of

Manchuria in 1931. Outraged by the aggression, the United States announced the Non- recognition Doctrine and pushed the members of the League of Nations to condemn Japan.

12 Michelle Murray, “Identity, Insecurity, and Great Power Politics: The Tragedy of German Naval Ambition Before the First World War,” Security Studies 19, no. 4 (2010): 656–88. 13 Robert Jervis, “Identity and the Cold War,” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 22–43.

These moral condemnations infuriated the Japanese, who withdrew from the League in

1933. The Manchuria Crisis was followed by the Sino-Japanese War (1937-45). Japan’s further aggression in China antagonized many Americans, who organized national campaigns to embargo Japan. The resulting series of embargoes provoked Japan’s further expansion and ultimately Pearl Harbor.14

Why study the Road to the Pacific War? This is an appropriate case to study the role of identity not only because of its historical importance, but also because of its paradigmatic relevance for the conventional explanations of enmity. As elaborated in

Chapter 1, scholars argue that the primary cause of American-Japanese enmity during the interwar years was strategic or domestic. Some argue that U.S.-Japan amity and cooperation since the Meiji Restoration turned into enmity and confrontation during the

1930s because Japanese aggression threatened U.S. commercial interests and its Open-

Door policy in China. The Americans retaliated with a series of embargoes, which contributed to Japanese economic insecurity and ultimately precipitated Pearl Harbor.

Others point to domestic politics, particularly the surge of Japan’s militarism during the

1930s. The shift in U.S.-Japan relations was punctuated by the Japanese military’s takeover of the civilian government during the Manchuria Crisis. Military leaders purposefully used the Western powers as foreign enemies to consolidate power and to justify expansionist policies in Asia and alignment with the Axis powers. The Americans believed that peace with the militarist Japan was impossible and took retaliatory measures. And a war started when the Japanese military overrode civilian opposition and attacked Pearl Harbor.

14 On the Road to the Pacific War thesis, see Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyo Senso Genin Kenkyubu, ed., Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi: Kaisen Gaikoushi, New Edition, 8 vols. (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1987); Keiichi Eguchi, Jugonen Sensoshi, 2nd ed. (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1991).

This study counters these conventional explanations and argues that the United

States and Japan developed enmity and sought confrontation due to the identity dilemma.

American-Japanese enmity erupted during the 1930s due to a shift in both countries’ identities. Before the 1930s, the identities of the United States and Japan were compatible, and there was no identity dilemma. As discussed in Chapter 2, many Japanese leaders were

“moderate internationalists” who thought that Japan as a great power should be a responsible member of the Western community. And many Americans were “isolationists” who believed that the United States should assume its role as a “city upon a hill” and stay aloof from overseas troubles. Unconcerned about Japan’s expansion in East Asia under the

Monroe Doctrine, the American isolationists welcomed Japan as a member of the Western international order based on regimes such as the League of Nations and the Washington

Treaties. The Japanese moderates reciprocated by cooperating with the Western countries in upholding the international order. In short, there was mutual recognition of each other’s identity, and the two countries maintained friendly relations.

During the 1930s, the two countries’ identities became incompatible. Many

Japanese leaders believed that Japan had to assert its role as a “leader in Asia” to establish

“Asia of the Asians” and supported expansion into China. This “pan-Asianist” worldview and policy conflicted with the U.S. “liberal internationalist” worldview that the United

States must assume its role as a “crusader nation” to uphold the post-WWI peace system and democratize and Christianize China. Japan’s invasion of China during the 1930s dramatically exposed this identity incompatibility, triggered an identity dilemma between

America and Japan, and paved the Road to the Pacific War.

Chapters 3-5 discuss this dynamic in detail. In Chapter 3, I explain how the U.S.-

Japan identity dilemma began during the Manchuria Crisis. The crisis started with the invasion of Manchuria by the Kwantung Army. Although the United States had very little interests in China, let alone Manchuria, the American liberal internationalists viewed

Japan’s aggression as a challenge to their role identity as a crusader nation. They thus became anti-Japanese and took symbolic actions to condemn Japan. These actions did not directly threaten Japan’s strategic interests in Manchuria, but the Japanese pan-Asianists viewed them as a denial of their national identity as a leader in Asia, became anti-American, and demanded confrontation. This action-reaction dynamic deepened as the crisis continued. The bilateral relationship worsened, and the identity dilemma became entrenched.

The crisis became intractable because of the two consequences of an entrenched identity dilemma: enduring enmity and identity indivisibility. First, the bilateral relations turned into one of enduring enmity where states internalize their zero-sum identity relations and pursue aggression to defend their identities. Particularly, Japan’s anti-U.S. sentiment became so entrenched that many Japanese demanded withdrawal from the League and even war with America. This political climate eliminated room for Japan’s cooperation with the

League and the United States. Second, the two countries could not resolve their differences because of identity indivisibility, a situation in which states refuse compromise because such action would undermine their identities. Although the other Western powers sought a diplomatic settlement through the League system, the United States pushed diplomatic measures to condemn Japan because compromise would have contradicted its liberal internationalist identity. Although these measures were symbolic, Japan refused any settlement and took an extreme action of withdrawing from the League because accepting

the international condemnation and remaining in the organization would have undercut their national pride as a leader of Asia. As a result, the minor crisis in the Far East became a major conflict on the world stage, starting the Road to the Pacific War.

The identity dilemma deepened during the Sino-Japanese War, and the American-

Japanese conflictual relationship worsened. As discussed in Chapter 4, although the U.S. strategic stakes in China remained very limited, the American liberal internationalists viewed Japan’s expansion into China as a threat to their identity as a crusader nation. They organized national embargo campaigns against Japan, leading a public debate that the

United States had a moral responsibility to save China, a Christian democracy in Asia.

These campaigns pushed the U.S. government to issue diplomatic denunciations and voluntary, “moral” embargoes against Japan. These symbolic measures were too weak to threaten Japan’s interests in China and its national security, but the pan-Asianists saw them as an invalidation of their national identity as a leader in Asia and took confrontational countermeasures. In response, the United States terminated its commercial treaty with

Japan in 1939, which removed legal barriers to embargo Japan.

The U.S.-Japan identity dilemma intensified and became entrenched after the outbreak of World War II in Europe. As elaborated in Chapter 5, Germany’s conquest of

Holland, Belgium, and France fueled the anti-Anglo-Saxon pan-Asianist debate and created increased support for further expansionist policies in Japan. Meanwhile, the situation in Europe meant that the United States now had to focus on the Nazi threats and could not afford to embargo and provoke Japan. However, the identity-driven internationalist campaign to embargo Japan intensified and pressured the Roosevelt administration to impose a scrap iron embargo in 1940, which precipitated Japan’s

expansion into Indochina and its signing of the Tripartite Pact. In 1941, the internationalist campaign led to an oil embargo, which prompted Japan to attack Pearl Harbor.

Before Pearl Harbor, though, the United States and Japan attempted to reach a modus vivendi and avoid war. However, this effort failed due to the two consequences of an entrenched identity dilemma: enduring enmity and identity indivisibility. At this point,

U.S.-Japan relations became one of enduring enmity in which states willingly take aggressive actions to defend their identities. Many Americans supported further embargoes even at the risk of war with Japan, and many Japanese demanded war even at the slim chance of victory. This political environment made it extremely difficult to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough. Moreover, the two countries found it difficult to resolve their differences because identity issues can be indivisible and difficult to compromise.

Although China was not its vital interest, the United States insisted on the liberation of

China as a precondition for a modus vivendi because abandoning the Chinese would have contradicted its liberal internationalist identity. Although the Japanese recognized little chance of winning a war, they rejected the U.S. demands because capitulating would have meant giving up their pan-Asianist identity. Amid the collapsed negotiation, Japan attacked

Pearl Harbor.

In sum, from the Manchuria Crisis to the Sino-Japanese to Pearl Harbor, the identity dilemma consistently played a key role in creating and exacerbating hostilities and conflicts between the United States and Japan. The Road to the Pacific War was a clash of identities.

Broader Implications

Overall, this study challenges the conventional views on the origins of the Pacific

War in diplomatic history scholarship and on those of conflicts in international relations

(IR) literature. In doing so, it aims to contributes to the broader debates on Pacific War historiography, IR theory, and foreign policy. Here, I briefly explain these contributions, while returning to them in greater depth in the conclusion chapter.

Empirically, this study proposes a novel interpretation that the origins of the Pacific

War were identity politics, challenging the conventional accounts that emphasize either strategic or domestic factors. Of course, this is not to say that the identity dilemma was the only cause of the Pacific War. There were other factors that affected U.S.-Japan relations.

But even among these factors, identity politics played a singular role during the critical junctures of the bilateral relationship and paved a pathway through which American-

Japanese enmity deepened and headed toward war. Also, many historians certainly have examined the impacts of American liberal internationalism and Japanese pan-Asianism on the respective country’s foreign policies. However, to my knowledge, none has explicitly focused on the interaction of each country’s identity politics across the Pacific to argue that

World War II originated from the identity dilemma. I thus believe that this study contributes to the historiographical debate on the Pacific War.

Theoretically, this study’s most significant contribution is to broaden our conception of the role that identity plays in international politics. There is nothing new about suggesting that identity affects state behavior. Many scholars have shown that states form their identities based on their domestic discourses about history, culture, and ideology, their internalization of global norms and cultures, or their interactions with other states, and that identity shapes the ways in which states understand their interests and formulate

their foreign policies. However, scholars have rarely theorized how interstate identity politics can become zero-sum and produce hostilities, although the popular wisdom is that a clash of identities leads to hostilities.15 Neither have they clearly theorized how such international dynamics shape and are shaped by the domestic identity politics of the states involved, even though there have been calls to develop ideational theories that capture such international-domestic dynamics.16 This study overcome these challenges by showing how an identity dilemma happens between states when political groups in power on both sides have incompatible identities and when an event or a series of events expose this identity incompatiblity and push both sides to defend their identities, and how interstate competition deepens as the domestic groups make coalitions to gain influence and lock in confrontational policies. In short, this study lays out a new theory of interstate identity competition, its domestic mechanisms, and its effects on international conflicts.

Another significant theoretical contribution of this study is to offer an alternative view to the standard model for discussing international conflict—namely, the security dilemma. While many scholars and practitioners think that states develop hostilities because their policies threaten each other’s national security, I argue that states can also become enemies because their actions challenge each other’s national identity. I make this argument by drawing on social psychology to suggest that political actors develop enmity in response to identity threats because they are nationalistic, that is, identify themselves with and are emotionally attached to their nation. This socio-psychological account of

15 One of the most well-known—and perhaps controversial—studies on a clash of identities is Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1996). 16 Christian Reus-Smit, “Constructivism,” in Theories of International Relations, ed. Scott Burchill et al., 5th ed. (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 228–29.

world politics casts doubt on our predominant assumption that states are rational actors and that their actions are governed by strategic considerations.

Lastly, this study offers important policy lessons because the identity dilemma appears increasingly relevant in today’s world politics. For instance, the resurgence of nativism in Europe and the United States seems to be turning the Western community of shared identity and xenophilia into a clash of national identities and xenophobia. This identity struggle within the West is complicated by its identity dilemma with Russia: The

West’s commitment to retain a liberal democratic European community conflicts with

Russia’s action to regain its great-power status and sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space. In the Asia-Pacific, China’s aspiration to reclaim its regional leadership seems to be clashing with America’s self-identification as a champion of the liberal rule-based order in the region. If history is any indication, the Road to the Pacific War shows the difficulty of stopping the escalatory identity dilemma dynamics once states frame the stakes as identity issues and start fighting over their identities. It is thus wise to avoid identity politics where passion and emotion can trump reason. In the conclusion chapter, I further explore this theme, discussing whether the United States and China will follow the footsteps of U.S.-

Japan prewar relations and face a clash of identities, and possibly a war, across the Pacific.

Plan of the Study

In the following chapters, I lay out my theoretical argument and tests it with the case study of the Road to the Pacific War. In Chapter 1, I outline the identity dilemma theory and develop a research design for testing it against the alternative strategic and

domestic explanations. Building on existing IR and social psychology scholarship on identity, I elaborate the causal mechanisms of the identity dilemma in detail. I also expand on why the Road to the Pacific is an appropriate case to study the role of the identity dilemma in interstate conflict. I derive hypotheses from the identity dilemma theory, as well as strategic and domestic explanations, and discuss ways to assess their relative importance.

In Chapter 2, I discuss the identities and bilateral relationship of the United States and Japan before the 1930s. I explain that there were two identity worldviews in each country: liberal internationalism and isolationism in the United States; and pan-Asianism and moderate internationalism in Japan. I argue that the two countries did not experience an identity dilemma, and maintained amity and cooperation, because their identities were compatible, with isolationists in the United States and moderate internationalists in Japan holding domestic power.

In Chapters 3-5, I examine the rise of American-Japanese enmity from the

Manchuria Crisis to the Sino-Japanese War to Pearl Harbor. During the 1930s, the two nations’ identities became incompatible, seeing liberal internationalists in America and pan-Asianists in Japan seizing power. Japan’s invasion of China dramatically showed the incompatibility between these two identity worldviews and triggered an identity dilemma.

I make this argument by tracing the key moments of American-Japanese enmity during the decade and pitting it against the competing strategic and domestic explanations.

While this study primarily explores the U.S.-Japan prewar enmity, there are reasons to suggest that the identity dilemma is a common feature of international politics. Thus, my argument offers implications for not only Pacific War diplomatic historians but also IR

scholars and policymakers. The conclusion chapter explores this theme in detail, offering general lessons about the danger of identity conflicts. George Satayana said, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” If we do not learn from history, we may be doomed to repeat the tragedy of identity politics that contributed to the Second

World War.

Chapter 1: The Identity Dilemma and Interstate Enmity

The essence of politics, Carl Schmitt reminds us, is friend/enemy distinction. 17

International politics is no exception. States exist in an anarchic system where they must help themselves for survival. They distinguish friends and enemies and decide whether to cooperate or compete. One of the central questions for international relations scholars, then, is why does enmity develop? Many scholars answer this question by focusing on either power politics or domestic politics. Some emphasize strategic factors, arguing that material threats or conflict of interests cause enmity between states. Others look at domestic factors, claiming that warmongering by political actors creates interstate enmity.

By contrast, I focus on identity politics. I argue that states develop enmity due to what I call an “identity dilemma,” a situation in which one’s action to enact its identity challenges the other’s identity. States form identities based on the roles they play in international society and feel secure about their identities by enacting those roles. The identity dilemma happens when two states have incompatible identities and when an event or a series of events expose the identity incompatibility and leads states to defend their identities. Perceiving identity threats, states take actions to defend their own identities against the other. This action-reaction process results in interstate enmity. As enmity deepens, states take confrontational actions, possibly leading to conflict. The identity dilemma is escalatory because it is more emotional than rational. It impedes cool-headed discussions and negotiations because passion and nationalism trump reason and pragmatism.

17 Carl Schmitt, Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1986).

This chapter lays out the identity dilemma theory. Certainly, I am not the first person to study the role of identity in international politics. Many scholars have argued that identity is one of the key variables that shape state interest, worldview, and behavior.

However, existing studies rarely discuss what happens when one state’s action to establish its identity challenges the other’s identity. In other words, they do not theorize the identity dilemma. The central contribution of this study is to do just that. To make this point, I first review existing studies on state identity and discuss how my argument expands our understanding of interstate identity politics. After doing so, I discuss the research design and case selection I use to test my argument. In the following chapters, I test whether the identity dilemma can explain interstate enmity in a hard case, the rise of American-

Japanese enmity leading up to the Pacific War.

Identity and International Politics

Identity is a sense of self, how one defines itself in relation to others. Since the

“constructivist turn” in IR scholarship, many scholars have recognized the importance of identity.18 In this section, I review existing studies and show why and how identity matters in international politics. In doing so, I problematize the fact that these studies rarely discuss how one state’s action to enact its identity may threaten the other’s identity and how this interaction affects their relationship. My identity dilemma argument aims to address this challenge and expand our knowledge of interstate identity politics.

18 Jeffrey T. Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,” World Politics 50, no. 2 (1998): 324–48; Rawi Abdelal et al., eds., Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social Scientists (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

One strand of existing studies views identity as domestic discourses about self, showing how discourses shape states’ interests and behavior. Specifically, states form identities by telling stories about who they are, or what Antony Giddens calls the “narrative of the self.”19 Charles Taylor explains: “In order to have a sense of who we are, we have to have a notion of how we have become, and of where we are going. … [The] basic condition of making sense of ourselves [is] that we grasp our lives in a narrative.”20 This self- biographical narrative acts as “an axis of interpretation,” or cognitive heuristics through which states understand themselves, their purposes and interests, and the world.21 One’s narrative builds on social demarcation and comparison between the Self and the Other.22

The Other can be historical (i.e., its past self), external (i.e., other countries), or internal

(i.e., ethnically, religiously, or culturally different other populations within the country).23

For instance, Ted Hopf demonstrates how Moscow after the Cold War has developed multiple discourses of a “New Russia” in relation to the Historical Other of the Soviet

Union, the Internal Other of the Chechens, and the External Other of the West, and how these discourses have affected Russian foreign policy.24 David Campbell discusses how the

“discourse of danger,” or societal discussions about external threats and enemies, have shaped American identity and foreign policy.25

19 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), 243. 20 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 47, emphasis in original. 21 Ted Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics: Identities & Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 4–5. 22 Iver B. Neumann, Uses of the Other: The “East” in European Identity Formation (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999). 23 Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics. 24 Hopf; Ted Hopf, Reconstructing the Cold War: The Early Years, 1945-1958 (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012). 25 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, Revised Edition (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).

Domestic-level studies also show that states behave in line with their self-narratives to feel secure about their identities. According to Giddens, to be ontologically secure, or maintain a stable sense of self, one needs to “ha[ve] a feeling of biographical continuity which she is able to grasp reflexively and… the capacity to keep a particular narrative going.”26 Thus, states seek identity security by maintaining a coherent self-biographical narrative, and shun away from behavior that deviates from that narrative and creates inconsistencies in their self-understandings. 27 For instance, when faced with a humanitarian crisis, liberal states may feel compelled to provide aid or seek humanitarian intervention, because inaction contradicts their narratives of human rights promotion.28

Another strand sees identity as the product of social interaction. It shows how international norms and intergroup dynamics affect state identity, interest, and behavior.

For instance, Alexander Wendt argues that states form role identities (enemies, rivals, or friends) through Self-Other interaction, and that this creates different “cultures of anarchy”

(Hobbesian, Lockean, or Kantian) that determine whether states compete or cooperate.29

Similarly, some claim that “world cultures” generate institutional isomorphism among nation-states, for instance, in terms of modern bureaucratic structures.30 Other studies show that norms go through a “life cycle” in which they emerge, spread, and ultimately become

26 Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, 54, emphasis in original. 27 Brent J. Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-Identity and the IR State (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008). Also see Amir Lupovici, The Power of Deterrence: Emotions, Identity and American and Israeli Wars of Resolve (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 28 Brent J. Steele, “Making Words Matter: The Asian Tsunami, Darfur, and ‘Reflexive Discourse’ in International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly 51, no. 4 (2007): 901–25. 29 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 30 John W. Meyer et al., “World Society and the Nation-State,” American Journal of Sociology 103, no. 1 (1997): 144–81; Martha Finnemore, “Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s Institutionalism,” International Organization 50, no. 02 (1996): 325–347; Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).

internalized by states. Once internalized, these norms constitute states’ identities and interests and thereby shape their behavior.31 In addition, existing studies draw on social identity theory to show how in/out-group differentiation, discrimination, and favoritism affect status competition, 32 threat perception and alliance formation, 33 and peace and conflict. 34

Systemic-level studies also suggest that states engage in routines with significant others to maintain ontological security. This helps explain why some conflicts, such as the

U.S.-Soviet Cold War rivalry and the Israel-Palestine dispute, are “enduring.” In these conflicts, routinized fighting becomes part of the waring states’ collective role identity as rivals. States cannot let go of this routine because it will contradict their understandings of who they are to each other and undermine their ontological security.35 Similarly, regional or security communities, such as the European Union and NATO, are robust because routinized cooperation constitutes the cooperating states’ collective role identity as

31 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization 52, no. 04 (1998): 887–917. 32 Allan Dafoe, Jonathan Renshon, and Paul Huth, “Reputation and Status as Motives for War,” Annual Review of Political Science 17, no. 1 (2014): 371–93; Murray, “Identity, Insecurity, and Great Power Politics”; T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. Wohlforth, Status in World Politics (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Thomas J. Volgy and Stacey Mayhall, “Status Inconsistency and International War: Exploring the Effects of Systemic Change,” International Studies Quarterly 39, no. 1 (1995): 67–84. 33 Zoltán I. Búzás, “The Color of Threat: Race, Threat Perception, and the Demise of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902-1923),” Security Studies 22, no. 4 (2013): 573–606; John M. Owen, “When Do Ideologies Produce Alliances? The Holy Roman Empire, 1517-1555,” International Studies Quarterly 49, no. 1 (2005): 73–99; David L. Rousseau, Identifying Threats and Threatening Identities: The Social Construction of Realism and Liberalism (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006); David L. Rousseau and Rocio Garcia-Retamero, “Identity, Power, and Threat Perception A Cross-National Experimental Study,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 5 (2007): 744–71. 34 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, Security Communities (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Mark L. Haas, The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789–1989 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); Thomas Risse, “Democratic Peace — Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument,” European Journal of International Relations 1, no. 4 (1995): 491– 517. 35 Jennifer Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma,” European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 3 (2006): 341–70.

friends.36

Despite these insights into the role of identity in international politics, existing studies seldom theorize zero-sum identity contestation and its effects on interstate relations.

The domestic strand emphasizes that states form narratives in relation to others, but rarely discusses how the discourses of multiple countries interact and shape their relationships.

For instance, Hopf’s analysis of the Soviet discourse37 and Campbell’s discussion of the

American “discourse of danger”38 show how the discourse affect the respective country’s foreign policy, but not how it interacts with other states’ discourses. Similarly, domestic analyses of ontological security focus on how states take unilateral actions to reduce discrepancies between their narratives and their actions and maintain ontological security, not how states interact in maintaining their ontological security. 39 The systemic strand stresses Self-Other interaction but rarely analyzes how interaction creates zero-sum identity contestation. For instance, Wendt suggests that states, through interaction, agree on their role-based relationship (enemies, rivals, or friends) and culture of anarchy

(Hobbesian, Lockean, Kantian), instead of disagreeing over their relationship and failing to establish stable identities. 40 Mitzen similarly assume that states become attached to security-dilemma-driven conflict as a routine and internalize their role-based relationship as enemies, instead of contesting their relationship, rejecting routines, and failing to maintain ontological security. 41 Consequently, neither strand directly examines what happens when one state’s actions to enact its identity threaten the other’s identity.

36 Jennifer Mitzen, “Anchoring Europe’s Civilizing Identity: Habits, Capabilities and Ontological Security,” Journal of European Public Policy 13, no. 2 (2006): 270–85. 37 Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics. 38 Campbell, Writing Security. 39 Lupovici, The Power of Deterrence; Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations. 40 Wendt, Social Theory. 41 Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics.”

Certainly, a few studies have addressed this issue, but there are limitations. For instance, based on the idea that states seek status for instrumental (e.g., increased bargaining power and influence) and sociopsychological (e.g., self-esteem) reasons, 42

Wohlforth argues that states fight conflict due to “status dilemmas,” a zero-sum situation in which one’s status-seeking actions threaten the other’s status.43 Similarly, based on the premise that states seek others’ recognition of their identities to maintain ontological security,44 Ringmar claims that states face “recognition games” in which they struggle for recognition as one’s actions misrecognize or fail to recognize the other’s identity.45 I agree with these studies about the importance of status and recognition for interstate identity politics and draw on them to theorize the identity dilemma. Yet, both status and recognition literature only emphasize the status aspects of state identity, thereby often limiting their analysis to major powers and omitting other types of identities that also drive state behavior.46 Neither do they pay adequate attention to how domestic actors disagree on the

42 On status, see Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, “Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy,” International Security 34, no. 4 (2010): 63–95; Paul, Larson, and Wohlforth, Status in World Politics; Steven Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2017). 43 William C. Wohlforth, “Status Dilemmas and Interstate Conflict,” in Status in World Politics, ed. T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. Wohlforth (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 115– 40. 44 Karl Gustafsson, “Memory Politics and Ontological Security in Sino-Japanese Relations,” Asian Studies Review 38, no. 1 (2014): 71–86; Karl Gustafsson, “Routinised Recognition and Anxiety: Understanding the Deterioration in Sino-Japanese Relations,” Review of International Studies 42, no. 4 (2016): 613–33; Thomas Lindemann, Causes of War: The Struggle for Recognition (Colchester, UK: ECPR Press, 2010); Michelle Murray, “Recognition, Disrespect and the Struggle for Morocco: Rethinking Imperial Germany’s Security Dilemma,” in The International Politics of Recognition, ed. Thomas Lindemann and Erik Ringmar (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2012), 131–51. 45 Erik Ringmar, “The Recognition Game Soviet Russia Against the West,” Cooperation and Conflict 37, no. 2 (2002): 115–36. 46 On the tendency of status scholars to only focus on major powers, see Jonathan Renshon, Fighting for Status: Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017), 16–17. Wolf notes that while recognition is not only about status, existing studies on recognition tend to emphasize only the status aspects of state identity. He even goes to downplay the importance of non-status identities, arguing that people do not develop anger in response to identity threats that have no status implications. Reinhard Wolf, “Respect and Disrespect in International Politics: The Significance of Status Recognition,” International Theory 3, no. 1 (2011): 108.

content of status and how this debate affects and is affected by interstate interaction.47

Meanwhile, Barnett analyzes how Arab leaders compete to define regional norms and to gain regional leadership.48 However, this explores how leaders seek international influence and regime survival through normative competition, not how one’s identity-enacting actions threaten the other’s identity (i.e., identity dilemmas). It also limits the focus to countries with shared norms (Arabism) and identities (Arab states) and underemphasizes how domestic contestation over national identity (what it means to be an Arab state) shapes and is shaped by interstate identity competition. Thus, we need a more general theory of zero-sum identity contestation that captures both status and non-status identities, as well as the international-domestic dynamics.

The Identity Dilemma

This study attempts to address this challenge. This is important because the conventional wisdom holds that a clash of identities leads to interstate enmities.49 With the identity dilemma, I theorize how zero-sum interstate identity interaction leads to enmity, as well as how intrastate identity debates shape and are shaped by this interstate

47 Ward theorizes domestic mechanisms where status-seeking hardliners overwhelm moderates and implement revisionist policies. This does not capture how one state’s domestic identity debates interact with the other’s—mechanisms that the identity dilemma theorizes. Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers. 48 Michael Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1998). 49 Arguably the most well-known (and controversial) study is on a clash of identities and conflict is Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. While there are many criticisms of his work, critics acknowledge that the idea of clash of identities—be they cultural or ethnic—long precedes the work. Chiara Bottici and Benoît Challand, The Myth of the Clash of Civilizations (New York, NY: Routledge, 2010). My intention is not to discuss Huntington’s work, but to theorize how zero-sum interstate identity contestation leads to enmity.

contestation. Importantly, I do not claim that the identity dilemma is the only cause of interstate enmity. There are many factors at play, including strategic and domestic factors which I will discuss later, and it is beyond the scope of this study to cover all potential factors. The aim of this study is to theorize the identity dilemma as one pathway through which states become enemies. Before doing so, I first define interstate enmity, the dependent variable in this study.

What is Enmity?

I define interstate enmity as emotion of animosity, hatred, and ill will that domestic actors within a state have against another state.50 To be sure, states do not have emotions, but people within them do.51 However, for convenience, I say “states develop enmity,” instead of “people within states develop enmity.” I also use the terms enmity and hostility interchangeably.

Existing studies show that enmity has many conflict-prone characteristics. Enemies tend to dehumanize, demonize, and delegitimate each other. They tend to view each other in terms of “the Good versus the Evil” and morally justify violence against each other.

They also see each other in zero-sum terms and willingly use violence to obtain their goals at the others’ expense. Moreover, they selectively attend to and remember negative aspects and actions of each other, and act on worst-case assumptions of each other’s motives due

50 Psychologists for Social Responsibility, Dismantling the Mask of Enmity: An Educational Resource Manual on the Psychology of Enemy Images (Washington, DC: Psychologists for Social Responsibility, 1989). 51 Jonathan Mercer, “Feeling like a State: Social Emotion and Identity,” International Theory 6, no. 3 (2014): 515–35; Brent E. Sasley, “Theorizing States’ Emotions,” International Studies Review 13, no. 3 (2011): 452– 76.

to attribution bias. Because of these tendencies, a high level of enmity leads states to desire direct confrontation, have no trust in the others, and view each other as highly threatening and with great suspicion. It is very difficult to promote friendship and cooperation once states have firm images of each other as “the Enemy.”52

It is important to distinguish enmity from related but different concepts, such as rivalry and threat perception. Rivalry involves not just hostility but also competition over issues often resulting in militarized disputes. 53 Therefore, enmity is “a necessary but insufficient condition for the existence of a rivalry.”54 Thus, it makes little sense to call the

Arab nations and the United States “rivals” simply based on their hostile attitudes.

Moreover, enmity does not necessarily entail threat perception. Some Muslims may view the Americans with hostility, but not necessarily as a threat. However, enmity can inflate threat perception. Enemies tend to develop mutual hatred and distrust and thus view each other as threatening. Many Americans view North Korea’s nuclear bombs highly threatening and Britain’s less so because they see North Korea as an enemy and Britain as a friend.55

52 Kaitlyn F. Allen and Fathali M. Moghaddam, “Representations of Friendship, Enmity, Conflict Resolution, and Peace Psychology in Introductory Psychology Textbooks,” in The Psychology of Friendship and Enmity: Relationships in Love, Work, Politics, and War, ed. Rom Harré and Fathali M. Moghaddam, vol. 1, 2 vols. (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2013), 21–44; Martha L. Cottam et al., Introduction to Political Psychology (London, UK: Taylor & Francis, 2008), chap. 3; Sam Keen, Faces of the Enemy: Reflections of the Hostile Imagination (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1986); Psychologists for Social Responsibility, Dismantling the Mask of Enmity; Robert W. Rieber, ed., The Psychology of War and Peace: The Image of the Enemy (New York, NY: Springer, 1991); Vamik D. Volkan, The Need to Have Enemies & Allies: From Clinical Practice to International Relationships (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, Inc., 1988); Wendt, Social Theory, 262; Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), chap. 6; Ofer Zur, “The Love of Hating: The Psychology of Enmity,” History of European Ideas 13, no. 4 (1991): 345–69. 53 David R. Dreyer, “Unifying Conceptualizations of Interstate Rivalry: A Min–Max Approach,” Cooperation and Conflict 49, no. 4 (2014): 501–18. 54 Steven Chan, Enduring Rivalries in the Asia-Pacific (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 33. 55 Wendt, Social Theory, 255.

In sum, enmity is important for international politics because it promotes hatred, distrust, and threat perception, which in turn contributes to violence and conflict. Despite its significance, enmity has been an understudied subject in IR scholarship.56 While there are many causes of interstate enmity, this study theorizes one causal mechanism through which states develop enmity: the identity dilemma. Moreover, it discusses two reasons why enmity developed under an entrenched identity dilemma is intractable: enduring enmity and identity indivisibility.

Identity Dilemma Defined

One of the most popular concepts IR scholars use to explain interstate conflicts is the security dilemma, a situation where “many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others.”57 This zero-sum security interaction leads states to perceive each other’s defensive actions as threats, which in turn could spark an arms race and a war. Drawing inspirations from this, I define the identity dilemma as a situation in which one’s action to enact its identity challenges the other’s identity. States form identities based on the roles they play in international society and maintain ontological security, or feel secure about their identities, by enacting those roles. A problem arises when states have incompatible identities and an event or a series of events exposes this identity incompatibility and leads states to defend their identities. Due to identity

56 Few existing IR studies on enmity include: Richard K. Herrmann and Michael P. Fischerkeller, “Beyond the Enemy Image and Spiral Model: Cognitive-Strategic Research after the Cold War,” International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 415–50; Wendt, Social Theory, 260–63; Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, chap. 2. 57 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978): 169. Also see John H. Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 2, no. 2 (1950): 157–80.

incompatiblity, states view each other’s action as a threat to their own identities. States develop enmity in response to such identity threats and react by further defending their identities. This action-reaction process results in interstate enmity. As enmity deepens, states develop hatred and distrust and seek confrontation.

States maintain ontological security by performing their roles in international society. Existing studies suggest that states form identities by adopting certain roles and self-biographical narratives based on a host of domestic and systemic factors, such as history, cultures, norms, interaction with other states.58 And by performing their roles, states establish consistencies between their narratives and their actions and feel ontologically secure.59 For instance, given its liberal democratic values and its history of leading liberal democracies in fighting the two world wars and the Cold War, the United

States has formed its internationalist identity based on its role as the “leader of the free world” and its “American exceptionalism” narrative about its mission in international society.60 By performing its role and promoting a liberal international order, the United

States acts in line with its self-narrative and feels secure about its sense of self.

However, states face difficulty enacting their roles and feeling secure when they face others with incompatible identities. Identity incompatiblity can occur in two ways.

First, two states claim the same role, but only one can fulfill that role. For instance, two states view themselves as a leader of a same region or movement and take actions to claim their leadership. Yet, since only one can be a leader, such actions challenge the other’s

58 Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics; Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1996); Wendt, Social Theory. 59 Lupovici, The Power of Deterrence; Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations. 60 John Gerard Ruggie, Winning the Peace: America and World Order in the New Era (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1998).

identity. During the Cold War, both the Soviet Union and China viewed themselves as “the vanguard of the world revolutionary process.” Their actions to enact their leadership roles in the communist movement clashed and contributed to the Sino-Soviet split.61 Importantly, states can also fight over roles unrelated to status. For instance, two states who fought a war view themselves as victims. But one’s actions to claim its victimhood challenges the other’s victim identity because only one can assume the victim role and the other must accept the perpetrator role. This dynamic appears in many history disputes, including

“memory wars” over World War II in East Asia and Europe.62 Similarly, two states may view themselves as the rightful sovereign of a given nation. But one’s action to establish its nationhood challenges the other’s nationhood because only one can be the sovereign.

This dynamic appears in many territorial conflicts such as the Israel-Palestine conflict63 and the China-Taiwan conflict.64 In short, role overlaps create identity incompatiblity.

Second, identity incompatiblity occurs when states have different roles but these roles are not complementary and interfere in a way that makes role enactment difficult. For instance, two states have missionary roles to spread their values, ideologies, or religions.

If these ideas are contradictory, one’s actions to perform its missionary role challenge the other’s role performance. During the Cold War, the Americans and the Soviets assumed missionary roles to promote competing ideologies, and this contributed to U.S.-Soviet

61 Ted Hopf, “Identity Relations and the Sino-Soviet Split,” in Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social Scientists, ed. Rawi Abdelal et al. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 279–315; Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliance (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990). 62 Gustafsson, “Memory Politics and Ontological Security in Sino-Japanese Relations”; Maria Mälksoo, “‘Memory Must Be Defended’: Beyond the Politics of Mnemonical Security,” Security Dialogue 46, no. 3 (2015): 221–37. 63 Herbert C. Kelman, “Israelis and Palestinians: Psychological Prerequisites for Mutual Acceptance,” International Security 3, no. 1 (1978): 162–86. 64 Yana Zuo, Evolving Identity Politics and Cross-Strait Relations: Bridging Theories of International Relations and Nationalism (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

competition especially in the Third World.65 President Ronald Ragan famously said: “both the arms race and geopolitical competition … [were] symptoms of an ideological struggle, not its causes.”66 Likewise, a state assumes a role that portrays, or “alter-casts,” the other in a way that challenges the other’s self-understanding. 67 For instance, given its self- understanding as a victim of WWII and its “century of humiliation” narrative, China accuses Japan of resurgent militarism over its recent assertive security policies and their history disputes. This accusation challenges Japan’s postwar identity as a “peace nation” and makes it difficult for Japan to claim that identity. 68 In sum, the lack of role complementarity makes identities incompatible.

It then follows that states can threaten the other’s identity in two ways. First, identity threats can be indirect: one’s action, due to identity incompatibility, makes it difficult for the other to enact its role. Through this action-reaction process, each state cannot assume its role, and feels insecure. Moreover, since roles are tied to narratives, inability to perform roles creates discrepancies between narratives and actions, leading to ontological insecurity.69 Second, states can take more direct actions, nonrecognition, to threaten the other’s identity. States seek others’ recognition of their identities to feel secure.70 In contrast, nonrecognition threatens one’s identity because it “attacks … an actor’s self-image.”71 When faced with another state acting in a way that makes it difficult

65 Jervis, “Identity and the Cold War.” 66 Jack Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended (New York, NY: Random House, 2004), 320. 67 On alter-casting, see Wendt, Social Theory, 328–35. 68 Gustafsson, “Memory Politics and Ontological Security in Sino-Japanese Relations.” 69 On the ontological security implications of inability to perform roles and narrative-action discrepancies, see Lupovici, The Power of Deterrence; Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations. 70 Alexander Wendt, “Why a World State Is Inevitable,” European Journal of International Relations 9, no. 4 (2003): 491–542; Gustafsson, “Routinised Recognition and Anxiety.” 71 Lindemann, Causes of War, 3, 9–10.

to perform its role, a state can deny the other’s identity to establish its own identity. For instance, when two states assume a leadership role, one denies the other’s leadership to establish its own leadership. This happened for the Soviet Union and China, both of which refused to recognize the other’s leadership in the world revolutionary process.72 Similarly, two states with competing sovereignty claims may deny each other’s nationhood to claim their own nationhood. For instance, Israel and Palestine refuse to recognize each other’s nationhood, thereby threatening each other’s national identity.73

In response to identity threats, states develop enmity and seek confrontation because identities are important to them. Social psychologists suggest that people care about social (national) identity because of self-identification and emotional attachment with their group (nation).74 When another country threatens their national identity, people develop “group-based” emotions of anger and animosity against that country. Moreover, they unite under their national identity and take collective confrontational actions against the other country to defend their identity.75 In fact, while people tend to respond to “realistic” threats to their group’s power, resources, and welfare in pragmatic ways (e.g., calculated

72 Hopf, “Identity Relations and the Sino-Soviet Split.” 73 Herbert C. Kelman, “The Political Psychology of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: How Can We Overcome the Barriers to a Negotiated Solution?,” Political Psychology 8, no. 3 (1987): 347–63; Herbert C. Kelman, “Acknowledging the Other’s Nationhood: How to Create a Momentum for the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations,” Journal of Palestine Studies 22, no. 1 (1992): 18–38. 74 Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior,” in Psychology of Intergroup Relations, ed. Stephen Worchel and William G. Austin (Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1986), 7– 24; William Bloom, Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 75 Nyla R. Branscombe et al., “The Context and Content of Social Identity Threat,” in Social Identity: Context, Commitment, Content, ed. Naomi Ellemers, Russell Spears, and Bertjan Doosje (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1999), 35–55; Naomi Ellemers, Russell Spears, and Bertjan Doosje, “Self and Social Identity,” Annual Review of Psychology 53 (2002): 161–86; D. M. Mackie, T. Devos, and E. R. Smith, “Intergroup Emotions: Explaining Offensive Action Tendencies in an Intergroup Context,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 79, no. 4 (2000): 602–16; Diana J. Leonard et al., “‘We’re Mad as Hell and We’re Not Going to Take It Anymore’: Anger Self-Stereotyping and Collective Action,” Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 14, no. 1 (2011): 99–111.

actions and negotiations to cope with the threats), they tend to react to “symbolic” threats to their group identity, values, and worldviews in emotional ways (e.g., dehumanization, delegitimation, moral exclusion, and antipathy for the other group).76 For instance, a classic psychology study shows that during the Cold War, the Americans viewed the Soviets as

“the enemy” not because they posed physical threats to the United States but because they posed threats to American values and its identity as a superpower.77 Similarly, the 9/11 terrorist attack threatened not only U.S. security but also its identity, as many Americans recognized the attack as a challenge to U.S. values and its standing as a superpower. They reacted emotionally by demonizing terrorists and supporting the war on terror.78 Therefore, a cycle of enmity results when one state acts to enact its identity and the other state perceives it as a challenge to its own identity, becomes hostile, and takes confrontational counteractions.

Importantly, identity incompatibility itself should not automatically start the identity dilemma. Social psychologists emphasize that identity issues are not necessarily always salient because people are not usually thinking about their identities all the time.79

For instance, people do not always think about their ethnicities or religions. Thus, people do not always frame their relationship in identity terms, and thus can enjoy amity despite their incompatible identities. Yet, identities move to the psychological foreground and gain salience, or become “activated,” in social contexts that make them particularly

76 Walter Stephan, C. Lausanne Renfro, and Mark Davis, “The Role of Threat in Intergroup Relations,” in Improving Intergroup Relations: Building on the Legacy of Thomas F. Pettigrew, ed. Ulrich Wagner et al. (Oxford, UK: Wiley, 2008), 55–72. 77 Robert R. Holt, “College Students’ Definitions and Images of Enemies,” Journal of Social Issues 45, no. 2 (1989): 33–50. 78 Ronald R. Krebs and Jennifer K. Lobasz, “Fixing the Meaning of 9/11: Hegemony, Coercion, and the Road to War in Iraq,” Security Studies 16, no. 3 (2007): 409–51. 79 As Jonathan Mercer “Feeling like a State,” 525. puts it, “[n]ot even a head-of-state walks around all day feeling like a state.”

meaningful—for instance, a dispute over a territory charged with ethnic or religious traditions.80 And activation can lead people to think of themselves in terms of identity incompatibility and fight over their identities.

Building on this insight, I suggest that the identity dilemma occurs when an event or a series of events occur for exogenous or endogenous reasons and trigger intensified discussions of identity issues (“who we are,” “what we stand for”) by changing the social context in a way that exposes identity incompatibility between states.81 This creates sociopsychological and emotional desires for taking actions to defend identities.82 When a state takes such actions, the other state views them as identity threats due to identity incompatibility. As this action-reaction dynamic begins, states define their relationship in zero-sum identity terms and entrap themselves in the cycle of enmity. For instance, Stalin’s death in 1953, an exogenous event, opened room for a leadership contest between the

Soviet Union and China in the revolutionary movement, contributing to the Sino-Soviet split.83 Similarly, the history textbook issue in the 1980s, brought up as a political problem endogenously by some nationalists in Japan, triggered intense debates on WWII history in

Northeast Asia, leading to Sino-Japanese memory wars over historical victimhood. 84

Importantly, the focus is not to explain why triggering events happen, but to analyze how identity politics unfolds following the events.

To recap, the identity dilemma happens when states have incompatible identities

80 Social psychologists explain this social context variable as “fit.” John C. Turner et al., Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 1987). 81 Barnett similarly discusses how events trigger “dialogues,” in which states debate their shared norms and identities. Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics. 82 The activation of social identity triggers group-based emotions and actions. Charles R. Seger, Eliot R. Smith, and Diane M. Mackie, “Subtle Activation of a Social Categorization Triggers Group-Level Emotions,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 45, no. 3 (2009): 460–67. 83 Hopf, “Identity Relations and the Sino-Soviet Split.” 84 Gustafsson, “Memory Politics and Ontological Security in Sino-Japanese Relations.”

and an event or a series of events exposes this incompatiblity and leads the states to defend their identities. The more the dilemma deepens, the more enmity worsens. While one may identify some similarities between the identity dilemma and the status dilemma, the discussion above shows that the identity dilemma offers a more general account of interstate identity politics because it discusses both status and non-status identities.

Similarly, one may wonder what differentiates the security dilemma from the identity dilemma. There are two importance differences. First, while both dilemmas capture zero-sum interstate interaction, they are about different things. The security dilemma explains how a state’s actions to maintain its physical security threatens the other’s physical security; the identity dilemma how a state’s actions to maintain its ontological security threatens the other’s ontological security. Second, because they are about different things, both dilemmas follow different logics of action. The security dilemma is rational and informational. States read each other’s intentions and form threat perception as they rationally process the signals sent and the actions taken. By contrast, the identity dilemma is emotional and ideational. Individuals develop enmity in response to threats to their national identities because they are nationalistic, or emotionally attached to their nations.85

This is why the identity dilemma could be dangerous. Identity debates based on emotion and nationalistic motivations, rather than policy debates based on reason and pragmatic considerations, drive policy discussion and decision making. It is difficult to stop the

85 This means that nationalism, or one’s self-identification with his or her nation, is a necessary condition for the identity dilemma. Without nationalism, individuals would not care about national identity and become hostile to other nations that threaten it. However, since most states after 1800 are nationalistic, nationalism is a fundamental but trivial condition and can be assumed away. Existing studies a similar case that nationalists are most likely to care about national identity issues, particularly status and stigma. Larson and Shevchenko, “Status Seekers”; Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers, 37; Rebecca Adler-Nissen, “Stigma Management in International Relations: Transgressive Identities, Norms, and Order in International Society,” International Organization 68, no. 1 (2014): 143–76; Ayse Zarakol, After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

identity dilemma once such an escalatory dynamic takes hold. Therefore, the identity dilemma is not a competing explanation against the security dilemma. It is an alternative account of international conflicts based on passion politics.

Lastly, my argument differs from Mitzen’s ontological security dilemma argument, which stipulates that states that are already enemies due to the security dilemma become attached to conflict routines for ontological security reasons.86 In contrast, I explain why states become enemies in the first place, due to the identity dilemma. And unlike Mitzen and others, I analyze this interstate dynamic by incorporating domestic politics, a point I shall now discuss.87

Domestic Politics and the Identity Dilemma

While the discussion above has treated states as unitary actors, it is important to consider the role of domestic politics in interstate relations. The security dilemma, for instance, discusses domestic debates on threat and armament between hardliners and moderates, arguing that military competition intensifies if hardliners drive decision- making. 88 Similarly, it is crucial to discuss domestic politics in the identity dilemma, because individuals often have competing views of national identity.89 Thus, I must discuss both interstate and intrastate identity contestation and how two interact. In doing so, I

86 Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics.” 87 On inadequate attention to the international-domestic interaction in ontological security studies, see Ayşe Zarakol, “Ontological (In)Security and State Denial of Historical Crimes: Turkey and Japan,” International Relations 24, no. 1 (2010): 6-9. 88 Charles L. Glaser, “Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models,” World Politics 44, no. 4 (1992): 497–538. 89 Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security.

bridge the domestic and systemic realms of identity politics and provide a more “holistic” account.90

To start, I posit that states have “identity groups,” political groups of leaders, elites, and other relevant actors who share unique narratives (“who we are as a country”) and national role conceptions (“what role our country should play in international society”).

These domestic actors form such competing world views because of their different views on the country’s history, cultures, and relationships with other states as well as the international society’s norms and cultures.91 The inclusion of such wide-ranging domestic actors is important because national identity is grounded in societal discourse involving not just leaders and elites but also intellectuals, media, and public.92 The level of intrastate identity contestation among these groups varies. Some countries have contested identities, with many groups disagreeing about national identity; others have settled identities with one group achieving a “hegemonic” position and a prevailing national narrative. 93 For

90 On “holistic” constructivism that captures the interplay of international and domestic politics, see Mahdi Mohammad Nia, Holistic Constructivism, Identity Formation and Iran’s Foreign Policy: Concepts, Principles and Objectives (Saarbrücken: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2012); Reus-Smit, “Constructivism.” 91 Many scholars claim that states have internally competing narratives of their identities. Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics; Hopf, Reconstructing the Cold War; Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security; Lisel Hintz, Identity Politics Inside Out: National Identity Contestation and Foreign Policy in Turkey (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018). Role theorists argue that domestic actors often have competing national role conceptions. Cristian Cantir and Juliet Kaarbo, Domestic Role Contestation, Foreign Policy, and International Relations (New York, NY: Routledge, 2016); K. J. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” International Studies Quarterly 14, no. 3 (1970): 233–309; Stephen G. Walker, Role Theory And Foreign Policy Analysis (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987). An astute reader may realize that my conception of role identity is closer to that of role theorists like Holsti and Walker, who focus on domestic sources of state identity (leaders’ beliefs and value systems), than mainstream constructivists like Wendt, who focus on systemic sources (e.g., cultures of anarchy, international norms, etc.). While I acknowledge the differences between these two approaches, I side with the middle- ground view that domestic actors adopt certain national role conceptions based on their (often competing) readings of the domestic and international environment. Therefore, roles have both domestic and international roots. For a similar approach, see Cameron G. Thies, “International Socialization Processes vs. Israeli National Role Conceptions: Can Role Theory Integrate IR Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis?,” Foreign Policy Analysis 8, no. 1 (2012): 25–46. 92 Lisel Hintz, “‘Take It Outside!’ National Identity Contestation in the Foreign Policy Arena,” European Journal of International Relations 22, no. 2 (2016): 354. 93 Hintz, “Take It Outside!”

instance, many Americans agree on the idea of “American exceptionalism” but disagree on its meanings and have competing narratives and national role conceptions about it.

Isolationists have a “exemplary” narrative of America and believe in its role as “a city upon a hill” to lead the world by perfecting democracy at home and acting as a beacon for other nations. In contrast, internationalists have a “missionary” narrative of America and embrace its role as a “crusader nation” to spread freedom and democracy to other nations.

Scholars argue that while there has always been contestation between these groups, internationalists have become hegemonic over time, especially after 1945.94

Domestic identity politics complicates the basic framework of the identity dilemma in several ways. To illustrate, I use the U.S.-Soviet Cold War competition as an example.

First, identity groups react differently to the other state’s identity-enacting actions because they have different identities. Those groups with incompatible identities with the other state’s identity become hostile and pursue confrontation; others with compatible identities remain friendly and pursue cooperation. For instance, internationalists and isolationists reacted to the Soviet threat differently. Internationalists viewed the Soviet Union as a challenge to America’s role identity and narrative of promoting liberty and democracy, became anti-Soviet, and supported the Europe Reconstruction Program, NATO, and the

Third World ideological competition to confront the Soviet ideological threats. By contrast, isolationists shared no such role identity and narrative, discounted the Soviet threat, and opposed these initiatives.95

94 Trevor B. McCrisken, “Exceptionalism,” in Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, ed. Alexander DeConde et al., 2nd ed., vol. 2 (New York, NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2002), 63–80. For more, see Chapter 2. 95 Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, “Defending the West: Occidentalism and the Formation of NATO,” Journal of Political Philosophy 11, no. 3 (2003): 223–52; Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2006).

Table 1: Domestic identity politics and the identity dilemma

State B

Compatible identity group in Incompatible identity group

power in power

Compatible identity No dilemma No dilemma group in power

State A

Incompatible identity No dilemma Identity dilemma group in power

Second, the identity dilemma occurs when the domestic balance of power favors hostile identity groups. As Table 1 shows, for the dilemma’s action-reaction dynamic to occur, the hostile groups need to be in power on both sides to direct the state’s policy toward enactment of their identities and confrontation with the other state. If they are out of power on both sides, neither side will act and initiate the action-reaction dynamic. If they are in power only on one side, that side will act but the other will not retaliate. Thus, there will be no dilemma. For instance, Soviet-American confrontation would not have likely happened if isolationists held power in America and accommodated the Soviets.

Likewise, the confrontation ceased when the “New Thinkers,” or an identity group of leaders who had a more social democratic identity compatible with U.S. identity, assumed power and promoted cooperation.96

Third, remember that the identity dilemma starts with some triggering events that

“activate” identity, or make identity issues politically salient. In this domestic context,

96 Jervis, “Identity and the Cold War,” 41–43.

hostile groups in power respond to those events by deploying a set of frames related to their identity worldviews.97 Using such frames to express enmity and argue for confrontation against the other state, they define the stakes as one of identity and set the tone of public debates. As discussed above, triggering events can happen for exogenous or endogenous reasons. They can happen exogenously, just like how the 1948 communist coup in

Czechoslovakia, an external event, fueled the U.S.-Soviet ideological competition. They can also happen endogenously, as identity groups purposefully take actions to politicize identity issues to promote their agenda. Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech and the Truman

Doctrine were conscious attempts by these leaders to highlight the ideological issue and mobilize the Western bloc against the East. In either case, the focus is not to explain why these events happen, but how identity groups in power frame the events and make identity issues salient.

Fourth, the dilemma deepens as hostile groups form coalitions to push confrontation. Through making coalitions with individuals and organizations that share the same identity, the hostile groups seek to lead public debates and gain more influence, to overwhelm the friendly groups that promote cooperation, and to lock in confrontational policies. For instance, during the Cold War, anti-Soviet coalitions expanded by involving more politicians, bureaucrats, military officers, experts, and businesses and purging pro-

Soviet sympathizers under the Red Scare and McCarthyism.98

Fifth, this domestic dynamic is reinforced by a feedback effect; the other state’s confrontational actions help this coalition-making effort by undermining the friendly

97 Existing studies stipulate that domestic actors use identity frames to shape public debates. Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics. 98 Albert Fried, McCarthyism: The Great American Red Scare: A Documentary History (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1997).

groups’ efforts for cooperation and motivating more political actors to join the hostile coalition. This helps the hostile groups to gain more power, which contributes to the further continuation of the dilemma. For instance, American confrontational debates and actions were reflected in Soviet discourse of America’s ideological threats, empowering the hands of those Soviet hardliners.99

Lastly, states can become “locked in” the dilemma when the hostile groups on both sides become “hegemonic” and control foreign policy. Hostile discourse becomes so dominant on both sides that there is little chance for friendly groups to gain power and shift foreign policy from confrontation to cooperation. For instance, after the days of the Red

Scare and McCarthyism, there was little political space for American politicians to openly promote cooperation with the Soviet Union.100

To recap, the identity dilemma occurs when two states have incompatible identity groups in power and when triggering events make identity issues salient and prompt these groups to take actions to defend their identities. The identity dilemma becomes locked in and interstate enmity deepens as these groups become dominant domestically through coalition-making. Importantly, I do not claim that hostile groups always win the domestic battle. My contention is that the identity dilemma deepens if hostile groups become more powerful and push confrontation.

In addition, this inclusion of domestic identity politics is where the identity dilemma provides a more nuanced account of interstate identity politics than the status dilemma. As discussed above, the status dilemma black-boxes the state and assumes that states have monolithic understandings of what it means to be a great power. However, this

99 Jervis, “Identity and the Cold War.” 100 Fried, McCarthyism.

discussion shows that states have internally contested ideas of their great-power status.

Both internationalists and isolationists agreed on U.S. great-power status, but disagreed on what this status meant for American national identity and foreign policy. And this difference plays a key role in determining identity incompatiblity with other states.

Also, the security dilemma theory discusses similar domestic dynamics: military competition deepens as hardliners win over moderates in domestic debates and take confrontational measures in one state, which in turn empowers hardliners in the other state and provoke countermeasures. 101 But the important difference remains. In the identity dilemma, incompatible identity groups perceive identity threats, develop enmity, and argue for confrontation while compatible groups do the opposite. In the security dilemma, hardliners overestimate military threats, seek non-security expansion, and push for competition while moderates do the opposite. Therefore, domestic actors follow different logics of action in each dilemma. Thus, both dilemmas are alternative frameworks, not competing explanations.

The Consequences of an Entrenched Identity Dilemma

While the previous section has established the identity dilemma as one mechanism through which states develop enmity, it has not discussed what happens after the dilemma becomes locked in. This section explains two reasons why enmity under an entrenched identity dilemma can be particularly intractable: enduring enmity and identity indivisibility.

101 Glaser, “Political Consequences of Military Strategy.”

Enduring Enmity

First, under an entrenched identity dilemma, states may become malign and seek confrontation in pursuit of their identities. I call this effect enduring enmity.

Specifically, as the identity dilemma and enmity become entrenched, states, or their dominant hostile identity groups, internalize the zero-sum nature of their identity relations, define themselves in opposition to the other state, and conclude that securing their identities requires confrontation. Psychologists call such a relationship “negative interdependence,” where one defines itself by denying the other’s identity and, consequently, views the other as an enemy and believes that harming the other is necessary to establish its own identity.102

The dilemma thus becomes a spiral where states are malign.

Moreover, as discussed above, enmity leads to mutual distrust, threat perception, and zero-sum, worst-case mindset.103 Under enduing enmity, the sense of hostility becomes so entrenched that states, or their dominant hostile identity groups, desire direct confrontation, have no trust in the others, and view each other as highly threatening and with great suspicion. Worst-case assumptions become the default behavioral basis, and each side views the other’s cooperative behavior as driven by malign intentions.

Cooperation becomes very difficult because of tremendous hatred and distrust.

For instance, the Americans and the Soviets during the Cold War seemed to have internalized their zero-sum identity relations, concluding that confrontation was the only

102 Kelman, “The Political Psychology of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.” This also relates to Hopf and Allan’s conceptualization of enduring rivalries as an identity relation where “each regards the other as a hostile Other.” Yet, they do not fully theorize how such conflictual relationships emerge. Ted Hopf and Bentley B. Allan, eds., Making Identity Count: Building a National Identity Database (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016), 7, 230. 103 Wendt, Social Theory, 260–63.

way forward. Khrushchev said, “peaceful coexistence among different systems of government is possible, but peaceful coexistence among different ideologies is not.”104 As

Jervis posits, American neoconservatives opposed the détente because they believed that

“[a] detente that accepted a Communist Soviet Union was a betrayal of American values and would at most buy a temporary respite since it could not tame the expansionist Soviet policy that stemmed from its identity.”105 Under such hostility and distrust driven by identity politics, cooperation was extremely difficult.

This enduring enmity effect resembles how an entrenched security dilemma turns states aggressive and makes cooperation difficult. As Shiping Tang posits, “whenever one or both sides within a security dilemma decide that their security now requires them to pursue aggression, the security dilemma ceases to exist: the dynamics of security dilemma are not only potentially destructive (that is, leading to war) but also self-destructive.” In other words, “a security dilemma can be transformed into a spiral when one or both sides become malign.” And this “deadlock is almost impossible to unwind because it would require both sides to change their mind-set [of high mutual mistrust and threat perception].”106 Despite this similarity, the underlying drivers of state behavior remain different: identity for the identity dilemma and security for the security dilemma.

Identity Indivisibility

104 Quoted in John Mueller, “What Was the Cold War About? Evidence from Its Ending,” Political Science Quarterly 119 (2004): 620. 105 Jervis, “Identity and the Cold War,” 40. 106 Shiping Tang, “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis,” Security Studies 18, no. 3 (2009): 617– 18.

Second, conflict can become intractable, since identity issues, just like indivisible goods, have all-or-nothing quality and are difficult to compromise. I call this effect identity indivisibility.

The conventional wisdom suggests states may fight conflicts over indivisible goods, or issues that are impossible to negotiate.107 Scholars have built on this idea to show that states fight over identity issues because such issues could be nonnegotiable. For instance, states may fight war over identity concerns such as national honor because such concerns have all-or-nothing quality, that is, either you fight for honor or you don’t.108 States also fight over territories that are important to their identities, such as places charged with ethnic identities or religious beliefs, like Jerusalem. Dividing up such holy places and reaching a bargain is unacceptable.109

Building on these studies, I contend that states in an entrenched identity dilemma may reject compromise and choose confrontation over cooperation. In an identity dilemma, individuals discuss enmity and policy using what existing studies call “identity argument,” which “works by producing or calling upon previously existing identities … and claiming that specific behaviors are associated with certain identities.”110 This involves “epideictic” rhetoric, “a rhetoric of identity, invoking the community’s shared values and affirming the elements that bind community.”111 In short, individuals argue for confrontation saying that

107 James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 379– 414. 108 Thomas Dolan, “Demanding the Impossible: War, Bargaining, and Honor,” Security Studies 24, no. 3 (2015): 528–62. 109 Ron E. Hassner, “‘To Halve and to Hold’: Conflicts over Sacred Space and the Problem of Indivisibility,” Security Studies 12, no. 4 (2003): 1–33; Stacie E. Goddard, “Uncommon Ground: Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy,” International Organization 60, no. 01 (2006): 35–68. 110 Neta C. Crawford, Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian Intervention (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 24–25. 111 Ronald R. Krebs and Jennifer K. Lobasz, “Fixing the Meaning of 9/11: Hegemony, Coercion, and the Road to War in Iraq,” Security Studies 16 (2007): 433.

the other state is challenging their identity and thus an enemy to their country. This identity- laden discourse becomes dominant in an entrenched dilemma.

Under this environment, it is difficult to push strategic, rational arguments for cooperation. Epideictic rhetoric drives people through emotion, unlike “deliberative” rhetoric that drives people through reason. And it “fix[es] meanings, creating the foundation upon which later deliberative argumentation proceeds and structuring those later debates.”112 Once people rhetorically define foreign policy issues as one of identity and express enmity, they reject rational argument for cooperation on emotional grounds that they must fight for their identity. Promoting a counter-narrative of amity and cooperation becomes discursively unsustainable because people would regard this as a betrayal of who they are.113

For instance, the U.S.-Soviet détente, Jervis writes, “was opposed by neoconservatives who argued … that the very notion of detente was flawed because it abandoned America's deepest ideals of supporting the forces of freedom throughout the world. … their stance was effective because it represented a strong reaffirmation of

American identity … A detente that accepted a Communist Soviet Union was a betrayal of

American values.”114 On the Soviet side, Khrushchev, despite his policy of “peaceful coexistence,” still insisted: “To speak of ideological compromise would be betray our

Party’s first principles.”115 Similarly, the neoconservative discourse that defined the 9/11 attack as a challenge to American values and justified the war on terror made it impossible

112 Krebs and Lobasz, 433. 113 On the difficulty of reigning in emotional discourse of anger, see Todd H. Hall, “We Will Not Swallow This Bitter Fruit: Theorizing a Diplomacy of Anger,” Security Studies 20, no. 4 (2011): 537–38. 114 Jervis, “Identity and the Cold War,” 40. 115 Quoted in Mueller, “What Was the Cold War About?,” 620.

for the Democrats and other critics to reject this justification and promote an anti-war counter-discourse on strategic grounds, since this was regarded a betrayal of American identity.116 Likewise, many Israelis oppose a two-state solution as a compromise since it cuts against their identity as a Jewish state.117

One may see parallels between this identity indivisibility effect and the role of uncertainty in an entrenched security dilemma. States can overcome the security dilemma by adopting costly policies to communicate their benign intentions. Yet, in an entrenched security dilemma where states deeply mistrust each other, uncertainty about intentions prevents them from taking such action. 118 Similarly, identity impedes cooperation by making the stakes indivisible. Yet, there is an important difference. States in the security dilemma hesitate to compromise because it is risky from the rational standpoint. States in the identity dilemma refuse to compromise because it invalidates their identity from the emotional viewpoint. Thus, as said before, both dilemmas follow different logics of action and should be viewed as alternative frameworks, not competing explanations.

To recap, an entrenched dilemma can have two consequences (enduring enmity and identity indivisibility) that make it difficult to resolve identity conflicts. Figure 1 (see below) summarizes the overall causal mechanism. Before proceeding, it is important to note that I do not assume a linear escalation of the dilemma. The dilemma could follow the mechanism in reverse order and deescalate: compatible friendly identity groups gain power

116 Krebs and Lobasz, “Fixing the Meaning of 9/11”; Wesley W. Widmaier, “Constructing Foreign Policy Crises: Interpretive Leadership in the Cold War and War on Terrorism,” International Studies Quarterly 51, no. 4 (2007): 779–94. 117 Kelman, “Israelis and Palestinians.” 118 Charles L. Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); Andrew H. Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).

through coalition-making, outcast incompatible hostile groups, and adopt cooperation instead of confrontation. Yet, I expect that it becomes harder to deescalate as the dilemma deepens, and primarily analyze escalation in this study. In Chapter 6, I will discuss this issue as an area of future research.

It is also important to acknowledge that, at least in theory, states can rationally adopt

“realist” foreign policies that put aside identity issues and promote “pragmatic” relations based on common strategic interests. 119 Yet, it can be difficult for pragmatism to prevail in identity politics. Since identity politics tend to drive actors through emotion, the attempts by pragmatists to coopt identity-driven actors and prevent enmity and confrontation through rational arguments may fail. To use the Cold War example, despite their appreciation of realpolitik, Nixon and Kissinger could not openly promote “a détente that accepted a Communist Soviet Union” because the American public “remained truer to traditional American values” and would have rejected such a policy as “a betrayal of

American values.”120

Moreover, to put aside identity issues and promote friendship, pragmatists must hold power in both countries simultaneously. If only one side has a pragmatic leader, she will be pressured to respond to confrontational policies by the other side that still views the relationship through identity-laden enmity. For instance, Nixon’s pragmatic détente policies with the Soviet Union were undermined by American neoconservatives’ actions to emphasize the ideological issues, including the 1974 Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which made U.S.-Soviet most favored nation status conditional on greater freedom for Soviet

119 For a similar idea, see Mark L. Haas, The Clash of Ideologies: Middle Eastern Politics and American Security (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012), 8–9. 120 Jervis, “Identity and the Cold War,” 40.

Jews. These actions empowered Soviet conservatives who believed that America was committed to overthrow the Soviet regime for ideological reasons. The Soviet conservatives’ actions, then, contributed to the election of Ronald Ragan, who had much more ideological worldviews and policies than Nixon.121 In short, it takes two to tango; it takes two pragmatist parties to cooperate on a rational basis.

In sum, I do not preclude the possibility that states can rationally adopt pragmatism to avoid identity politics. However, given the difficulties pragmatist leaders have with maintaining realist foreign policies, I expect identity politics to often prevail. I will return to this issue as a future research topic in Chapter 6.

121 Haas, The Clash of Ideologies, 9.

Figure 1: The causal mechanism of the identity dilemma

Identity Domestic power

incompatibility balance

Triggering events (activation of identity)

Identity dilemma (action-reaction

and coalition making)

Interstate enmity

Continuation of identity dilemma (political

dominance of hostile identity groups)

Entrenched

identity dilemma

Identity Enduring enmity indivisibility

Evaluating the role of the Identity Dilemma in Interstate Enmity

Testing the identity dilemma theory requires a well-crafted research design. Below,

I explain why I study the rise of American-Japanese enmity leading to the Pacific War and what methodological techniques I use to conduct this case study. I also briefly summarize my empirical claims about how the identity dilemma contributed to the making of the Road to the Pacific War.

Why the Road to the Pacific War?

The “Road to the Pacific War” (Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi) refers to the decade proceeding Pearl Harbor (1931-41) in which the United States and Japan developed enmity and pursued confrontation.122 The bilateral relations deteriorated during the Manchuria

Crisis (1931-33), in which the United States and the League of Nations condemned Japan’s invasion of Manchuria and provoked its withdrawal from the international organization.123

The bilateral relations worsened during the Sino-Japanese War (1937-45). The Americans led international protests and economic sanctions against Japan’s expansion into China. In response, the Japanese declared the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, invaded

122 Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyo Senso Genin Kenkyubu, Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi, 1987. For more on the historiography, see Haruo Iguchi, “Japanese Foreign Policy and the Outbreak of the Asia-Pacific War: The Search for a Modus Vivendi in US-Japanese Relations after July 1941,” in The Origins of the Second World War: An International Perspective, ed. Frank McDonough (New York, NY: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011), 466–81; Akira Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific (New York, NY: Longman, 1987); Louise Young, “Japan at War: History-Writing on the ‘Crisis of 1930s,’” in The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered, ed. Gordon Martel, 2nd ed. (London, UK: Taylor and Francis, 1999), 155–77. 123 The famous “Fifteen-Year War” thesis views Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 was the origins of the Pacific War. Eguchi, Jugonen Sensoshi; Saburo Ienaga, The Pacific War, 1931-1945: A Critical Perspective on Japan’s Role in World War II (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1978).

Southeast Asia, joined the Axis alliance, and ultimately attacked Pearl Harbor. And the

Pacific War (1941-45) came.

I choose this case for several reasons. First, the Road to the Pacific War has clear variations in this study’s dependent variable, interstate enmity. Before 1931, the United

States and Japan enjoyed a relatively friendly relationship, cooperating on issues like the

Open Door in China and naval limitation under the Washington Treaty System. Yet, the relationship collapsed during the Manchuria Crisis and the Sino-Japanese War. During this period, many Americans and Japanese developed enmity and pursued diplomatic, economic, and military confrontation, ultimately leading to war. This means that there are three periods, or within-cases, to test my argument: U.S.-Japan relations before the

Manchuria Crisis (1853-1931), during the Manchuria Crisis (1931-1933), and from the

Sino-Japanese War to Pearl Harbor (1937-1941).

Second, the scale of the Pacific War makes it one of the most important cases of interstate enmity in modern history. The war claimed the lives of more than 100,000

Americans and nearly two million Japanese, not to mention the lives of about 200,000 civilians who were killed by the atomic bombing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The total casualties of the war numbered 36 million, or 50 percent of the total deaths of WWII. The legacies of the war still affect the memories of many people and the relations of many countries today. From the historical viewpoint, it is meaningful to study how the two countries ended up becoming enemies and fighting the war.

Third, the Road to the Pacific War is paradigmatic of realist-liberal debates on war and peace.124 Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 revealed what E.H. Carr calls the

124 On “paradigmatic” cases, see Bent Flyvbjerg, “Five Misunderstandings about Case-Study Research,” Qualitative Inquiry 12, no. 2 (2006): 219–45; John Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices

“nemesis of utopianism.” Faced with the first major international crisis since World War I, the United States and the League of Nations only used “the condemnation of international public opinion” against Japan. Such toothless action not only failed to stop Japan but also provoked the country to withdraw from the League. This proved that the liberal peace system was “a broken reed,” laying grounds for Axis aggressions in later years.125 When faced with Japanese invasion of China in 1937, the international community again issued diplomatic protests in vain. When the United States finally imposed embargoes on Japan, the Japanese retaliated and started the Pacific War. In short, the episode of U.S.-Japan confrontation symbolized the triumph of realism over liberalism. Given this significance for IR scholarship, it is meaningful to revisit the case from a novel, identity-based perspective of constructivism.

Fourth, the Road to the Pacific War is an appropriate case to study the role of identity because it is a crucial case. Specifically, it is a least-likely, hard case for the identity dilemma and a most-likely, easy one for the two alternative explanations of enmity. 126

Realists argue that states seek military and economic power to achieve their primary goal, survival.127 Therefore, material threats to security and economic interests and conflict of these interests create enmity. Moreover, these strategic factors matter more during power transition due to the competition between rising and declining powers.128 The Road to the

Pacific War is an easy case for this strategic explanation because many historians claim

(New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 125 Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939 (New York, NY: Harper & Brothers, 1939), 48–49. 126 On crucial cases, see Gerring, Case Study Research, chap. 5. 127 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 290–91; John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001). 128 A. F. K. Organski, World Politics (New York, NY: Knopf, 1958); Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics.

that America and Japan “clashed” over their competing interests in China129 and because there was power transition with a rising revisionist Japan.130 In contrast, others argue that warmongering creates enmity. Leaders purposefully exaggerate external threats and use foreign enemies as justifications for military expansion (i.e., logrolling)131 or as scapegoats to gain public support (i.e., diversionary war).132 The Road to the Pacific War is an easy case for this domestic explanation because during the 1930s, the Japanese military used warmongering and a “myth of empire” in its logrolling efforts to control the government and to expand into China.133 Moreover, the socioeconomic problems resulting from the

Great Depression, combined with the rapid democratization during the 1920s, incentivized

Japanese leaders to use nationalist ideologies as propagandas and foreign enemies as scapegoats.134 In contrast to these prevailing explanations, I argue that the United States and Japan developed enmity and pursued confrontation because of an identity dilemma. If identity played an important role in creating American-Japanese enmity during the Road to the Pacific War, then it should lead us to question whether other cases of interstate enmity often studied in IR scholarship—from U.S.-Soviet confrontation during the Cold War to

U.S.-China competition today—are the result of strategic and domestic factors or that of the identity dilemma (or both).

129 Walter LaFeber, The Clash: A History of U.S.-Japan Relations (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997); Michael Barnhart, Japan Prepares Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); James B. Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930-1938 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966). 130 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, chap. 6. 131 Snyder, Myths of Empire. 132 Amy Oakes, Diversionary War: Domestic Unrest and International Conflict (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012); John Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion (New York, NY: Wiley, 1973). 133 Snyder, Myths of Empire; Ienaga, The Pacific War, 1931-1945; Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998); Sadako Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria: The Making of Japanese Foreign Policy, 1931-1932 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1964). 134 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War,” International Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 5–38.

Testing the Argument

In a nutshell, I argue that the United States and Japan did not develop enmity in an escalatory manner before the Manchuria Crisis because they did not experience an identity dilemma. As I explain in Chapter 2, the dilemma did not take place because the two countries had compatible identity groups in power: isolationists in the United States and moderate internationalists in Japan. Because of their compatible identities, they did not see each other’s identity-enacting actions as an identity threat and become hostile.

Table 2: American-Japanese identity relations

Japan

Moderate internationalist Pan-Asianist (incompatible) in (compatible) in power power

Isolationist (compatible) No dilemma N/A in power (-1920s)

U.S.

Liberal internationalist Identity dilemma N/A (incompatible) in power (1930s)

Chapters 3-5 explain that the identity dilemma occurred after 1931 as domestic power balance favored incompatible identity groups: liberal internationalists in the United

States and pan-Asianists in Japan (see Table 2). In both cases of the Manchuria Crisis and the Sino-Japanese War, American liberal internationalists viewed Japanese expansion as a challenge against their role identity as a “crusader nation” to uphold the post-WWI peace

system and to democratize and Christianize China. They organized anti-Japan, pro-China campaigns and demanded diplomatic, economic, and military measures to punish Japan.

Yet, isolationists’ opposition against involvement in the Far Eastern crisis led the U.S. government to take symbolic measures such as diplomatic condemnation and toothless sanctions. Japanese pan-Asianists developed anti-American enmity because they saw these symbolic measures as a repudiation of their role identity as a “leader in Asia” to establish

“Asia of the Asians.” They organized political coalitions to push anti-Western policies and overcame opposition from moderate internationalists who argued for cooperation. This action-reaction dynamic escalated as these incompatible identity groups gained more domestic influence through coalition making and locked in confrontational policies. As the identity dilemma became entrenched, American-Japanese enmity deepened. The ultimate outcome was a war across the Pacific.

I test my argument by using two types of research methods: qualitative discourse analysis and process tracing. 135 To begin, establishing an identity dilemma requires measuring identity as a variable. Since I operationalize identity as narratives, I rely on qualitative discourse analysis. Following existing studies,136 I use primary sources of texts, such as diaries, letters, memoirs, political speeches, newspapers, and books to examine what identities people express. For instance, statements such as “French people are …” or

“the nation embodies …” can be viewed as identity expressions. Since my aim is to examine whether identities are “activated” and expressed in specific foreign policy contexts, I selectively choose texts during the key moments of American-Japanese

135 For a similar approach, see Lupovici, The Power of Deterrence, 78–86. 136 Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics; Hopf, Reconstructing the Cold War; Hopf and Allan, Making Identity Count.

confrontation.137

One may raise concerns about a potential selection bias that I am cherry-picking text samples that support my argument but represent only a small fraction of views in the countries concerned. I address this issue as follows. First, I survey the views expressed by all the main political actors to better cover the breadth of elite opinions. Second, I cover most circulated newspapers from different ideological backgrounds, and relevant popular books and magazines, to estimate the overall public opinion.138 Third, since my argument allows room for domestic identity contestation, the problem is not whether I am representing only certain identity groups and disregarding the others. It is whether the identity groups I identify are developing enmity because of identity threats, and whether these groups are influencing the country’s policies to enact the identity dilemma’s action- reaction process.

While the qualitative discourse analysis above allows me to observe and link identity and enmity, the analysis is still correlational. To establish causality, I use process tracing.139 Specifically, I conduct two “hoops tests”: whether individuals explicitly cite

137 Here, I differ from existing studies that randomly select texts to better reflect the everyday identity discourse and inductively code all types of identities that they find in those texts, without pre-theorizing what identities exist. Existing studies take this approach because their aim is to discover identities that researchers may not know beforehand. 138 For instance, Krebs survey most circulated newspapers from different ideological backgrounds to assess the presence of foreign policy consensus among the American public. Ronald R. Krebs, Narrative and the Making of US National Security (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015). Hopf and Allan’s edited volume on identity measurement samples newspapers from different ideological backgrounds, as well as best-selling novels and films, to better represent the societal discourse. Hopf and Allan, Making Identity Count. 139 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), chap. 10; Andrew Bennett, “Process Tracing and Causal Inference,” in Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, ed. Henry E. Brady and David Collier, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 207–19; Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2013); Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, eds., Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014); David Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing,” PS: Political Science & Politics 44, no. 4 (2011): 823–30.

identity to express enmity and seek confrontation; and whether changes in strategic or domestic factors correlate to the level of enmity. There is strong evidence for the identity dilemma if individuals base their enmity on identity-related reasons when there is no change in material threats or warmongering.140

Also, to show the domestic coalition making process behind the identity dilemma,

I trace organizational and lobbying records and show that identity groups mobilized and lobbied for confrontational policy. In doing so, it is important to show that these efforts are not driven by pure material interests in warmongering and expansion, a phenomenon called logrolling.141

Lastly, I show the two consequences of an entrenched identity dilemma—enduring enmity and identity indivisibility—by looking for the following observable implications.

As for enduring enmity, I demonstrate the dominance of confrontational discourse, manifesting in confrontational statements, policy preferences, and actions, with hostile groups driving decision-making processes. As for identity indivisibility, I demonstrate the dominance of identity, emotional arguments for confrontation over strategic, rational arguments for cooperation, resulting in refusals to compromise to resolve conflicts.

Importantly, the Road to the Pacific War case provides three types of within-case variations: within-country (reactions across identity groups), between-country (reactions across countries), and longitudinal (temporal changes in those reactions). I leverage them to maximize the number of “causal-process observations”142 and rigorously test the role of

140 On hoops tests, see Bennett, “Process Tracing and Causal Inference.” 141 Snyder, Myths of Empire. 142 Henry E. Brady, David Collier, and Jason Seawright, “Refocusing the Discussion of Methodology,” in Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, ed. Henry E. Brady and David Collier, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 15–31.

identity in enmity.143

Table 3 (see below) summarizes the discussion. Before concluding, I discuss two potential challenges to this methodological strategy. The first concerns identity formation.

I have theorized the identity dilemma on the premise that domestic actors have formed competing views of national identity based on various domestic and systemic factors. Some might argue that my argument is incomplete since it does not predict what identity states form, a prevalent problem in existing studies.144 While I admit this omission, I maintain that it is commonplace for scholars to take identities as given and use them as independent variables to explain international politics. Similarly, one might think that the omission of identity formation is a problem for another reason: there is an endogeneity issue if enmity, the dependent variable in my study, affects identity formation in a way that leads to identity incompatibility, the independent variable. In Chapter 2, I deal with this issue by showing that enmity did not drive the formation of identity groups in U.S.-Japan relations.

The second concerns the alternative domestic explanation. This explanation emphasizes that leaders use ideological propagandas, or “myths of empire,” to justify and mobilize support for expansionist policies. According to the explanation, leaders may use identity language simply as rhetoric to advance their own interests. By contrast, I argue that individuals genuinely embrace such identity-laden myths and demand confrontation.

To show this, I analyze private documents and meetings where actors are likely to express their genuine opinions. If actors consistently invoke identity to support their positions and

143 On the importance of leveraging within-case variations to test the causal forces of ideas, see Allan M. Jacobs, “Process Tracing the Effects of Ideas,” in Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool, ed. Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 41–73. 144 Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, “Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise,” in The Culture of National Security, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1996), 451–97; Maja Zehfuss, “Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison,” European Journal of International Relations 7, no. 3 (2001): 315–48.

do not use identity rhetoric only when it is politically convenient, one can have confidence in their genuineness.

Relatedly, the domestic explanation posit that domestic groups act differently because of different interests, not identities. Some groups become hostile and pursue confrontation, and others do not, not because they have different identities, but because they have different interests. I address this by showing that these groups had different identities and expressed their different attitudes in such identity, not purely material, terms.

My argument is strengthened if individuals belonging to same political groups with certain interests (e.g., military’s organizational interests in expansion) express different opinions genuinely citing their different identity views.

Importantly, the lack of genuineness in identity expressions does not make identity irrelevant. This point is crucial, so I discuss it at length. First, strategically-minded actors use identity rhetoric because it resonates with the audience. If identity is necessary to justify enmity and policy, it is shaping what these actors can do. Logrolling would not likely succeed without an identity-laden discursive environment conducive to warmongering.145

For instance, if no American had cared about democracy promotion during the Cold War, the use of ideological language to paint the Soviets as enemies and justify containment policies would have not gained support. Similarly, if no Korean or Chinese cared about the history issues, leaders cannot play the “history card,” or intentionally stir up the history disputes with Japan, to rally the public.

Second, precisely because identity issues are salient and popular, strategic actors who may not personally care about them can be tempted to play identity politics for

145 For a similar point, Steven Ward, “Race, Status, and Japanese Revisionism in the Early 1930s,” Security Studies 22, no. 4 (2013): 611, 623.

political gains. Such actions legitimize and strengthen the arguments and positions of actors who genuinely hold identity-based enmity against other states. Moreover, strategic actors may join the hostile coalition of such identity-driven actors to strengthen their own domestic political standing. These actions enflame the identity dilemma. For instance, the instrumental use of the “history card” by Chinese or Korean leaders not only strengthens the existing anti-Japanese sentiments among conservatives and nationalists in China and

South Korea, but also provokes nationalistic sentiments in Japan, fueling the identity dilemma between these countries over historical victimhood.146

Third, the participation of strategic actors in identity politics can contribute to the entrenchment of the identity dilemma. As discussed earlier, the identity dilemma becomes locked in when hostile identity groups dominate the domestic debate and eliminate political space for opponents to promote cooperation. The domestic explanation similarly claims that logrolling becomes unstoppable and result in overexpansion when enough interest groups buy into myths of empire and push expansion.147 I place a greater emphasis on the power of societal, emotional discourse than on that of pure interest groups politics. Even if strategic actors may think that they can control identity politics, by framing a foreign policy issue as one of identity, they are creating, and entrapping themselves in, an emotional identity discursive dynamic that takes on a life of its own and drives enmity.148 And, as discussed above, it is politically and rhetorically difficult to promote a counternarrative of

146 Yinan He, The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations since World War II (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Jennifer Lind, Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010). 147 Snyder, Myths of Empire. 148 Frank Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union,” International Organization 55, no. 01 (2001): 47–80; Todd H. Hall, Emotional Diplomacy: Official Emotion on the International Stage (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), 28.

cooperation in this environment because such action would be viewed as a betrayal of national identity. For instance, the 2015 South Korea-Japan agreement on the issue of wartime sex slaves, known as comfort women, has come under intense criticism by the

Korean public that the agreement did not adequately address their historical victimhood.

This pressured the Korean president to recognize that the agreement was something that

“the people cannot emotionally accept” and to seek its renegotiation.149

In sum, I do not preclude the possibility that domestic actors instrumentally use identity rhetoric. Even so, such actions work because identity issues are important to the audience. And they can add momentum to the identity dilemma dynamic that independently drives interstate enmity. Therefore, identity politics may be easy to incite but difficult to put out.

149 Yukari Easton, “Japan Must Not Renegotiate the Comfort Women Agreement,” The Diplomat, December 30, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/japan-must-not-renegotiate-the-comfort-women-agreement/.

Table 3: Predictions and observable implications of the identity dilemma Identity dilemma Consequences of entrenched identity dilemma Action-reaction Coalition making Enduring enmity Identity indivisibility Predictions • Each state takes actions • Identity groups with • One or two states become • States reject cooperation that enact its identity incompatible identities malign and seek and pursue confrontation • Each state views the become hostile; those with confrontation in pursuit of because compromise will other’s actions as a compatible identities identity undermine their identities challenge to its own remain friendly • States develop deep identity and develops • Hostile identity groups mistrust, threat perception, enmity toward the other form coalitions to push for and suspicion • Each state act and reacts in confrontational policies sequence • Friendly identity groups lose power against this coalition effort Observable • Confrontational statements, • Organizational • Dominance of • Dominance of identity, implications policy preferences, and mobilization among hostile confrontational discourse emotional arguments for actions based on identity- identity groups • Confrontational statements, confrontation over related reasons • Lobbying for policy preferences, and strategic, rational confrontational policies by actions arguments for cooperation Irrelevance of: hostile groups • Refusal to compromise • Material threats • Decision-making driven by • Conflict of interests hostile groups • Warmongering Irrelevance of: • Logrolling driven by material interests Measurement/data Discourse analysis based on: • Political speeches • Diaries, letters, memoirs • Newspapers, books, magazines

Conclusion

While numerous scholars have studied the role of identity in international politics, few have examined zero-sum identity contestation and its effects on interstate relations.

This study addresses this issue by theorizing the identity dilemma and explaining why and how states develop enmity when one’s actions to enact its identity challenges the other’s identity. In stipulating this action-reaction dynamic, this study also shows how domestic identity politics shapes and is affected by the interstate identity contestation. Moreover, it demonstrates how enmity developed through identity politics can be entrenched and intractable due to the two consequences of an entrenched identity dilemma: enduring enmity and identity indivisibility. I believe that these assertions, if shown to be true, give us a novel way to study world politics.

In the following chapters, I test these assertions by studying the Road to the Pacific case. In Chapter 2, I explain the identity formation and relations of the United States and

Japan before 1931, the starting year of the Road to the Pacific War. This analysis serves as an essential backbone for the later chapters on the Manchuria Crisis and the Sino-Japanese

War. It also explains that the two countries did not experience an identity dilemma and avoided enmity. In Chapter 3, I analyze the Manchuria Crisis and demonstrate how the Far

Eastern crisis over Manchuria became a major international crisis due to U.S.-Japan identity dilemma, ending with Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations. In Chapters

4-5, I examine the Sino-Japanese War and show how this second conflict in the Far East triggered an identity dilemma across the Pacific, resulting in Pearl Harbor. In Chapter 6, I summarize my argument and the results of the empirical chapters and discuss implications

for IR theory, Pacific War historiography, and foreign policy.

Chapter 2: U.S.-Japan Identity Relations across the Pacific, 1853-1930

U.S.-Japan official relations started when an American fleet led by Commodore

Matthew C. Perry reached the coast of Uraga in 1853 and pressured Japan to end its 220- year diplomatic isolation by signing the 1854 Treaty of Peace and Amity. Historian Makoto

Iokibe writes, “Early on, this bilateral relationship was based on primarily on mutual friendship, with America acting as the wise and benevolent mentor, astutely guiding in its quest to enter the global system and survive.”150 After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan had embraced Western civilization and industrialization and transformed itself into a great power. As historian Akira Iriye explains, Japanese leaders had sought to integrate the country into the West-led order “according to the formula of ‘international cooperation,’” dealing with “its external problems through the framework of multilateral agreements,” such as the League of Nations and the Washington Conference treaties with the United

States and Great Britain. 151 However, as Iokibe puts it, “U.S.-Japan relations hastily deteriorated … during the ‘dark valley’ of the 1930s as Japan increasingly leaned more toward militarism and sent its army into Manchuria in September 1931. The Japanese policy of expansionism now redefined the relationship to one that was based on friction and tension; it would ultimately reach its breaking point and completely collapse in

December 1941.”152 In short, the 1930s marked a shift in American-Japanese relationship from one of amity to one of enmity, ultimately leading to the Pacific War.

Why did this shift in U.S.-Japan relations occur during the 1930s, and not before?

150 Tosh Minohara and Makoto Iokibe, eds., The History of US-Japan Relations: From Perry to the Present (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), v–vi. 151 Akira Iriye, Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1841-1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 2. 152 Minohara and Iokibe, The History of US-Japan Relations, vi.

Throughout this chapter and chapters 3-5, I argue that American-Japanese enmity resulted from an identity dilemma, and that the dilemma only occurred during the 1930s due to the shifts in the domestic balance of power among each country’s identity groups. Before the

1930s, the identity groups in power had compatible worldviews, and experienced no identity dilemma. Many Americans were “isolationists” who believed that the United

States must act as a “city upon a hill” and stay aloof from overseas trouble. Unconcerned about Japan’s rise and expansion in East Asia, they welcomed Japan as a member of the

Western international order. Meanwhile, many Japanese leaders were “moderate internationalists” who thought that Japan as a great power should be a responsible member of the West-led international community. They cooperated with the Western countries in solving their differences through multilateral schemes. In short, each country acted in a way that did not challenge the other’s identity, and the bilateral relationship remained friendly. During the 1930s, incompatible identity groups gained power, and an identity dilemma began. Many Japanese leaders were “pan-Asianists” who believed that the country must assert its role as a “leader in Asia” and establish “Asia of the Asians.” This worldview conflicted with that of American “liberal internationalists” who thought that the

United States as a “crusader nation” had a responsibility to uphold the post-WWI peace system and to democratize and Christianize China. Japan’s invasion of China during the

1930s dramatically revealed this identity incompatibility, triggered an identity dilemma, and precipitated the rise of American-Japanese enmity leading up to Pearl Harbor.

This chapter focuses on the first component of these empirical claims: U.S.-Japan identity relations before the 1930s. Specifically, it discusses the origins and worldviews of the identity groups in America and Japan in detail. It then shows that the two countries

maintained friendly relations before the 1930s because their compatible identity groups—

American isolationists and Japanese moderate internationalists—held power and conducted foreign policies. There were certainly frictions in the bilateral relationship. In fact, issues surrounding China, race, and naval limitation involved challenges to the worldviews of the incompatible identity groups, American liberal internationalists and

Japanese pan-Asianists, and caused their enmity toward the other state. However, as discussed below, this did not result in an identity dilemma and an escalation of American-

Japanese enmity because the compatible identity groups were in charge and maintained cooperation. This sustainment of American-Japanese cooperative relationship supports my theoretical claim that an identity dilemma occurs only when incompatible identity groups are in positions of power to push confrontation against the other state. In other words, these episodes of frictions provide tests for my identity dilemma theory.

I organize this chapter as follows. I first describe the identity groups within the

United States and Japan. I then examine the U.S.-Japan identity relations prior to 1931. In addition to testing my argument that an identity dilemma does not happen when the domestic balance of power favors compatible identity groups, these discussions lay out the historical and analytical background necessary for the following chapters on the Manchuria

Crisis, the Sino-Japanese War, and Pearl Harbor.

Identity Groups in America and Japan

To establish the presence of identity (in)compatibility between America and

Japan—the key independent variable for the identity dilemma—we must first discuss the

roots and contents of the two countries’ identities. In this section, I show that each country had two identity groups, or political groups with shared identity narratives (i.e., who we are as a country) and national role conceptions (i.e., what role our country should play in international society): isolationism and liberal internationalism in America and moderate internationalism and pan-Asianism in Japan. I suggest that there was compatibility between

American isolationism and Japanese moderate internationalism and incompatiblity between American liberal internationalism and Japanese pan-Asianism. Admittedly, this categorization is a very broad characterization and leaves room for disagreements within each identity group.153 Neither is it intended to be exhaustive and encompass all the worldviews within these countries. And this is far from the first study to categorize various understandings of identity in these countries and draws on existing studies to describe each identity group. However, I maintain that the categorization discussed here serves as a useful analytical tool to understand the major schools of thought within these countries’ identity debates and to analyze their bilateral relationship leading up to WWII.

American Identity

Scholars agree that “the belief in American exceptionalism … forms one of the core elements of American national identity.”154 Historically, American exceptionalism has had three elements. First, the United States has a special mission in human history. As a promised land and its citizens as the chosen people by the God, America as a nation

153 For instance, historians have noted different strands within Japanese pan-Asianism. Eri Hotta, Pan- Asianism and Japan’s War, 1931-1945 (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 154 McCrisken, “Exceptionalism,” 63.

represents an experiment toward progress in history and thus has a mission to lead the world for the better. Second, the United States is defined by its difference from the Old

World of Europe, which is plagued by self-interested monarchies and corrupted political systems. By contrast, the New World of America pursues freedom, morality, and the betterment of humankind. Third, America will defy the “laws of history” that all great powers rise and fall. As the leader of human progress, the United States will keep striving to form an ever more perfect union and lead the world.155

Beyond these elements, however, the Americans disagree on the meanings of

American exceptionalism and national identity. Scholars argue that there are two competing narratives: “exemplary” exceptionalism that promotes an isolationist foreign policy, and “missionary” exceptionalism that supports an internationalist foreign policy.156

I call the identity group with an exemplary narrative of America as a “city upon a hill” isolationist and that with a missionary narrative of America as a “crusader nation” liberal internationalist.

Isolationist

Isolationists have a “exemplary” narrative of America’s role as a “city upon a hill” that remains aloof from world affairs and believe in its role to lead the world by perfecting democracy at home and acting as a beacon for other nations. Instead of interfering in other

155 McCrisken, 64–65. 156 McCrisken, “Exceptionalism.” Henry Kissinger explains: “The singularities that America has ascribed itself throughout its history have produced two contradictory attitudes toward foreign policy. The first is that America serves its values best by perfecting democracy at home, thereby acting as a beacon for the rest of mankind; the second, that America’s values impose on it an obligation to crusade for them around the world.” Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 17.

nations’ affairs, the country, isolationists argue, should strive to perfect their own republican society in the New World. In their eyes, overseas intervention would not only harm other nations, but also invite the ills of the Old World and denigrate the American experiment at home. Thus, the Americans must focus on a model society for others to emulate rather than forcing American values on others.157

This isolationist narrative dates to colonial times. Early Puritan settlers regarded the North American continent as a “promised land” where a “new Canaan” could be established as a model for the world. They viewed their exodus to North America as part of the Christian millennial story: The Puritans had stood as the true Christians through the

Reformation and now had a sacred mission to create a New World.158 John Winthrop, a

Puritan leader and the first governor of the Massachusetts Bay colony, proclaimed

American millennialism in 1630: The New World would become a “city upon a hill,” a beacon of hope for the betterment of humankind.159 In Common Sense, Thomas Paine attributed the need for America’s independence to its separateness and difference from the

Old World. The settlers arrived in the New World to “begin the world over again” by establishing a new republic form of government based on the protection of individual rights.160 In short, America was a national experiment toward human progress, a perfect republic in the world.

To accomplish this sacred mission, it was crucial for the United States to remain aloof from oversea troubles. In his Farewell Address of 1796, George Washington

157 McCrisken, “Exceptionalism,” 65. 158 Sacvan Bercovitch, “The Typology of America’s Mission,” American Quarterly 30, no. 2 (1978): 135–55. 159 John Winthrop, “A Model of Christian Charity,” 1630. The text of the speech is available at http://winthropsociety.com/doc_charity.php. 160 Thomas Paine, Common Sense (New York, NY: Peter Eckler Publishing Company, 1922), 57.

proclaimed: “The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. …

Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none; or a very remote relation….

It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world.”161 Thomas Jefferson, in his First Inaugural Address of March 1803, declared: “… peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none …

These principles form the bright constellation which has gone before us and guided our steps through an age of revolution and reformation.” He also emphasized that the geographic isolation of the American continent from Europe was crucial for avoiding adverse influences from the Old World. America, he said, was “kindly separated by nature and a wide ocean from the exterminating havoc of one quarter of the globe; too high- minded to endure the degradations of others.”162 As historian Trevor McCrisken notes,

“these pronouncements laid the foundations for a foreign policy characterized by high levels of unilateralism and so-called isolationism.”163

Isolationist thoughts became institutionalized under President James Monroe. In his seventh annual message to Congress on December 2, 1823, Monroe laid out what became known as the Monroe Doctrine. He declared that the Western hemisphere was closed to

European colonization and intervention, and that the United States would become the

161 George Washington, “Farewell Address,” September 19, 1796. The text of the speech is available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp. On Washington’s foreign policy, see Alexander Deconde, Entangling Alliance: Politics and Diplomacy under George Washington (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1958). 162 Thomas Jefferson, “First Inaugural Address,” March 4, 1801. The text of the speech is available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jefinau1.asp. 163 McCrisken, “Exceptionalism,” 67. On Jefferson’s foreign policy, see Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1990); Lawrence S. Kaplan, Entangling Alliances with None: American Foreign Policy in the Age of Jefferson (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1987); Francis D. Cogliano, Emperor of Liberty: Thomas Jefferson’s Foreign Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014).

region’s dominant power and refrain from interfering in European affairs.164 John Quincy

Adams, Monroe’s Secretary of State, also stated on July 4, 1821, that the United States

“goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own. She will recommend the general cause, by the countenance of her voice, and the benignant sympathy of her example.”165 On December 2, 1845, President James Polk reaffirmed the

Monroe Doctrine, rejecting European colonialism in the Western Hemisphere and asserting

America’s hemispheric dominance.166

For most of the nineteenth century, isolationism remained a dominant narrative.

The United States did not have a large standing army, and as late as the 1870s, its navy was smaller than Chile’s navy. This is not to say that the United States did not use force at all.

It forcefully took land and resources from the Indian nations and Mexico. Yet, for the most part, most Americans opposed involvement in international affairs outside the Western hemisphere. The United States was acting as a city on the hill.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, isolationists met challenges from liberal internationalists. The idea of “manifest destiny” became popular following the Spanish-

American War of 1898, which expanded U.S. imperial control to Hawaii, Puerto Rico,

Samoa, Guam, and the Philippines. During with this period, a “Great Debate” occurred between the “imperialist” internationalists who supported the annexation of overseas colonies and the “anti-imperialist” isolationists who opposed it. The isolationists opposed

164 James Monroe, “Seventh Annual Message to Congress,” December 2, 1823. The text of the speech is available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/monroe.asp. 165 John Quincy Adams, “Speech on Independence Day,” July 4, 1821. The text of the speech is available at http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/speech-on-independence-day/. 166 James Polk, “First Annual Address to Congress,” December 2, 1845. The text of the speech is available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29486.

these foreign adventures based on the idea of exemplary exceptionalism: The United States should resist the immoral imperialism of the Old World, allow the liberated colonies to determine their own destinies, and avoid oversea involvement in distant places like the far side of the Pacific Ocean. 167 This policy drew a contrast to Alfred Thayer Mahan,

America’s foremost naval strategist who opposed isolation and advocated U.S. maritime dominance in the Pacific against potential continental challengers.168

During the twentieth century, isolationism seemed to decline further with the rise of President Woodrow Wilson and U.S. participation in World War I. However, the tremendous costs of the war, the failure of Wilson’s liberal agenda to reform international politics afterward, and the Great Depression all turned the Americans inward.169 In fact, the term isolationism itself became widely used during the interwar years, especially the

1930s,170 and isolationists maintained strong political influence until Pearl Harbor.171

Liberal Internationalist

167 McCrisken, “Exceptionalism,” 38–70; Trevor B. McCrisken, American Exceptionalism and the Legacy of Vietnam: U.S. Foreign Policy Since 1974 (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 11–13; Fabian Hilfrich, Debating American Exceptionalism: Empire and Democracy in the Wake of the Spanish-American War (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Stephen Kinzer, The True Flag: Theodore Roosevelt, Mark Twain, and the Birth of American Empire (New York, NY: Henry Holt and Co., 2017); Robert L. Beisner, Twelve against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900 (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1968). 168 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1890). 169 Selig Adler, The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth-Century Reaction (Toronto: Collier-Macmillan Canada, Ltd., 1957); Thomas N. Guinsberg, The Pursuit of Isolationism in the United Senate from Versailles to Pearl Harbor (New York, NY: Garland, 1982); Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in America, 1935-1941 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966); Robert W. Tucker, A New Isolationism: Threat Or Promise? (New York, NY: Universe Books, 1972); Ronald E. Powaski, Toward an Entangling Alliance: American Isolationism, Internationalism, and Europe, 1901-1950 (New York, NY: Greenwood Press, 1991). 170 Walter McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776 (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997), 39. 171 Adam J. Berinsky, In Time of War: Understanding American Public Opinion from World War II to Iraq (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 45.

In contrast, liberal internationalists had a “missionary” narrative of America as a

“crusader nation” and embraced its role, or its “civilizing” mission, to spread liberty, democracy, and abroad. It was assumed that foreign nations aspire to be like America and adopt the universal values of freedom, equality, and justice for all. As a champion of these values, the United States has a unique responsibility to help other nations realize their aspirations.172

Underlying the liberal internationalist narrative was the idea of “manifest destiny,” a term coined in 1845 by John O’Sullivan, the editor of the Democratic Review. As historian Albert Weinberg posits, manifest destiny was “in essence the doctrine that one nation has a preeminent social worth, a distinctively lofty mission, and consequently unique rights in the application of moral principles.”173 It “expressed a dogma of supreme self-assurance and ambition—that America’s incorporation of all adjacent lands was the virtually inevitable fulfillment of a moral mission delegated to the nation by Providence itself.”174 The Americans were tasked to fulfill what O’Sullivan called the “destiny to overspread the whole North American continent with an immense democratic population.”175

Manifest destiny involved missionary activities to spread Christianity. This religious aspect, according to one historian, was “a defining trait of American church life” and “reached an organizational peak toward the end of the century … because of the urgent desire to spread the blessings of the Word to non-Christian, uncivilized areas.” In fact,

172 McCrisken, “Exceptionalism,” 65. 173 Albert Katz Weinberg, Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1935), 8. 174 Weinberg, 1–2. 175 Weinberg, 121.

“Christian missionaries were the one consistently ‘expansionist’ feature of American foreign relations after the Civil War.”176 “Democracy,” the Democratic Review wrote, “in its true sense is the last best revelation of human thought. We speak, of course, of that true and genuine Democracy which breathes the air and lives in the light of Christianity—whose essence is justice, and whose object is progress.”177 Democracy and Christianity were therefore the twin goals of manifest destiny.

During the “Great Debate” over imperialism following the American-Spanish War, liberal internationalists advocated expansionist foreign policy designed to spread American ideals to the rest of the world, supporting the annexation of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Samoa,

Guam, and the Philippines.178 President William McKinley spoke of the annexation as a matter of manifest destiny: “There was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God’s grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellow-men for whom Christ also died.”179 The church community also supported the annexation.180 John Ireland, a Catholic archbishop, proclaimed in the fall of 1898: “America is too great to be isolated from the world. … And with America goes far and wide what America in her grandest ideal represents—democracy and liberty, a government of the people, by the people, and for the people.”181 As British

176 Anders Stephanson, Manifest Destiny: American Expansionism and the Empire of Right (New York, NY: Hill & Wang, 1995), 79. 177 Quoted in McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State, 79. 178 Hilfrich, Debating American Exceptionalism; Kinzer, The True Flag; Beisner, Twelve against Empire. 179 McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State, 112; Stuart Creighton Miller, Benevolent Assimilation: American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), 23–24. Also see Robert W. Merry, President McKinley: Architect of the American Century (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2017), 333–41; Gregg Jones, Honor in the Dust: Theodore Roosevelt, War in the Philippines, and the Rise and Fall of America’s Imperial Dream (New York, NY: New American Library, 2012), 103–4. On the missionaries in the Philippines, see Kenton Clymer, Protestant Missionaries in the Philippines, 1898- 1916: An Inquiry into the American Colonial Mentality (Urbana, IN: University of Illinois Press, 1986). 180 McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State, 112–13. 181 Stephanson, Manifest Destiny, 93.

poet Rudyard Kipling wrote, U.S. imperialism was an embodiment of the “white man’s burden” to civilize other nations.182 “Isolation is no longer possible or desirable,” declared

McKinley on the day of his death. “The period of exclusiveness is past.”183

America’s manifest destiny extended to the Far East. In 1853, U.S. Commander

Matthew C. Perry and his “Black Ships” forced Tokugawa Japan to end its diplomatic isolation and accept Western influences. In 1889-90, Secretary of State John Hay announced the Open-Door policy, designed to establish an equal economic opportunity for all major powers in their trade relations with China and grant the Americans greater access to the Chinese market. Importantly, American missionaries’ “civilizing mission” to democratize and Christianize China preceded U.S. business interests there.184 After 1890,

China became the largest destination for American foreign missionaries. The number of

Protestant missionaries in China rose from 81 in 1858 to 1,296 (about 500 of which were

American) in 1889. From 1890 to 1895 alone, 1,153 more missionaries had arrived China.

The number of communicants increased from about 350 in 1853 to 80,683 in 1898. The expansion of missionary activities was followed by that of Chinese exposure to Western products and of American commercial interests in China. As the Reverend Josiah Strong,

General Secretary of the Evangelical Alliance of the United States, posited, “commerce follows the missionary.”185

182 Stephanson, 88; Rudyard Kipling, Rudyard Kipling’s Verse: Inclusive Edition, 1885-1918 (New York, NY: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1922), 371–73. 183 Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKinley (Newtown, CT: American Political Biography Press, 1999), 587. 184 On civilizing missions, see Miwa Hirono, Civilizing Missions: International Religious Agencies in China (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 185 Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1963), 305–7; Paul A. Varg, Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats: The American Protestant Missionary Movement in China, 1890-1952 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1958), 13; Kenneth Scott Latourette, A History of Christian Missions in China (New York, NY: The Macmillan Company, 1929), 406, 494–96; Valentin H. Rabe, The Home Base of American China Missions, 1880-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), 6; Xi Lian, The Conversion of Missionaries: Liberalism

America’s civilizing mission in China was embraced beyond the missionary community. Lieutenant C. A. Seoane claimed in his long paper written for the Army War

College: “in addition to economic and political questions we must remember that … if the said East is to take on the benefits of Western Civilization, the grater task is one that the

United States and the United States only can assume.”186 Stanley Hornbeck, son of a

Methodist missionary, a prominent China scholar, and director and later adviser for the Far

Easter Affairs at the State Department (1928-44), posited that America took on a role as

“instructors of the Orient in the mysteries and advantages of Western civilization” and became “friends and helpers of the peoples of the East, especially the Chinese.”187

In the twentieth century, it was President Woodrow Wilson who personified liberal internationalism.188 A liberal idealist, Wilson believed that the “force of America is the force of moral principles,” and that the “idea of America is to serve humanity.”189 He declared, “I believe that God planted in us the vision of liberty. … I cannot be deprived of the hope that we are chosen, and prominently chosen, to show the way to the nations of the world how they shall walk in the paths of liberty.”190 To make the world more democratic and orderly, he was willing to use force, imposing military protectorates on Haiti and

Nicaragua and sending American forces to Mexico, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba.

in American Protestant Missions in China, 1907-1932 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 6. 186 Akira Iriye, Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1897-1911 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 220. 187 Stanley K. Hornbeck, Contemporary Politics in the Far East (New York, NY: D. Appleton and Company, 1916), 381. 188 McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State, chap. 6; Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism During World War I (Wilmington, DE: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1991); Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Tony Smith, Why Wilson Matters: The Origin of American Liberal Internationalism and Its Crisis Today (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017). 189 McCrisken, “Exceptionalism,” 71. 190 McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State, 136.

He also led the Allied powers in intervening in the Russian civil war. When deciding to enter WWI in April 1917, Wilson declared before Congress that the Americans must fight to “make the world safe for democracy.” 191 His internationalist foreign policy later developed into the Fourteen Points and the League of Nations.

In addition, Wilson redefined America’s China policy. At the core of Wilsonianism was the belief that democracy, as part of the God’s plan for humanity, thrives in

Christianity.192 He thus replaced his predecessor Taft’s “dollar diplomacy,” which solely focused on U.S. commercial interests in China, with his “missionary diplomacy,” which prioritized U.S missionaries’ efforts to educate, democratize, and Christianize China.193

Bertrand Russell, a prominent British philosopher and social critic, called these efforts

“missionaries of Americanism” seeking to Americanize China. 194 Indeed, American missionaries in China had increased from over 500 in 1890 to about 2,500 by 1915, becoming the “leading evangelical force in China.”195 By 1916, there were nearly 50

American missionary societies supporting 2,862 foreign staffs, and a survey in 1924 concluded that “China is the leading mission land.” 196 In the peak years of 1925-26,

Americans accounted for about 5,000 of the 8,300 Protestant missionaries in China.197 As posited by one historian, and discussed later in this chapter and chapters 3-5, these missionaries, viewing Japan’s aggression in China as a challenge to their civilizing mission,

191 Woodrow Wilson, “War Message to Congress,” April 2, 1917. 192 Arthur S. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look at His Major Foreign Policies (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), 12–13. 193 Donald E. Davis and Eugene P. Trani, Distorted Mirrors: Americans and Their Relations with Russia and China in the Twentieth Century (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2009), chap. 8; Tien-yi Li, Woodrow Wilson’s China Policy, 1913-1917 (New York, NY: University of Kansas City Press, 1952), 5, 14– 15, 19, 84, 203–4. 194 Bertrand Russell, The Problem of China (London, UK: George Allen & Unwin ltd., 1922), 221. 195 Lian, The Conversion of Missionaries, 4, 6. 196 Rabe, The Home Base of American China Missions, 6. 197 Lian, The Conversion of Missionaries, 6.

“played their singularly most influential role in their arousal of domestic American pro-

Chinese and anti-Japanese sentiments.”198

As discussed above, internationalism was called into question when Wilson’s liberal policy to reform international politics failed after WWI, starting with the Senate’s rejection of the League of Nations and the organization’s inability to resolve international crises such as the Manchuria Crisis. Isolationism gained popularity and hamstrung the hands of liberal internationalists. Chapters 3-5 focus on this political dynamic between internationalism and isolationism.

In sum, the United States historically had two competing identity groups: isolationists and liberal internationalists. Indeed, scholars have questioned the historical accuracy of this “identity dichotomy” in understanding American foreign policy. Some historians argue that U.S. foreign policy has been consistently marked by expansionism, and that isolationism is not part of American foreign policy tradition and was not as strong as often assumed even during the interwar years.199 Some political scientists claim that

American isolationism is a “myth,” 200 and that American exceptionalism was a more consistent tradition grounded in “unilateral internationalism.” 201 There are several problems with this claim, however.

First, critics see America’s commercial policy such as the Open Door as evidence

198 Yu-ming Shaw, An American Missionary in China: John Leighton Stuart and Chinese-American Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 2. 199 Weinberg, Manifest Destiny; William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1959); Walter LaFeber, The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad Since 1750 (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 1989). 200 Bear F. Braumoeller, “The Myth of American Isolationism,” Foreign Policy Analysis 6, no. 4 (2010): 349– 71. 201 Hilde Eliassen Restad, American Exceptionalism: An Idea That Made a Nation and Remade the World (New York, NY: Routledge, 2014).

of expansionism. 202 Isolationism, however, does not mean economic or diplomatic insulation like Tokugawa Japan or North Korea. When opposing “permanent alliances” in his Farewell Address, George Washington emphasized the importance of “extending our commercial relations” with other nations.203 This was what historians call “cosmopolitan isolationism,” which rejected overseas political and military entanglement but embraced international trade.204

Second, critics have correctly identified that the term isolationism had rarely appeared until the interwar years. However, the absence of the term does not mean that of the idea of exemplary exceptionalism and of support for anti-interventionist foreign policy.

It is true that the Americans in the interwar years, as Walter Mead posits, mystified the idea of “virtuous isolation,” reading without any historical context Washington’s Farewell

Address and the Monroe Doctrine “as the eternal and unchanging creed of the American people through generations.” Yet, it is through such interpretations of the past that people form narratives in the present. Moreover, “Americans bought the myth of virtuous isolation,” and FDR had difficulty debunking this myth when ushering the public into

WWII. 205 Isolationism was thus important part of American identity, or “a vision of

American destiny and an ideological commitment.”206

202 On the “Open Door” thesis, see William Appleman Williams, “The Legend of Isolationism in the 1920’s,” Science & Society 18, no. 1 (1954): 1–20; William Appleman Williams, “The Open Door Policy: Economic Expansion and the Remaking of Societies,” in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Vol. I: To 1920, ed. Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 7– 11. For strong rebuttals of the thesis, see Robert James Maddox, “Another Look at the Legend of Isolationism in the 1920s,” Mid-America 53 (1971): 35–43; John Braeman, “The New Left and American Foreign Policy during the Age of Normalcy: A Re-Examination,” The Business History Review 57, no. 1 (1983): 73–104. 203 Washington, “Farewell Address.” 204 Christopher McKnight Nichols, Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of a Global Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 8, 11. 205 Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World (New York, NY: Knopf, 2001), 58–60. 206 Guinsberg, The Pursuit of Isolationism, 13. While historians like Walter McDougall dismiss the term isolationism and use the term unilateralism, I still prefer to use the former because it is still widely used as

Third, and most importantly, one should not confuse the continuity of American foreign policy with a consensus on American identity. The foreign policy compromise reached by isolationists and internationalists may have followed a general trend of

“unilateral internationalism,” but this does not mean that the Americans have always agreed on the meanings of American exceptionalism and identity.207 Even before the Great

Debate, the Americans disagreed on the frontier expansion against the Western colonies, the Indian nations, and Mexico.208 After the Great Debate, they disagreed on the expansion of the Monroe Doctrine into Central and Latin America. 209 Later, they disagreed on

America’s participation in the two world wars. These disagreements reflected different views of American identity. One cannot paint a uniform picture of national identity based on a general foreign policy trend.

For these reasons, I maintain that American identity has been contested by two identity groups: isolationists and liberal internationalists.

Japanese Identity

an antonym of internationalism in political science. McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State, chap. 2. 207 Bear Braumoeller, for instances, argues that American isolationism during the interwar period was a “myth” by pointing out the strength of internationalism and the overall internationalist foreign policy decisions during the time. This does not mean that there was no isolationist opposition. Braumoeller, “The Myth of American Isolationism.” 208 For instance, then Whig Rep. Abraham Lincoln famously opposed the Mexican-American War, arguing that it was immoral, unconstitutional, and against America’s republican values. For an overview of American foreign policy during the era, see Ray Allen Billington and Martin Ridge, Westward Expansion: A History of the American Frontier, 6th ed. (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 2001); Mark Joy, American Expansionism, 1783-1860: A Manifest Destiny? (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013). 209 For a brief overview, see Christopher McKnight Nichols, “The Enduring Power of Isolationism: An Historical Perspective,” Orbis 57, no. 3 (June 1, 2013): 392–96. For more, see David Henry Burton, William Howard Taft: Confident Peacemaker (Philadelphia, PA: Saint Joseph’s University Press, 2004); Ralph Eldin Minger, William Howard Taft and United States Foreign Policy: The Apprenticeship Years, 1900-1908 (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1975); Dana Gardner Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964).

After a few hundred years of diplomatic isolation, Tokugawa Japan was forced to open its door to the outside world when U.S. Commodore Matthew C. Perry and his “Black

Ships” (kurofune) arrived at its shore in 1853. After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan modernized and rose as a great power under the banner of “Rich Nation, Strong Army.”

During this incredible national transformation, there emerged two competing worldviews about Japan’s national identity: moderate internationalist and pan-Asianist. While moderate internationalists had a narrative of “Japan in the world” and promoted its role as a member of the Western club, pan-Asianists had had a narrative of “Japan in Asia” and championed its role as a leader in Asia.210

Moderate Internationalist

Moderate internationalists had a narrative of “Japan in the world” and promoted its role to “de-Asianize” and Westernize and to participate in world politics as part of the

Western club.211 Prince Kinmochi Saionji, one of the senior statesmen (genro) in charge of nominating prime ministers and deciding Japan’s foreign policy objectives, explained the worldview of these statesmen as “Japan in the world”: “[Instead of] thinking of ‘Japan as a leader in Asia’ or an ‘Asian Monroe Doctrine’ … [w]e must look at the broad picture of the world and think about the direction of our country…. Japan can secure its place in the

210 Price Kinmochi Saionji, one of the most important senior statesmen in modern Japan, used the terms “Japan in the world” and “Japan in Asia” to describe the two identity worldviews. Kumao Harada, Saionji- ko to Seikyoku, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1950), 376–77. For scholarly work that builds on this identity categorization, see Yoshitake Oka’s “Kokuminteki Dokuritsu to Kokka Risei” in Yoshitake Oka, Oka Yoshitake Chosakushu, vol. 6 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1993). 211 Historian Ian Nish describe the moderate leaders as “internationalists.” To differentiate them from American liberal internationalists, I call them moderate internationalists. Ian Hill Nish, Japan’s Struggle with Internationalism: Japan, China, and the League of Nations, 1931-3 (London, UK: Kegan Paul International, 1993), 8.

world by ruling it together with Britain and America.”212

Behind the embracement of the Western civilization was the brute reality of international politics at the time. Japanese leaders became aware of the harsh treatment of

“uncivilized” nations by the “civilized” European great powers after observing the fall of the Chinese Middle Kingdom in the Opium War (1840) and experiencing the Western

“gunboat diplomacy” that forcefully opened other states and stripped of their sovereign prerogatives by coercing into signing unequal treaties. The secretary of the Iwakura delegation, which travelled the United States and Europe between 1871 and 1873, observed: “The flesh of the weak is eaten by the strong. Ever since the Europeans began sailing to faraway lands, the weaker states of the tropics have been devoured by them.”213

Japanese leaders thus concluded that to survive the realpolitik of Western imperial competition, their country must depart from the “backward-looking” Asian countries and become a “civilized” member of the European international society. Yukichi Fukuzawa, one of the most influential Japanese political thinkers at the time, argued in his famous piece, “Datsu-A Ron” (De-Asianization):

Once the wind of Western civilization blows to the East, every blade of grass and every tree in the East follow what the Western wind brings…. In my view, these two countries [China and Korea] cannot survive as independent nations with the onslaught of Western civilization to the East. We do not have time to wait for the enlightenment of our neighbors so that we can work together toward the development of Asia. It is better for us to leave the ranks of Asian nations and cast our lot with civilized nations of the West.214

212 Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, 1950, 2:376–77. 213 Inoue Kaoru Ko Denki Hensan Kai, Segai Inoue Ko Den, vol. 3 (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1968), 907–8. 214 Yukichi Fukuzawa, “Datsu-A Ron,” Jiji Shimpo, March 16, 1885. Also see Akira Tanaka, “Datsua” No Meiji Ishin (Tokyo: Nihon Hoso Shuppan Kyokai, 1984).

Similarly, Kaoru Inoue, one of the senior statesmen (genro) that led the Meiji Restoration and ruled Meiji Japan, wrote:

We must make our empire a European-style empire; make our people a European- style people, create a new, European-style empire in the Orient. Only by doing so can our empire climb to an equal position in terms of treaties with the Occidental states.215

Most Meiji leaders were thus moderate internationalists aspiring Japan’s

Westernization. Under the Meiji Restoration and the national slogans such as “a wealthy nation, a strong army” (fukoku kyohei) and “civilization, enlightenment” (bunmei kaika),

“Japan strove to adopt the behavior appropriate to the Western-dominated international society in order to be accepted as one of its full members.”216 In 1894-1895, Japan defeated the Qing Empire after more than six months of successful campaigns by the Japanese land and naval forces. Japanese colonial expansion then extended to Taiwan and the Pescadores.

Following the imperial expansion, Japan significantly increased its military expenditures to possess a first-class army and navy, from the average of 21 million yen before the Sino-

Japanese war to 73 million yen in 1896 and 110 million yen in 1897.217 In 1902, Japan signed an alliance treaty with Great Britain, a first-class military power in the world, as part of its policy of “cooperation with the West” (obei kyocho).218 In 1904-05, Japan proved its military power to the world by winning the Russo-Japanese War.219 Following the war,

215 Quoted in Shogo Suzuki, Civilization and Empire: China and Japan’s Encounter with European International Society (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009), 114. 216 Hidemi Suganami, “Japan’s Entry into International Society,” in The Expansion of International Society, ed. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1984), 192. 217 Iriye, Pacific Estrangement, 46. 218 Ian Hill Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907 (London, UK: Athlone Press, 1966); Ian Hill Nish, Alliance in Decline: Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23 (London, UK: Athlone Press, 1972). 219 Masayoshi Matsumura, Baron Kaneko and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05): A Study in the Public

Japan annexed Korea in 1910.220 By 1911, Japan had succeeded in rectifying the unequal treaties forced by the Western countries in the nineteenth century and recovered its tariff autonomy, becoming a full member of the European international society.221 During this period of modernization, Japan “began to apply what she had learnt from the West in her external affairs,” and “by the end … had begun to behave like a Great Power.”222

After the country’s successful accession to great-power status, moderate internationalists remained in power and managed foreign policy. After World War I, Japan joined the League of Nations as a charter member and one of four permanent members of the League Council. In the international organization, Japan was “a conscientious member, sending to Geneva some of its most talented diplomats and bureaucrats … who strove to make international order efficacious.”223 One of these Japanese policymakers was Inazo

Nitobe, a prominent politican who served as Undersecretary General of the League. He wrote, “Japan’s preparations are for peace and the maintenance of peaceful relations with the rest of the world. There is scarcely an international Conference of any importance in which Japan has not participated, hardly any document drawn up for world peace which she has not signed with sincerity, not a single ‘universal way of heaven – earth’ which she has not accepted as a guiding principle of Government and diplomacy.”224 During the

1920s, the Japanese government, led by Foreign Minister Kijuro Shidehara, also cooperated with the Western powers in other multilateral schemes for disarmament, trade,

Diplomacy of Japan, trans. Ian Ruxton (Morrisville, NC: Lulu.com, 2009). 220 Shigenori Moriyama, Nikkan Heigo (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Koubunkan, 1992). 221 Makoto Iokibe, Joyaku Kaiseishi: Hoken Kaihuku he no Tenbo to Nashonarisumu (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2010). 222 Suganami, “Japan’s Entry into International Society,” 192. 223 Thomas W. Burkman, Japan and the League of Nations: Empire and World Order, 1914-1938 (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2008), 210. 224 Inazo Nitobe, Japan: Some Phases of Her Problems and Development (London, UK: Ernest Benn, 1931), 168.

and world peace, such as the Washington Conference treaties, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the London Naval Treaty. Historians praise this “Shidehara Diplomacy” as the culmination of the country’s internationalist foreign policy. 225 Shidehara explained that his foreign policy pursued “co-prosperity and co-existence among nations,” based on the spirit of “live and let live.”226 Beyond these top-level political elites, internationalist movements spread among the intellectuals, the Foreign Ministry, and the Imperial court, giving birth to organizations such as the Japan League of Nations Association and the Japanese Council of the Institute for Pacific Relations.227 Internationalism was having its heyday in Japan.

Yet, as discussed in Chapters 3-5, the era of moderate internationalists ended with the rise of pan-Asianism during the 1930s.

Pan-Asianist

Pan-Asianism (Ajia shugi) was an idea that “Japan as a leader should unite the

Asian peoples to resist Anglo-Saxon great powers’ encroachment into Asia.”228 In contrast to moderate internationalists’ emphasis on de-Asianization and Westernization, pan-

Asianists had a narrative of “Japan in Asia” and championed its role as a leader of Asia

(Ajia no meishu). For them, Japan was “a ‘chosen’ country, the ‘Land of the Gods’— qualities that uniquely fitted it for a special ‘mission’ to liberate Asia from Western

225 Ryuji Hattori, Shidehara Kijuro to Nijuu Seiki no Nihon: Gaiko to Minshu Shugi (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2006). 226 Kijuro Shidehara, Gaiko Gojunen, Revised Edition (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha, 2015), 289. 227 Burkman, Japan and the League of Nations. 228 Ryuhei Hase, Dentoteki Uyoku Uchida Ryohei no Kenkyu (Fukuoka: Kyushu University Press, 1980), 22. On pan-Asianism, see Yoshimi Takeuchi, ed., Gendai Nihon Shiso Taikei Dai, vol. 9 (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1963); Tetsuo Furuya, Kindai Nihon No Ajia Ninshiki (Tokyo: Ryokuin Shobo, 1996); Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman, eds., Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History, vol. 1, 2 vols. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011); Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman, eds., Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History, vol. 2, 2 vols. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011).

oppression, become the leader of the region, and … unite the whole world under the benevolent rule of the Japanese emperor, following the ancient slogan hakko ichiu, or ‘The

Eight Corners of the World [United] under One Roof.”229

The idea of pan-Asianism was shared and promoted by policymakers, intellectuals, and masses in various corners of Japanese society. The central pan-Asianist leaders and thinkers included Tenshin Okakura, Atsumaro Konoe, Mitsuru Toyama, Ryohei Uchida,

Kazunobu Kanokogi, Ikki Kita, and Shumei Okawa. They argued for Japan to unite, lead, and liberate Asia, because, as Okakura put it, “Asia is one,” and “the glory of Europe is the humiliation of Asia.”230 Okakura argued that unlike the warring people of the West, the peace-loving people of the Orient, led by Japan, would be able to transcend the ethnic and religious divides and establish a prosperous region for themselves.231 Toyama similarly claimed that Japan must lead the “great restoration” of Asia to emancipate the Asians from the rule by the Westerners.232

Early pan-Asianist political associations included the Raising Asia Society (Koakai, later Asia Association, or Ajia Kyokai), the Dark Ocean Society (Genyosha), the East Asian

Society (Toakai), the East Asian Common Culture Society (Toa Dobunkai), and the Black

Dragon Society (Kokuryukai). 233 These organizations supported Japan’s continental

229 Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman, “Introduction: The Emergence of Pan-Asianism as an Ideal of Asian Identity and Solidarity, 1850-2008,” in Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History, ed. Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman, vol. 2 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), 9; Hotta, Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War, 44–49. 230 Kakuzo Okakura, The Awakening of Japan (New York, NY: The Century Co., 1905), 107; Kakuzo Okakura, The Ideals of the East, with Special Reference to the Art of Japan (New York, NY: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1920), 1. On Tenshin Okakura’s influence on pan-Asianism in Japan and other countries, see Brij Tankha, Okakura Tenshin and Pan-Asianism: Shadows of the Past (Kent, UK: Global Oriental, 2009). 231 Kakuzo Okakura, The Book of Tea (New York, NY: Putnam’s, 1906); Hotta, Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War, 30–37. 232 Takashi Saga, “Toyama Mitsuru and Asianism,” Journal of International Relations and Comparative Culture 11, no. 1 (2012): 1–19. 233 Saaler and Szpilman, Pan-Asianism, 2011, vol. 1, chaps. 2, 3, 9, 10.

expansion into Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria as its pejorative as a leader of Asia. After the Sino-Japanese War, the public gradually started to support pan-Asianism. Many

Japanese viewed their country’s victory in the war as the end of the Sino-centric Asian order and became convinced that their country must rule the region as its leader.234 They were thus dissatisfied with the moderate internationalists’ overtly pragmatic and pro-

Western foreign policy and demanded a more moralistic and emotional basis for justifying

Japan’s imperialist diplomacy.235

Before the First World War, pan-Asianism was still a minority voice. It gained popularity during the war, as Western influence declined in East Asia and opened opportunities for Japan to project its influence in the region. Terms such as Pan-Asianism

(Han Ajia shugi), Greater Asianism (Dai Ajia shugi), All-Asianism (Zen Ajia shugi), and the “Asian Monroe Doctrine” (Ajia Monroshugi) became common in popular outlets.236

For instance, Ichiro (better known as Soho) Tokutomi, one of the most influential columnists at the time, wrote in 1917 that Japan had a “mighty mission” to establish an

“Asian Monroe Doctrine” and unite the region. 237 Many other pan-Asianist leaders similarly argued that Japan as a leader must establish “Asia of the Asians.”238

As the idea of pan-Asianism became widespread, new pan-Asianist organizations were founded. In 1919, Okawa and Mitsukawa established the Pan-Asian Society of Those

Who Yet Remain (Yuzonsha), and Okawa founded the Society for Action on Earth

234 Feng Liu, “The Development and Feature of ‘Asianism’ in the Later Half of 1910s,” Chiba Daigaku Jinbun Shakai Kagaku Kenkyu, no. 25 (2012): 78. 235 Akira Iriye, Nihon No Gaiko: Meiji Ishin Kara Gendai Made (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Sha, 1966), 28, 42–43; Nakao Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919 (New York, NY: Routledge, 1998), 94. 236 Saaler and Szpilman, “Introduction,” 16–18. 237 Tokutomi Ichiro, “Japan’s Mighty Mission,” in Is Japan a Menace to Asia?, ed. Taraknath Das (Shanghai: no publisher, 1917), 153–59. 238 Liu, “The Development and Feature of ‘Asianism’ in the Later Half of 1910s.”

(Kochisha) in 1925. In 1924, members of the Lower House, including Isao Iwasaki and

Juntaro Imazato, formed the Pan-Asiatic Society (Zen Ajia Kyokai) and organized many pan-Asian conferences both at home and abroad.239

Certainly, the imperialistic outlook of Japanese pan-Asianism invited criticism from other Asian nations. Pan-Asianists, in their early years, tended to view Japan and other

Asian nations as equal partners working together to restore the region, and gained support from Asian revolutionary leaders, including Chinese nationalist Sun Yat-sen. However, as

Japan grew its national power and defeated China, Korea, and Russia, this idea eventually gave a way to a more egocentric worldview in which Japan should rule the region. This received foreign criticism, especially from China, where anti-Japanese nationalism and boycotts were strong. In November 1924, Sun Yat-sen criticized Japan in his famous pan-

Asianist speech in Kobe. Stressing the superiority of Asian civilization and culture to the

West, he urged Japan to revive Asia under the Confucian, “Kingly Way” (Chinese: wangdao; Japanese: odo) of benevolent rule, not the Western, “Despotic Way” (Chinese: badao; Japanese: hado) of coercive rule. He in effect told the Japanese audience to return to the earlier pan-Asianist vision of equal partnerships between Japan and other Asian nations. 240 Despite such external criticism, many Japanese embraced the Japan-centric view of pan-Asianism.

Despite the increasing popularity, it was not until the 1930s that pan-Asianists and their ideals became dominant in Japanese politics. 241 Prior to the Manchuria Crisis,

239 Sven Saaler, “The Pan-Asiantic Society and the ‘Conference of Asian Peoples’ in Nagasaki, 1926,” in Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History, ed. Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman, vol. 2 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), 97–105. 240 Takeuchi, Gendai Nihon Shiso Taikei Dai; Takeshi Nakajima, Ajia Shugi: Sono Saki No Kindai e (Tokyo: Ushio Shuppansha, 2014). 241 Saaler and Szpilman, “Introduction,” 11.

moderate internationalists held power and managed relations with the United States.

In sum, Japan had two identity groups: moderate internationalists, who aspired

Japan to become a civilized great power through de-Asianization and Westernization, and pan-Asianists, who desired Japan to become a leader in Asia to unite and liberate the region.

One may raise two issues with this categorization of Japanese national identity. First, some scholars criticize the identity dichotomy of de-Asianization and pan-Asianism.242

Critics argue that these two narratives were more complimentary than contradictory and in fact formed a coherent narrative: De-Asianization emphasized Japan’s more civilized status vis-à-vis the rest of Asia, and pan-Asianism Japan’s unique Oriental position vis-à- vis the West. 243 Moreover, critics point out that Fukuzawa, when writing the famous

“Datsu-A Ron,” recognized the danger that excessive Westernization would undermine

Japan’s national identity. In fact, until the 1930s, the exclusionary worldview of pan-

Asianism was not a popular concept, and the idea of “East-West cultural harmony” was common.244 It was during the 1950s when the Japanese “discovered” Fukuzawa’s text and reflected it in the postwar discourse.245 There are a few issues with this criticism. As shown below and in the following chapters, pan-Asianism had emerged as a potent counternarrative against de-Asianization by the 1930s. Even if the two formed a unified narrative right after the Meiji Restoration, they diverged as time passed. And even if Fukuzawa’s text became popular after 1945, his message of de-Asianization reflected the spirit of

242 For a survey of such critiques, see Tetsuya Sakai, Kindai Nihon No Kokusai Chitsujo Ron (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2007), 236–45. 243 Junji Banno, Meiji: Siso No Jitsuzo (Tokyo: Sobunsha, 1977), chap. 1. 244 Hiroaki Matsuzawa, Kindai Nihon No Keisei to Seiyo Taiken (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1993), chap. 5; Stefan Tanaka, Japan’s Orient: Rendering Past into History (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1993); Sakai, Kindai Nihon No Kokusai Chitsujo Ron, 239–40. 245 Sakai, Kindai Nihon No Kokusai Chitsujo Ron, 243–44.

Westernization in Japan’s prewar internationalism. In short, moderate internationalists and pan-Asianists did emerge as opposing identity groups and contested Japan’s national identity and foreign policy.

Second, the anti-Western flavor of pan-Asianism may raise concerns about an endogeneity problem: It was anti-Western enmity that created the pan-Asianist identity, so that an identity dilemma did not create such enmity but merely reflected it. This view is inaccurate, however. The domestic debate about the West versus the East stemmed from a genuine “identity crisis,” or fundamental disagreements about how to preserve Japanese- ness and Asian-ness during the rapid modernization following the Meiji Restoration.246 But even most of the late Meiji nationalist ideologues were Westernizers. As one historian posits, “it is a trivialization … to regard the ideologists as anti-Western, which the majority emphatically were not, or as apostles of a return to the past, which had little hold on most of them.”247 Therefore, the idea of “East-West cultural harmony” was common in Meiji

Japan. Pan-Asianists, however, later became anti-Western because of the identity politics vis-à-vis the West, a point that I discuss below.

American-Japanese Identity Politics before the 1930s

How did U.S.-Japan relations evolve in the presence of these identity worldviews?

In this section, I examine the pre-1930s period, when the two countries remained relatively friendly. I show that the friendly relationship partly resulted from the fact that the two

246 Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, 119–20. 247 Carol Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 20.

countries did not have incompatible identity groups (American liberal internationalists and

Japanese pan-Asianists) in power and suffer an identity dilemma. There were certainly issues that caused frictions in the relationship. Particularly, those surrounding race, China, and naval limitations posed challenges to the worldviews of the incompatible identity groups and created enmity. Yet, this did not lead to an identity dilemma and an escalation of American-Japanese enmity since the compatible identity groups (American isolationists and Japanese moderate internationalists) maintained power and prevented American liberal internationalists and Japanese pan-Asianists from taking confrontational actions. I demonstrate this by organizing the discussion into periods before and after World War I.

Before WWI

U.S.-Japan relations before WWI were generally cooperative. There were indeed issues such as race and immigration that created enmity between the two countries. Yet, so long as American isolationists and Japanese moderate internationalists remained in power,

U.S.-Japan relations did not experience an identity dilemma.

As discussed above, under the leadership of the moderate internationalists, Japan had successfully embraced Westernization and transformed itself into a great power by the time of WWI. It had expanded its sphere of interest into northern China, Manchuria, Taiwan, and Korea. Meanwhile, by the beginning of President Theodore Roosevelt’s second term, many Americans had become more isolationist and less enthusiastic about imperial adventures, caring about their own sphere of influence in the Western hemisphere but not

Japan’s expansion in the Far East.248

A master of the Old Diplomacy, President Roosevelt understood the public mood as well as the strategic importance of cooperation with the new great power, Japan. He accordingly adopted realpolitik, pragmatic foreign policies. 249 On December 6, 1904,

Roosevelt reaffirmed the Monroe Doctrine over the Venezuela Crisis of 1902-03, declaring that the United States had the right to exercise its “international police power” to address chronic unrest or wrongdoing in the Western Hemisphere.250 He welcomed the rise of Japan and praised the Japanese as “a wonderful and civilized people … entitled to stand on an absolute equality with all the other peoples of the civilized world.”251

Observing Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War, Roosevelt congratulated the

Japanese: “I was thoroughly well pleased with the Japanese victory, for Japan is playing our game.”252 He continued, “The Japs have played our game because they have played the game of civilized mankind.”253 He also showed understanding to Japan’s annexation of

Korea despite the U.S.-Korea treaty of 1882, in which America promised to use its “good offices” to help the Koreans if their independence was threatened. He wrote, “The treaty rested on the false assumption that Korea could govern herself well,”254 and “[Korea was] utterly impotent either for self-government or self-defense.” 255 “Korea is absolutely

248 Richard William Leopold, Elihu Root and the Conservative Tradition (Boston, BA: Little, Brown and Company, 1954), 50. 249 Raymond A. Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and Japan (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1966); Charles E. Neu, An Uncertain Friendship: Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, 1906-1909 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967). 250 Theodore Roosevelt, “Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine,” December 6, 1904. 251 Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 4 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951), 1240–41. 252 Morison, 4:724. 253 Morison, 4:865. 254 Theodore Roosevelt, America and the World War (C. Scribner’s Sons, 1915), 29. 255 Theodore Roosevelt, The Autobiography of Theodore Roosevelt (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1913), 545.

Japan’s. … Japan could not afford to see Korea in the hands of a great foreign power. …

Therefore, when Japan thought the right time had come, it calmly tore up the treaty and took Korea.”256

In his meeting with Japanese Ambassador Kentaro Kaneko, the President even said,

“Japan is the only nation in Asia that understands the principles and methods of Western civilization. … A ‘Japanese Monroe Doctrine’ in Asia will remove the temptation to

European encroachment, and Japan will be recognized as the leader of the Asiatic nations, and her power will form the shield behind which they can reorganize their national systems…. I will support [Japan] with all my power, either during my Presidency or after its expiration.”257 In 1908, the United States signed the Root-Takahira agreement on the maintenance of the status-quo in the Asia-Pacific, China’s territorial integrity, and equal opportunity in China. The agreement was seen by the Japanese and international society as

U.S. implicit recognition of Japan’s sphere of influence in Manchuria and the Korean

Peninsula.258

After his time in office, Roosevelt criticized his successor William Taft for his

“dollar diplomacy,” which asserted U.S. commercial interests such as investment and railways in Manchuria.259 He wrote to Taft: “It is … peculiarly our interest not to take any steps as regards Manchuria which will give the Japanese cause to feel … that we are hostile to them. … Our interests in Manchuria are really unimportant, and not such that the

American people would be content to run the slightest risk of collision about them.”260

256 Roosevelt, America and the World War, 29. 257 James Bradley, The China Mirage: The Hidden History of American Disaster in Asia (New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company, 2015), 74. 258 Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, chap. 16. 259 On dollar diplomacy, see Wu Xin Bo Zhu, Dollar Diplomacy with Foreign Powers in China :1909-1913 (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 1997). 260 Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 7 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

The moderate internationalist leaders in Japan responded positively to America’s welcoming the rise of a Westernized, civilized Japan. In his interview with the New York

Times Japanese Prime Minister Taro Katsura said, “The introduction of all the blessings of modern civilization into the East Asiatic countries—that is our Far Eastern policy …

[because] China and Korea are both atrociously misgoverned.” 261 During the Russo-

Japanese War, Ambassador Kaneko also explained, “Japan simply seeks in the present war to maintain the peace of Asia and conserve the influence of the Anglo-American civilization in the East.”262 These self-representations fitted Roosevelt’s understanding of

Japan as a successful fusion of Occidental and Oriental civilizations.263

In other words, there was mutual identity recognition between America and Japan.

Acting in line with their isolationist narrative of the Monroe Doctrine, American isolationists welcomed Japan’s rise as a member of the Western civilization club. In response, Japanese moderate internationalists conducted diplomacy in a way that fitted that narrative. Thus, there was no identity dilemma where one’s attempt to enact its identity challenges the other’s identity.

None of this is to say that U.S.-Japan relations experienced no tension. Particularly, racism in America threatened many Japanese’ national pride as a civilized power, prompting them to embrace pan-Asianism, become anti-American, and claim that Japan must abandon and confront the West. The root cause of the racial tension was the anti-

Japanese immigrant movements in America, which first started in the West coast and then

Press, 1951), 189–90. 261 Taro Katsura, “Japan’s Policy Abroad,” New York Times, July 30, 1905. 262 Matsumura, Baron Kaneko, 91–92. 263 Georgia Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), 264–70.

spread nationwide. The “Yellow Peril” became prevalent as many Americans viewed

Japanese immigrants as nonassimilable and even experienced war scares, especially after

Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War. 264 During the war, the California state legislation passed a resolution declaring that “the close of the war … will surely bring our shores hordes … of the discharged soldiers of the Japanese army, who will crowd the State with immoral, intemperate, quarrelsome men, bound to labor for a pittance, and to subsist on a supply with which a white man can hardly sustain life.”265 William Straight, U.S.

Counsel General at Mukuden and later Acting Chief of the Far Eastern Division at the State

Department, who pushed the construction of American railways in Manchuria, wrote: “For no particular reason, with no real cause for complaint I now find myself hating the Japanese more than anything else in the world. … ‘The East is East and the West is West, and never the twain shall meet.’” 266 In 1913, California passed the Alien Land Law, which specifically targeted Japanese immigrants and banned their land acquisition. This legislation then became a model for similar laws in other states.

In response to the racial discrimination, the Japanese became extremely upset, not because they feared its economic consequences, but because they resented its identity implications.267 Japanese officials complained that the Alien Land Law was “hurtful to their just national susceptibility,” and explained the sense of identity denial among the

Japanese: “What we regard very unpleasant about the California question … is the

264 Carey McWilliams, Prejudice: Japanese-Americans: Symbol of Racial Intolerance (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1944); Roger Daniels, The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California, and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1962); Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality. 265 Akira Iriye, Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967), 105. 266 Iriye, 104. On Straight’s policy in Manchuria, see Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, chap. 14. 267 Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality, chaps. 3, 4.

discrimination made against our people in distinction from some other nations. ... We are not vain enough to consider ourselves at the very forefront of enlightenment; we know that we still have much to learn from the West. But … we thought ourselves ahead of any other

Asiatic people and as good as some of the European nations.”268 The problem, according to another diplomat, was that racial measures treated the Japanese “as if the Japanese were on the same level of morality and civilization as Chinese and other less advanced populations of Asia.”269

In this climate, many Japanese abandoned de-Asianization (Datsu-A) and supported pan-Asianism (Ajia shugi), demanding confrontation against the United States.270 Prince

Atsumaro Konoe, one of the pan-Asianist leaders and the President of the House of Peers, even argued that Japan and China must form “an alliance of the same race” (dojinshu domei) in preparation for the final battle between the yellow and white races.271 Although the U.S. Navy concluded that the Japanese navy posed no direct threat to the United States even after the Russo-Japanese War, 272 Japan’s anti-Americanism was so strong that

Roosevelt recognized the danger of potential war with Japan.273 The Wilson administration also discussed mobilization of the American Pacific fleet against potential Japanese attacks.274

Despite the anti-American outcry, Japanese moderate internationalists still held

268 Shimazu, 76, 79–80. 269 Shimazu, 80. 270 Shimazu, 101–2. 271 Atsumaro Konoe, “Dojinshu Domei Fu Shina Mondai Kenkyu No Hitsuyo,” Taiyo 24, no. 1 (January 1, 1898): 1–3. Also see Urs Matthias Zachmann, “Konoe Atsumaro and the Idea of an Alliance of the Yellow Race, 1898,” in Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History, ed. Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman, vol. 1 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), 85–92; Hotta, Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War, 39–41. 272 Neu, An Uncertain Friendship, 98. 273 Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 6 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951), 1012–13, 1510–14. 274 Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality, 76.

power and managed relations with the United States.275 For instance, Ambassador Kaneko dismissed the talk of “Asia of the Asiatics” and the “Asian Monroe Doctrine,” assuring the

Americans: “Instead of trying to shut Americans and Europeans out, Japan so far has done all in her power to attract them to the East.” The Yellow Peril, he argued, was “a golden opportunity” for the Japanese, Americans, and Europeans to exchange cultures and civilizations for the betterment of the Orient and the West. 276 In 1907, the Japanese government reached the Gentleman’s Agreement with the United States, voluntarily restricting Japanese immigrants to America. It also pursued diplomatic solutions to “save face,” despite public criticism against such “week-kneed diplomacy” (nanjaku gaiko).277 It showed no hostility toward the cruise of the American fleet in the Pacific, a strategic move designed to show America’s naval power during ongoing great power naval arms race. And both nations reached the 1908 Root-Takahira agreement discussed above.278 In other words, so long as Japanese moderate internationalists were in charge, anti-Americanism was contained. An identity dilemma did not erupt because compatible identity groups held power and pursued cooperation.

After WWI

After World War I, the compatible identity groups, American isolationists and

Japanese pan-Asianists, largely maintained domestic power and managed U.S.-Japan

275 Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, 300–301. 276 Baron Kentaro Kaneko, “The Yellow Peril Is the Golden Opportunity for Japan,” The North American Review 179, no. 576 (1904): 645, 648. 277 Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality, chap. 3. 278 Neu, An Uncertain Friendship, chaps. 9–11.

cooperative relations. There were certainly points of contention such as China, race, and naval limitation, all of which involved challenges to the worldviews of the incompatible identity groups, American liberal internationalists and Japanese pan-Asianists, and fueled their enmity toward the other state. Yet, this did not escalate as an identity dilemma because the compatible identity groups remained in power and prevented the incompatible groups from seeking confrontation.

Following the outbreak of WWI in Europe, Japan sided with the Entente powers and declared war on Germany in August 1914. It opportunistically sought to expand its interests in East Asia, issuing the Twenty-One Demands to China in January 1915. These demands included recognition of Japan’s seizure of German interests in Shandong, expansion of Japan’s railway and other commercial interests in Southern Manchuria and

Inner Eastern Mongolia, and appointment of Japanese political, economic, and military advisors.279

Unlike the pre-WWI period, when America was largely isolationist, Japan’s expansion in East Asia coincided with liberal internationalists in the White House:

President Woodrow Wilson, Secretary of State William Bryan, who had been a champion of Chinese nationalism, and others including Paul S. Reinsch, a China scholar and minister to Peking, and E. T. Williams, a former missionary and the chief of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department. Also, prior to WWI, there was a republican revolution of 1912 in

279 The demands reflected opportunism to expand Japan’s colonial interests rather than pan-Asianism to establish Japan’s regional leadership. Foreign Minister Takaaki Kato, who authored the demands, in fact denied pan-Asianism or an Asian Monroe Doctrine and prioritized cooperation with the Anglo-Saxon powers. Yuuichi Hasegawa, ed., Taisho-Ki Nihon No America Ninsiki (Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2001), 100. Also, the most assertive parts of the demands, Japan’s police and administrative rights in China, were bargaining tips, not actual demands. Shinichi Kitaoka, Monko Kaiho Seisaku to Nihon (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2015), chap. 2. For more, see Sochi Naraoka, Taika Nijyuichikajo Yokyu to ha Nan datta no ka: Dai Ichiji Sekai Taisen to Nicchu Tairitsu no Genten (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai, 2015).

China. This gave liberal internationalists, including church leaders, a hope for the birth of a New China as a “sister republic” led by Sun Yat-sen, “the George Washington of China” and a man of Christian faith. “It was the firm purpose of the American missionaries,” writes

Walter Mead, “to make China an advanced, Christian, and democratic country, and when

Sun Yat-sen took power, those missionaries were convinced that the destined hour was at hand.”280 On February 29, the House of Representatives passed a resolution expressing support for China’s democratization.281

Japan’s Twenty-One Demands thus posed a challenge to America’s internationalist role as a “crusader nation” to uphold the peace system and to democratize and Christianize

China. Unlike Theodore Roosevelt, who considered American interests in China “really unimportant” and avoided confrontation with Japan from a realpolitik, pragmatic perspective,282 Wilson and others considered the China issue as one of American identity and became hostile toward the Japanese. In short, they viewed the China issue through what historians call the “missionary mind.”283 Bryan emphasized that American interests in China were not only commercial: “For two generations American missionaries and teachers have made sacrifices in behalf of religious and educational work in China.”284

Reinsch also insisted, “Among the specific American interests already existing in China,

280 Mead, Special Providence, 134. 281 Iriye, Across the Pacific, 125–27. 282 Colonel Edward House, Wilson’s advisor, agreed with Roosevelt, writing in his diary: “Trouble may grow out of this and I advised great caution. … we are not at present in a position to war with Japan over the ‘open door’ in China.” Quoted in Michael J. Green, By More Than Providence: Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia Pacific Since 1783 (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2017), 125–26. 283 James Reed, The Missionary Mind and American East Asia Policy, 1911-1915 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 1983). 284 “The Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador,” March 13, 1915, Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1924), 108 (hereafter cited as FRUS: 1915).

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that of missionary and educational work had at this time to be given the first rank.”285 Thus,

Bryan and Reinsch both emphasized America’s “moral obligation” to protect the open door in and the administrative integrity of China. A champion of “missionary diplomacy” to

China, Wilson agreed with his advisers: “we should be as active as the circumstances permit in showing ourselves to be champions of the sovereign rights of China.”286 Thus, the President instructed Bryan to issue the famous “non-recognition” statement of any

Sino-Japanese agreements that would impair America’s treaty rights, China’s political or territorial integrity, or the Open-Door policy.287

This enmity and confrontation toward Japan soon ended because Wilson’s internationalist vision of American identity was shortly rejected by isolationists. His failure to gain the Senate’s support for the League of Nations—due to the Irreconcilables’ opposition against the League itself and many Republicans’ reservation over Article 10

(collective security) of the League Covenant—evinced the strength of isolationism.288 With regards to East Asia, Robert Lansing, counselor of the State Department, succeeded

Secretary Bryan in 1917. Unlike Wilson and other internationalists, Lansing rejected

America’s crusading role abroad, including China. For the new secretary, who later joined the isolationist opposition against U.S. entry into the League of Nations, 289 “American

285 Paul S. Reinsch, An American Diplomat in China (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page & company, 1922), 66. 286 “The Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador,” March 13, 1915, FRUS: 1915, 108; “President Wilson to the Secretary of State,” April 14, 1915, Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 2, The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1940), 416–17 (hereafter cited as FRUS: 1914-1920, vol. 2); Davis and Trani, Distorted Mirrors, chap. 8; Kitaoka, Monko Kaiho Seisaku to Nihon, 134–37. 287 “The Secretary of State to Ambassador Guthrie,” May 11, 1915, FRUS:1915, 146. 288 Harold Underwood Faulkner, From Versailles to the New Deal: A Chronicle of the Harding-Coolidge- Hoover Era, Volume 51 of The Chronicles of America Series (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1950); Denna Frank Fleming, The United States and the League of Nations, 1918-1920 (New York, NY: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1932); Guinsberg, The Pursuit of Isolationism; Ralph Stone, The Irreconcilables: The Fight against the League of Nations (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1970). 289 Robert Lansing, Peace Negotiations: Personal Narrative (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1921), 39,

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interests in China were commercial only, and a Japanese guarantee of equal treatment for

American goods satisfied requirements of the ‘Open Door.’” 290 “From such a narrow definition of American interests, it naturally followed that for the United States to concern itself with China’s integrity was nothing less than ‘quixotic.’” Lansing viewed “Japanese predominance in East Asia as a fact to be reckoned with, as long as America’s security and economic interests were not compromised. … [And] he felt that war between Japan and

America would be so catastrophic that he even considered the sale of the Philippines to

Japan in return for certain concessions on Japan’s part.”291 Soon after coming into office,

Lansing thus ignored opposition from liberal internationalists such as Reinsch and signed the Lansing-Ishii agreement with Japan, in which America recognized Japanese “special interests” in China. 292 In other words, if the incompatible identity group, American internationalists, had continued to hold office and pursued further confrontation with the

Japanese, American-Japanese enmity could have escalated. But since the compatible identity group, American isolationists, regained power, the United States avoided hostile confrontation with Japan.

After WWI, the two countries deepened their cooperative relations, as American isolationists and Japanese moderate internationalists secured power and conducted diplomacy. On the American side, isolationism became more influential. Under two

Republican Presidents, Warren G. Harding and Herbert Hoover, the United States during the 1920s “fostered a policy of deliberate isolation.”293 In his Inaugural Address, Harding

149–50, 168–69. 290 Warren I. Cohen, America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations, 3rd ed. (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1990), 75. 291 Iriye, Across the Pacific, 133. 292 Davis and Trani, Distorted Mirrors, 188. 293 Walter Johnson, The Battle Against Isolation (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1944), 132. Also see Adler, The Isolationist Impulse; Denna Frank Fleming, The United States and World Organization, 1920-

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declared: “Confident of our ability to work out our own destiny, and jealously guarding our right to do so, we seek no part in directing the destinies of the Old World. We do not mean to be entangled.”294 William Borah, the Irreconcilables leader and chairman of the Senate’s

Foreign Relations Committee, “became the foremost spokesman for a new nationalistic, populist, and unilateralist isolationism that became the archetype for opposition to the world order that President Wilson hoped to establish.”295 He proclaimed after Harding’s victory in the 1920 election: “The United States had rededicated itself to the foreign policy of George Washington and James Monroe, undiluted and unemasculated.”296 He and other isolationists opposed U.S. entry into the World Court while leading the “outlawry of war movement,” which contributed to the making of the anti-war Kellogg-Briand Pact.297

In line with this modern isolationism, State Secretary Charles E. Hughes upgraded the Monroe Doctrine with his own “Hughes Doctrine,” positioning the United States as a benign power within the Western hemisphere and only pursuing informal influence in other regions.298 The United States downsized its army to less than two hundred thousand men and refused to make any military guarantee or economic aid to Europe. In East Asia,

Hughes sought “rapprochement with Japan … [based on] … a partial retreat from

Wilsonian New Diplomacy and a partial return to the realist tradition of Theodore

Roosevelt, a master of the Old Diplomacy.” The Secretary “pursue[ed] a friendly policy

1933 (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1938), chap. 6; Powaski, Toward an Entangling Alliance, chap. 2. 294 Quoted in McCrisken, “Exceptionalism,” 72. 295 Nichols, Promise and Peril, 229. 296 Quoted in Powaski, Toward an Entangling Alliance, 27. 297 Nichols, Promise and Peril, chap. 7. 298 Patrick O. Cohrs, The Unfinished Peace after World War I: America, Britain and the Stabilisation of Europe, 1919–1932 (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 8, 95. Also see, Charles E. Hughes, “Observations on the Monroe Doctrine,” The American Journal of International Law 17, no. 4 (1923): 611– 28.

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that would bolster its (Japan’s) liberal-moderate elements and promot[ed] Japanese-

American cooperation.” Thus, while the Secretary insisted on the Open-Door principles as part of the Nine Power Treaty, he was willing to recognize Japan’s “special interests” in

China, particularly Manchuria. 299 Also, Hughes led the conclusion of the Five Power

Treaty and the Four Power Treaty, in which the United States, Japan, and other Western powers agreed to naval limitation, nonfortification of Pacific islands, and recognition of each other’s Pacific possessions. In examining these treaties, isolationist senators made sure to eliminate any potential dangers of international entrapment. In passing the Four

Power Treaty, the isolationist-controlled Senate attached an amendment declaring that the pact contained “no commitment to armed force, no alliance, no obligation to join in any defense.”300

In sum, while the United States during the 1920s was active in international cooperation such as the Washington Conference and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, it made no military commitments abroad. This was “involvement without commitment,” not pure diplomatic isolation but still a rejection of America’s internationalist crusading role in the world.301

This isolationist turn in America coincided with the rule by Japanese moderate

299 Sadao Asada, “From Washington to London: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the Politics of Naval Limitation, 1921–1930,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 4, no. 3 (1993): 220, 223. 300 Powaski, Toward an Entangling Alliance, 36. 301 Guinsberg, The Pursuit of Isolationism, 52. This is where skeptics dispute whether the United States was isolationist during the 1920s. Braumoeller, “The Myth of American Isolationism,” 355–59; Restad, American Exceptionalism, chap. 5; D. C. Watt, “American ‘Isolationism’ in the 1920s: Is It a Useful Concept?,” Bulletin. British Association for American Studies, no. 6 (1963): 3–19; Williams, “The Legend of Isolationism in the 1920’s.” However, U.S. involvement in the Washington Conference, the Anti-war Kellogg-Briand Pact, etc.—policies cited by skeptics as evidence of American internationalism, not isolationism—reflected both - isms. Historian Christopher Nichols calls it “isolationist internationalism” or “a pre-Wilsonian isolationist view of internationalism.” This foreign policy vision “was cooperative enough to satisfy many internationalists, while it was nonentangled enough to placate many among the unilateralist-oriented isolationists.” Nichols, Promise and Peril, 276–77, 314–15. Regardless of this hybridity, the United States during the 1920s did refuse any oversea military commitments. Tucker, A New Isolationism, 27–28.

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internationalists, a compatible identity group. Specifically, Prime Minister Takashi Hara, and Navy Minister Tomosaburo Kato, Foreign Minister Kijuro Shidehara, and Army

Minister Kazushige Ugaki held power, conducted internationalist diplomacy, and cooperated with the Anglo-Saxon powers. In 1920, the Hara government abandoned a coercive approach toward China like the Twenty-One Demands and joined a new four- power (Japan, Britain, America, France) loan project to China. At the 1922 Washington

Conference on naval limitation and the Open-Door policy, the Japanese delegations led by

Prime and Navy Minister Kato and Foreign Minister Shidehara cooperated with the Anglo-

Saxon counterparts, concluded all the Washington treaties, and resolved thorny issues surrounding Shandong, the Twenty-One Demands, and Japan’s Siberia expedition. Foreign

Minister Shidehara later developed his own internationalist “Shidehara Diplomacy,” positioning Japan as a responsible member of the Washington Treaty system. This internationalist policy continued under Prime Minister Giishi Tanaka, who pursued a more aggressive China policy but still maintained the traditional cooperative stance with the

West. After Tanaka’s resignation over the assassination of Zhang Zuolin by the Kwantung

Army in 1929, Prime Minister Osachi Hamaguchi and Foreign Minister Shidehara started the “second” Shidehara diplomacy, singing the London Naval Treaty at the 1930 London

Conference.302

In contrast to the moderate internationalists, the pan-Asianists became anti-

American over the issues of race and naval limitation and desired confrontation rather than cooperation with the Anglo-Saxons. For instance, prominent politicians and columnists

302 Although Tanaka is known for his “assertive diplomacy” (sekkyoku gakiko) in China, his still prioritized cooperation with the Western powers. Therefore, the so-called “Tanaka Diplomacy” was not a clear break from Shidehara Diplomacy as some scholars argue. Ryuji Hattori, Higashi Ajia Kokusai Kankyo no Hendo to Nihon Gaiko, 1918-1931 (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2001); Asada, “From Washington to London.”

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viewed America’s opposition to Japan’s Twenty-First Demands as a form of racial discrimination and advocated pan-Asianism and an Asian Monroe Doctrine as a way to combat the “white peril” and allow “Asians run Asia.”303 Resented at the issue of racial discrimination, many opposed Japan’s entry into the League of Nations. Later Prime

Minister Fumimaro Konoe wrote in his famous peace “A Call to Reject the Anglo-

American Centered Peace” that the “have” established powers like the United States and

Great Britain were using the postwar peace settlements to maintain their favorable international positions and contain the “have-not” rising powers like Germany and Japan.

Dismissing the idealistic language of peace and humanity, he argued that behind this Anglo-

Saxon plot was their racial discrimination against the yellow race.304 Leading pan-Asianist thinker and activist Shumei Okawa rebuked the post-WWI peace system as a Western scheme to “enslave” Asia, arguing that Japan must unite the region as a leader and gain freedom.305 Another pan-Asianist leader Kita advocated the establishment of the “Asian

League of Nations” to create a Japan-led world order.306 In short, for pan-Asianists, the peace system represented racial discrimination against and invalidation of their national identity as a leader in Asia. This created enmity against the West, leading pan-Asianists to reject the Anglo-Saxon-led post-WWI order and demand an Asian Monroe Doctrine.

To resolve the race issue, the Japanese government sought to insert a racial equality clause in the charter of the League of Nations at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. However,

Japan’s proposal failed, partly because of opposition from the Australian delegation and

303 Kenkichi Kodera, Dai Ajia Shugi Ron (Tokyo: Tokyo Hobunkan, 1916); Soho Tokutomi, Taisho No Seinen to Teikoku No Zento (Tokyo: Minyusha, 1916). 304 Konoe Fumimaro, “Eibei Hon’i Heiwashugi o Hai Su,” Nihon Oyobi Nihonjin, December 12, 1918, 23– 26. 305 Shumei Okawa, Fukko Ajia No Shomondai (Tokyo: Chuko Bunko, 1993), 69. 306 Ikki Kita, Kita Ikki Chosaku Shu (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 1959), 220.

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from the anti-immigration interest groups in America. 307 This was followed by the strengthening of the Californian Alien Land Law in 1920 and the U.S. Immigration Act of

1924, which established quotas specifically for Japanese and other immigrants.

Consequently, racial tensions intensified after the Paris Conference, and anti-American pan-Asianist movements surged in Japan, involving the public, politicians, and the military.308 As one historian noted, “During the 1920s, no issue produced more Japanese ill feeling toward America than immigration.”309 This laid ground for the political dominance of pan-Asianist militarism and the identity dilemma with the United States during the Road to the Pacific War of the 1930s, discussed in Chapters 3-5. As the Emperor explained in his post-WWII “monologue,” the problem of race was “the distant cause of the Pacific War.”

He lamented that the League’s rejection of Japan’s racial equality proposal and the anti-

Japanese immigrant legislations were “sufficient to upset the Japanese people,” which made it “not easy to restrain the military when it asserted itself against the background of this public resentment.”310

Moreover, the race issue coincided with the disagreement over the naval treaties and worsened the anti-Western sentiment in Japan. While moderate internationalist navy leaders in the “treaty faction” accepted the terms of naval limitation, others in the “fleet faction” saw the inferior 5:5:3 ratios between America, Britain, and Japan as another instance of racial discrimination and supported the cause of pan-Asianism. 311 Pan-

307 Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality. 308 Ward, “Race, Status, and Japanese Revisionism in the Early 1930s,” 630; Izumi Hirobe, Japanese Pride, American Prejudice: Modifying the Exclusion Clause of the 1924 Immigration Act (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001); Izumi Hirobe, Jinshu Senso to iu Guwa: Okaron to Ajia Shugi (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai, 2017), 93–97. 309 Burkman, Japan and the League of Nations, 109. 310 Hidenari Terasaki, Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku, ed. Mariko Terasaki Miller (Tokyo: Bungei Shunshu, 1991), 20–21. 311 Asada, “From Washington to London.”

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Asianists such as Okawa claimed that Japan, “the strongest nation in Asia,” must win war against the United States, “the strongest nation representing Europe,” and “actively contribute to world history.”312 The London Conference was therefore a watershed moment for Japan to “either become a slave to the United States or risk its national fate and fight.”

By signing the treaty, the “weak-kneed” internationalists leaders “missed this golden opportunity.”313 This public resentment broke out when Prime Minister Hamaguchi, who led the naval limitation effort, was shot by a member of a right-wing pan-Asianist organization, Patriot Society (Aikoku Sha), after the London Conference.

Despite these setbacks, moderate internationalists managed to hold power, but not for long. Foreign Minister Shidehara became the acting Prime Minister after the shooting, continuing his internationalist foreign policy and maintaining good relations with the

Anglo-Saxon powers. After Hamaguchi’s death, Reijiro Wakatsuki assumed power, with

Shidehara remaining as the foreign minister. Prince Saionji, the last standing genro who had been promoting the worldview of “Japan of the world” and rejecting that of “Japan in

Asia,” oversaw the continuation of the Shidehara Diplomacy.314 This moderate coalition, however, collapsed during the Manchuria Crisis (1931-33). During the crisis, pan-Asianists seized power and drove foreign policies in a way that was incompatible with America’s internationalist crusading role in China. This led to an identity dilemma and American-

Japanese enmity, marking the first step toward the Pacific War (see Chapter 3). Thus, the success of the London Treaty was a “fragile victory” before both nations found themselves

312 Shumei Okawa, Ajia, Yoroppa, Nihon (Tokyo: Daito Bunka Kyokai, 1925). 313 Shumei Okawa, “Rondon Kaigi No Igi,” Gekkan Nippon, no. 62 (May 1930). 314 Bunji Omura, The Last Genro: Prince Saionji, Japan’s “Grand Old Man” (New York, NY: Kegan Paul International, 2004).

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on the Road to the Pacific War.315

Conclusion

In this chapter, I described the identity groups in the United States and Japan and briefly discussed the bilateral relations before the 1930s. In sum, each county had two identity groups: isolationists and liberal internationalists in the United States; and moderate internationalists and pan-Asianists in Japan. Despite differences over issues like race,

China, and naval limitation, the two countries maintained friendly relations until the 1930s, as long as the compatible identity groups—American isolationists and Japanese moderate internationalists—were in power. As discussed in the following chapters, this changed during and after the Manchuria Crisis, when the incompatible groups—American liberal internationalists and Japanese pan-Asianists—gained power and the identity dilemma started.

Based on the earlier discussion of racial tensions, some might think that the United

States and Japan had already become enemies before the Manchuria Crisis, so that the crisis did not present a shift in the bilateral relations. In other words, the two nations were predestined to become enemies and ultimately fight a war because of racial differences.316

This view is misleading, however. As discussed above, Japanese and American leaders had

315 Kumao Harada, Fragile Victory: Prince Saionji and the 1930 London Treaty Issue, from the Memoirs of Baron Harada Kumao, trans. Thomas Francis Mayer-Oakes (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1968). 316 Some scholars point to race as a driving force for Japan’s revisionism during the 1930s. Ward, “Race, Status, and Japanese Revisionism in the Early 1930s.” Others discuss the role of race during the Pacific War. John Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York, NY: Pantheon, 1986); Gerald Horne, Race War!: White Supremacy and the Japanese Attack on the British Empire (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2003).

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managed to contain the racial tensions and maintained friendly commercial and security relations until the 1930s. In fact, after reaching the peak during the Californian Alien Land

Law in 1920 and the U.S. Immigration Act in 1924, the immigration issue had subsided by the 1930s.317 Thus, historians do not single out race to explain American-Japanese enmity during the crisis.318 Also, race, a constant factor, cannot explain the shift in U.S.-Japan relations before and after the crisis. And since the Yellow Peril targeted both Chinese and

Japanese, race alone cannot explain why some Americans were pro-China and anti-Japan during the Twenty-One Demands, as discussed above, and during the 1930s, as discussed in the following chapters. Thus, the Pacific War was not as simple as a “race war.”

The Road to the Pacific War had to do with the way in which America’s liberal internationalist identity and its civilizing mission to uphold the interwar peace system and to democratize and Christianize China, on the one hand, and Japan’s pan-Asianist identity and its holy mission to unite, lead, and liberate Asia, on the other, clashed and resulted in an identity dilemma during the Manchuria Crisis (Chapter 3), the Sino-Japanese War

(Chapter 4), and Pearl Harbor (Chapter 5).

317 Hirobe, Japanese Pride, American Prejudice. 318 For a skeptical historian account on race, see Hirobe, Jinshu Senso to iu Guwa.

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Chapter 3: The Manchuria Crisis and the Road to the Pacific War, 1931-1933

The Road to the Pacific War (1931-41) started with the Manchuria Crisis. “For the

United States and Japan,” writes one historian, “World War II’s roots ran back to September

1931, when the Kwangtung Army struck to place all Manchuria under Japanese control.”319

After the Manchuria Incident, the Kwangtung Army made further advances and established the state of Manchukuo. The United States developed enmity toward Japan and worked with the League of Nations to condemn Japan. This international condemnation not only provoked Japan to leave the League, but also “made Japan more isolated and desperate and ultimately led to war with America.”320 What explains this American-Japanese enmity over

Manchuria that contributed to World War II?

Conventional explanations of this enmity focus on strategic or domestic factors.

Some scholars argue that enmity emerged because of material factors: Japan sought to build its economic bloc by invading Manchuria, this threatened U.S. commercial interests in

China, and the United States and the League took countermeasures and provoked Japan’s withdrawal.321 Others blame the rise of militarism in Japan: the Japanese military engaged in anti-Western warmongering as part of its logrolling efforts to overthrow the civilian government and expand into China.322

In this chapter, I question these conventional accounts and argue that American-

Japanese enmity resulted from an identity dilemma. The strategic account is weak because there was no significant conflict of interests or exchange of material threats. U.S. interests

319 LaFeber, The Clash, 160. 320 Ienaga, The Pacific War, 1931-1945, 3. 321 LaFeber, The Clash; Barnhart, Japan Prepares Total War; Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy. 322 Snyder, Myths of Empire; Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria; Ienaga, The Pacific War, 1931-1945.

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in China, let alone Manchuria, were minimal. Neither the United States nor the League sanctioned or militarily intervened against Japan. The domestic account is not fully convincing because many civil and military Japanese leaders did not engage in anti-

American warmongering. They sought to contain the crisis to avoid confrontation with the

West.

Why and how did identity politics produce American-Japanese enmity over

Manchuria? Recall that an identity dilemma occurs when incompatible identity groups have domestic power and an event or a series of events exposes their identity incompatibility and leads them to defend their identities. As explained in Chapter 2, there was no identity dilemma between the United States and Japan before the 1930s, because the domestic power balance favored American isolationists and Japanese moderate internationalists. Their worldviews complemented one another. By 1931, however, the power balance had shifted, seeing American liberal internationalists and Japanese pan-

Asianists gain increased political power. The Manchuria Incident dramatically showed that these identity groups were incompatible. As both began to enact their identities over

Manchuria, their incompatible worldviews clashed and resulted in an identity dilemma.

More specifically, the Manchuria invasion was planned and executed by pan-

Asianist officers of the Kwangtung Army who viewed the action as a step toward establishing Japan’s regional leadership and an East Asian League. In response, American liberal internationalists developed enmity toward Japan because they saw the invasion as a challenge to their role identity as a “crusader nation” with a “civilizing mission” to uphold the post-WWI peace system and to democratize and Christianize China. Although isolationists rejected such a missionary mindset, saw no interest in the Far East, and

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opposed any intervention, internationalists won the domestic debate and pushed the Non- recognition Doctrine and League resolutions to defend their identity and condemn Japan.

These symbolic actions created anti-U.S. enmity in Japan because pan-Asianists viewed them as a threat to their role identity as a “leader in Asia” with a special mission to establish

“Asia for Asians.” Although moderate internationalists rejected pan-Asianism and promoted cooperation with the West, pan-Asianists organized the “Back to Asia” movement and adopted confrontational policies to defend their identity. As the crisis ensued, the identity dilemma became entrenched. And American-Japanese enmity deepened.

The conflict became intractable due to the two consequences of an entrenched identity dilemma: enduring enmity and identity indivisibility. Although the Western measures against Japan remained symbolic, many Japanese viewed it as further invalidation of their pan-Asianist identity. Having concluded that confrontation was necessary to defend their identity, they demanded withdrawal from the League and even war with America. Moreover, the indivisible nature of identity politics made it difficult to resolve the crisis. The Americans refused to compromise on their internationalist values and pushed the League to condemn Japan. The Japanese responded by resorting to League withdrawal because compromise would have undermined their national pride as a leader in Asia.

Manchuria and Its Historical Background

Understanding the Manchuria Crisis requires some background knowledge. Since

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the Opium War and the First Sino-Japanese War, China had been the target of imperialism.

To expand its commercial interests in China, the United States declared the Open-Door policy in 1899-1900 and implemented the Dollar Diplomacy under the Taft administration.

At the 1922 Washington Conference, the United States negotiated the Nine-Power Treaty and secured international cooperation on the open-door principles. Meanwhile, Japan had significant interests in China. Japan gained Taiwan and trading privileges in China after the victory in the First Sino-Japanese War. It also gained the Southern Manchuria railway after winning the Russo-Japanese War. Since then, the Japanese viewed Manchuria as a vital economic interest. By 1931, they had invested over a half-billion dollars and built nearly seven hundred miles of rails for transporting goods such as lumber, coal, and ores upon with Japanese industry relied.323 The region, where the Japanese fought the Russians, was also vital for Japan’s defense. Thus, many Japanese considered Manchuria as their country’s “lifeline.”

Some historians such as Walter LaFeber point to this imperial competition as a main reason for American-Japanese enmity during the Manchuria Crisis: The Kwangtung Army invaded Manchuria to secure Japan’s imperial interests, and this attack threatened the U.S.

Open-Door policy and its interests in China.324 However, this strategic explanation does not bear scrutiny. The Open-Door policy emphasized U.S. “potential” commercial interests in China, but these interests never materialized.325 American businesses only had invested

$13 million in Manchuria (and $155 million in China overall) by 1931, and traded only

323 LaFeber, The Clash, 161. 324 LaFeber, chap. 6. For similar realist accounts, see Barnhart, Japan Prepares Total War; Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy. 325 Kitaoka, Monko Kaiho Seisaku to Nihon.

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$24 million with Manchuria (and $339 million with China overall) in 1929. 326 By contrast,

Japan was America’s third-largest trading partner: U.S. exports to Japan were worth nearly half a billion dollars; its imports from Japan over one-quarter billion. 327 Beyond commercial interests, one might think that the Americans faced security threats from

Japan’s invasion of Manchuria. Yet, the United States did not have a direct security stake in China. The only U.S. security interest in Asia was its colonial rule over the Philippines, which was not directly threatened by Japans’ action.328 In fact, both countries had common security interests. As discussed in Chapter 2, the United States had acknowledged Japan’s regional dominance since the Russo-Japanese War, and both countries had cooperated on naval limitation under the Washington Treaty System. In short, as one historian explains,

“America had very little realistic interest to lose from, or being threatened by, the Sino-

Japanese conflict.”329

Why, then, did the Americans develop enmity toward Japan over Manchuria? Also, although Japan did have vital interests in Manchuria, as I discuss below, neither the United

States nor the League of Nations took materially significant actions to threaten these interests during the Manchuria Crisis. All they did was to issue symbolic statements and resolutions condemning Japan’s invasion. Why, then, did Japan react so badly and leave the League? I answer these questions by arguing that American-Japanese enmity over

Manchuria developed because of an identity dilemma. To show this, I begin by discussing

326 Joan Hoff Wilson, American Business and Foreign Policy: 1920-1933 (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1971), 223. 327 Armin Rappaport, Henry L. Stimson and Japan, 1931-1933 (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 89; Richard N. Current, Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1954), 70. 328 In fact, the Philippines had been dismissed as a strategic liability since Theodore Roosevelt, and the movement to end U.S. occupation had been underway. Rappaport, Henry L. Stimson, 36. 329 Shinichi Kitaoka, “Taiheiyo Senso No Soten to Mokuteki,” in Taiheiyo Senso, ed. Chihiro Hosoya et al. (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1993), 568; Kitaoka, Monko Kaiho Seisaku to Nihon.

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how the crisis happened with the Manchuria Incident and how Japan, the United States, and the other Western powers reacted. I then discuss how American-Japanese enmity intensified as the crisis continued, ending in Japan’s withdrawal from the League.

The Manchuria Incident and The Identity Dilemma Started

The Manchuria Incident occurred on September 18, 1931, when the Kwangtung

Army detonated the Japanese-controlled South Manchuria Railway. The Army used the incident as a pretext to occupy Manchuria as well as inner Chinese cities. This attack was not authorized by the Japanese central government; it was planned and carried out by pan-

Asianist officers in the Kwangtung Army who viewed the attack as a first step to establish

Japanese leadership in Asia. The main plotter explained the Manchuria Incident as a move toward establishing an East Asian League, a vision promoted by prominent pan-Asianist thinkers at the time.330

The incident triggered an identity dilemma. Recall that an identity dilemma happens when incompatible identity groups have domestic power and an event or a series of events expose this incompatiblity and lead both states to fight over their identities. By

1931, incompatible identity groups—American liberal internationalists and Japanese pan-

Asianists—held power. The incident exposed the incompatiblity between these groups, led them to assert their worldviews over Manchuria, and set off an identity dilemma. As these incompatible identity groups formed domestic coalitions to push confrontational actions,

330 Kanji Ishiwara, Saishu Sensoron, Sensoushi Taikan (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Sha, 1993); Michio Nakao, “Ishihara’s Idea on Toa Allies and His Identity,” Yamaguchi Journal of Economics, Business Administrations & Laws 47, no. 4 (1999): 1043–76.

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this action-reaction dynamic continued, and American-Japanese enmity deepened.

As discussed above, the United States had very limited stakes in China, let alone

Manchuria. Despite this lack of interests, the American liberal internationalists developed enmity toward Japan for identity-based reasons. For them, the Manchuria Incident was an identity issue concerning America’s role a “crusader nation” to uphold the post-WWI peace system and to democratize and Christianize China. Viewing and framing the incident in such identity terms, they perceived Japan’s invasion as a challenge to their identity and developed anti-Japanese enmity.

The most important figure among these liberal internationalists was Secretary of

State Henry Stimson. Having served as the former General-Governor of the Philippines before joining the Hoover administration, Stimson long advocated America’s “white man’s burden” to civilize other nations and champion the post-WWI peace system.331 Viewing the Manchuria Incident through his internationalist eyes, Stimson framed the stakes in terms of American identity, not its strategic interests: “The immense blow to the cause of peace and war prevention … [based on] the group of post-war treaties … upon which so many hopes of our race and of our part of the world had been predicated”; and “The incalculable harm which would be done immediately to American prestige in China … if after having for many years assisted by public and private effort in the education and

331 Stimson’s internationalism was evident when he opposed the 1933 Hare-Hawes-Cutting bill, which granted independence to the Philippines, on the ground of “the white man’s burden” to civilize and democratize the Filipinos. Current, Secretary Stimson, 11, 120; David F. Schmitz, Henry L. Stimson: The First Wise Man (Wilmington, D.E.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), chap. 3; Elting E. Morison, Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson (Boston, BA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960), chap. 17; Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York, NY: Harper & Brothers, 1948), 118–20. For Stimson’s internationalist beliefs in the post-WWI peace system, see Oona A. Hathaway and Scott J. Shapiro, The Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to Outlaw War Remade the World (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2017), 163–68.

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development of China towards the ideals of modern Christian civilization.”332 He even wrote: “Civilization itself will collapse [due to Japan’s invasion].”333 For this identity- based reason, Stimson became anti-Japanese. To accomplish U.S. crusading role, Stimson sought international protests, economic sanctions, and even use of force against Japan.334

He was in fact willing to take a “risk of going to war with Japan.”335

Many pacifist, liberal, and religious organizations, committed to the cause of

America’s missionary movement to democratize and Christianize China, also view the

Manchuria invasion a challenge against American internationalist identity. 336 They supported Stimson, forming a political coalition and organizing a campaign that framed the stakes as one of American internationalism and demanded anti-Japan embargoes.337 Under this discursive environment, where identity is “activated,” or made salient, anti-Japanese enmity rose in American society. As Stimson explained, Japan’s invasion “touched a phase of American feeling which has not been thoroughly understood or described by writers in dealing with the Sino-Japanese controversies. The most widespread interest of our people in China is not commercial. … Our most general information of China has come through

332 Henry L. Stimson, The Far Eastern Crisis (New York, NY: Harper & Brothers, 1936), 12–15, 89–91, 236– 37, emphasis added. Also see Henry Stimson to Elihu Root, December 14, 1931, Yale University Library, Manuscripts and Archives, microfilm edition (hereinafter Stimson Papers), Reel 82. 333 Quoted in LaFeber, The Clash, 171. 334 Richard N. Current, “The Stimson Doctrine and the Hoover Doctrine,” The American Historical Review 59, no. 3 (1954): 519–22; Schmitz, Henry L. Stimson, 106–7; Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Cabinet and the Presidency, 1920-1933, vol. 2 (New York, NY: The Macmillan Company, 1952), 366–70. 335 Morison, Turmoil and Tradition, 394. 336 John W. Masland, “Missionary Influence upon American Far Eastern Policy,” Pacific Historical Review 10, no. 3 (1941): 279–96. 337 The New York Times, November 25, 1931, February 1, 1932; Rappaport, Henry L. Stimson, 85–88, 114– 15, 138; Warren F. Kuehl and Lynne K. Dunn, Keeping the Covenant: American Internationalists and the League of Nations, 1920-1939 (Kent, O.H.: The Kent State University Press, 1997), 181, 194; Justus D. Doenecke, When the Wicked Rise: American Opinion-Makers and the Manchurian Crisis of 1931-1933 (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1984), 69–70, 83; Varg, Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats, 253.

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… the great missionary movement … which had been carried on in China for a nearly a century by the churches and humanitarian organizations of this country. The breadth and influence of that movement have not always been adequately appreciated by historians.”338

For the internationalists, Manchuria was more about identity than about strategic interest.

By contrast, most Americans at the time were isolationist. 339 They held no enmity toward Japan and demanded noninvolvement because of their isolationist worldviews.

Recall the discussion in Chapter 2 that the worldviews of American isolationism and

Japanese pan-Asianism were compatible, because the isolationist role identity as a “city upon a hill” rejected the internationalist “civilizing mission” to actively promote peace, democracy, and Christianity abroad, remaining aloof toward overseas troubles, including

Japan’s assertion of leadership in Asia. Given their isolationist worldviews, many

Americans viewed no vital interest in Manchuria that warranted confrontation, especially sanctions or use of force. They did not even show concerns for Japan’s revisionism and its implications for world peace in general. All they demanded was noninvolvement in the Far

Eastern conflict.

One historian explains: “few suggested active intervention in any form in Asia” because “[t]he price for saving China was great, and few were prepared to pay for it. …

The vast majority wanted to steer clear of the oriental imbroglio and would support no policy calculated to get America involved.”340 One newspaper said, “The Americans don’t give a hoot in a rain barrel who controls North China.”341 Others showed sympathy for

338 Stimson, The Far Eastern Crisis, 153, emphasis added. 339 Adler, The Isolationist Impulse; Jonas, Isolationism in America, 1935-1941; Tucker, A New Isolationism. 340 Rappaport, Henry L. Stimson, 84–85. 341 Thomas A. Bailey, The Man in the Street: The Impact of American Public Opinion on Foreign Policy (New York, NY: MacMillan, 1948), 122.

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Japan’s difficult geopolitical position in Asia and supported its annexation of Manchuria.342

Many businesses sided with the isolationist public. As another historian explains, there was

“greater commercial and financial involvement with Far Eastern interests tacitly on the side of the Japanese … It was generally assumed that Japanese control of the area would provide greater economic stability and possibly greater economic opportunity in the long run.”343

U.S. Ambassador to China took a similar view, calling Japan’s occupation of Manchuria

“an increased opportunity” for American industries.344

Many policymakers also took the isolationist stance. Within the State Department, there was “essential agreement that American interests in Manchuria in particular and

China in general were insignificant: there was no reason to fight.”345 Worried that “some incident may provoke an explosion of American public opinion” in favor of “a foreign military adventure … represented as an idealistic crusade for world peace and international justice,” the State opposed any pro-sanction or pro-intervention debate.346 It told American businesses that in case Japan occupies Manchuria as its protectorate, “there was no evidence to indicate that a nullification of the ‘Open Door’ policy would necessarily follow.” 347 The isolationist-controlled Congress similarly showed “no willingness to consider Japan’s action a threat to any interests of the United States.” 348 And anti- interventionist Herbert Hoover thought: “Neither our obligation to China, nor our own interest, nor our dignity requires us to go to war over these [Manchuria] questions.”349 He

342 Rappaport, Henry L. Stimson, 85–86. 343 Wilson, American Business and Foreign Policy, 222–23. 344 Iriye, Across the Pacific, 181. 345 Cohen, America’s Response to China, 108. 346 Doenecke, When the Wicked Rise, 68. 347 Wilson, American Business and Foreign Policy, 222. 348 Cohen, America’s Response to China, 108, emphasis in original. 349 Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, 2:369. For more on Hoover’s foreign policy views, see Justus D. Doenecke, “The Anti-Interventionism of Herbert Hoover,” The Journal of Libertarian Studies 8, no. 2

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told his aide, “Well, just between ourselves, it would not be a bad thing if Mr. Jap should go into Manchuria, for with two thorns in his side—China and the Bolsheviks—he would have enough to keep him busy for a while.”350 He strongly opposed taking coercive actions against Japan’s violation of the peace treaties, which he dismissed as “scraps of paper or paper treaties.”351 In short, denying that saving world peace and China “is any of our business,” the isolationists remained unconcerned about Japanese revisionism.352

Despite such isolationist opposition, the domestic power balance in America favored the internationalists, with Stimson in charge of foreign policy. He used his secretary position to take actions to defend American internationalism and condemn

Japanese invasion. In October, Stimson opposed Hoover’s dismissal of the peace treaties as “scraps of paper,” telling him that “if we lie down and treat them like scraps of paper nothing will happen, and in the future peace movement will receive a blow that it will not recover for a long time.” He pushed the President to accept his “policy to encourage the

League” to condemn Japan.353 This led to U.S. participation as an observer in the League’s

Council and the passage of two League resolutions condemning Japan of its violation of the peace treaties. After the Kwangtung Army’s further advance in January 1932, Stimson announced the Non-recognition Doctrine, sending an official note to Japan and China that the United States would not recognize the situation in Manchuria in light of the Kellogg-

Briand Pact and the Open-Door policy.354 He also urged Great Britain and France to issue

(1987): 311–40. 350 David Burner, Herbert Hoover: The Public Life (New York, NY: Knopf, 1979), 294. 351 Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries, October 9, 1931, Yale University Library, Manuscripts and Archives, microfilm edition (hereinafter Stimson diary); Current, “The Stimson Doctrine and the Hoover Doctrine,” 517. 352 Doenecke, When the Wicked Rise, 30–34, 51. 353 Stimson diary, October 9, 10, 1931; Schmitz, Henry L. Stimson, 105; Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 233. Also see Henry Stimson to Fredric Coudert, October, 9, 1931, Stimson Papers, Reel 82. 354 Stimson diary, January 2, 7, 1932; “The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Naneing (Peck),”

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a similar statement. Following the bombing of Shanghai by Japan in late January, Stimson wrote to Congress a letter defending his Non-recognition Doctrine and declaring U.S. support for the peace treaties.355 Stimson’s enmity toward Japan was so strong that Hoover wrote he “was at times more of a warrior than a diplomat.”356

However, U.S. actions against Japan remained symbolic due to opposition against coercive measures from the isolationists as well as the Europeans. Hoover was “greatly disturbed” by Stimson’s suggestion of sanctions, which for him “meant war when applied to any large nation.”357 Other cabinet secretaries and the isolationist-controlled Congress supported Hoover’s position. This prevented Stimson from imposing sanctions or using force against Japan.358 Moreover, the European great powers refused to join Stimson in going after Japan. According to the strategic explanations, they should have formed enmity toward Japan, because they had greater interests in China than America. However, they saw no vital interests in Manchuria and dismissed the crisis on strategic grounds.359 Despite having the largest commercial interests in China, the U.K. government decided against using the League machinery to sanction Japan and even showed satisfaction with Japan’s assurance of the Open-Door policy in China. 360 When Stimson requested Britain and

January 7, 1932, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, vol. 3, The Far East, 1932 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1948), 3, 7–8 (hereafter cited as FRUS: 1932, vol. 3); Current, “The Stimson Doctrine and the Hoover Doctrine,” 523–24; Rappaport, Henry L. Stimson, 94. 355 Stimson diary, February 21, 23-24, 1932; Stimson, The Far Eastern Crisis, 166–75. 356 Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, 2:366. 357 Hoover, 2:366. 358 President Hoover even announced America’s intention not to boycott Japan. Stimson diary, November 7, 13, 19, 27, 1931; Current, “The Stimson Doctrine and the Hoover Doctrine,” 519–22; Schmitz, Henry L. Stimson, 106–7; Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, 2:369; Rappaport, Henry L. Stimson, 138–39; Morison, Turmoil and Tradition, 397–98. 359 Stimson, The Far Eastern Crisis, 100–109; Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 237–39; Rappaport, Henry L. Stimson, 102–5; Katsumi Usui, Manshu Jihen: Senso to Gaiko to (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha, 1974), 143–45. 360 Christopher G. Thorne, The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931-1933 (London: Hamilton, 1972), 181–92; Rappaport, Henry L. Stimson, 100.

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France to issue non-recognition statements, both countries, to his “disappointment,” ignored the request and opposed any sanctions against Japan, even with the League or the

United States.361 Accordingly, the international condemnation of Japan was much weaker than Stimson hoped. And it lacked coercive measures like sanctions.

This European reaction is important for my argument not only because it prevented coercive actions against Japan, but also because it shows that ideational factors more than material factors explain enmity. That is, the Europeans did not develop enmity toward

Japan because they did not view Manchuria as an identity issue like the American internationalists did. For instance, the British Foreign Minister publicly rejected the

American internationalists’ insistence of the peace treaties, saying that Britain must assume not the role of “a statesman honoring solemn treaty obligations and pinning his faith to a new world order … but that of a lawyer picking holes in a contract in the interests of a shady client.”362 The British Ambassador to Japan did not seem to share the American internationalist cause of democratizing and Christianizing China, writing that “it seems to me that the Western world should be thankful that … [Japan’s] explosive energy and teeming life should have found an outlet in the distant plains of Manchuria, where foreign interests hardly exist and where the task is such as to try the strength even of this remarkable people.”363 This shows that identity factors were important in creating variations within the

Western reactions to the Manchuria Incident. And the division between the Americans and the Europeans prevented sanctions or use of force against Japan’s invasion of Manchuria.

361 Stimson diary, January 7, February 18, 1932; Stimson, The Far Eastern Crisis, 100. 362 “The Japanese Adventure,” The Manchester Guardian, October 1, 1932; Rappaport, Henry L. Stimson, 104. 363 Quoted in Sandra Wilson, The Manchurian Crisis and Japanese Society, 1931-33 (London: Routledge, 2002), 95, emphasis added.

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Although the symbolic actions by America and the League did not challenge

Japan’s vital economic and security interests in Manchuria, many Japanese became anti-

American for identity-based reasons. As discussed above, pan-Asianist officers in the

Kwangtung Army plotted the Manchuria Incident and invaded Manchuria without authorization, because they viewed the attack as a step toward establishing Japan’s leadership and an East Asian League. Many Japanese at home shared this worldview, attaching emotional significance to Manchuria, calling it Japan’s “lifeline,” and viewing it as important part of their pan-Asianist identity. 364 Therefore, the incident triggered intensified identity debates on pan-Asianism in Japan and generated nationwide support for the Kwantung Army. Public debates centered around the slogans of “Asia of the Asians” and “Back to Asia.”365

It was through this “activated” identity lens that many Japanese perceived and framed U.S. and League condemnation as an identity threat and developed anti-Western sentiments. One editorial criticized U.S. “unreasonable” participation in the League

Council as “the expression of natural prejudice toward the [Japanese] empire.” 366 In response to the League’s resolutions, a Mainichi editorial, titled “Japan the Country of

Justice, Unreasonable Council,” castigated them as “an attempt to deprive the rising nation of Japan of her heaven-bestowed rights.”367 The Mainichi published a special four-page column, titled “Protect Manchuria, the Empire’s Lifeline,” which asserted that Japan as a

“guardian of Manchuria” won “honorable isolation” by confronting the League to maintain

364 Masamichi Royama, “Manmo Mondai No ‘Jyudaika,’” Chuo Koron 46, no. 10 (October 1, 1937). 365 Sadako Ogata, “Gaiko to Yoron: Renmei Dattai Wo Meguru Ichi Kousatsu,” Kokusai Seiji, no. 41 (1970): 40–55. 366 “Renmei Ha Kosei Dato Nare: Beikoku Sanka No Mondai,” Hochi Shimbun, October 17, 1931. 367 “Seigino Kuni, Nihon: Hiri Naru Rijikai,” Osaka Mainichi Shimbun, October 26, 1931.

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her “special interests” in the region. 368 The Japanese Newspaper Association issued a statement that Manchuria was a matter of “life or death for the Japanese empire.”369 The

Asahi claimed that “the League’s demand to withdraw Japanese troops is absolutely impossible.”370 Mainichi’s President published editorials in twenty-five U.S. newspapers to defend Japan’s action in Manchuria.371

Despite their symbolic nature, Stimson’s Non-recognition Doctrine, his request for the British and French governments to adopt the doctrine, and his letter to Congress all worsened anti-Americanism. The Asahi criticized Stimson’s actions as the replay of the

Triple Intervention of 1895, a diplomatic intervention by Russia, Germany, and France over the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki ending the First Sino-Japanese War. 372 The

Mainichi argued that Japan was now “heading to war,” because of Uncle Sam “reaching his hand” to Manchuria and seeking to take Japan’s place in Asia.373 “If the League lost

Japan,” the Mainichi wrote, it would lose “the one and only largest civilized nation in the

Orient” that could maintain regional stability.374 In response to Stimson’s letter to Congress, the Foreign Ministry called him “a blood-thirsty pacifist” who rejects Japan’s legitimate action in Manchuria and seeks conflict with Japan. 375 The Asahi accused Stimson for falsely accusing Japan for violation of the Nine-Power Treaty, claiming that Japan’s action is not only self-defense but also will bring peace to China and help promote the Open-Door

368 “Mamore Manmo Teikoku No Seimeisen,” Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, October 27, 1931. 369 Toshiyuki Maesaka, Hei ha Kyoki nari: Senso to Shimbun 1926-1935 (Tokyo: Shakai Shiso Sha, 1989), chap. 12. 370 “Renmei Rijikai He Yobo: Kono Jijitsu Wo Seishi Seyo Waga Yokyu Ha Saisyo Teido,” Osaka Asahi Shimbun, November 17, 1931. 371 Maesaka, Hei ha Kyoki nari, chap. 12. 372 “Ware Manshu Seisaku to Daisangoku Kansyosetsu,” Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, January 8, 1932. 373 “Beikoku No Taiman Inbo,” Osaka Nichinichi Shimbun, January 12, 1932. 374 “Renmei Ga Nihon Wo Ushinatta Baai,” Osaka Mainichi Shimbun, November 13, 1931. 375 “‘Chi Ni Uetaruka Nanji, Heiwa Shugisha Yo’: America Kokumu Chokan No Seimei Wo Waga Gaimu Tokyoku Hihan,” Osaka Jiji Shimpo, February 26, 1932.

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Policy.376 Another editorial argued that the Westerners were challenging Japan’s “mission as a leader in the Orient … [to] enlighten and lead the Asians, who are in general so far behind the Westerners in terms of material and cultural levels.”377 The Japanese needed not fear U.S. embargoes, wrote the Mainichi, because in such a case “Japan as a leader in the

Orient” will “restore order in China,” “remove the white peril ... and racial discrimination,” and achieve economic independence for the region.378

Many political elites sided with the pan-Asianist public opinion. A pan-Asianist coalition called the “Back to Asia” movement emerged, with participants across the

Foreign Ministry, the military, and the major political parties. The movement leaders argued that Japan must “return to Asia,” unite the region, and confront the West. 379

Moreover, two major parties expressed unanimous support for the Kwangtung Army. On

December 31, 1931, the Lower House passed unanimously a vote of gratitude to Japanese troops in Manchuria, who had “fulfilled their duty in protecting the rights of Japan.” The

House of Peers passed a similar vote without any dissenting opinions. Both Army and Navy

Ministers publicly thanked each House for its action.380

The domestic explanation of Japanese enmity toward America is that leaders, especially those within the Japanese Army, orchestrated anti-American warmongering and used it to justify expansion into China.381 However, these leaders, many of whom were moderate internationalists, did the opposite. With their worldview of Japan as a responsible

376 “Kyukoku Joyaku to Nihon No Taido: Bei Kokumu Chokan No Shomen Wo Yomu,” Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, February 27, 1931. 377 “Sekai Wo Teki to Shite (1),” Chugai Shogyo Shimpo, March 2, 1932. 378 “Renmei No Iwayuru ‘Keizai Seisai,’” Osaka Mainichi Shimbun, February 25, 1932. 379 Yamaura Kanichi, Mori Kaku: Toa Shintaisei no Senku (Tokyo: Mori Kaku Denki Hensankai, 1940), 715. Ryoichi Tobe, Gaimusho Kakushinha: Sekai Shin Titsujo no Genei (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha, 2010), chap. 2, esp. p. 43-45. 380 Nish, Japan’s Struggle with Internationalism, 37; Wilson, The Manchuria Crisis, 88. 381 Snyder, Myths of Empire.

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member of the Western club, they rejected pan-Asianism, did not see Western condemnation as an identity threat, and pursued diplomatic cooperation by trying to stop the Kwantung Army’s unauthorized expansion. Top leaders including Prince Kinmochi

Saionji, the most influential senior statesmen at the time, rejected the pan-Asianist claims and welcomed the noncoercive Western non-recognition as conciliatory.382 Former army minister even thought that it was “height of absurdity” to protest U.S. participation in the

League, and that Japan should simply ignore the Western condemnation.383 And contrary to the popular view of the Japanese Army trying to overthrow the civilian government, the present army minister cooperated civilian leaders to contain the crisis. 384

However, these moderate leaders came under attack from the pan-Asianists organizing the “Back to Asia” movement discussed above. Many young army officers embraced ultra-nationalistic pan-Asianist thoughts and demanded an independent, confrontational foreign policy.385 Some army leaders began to accept that the moderate leadership “cannot control the current army.”386 Similarly, the Japanese Navy faced an internal crisis. Given the rise of anti-Anglo-Saxon voices, the anti-Western “fleet” faction started to overwhelm the pro-Western “treaty” faction by gaining support from those young officers dissatisfied with the navy’s moderate leadership. 387 These officers not only organized to oust pro-Western leaders, but also built close relations with the anti-League

382 Koichi Kido, Kido Koichi Nikki, vol. 1 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1966), 134. 383 Kazushige Ugaki, Ugaki Kazushige Nikki, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 1970), 812, 816. 384 Hattori, Shidehara Kijuro to Nijuu Seiki no Nihon, 251–57. Shidehara, Gaiko Gojunen, 181–202. Also see Michihiko Kobayashi, Seito Naikaku no Hokai to Manshu Jihen, 1918-1932 (Kyoto: Minerva Shobo, 2010), chap. 3. 385 Kido, Kido Koichi Nikki, 1966, 1:141; Ikuhiko Hata, Gun Fasizum Undoshi (Tokyo: Kawade Shobo Shinsha, 1962), 18–19. 386 Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, 1950, 2:87. 387 Sadao Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press, 2006), 161–69. See chapter 2 on the navy’s factional politics.

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officials who orchestrated the “Back to Asia” movement. 388 Foreign Minister Kijuro

Shidehara, who championed Japan’s internationalism with his “Shidehara Diplomacy” since the 1920s, tried to remove the movement’s leader in vain.389 Shidehara later wrote that “even the army and navy ministers could not control the united young officers,” characterizing the Manchuria Crisis as a “revolt” (gekokujo) by young officers against senior officers. 390 He blamed Stimson’s policy for instigating the anti-Western pan-

Asianist opinion and making his internationalist position “untenable.”391

Consequently, the domestic political environment became difficult for the moderates to maintain internationalist foreign policy. Prominent liberals criticized the

Kwangtung Army, rejected pan-Asianism, and advocated diplomatic cooperation.392 One liberal intellectual, who long argued that Manchuria was not Japan’s core interests, 393 firmly held his position and criticized the military.394 Another intellectual criticized that the

Army’s actions were violating the peace treaties and going beyond self-defense.395 These moderate voices, however, did not resonate with the angry public.396 On November 19, just two months after the Manchuria Incident, Prince Saionji privately admitted: “In regards to

Shidehara Diplomacy, we have come until today viewing it as the impeccable standard. Yet, however correct it is, we now need to rethink because the public opinion views it as wrong

388 Shingo Ishikawa, Shinjuwan Made No Keii: Kaisen No Shinso (Tokyo: Jiji Tsushinsha, 1960), 92, 100; Hata, Gun Fasizum Undoshi, 60–61. 389 Ryoichi Tobe, “Shiratori Toshio to Manshu Jihen,” Boei Daigakko Kiyo 39 (September 1979): 87–93. 390 The Chief of the Staff of the Army, Hanzou Kanaya, even personally apologized Shidehara for his inability to control the Army and contain the crisis. Shidehara, Gaiko Gojunen, 181–82. 391 Morison, Turmoil and Tradition, 400. 392 For an overview of liberal and moderate voices in Japan, see Wilson, The Manchuria Crisis, 105–14. 393 Hiroshi Masuda, “Ishibashi Tanzan No Manshu Hoki Ron: Sho Nihon Syugi Ni Kansuru Ichi Kosatsu,” Kokusai Seiji, no. 71 (1982): 72–92. 394 Maesaka, Hei ha Kyoki nari, chap. 10. 395 Sakuzo Yoshino, “Minzoku to Kaikyu to Senso,” Chuo Koron 47, no. 2 (February 1932). 396 NHK, Nihonjin ha Naze Senso he to Mukatta no ka: Media to Minshu, Shidosha Hen (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 2015), 63–64.

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and evil.” 397 In fact, public criticism and internal political attacks against Shidehara

Diplomacy forced the entire cabinet to resign in December.398

The moderates tried to reverse the situation, but this attempt backfired. When sworn into office, the new Prime Minister Tsuyoshi Inukai appointed two nationalist officers as the new army minister and the new navy minister, because they enjoyed the support from those younger officers who dissented the moderate leadership. Contrary to Inkukai’s hope of regaining control over the military, these appointments exacerbated the situation. It ended up helping the efforts of those dissatisfied officers to remove the moderate leadership in the Army and Navy General Staff Offices. The civilian control over, and the internationalism within, the military rapidly eroded.399 The moderates’ loss of domestic power to the pan-Asianists meant that Japan’s confrontation against the United States would intensify as the crisis continued.

In sum, the Manchuria Incident exposed the incompatiblity between Japanese pan-

Asianist identity and American liberal internationalist identity, setting off an identity dilemma. The Kwangtung Army staged the incident to establish Japan’s leadership in Asia.

American liberal internationalists viewed this as a threat to their role identity as a “crusader nation” to uphold the post-WWI peace system and to democratize and Christianize China.

Despite isolationist opposition against involvement, internationalists had domestic power to take symbolic actions to defend U.S. liberal internationalism and condemn Japan.

Japanese pan-Asianists, viewing Manchuria as a matter of identity, regarded these actions

397 Ugaki, Ugaki Kazushige Nikki, 1970, 2:818. 398 Kobayashi, Seito Naikaku no Hokai, 210–31. 399 Kobayashi, 232–33; Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 138; Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, 1950, 2:163– 64; Kido, Kido Koichi Nikki, 1966, 1:140–41.

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as identity threats. Although Japanese moderates pursued cooperation with the West to solve the crisis, pan-Asianists led the debate toward confrontation. This action-reaction continued as these hostile identity groups strengthened domestic power and pushed confrontation through making coalitions.

Manchukuo and Entrenched Identity Dilemma

American-Japanese enmity over Manchuria exacerbated after the Kwantung Army established the Manchukuo state on March 1. This action undermined the investigation of the Manchuria Incident by the League’s Lytton Commission, done in search for a diplomatic solution. On March 11, the League passed a resolution based on U.S. non- recognition policy.400 On September 15, Japan recognized Manchukuo’s statehood. This antagonized the Americans, who pushed for non-recognition of Manchukuo by the League.

This American-Japanese enmity, I argue, resulted from the entrenchment of the identity dilemma. Recall that an identity dilemma becomes entrenched when hostile incompatible identity groups dominate domestic debates and lock in confrontational policies. In the Manchuria Crisis, Japan’s continued expansion in Manchuria further antagonized American liberal internationalists. They pursued punitive actions against

Japan but only succeeded in taking symbolic measures due to isolationist opposition.

Despite their noncoercive nature, these measures further angered Japanese pan-Asianists and led them to seek further confrontation. As these hostile identity groups gained more

400 “Resolution Adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations on March 11, 1932,” Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 1, Japan: 1931-1941 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1943), 210–12 (hereafter cited as FRUS: 1931-1941, vol. 1).

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domestic influence and drove foreign policy, the identity dilemma became locked in.

Viewing Manchuria through their identity lens, American internationalists responded harshly to Manchukuo. Secretary Stimson followed his internationalist identity, promoting his Non-recognition Doctrine and pushing the League to pass the March resolution on nonrecognition of Manchukuo. After the passage, he celebrated the resolution as a victory for liberal internationalism: “This action will go far towards developing into terms of international law the principles of order and justice which underlie those treaties.”401 He then sought further confrontation against Japan. He decided to maintain the

American Fleet in Hawaii to pressure Japan, despite the opposition from Hoover and navy officers that such an interventionist policy could bring about war in Asia when the United

States should have been preparing for war in Europe.402 Moreover, Stimson sought naval measures with Great Britain to intimidate Japan. 403 Following Stimson, many peace and religious organizations demanded boycotts against Japan under the new theology of

“Christian realism” that only an international boycott could stop Japan and save China.404

However, internationalists met opposition from many isolationists and Europeans, both of whom continued to dismiss Manchuria on strategic grounds. In America, the public, businesses, and newspapers remained isolationist, rejecting the internationalist crusading mentality to save China and opposing any sanctions for their dire consequences for the

American economy. Many outlets criticized the sanction advocates as “zealots,” “utopians,” and “generations of war psychology.” The State Department discouraged the Americans

401 Stimson, The Far Eastern Crisis, 179. 402 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 245; Ikuhiko Hata, “1932 Nen No Nichibei Kiki: Kyozou to Jitsuzou,” Kokusai Seiji, no. 41 (1970): 33. 403 Hugh R. Wilson, Diplomat Between Wars (New York, NY: Longmans, Green, 1941), 277. 404 Doenecke, When the Wicked Rise, 79–83.

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from participating in any individual boycott. And the isolationist-leaning Congress continued to oppose any coercive actions.405 Similarly, the Europeans showed no interest in confronting Japan over Manchukuo. Britain and France, despite their standing as League

Council members, almost recognized Manchukuo to avoid confrontation with Japan. When the League passed the resolution on the non-recognition of Manchukuo, both countries made sure not to sanction Japan through the invocation of Article XVI of the League

Charter.406 The U.K. government also rejected Stimson’s proposal of joint naval measures against Japan. The British Foreign Minister “was perturbed” by “such vigorous” proposal, saying that “the British public was no state of mind to support a war in such a remote region and for purposes which they would consider remote.” 407 Due to these oppositions,

American internationalists could take only symbolic measures against Japan over

Manchukuo.

Despite their symbolic nature, these measures by America and the League angered many Japanese who perceived them as a further invalidation of their pan-Asianist identity.

This created a feedback effect: The West’s actions exacerbated the identity dilemma by empowering the pan-Asianist coalition efforts to promote confrontation and undermining the moderates’ counter-efforts to pursue cooperation. Japanese moderates failed to tone down the Manchuria issue during a national election in February, which was dominated by pan-Asianist slogans such as “Independent Diplomacy or Submissive Diplomacy” and

“Leader in Asia or slave of the West.” 408 One editorial opined that the election was a

“turning point” for Japan’s Far Eastern policy, for the country to decide whether to continue

405 Rappaport, Henry L. Stimson, 148–49. 406 Rappaport, 152–53; Thorne, The Limits of Foreign Policy, chap. 7. 407 Wilson, Diplomat Between Wars, 277. 408 Kobayashi, Seito Naikaku no Hokai, 381.

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its “submissive diplomacy” toward America and the League or to seek “splendid isolation” and withdraw from the League and “return to Asia.”409 The Mainichi claimed that the

League is plagued by “the streak of racial prejudice residing at the bottom of the hearts of the Europeans and the Americans,” and that it is “inevitable” for Japan to withdraw if the

League imposes an unjust resolution.410

These pan-Asianist opinions spread among officials.411 Foreign Ministry officials criticized the moderate leadership and called for Japan’s withdrawal from the League, arguing that withdrawal is an “absolute necessity” because Japan would otherwise “lose its dignity and denigrate into a third-rank country.”412 The chief cabinet secretary, one of the leaders in the “Back to Asia” movement, pressured Prime Minister Inukai to withdraw from the League.413 Even prominent liberals in Japan spoke against the West. They warned the

Americans that if the League did not “recognize the justice of our claim which involves our honor and our very existence as a nation,” Japan would withdraw and “carve out, unaided and alone, her own destiny.”414

Pan-Asianists took control and locked in anti-American policies after May 15, when younger navy officers assassinated Prime Minister Inukai, who opposed warmongering and maintained cooperative diplomacy by reasserting control over the

409 “Kokuren Dattai Mondai: Tenkanki Ni Tatsu Waga Gaiko,” Kobe Yushin Nippo, March 30, 1932; “Renmei No Ketsugi to Jishu Gaiko,” Kobe Yushin Nippo, March 14, 1932. 410 “Renmei Dattairon: 3 Gatsu 11 Nichi No Ketsugi,” Osaka Mainichi Shimbun, March 29, 1932; Yosaburo Takekoshi, “Shin ‘Manshukoku’ No Iku Michi,” Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun, March 12, 1932. 411 “Beiro Ryokoku No Gotoku Renmei Wo Dattai Seyo,” Osaka Jiji Shimpo, March 26, 1932. 412 Sato Tadao, Nihon Gaiko Ron (Tokyo: Kokusai Keizai Kenkyujo, 1938), 91; Masakuma Uchiyama, “Kokusai Renmei Dattai No Yurai,” Hogaku Kenkyu, no. 10 (October 1967): n. 13; Nobuaki Makino, Makino Nobuaki Nikki, ed. Takshi Ito and Yoshiro Hirose (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Sha, 1990), 524; Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, 1950, 2:274. 413 Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, 1950, 2:274. 414 Burkman, Japan and the League of Nations, 183–84; Rappaport, Henry L. Stimson, 164.

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military and refusing to recognize Manchukuo.415 Moderate Admiral Makoto Saito became the new prime minister and tried to restore internationalist diplomacy. But he was pressured to give the foreign minister position to Manchuria Railway’s President, whose pan-Asianist views concerned many moderate leaders.416 In retrospect, these developments marked a

“turning point” for Japan’s foreign policy. 417 The new pan-Asianist Foreign Minister personally believed: “There is no Manchuria problem as far as Japan is concerned. What is left is recognition of Manchukuo. It is especially resentful that no country recognizes

Manchukuo. … Above all, America’s refusal of recognition is rather laughable, and the

United States will alone suffer the consequences of non-recognition.”418 Soon after coming into office, he addressed the Diet, declaring Japan’s intentions to recognize Manchukuo.

The Diet then passed a unanimous resolution supporting him.

American internationalists responded to this further pan-Asianist shift in Japanese politics with confrontation despite isolationist opposition. In the Hoover administration, the President opposed confrontation and sought to improve U.S.-Japan relations with his plan for the World Disarmament Conference that “the arms of the world should be reduced by nearly one-third.” Stimson strongly opposed, calling Hoover’s idea as “just a proposition from Alice in Wonderland.”419 In August, he delivered a speech “in defense of the non-recognition policy” before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. He declared that the non-recognition policy reflected the “revolution in human thought,” the

415 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 145, 150–54; Kobayashi, Seito Naikaku no Hokai, chap. 4. 416 Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, 1950, 2:93–95; Yamaura, Mori Kaku, 713. Also see Debuchi Diaries, September 16, 1932. The diaries are published in Katsuhiro Takahashi, “Debuchi Katsuji Nikki (3) Showa 6 nen - 8 nen,” Kokugakuin Daigaku Nihon Bunka Kenkyujo Kiyo, September 2000, 71–229. 417 Masaru Ikei, “Uchida Kosai: Shodo Gaiko He No Kiseki,” Kokusai Seiji, no. 56 (1977): 18. 418 Kashima Heiwa Kenkyujo, Uchida Kosai (Kashima Kenkyujo Shuppansha, 1969), 335; Tetsuya Sakai, Taisho Democracy Taisei no Hokai (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1992), 28; Ikei, “Uchida Kosai,” 6. 419 Stimson diary, May 22, 24, 1932; Current, “The Stimson Doctrine and the Hoover Doctrine,” 535.

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illegalization of war by the League Covenant and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. While acknowledging that the Pact had no “sanctions of force,” and only those of “public opinion,” he proclaimed that non-recognition would lead eventually to a world-wide “moral disapproval” of aggression and to “consultation between signatories of the Pact.” While some internationalist organizations praised the speech as an end of isolationism, many

Americans rebuked it as an act of war provocation.420

Stimson’s action exacerbated the identity dilemma by further antagonizing

Japanese pan-Asianists. According to U.S. Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew, “all Japan was indignant at Mr. Stimson’s charges and the newspapers came out with such slurring comments as ‘malicious propaganda,’ ‘highly improper,’ ‘imprudent utterance,’ ‘vile and provocative,’ and so on.”421 In the Diet, the pan-Asianist Foreign Minister delivered the famous “scorched earth” speech, asserting that regarding Manchuria the Japanese would not “yield an inch even if the country turned to scorched earth.”422 Another pan-Asianist leader proclaimed that “the recognition of Manchukuo … [signifies] … a world-wide proclamation that Japan “now defiantly rises from her traditional diplomacy characterized by servility … [and] establishes independent diplomacy.” Japan must “return to Asia [from the past] sixty years of blind imitation of Western materialistic civilization… [and] return to Japanese traditional spirits to protect our Asia based on the Oriental civilization and

420 Rappaport, Henry L. Stimson, 168–71. The text of this speech is available in The Washington Post, August 9, 1932. 421 Joseph C. Grew, Ten Years in Japan: A Contemporary Record Drawn from the Diaries and Private and Official Papers of Joseph G. Grew, United States Ambassador to Japan, 1932-1942 (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1944), 43. 422 The House of Representatives, 63rd Imperial Diet, Plenary Session, August 25, 1932; Ian Hill Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period (London, UK: Praeger, 2002), 86. For the pan-Asianist influences behind the speech, see Kiyotada Tsutsui, Senzen Nihon No Populism (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha, 2018), 184–88; Ikei, “Uchida Kosai.”

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ideals.”423 He also asserted that Japan had been “fawning at the League of Nations … hesitating before the prestige of a great nation and being startled or dazzled by the name of the sacred covenant of the League or the Kellogg-Briand Pact [which are] nothing more than expediencies to help a few influential nations maintain the status quo.” 424 He concluded: “it is our important mission to abandon the meaningless League, to return to

Asia, and to establish peace in the Orient. The recognition of Manchukuo means that our nation has abandoned its heretofore humiliating diplomacy and declared independent diplomacy.” 425 The Army Minister also took a pan-Asianist stance, publicly declaring

Japan’s intention to establish its own Asian League of Nations if the League would continue condemning Japan. 426 Facing these pressures, the Saito cabinet started considering withdrawal from the League, while recognizing Manchukuo.427

In sum, American-Japanese enmity deepened as the hostile incompatible identity groups, American liberal internationalists and Japanese pan-Asianists, gained more influence and locked in confrontational policies. This takeover of domestic politics was aided by the feedback mechanism in which the confrontational actions by one side’s hostile group empower the other side’s hostile group. Thus, the identity dilemma became entrenched.

423 The House of Representatives, 63rd Imperial Diet, Plenary Session, August 25, 1932; Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 170; Tobe, Gaimusho Kakushinha, 52–54. 424 Wilson, The Manchuria Crisis, 87. 425 Yamaura, Mori Kaku, 747–48. 426 Manabu Kikkawa, Arashi to Tatakau Tetsusho Araki (Tokyo: Araki Satao Syogun Denki Hensan Kankokai, 1955), 234–35. 427 Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period, 15–161.

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The Lytton Report and Enduring Enmity

One consequence of an entrenched dilemma, as explained in Chapter 1, is enduring enmity: states internalize their zero-sum identity relations and pursue confrontation to defend their identities. U.S.-Japan identity dilemma over Manchuria witnessed this effect at work. A few weeks after Japan recognized Manchukuo, the Lytton Commission concluded its investigation and announced a report. Despite its favorable content, the report infuriated many Japanese, who saw it as a definite denial of their pan-Asianist identity.

Concluding that confrontation was now necessary for defending their identity, they demanded withdrawal from the League and even war with America. The identity dilemma thus was turning into a spiral where states become malign and seek confrontation in pursuit of identities. Under this enduring enmity, threat perception and distrust toward America peaked, with a nationwide war scare.

The Lytton Report was designed to appease Japan. The Chief Commissioner Lord

Lytton admitted: “The most important thing was … to avoid an open breach between the

League and Japan. … The Commission had deliberately avoided any comments on the facts and the report contains no word of criticism of Japan. The future was of far greater importance than the past. Constructive peace rather than a legal judgement was the object of the Commission.” 428 Thus, the report did not condemn Japan at all. It instead acknowledged the maintenance and even the expansion of Japanese interests in the region.

It also promised to regulate the anti-Japanese movements in Manchuria and proposed the establishment of a local self-rule government under international auspices where Japan

428 Quoted in Nish, Japan’s Struggle with Internationalism, 179.

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could exercise its influence. Indeed, it did not recognize Japan’s claim that the Manchuria incident was an act of self-defense and Manchukuo a result of local independence movements. But this meant that the report recognized Japan’s de facto interests and China’s de jure sovereignty in Manchuria. Clearly, as one historian explains, the League

“deliberately pulled their punches in the interests of a future settlement.”429

America’s reaction to the report was divided between internationalists and isolationists. Calling the report “probably the greatest event that has happened in foreign relations for a long time,” Stimson took on the job of “stiffening up the League on

Manchuria” to adopt the report and the Non-recognition Doctrine. His efforts, however, fell short of tangible results due to isolationist opposition. Hoover and other officials “did not take any great interest” in the report and opposed Stimson.430 Except for some liberal newspapers that praised Stimson as the “chief defender” of the Non-recognition Doctrine, the peace treaties, and the League system,431 the isolationist public criticized Stimson for

“put[ting] a hand into the League of Nations machinery formerly rejected by our people…[and] throwing us once more into a position of hostility to Japan.”432 The latter view of isolationism held the majority. The Undersecretary of State wrote, “One thing is certain … nobody in America wants war with Japan whatever the Japanese may do in

Manchuria.”433 Therefore, the United States ended up taking no coercive actions against

Japan.

Despite the favorable content of the report and the lack of any coercion, many

429 Nish, 179. 430 Current, “The Stimson Doctrine and the Hoover Doctrine,” 537–38. 431 “The Manchurian Debate,” The New York Times, October 2, 1932, sec. 2. 432 New York Evening Post, October 2, 1932. Also see Reginald Bassett, Democracy and Foreign Policy: A Case History of the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1931-1933 (Londonm UK: Frank Cass & Company, 1968), 266. 433 Quoted in Rappaport, Henry L. Stimson, 186–87.

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Japanese saw the report and U.S. support for it as an invalidation of pan-Asianism.

Concluding that confrontation was necessary to defend their pan-Asianist identity, they demanded Japan’s withdrawal from the League and even war with America. Specifically, newspapers unanimously condemned the Lytton Report as full of “disillusion, distortion, and lack of comprehension,” “preaching a dream,” and “intolerable exaggerations.”434

These frustrations turned into widespread demands for withdrawal from the League and war with America.435 Books calling for war with America became bestsellers.436 These demands within the public and the military became so strong that the Navy Minister acted

“out of deep worries” and arranged a secret agreement between the military command and the general staff office on avoiding withdrawal and war. 437 Cabinet members had to reassure each other that navy leaders “are not contemplating war against the United

States.”438 Prince Saionji lamented the situation using identity language:

“Japan can secure its place in the world by ruling it together with Britain and America. … Regarding the future direction of our country, we … have been focusing not on the narrow thinking of ‘Japan as a leader in Asia’ or an ‘Asian Monroe Doctrine’ but on the perspective of ‘Japan in the world.’ Regarding the matters in Asia, we can solve them by cooperating with the Anglo-Saxon powers, not by claiming ‘Asianism’ or an ‘Asian Monroe Doctrine.’ We must look at the broad picture of the world and think about the direction of our country.”439

Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 1, the identity dilemma theory expects states

434 “Sakkaku, Kyokuben, Ninshiki Busoku,” Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, October 3, 1932, Morning edition; “Yume Wo Toku Hokokusho,” Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun, October 3, 1932, Morning edition. 435 Hata, “1932 Nen No Nichibei Kiki.” 436 These books include: Sokosha, ed., Kakugo seyo! Tsugi no Taisen (Tokyo: Sokosha, 1932); Ryujo Date, Nichimaru Moshi Takahaba (Tokyo: Meiji Tosho Shuppan Kyokai, 1932); Teruhisa Nakama, ed., Nichibei Tatakau Bekika (Tokyo: Shinkosha, 1932); Toda Ishimaru, Showa Junen Goro Ni Okoru Nihon Tai Sekai Senso (Tokyo: Nichigetsusha, 1932); Takeshi Nakajima, Nihon Ayaushi! Taiheiyo Daikaisen (Tokyo: Gunji Kyoikusha, 1932); Hironori Mizuno, Dakai Ka Hametsu Ka Kobo No Kono Issen (Tokyo: Tokai Shoin, 1932); Tadataka Ikezaki, Syukumei No Nichibei Senso (Tokyo: Senshinsha, 1932); Kazutsugu Inoue, Nichibei Senso No Shohai (Tokyo: Ichigensha, 1932). 437 Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, 1950, 2:340. Also see, Kido, Kido Koichi Nikki, 1966, 1:215. 438 Daiki Sairenji, “Manshu Jihen Go No Taibei Ninshiki: Debuchi Katsuji to Shiratori Toshio Wo Chushin Ni,” Journal of Law and Political Studies, no. 38 (September 1998): 336. 439 Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, 1950, 2:376–77, emphasis added; Kido, Kido Koichi Nikki, 1966, 1:198.

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under enduring enmity to develop deep mistrust, threat perception, and suspicion. In fact, distrust and threat perception toward America became so acute that many Japanese believed that America would attack Japan.440 For instance, newspapers and commentators debated U.S.-Japan war as “an inescapable destiny.”441 This war scare was so widespread that Japanese Ambassador to the United States had to reassure Saionji and other diplomats that “America is not thinking about U.S.-Japan war at all.” 442 The ambassador also discussed with the Emperor and civilian and military leaders, and they all agreed that war was impossible.443 The Emperor’s brother even inquired an American diplomat “point- blank” whether “the United States is actively preparing for war with Japan.” Ambassador

Grew warned Stimson: “Such a question from the Emperor’s bother is highly significant of the present nervousness of the country.” Grew even compared “the present nervousness of the country” to the “public war psychology” in pre-WWI Germany and warned the replay of the Maine incident.444

Although the domestic explanation based on warmongering expects Japanese leaders to be instigating the war scare, both civilian and military moderates did the opposite.

They argued that the Lytton Report was favorable to Japan, and that it was strategically beneficial to stay in the League. 445 Internationalist intellectuals welcomed the report, advocated diplomatic cooperation, and opposed war and an East Asian Monroe Doctrine.446

440 Hata, “1932 Nen No Nichibei Kiki,” 34–38. 441 Ikezaki, Syukumei No Nichibei Senso; Inoue, Nichibei Senso No Shohai; Mizuno, Dakai Ka Hametsu Ka Kobo No Kono Issen. 442 Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, 1950, 2:376. 443 Debuchi Diaries, September 9, October 6, 27, 1932; Makino, Makino Nobuaki Nikki, 519; Sairenji, “Manshu Jihen Go No Taibei Ninshiki,” 336; Imperial Household Agency, Showa Tenno Jitsuroku, vol. 8 (Tokyo: Tokyo Shoseki, 2016), 163–64. 444 Grew, Ten Years in Japan, 64–67. 445 Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, 1950, 2:414–15. 446 For some examples of these internationalist views, see Kiyoshi Kiyosawa, America Ha Nihon to Tatakawazu (Tokyo: Chikura Shobo, 1932); Kiyoshi Kiyosawa, Hijo Nihon Heno Chokugen (Tokyo: Chikura

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These arguments, however, again failed to convince the Japanese, many of whom were fanatically supporting pan-Asianism. “With the public rancor flaring since the Manchuria

Incident,” wrote one liberal intellectual, “there was no room for calmly listening to the legal argument of the Lytton Report.”447 Another prominent liberal deplored this situation, expressing serious concerns about the future of the country.448 Given the dominant pan-

Asianist narrative of confrontation, there was little room for the internationalist counternarrative of cooperation to gain support.

In sum, enduring enmity occurred under the now entrenched identity dilemma.

Despite the conciliatory content of the Lytton Report, pan-Asianists concluded that confrontation was necessary to defend their identity as a leader in Asia and demanded withdrawal from the League and even war with America. The war scare in Japan also shows how much threat perception and distrust the Japanese had toward the Americans under this high level of enmity. Certainly, not everyone genuinely believed in the scare. One pan-

Asianist leader privately called the scare “absurd,” but often used pan-Asianist rhetoric to fuel anti-Americanism.449 This instrumental use of identity, however, contributed to the identity-driven confrontational discourse that went beyond his control and led many to demand war with America. The identity dilemma was taking a life of its own.

Shobo, 1933), chap. 2; Kiyoshi Kiyosawa, Kiyosawa Kiyoshi Hyouronshu, ed. Yoshihiko Yamamoto (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2002), 134–95; Shinichi Kitaoka, Kiyosawa Kiyoshi: Gaiko Hyouron no Unmei, Enlarged Edition (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha, 2004), 115; Yoshino, “Minzoku to Kaikyu to Senso”; Sakuzo Yoshino, “Sokuji Dokuritsu Shyoninsha No Humei,” Chuo Koron 47, no. 10 (September 1932); Sakuzo Yoshino, “Ritton Hokokusho Wo Yonde,” Chuo Koron 47, no. 12 (November 1932). 447 Kiyoshi Kiyosawa, Nihon Gaikoshi, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shimpo, 1942), 481. 448 Sakuzo Yoshino, “Toyo Monro Shugi No Kakuritsu,” Chuo Koron 47, no. 13 (December 1932). 449 Grew, Ten Years in Japan, 67.

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Japan’s League Withdrawal and Identity Indivisibility

Another consequence of an entrenched identity dilemma, as discussed in Chapter

1, is identity indivisibility: states reject compromise to cooperate because doing so undermines their identities. This effect was at play in the final moment of the Manchuria

Crisis. After receiving the Lytton Report, the League pursued a diplomatic settlement. Yet,

Secretary Stimson insistently pushed tougher measures against Japan. The League ultimately adopted the report and issued a recommendation based on Stimson’s Non- recognition Doctrine. In response, Japan withdrew from the organization in protest. From the material viewpoint, it is puzzling that the United States and Japan confronted each other this fiercely over Manchuria. As discussed above, the United States had very limited interests in Manchuria. Moreover, isolationists’ attack against Stimson’s interventionist policy intensified as the crisis continued without a clear resolution in sight.450 Japan also took a dramatic action of withdrawal in response to the League’s adoption of the Lytton

Report and its recommendation both of which included no coercive measure. As one historian puts it, “it was a pity that she (Japan) reacted so badly to the Lytton Report, which was intended as a document of conciliation. Instead she took a stubborn posture which led inexorably to her leaving the League.”451 I argue that this confrontation resulted from identity indivisibility. American internationalists continued to view the Manchuria issue as one of identity and refused to compromise on their internationalist values. Japanese pan-

Asianists saw withdrawal as the only way to defend their identity as a leader in Asia. There was no middle ground to be found.

450 Rappaport, Henry L. Stimson, 196. 451 Nish, Japan’s Struggle with Internationalism, 246.

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As the Manchuria Crisis continued, more Americans supported the isolationist position of noninterference and criticized Stimson for antagonizing Japan and exacerbating the crisis.452 Yet, Stimson, motivated by his internationalist identity, continuously pursued anti-Japanese policies. He insisted that the League must “do its duty as to principles before they start conciliation.” Criticizing the League powers’ “wishy-washy” stance on Japan,

Stimson pledged to put “some more punch into these damned mushy cowards.”453 On

January 16, he informed the League powers that the United States would not recognize

Manchukuo and pressured them to follow the suit. Moreover, Stimson locked in his non- recognition policy by passing it to President-elect Franklin Roosevelt. After his meeting with Stimson on January 9, Roosevelt publicly declared that “American foreign policy must uphold the sanctity of treaties,” and that his administration will inherit the Non- recognition Doctrine.454

Behind FDR’s action was his internationalist identity. Roosevelt’s advisors thought of his decision as “wholeheartedly acquiescence in the Hoover-Stimson rejection of the traditional American concept of neutrality” and endorsement of “a policy which invited a major war in the Far East.”455 They tried to talk Roosevelt out of it, but the several-hour discussion ended when the President-elect recalled that his ancestors once traded with

China and said, “I have always had the deepest sympathy for the Chinese. How could you

452 Rappaport, Henry L. Stimson, 196. 453 Stimson diary, December 12, 15, 16, 1932; Current, “The Stimson Doctrine and the Hoover Doctrine,” 538; Gary B. Ostrower, “Secretary of State Stimson and the League,” Historian 41, no. 3 (1979): 475. 454 Stimson diary, January 9, 1933; Raymond Moley, After Seven Years (New York, NY: Harper & Brothers, 1939), 93; Bernard Sternsher, “The Stimson Doctrine: F.D.R. versus Moley and Tugwell,” Pacific Historical Review 31, no. 3 (1962): 282. 455 Moley, After Seven Years, 94. The New York Herald Tribune shared a similar view that due to the “Stimson doctrine” the country was “drifting into a quarrel with Japan to no clear end.” New York Herald Tribune, Jan. 18, 1933; Current, “The Stimson Doctrine and the Hoover Doctrine,” 540.

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expect me not to go along with Stimson on Japan?”456 Out of moral obligations, Roosevelt, just like Stimson, left no room for further negotiations with Japan. One historian explains:

“His (Roosevelt’s) sympathies were unmistakenly with China, not only because of his familial ties to the Orient through the China trade, but also because he self-consciously inherited the Wilsonian moralistic foreign policy with regard to China.”457 In other words,

Roosevelt embraced liberal internationalism and left little room for compromise with Japan over Manchuria.

Unlike Stimson and Roosevelt, Britain and other European powers continued to avoid confrontation with Japan. To resolve the Manchuria conflict in their own hands, they referred the issue from the General Assembly to the Committee of Nineteen and the

Subcommittees in New York.458 In Geneva, the British Foreign Minister worked on a diplomatic solution under Clause III of Article XXV of the League Covenant, proposing

“conciliation” through the inclusion of the United States and Russia in the Committee of

Nineteen. On December 25, the Committee of Nineteen issued a draft conciliation, which, building on the Lytton Report, did not recognize Manchukuo but avoided sanction and proposed the international management of Manchuria.

Despite the noncoercive content, Japanese pan-Asianists rejected Britain’s mediation and asserted their identity as a leader in Asia. The discourse in Japan at the time was predominantly pan-Asianist and anti-Western. The Military Reserve Association, political parties, and other civil groups organized rallies to demand Japan’s League withdrawal.459 One hundred and thirty-two newspapers issued a joint statement: “It stands

456 Moley, After Seven Years, 95; Sternsher, “The Stimson Doctrine,” 285. 457 Iriye, Across the Pacific, 187, emphasis added. 458 Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period, 87; Doenecke, When the Wicked Rise, 106. 459 Ogata, “Gaiko to Yoron,” 48–49; Kiyosawa, Nihon Gaikoshi, 2:482.

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to reason that Japan has established Manchukuo. The world has an obligation to recognize this. … The Japanese delegates must not accept any resolution that could jeopardize the existence of Manchukuo.”460 Yosuke Matsuoka, Japan’s chief delegate at the League, received tens of thousands of letters demanding withdrawal. 461 In Geneva, Matsuoka delivered the famous “Japan on the Cross” speech: “Humanity crucified Jesus of Nazareth two thousand years ago. And today? Can any of you assure me that the so-called world opinion can make no mistake? We Japanese feel that we are now put on trial. Some of the people in Europe and America may wish even to crucify Japan in the twentieth century.

Gentlemen, Japan stands ready to be crucified!”462 In Tokyo, pan-Asianist officials argued for Japan’s immediate withdrawal from the League. The Army Minister argued that Japan as a leader in Asia “cannot allow the tyranny of the white race,” and that withdrawal will

“free” Japan from the League’s constraints and allow the country to “expand to its wishes.” 463 The Foreign Minister also made a similar argument. 464 And these views dominated the Japanese government. 465 Faced with these pressures, the Saito cabinet declined the British mediation.466

Even then, moderate leaders opposed withdrawal. Prime Minister Saito, Prince

460 A joint statement by the Newspaper Association, December 19, 1932. See Yomiuri Shimbun 100 Nenshi Henshu Iinkai, ed., Yomiuri Shimbun Hakunenshi: Shiryo, Nenpyo (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1976), 351. 461 Kiyosawa, Nihon Gaikoshi, 2:482. 462 Japanese Delegation to the League of Nations, Japan’s Case in the Sino-Japanese Dispute: As Presented Before the Special Session of the Assembly of the League of Nations (Geneva: League of Nations, 1933), 40. Hearing this emotional speech, one U.S. diplomat was alarmed at the magnitude of Japanese enmity toward America: “I began to have a conception of the rancor and resentment that public condemnation could bring upon a proud and powerful people. … for the first time I began to question the non-recognition policy. More and more as I thought it over I became conscious that we had entered a dead-end street.” Wilson, Diplomat Between Wars, 279–81. 463 Sadao Araki, Showa Nihon No Shihmei (Tokyo: Shakai Kyoiku Kyokai, 1932); Hirobe, Jinshu Senso to iu Guwa, 125–26; Kumao Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, vol. 3 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1951), 14. 464 Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, 1951, 3:14, 17. 465 Hirobe, Jinshu Senso to iu Guwa, 125–26. 466 Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, 1951, 3:7–9.

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Saionji, and top navy moderate leaders did the opposite of warmongering, rejecting withdrawal and stressing its strategic consequences, including the loss of Japan’s great- power status as a League Council permanent member and the termination of Japan’s mandates to the Pacific islands under the League Covenant.467 The former Army Minister insisted that “it is the height of absurdity to force the Powers to recognize Manchukuo’s independence.” Western non-recognition, he claimed, was “a rare, heaven-bestowed gift” because Japan would have been unable to monopolize Manchuria if the Powers had recognized Manchukuo and started directly interfering.468

These rational, strategic arguments against withdrawal, however, lost to emotional, identity-based arguments for it. On February 14, the Committee of Nineteen adopted the

Lytton Report and unanimously decided not to recognize Manchukuo. On February 17, the

General Assembly drafted the recommendation based on the Lytton Report. Just like the report, the recommendation did not recognize Manchukuo, but its content was conciliatory and contained no sanction. Despite such a favorable outcome, Chief Delegate Matsuoka dispatched the “ultimatum” telegram to urge withdrawal. Evoking national pride at stake, he made an emotional case: “Japan will invite the ridicule of the world if it chooses not to resolutely withdraw in a timely manner.”469 This telegram decisively amplified the pro- withdrawal voices within the government.470 Moreover, all newspapers at the time were vehemently calling for immediate withdrawal, and military reservists were sending countless letters to top political leaders in support for such action. 471 The Mainichi

467 Harada, 3:12, 14, 16–17. 468 Ugaki, Ugaki Kazushige Nikki, 1970, 2:884, emphasis added. 469 Nihon Gaiko Bunsho, Manshu Jihen, vol. 3-1, 501. 470 Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, 1951, 3:27. For more details on the role of Matsuoka in the withdrawal decision, see Uchiyama, “Kokusai Renmei Dattai No Yurai.” 471 Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, 1951, 3:26–17.

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demanded the country “not [to] bear humiliation by staying” but to “fearlessly” withdraw for the sake of “glorious national prestige.”472 The Asahi even called for U.S.-Japan war.473

In the end, Prince Saionji admitted: “withdrawal is inevitable.”474 On February 20, the cabinet decided to withdraw.475

The public reaction to this decision suggests that withdrawal was indeed politically

“inevitable.” During the General Assembly on February 24, in which the League issued the recommendation, Chief Delegate Matsuoka delivered the famous “goodbye” speechs and walked out of the room to show Japan’s intention to abandon the League.476 The Japanese praised Matsuoka’s speech and treated him as a national hero defending Japan’s national pride as a leader in Asia.477 Newspapers called the speech “historic” and celebrated the withdrawal as a “glorious independent way of life.”478 Certainly, some liberals attacked

Matsuoka for “fearing, submitting, and catering to the King Mob” and failing to

“tentatively ignore the public opinion and sacrifice himself for the nation” to avoid the diplomatic catastrophe.479 However, very few voiced such criticism.480 In his diary, one cabinet member called the state of the debate “insane,” observing that people “do not adequately consider its [withdrawal’s] meanings, and believe that withdrawal is an end of itself.”481 Withdrawal was indeed an end in and of itself, a symbolic assertion of Japan’s

472 “Renmei Dattai, Osoru Ni Tarazu,” Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun, February 21, 1933. 473 “Chokumen Suru Jyudai Kiki―Renmei No Tainichi Taido Ha Masumasu Akka,” Osaka Asahi Shimbun, February 14, 1933. 474 Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, 1951, 3:26–27. 475 Nihon Gaiko Bunsho, Manshu Jihen, vol. 3-1, 509-510. 476 Japanese Delegation to the League of Nations, Japan’s Case in the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 62–63. 477 Tatsuo Kobayashi and Toshihiko Shimada, Gendaishi Shiryo, vol. 7 (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 1964), 877– 87; NHK, Jujika jo no Nihon: Kokusai Renmei tono Ketsubetsu (Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten, 1987), 202–3. 478 “Matsuoka Zenken No Rekishiteki Daienzetsu,” Osaka Asahi Shimbun, February 25, 1933; “Koei Aru Jishudokuo,” Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun, February 25, 1933. 479 Kiyoshi Kiyosawa, Gekidoki Ni Ikiru (Tokyo: Chikura Shobo, 1934), 340–42; Kitaoka, Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, 115–18; Kiyosawa, Kiyosawa Kiyoshi Hyouronshu, 208–9. 480 Kiyosawa, Nihon Gaikoshi, 2:506; Kitaoka, Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, 118. 481 Makino, Makino Nobuaki Nikki, 546.

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identity as a leader in Asia. As Ambassador Grew put it, “Japan has finally determined to defy the world and to isolate herself, putting into practice the ‘Back to Asia’ movement and with the probable intention of eventually formulating a Monroe Doctrine for the Far East.”

482

In sum, the Manchuria conflict was intractable due to identity indivisibility, one consequence of an entrenched identity dilemma. Viewing the conflict as a matter of identity, liberal internationalists and pan-Asianists refused compromise because that would have undermined their identities. Indeed, there was some instrumental use of identity rhetoric.

For instance, Matsuoka himself was an internationalist and personally opposed withdrawal, but sometimes used inflammatory pan-Asianist rhetoric to push America and the League to back down. This, however, does not make identity irrelevant, because his rhetoric fueled the anti-Western sentiments and made any compromise politically impossible. 483

Matsuoka recognized this when he privately called his League diplomacy a “debacle.”484

Identity politics thus made the crisis intractable.

Alternative Explanations

482 Grew, Ten Years in Japan, 73–74, emphasis added. While many historians view Japan’s withdrawal as a result of political pressures, Inoue Toshikazu offers a revisionist interpretation that it was a calculated action by the internationalists who concluded that it was impossible to cancel the Rehe military campaign scheduled in February, that the League may respond to the operation with sanctions or membership termination, and that Japan could restore international cooperation by leaving the League and removing Manchuria as a diplomatic issue. Toshikazu Inoue, Kiki no Naka no Kyocho Gaiko: Nicchu Senso ni Itaru Taigai Seisaku no Keisei to Tenkai (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1994), chap. 1. To the best of my knowledge, there seems to be no conclusive evidence for both claims. But I still contend that the fact that the Japanese moderates thought withdrawal was “inevitable” given the identity-driven hostile domestic discourse supports my argument. 483 Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, 1951, 3:3–4. 484 Toshiyuki Maesaka, Taiheiyo Senso to Shimbun (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2007), 129; Inoue, Kiki no Naka no Kyocho Gaiko, 12–13; Nish, Japan’s Struggle with Internationalism, 184–86, 214–17; David J. Lu, “Matsuoka Yosukue: Kokusai Renmei Tono Ketsubetsu,” Kokusai Seiji, no. 56 (1977): 92–95.

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To further examine my identity dilemma argument, it is important to revisit how it fares against the alternative explanations of American-Japanese enmity over Manchuria.

As discussed above, the conventional wisdom is that the enmity developed due to strategic or domestic factors. I consider each factor in turn.

The strategic explanation that the United States and Japan formed enmity due to conflict of interests or material threats is weak. As discussed above, the United States had very limited commercial interests and no security stakes in China, let alone Manchuria.

The fact that American isolationists and the Europeans recognized this lack of interests and opposed involvement in Manchuria suggests that material factors were not the key driver of U.S. enmity toward Japan. Moreover, although Japan had vital economic and security interests in Manchuria, the actions by the United States and the League were symbolic and did not challenge these interests. This was precisely why Japanese moderates accepted U.S.

Non-recognition Doctrine and League mediation to reach a diplomatic resolution.

Therefore, it is unlikely that material factors were the main cause of American-Japanese enmity over Manchuria.

The domestic politics explanation that enmity resulted from warmongering is also questionable. Many Americans were isolationists and opposed Stimson’s hostile policy toward Japan. Many Japanese moderate leaders in the government and the military argued against the anti-Western, pan-Asianist policies and sought diplomatic cooperation with the

West. These actions were the opposite of warmongering.

One may still suspect the Japanese military’s warmongering and its media control, as suggested by existing studies.485 For instance, prior to the Manchuria Incident, the

485 Snyder, Myths of Empire, chap. 4; Tomiko Kakegawa, “The Press and Public Opinion in Japan, 1931- 1941,” in Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941, ed. Dorothy Borg and

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Japanese Army discussed using the media to gain public understanding for solving the

Manchuria problem.486 During the crisis, the military sought to shape the public opinion.

The Japanese Army’s internal document emphasized the need to “guide” the public debate. 487 After the Lytton Report, Ambassador Grew observed that the military was

“completely in control” of the press and leading the anti-Western debate.488 Before the withdrawal, the Finance Minister accused the Army Minister that the Army was pressuring the media to create the anti-Western, pro-withdrawal public opinion.489

Yet, this domestic explanation overstates the extent to which the military manipulated the public opinion. First, compared to later years, the government censorship was moderate during the crisis. 490 Second, the Army was not cognizant of all major newspapers’ editorial stances right after the Manchuria Incident.491 Third, as discussed above, there was no need to manipulate the public opinion because the media voluntarily took pro-military stances following the incident. 492 As one historian explains, “the newspapers did not submit to military pressures but instead voluntarily acted.”493 Lastly,

Shumpei Okamoto, trans. Shumpei Okamoto (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1973), 553–550; NHK, Nihonjin ha Naze Senso he to Mukatta no ka: Media to Minshu, Shidosha Hen; Yutaka Arase, “Nihon Gunkoku Shugi to Masu Media,” Shiso, September 1957, 33–47; Takao Goto, Shingai Kakumei kara Manshu Jihen e: Osaka Asahi Shimbun to Kindai Chugoku (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 1987); Maesaka, Taiheiyo Senso to Shimbun; Young, Japan’s Total Empire, 130–49. 486 Kobayashi and Shimada, Gendaishi Shiryo, 7:164. 487 Akira Fujiwara and Toshihiro Kunugi, eds., Shiryo Nihon Gendaishi, vol. 8 (Tokyo: Otsuki Shoten, 1983), 218–19. 488 Grew, Ten Years in Japan, 66. 489 Makino, Makino Nobuaki Nikki, 537; Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, 1951, 3:14. 490 Wilson, The Manchuria Crisis, 36–38. 491 Katsuya Sato, “Manshu Jihen Boppatsu Tosho No Gunbu no Hodo Taisaku to Roncho ni Taisuru Ninshiki,” Nihon Daigaku Daigakuin Sogo Shakai Joho Kenkyuka Kiyo 6 (2005): 357. 492 Sato, 357. For more discussions, see Yuji Daba, Dai Shimbunsha: Sono Jinmyaku Kinmyaku no Kenkyu (Tokyo: Hamano Shuppan, 1996), 154–219. Also see Osamu Ishida, Shinbun ga Nihon wo Dameni shita: Taiheiyo Senso “Sendo” no Kozo (Tokyo: Gendai Shorin, 1995), 33–34. 493 To explain this, some historians point to commercial incentives, arguing that newspapers adopted pro- military stances to boost sale. The fact that pan-Asianist editorials appealed to the public shows the extent to which identity factors affected—and newspapers reflected—the public opinion. Ishida, Shinbun ga Nihon wo Dameni shita, 33–34. Also see Young, Japan’s Total Empire, 55–114, 130–49.

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both civil and military leaders attempted to contain, not enflame, the crisis. This attempt, as seen above, failed due to nationwide anti-Americanism created by identity politics.

Conclusion

In retrospect, the Manchuria Crisis was a turning point for U.S.-Japan relations.

American-Japanese enmity during the crisis continued into the following years and pave the “Road to the Pacific War.”

In this chapter, I argued that American-Japanese enmity over Manchuria resulted from identity politics, not power politics or domestic politics that conventional accounts emphasize. The Manchuria Incident exposed the incompatiblity between American liberal internationalist identity and Japanese pan-Asianist identity. American liberal internationalists viewed Japan’s invasion of Manchuria as a challenge to their role identity as a “crusader nation” to uphold the post-WWI peace system and to democratize and

Christianize China. While isolationists rejected such crusading mentality and opposed intervention, internationalists had a favorable domestic power position to take symbolic actions to condemn Japan. Japanese pan-Asianists, viewing Manchuria as a matter of national identity as a leader in Asia, saw these actions as identity threats. Although Japanese moderates did not share this worldview and opposed confrontation, pan-Asianists won the domestic debate and took assertive policies against the West. This action-reaction dynamic of the identity dilemma became entrenched as these hostile identity groups dominated domestic politics through coalition making and drove foreign policies.

American-Japanese enmity developed through this dynamic became intractable due

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to two consequences of an entrenched identity dilemma: enduring enmity and identity indivisibility. Pan-Asianists demanded withdrawal from the League and even war with the

United States to defend their identity. Both American internationalists and Japanese pan-

Asianists rejected compromise to cooperate because that would undermine their identities.

Consequently, a minor crisis in the Far East that started with the Kwangtung Army’s unauthorized invasion of Manchuria became a major conflict on the world stage that ended with Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations.

Before closing this chapter, I briefly discuss what happened after Japan’s withdrawal as a historical background for the next chapter on the Sino-Japanese War. After the Manchuria Crisis, pan-Asianists expanded their network within the government and the military.494 In 1934, the Foreign Ministry issued an unofficial policy pronouncement that many observers regarded as the declaration of an Asian Monroe Doctrine.495 And Japan withdrew from the Washington Naval Treaty. 496 The new Prime Minister and Foreign

Minister Kouki Hirota tried to reorient Japan’s foreign policy but eventually lost the domestic battle against hardliners. 497 In 1936, Japan and Germany signed the Anti-

Comintern Pact, an agreement that led to the formation of Axis powers. Meanwhile, the new Roosevelt administration was preoccupied with domestic economic problems.

494 Masataka Matsuura, “Dai Toa Senso” ha Naze Okita noka (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai, 2010), chap. 9. 495 Kazuhiko Tomizuka, “1933-4 Ni Okeru Shigemitsu Gaimu Jikan No Taichu Gaiko Rosen: ‘Amau Seimei’ No Kosatsu Wo Chushin Ni,” Journal of the Diplomatic Record Office, no. 13 (1999): 52–75. 496 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 164–74; Sadao Asada, “The Japanese Navy’s Road to Pearl Harbor, 1931-1941,” in Culture Shock and Japanese-American Relations: Historical Essays (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2007), 146–51; Kumao Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, vol. 4 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1951), 27–28, 39, 43–47. 497 Inoue, Kiki no Naka no Kyocho Gaiko, chap. 4; Chihiro Hosoya, Ryo Taisen Kan no Nihon Gaiko, 1914- 1945 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1988), 132–35; Ryuji Hattori, Hirota Koki: “Higeki no Saisho” no Jitsuzo (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha, 2008); Hirota Koki Denki Kankokai, Hirota Koki (Fukuoka: Ashi Shobo, 1992).

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Roosevelt had to spend much of his political capital on the New Deal Initiatives and put aside foreign policy issues. He personally opposed the Neutrality Acts, a series of laws that curtailed U.S. participation in foreign wars, but had to support them to placate isolationists and preserve political capital for his domestic agenda. Roosevelt thus failed to firmly respond to foreign crises such as Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia and the Spanish civil war.498

He also “left East Asian affairs largely to the State Department,” where the majority desired no confrontation with Japan.499 This inwardness meant a break in U.S. assertive foreign policies and a thaw in U.S.-Japan relations.

The Sino-Japanese War, however, changed this dynamic. As discussed in the following chapters, it precipitated another identity dilemma between the United States and

Japan and created much severer enmity, resulting this time in Pearl Harbor on December

7, 1941. As Ambassador Grew wrote, “The longer the period of calm, the more intense the storm.”500

498 H. W. Brands, Traitor to His Class: The Privileged Life and Radical Presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt (New York, NY: Doubleday, 2008), 444–56, 480–82. 499 For instance, Undersecretary of State William Castle wrote in 1933, “Nothing else would so advance American interests in the Orient as the real peace and progress which would result from a close friendship and understanding between Japan and China.” Former Assistant Secretary of State John MacMurray argued in his famous 1935 memorandum that the United States must recognize Japanese hegemony in the Orient as a source of peace in the region, and that if the country is to defeat Japan, it will allow Soviet domination of Asia or make America “not the most favored, but the most distrusted of nations.” Quoted in Iriye, Across the Pacific, 186–87. 500 Grew, Ten Years in Japan, 73.

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Chapter 4: The Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1939

The Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) shaped the trajectory of U.S.-Japan relations leading up to Pearl Harbor (1941). The United States incrementally imposed a series of embargoes on Japan to stop its aggression in China. Japan responded by further expanding into China and Indochina, joining an alliance with the Axis powers, and ultimately attacking Pearl Harbor. Just like the Manchuria Crisis (see Chapter 3), a Sino-Japanese conflict in the Far East turned into an American-Japanese conflict across the Pacific.

Why did the United States and Japan develop enmity and ultimately fight war over

China? I argue that the Sino-Japanese War triggered an identity dilemma by exposing U.S.-

Japan identity incompatiblity and prompting both nations to defend their identities.

American liberal internationalists became anti-Japanese and pursued confrontation because they viewed Japan’s invasion of China as a challenge to their role identity as a “crusader nation” to uphold the post-WWI peace system and to democratize and Christianize China.

Despite opposition from isolationists who shared no such identity view and demanded involvement, internationalists had domestic power to push retaliatory measures. Although these measures were initially symbolic and did not threaten Japanese interests, pan-

Asianists viewed them as a challenge to their role identity as a “leader in Asia” and became anti-American. Although moderate internationalists rejected pan-Asianism and promoted cooperation, pan-Asianists held power and implemented confrontational policies. This action-reaction dynamic resulted in American-Japanese enmity, ultimately leading to the

Pacific War.

I make this argument by separating the case into two periods (1937-39 and 1940-

41) and using a separate chapter for each. I do this for three reasons. First, a detailed

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analysis requires space. Second, U.S.-Japan enmity became qualitatively different across the two periods. The earlier period involved mainly an exchange of symbolic actions; the latter an exchange of material threats including Japanese southward expansion, the Axis alliance, and severe U.S. embargoes. The latter is thus a harder case for my identity argument and an easier case for the strategic explanation that material threats cause enmity.

Third, German’s victories in the European war in May-June 1940 served as another triggering event that intensified identity debates and U.S.-Japan identity dilemma. It therefore makes a theoretical sense to treat the two periods separately. For these reasons, this chapter focuses on the early years of the Sino-Japanese War, leaving the following years before Pearl Harbor for the next chapter.

The Sino-Japanese War and Its Historical Background

Understanding the Sino-Japanese War requires some background. The Manchuria

Crisis formally ended with the Tanggu Truce between the Republic of China and Japan in

May 1933. Afterwards, Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek and Japanese Prime

Minister Koki Hirota pursued further peace initiatives. Yet, skirmishes between Chinese and Japanese forces erupted along the ceasefire line in the winter of 1934-35, prompting the Japanese military to attack the nationalists in North China and establish as a puppet state in November 1935. Although the Chinese nationalists were fighting the civil war against the communists, the Xi’an Incident of December 1936 ended the war and created a united front against Japan.501

501 Katsumi Usui, Nichu Senso, New Edition (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha, 2000), 4–51.

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The Sino-Japanese War broke out in this shifting geopolitical context. On July 7,

1937, Japanese and Chinese soldiers exchanged fire near the Marco Polo Bridge, located in the vicinity of Beijing. Caught off guard by this unexpected incident, the Japanese central government adopted a non-expansion policy. Yet, Chinese strong resistance, and demands for counterattacks in the local and central authorities of the Japanese Army, pushed the government to internally decide troop reinforcement. The fighting halted with a local ceasefire and a peace agreement in mid-July, but Chinese provocations prompted the

Japanese local forces to respond. And the central government officially announced troop reinforcement. Both sides negotiated peace, but the fighting became a full-scale war following the Second Shanghai Incident in mid-August.502 I do not recount all the details here, including ongoing historical debates about the origins of the war. The purpose of this chapter is to show how the war triggered an identity dilemma and enmity between the

United States and Japan.503

Scholars such as Walter LaFeber, James Crowley, and John Mearsheimer offer a strategic explanation of U.S.-Japan enmity over the Sino-Japanese War: Japan’s pursuit of regional hegemony and economic autonomy threatened America’s strategic interests in

China, and U.S. retaliatory embargoes undermined Japan’s national security and provoked

Pearl Harbor.504 This explanation, however, is wanting. On the American side, its Open-

Door policy (1899-) had long emphasized U.S. “potential” interests in China, but these interests had never materialized.505 In 1937, the China trade only occupied 1.5 percent of

502 For an overview of the war, see Ikuhiko Hata, Nichu Senso Shi, Reprinted Edition (Tokyo: Kawade Shobo Shinsha, 2011); Usui, Nichu Senso. 503 Recall that as discussed in Chapter 1, my focus is to explain how identity politics unfolded and created enmity following triggering events, not to explain why those events happened in the first place. 504 LaFeber, The Clash, chap. 7; Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy; Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, chap. 6. 505 Kitaoka, Monko Kaiho Seisaku to Nihon.

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all U.S. exports and 3.3 percent of all U.S. imports. Meanwhile, the Japan trade constituted

8.6 and 6.6 percent, respectively, making Japan America’s third-largest trading partner. The

American investment only consisted 6.1 percent of all foreign investments in China, compared to 36.7 percent for Great Britain and 35.1 percent for Japan. 506 U.S. direct investments in East Asia were only $132 million, less than one-seventh of that in Latin

America, in 1937.507 Moreover, the United States had little security interest in the region.

America’s only military commitment was the Philippines, and the island nation was scheduled for independence in 1946. The U.S. military concluded that “even in peace the defense of the Philippines is not worth the risk to the Fleet in that exposed position, and not worth the risk of provoking retaliation by Japan.”508 Thus, as one historian explains,

“America had very little realistic interest to lose from, or being threatened by, the Sino-

Japanese conflict.”509 From the strategic viewpoint, the Americans had little reason to develop anti-Japanese sentiments.

Why, then, did the Americans develop enmity against Japan over the Sino-Japanese

War? Also, although Japan traditionally emphasized its economic and security interests in

China given its resource scarcity and Soviet threats from the north,510 it did not view the conquest of China as necessary for resource management and national defense.511 Neither

506 Gaimusho Ajiakyoku DaiichiniKa, “Shina Mondai wo Chushin to suru Taibei Kosaku ni kansuru Iken,” January 9, 1941, Ref. B02030597700, Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, National Archives of Japan (hereafter cited as JACAR); Gaimusho Ajiakyoku, “Taibei Kosaku Yoko An,” February 7, 1939, Ref. B02030597700, JACAR. 507 Boake Carter and Thomas H. Healy, Why Meddle in the Orient? Facts, Figures, Fictions, and Follies (New York, NY: Dodge Publishing Company, 1938), 175; Soho Tokutomi, “Naze Toyo Ni Osekkai Suru Ya,” Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun, April 6, 1938, Evening edition. 508 Jonathan G. Utley, Going to War with Japan, 1937-1941 (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1985), 41. 509 Kitaoka, “Taiheiyo Senso No Soten to Mokuteki,” 568; Kitaoka, Monko Kaiho Seisaku to Nihon. 510 Barnhart, Japan Prepares Total War. 511 Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy, 320–22.

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did it face materially significant measures by the Western powers following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, as discussed below. Why, then, did Japan develop enmity against the West? I argue that American-Japanese enmity over China grew because of an identity dilemma. To show this, I begin by discussing how the United States, the other Western powers, and Japan initially reacted to the Sino-Japanese conflict and analyze the role of identity politics in each reaction.

The Sino-Japanese War and the Identity Dilemma Started

Recall that an identity dilemma happens when incompatible identity groups have domestic power and an event or a series of events exposes this incompatibility and leads both states to fight over their identities. During the Sino-Japanese War, incompatible identity groups—American liberal internationalists and Japanese pan-Asianists—held power. The war exposed the incompatiblity between these groups, led them to assert their worldviews over China, and set off an identity dilemma. As these groups formed domestic coalitions to push confrontation, this action-reaction dynamic ensued, and American-

Japanese enmity deepened.

American Reactions

The United States, as discussed above, had very limited strategic stakes in China.

However, liberal internationalists developed enmity toward Japan for identity-based reasons. Specifically, they viewed Japan’s invasion of China as a threat to America’s role

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identity as a “crusader nation” with a “civilizing” mission to uphold the peace system and to democratize and Christianize China. They organized a nationwide anti-Japanese campaign to embargo Japan.

Understanding America’s internationalist identity at the time requires discussing

Henry R. Luce and Pearl Buck, both of whom played a singular role in shaping the public belief in America’s responsibility to democratize and Christianize China. Luce was son of the famous China missionary Henry W. Luce and the founder of Times Inc. He also wrote the famous piece “The American Century” (1941), a manifesto of U.S. mission to promote freedom and democracy in the world. As one historian posits, “it was Henry R. Luce’s steadfast belief in the eventual creation of Christian, democratic China that combined with his business acumen and journalistic savvy to force a focused and ultimately influential conception of what China represented to the United States. … It (China) represented the opportunity for the United States to act benevolently in world affairs and to affect the environment in which it lived—both principal components outlined in his essay ‘The

American Century.’” 512 By early 1937, Luce had used his media empire to support

Generalissimo and Madam Chang.513 He selected the couple as the International Men &

Wife of the Year in Time, praising their marriage as “one being lined under Christian influence and modern republicanism.”514

Luce’s activities coincided with the “Pearl Buck phenomenon.” Buck’s writing

512 T. Christopher Jespersen, American Images of China, 1931-1949 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 10, 24. 513 Jespersen, 30, 35. 514 Time vol. 31, no. 1, January 3, 1938. Tae Jin Park, “In Support of ‘New China’: Origins of the China Lobby, 1937-1941” (Ph.D. Dissertation, West Virginia University, 2003), 110. Luce’s reporting was so biased in favor of China that David Halberstam characterized him as “the missionary, the believer, a man whose beliefs and visions and knowledge of Truth contradicted and thus outweighed the facts of his reporters…. [and] a true ideologue of the West… [who] had an acute sense of America’s destiny.” David Halberstam, The Powers That Be (New York, NY: Knopf, 1979), 49–50.

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inspired by her missionary upbringing in China—particularly her Pulitzer-prize-winning novel The Good Earth (1931)—helped promote Luce’s message. As one historian explains, she “single-handedly changed the distorted image of the Chinese people in the American mind … as cheap, dirty, ridiculous coolies or sneaky, vicious, insidious devils … [by portraying them] as honest, kindhearted, frugal-living, hard-working, gods-fearing peasants who are much the same as American farmers.”515

This discourse of American internationalist identity became “activated,” or politically salient, as many Americans viewed and framed the Sino-Japanese War as an issue of American internationalism and developed enmity against Japan. Among them was

Henry Stimson, an internationalist politician who led the anti-Japanese campaign as secretary of state during the Manchuria Crisis (see Chapter 3). He understood and framed the stakes in terms of identity, not strategic interest, arguing that America must cut off its sale of war materials to Japan and assist China’s struggle for democracy. He wrote, “The lamentable fact is that today the aggression of Japan is being actively assisted by the efforts of men of our own nation … China’s principal need is not that something should be done by outside nations to help her, but that outside nations should cease helping her enemy.”516

Moreover, Stimson personally urged President Franklin Roosevelt and Secretary Cordell

Hull to take a moral stance against Japanese aggression to save China: “China is really fighting our battle for freedom and peace in the Orient today. … Her people … are headed by a government largely influenced by American education and traditions.”517

515 Kang Liao, Pearl S. Buck: A Cultural Bridge Across the Pacific (London, UK: Praeger, 1997), 47. Also see Pearl Buck, The Good Earth (New York, NY: The John Day Company, 1931); Bradley, The China Mirage, 115–18; Jespersen, American Images of China, 1931-1949, 25–26; Oliver Turner, American Images of China: Identity, Power, Policy (New York, NY: Routledge, 2014), 80–81. 516 Henry L. Stimson, “Stop Helping Japan,” New York Times, October 7, 1937. Also see Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 311–12. 517 Henry Stimson to Cordell Hull, August 30, 1937. Stimson Papers (microfilm), Reel 93; Henry Stimson to

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Missionaries, committed to the cause of America’s mission to democratize and

Christianize China, also viewed Japan’s invasion as a challenge against American internationalist identity. They supported Stimson and formed a political coalition to embargo Japan. As one historian explains, “many churchmen favored sanctions against

Japan because they did not believe that the American people should support an aggressor, and regarded these measures as a ‘form of moral protest and social coercion.’”518 They

“celebrated Chiang as a devoted Christian leader,”519 promoted internationalist foreign policies, and pushed the church to lead the anti-Japanese public debate.520 Correspondingly,

Chiang Kai-shek and his wife made public diplomacy efforts to frame the Sino-Japanese

War as China’s struggle for democracy and Christianity. They publicly criticized America for selling war materials to Japan.521 These efforts won public support, with 43 percent of the Americans showing sympathies for China, compared to only 2 percent for Japan.522

This public enmity against Japan turned into concrete policies because those in power shared the internationalist worldview. Particularly, President Roosevelt supported

Stimson’s views, 523 “took Manchukuo as a text,” 524 and considered coercive

Franklin Roosevelt, November 15, 1937. Stimson Papers (microfilm), Reel 94; Stimson diary, November 17, 1937. 518 Dorothy Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938: From the Manchurian Incident Through the Initial Stage of the Undeclared Sino-Japanese War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), 389–91. 519 Park, “In Support of ‘New China,’” 111. 520 Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938, 352. 521 May-ling Soong Chiang, War Messages and Other Selections (Hankow: China Information Committee, 1938), 8, 19–20, 36, 138, 157; Kai-shek Chiang, The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, 1937-1945, vol. 1 (New York, NY: Kraus Reprint, 1969), 47–52. For an analysis of Chinese public diplomacy, see Akio Tsuchida, “China’s ‘Public Diplomacy’ toward the United States before Pearl Harbor,” The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 17, no. 1 (2010): 35–55. 522 George Horace Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935-1971, vol. 1 (New York, NY: Random House, 1972), 69. 523 Stimson diary, November 17, 1937. 524 Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes: The Inside Struggle, 1936 - 1939, vol. 2 (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1954), 275.

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countermeasures, including an American-British naval “quarantine” and “an extreme form of sanctions” against Japan.525 Concerned with isolationist opposition, he instead delivered a speech on October 5 in Chicago, a city that Secretary Hull characterized as “the very heart of isolationism,” to convince the American public of his liberal internationalism.526

“The peace-loving nations,” he declared, “must work together for the triumph of law and moral principles,” “quarantine” the aggressor nations, and stop “the epidemic of world lawlessness.” 527 Liberal newspapers praised this speech as a champion of Wilsonian internationalism. 528 The speech pushed the State Department to denounce Japan for violating the Nine Power Treaty and the anti-war Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the League of

Nations to condemn Japan and to call for the Nine Power Treaty Conference, also known as the Brussels Conference.529

In contrast, many Americans were isolationists and rejected the internationalist worldview and Roosevelt’s policy. They dismissed the relevance of the Far Eastern crisis for American interests and urged the government to enact the Neutrality Act to avoid any involvement. They did not even show concerns with Japan’s revisionism and its

525 John McVickar Haight, “Franklin D. Roosevelt and a Naval Quarantine of Japan,” Pacific Historical Review 40, no. 2 (1971): 204; Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History (New York, NY: Harper & Brothers, 1951), 71–75; Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, American White Paper, The Story of American Diplomacy and the Second World War (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1940), 91; Dorothy Borg, “Notes on Roosevelt’s ‘Quarantine’ Speech,” Political Science Quarterly 72, no. 3 (1957): 418–19; Travis Beal Jacobs, “Roosevelt’s ‘Quarantine Speech,’” Historian 24, no. 4 (1962): 485. 526 Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938, 379–80; Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, 2:211–13; Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. 1 (New York, NY: Macmillan Company, 1948), 544–45; Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision (New York, NY: Harper & Brothers, 1944), 61. 527 The speech is available at https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/october-5-1937- quarantine-speech. 528 “America Finds Her Voice,” The Washington Post, October 6, 1937; “Roosevelt Urges ‘Concerted Action,’” New York Times, October 6, 1937; “U.S. Held Prepared to Help Curb Tokyo,” New York Times, October 6, 1937. For a survey of editorials on the quarantine speech, see “Nation-Wide Press Comment on President Roosevelt’s Address,” New York Times, October 6, 1937. 529 Jay Pierrepont Moffat, The Moffat Papers: Selections from the Diplomatic Journals of Jay Pierrepont Moffat (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956), 154–56.

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implications for the interwar peace system in general.530 Roosevelt’s speech writer wrote,

“The reaction to the [quarantine] speech was quick and violent—and nearly unanimous. It was condemned as warmongering and saber-rattling.” 531 Polls showed 73 percent of respondents believing that there would be another world war and 44 percent fearing that

America will be dragged into it.532 54 percent favored the withdrawal of all American troops from China,533 95 percent opposed U.S. banks lending money to Japan and China,534 and 63 percent rejected any boycotts against Japan.535 Conservative newspapers criticized

Roosevelt’s speech, proclaiming “Stop Foreign Meddling; America Wants Peace”536 and accusing the president for turning Chicago into “a world-hurricane of war fright.”537 Many civil organizations also criticized Roosevelt as a warmonger and filed a petition to “Keep

America Out of War.”538 The State Department concluded: “the temper of the country was definitely against any form whatsoever of pressure against Japan.”539

Moreover, many politicians and officials shared the isolationist sentiment and rejected the internationalist argument for saving China and the peace system. According to one cabinet member, “most of the members of the President’s own Cabinet” and “[a] majority of the President’s spokesmen in Congress” showed opposition.540 In fact, more

530 Akira Iriye, The Globalizing of America, 1913-1945 (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 140, 154. The Neutrality Act prohibited the sale of war-related materials and loans and commercial credits to all belligerents in a conflict, banned the sailing of American ships in belligerent waters, and barred the traveling of American citizens on ships of belligerent nations. 531 Samuel Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt (New York, NY: Harper & Brothers, 1952), 166. Also see Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 1948, 1:544–45. 532 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, 1:65. 533 Gallup, 1:68. 534 Gallup, 1:70. 535 Gallup, 1:72–73. 536 “Stop Foreign Meddling; America Wants Peace,” Wall Street Journal, October 6, 1937. 537 “Speech on ‘War Fears’ Stirs Quick Action by League to Curb Japanese,” Chicago Daily Tribune, October 6, 1937. 538 Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 1948, 1:545. 539 Moffat, The Moffat Papers, 184. 540 Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History, 73.

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than two out of three congressmen opposed America’s taking common action with the

League in the Far East. Some isolationist representatives threatened to impeach the

President,541 while some isolationist senators publicly criticized Roosevelt’s involvement in the Brussels Conference.542 Similarly, isolationist State officials opposed involvement arguing that “we have no interest in the Far East that would justify a war.”543 Clearly, isolationist policymakers had no anti-Japanese sentiments.544

Such isolationist opposition made it politically impossible for internationalists to take coercive actions against Japan. Roosevelt admitted that he was “fighting against a public psychology of long standing—a psychology which comes very close to saying

‘peace at any cost.’”545 During the Brussels Conference, he instructed U.S. delegates “not to take the lead in this conference,” 546 because pushing anti-Japanese actions at the conference would require “such obvious leadership on our part that I am sure neither the people of this country nor Congress would have supported it.” 547 Absent American leadership, the conference ended with no tangible action but a declaration that all parties

“hope” Japan consider their “common attitudes” that there is no warrant for using force to

541 Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 1948, 1:545. 542 “Any Move by the Nine Power Conference Will Be Firmly Opposed in Congress,” New York Times, November 16, 1937. 543 This is an observation by Norman Davis, U.S. delegate to the Brussels Conference. John McVickar Haight, “Roosevelt and the Aftermath of the Quarantine Speech,” The Review of Politics 24, no. 2 (1962): 242. Also see “The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State,” August 27, 1937, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 3, Diplomatic Papers, 1937 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1954), 487 (hereafter cited as FRUS: 1937, vol. 3).; “The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State,” October 15, 1937, FRUS: 1937, vol. 3, 612-16; Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938, 315; Moffat, The Moffat Papers, 156, 167, 183. 544 For more, see Borg, “Notes on Roosevelt’s ‘Quarantine’ Speech,” 430–32. 545 Elliot Roosevelt, ed., F. D. R.: His Personal Letters, 1928-1945, vol. 1 (New York, NY: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), 716–17. 546 Moffat, The Moffat Papers, 162. 547 Haight, “Roosevelt and the Aftermath of the Quarantine Speech,” 258. The State Department also opposed coercive actions against Japan. “The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis),” November 12, 1937, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 4, Diplomatic Papers, 1937 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1954), 180–81 (hereafter cited as FRUS: 1937, vol. 4).

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intervene in Chinese internal affairs.548 Unable to take tangible actions to punish Japan,

Roosevelt complained to his aide, “It’s a terrible thing to look over your shoulder when you are trying to lead—and to find no one there.”549 U.S. actions against Japan thus remained largely symbolic.550

European Reactions

Another source of evidence to demonstrate the role of identity is variation between the reactions of the Americans and the Europeans, particularly the British. Unlike the

American internationalists who held enmity against Japan for identity-based reasons, the

British became anti-Japanese for strategic reasons that Japan’s expansion threatened their interests. Still, they did not consider China important enough to support U.S. hostile policy against Japan.

The British had the largest strategic interests in China among the great powers.

Commercially, Britain had the largest investment in China, which constituted about 35 percent of all foreign investments there and about 6 percent of all British overseas holdings.

It also highly valued China’s potential market in the future because the world economy was turning inward after the Great Depression. Moreover, Britain had large shipping interests in China, with its ships carrying 41.9 percent of the total tonnage of foreign, costal,

548 “Declaration Adopted by the Nine-Power Conference at Brussels on November 15, 1937,” FRUS: 1931- 1941, vol. 1, 410-12. 549 Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt, 167. 550 Roosevelt’s inaction continued during the Panay Incident in December 1937, in which the Japanese bombed an American gunboat Panay, stationed on the Yangtze River. Although he believed that the attack was deliberate and contemplated a blockade and even war, he only issued diplomatic protests because of isolationist opposition. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, 2:274–75; Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt, 182. Also see, Grew, Ten Years in Japan, 206–11.

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and inland shipping in 1936. Geopolitically, Britain possessed many colonial interests in

South Asia and the Western Pacific. Fearing that Japan’s victory against Chiang Kai-shek would embolden the Japanese to attack the British Empire, the Britons “generally tended to view China as the Empire’s first line of defense.”551

For this strategic, not identity-based, reason, many British developed enmity in response to Japan’s invasion of China. The British embassy in Tokyo explained the cause of U.K.-Japan friction as follows: “Britain has got what Japan wants, and no other country has, a dominating position in China.”552 The British Foreign Office argued that Britain must make Tokyo aware that it was “a much greater Asiantic power than Japan”: “The point that we are much greater Asiantic Power than Japan is one that might well be made to the

Japanese when they become overinsistent on their claim to a leading role in Asiantic affairs

… Consistent firmness and ‘standing up for one’s rights’ is unquestionably the policy to adopt in dealing with the Japanese.”553 Newspapers argued that “it is time for Japan to learn that the free hand which she desires in Eastern Asia will in no circumstances include license to play havoc with the lawful interests of Great Britain.” 554 Many British supported sanctions and organized anti-Japanese protests. 555 Anti-Japanese sentiments in Britain became so “noticeably intensified” that top Japanese leaders expressed deep concerns.556

551 Bradford A. Lee, Britain and the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1939: A Study in the Dilemmas of British Decline (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1973), 16–18. 552 Lee, 112. 553 Lee, 46–47. 554 “Chaos at Shanghai,” The Times, August 20, 1937, sec. Opinion and Editorial. 555 Lee, Britain and the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1939, 50–51; Douglas Ford, Britain’s Secret War against Japan, 1937-1945 (London, UK: Routledge, 2006), 17–19; Antony Best, Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbour: Avoiding War in East Asia, 1936-1941 (New York, NY: Routledge, 1995), 37–45; Nicholas R. Clifford, Retreat from China: British Policy in the Far East, 1937-1941 (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1967), 33. 556 Makino, Makino Nobuaki Nikki, 686–87; Ugaki, Ugaki Kazushige Nikki, 1970, 2:1188; Kumao Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, vol. 6 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1951), 114–15. “The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State,” October 5, 1937, FRUS: 1937, vol. 3, 580-81. Japanese leaders also agreed that given Britain’s interests in China, “it stands for reasons that anti-Japanese feelings are particularly bad in

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However, the British government refused to militarily intervene or sanction Japan because China was not a strategic priority. As British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain explained: “We have got quite enough troubles on our hands in Europe to make it most undesirable to send the Fleet out the Far East. Sanctions are just as likely to mean sending the Fleet out to the Far East as the sanctions against Italy meant sending the Fleet out to the Mediterranean.”557 After the quarantine speech, British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden discouraged President Roosevelt from seeking anti-Japanese boycotts, which he believed would provoke Japan’s “measures of aggression.”558 During the Brussels Conference, the

Europeans unanimously refrained from going after Japan.559 One U.S. official wrote, “I have never known a conference where even before we meet people are discussing ways to end it. The Belgians quite frankly would like to see us finish and go home, and several other powers feel the same way.”560 Britain refused a leadership role, with Eden stating that

“the initiative for the holding of the Conference in Brussels never came from us at all, but from the United States Government itself.”561 The British, according to one U.S. official,

“did not want anything to transpire at the conference and wished to hide behind America’s skirts.”562 This hesitancy among all the parties led to such a toothless resolution against

Japan that the New York Times criticized the conference as “bathetic” and even

Britain.” Harada, 6:104–5; Ugaki, Ugaki Kazushige Nikki, 1970, 2:1188. 557 Peter Lowe, Great Britain and the Origins of the Pacific War: A Study of British Policy in East Asia, 1937 to 1941 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1977), 27. Also see Best, Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbour, 43. 558 “Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles),” October 12, 1937, FRUS: 1937, vol. 3, 600- 602. 559 Lowe, Great Britain and the Origins of the Pacific War, 29–31. 560 Moffat, The Moffat Papers, 161. 561 Moffat, 161. 562 Moffat, 162. The Chicago Daily Tribune, in line with its isolationist position, criticized Eden’s statement as “laying the baby on the doorstep of the United States” and “getting Mr. Roosevelt to take the lead in calling the Brussels conference when everyone from the Japanese to the Italians had been preparing to get angry at the British for assembling the powers at Brussels.” David Darrah, “Eden Discloses Secret in Talk to Parliament,” Chicago Daily Tribune, November 2, 1937.

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“pathetic.”563 In short, the international community failed to take meaningful action against

Japan.

Japanese Reactions

Although the symbolic actions by the Western powers did not directly threaten

Japan’s vital interests in China, many Japanese developed enmity for identity-based reasons. Specifically, they saw and framed the Western condemnation as a threat against

Japan’s pan-Asianist role identity as a “leader in Asia” and its mission to establish “Asia of the Asians.” They became anti-Western and pursued confrontational policies.

From the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War, many Japanese viewed the conflict through the lens of their pan-Asianist identity. In the wake of the Marco Polo Bridge

Incident, newspapers repeatedly evoked the theme of pan-Asianism and called for an Asian

Monroe Doctrine.564 Under this discursive environment where pan-Asianist identity was

“activated,” or politically salient, many Japanese expressed anti-Americanism following

Roosevelt’s quarantine speech, calling for the country to defend pan-Asianism. 565 The

Greater Asia Association (Dai Ajia Kyokai), the largest pan-Asianist organization whose membership network extended to prominent politicians, intellectuals, businessmen,

563 Edwin L. James, “Brussels Conference in Bathetic Impotence,” New York Times, November 21, 1937, sec. 4. One U.S. top official called the resolution “a revealing study in the bankruptcy of policy” because “it had hardly contributed more than pious good wishes toward the solution of the conflict.” Moffat, The Moffat Papers, 156. 564 “Hokushi Jihen to Sekai No Ninshiki,” Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, July 14, 1937, Morning edition; “Ikkyo Ni, Saishuteki Ni,” Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, July 18, 1937, Morning edition; “Kyukoku Joyaku Ha Mondai Wo Kaiketsu Sezu,” Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, July 19, 1937, Morning edition; “Ronbaku Ni Koto Yosete,” Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, August 4, 1937, Morning edition. Also see Kentaro Kaneko, “Toyo Heiwa to Ajia Monro Shugi,” Chuo Koron, January 1938. 565 For Grew’s observation of Japanese reactions, see “The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State,” October 22, 1937, FRUS: 1937, vol. 3, 633.

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military officers, and government officials,566 framed and defended the China Incident as

Japan’s mission to emancipate Asia from Western influence.567 One pan-Asianist leader wrote that the China Incident, just like the Manchuria Incident, was “an outward expression” of Japanese pan-Asianism that the country would abandon the policy of following the West and “return to Asia” to complete its “cultural historical mission” of establishing Asia for the Asians. It is unacceptable, he argued, for Japan to surrender to Western pressures and abandon its mission.568 Another official publicly defended the conflict, characterizing the

American denunciation as an “unfair” attempt by “have nations” to contain “have-not nations” like Japan.569

Major newspapers expressed similar anti-Western opinions using pan-Asianist identity frames. The Mainichi condemned U.S. intervention and sent its chief editorial writer to America to publicize “Japan’s justice as a leader in East Asia” and its “mission to promote peace and development in East Asia.”570 During his trip to America, the writer said to his accompany: “Under the name of the Monroe Doctrine, America thinks of its rule over the hemispheres as its heaven-bestowed right. This is fine, but if other countries try to establish an autonomous co-prosperity sphere in their respective regions, … [America] immediately thinks of this as a pretext to world domination or an ambition to enslave all humanity. Since … [America regards] its hemisphere as a guarantee of world peace and

566 Matsuura, “Dai Toa Senso” ha Naze Okita noka, chap. 11. 567 Dai Ajia Kyokai, Dai Ajia Shugi, October 1937. 568 Toshio Shiratori, “Shina Jihen No Honshitsu,” Dai Ajia Shugi, October 1937; Toshio Shiratori, “Tairiku Seisaku No Sekaishi Teki Igi,” Kaizo, October 1937; Tobe, Gaimusho Kakushinha, 123–24. Other pan- Asianist writings include Fumio Ishii, “Toyo Bunka No Saininshiki,” Shina, November 1937; “Waga Taishi Seisaku No Kicho to Mokuhyo,” Toa, December 1937. 569 “Bei Daitouryo No Hushi Enzetsu Ni Ousyu,” Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun, October 7, 1937, Evening edition. 570 “Takaishi Habei Shisetsu,” Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun, October 7, 1937, Morning edition; “Kokumin Teki Seienn Wo Ato Ni Takaishi Shisetsu, Kashima Wo Tachi,” Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun, October 8, 1937, Morning edition.

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condemns anything that does not recognize this as injustice and immoral, it is probably futile to argue against such self-righteousness and arrogance.”571

Anti-Americanism was also rising within the military. Many army officers supported the war in China as “the basis for East Asia restoration under the awakening of

East Asia.”572 The quarantine speech also “completely changed” the attitudes of the Navy’s leadership. Many navy leaders were initially careful not to antagonize the United States, but were now claiming that Japan would be ready to fight the Americans if U.S. intervention was to continue.573 U.S. Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew wrote alarmingly:

“The war spirit here is noticeably growing.”574

The Brussels Conference and its symbolic resolution intensified the anti-Western sentiments. For instance, Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe declared that “the Japanese and

Manchuria Empire will prosper as the bearer of the establishment of an East Asia new order.”575 He also stated that Japan would abrogate the Nine Power Treaty to eliminate

Western intervention in the Far East.576 Major newspapers shard this pan-Asianist stance.

The Mainichi complained that the Americans, despite “having no knowledge about the

Chinese at all,” regarded them as “completely democratic citizens” while mistakenly accusing the Japanese as aggressors. Comparing America’s Monroe Doctrine to Japan’s

Asia Monroe Doctrine, the newspaper justified Japan’s action: “America has done a similar

571 Hassei Furukai, Bunka No Senpei: Jinbutsu Shosetsu Takaishi Shingoro (Tokyo: Shinbun Tsushinsha, 1941), 24. 572 Kazuo Horiba, Shina Jihen Senso Shidoshi (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1973), 1, 4–6, 35–36. 573 George T. McJimsey, Documentary History of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidency, vol. 7 (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 2002), 7–8. 574 Grew, Ten Years in Japan, 197. 575 Junichiro Shoji, “Nicchu Senso Eno Boppatsu to Konoe Fumimaro Kokusai Seigi Ron,” Kokusai Seiji, May 1989, 41. 576 “Konoe Shusho Syachu Dan,” Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, November 27, 1937, Morning edition.

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thing to Cuba, Nicaragua, and Mexico. America is rather a teacher for Japan.”577 The

Yomiuri criticized the resolution as “self-righteous” calling it “an attempt by Britain,

America, and France to impose the sanctities of the treaty and to behave like a knight of peace.”578 The Asahi ridiculed the “incompetence” of the Brussels Conference saying that

Japan would not be stopped by the West.579

The domestic explanation of Japanese enmity toward America is that leaders, especially those within the Japanese Army, orchestrated anti-American warmongering and used it to justify expansion into China.580 However, these leaders, many of whom were moderate internationalists, did the opposite. With their worldview of “Japan in the world,” or a responsible member of the Western club, they rejected pan-Asianism and did not view

Western condemnation as an identity threat. They instead tried to contain the Sino-Japanese conflict by pursuing a non-expansion policy, a peace agreement with the Chinese, and cooperation with the West. This was the opposite of warmongering.

Foreign Minister Kouki Hirota led this internationalist effort.581 After the Western condemnation of the Sino-Japanese conflict, Hirota prioritized cooperation with the Anglo-

Saxon powers. He sent several Japanese policymakers as goodwill convoys to America,582 and worked with the British Ambassador to bring about Britain’s diplomatic mediation.583

Under Hirota’s leadership, the Foreign, Army, and Navy Ministries agreed to “accept a fair

577 “Seisen No Rekishiteki Shimei,” Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun, November 15, 1937, Morning edition; “Senka No Kakudai Ni Abura Sosogu Mono,” Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun, November 17, 1937, Morning edition; “Shina Wo Shiranu Beikokumin Zenji Ware Shini Ni Kyomei,” Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun, November 18, 1937, Morning edition. 578 “Ete Katte Na Kyukoku Kaigi Sengen,” Yomiuri Shimbun, November 17, 1937, Morning edition. 579 “Kyukoku Kaigi No Muno Kokuhaku,” Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, November 17, 1937, Morning edition. 580 Ienaga, The Pacific War, 1931-1945; Snyder, Myths of Empire. 581 Before the Sino-Japanese conflict, Hirota implemented “Harmony Diplomacy (kyowa gaiko)” to restore Japan’s diplomatic relations with the West. Inoue, Kiki no Naka no Kyocho Gaiko, chaps. 5, 6. 582 Grew, Ten Years in Japan, 194; Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, 1951, 6:88–89. 583 Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, 1951, 6:98–99, 104–5, 112.

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peace mediation when the purposes of the military action are mostly achieved.”584 With support from the Emperor, Hirota then started a peace negotiation with China, mediated by

Germany, while asking for U.S. diplomatic assistance.585

However, moderates were already losing the debate after the Marco Polo Bridge

Incident, and the Japanese government abandoned its non-expansion policy during the

Second Shanghai Incident.586 The “Old Guard (moderate) elements don’t seem to come into the picture at all nowadays,” alarmed the American and British Ambassadors to

Japan.587 Instead of warmongering, many military leaders, including the director of the

Army General Office who instigated the Manchuria Incident (1931) as the chief commander of the Kwangtung Army, opposed the Sino-Japanese War, because further expansion into China would undermine Japan’s war preparation against its primary strategic foe, the Soviet Union.588 Yet, the internal opposition was too strong for these leaders to contain.589 The moderate leadership, observed Ambassador Grew, “has made and is making efforts to avoid antagonizing the United States,” but has “very little influence” with “the military and naval forces in individual local issues.” 590

Moderates also faced pressures from the anti-Western public. After the quarantine speech, former Army Minister Kazushige Ugaki privately said: “The power of public

584 Gaimusho Toakyoku Daiikka, “Daisankoku no Assen, Chotei ni taisuru Nihon Seihu no torubeki Hoshin,” October 21, 1937, Ref. B02030510700, JACAR. 585 Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, 1951, 6:87–88, 111–12; Grew, Ten Years in Japan, 199; Hata, Nichu Senso Shi, 148–51. 586 Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, 1951, 6:67. For an overview, see Hata, Nichu Senso Shi, chap. 5. 587 Grew, Ten Years in Japan, 197–98. 588 But this officer was forced by hardliners to resign in September. Ugaki, Ugaki Kazushige Nikki, 1970, 2:1186. 589 Makino, Makino Nobuaki Nikki, 675, 679. Entries on July 22, August 10, 1937; Horiba, Shina Jihen Senso Shidoshi, 82–86; Hitoshi Imamura, Imamura Hitoshi Kaikoroku, New Edition (Tokyo: Fuyo Shobo Shuppan, 1993), 212–13. The Emperor even inquired Army Minister Sugiyama whether he could really unite the military. Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, 1951, 6:87–88. 590 Grew, Ten Years in Japan, 192–94, 197–98.

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opinion is enormous. We have to be extremely cautious because … [it can] sometimes ignore careful calculations and seek adventures.” 591 To avoid instigating anti-Western public reactions, these leaders sought to block any anti-Japanese contents from foreign newspapers and keep the Japanese press “quiet” on anti-American contents.592

The decline of the moderate leadership was evident in their futile attempt to regain power. They attempted to have General Ugaki lead the military and the peace negotiation with China.593 Ugaki himself long desired a peaceful resolution and a compromise between

Japan and the Anglo-Saxon powers. 594 But his faction was already weak. 595 He even lamented with his colleagues that “internal order, especially the Army’s discipline, is noticeably becoming chaotic.”596 He thus could not lead the military and the peace effort.

In short, in opposition to the domestic explanation of warmongering, both civilian and military moderate leaders tried to contain the war and restore relations with the Anglo-

Saxons. But the domestic balance of power favored pan-Asianists. In December 1937, the war expanded into Nanjing and beyond.597 In January 1938, the public criticism against the moderates’ peace efforts led to the failure of a peace negotiation mediated by Germany and the Prime Minister’s statement that Japan will “no longer speak with the Nationalist

Government of China.” This so-called First Konoe statement meant the loss of the moderate leadership to the nationalistic pan-Asianist public opinion.598

591 Ugaki, Ugaki Kazushige Nikki, 1970, 2:1192. 592 Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, 1951, 6:89. Grew, Ten Years in Japan, 199. 593 Makino, Makino Nobuaki Nikki, 688–89; Ugaki, Ugaki Kazushige Nikki, 1970, 2:1190–91. 594 Ugaki, Ugaki Kazushige Nikki, 1970, 2:1189. 595 Ugaki, 2:1161. Ugaki’s failure to form a cabinet due to internal opposition within the Army in January 1937 had already shown the decline of his faction. Inoue, Kiki no Naka no Kyocho Gaiko, 304–12. 596 Ugaki, Ugaki Kazushige Nikki, 1970, 2:1212. 597 Horiba, Shina Jihen Senso Shidoshi, chaps. 3–6; Usui, Nichu Senso, 77–87. 598 Tsutsui, Senzen Nihon No Populism, 263–66; Kido, Kido Koichi Nikki, 1966, 1:456; Horiba, Shina Jihen Senso Shidoshi, 130–32.

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In sum, the Sino-Japanese War exposed the incompatibility between American liberal internationalist identity and Japanese pan-Asianist identity, setting off an identity dilemma. American internationalists viewed Japan’s invasion of China as a threat to their role identity as a “crusader nation.” Despite isolationist opposition, they held domestic power to take symbolic actions to condemn Japan. Japanese pan-Asianists viewed these actions as a threat to their identity as a “leader in Asia.” Although moderates rejected pan-

Asianism and pursued diplomatic cooperation, pan-Asianists had more domestic influence and led the debate toward further expansion in China and confrontation against the West.

Further Confrontation

As the Sino-Japanese War expanded after the First Konoe statement, the Americans’ anti-Japanese sentiments intensified, forcing the U.S. government to denounce Japan’s aggression and impose “moral embargoes.” In turn, the anti-American pan-Asianist voices became stronger in Japan and undermined the moderates’ last-ditched peace efforts. This was followed by the so-called Second Konoe Statement on November 3 that Japan will establish a “New Order in East Asia.” This increased American-Japanese enmity resulted from the action-reaction and feedback processes of the identity dilemma. Incompatible identity groups—American liberal internationalists and Japanese pan-Asianists—gained more influence and pushed confrontation through coalition-making. Enmity deepened through a feedback loop in which confrontational actions by one side’s incompatible group antagonized and empowered the other side’s incompatible group to take counteractions.

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U.S. Moral Embargo

As the Sino-Japanese War expanded after the First Konoe Statement, the images of

Japanese killings of Chinese civilians in Nanjing and Guangzhou spread across America.

They help generate further anti-Japanese sentiments and societal support to embargo Japan.

Many Americans continuously viewed China through their internationalist identity lens, problematizing the fact that Japan was buying from America one-half of its war materials used to invade China, the fellow Christian democracy in the Far East.599 Henry

Luce led the internationalist debate. His magazines featured gruesome pictures of Japan’s atrocities in China and compared Generalissimo Chiang to George Washington and celebrated him “a converted Methodist who has now for solace the examples of tribulation in the Christian Bible.”600 Prominent missionaries urged Roosevelt to embargo Japan and called on the “Fellow Christians of North America” to lead the public debate.601 The

Chiang couple participated in this debate through public diplomacy to promote the image of China as an aspiring Christian democracy while criticizing U.S. inaction on the embargo issue.602

These internationalist opinions turned into pro-embargo lobbying coalitions.

599 The New York Times reported: “The war picture, so far as raw materials for war purposes are concerned, is particularly all Japanese. Japan’s total import trade from the United States in 1937 was $288,000,000 and of this it is a reasonable estimate that more than $200,000,000 was for raw materials Japan must have in order to wage war against China.” L. C. Speers, “China, Japan Spend Much on U.S. Arms,” New York Times, July 24, 1938. 600 “War in China Gambles for Asia’s Future,” Life, October 17, 1938; “China’s Chiang Kai-Shek Returns to the Hills,” Life, November 7, 1938; Park, “In Support of ‘New China,’” 110–11. 601 Shaw, An American Missionary in China, 131–32. 602 Letter to the New York Times, June 12, 13, 1938; Chiang, The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, 1937-1945, 1:59–62. Also see Tsuchida, “China’s ‘Public Diplomacy.’”

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Specifically, two famous American missionaries to China, Frank Price and Harry Price, established the American Committee for Nonparticipation in Japanese Aggression

(ACNPJA). The committee spearheaded the embargo campaigns with many other internationalist organizations. Henry Luce and Pearl Buck as well as “missionaries and religious leaders played a crucial role in the committee’s campaign.” 603 The committee argued that America must “refuse …to furnish Japan with the materials of war” and help

China, which “is making a magnificent struggle for liberty.”604 It also welcomed Henry

Stimson as its honorary chairman and lobbied for embargoes, working closely with key policymakers such as Stanley Hornbeck, chief advisor on Far Eastern Affairs in the State

Department, and Senator Key Pittman, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee.605

This anti-Japanese public outcry pushed both internationalist and isolationist politicians to support a tougher Japan policy. The Senate unanimously passed a resolution expressing “unqualified condemnation of the inhumane bombing of civilian populations.”

In introducing and passing the resolution, Pittman, a “vehemently anti-Japanese” voice in the Senate,606 argued, “I believe the people, the churches and the peace societies of the country have at least awakened to their duty in protesting against military wrongs and against violation of the peace treaties.”607 The fact that isolationist politicians joined the

603 Donald J. Friedman, The Road from Isolation: The Campaign of the American Committee for Non- Participation in Japanese Aggression, 1938-1941 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 15, 19–21, 34, 69. 604 American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression, America’s Share in Japan’s War Guilt (New York, NY: American Committee for Non-participation in Japanese Aggression, 1938), 3–5. 605 Bradley, The China Mirage, 152–53; Friedman, The Road from Isolation, 17–18; Utley, Going to War with Japan, 36–37. 606 Wayne S. Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932-45 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), 348. 607 Quoted in American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression, America’s Share in Japan’s War Guilt, 9–10.

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anti-Japanese coalition testified the strength of the public enmity toward Japan.608

By contrast, many isolationist public figures and newspapers rejected the internationalist missionary mindset to help China. The bestseller Why Meddle in the

Orient? captured this sentiment: “Let us cease lecturing to the rest of the world as to how we think it ought to live and conduct itself. … At every step in the development of world affairs, we should calculate, not simply like moralists, but like practical men, as to what is the best way to avoid the disaster of war.”609 Secretary Hull and many State Department officials sided with isolationists and pursued nonintervention. Historian Akira Iriye explains: “If anything, steps were taken to minimize chances of direct confrontation between Japan and America in China; officials of the State Department favored the withdrawal of Americans from areas of danger in China and disapproved of arms shipment to China in defiance of the Japanese blockade.” Many officials took this position because they did not view the Sino-Japanese War as a moral issue concerning American internationalist mission to save China and world peace. “At bottom, as in the past, was the perception of the East Asian conflict,” posits Iriye. “While it was a moral issue, one involving the peace of the whole world, it could still be defined as a Sino-Japanese affairs as far as American policy was concerned.”610

However, the increasingly anti-Japanese public opinion forced the State

Department to take symbolic actions. In June, Hull announced a “moral embargo,” a

608 Utley, Going to War with Japan, 35; Akira Iriye, “U.S. Policy toward Japan Before World War II,” in Pearl Harbor Reexamined: Prologue to the Pacific War, ed. Hilary Conroy and Harry Wray (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1990), 18–19. Also see the observation made by a Japanese foreign officer that the anti-Japanese sentiment resulted from the Americans’ view of China as a fellow Christian democracy. Kaname Wakasugi, “Tochiho ni okeru Shina gawa Senden ni kansuru ken,” July 10, 1938, Ref. B02030591100, JACAR. 609 Carter and Healy, Why Meddle in the Orient?, 220. 610 Iriye, Across the Pacific, 195–96.

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voluntary termination of shipment of American aircraft to Japan. “So great was the public outcry that Hull could no longer denounce Japanese bombings of civilians while simultaneously doing nothing to stop American firms from selling Japan the planes used in those bombings,” explains one historian. “The moral embargo accomplished its primary goal—it calmed the American public. Hull gave the American people just enough action to satisfy most of them without doing anything that would provoke Japan.”611 In fact, many

Americans welcomed the moral embargo and demanded further actions. Many congressmen showed not only “an entire willingness to support” the embargo but also “an even greater desire to extend the embargo to a wider range of exports.”612 Internationalists in the State Department similarly supported tougher measures.613 But Hull ignored these opinions and took no further action. In fact, by the end of 1938, only one air plane manufacture in America followed the voluntary embargo, and Japan was free to purchase materials that were necessary to produce, repair, and fuel aircrafts from America.614 Thus,

U.S. retaliation remained purely symbolic.

Japan’s Peace Efforts

Based on the strategic explanation, symbolic measures like the moral embargo should not cause enmity. Yet, Japanese pan-Asianists viewed this as a challenge to their

611 Utley, Going to War with Japan, 36–37. 612 Christian Science Monitor, June 21, 1938. 613 “Memorandum by the Advisor on Political Relations (Hornbeck) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Sayre),” December 22, 1938, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 3, Diplomatic Papers, 1938 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1954), 425–27 (hereafter cited as FRUS: 1938, vol. 3); Utley, Going to War with Japan, 35–37. 614 Utley, Going to War with Japan, 36–37.

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identity as a leader in Asia and became further anti-American. This undermined the diplomatic efforts by Japanese moderates to end the Sino-Japanese War and empowered pan-Asianists to pursue confrontation.

By late May, Prime Minister Konoe had recognized his China policy as a mistake and attempted to resume the peace talks with the Chinese and to restore relations with the

West. He pursued these goals by welcoming civilian and military moderate leaders into the cabinet, including General Kazushige Ugaki as foreign minister.615 Ugaki spearheaded the peace negotiations with China while prioritizing cooperation with the Anglo-Saxon powers.616 Behind these actions was the realization that “the solution of Japan’s problem in China will be impossible unless good relations are maintained with Great Britain and the United States.”617

However, these peace efforts failed due to opposition from pan-Asianists, who were becoming further anti-Western and expanding influence through coalition-making. Soon after joining the Foreign Ministry, Ugaki faced internal opposition. Pan-Asianist foreign officers confronted Ugaki multiple times with demands to reject compromise with the

Anglo-Saxons in East Asia, to strengthen ties with the Axis powers, and to appoint Toshio

Shiratori, the chief pan-Asianist voice in the ministry, as new deputy foreign minister.618

Ugaki also faced public demands to expel the Western influence and establish a

615 Grew, Ten Years in Japan, 218. For Ugaki’s thoughts in taking the ministerial position, see Ugaki, Ugaki Kazushige Nikki, 1970, 2:1240–41. 616 Ugaki, Ugaki Kazushige Nikki, 1970, 2:1244, 1249. For Ugaki’s view on China policy, see Kazushige Ugaki, “Hokushi No Mondai,” Chuo Koron, January 1938. 617 Grew, Ten Years in Japan, 218. 618 Memorandunm by Itaro Ishii, 1938, Ref. B02030010400, JACAR; Kumao Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, vol. 7 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1952), 29–30. Itaro Ishii, Gaikokan no Issho, Revised Edition (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha, 2007), 341–43, 346–49; Ugaki, Ugaki Kazushige Nikki, 1970, 2:1255; Jun Tsunoda, Gendaishi Shiryo, vol. 10 (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 1964), 351–54. Historians often refer to the pan-Asianist officials in the Foreign Ministry as “progressives” (kakushinha). I choose to call them pan-Asianists because of their pan-Asianist worldviews. Tobe, Gaimusho Kakushinha.

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“new order” in Asia.619 In his meeting with the Emperor, Ugaki showed great concerns with emotional public reactions to the war and Western denunciations. He maintained that interests, not emotions, must guide diplomacy and that Japan should cooperate with Britain and America on a “given-and-take” basis.620

Lastly, Ugaki met opposition from his peers and subordinates within the Army.

Dissatisfied with the peace efforts, these officers demanded the establishment of an East

Asia Development Board (Koa-in), an inter-bureaucratic agency that would centralize the decision-making processes and enable the Army to run the China policy. Prime Minister

Konoe eventually submitted to these pressures.621 This decision prompted Ugaki and his allies in the Foreign Ministry to resign.622 Consequently, pan-Asianists effectively took over the ministry and stopped the peace efforts.623 Hachiro Arita, a member of the Asianist faction, became the new foreign minister.624

Japan’s New Order in East Asia

619 For some examples of pan-Asianist opinions at the time, see Ryoichi Tobe, “Nihonjin No Nichu Senso Kan,” in Nichu Senso to Ha Nandatta No Ka, ed. Tzuchin Huang, Jianhui Liu, and Ryoichi Tobe (Kyoto: Minerva Shobo, 2017), 188–89. 620 Ugaki, Ugaki Kazushige Nikki, 1970, 2:1249, 1257–58. Entries on July 11, August 6, 11, 1938. 621 Behind Konoe’s decision was the inability of the newly appointed army minister, Seishiro Itagaki, to control the army’s internal opposition. Saburo Sakai, Showa Kenkyukai: Aru Chishikijin Syudan no Kiseki (Tokyo: TBS-Britannica, 1979), 108–9. Itagaki’s support for the agency led Ugaki to criticize him. Ugaki, Ugaki Kazushige Nikki, 1970, 2:1264. 622 Ugaki, Ugaki Kazushige Nikki, 1970, 2:1263–64; Ishii, Gaikokan no Issho, 349–51. 623 As one prominent liberal intellectual wrote, Ugaki’s fall “meant that the internal situation in japan is not yet suitable for carrying out Ugaki’s preferred policies. ”Kiyosawa, Nihon Gaikoshi, 2:556. Also see Sokichi Takagi, Takagi Sokichi: Nikki to Joho, ed. Takashi Ito, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 2000), 200. 624 Tobe, Gaimusho Kakushinha, 151–52. Arita was chosen because he was less nationalistic than other candidates, including Toshio Shiratori, the leader of the pan-Asianist faction within the Foreign Ministry and Yosuke Matusoka, who spearheaded Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations during the Manchuria Crisis. Ugaki, Ugaki Kazushige Nikki, 1970, 2:1264; Ishii, Gaikokan no Issho, 341–43; Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, 1952, 7:141–42.

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This decline of the moderate leadership was followed by pan-Asianist anti-Western policies. In response to the U.S. State Department’s denunciation of the Sino-Japanese War in October,625 Prime Minister Konoe issued the “Second Konoe Statement” in November, which declared Japan’s basic national objective as “the establishment of new order which will insure the permanent stability of East Asia.” Japan, China, and Manchukuo must cooperate so as to “secure international justice, to perfect the joint defense against

Communism, and to create a new culture and realize a close economic cohesion throughout

East Asia.”626 Foreign Minister Arita then issued a statement rejecting the Washington

Treaties and the Open Door.627

Importantly, the New Order policy was not meant to antagonize Britain and

America. According to the Showa Kenkyukai, Konoe’s brain trust organization that authored the policy, the purpose was to maintain Japan’s access to the global market and to “avoid friction with the (Anglo-American) powers as much as possible.” It was assumed that Japan and America should be able to cooperate because the two nations had “no competition or conflict of interest” and because the United States had “far greater interests” with Japan than with China.628 Konoe also publicly declared: “It goes without saying that

Japan will not exclude cooperation of foreign Powers.” The real foe was “the evils of bolshevization [of the Far East] and their subversive activities behind the so-called long- term resistance of the Chiang Kai-shek administration.” 629 Moreover, many military

625 “The American Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Japanese Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs (Prince Konoye),” October 6, 1938, FRUS: 1931-1941, vol. 1, 785-90. 626 “Statement by the Japanese Government,” November 3, 1938, FRUS: 1931-1941, vol. 1, 477-78. 627 Usui, Nichu Senso, 104. 628 Syowakenkyukai Shinamondai Kenkyukai, “Shina Jihen ni Taisyo subeki Konpon Housaku ni tsuite,” June 1938 in Koichi Kido, Kido Koichi Kankei Bunsho (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1966), 324–29. For details on the making of the New Order policy, see Sakai, Showa Kenkyukai, 135–38, 149–62. 629 “Radio Speech by the Japanese Prime Minister (Prince Konoye),” FRUS: 1931-1941, vol. 1, 478-81.

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leaders recognized Japan’s economic dependence on U.S. imports, regarded the Soviet

Union and China as the “front enemies,” and desired no confrontation against America.630

Meanwhile, the New Order policy signified Japan’s identity as a leader in Asia.

“The establishment of a new order in East Asia,” proclaimed Konoe, “is in complete conformity with the very spirit in which the Empire was founded; to achieve such a task is the exalted responsibility with which our present generation is entrusted.”631 According to one Showa Kenkyukai member, through the Sino-Japanese War, Japan “has come to realize its mission in the world, from an independent position apart from the guidance and interference from the Western nations.” Thus, “the moral and philosophical purpose” of the

New Order was “an awakening of East Asia in the world” and “world historical significance in uniting the Orient.” 632 Another member defined this “world historical significance” as “the task of breaking out of the so-called Europeanist (yoroppashugi) perspective of world history, which equates the history of white people to the history of the world.”633

In short, the New Order policy was a balancing act. By framing the Sino-Japanese

War as a pan-Asianist identity issue and a holy war to establish a new order, Konoe attempted to mobilize the public and end the conflict with China—all the while avoiding frictions with the Americans.634 But this rather invited U.S. retaliations and incited anti-

630 Toshikazu Inoue, Ajia Shugi wo Toinaosu, Enlarged Edition (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 2016), 198–202; Yoko Kato, Mosaku suru 1930 Nendai: Nichibei Kankei to Rikugun Chukensou, Revised Edition (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 2012). Takahiro Koiso, “Nihon Kaigun No Taibeikan to Seisaku, 1936-1939,” Sundai Shigaku 145 (2015): 35–36. 631 “Statement by the Japanese Government,” November 3, 1938, FRUS: 1931-1941, vol. 1, 477-78. 632 Masamichi Royama, Toa to Sekai (Tokyo: Kaizosha, 1941), 4–5. 633 Kiyoshi Miki, “Toa Shiso No Konkyo,” Kaizo, December 1938, 9–10; Hotta, Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War, 167. 634 Ryunosuke Goto, ed., Showa Kenkyukai (Tokyo: Keizaioraisha, 1968), 63; Hotta, Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War, 165.

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Western pan-Asianism.

American liberal internationalists viewed the New Order as a challenge to their identity and their civilizing mission to democratize and Christianize China. This resulted in $25 million financial aid to Chiang Kai-shek in December. The aid idea had been promoted by Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau since the spring of 1938. 635 While

Morgenthau had gained support from Roosevelt, Hull insisted on noninvolvement for strategic reasons. The State Department concluded that assistance to China “would be of no decisive aid to China and would be a profitless irritant to Japan … [and] lead to armed conflict with Japan.”636

However, Morgenthau wrote the President an emotional plea using internationalist identity language: “I am taking I am taking the liberty of pleading China’s cause so earnestly because you have three times told me to proceed with the proposal for assistance to China. All my efforts have proved of no avail against Secretary Hull’s adamant policy of doing nothing … It is the future peace and present honor of the United States that are in question. It is the future of democracy, the future of civilization that are at stake.”637

Morgenthau even wrote: “After all, we might just recognize that the democratic form of

Government in my life is finished. There is a bare chance we may still keep a democratic form of Government in the Pacific, but … this has been in Mr. Hull’s lap since June or July

635 The aid plan was to provide China with $25 million to help the Chinese soldiers, to be reimbursed by ten years of tung oil exports to America. It was considered that the transaction would appear a normal business since U.S. paint and varnish industry widely used tung oil. Utley, Going to War with Japan, 45. On the internal discussion within the Treasury Department, see Morgenthau diary, vol. 147, 348-353, 368. 636 “Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton),” November 13, 1938, FRUS: 1938, vol. 3, 569-572. Hull agreed with this assessment. “Memorandum by the Secretary of State,” November 14, 1938, FRUS: 1938, vol. 3, 574-75. Hornbeck opposed Hull and advocated tougher commercial and naval actions. “Memorandum by the Advisor on Political Relations (Hornbeck),” November 14, 1938, FRUS: 1938, vol. 3, 572-74. 637 Utley, Going to War with Japan, 45, emphasis added.

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and the responsibility is entirely his.” 638 Clearly, Morgenthau was driven by his internationalist identity.

In the end, Morgenthau succeeded in implementing the China aid. In November,

Hull left for an international conference in Lima. In Hull’s absence, internationalist Sumner

Welles became Acting Secretary and worked with Roosevelt and Morgenthau to permit the

China aid, only informing Hull after the fact.639 This was followed by the State’s diplomatic response to the Arita statement on December 30, which criticized Japan’s action as

“arbitrary, unjust, and unwarranted” and protested that the Americans would never “assent” to Japan’s New Order.640

Importantly, these U.S. measures were nothing but symbolic. Aside from the diplomatic protest, the $25 million assistance “was little more than a moral boost for China.”

The British called it “eyewash.”641 Despite the increasing public demand for sanction, the

U.S. government still took no such action. The State Department’s internal memorandum stated: “Such a program of retaliation would involve serious risk of armed conflict. Neither our interests in the Far East nor the effect of current events in the Far East upon our general world interests seems to warrant incurring such a risk.”642 Thus, Hull’s noninterventionist

638 Henry Morgenthau and John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of Crisis, 1928-1938, 2nd ed. (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959), 510. 639 “The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State,” December 2, 1938, FRUS: 1938, vol. 3, 575-76. On Welles’ internationalist foreign policy views, see Christopher D. O’Sullivan, Sumner Welles, Postwar Planning, and the Quest for a New World Order, 1937-1943 (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2008). 640 Nihon Gaiko Bunsho, Nichu Senso, vol. 3, 2246-51; Gaimusho Americakyoku Daiikka, “Taibei Gaiko Kankei Shuyo Shiryoshu,” February 1940, Ref. B02030597800, JACAR; Utley, Going to War with Japan, 49. 641 Utley, 48. 642 “Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State,” December 5, 1938, FRUS: 1938, vol. 3, 406-409. The memo was requested by Secretary of State Hull and prepared by Assistant Secretary of State Sayre, Chief of the Division of Trade Agreements Hawkins, Assistant Adviser on International Economic Affairs Livesey, and Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs Hamilton. Hornbeck disagreed with the memo’s conclusion and pushed for “material pressures of such weight that the Japanese, contemplating the prospect of those pressures being applied, would very substantially modify the program to which they have recently and openly

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policy largely remained.

Although U.S. symbolic actions did not pose material threats, they worsened the anti-Western sentiment among many Japanese who saw them as an invalidation of national identity as a leader in Asia. Foreign Minister Arita responded on December 19 that Japan will pursue its Asianist policy even if that would necessitate frictions with Britain and

America.643 Pan-Asianist leaders championed the new policy and argued that the West must recognize Japan’s “new place in East Asia.”644 The Mainichi defended the New Order policy as Japan’s “mission and responsibility” as “a leader in East Asia” to unite the region against the Anglo-American imperialism that “exploited” China as a “half-colony.”645 The

Asahi criticized the Anglo-American China aid as “malign intentions to fuel the long-term resistance” by Chinese nationalists, calling for national unity to establish the New Order as

“a leader in Asia.”646 Prominent columnists condemned America and called for an East

Asian Monroe Doctrine.647

In contrast, moderates pursued diplomatic cooperation. Within the Foreign Ministry, the America Division concluded that given America’s “extremely small” commercial interest in China, “there is no concrete significant problem to fight over.” 648 Liberal

declared themselves committed.” “Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Sayre),” December 22, 1938, FRUS: 1938, vol. 3, 425-27. 643 “Koa Gaiko Tenkai Ni Tomonahu Eibei Tono Masatsu Ha Kakugo,” Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, December 12, 1938, Morning edition. 644 Morinosuke Kajima, “Shin Toa Kensetsu to Daisankoku,” Bungei Shunshu 16, no. 21 (December 1938): 108–17; Toshio Shiratori, “Koa Gaiko e No Kyoho,” Bungei Shunshu 16 (January 1939): 4–13. 645 “Toa Shinchitsujo to Keizai Kensetsu,” Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun, December 21, 1938, Morning edition; “Jihen Daininen Wo Kaeru 6,” Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun, December 21, 1938, Morning edition. 646 “Eibei No Taishi Shakkan,” Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, December 17, 1938, Morning edition; “Kizen Meishuno Kyoho,” Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, December 21, 1938, Morning edition. 647 Soho Tokutomi, “Kyukokujoyaku No Shigai Ha Eibeijinn Kore Wo Maiso Seyo,” Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun, October 24, 1938, Evening edition; Soho Tokutomi, “Beikoku to Seijiteki Joshiki,” Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun, February 28, 1939, Evening edition; Jiro Sawada, Tokutomi Soho to America (Tokyo: Takushoku University Press, 2011), 480–83. 648 Gaimusho Ajiakyoku Dai 1, 2 Ka, “Shina Mondai wo Chushin to suru Taibei Kosaku ni kansuru Iken,” January 9, 1941, Ref. B02030597700, JACAR; Gaimusho Ajiakyoku, “Taibei Kosaku Yoko An,” February

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politicians organized pro-Anglo-American groups and rallies, arguing that both countries will gain nothing by fighting, and that “Japan, without having oil, would not be able to fight a long-term war in the first place.”649 Liberal intellectuals rebuked the New Order policy for antagonizing the Anglo-Saxons. They feared that the anti-Japanese public sentiment in America would push the Roosevelt administration to pursue further confrontation despite the lack of U.S. strategic interests in China.650

Despite these moderates’ efforts, pan-Asianists still carried the debate. On January

4, 1939, Konoe stepped down, taking responsibility for his failure to end the China war.

Next day, Kiichiro Hiranuma, the chairman of the Privy Council, became a prime minister.

Many cabinet members, including Foreign Minister Arita, remained on board. To reformulate foreign policy, the cabinet members, members of the House of Councilors, and business leaders all prioritized cooperation with the Anglo-Saxons. Yet, the anti-Western sentiment was so prevalent that it was politically difficult to promote cooperation. Arita privately said, “Although I understand that conducting diplomacy centered around Britain and America is good for Japan, things will certainly not get done if I say that in a climate like today’s. … to unite and lead people, I need to first give an impression that Arita is being tough.”651 “It is not good for Japan to turn Britain and America into enemies,” admitted Hiranuma. “But … we need to go somewhat tough.”652

7, 1939, Ref. B02030597700, JACAR. 649 Genta Muramatsu, “Miki Takeo No Shoki Seiji Katsudo,” Meiji Daigakushi Kiyo 15 (2011): 193–94. 650 Kiyoshi Kiyosawa, “Shingaiko Taisei No Kansei,” Kaizo, January 1939; Kiyoshi Kiyosawa, “Eibei No Tainichi Appaku No Teido to Genkai,” Chuo Koron, February 1939; Kiyoshi Kiyosawa, “Beikoku Tainichi Seisaku No Shinkyokumen,” Kokusai Chisiki Oyobi Hyoron, March 1939; Kiyoshi Kiyosawa, “Nichibei Tsusho Joyaku Shikko No Eikyo,” Kaizo, January 1940; Kitaoka, Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, 170–72. Also see Tanzan Ishibashi, “Seifu Ha Kasanete Taisi Seisaku Wo Gutaiteki Ni Seimei Subeshi,” Sharon, November 12, 1938; Tanzan Ishibashi, Ishibashi Tanzan Zenshu, vol. 11 (Toyo Keizai Shimposha, 1972), 83–87. 651 Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, 1952, 7:284, 292. 652 Harada, 7:249–50. The Finance Minister was “restlessly concerned” about Hiranuma’s comments and even said to him: “That is so absurd. What do you do if things go bad when we go tough and do not conduct

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As the Sino-Japanese War continued into 1938, American-Japanese enmity worsened due to the action-reaction process of the identity dilemma. American internationalists increased their influence through coalition-making and implemented symbolic measures against Japan. This angered Japanese pan-Asianists, leading them to rally behind the New Order policy while cornering those moderates who pursued cooperation. Hostile voices on each side became more powerful through this feedback loop, constraining U.S.-Japan relations.

The Tu rning Point

U.S.-Japan relations continuously worsened in 1939, when the United States announced the abrogation of the 1911 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Commerce and Navigation.

The abrogation was significant not only because it triggered Japanese backlash, but also because it removed legal barriers for U.S. embargoes in later years, measures that ultimately prompted Pearl Harbor.653 Therefore, some historians view the abrogation as a

“turning point” for the bilateral relations that made the Pacific War “inevitable.”654 Behind this U.S.-Japan confrontation was the entrenchment of the identity dilemma. Hostile incompatible identity groups—American liberal internationalists and Japanese pan-

Asianists—became dominant political forces and locked in confrontational policies in both

diplomacy based on Japan’s capabilities?” Also see Jinzaburo Masaki, Masaki Jinzaburo Nikki, ed. Takashi Ito, Takashi Sasaki, and Yasutaka Terunuma, vol. 4 (Tokyo: Yamagawa Shuppansha, 1983), 48. 653 Specifically, the most-favored-nation clause of the treaty prohibited the United States to take retaliatory commercial measures against Japan. 654 Kitaoka, Monko Kaiho Seisaku to Nihon, 51–56.

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countries. Therefore, confrontation became the way forward.

The Abrogation of U.S.-Japan Commercial Treaty

American internationalists’ anti-Japanese lobbying efforts increased as the Sino-

Japanese conflict ensued in 1939. They continued making an identity-based argument that

America must stop its sale of war materials to Japan and save China, the fellow Christian democracy in Asia.

For instance, prominent missionaries appeared on national radio to criticize the use of U.S. war materials in China and America’s “blood trade” with Japan.655 Church leaders also called on Congress to illegalize the sale of war materials to Japan.656 The ACNPJA submitted embargo petitions with 156,231 signatures to Congress.657 ACNPJA’s executive secretary Harry Price and its honorary chairman Henry Stimson urged Senator Key Pittman, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to push an embargo resolution.658

Moreover, American public showed increasing support for internationalists. 72 percent of the Americans favored an embargo of war materials to Japan, and 66 percent supported boycotts of Japanese products. 74 percent showed sympathies for China, compared to only 2 percent for Japan.659 Also, 70 to 80 percent of newspapers in America favored retaliatory measures, such as revising the Neutrality Act or imposing tougher

655 Utley, Going to War with Japan, 54–55. 656 “Call United States the Ally of Japan,” New York Times, June 1, 1939; Varg, Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats, 271. 657 Harold B. Hinton, “Hunt for Peace Policy Turns to New Avenues,” New York Times, May 7, 1939; Varg, Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats, 271. 658 “40,000,000 Reported for a Japan Embargo,” New York Times, July 18, 1939; Utley, Going to War with Japan, 54–55. 659 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, 1:159–60.

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sanctions.660

This political climate prompted actions by the Senate. Senator Pittman proposed a senate resolution that would enable the president to embargo sale of war materials to any nation that violates the Nine Power Treaty—in other words, Japan. 661 Other senators, including even Senator Arthur Vandenberg, one of the leading isolationist members of the

Committee on Foreign Relations, proposed various resolutions designed to embargo Japan and abrogate the 1911 U.S.-Japan commercial treaty. Such concerted actions by the senators reflected the strength of the anti-Japanese public opinion.662

Meanwhile, there was strategic consensus against embargo. Nazi Germany annexed

Czechoslovakia in March 1939, and the U.S. military was shifting its focus from Asia to

Europe, and from offensive to defensive operations and readiness. The Joint Army and

Navy Board walked away from its color-coded war plans, including the Orange plan against Japan since the 1920s, and adopted a new plan, Rainbow, which prioritized the defense of the Western hemisphere over the Pacific theater.663 The State Department and the U.S. military concluded that the U.S. government “should continue to avoid measures which risked the danger of war with Japan” and “do no more than dispatch a declaration of protest.”664 Secretary Hull himself opposed embargoes because of his “conclusion that

China held no vital American interests.”665 In short, given the new strategic priority, the

United States could not afford sanctioning and provoking Japan.

660 Friedman, The Road from Isolation, 68. 661 Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932-45, 349; Friedman, The Road from Isolation, 31. 662 These resolutions were in fact written in collaboration with the ACNPJA. Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932-45, 346–51; Friedman, The Road from Isolation, 31–32. 663 Ronald Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War With Japan (New York, NY: Free Press, 1985), 59. 664 Chihiro Hosoya, “Miscalculations in Deterrent Policy: Japanese-U.S. Relations, 1938-1941,” Journal of Peace Research 5, no. 2 (1968): 100. 665 Utley, Going to War with Japan, 56.

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Despite this strategic consideration, the anti-Japanese public opinion and the

Congress resolutions pressured Roosevelt and Hull to act.666 On July 26, they announced a six-month notice required for the abrogation of the U.S.-Japan commercial treaty.667 The anti-Japanese public welcomed the announcement, with 81 percent supporting it and 82 percent demanding that the country would refuse to “sell Japan any more war materials” after the abrogation becomes effective in January 1940.668 This public support, in spite of the strategic consensus against embargoes, suggests that identity politics was driving enmity toward Japan.

Another source of evidence to show the role of identity is isolationists’ reactions.

They opposed the anti-Japanese measures because they rejected the internationalist crusading mentality to save China and world peace. 669 Isolationist-leaning newspapers contended that the Americans “have nothing to fight for in China,” denying China’s need for American aid and dismissing the idea of militarily defending China.670 Famous public figures, including prominent journalist Walter Lippmann and former Undersecretary of

State William Castle, publicly sided with isolationists, making a strategic case that embargoes against Japan would bring the Axis powers together and start a two-ocean war against them.671 But these strategic arguments for nonintervention did little to change the

666 Cohen, America’s Response to China, 134. 667 The announcement took place soon after the Tianjin Incident on June 27, in which the British made unilateral concessions to the Japanese over a dispute over concessions in Tianjin. Besides responding to the anti-Japanese public opinion in America, Roosevelt and Hull also needed to avoid a sign of American weakness in light of Britain’s capitulation. Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932-45, 346–51; Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1979), 188–96; Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 1948, 1:635–38; Utley, Going to War with Japan, 62–63. 668 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, 1:177. 669 Justus D. Doenecke, Storm on the Horizon: The Challenge to American Intervention, 1939-1941 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 304–5. 670 “Our Relations with Japan,” Chicago Tribune, September 1, 1939; “We Have Nothing to Fight for in China,” Chicago Tribune, September 23, 1939; “Our Front in China,” Chicago Tribune, November 15, 1939. 671 Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932-45, 351–52.

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increasingly anti-Japanese emotional public opinion driven by identity politics.672 This, combined with the removal of legal hurdles for embargoes through the treaty abrogation, meant that confrontational policies against Japan were effectively locked in.

Japanese Reactions to the Treaty Abrogation

While the treaty abrogation marked an important shift in U.S. Japan policy, it still did not pose direct material threats to Japan. First, it did not involve an actual embargo. In fact, the Roosevelt administration “had no program for sanctions in mind.”673 After the abrogation announcement, Japan continued to purchase war materials including oil, steel, iron, and cooper from America. Second, the abrogation was to become effective in six months. This left room for negotiating a new treaty.

However, the treaty abrogation exacerbated the identity dilemma by antagonizing many Japanese who viewed it as a repudiation of the New Order policy and their pan-

Asianist identity. The resulting increase in anti-Americanism helped pan-Asianists become dominant in domestic politics. This meant that U.S.-Japan identity dilemma and confrontation were now locked in.

Anti-Western pan-Asianist voices became dominant in both the government and the public. Within the Foreign Ministry, pan-Asianists overwhelmed those moderate voices that argued for negotiating a new commercial treaty with the United States.674 They argued that Japan must “embark on the establishment of the New Order based on true international

672 For an overview of the isolationist position, see Doenecke, Storm on the Horizon, chaps. 20, 21. 673 Cohen, America’s Response to China, 134. 674 Tobe, Gaimusho Kakushinha, 205–11.

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justice” and “march toward the revision of the Washington Treaty system.”675 Many high- ranking diplomats also argued that Japan must “meet the challenge” from the United States and accomplish its “heaven-bestowed mission” to establish the New Order.676 Moreover, many citizens and intellectuals organized anti-Anglo-Saxon rallies across Japan.677 The public mood, as one prominent columnist put it, was: “We need frankness and bluntness against America. An eye to an eye and a tooth to a tooth is the only way against

America.”678 Liberal intellectuals, politicians, and military leaders argued against these pan-Asianist opinions, but they did little to change the debate.679

This anti-Western political environment led many Japanese to demand that their country sign an alliance with the Axis powers to fight the Allied powers and defend pan-

Asianism.680 Many army and navy officers argued for the alliance as a way to accomplish

675 Gaimusho Taibeiseisakusingiiinnkai Kanjikai, “Beikoku no Nichibei Tsusho Jyoyaku Haki Tsukoku ni taisuru Taisaku Hoshin An,” August 8, 1939, Ref. B02030598000, JACAR; Gaimusho Taibeiseisakusingiiinnkai Kanjikai, “Beikoku no Nichibei Tsusho Jyoyaku Haki Tsukoku ni taisuru Taisaku Hoshin An Hoi,” August 13, 1939, Ref. B02030598000, JACAR; Gaimusho Tsushojyoyaku Hakimondai Taisaku Iinnkai, “Kettei Yoko,” August 21, 1939, Ref. B02030598000, JACAR; Gaimusho Americakyoku Daiikka, “Yousiko Kaiho Mondai ni taisuru Americakyoku Daiikka Teishutsu no Ikensho,” December 13, 1939, Ref. B02030598100, JACAR; Nobukatsu Fujimura, “Showa 15 nen 1 gatsu 16 nichi no Fujimura America Daiikkacho yori Daijin ni Teishutsu sen Taibei Gaiko Sassin ni Kansuru Ikensho,” Ref. B02030598100, JACAR. 676 Mamoru Shigemitsu, “Beikoku no Nichibei Tsusho Joyaku Haki to Nihon Kokumin no Ketsui,” in Tomoki Takeda, Shigemitsu Mamoru GaikoIkenshoshu, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Gendaishiryo Shuppan, 2010), 238–46; Tadao Matsumoto, “Toa Shintaisei No Kakuritsu to Daisankoku: Monko Kaiho Kito Shugi Syusei No Hitsuzensei,” Nihon Hyoron, December 1938, 104–10. 677 Matsuura, “Dai Toa Senso” ha Naze Okita noka, chap. 12. Importantly, the anti-Anglo-Saxon sentiment at the time was more anti-British than anti-American, because the Tianjin Incident was underway and the Japanese believed that the British was giving direct assistance to Chiang Kai-shek and cajoling America into confronting Japan over China. Thus, many rallies ran on slogans such as “Defeat the British Empire.” 678 Soho Tokutomi, “Beikoku No Zoujoman,” Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun, July 29, 1939, Evening edition; Sawada, Tokutomi Soho to America, 484–85. 679 Examples of liberal pro-Western opinions include Kiyosawa, “Nichibei Tsusho Joyaku Shikko No Eikyo”; Kiyoshi Kiyosawa, “Eibei No Tainichi Appaku No Teido to Genkai,” Chuo Koron, February 1940; Kitaoka, Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, 174–76; Muramatsu, “Miki Takeo No Shoki Seiji Katsudo,” 193–94; Koiso, “Nihon Kaigun No Taibeikan to Seisaku, 1936-1939,” 37–38; Ugaki, Ugaki Kazushige Nikki, 1970, 2:1347. 680 In January 1939, Germany and Italy officially proposed an alliance treaty to Japan. Since the summer of 1938, the alignment with the Axis powers had been a controversial issue in Japan. The pan-Asianists from the Army and the Foreign Ministry supported it to strengthen Japan’s position in East Asia, while the moderate leaders within the government and the military opposed for its adverse consequences for Japan’s relationship with the Anglo-Saxons. Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyo Senso Genin Kenkyubu, ed.,

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the New Order in Asia policy.681 The public, as one cabinet member put it, considered the alliance as “absolutely necessary” for carrying out the “holy war” for the New Order in

Asia.682 Moderate civilian and military leaders opposed these pan-Asianist views because the alliance would bring war with the Allied powers, a war that Japan was not militarily ready to fight. But pan-Asianists outnumbered and pressured them to proceed the alliance negotiation with the Axis powers.683

Ultimately, the negotiation failed in August-September, when Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union signed the Neutrality Pact and invaded Poland and World War II broke out in Europe. In Japan, a moderate cabinet led by General Nobuyuki Abe emerged to restore Japan’s internationalist diplomacy. Instructed by the Emperor to “base foreign policy on cooperation with Great Britain and the United States,” 684 the Abe cabinet announced Japan’s nonparticipation in WWII and attempted to end the Sino-Japanese War and to improve Japan’s relations with America.685 But Abe’s efforts failed due to pan-

Asianists in the military and the Foreign Ministry who opposed his policy and demanded a neutral pact and even an alliance with the Soviets and the Nazis to fight the Anglo-Saxons.

Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi: Kaisen Gaikoushi, New Edition, vol. 4 (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1987), 60– 155; Takagi, Takagi Sokichi, 2000, 1:168–71, 179–80, 203–4, 212–13. 681 Rikugunsyo, “Nichidokui Sankokukyotei Mondai no Keii,” August 20, 1939 in Katsumi Usui, Gendaishi Shiryo, vol. 13 (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 1966), 358–61; Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 212–19. 682 Naimusyo Hoanka, “Gokuhi Nichidokui Gunjidomei Teiketsu Mondai ni kansuru Kakushin Jinei no Doko,” May 3, 1939 in Kido, Kido Koichi Kankei Bunsho, 406–28. Also see Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, 1952, 7:323. 683 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 212–19; Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, 1952, 7:7–8, 268–69, 319; Masaki, Masaki Jinzaburo Nikki, 4:48–49, 177–78; Hiroyuki Agawa, Inoue Shigeyoshi (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1992), 174. 684 Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyo Senso Genin Kenkyubu, ed., Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi: Kaisen Gaikoushi, New Edition, vol. 5 (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1987), 162.The Emperor viewed the collapse of the alliance negotiation as a chance to unify the Army and reorient Japan’s diplomacy. Takashi Ito and Yasutaka Terunuma, eds., Zoku Gendaishi Shiryo, vol. 4 (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 1983), 229. 685 Gaimusho Nichioushu Tisakushingikai Kanjikai, “Oshusen wo Keiki to suru Teikoku Gaikosaku Housin An,” September 18, 1939, Ref. B02030530100, JACAR; Gaimusho Gaimuiinnkai, “Taigai Shisaku Hoshin Yoko,” December 28, 1939, Ref. B02030530600, JACAR. Also see Grew’s observations on Abe’s foreign policy. Grew, Ten Years in Japan, 250, 258–59.

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Unable to contain the opposition, Abe resigned in January 1940, only a few months after taking office. This meant that pan-Asianists were dominant, and that the identity dilemma with America would continue.686

Over the course of 1939, U.S.-Japan identity dilemma and enmity became entrenched as American liberal internationalists and Japanese pan-Asianists gained more influence and locked in confrontational policies. The two nations were now heading toward a showdown, as discussed in the next chapter.

Alternative Explanations

Before closing this chapter, it is important to reassess how my identity dilemma argument fares against the alternative explanations of American-Japanese enmity over the

Sino-Japanese War. In doing so, I elaborate on some additional factors that I have not fully addressed.

This chapter finds little support for the strategic explanation that the United States and Japan developed enmity due to conflict of interests or material threats. As discussed above, the United States had limited commercial and geopolitical stakes in China. The fact that American isolationists and the Europeans dismissed China on strategic grounds and opposed intervention into the Sino-Japanese War suggests that material factors were not the key reason for American enmity toward Japan. Meanwhile, Japan had vital economic

686 Kumao Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, vol. 8 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1952), 112–18; Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 219–22; Tobe, Gaimusho Kakushinha, 181–204, 212–23; Katsuhiro Takahashi, “‘Debuchi Katsuji Nikki’ Ni Miru Gaimusho ‘Choro’ No Ugoki: ‘Bokyo Kyotei Kyoka Mondai’ to Nichibei Kankei Wo Megutte,” Shoryobu Kiyo, no. 45 (1993): 65–69.

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and security interests in China. But the actions taken by the United States and the other

Western powers were symbolic and did little to challenge these interests. It thus seems that material factors were not the main cause of American-Japanese enmity over China.

One might oppose this view by pointing out the role of naval arms race in U.S.-

Japan relations, a factor I have not discussed. Following Japan’s withdrawal from the

Washington Naval Treaty in 1934 and the termination of the treaty in 1936, the two countries started a naval race. In 1937, Japan implemented the Third Replenishment

Program, a large-scale procurement plan of 69 ships including two Yamato-class super- battleships and two carriers. In response to the Sino-Japanese War and Germany’s annexation of Austria, U.S. Congress passed in May 1938 the second Vinson Act, a program four times the size of Japan’s that would increase the strength of the U.S. navy by twenty percent. Since the Act would reduce Japan’s strength to 50 percent of the U.S.’ when completed, Japan responded in 1939 with the fourth program of 80 ships including two more Yamato-class battleships.687 One cannot overlook the role of these naval buildups in American-Japanese enmity.

Yet, one should not overemphasize this strategic factor since much of the enmity, as discussed above, revolved around the China question. Also, the fact that the U.S. Navy shifted its strategic focus from Asia to Europe, and from the war plan Orange to Rainbow, suggests that the naval race factor became less important for the United States as the

European situation developed. Lastly, the naval threats alone cannot explain the different reactions across different identity groups in the two countries. While liberal American internationalists and Japanese pan-Asianists became antagonistic and pursued

687 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 205–6, 240–41.

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confrontation, American isolationists and Japanese moderates did not. What primarily drove the enmity was thus identity politics, not power politics.

This chapter also questions the domestic politics explanation that warmongering led to American-Japanese enmity. Many Americans were isolationists, showed no anti-

Japanese sentiment, and opposed confrontation against Japan. Many Japanese civil and military leaders were moderates, argued against pan-Asianist policies, and sought cooperation with the West. These actions were the opposite of warmongering.

This does not mean that there were no militarist warmongering and logrolling. For instance, it is true that the Navy was using the anti-Anglo-Saxon debate to justify its fleet expansion and to satisfy its organizational interests.688 However, this is insufficient to explain the extent of anti-Americanism within the Navy, because it was never the navy leaders’ intention to provoke war with America. The Navy, one leader explained, was

“ready to use Britain and America as a ‘pretext’ for obtaining a large budget” but “[did] not really intend to take on these powers.”689 Moreover, the Navy’s warmongering cannot explain the anti-American enmity within the Foreign Ministry, the Army, and the public.

There was something larger than warmongering—the identity dilemma dynamics explained above—behind the nationwide anti-American enmity.

It is also true that the Japanese government and military implemented media control during the Sino-Japanese War. 690 Leaders sought to shore up public support for war mobilization in China, often using pan-Asianist rhetoric to justify the war efforts.691 This,

688 Asada, 215–16. 689 Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, 1952, 7:267–69; Takagi, Takagi Sokichi, 2000, 1:212–13. 690 Kakegawa, “The Press and Public Opinion,” 542–47. For details on media restriction orders, see Yoshimi Uchikawa, Gendaishi Shiryo, vol. 41 (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 1975), 130–36, 163–68, 238–43. 691 Uchikawa, Gendaishi Shiryo, 41:163–68.

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however, was different from warmongering against the United States. These leaders, as discussed above, were greatly concerned about the anti-Anglo-American public opinion.

For instance, after the announcement of the U.S.-Japan commercial treaty abrogation, the

Cabinet Information Division instructed the press to avoid exaggerating and emotionally reporting the issue and fueling the anti-American pan-Asianist public sentiment.692 But this sentiment—and the identity dynamics underlying it—took a life of their own and constrained the hands of the moderates seeking peace with the Anglo-Saxon powers.693

Thus, the instrumental use of identity language does not negate the importance of identity politics.

Conclusion

Just like the Manchuria Crisis (see Chapter 3), the Sino-Japanese War marked an important shift in U.S.-Japan relations. Despite the lack of significant conflict of interests or material threats, as well as warmongering, the United States and Japan developed enmity over the Sino-Japanese War due to an identity dilemma. The two nations continued marching the Road to the Pacific War.

Specifically, the Sino-Japanese War triggered an identity dilemma by exposing the incompatibility between American liberal internationalist identity and Japanese pan-

Asianist identity. Liberal internationalists viewed Japan’s invasion of China as a threat to their identity as a “crusader nation” and took symbolic actions to condemn Japan. Although

692 NHK, Nihonjin ha Naze Senso he to Mukatta no ka: Media to Minshu, Shidosha Hen, 46; Uchikawa, Gendaishi Shiryo, 41:241. 693 In fact, the government acknowledged this when it blamed newspapers for bringing down the Abe cabinet. Uchikawa, Gendaishi Shiryo, 41:261–63.

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these actions did not threaten Japan’s strategic interests, pan-Asianists viewed them as a challenge to their identity as a “leader in Asia” and pursued anti-Western policies. This action-reaction dynamic developed as these incompatible identity groups gained more domestic power through coalition-making, and the identity dilemma became entrenched.

The next chapter discusses how this American-Japanese confrontation continued and ultimately resulted in Pearl Harbor.

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Chapter 5: Road to Pearl Harbor, 1940-1941

U.S.-Japan relations dramatically changed following Germany’s conquests of

Belgium, Holland, and France in the European war in May-June 1940. In August, the

United States imposed a scrap embargo on Japan. The Japanese retaliated by announcing the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,” expanding into North Indochina, and joining the Tripartite Pact. In the summer of 1941, the Americans imposed an oil embargo. The two nations negotiated a modus vivendi to avoid war. But the negotiation stalled, and the

Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7.

This period of 1940-41 is a harder case for my identity dilemma argument than the earlier years discussed in Chapter 4. The intensification of the Allied-Axis conflict, combined with the exchange of material threats between the United States and Japan, makes it an easy case for the strategic explanation that material threats or conflict of interests creates interstate enmity. Moreover, the increased militarist logrolling and media control in Japan during the period make an easy case for the domestic explanation that political warmongering creates enmity.694

I argue that Germany’s victories in Europe exacerbated U.S.-Japan identity dilemma by enflaming the confrontational discourse promoted by the incompatible identity groups in both countries. Specifically, the German victories amplified Japanese pan-

Asianists’ calls for joining the Axis alliance and confronting the Allied powers and helped them overcome the moderates’ opposition. Meanwhile, American liberal internationalists

694 Tighter wartime media controls included the establishment of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association in October 1940 and the Greater Japan Association for Service to the State through Industry in November, the expansion of the Cabinet Information Division’s media control authority in December, and the National Defense Security Law in March 1941. Snyder, Myths of Empire, chap. 4; Kakegawa, “The Press and Public Opinion,” 547–49; Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 293–95.

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viewed Japan’s continued invasion of China as a threat to their role identity as a “crusader nation,” developed further enmity, and imposed a scrap embargo against Japan. Pan-

Asianists viewed the embargo as a challenge against their identity as a “leader in Asia,” became further anti-Western, and took confrontational measures such as the Axis alliance and southward expansion.

American-Japanese enmity escalated into war in 1941. The two consequences of an entrenched dilemma—enduring enmity and identity indivisibility—help explain why the two countries failed to resolve their differences. Specifically, both sides internalized their zero-sum identity relations and sought confrontation in pursuit of their identities, and refused compromise to reach peace because doing so would have undermined their identities. Although China was not a vital interest for the United States, the Americans insisted on the liberation of China as a precondition for a modus vivendi, because abandoning China would have contradicted America’s internationalist identity as a

“crusader nation.” Even though Japan had little chance of victory against the United States, the Japanese refused U.S. demands and sought war because capitulation would have meant giving up their national identity as a “leader in Asia.” Therefore, the Pacific War was a clash of identities.

U.S.-Japan Relation on Downhill

In 1940, U.S.-Japan relations went “steadily downhill.”695 The intensification of an identity dilemma, triggered by Germany’s victories in the European war, brought about

695 This is an observation by U.S. Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew. Grew, Ten Years in Japan, 259–60.

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this outcome. The European war fueled the confrontational discourse promoted by the hostile identity groups, Japanese pan-Asianists and American liberal internationalists, and helped them gain more domestic power. As these groups dominated the domestic political debate and pushed further confrontational policies, American-Japanese enmity further deepened.

European War and Japan

Discussing Japan’s reactions to Germany’s victories in May-June 1940 requires some background. Before then, there was a continued power struggle between moderate internationalists and pan-Asianists in Japan. In January, a moderate cabinet led by Admiral

Mitsumasa Yanai assumed power and sought to repair relations with the Allied powers. In

February, a liberal politician delivered the famous “anti-military” parliamentary speech, rebuking the ongoing war in China as a misguided policy forcing people’s sacrifices “in the name of the holy war” to establish a New Order in Asia.696 However, the political environment was predominantly anti-Western and pan-Asianist. One poll showed 62.1 percent of the Japanese supporting “confrontational” policies against America.697 Many politicians, military officers, and the public criticized the anti-military speech as a

“blasphemy” against the “holy war” for the pan-Asianist ideals and forced the speaker to

696 Usui, Gendaishi Shiryo, 13:336–48; Manabu Arima, “Senso No Paradaim: Saito Takao No Iwayuru ‘Hangun’ Enzetsu No Imi,” Hikaku Shakai Bunka 1 (1995): 1–9. 697 “Kokumin Ha Kou Omou: Yoron Chosa,” Bungei Shunshu 17 (January 1940); cited in NHK, Jujika jo no Nihon, 13. At the time, the scheduled abrogation of the U.S.-Japan commercial treaty, as well as the Asama Maru Incident, happened. This, according to Ambassador Grew, “let loose” the “emotional patriotism and chauvinism of the entire country” and criticism against the Yanai cabinet. Grew, Ten Years in Japan, 271–72. Also see Kazushige Ugaki, Ugaki Kazushige Nikki, vol. 3 (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 1971), 1382.

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resign. 698 U.S. Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew warned that the present “Japanese nationalistic fanaticism” presented “the possibility of Japan’s declaring war on the United

States.”699

It was in this volatile circumstance that Germany conquered Holland, Belgium, and

France and the potential defeat of Great Britain appeared on the horizon. These developments aggravated the U.S.-Japan identity dilemma by fueling Japan’s anti-Anglo-

Saxon, pan-Asianist debate and helping pan-Asianists gain more power to push through confrontational policies.

For instance, anti-Anglo-American, pan-Asianist movements spread under the slogan of “Don’t Miss the Bus.” They argued that Japan must bandwagon with the Axis powers and take advantage of Dutch and French losses by invading their Indochina colonies.700 Newspapers supported these movements by criticizing the Yanai cabinet’s internationalist foreign policy and demanding a new diplomacy to establish a new world order in Asia. 701 Within the Foreign Ministry, pan-Asianist officers organized and promoted a diplomatic and military alliance with the Axis powers to realize “the Empire’s ideal of the New Order in East Asia.” 702 Similar developments happened within the

Navy. 703 And politicians organized to bring down the Yanai cabinet and eradicate the

698 Takao Saito, Kaiko Nanajunen (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha, 1987), 150–60. 699 Grew, Ten Years in Japan, 272–74. 700 Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyo Senso Genin Kenkyubu, Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi, 1987, 4:198– 99; Tobe, “Nihonjin No Nichu Senso Kan,” 195. 701 For instance, see “Gaiko Isshin No Yosei Ha Kokuminteki Shinnen Made Koyo,” Osaka Mainichi Shimbun, June 20, 1940; “Arita Gaiko Tenkanki Ni Tatsu. Eibei Izon Gaiko Ha Shippai,” Hochi Shimbun, June 25, 1940; “Daitenkai Hissu No Teikoku Gaiko,” Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, July 13, 1940; “Gaiko Ima Zo Daitenkai No Ki, Yobo Saru Yondai Shihyo,” Osaka Mainichi Shimbun, July 14, 1940. Also see Tsutsui, Senzen Nihon No Populism, 269–75; Tobe, “Nihonjin No Nichu Senso Kan,” 195. 702 Gaimusho Americakyoku Daiikka, “Taibei Outo Shiryo,” June 21, 1940, Ref. B02030530900, JACAR; Gaimusho Americakyoku Daiikka, “7 gatsu 11 nichi Beikokugawa Moushide ni taisuru Kousatsu,” July 12, 1940, Ref. B02030530900, JACAR; Tobe, Gaimusho Kakushinha, 225–32. 703 Sadao Asada, “Nihon Kaigun to Taibei Seisaku Oyobi Senryaku,” in Nichibei Kankeishi: Kaisen Ni Itaru Junen, 1931-41, ed. Chihiro Hosoya et al., New Edition, vol. 2 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2000),

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Anglo-American influence in East Asia.704 According to Ambassador Grew, although the

Yanai cabinet was “moving slowly and carefully,” this pro-Axis, anti-Anglo-American coalition was now “vastly in the majority” and “increasingly vociferous.” The situation was so volatile that “anything can happen.”705

What happened was the shift in the domestic balance of power toward pan-

Asianists. On June 29, the Japanese government declared its ambition to expand into

Southeast Asia and pledged to reject any Western attempts to destabilize East Asia. In July,

Prime Minister Yanai resigned, and pro-Axis former prime minister Fumimaro Konoe assumed office. 706 Yosuke Matsuoka, a long standing anti-Western diplomat who led

Japans’ withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933, became the new foreign minister. 707 Yanai’s resignation meant that Japan had lost one of the last remaining moderate military leaders who could potentially reorient its foreign policy. 708 In other words, pan-Asianists would remain the dominant identity group, and Japan’s confrontation with America was to continue.

European War and America

120. 704 Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyo Senso Genin Kenkyubu, Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi, 1987, 5:167– 78. For the foreign policy views of these organizations, see Nobumasa Suetsugu, Sekai no Doran to Komei no Shimei (Tokyo: Toa Kensetsu Kokumin Renmei Jimukyoku, 1940). 705 Grew, Ten Years in Japan, 278, 281. 706 Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, 1952, 8:283–89; Koichi Kido, Kido Koichi Nikki, vol. 2 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1966), 801, 806–7; Takagi, Takagi Sokichi, 2000, 1:437. 707 Under Matsuoka’s leadership, many pro-Anglo-American diplomats were replaced by pro-Axis ones. Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyo Senso Genin Kenkyubu, Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi, 1987, 4:154; Tobe, Gaimusho Kakushinha, 237–43. 708 The Emperor lamented after the Pacific War: “If the Yanai cabinet had lasted, there would have been no war.” Ikuhiko Hata, Showashi No Gunjin Tachi (Tokyo: Bungei Shunshu, 1982), 319.

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Meanwhile, Germany’s conquests intensified the shift of America’s strategic focus from Asia to Europe, which had been underway since the Nazis’ occupation of

Czechoslovakia and the outbreak of WWII in 1939 (see Chapter 4). More than ever, the

United States had to focus the imminent Nazi threat over the Atlantic. It could not afford to sanction Japan and provoke war in the Pacific. Yet, liberal internationalists, motivated by their identity, still managed to impose an embargo.

On the one hand, the Roosevelt administration had to put aside the Asian war to prepare for the European war. The State Department, the Army, and the Navy adopted this

“Europe-first” view. State Department officials, from Asian to European to Latin American specialists, agreed that Asia was not an important national interest. The Army maintained its longstanding opposition against any involvement in the Asian war and reinforcement of

American forces in the Philippines. The Navy concluded that its fleet needed to be deployed to the Atlantic for the European war.709

This new strategic consensus led to many policy changes. At the end of May, the

President received $1.3 billion military appropriation from Congress. On June 20, he welcomed two internationalist Republicans into his cabinet—Henry Stimson as Secretary of War and Frank Knox as Secretary of Navy. He then transferred fully one-quarter of the

U.S. fleet to the Atlantic as part of a contingency plan to help the British navy in case of its defeat to Germany. In July, Congress passed the Two-Ocean Navy Act, the largest naval procurement program in U.S. history, designed to increase the size of the U.S. navy by 70 percent. Roosevelt also called a Pan-American conference in Havana and reached an

709 The Navy’s position was later developed in the famous “Plan Dog” memorandum on November 12, 1940, which gave strategic priority to defeating Germany and Italy in the Atlantic. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun, 65–67.

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agreement with South American nations to work together in the event of British defeat to prevent Axis seizure of European colonies in the Americas.710

On the other hand, missionaries and organizations like the American Committee for

Nonparticipation in Japanese Aggression (ACNPJA) continuously made identity-based arguments that America must embargo Japan and save China, a Christian republic in

Asia.711 This campaign used the European situation as a political opportunity to sanction

Japan.

Specifically, after the German victories in Europe, the ACNPJA worked to pass export restrictions on the basis of national defense needs to conserve America’s war materials. The ACNPJA members lobbied Congress, the State Department, and the military, arguing that since the European war “greatly increased Japan’s dependence upon the

United States for essential war supplies,” the United States needed to abandon its “role as

Japan’s economic ally for the war against China” and take “measures to end this unholy partnership.” 712 They published a new pamphlet, Shall America Stop Arming Japan?, urging the public to push their congressmen to support an embargo.713 They also advocated a National Defense Act authorizing the President to stop sales of war materials for national defense purposes. Congress showed strong support, but Secretary Hull only agreed to such export restrictions on the condition that they would not apply to Japan.714 The National

Defense Act passed the House on May 24 and the Senate on June 11 and was signed into

710 Utley, Going to War with Japan, 87–89; Frank Burt Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous with Destiny (New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company, 1990), 349–51. 711 See Chapter 4 for the development of the anti-Japan, pro-China movement, and the role of ACNPJA in it, following the Sino-Japanese War. 712 Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932-45, 353; Friedman, The Road from Isolation, 33–36. 713 American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression, Shall America Stop Arming Japan? (New York, NY: The American Committee for Nonparticipation in Japanese Aggression, 1940). 714 Friedman, The Road from Isolation, 33–34; Utley, Going to War with Japan, 93–95.

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law by Roosevelt on July 2.

One cannot overemphasize the significance of the National Defense Act, because it paved a legal path for the President to authorize embargoes at his will. And an embargo against Japan happened in an unexcepted way. At the time, Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, in his words, was “putting all the pressure on the State Department I (he) can” for a complete petroleum embargo against Japan. He asked other anti-Japanese internationalist cabinet members, War Secretary Stimson, Navy Secretary Knox, and Interior Secretary

Harold Ickes, to help him in the “big row,” and they promised “to go on the limit.” On July

19, Morgenthau urged Sumner Welles, presently Acting Secretary of State in Hull’s absence,715 to back the embargo plan. Welles supported an aviation fuel embargo but not a complete oil embargo, thinking that the latter would provoke war with Japan. Roosevelt, to the contrary, remained ambivalent because he was about to begin a presidential campaign for his third term and wanted no friction with those cabinet members who supported a complete embargo. On July 22, Roosevelt directed an executive order designed to stop the sale of aviation gasoline. Yet, Morgenthau exercised his discretion and changed the wording of the order, replacing aviation fuel with “petroleum products” and adding scrap iron and steel to the embargo list. Unaware of this change, Roosevelt signed the order on

July 26, and it was announced that an oil and scrap iron embargo took effect.716 Next day,

Roosevelt noticed what happened and explained in a press conference that the reports of an oil and scrap iron embargo were incorrect. He then instructed Morgenthau and Welles

715 Secretary Hull was out of the county for an international conference. 716 Morgenthau diary, vol. 287, 151-52 154-57; Henry Morgenthau and John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of Urgency, 1938-1941 (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964), 348– 54; Utley, Going to War with Japan, 97–99; Irvine H. Anderson, The Standard-Vacuum Oil Company and United States East Asian Policy, 1933-1941 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 129–35.

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to work out their differences. Welles won the discussion in cancelling the oil embargo.717

However, Roosevelt and Hull (now back at the White House) could not cancel the scrap embargo because of the anti-Japan public opinion driven by the internationalist identity-based argument. Polls showed 96 percent of the Americans supporting the embargo and 90 percent demanding its extension to “arms, airplanes, gasoline, and other war materials.”718 Of 38 editorials that took a definite stance on this issue, 37 supported the embargo.719 “Given the emotional public debate over American sales of scrap to Japan,” explains one historian, “it was simply not possible to totally rescind the scrap embargo.”720

In other words, the identity-driven enmity toward Japan was so strong that it was politically impossible not to confront Japan.

Isolationist opposition against the embargo also shows the role of identity in

American enmity toward Japan. During the run-up to the presidential election for FDR’s third term, isolationists and the Republican Presidential Candidate Wendell Willkie viciously attacked Roosevelt for bringing the Americans into war.721 Many isolationist organizations and newspapers opposed the embargo, claiming that America should withdraw its troops from China and avoid confrontation with Japan, a country they called

“our second-best overseas customer.”722 Former Undersecretary of State William Castle,

717 Morgenthau diary, vol. 287, 163-64, 173; Utley, Going to War with Japan, 98–99; Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes: The Lowering Clouds, 1939-1941, vol. 3 (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1954), 273–74; Morgenthau and Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of Urgency, 1938- 1941, 353; James C. Thomson, Jr., “The Role of the Department of State,” in Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941, ed. Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1973), 100–101. 718 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, 1:246. 719 Friedman, The Road from Isolation, 68. 720 Utley, Going to War with Japan, 99. 721 Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 354–57. 722 Justus D. Doenecke, ed., In Danger Undaunted: The Anti-Interventionist Movement of 1940–1941 as Revealed in the Papers of the America First Committee (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), 46– 47, 90–92; “Friendship with Japan,” San Francisco Examiner, January 24, 1940; “Is Japan Quitting China?,” New York Daily News, November 4, 1940; “Take Our Army Out of China,” Chicago Tribune, July 13, 1940;

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who sided with isolationists and advocated nonintervention during the Manchuria Crisis, urged the U.S. government to stay out of the Asian conflict and to acknowledge “a Monroe

Doctrine for Japan.” 723 In short, isolationists rejected the internationalist crusading mentality to save the Chinese, seeing no reason to confront Japan, the more important trading partner.

Furthermore, the aforementioned fact that policymakers opposed the embargo on strategic grounds suggests that many Americans supported it for identity-based reasons.

President Roosevelt maintained this strategic thinking even after he let the scrap iron embargo in place. Eleanor Roosevelt, who had been part of the internationalist pro-China movement as honorary chairwoman of the China Emergency Relief Committee, asked her husband: “Now we’ve stopped scrap iron, what about oil?” The President answered candidly: “The real answer which you cannot use is that if we forbid oil shipments to Japan,

Japan … may be driven by actual necessity to a decent to the Dutch East Indies. At this writing, we all regard such action on our part as an encouragement to the spread of war in the Far East.”724 His rational, strategic thinking, however, resonated little with the public, who was swayed by emotional, identity-based arguments for embargoes.

The Tripartite Pact and Southward Advance

“Why Are Our Marines in Shanghai?,” Chicago Tribune, July 24, 1940; “Wars ‘On Order,’” Chicago Tribune, October 15, 1940; “Professors Thirsting for Blood,” Chicago Tribune, November 24, 1940. For an overview of the isolationist position, see Doenecke, Storm on the Horizon, chaps. 20, 21. 723 William Castle, “A Monroe Doctrine for Japan,” Atlantic Monthly 166 (October 1940): 445-52. 724 Memorandum from Eleanor Roosevelt to Roosevelt, November 12, 1940, Roosevelt to Eleanor Roosevelt, November 13, 1940, Elliot Roosevelt, ed., F. D. R.: His Personal Letters, 1928-1945, vol. 2 (New York, NY: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), 1077, emphasis in original.

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From a strategic viewpoint, it is not surprising that an embargo causes enmity.725

But at a closer look, the embargo, now reduced to only scrap iron and aviation gasoline, was more symbolic than one might think. During the following two months when the embargo had not yet become effective, Japan purchased license for 563,000 tons of heavy melting scrap, and the actual figures show the embargo was “nothing of the sort.”726 The aviation gasoline embargo did not pose much of a threat to Japan either, since the restriction only included gasoline of 87 or higher octane. While American jets ran on 100-octane gasoline, Japanese planes ran on 86-octane gasoline due to their less powerful engines.

Thus, while the embargo secured stockpiles of aviation gasoline for American aircraft, it assured Japanese purchases of more aviation fuel. In fact, Japan could buy 550 percent more 86-octane gasoline during the five months after the embargo than during the five months before it.727 As Interior Secretary Ickes admitted, “we are pretending to be holding back on exports of gasoline for Japanese planes while we are doing nothing.”728

Despite its rather symbolic nature, the embargo intensified anti-Americanism among many Japanese who saw it as a challenge to their national identity as a “leader in

Asia” and their “holy war” mission to establish a New Order in Asia. This, together with the German victories in Europe, empowered anti-Allied pan-Asianist voices in Japan and prompted the signing of the Tripartite Pact and the southern advance into the Northern

French Indochina. Japanese moderates opposed these measures but held no power to stop them.

725 The Japanese Navy, for instance, called the U.S. embargo, somewhat dramatically, “a matter of life and death for our Empire.” Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 236. 726 Utley, Going to War with Japan, 105–6. 727 Utley, 100. 728 Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, Vol. 3, 3:299.

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As discussed in Chapter 4, the Tripartite Pact initially gained support from anti-

Anglo-American pan-Asianists in 1939, but the alliance negotiation stalled due to the outbreak of WWII. Now, Foreign Minister Matsuoka promoted it as an anti-Anglo-

American alliance with support from pan-Asianists within the Foreign Ministry, the Army, and the Navy.729 Many moderate leaders, including the Emperor and the Navy Minister, opposed the alliance because they believed that it would bring about U.S.-Japan war, a war they believed Japan would likely lose given its inferior naval capabilities vis-a-vis and its economic dependence on the United States.730 But the moderates lost to the pan-Asianist identity-based argument for the alliance. The Navy Minister opposed the alliance but became ill due to tremendous pro-Axis pressures from the Army, the Navy, and the Foreign

Ministry.731 His resignation led to the ousting of other moderate high-ranking officers, creating a vacuum in the leadership.732 The new Navy Minister also tried to stop Matsuoka.

In a pivotal meeting on September 13, Matsuoka confronted the new minister that Japan must choose a side: the Axis or the Allied. Admitting that U.S.-Japan war could result from the alliance, Matsuoka still rejected choosing the Allied side, which, he argued, would mean “abandoning the goal of the New East Asian Order and bowing to Great Britain and the United States at least for half a century.” Matsuoka made his case: “Would the Japanese

729 Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyo Senso Genin Kenkyubu, Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi, 1987, 5:195– 97. Importantly, Matsuoka viewed the Axis alliance as a way to deter, not invite, war with America, with an intention of later broadening the alliance to include the Soviet Union. During the imperial conference on September 19, Matsuoka argued, “At present, American sentiment against Japan has become stronger, and this cannot be remedied by a few conciliatory gestures. Only a firm stand on our part will prevent a war.” Nobutaka Ike, Japan’s Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967), 10. 730 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 221–26, 235–37; Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, 1952, 8:293; Kido, Kido Koichi Nikki, 1966, 2:821–22. 731 “Yoshida Sengoshi Danwa: Ogikubo Kaidan nit suite,” February 11, 1948, Papers of Sokichi Takagi, Ref. 9-Takagi-11, Military Archival Library, National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan; Terasaki, Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku, 51. 732 Asada, “Nihon Kaigun to Taibei Seisaku Oyobi Senryaku,” 120; Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyo Senso Genin Kenkyubu, Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi, 1987, 5:193–95.

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people support that? Would the spirits of tens of hundreds of the war dead be content?” In response, the Navy Minister agreed that the Axis alignment was “the only way.”733 As the alliance became an issue of Japan’s pan-Asianist identity, it was discursively difficult for the moderates to oppose the alliance.

Moreover, the anti-Anglo-Saxon political climate was so entrenched that the moderate leaders could not publicly oppose the alliance. As Prime Minister Konoe wrote,

“the national anti-Anglo-Saxon fervor and demand for the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact has reached the boiling point.”734 The Vice Navy Minister later admitted: “The Navy actually opposes the Tripartite Pact. However, the national political situation does not permit the Navy to show further opposition. Thus we are obliged to show support.”735 The

Emperor said that he could not veto the alliance treaty because he feared that such action would “imperil the Imperial Household.” 736 Given the political environment, leaders therefore had to support the alliance.737 This decision-making process shows how dominant the pan-Asianist confrontational discourse had become. “The conclusion of the Tripartite

Pact,” explains one historian, “effectively terminated all internal debate on foreign policy.”738

Similarly, it was in this anti-Western political environment that Japanese leaders

733 Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyo Senso Genin Kenkyubu, Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi, 1987, 5:204– 5; Usui, Nichu Senso, 124–25. 734 Fumimaro Konoe, “Sangoku Domei ni tsuite,” Papers of Konoe Fumimaro (microfilm edition), Reel 1, Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room, National Diet Library, Japan. 735 Fumimaro Konoe, Heiwa e No Doryoku (Tokyo: Nihon Denpo Tsushinsha, 1946), 31. 736 Terasaki, Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku, 53–54. 737 Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyo Senso Genin Kenkyubu, Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi, 1987, 5:206. Also see Ike, Japan’s Decision for War, 3–13; Paul W. Schroeder, The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations, 1941. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1958), 109–25. 738 Kakegawa, “The Press and Public Opinion,” 547. One navy leader later recalled that after the pact, the right-wing progressives in the military “completely control the nation’s leadership.” Shigeru Fukudome, Kaigun No Hansei (Tokyo: Nihon Shuppan Kyodo, 1951), 87.

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decided southward expansion. As discussed above, the public and many army officers, prior to U.S. embargo, demanded taking advantage of Germany’s victories in Europe and expanding into the French and Dutch territories in Southeast Asia. They expected that expansion would help resolve the Sino-Japanese War by cutting off the British supply routes to the Chinese Nationalist government and strengthen Japan’s strategic position.

While some younger officers within the Navy shared similar opinions, many senior officers opposed the idea, worried that southward expansion would invite U.S. complete embargos and ultimately war that Japan would likely lose given its economic dependence on and its inferior naval power vis-a-vis the United States.739

The central point of contention was that the proponents of southward expansion saw Great Britain and the United States as “separable” and the opponents “nonseparable.”

While most army officers believed that challenging the British in Southeast Asia would not bring war with the Americans, many navy officers believed the opposite. Thus, while the

Army pushed for opportunistic southward expansion with a risk of war with only the

British in mind, the Navy remained opposed, concerned with a risk of war with both Anglo-

American powers.740 Only few army leaders agreed with senior naval officers that Japan should not expand southward and antagonize the Anglo-American powers, which they believed would start a “white crusade” against the yellow Japanese. 741 The Emperor showed similar concerns.742

The U.S. scrap iron embargo shifted the debate in favor of southward expansion.

739 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 233–39. 740 Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyo Senso Genin Kenkyubu, Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi, 1987, 4:150– 75. 741 Ugaki, Ugaki Kazushige Nikki, 1971, 3:1411, 1418, 1421, 1423. 742 Kido, Kido Koichi Nikki, 1966, 2:821–22.

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The Army and the Navy both responded to the embargo by deciding to “strengthen” the southern policy. Despite senior officers’ concerns, middle-echelon officers in the Army and

Navy General Staffs argued for military advance into the whole French Indochina and the

Dutch Indies, despite their acknowledgement that such action would result in “U.S. imposition of a complete embargo.”743 In July, the Konoe cabinet adopted the “Greater East

Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,” proclaiming that Japan as a leader in Asia would seek

Southeast Asia as part of its sphere of influence. On September 23, Japan advanced into the Northern French Indochina.744

All this meant that pro-Axis pan-Asianists effectively held power over decision- making, and that the identity dilemma and confrontation with America would continue.

Ambassador Grew wrote: “It would be utterly unthinkable for any leader or group of leaders in Japan at present to advocate withdrawal from China and abandonment of their dreams of southward advance.”745 The Japanese people were “determined at all costs to proceed with the nation’s present program for leadership in East Asia which is ‘vital’ to

Japan.”746

In sum, Germany’s victories in Europe exacerbated the identity dilemma and enmity between Japan and the United States. Japanese pan-Asianists seized on the opportunity to gain domestic power over moderates and to push further confrontation

743 Hosoya, “Miscalculations in Deterrent Policy,” 107–8; Asada, “Nihon Kaigun to Taibei Seisaku Oyobi Senryaku,” 122–25. 744 Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyo Senso Genin Kenkyubu, Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi, 1987, 4:150– 75. 745 Grew, Ten Years in Japan, 308–9. 746 “The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State, Tokyo,” January 27, 1941, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 4, Diplomatic Papers, 1941 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1956), 16–17 (hereafter cited as FRUS: 1941, vol. 4).

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against the Anglo-Saxons. American internationalists responded by imposing a scrap embargo despite the strategic consensus against it. The embargo antagonized and prompted the pan-Asianists to pursue the Tripartite Pact and the southward expansion. Importantly, there was no further U.S. retaliation. Internationalist hawks, including Stimson, Ickes, and

Morgenthau, sought sanctions.747 Yet, Roosevelt and Hull, as well as the army and navy chiefs of staff, maintained the “Europe-first” views and opposed such actions that could prompt Japanese further invasion of Indochina.748 The President and the State Secretary also learned lessons from Morgenthau’s unilateral action to embargo Japan, making sure that no more embargo would be implemented without their approval.749 Thus, the year of

1940 ended with no more sanction against Japan. This had to wait until the summer of 1941.

Road to Pearl Harbor

Throughout 1941, America and Japan confronted each other over China. On August

1, the U.S. government imposed a complete oil embargo on Japan. The following modus vivendi negotiations stalled on November 26, when the United States issued the so-called

Hull note, an ultimatum that demanded Japan withdraw its troops from China. The

747 Utley, Going to War with Japan, 107–9. Stimson even personally propose to the President the deployment of the American Fleet to the Southwest Pacific. Stimson’s letter to Roosevelt, October 12, 1940. Stimson Papers (microfilm edition), Reel 102, 519-521. Even pro-Japan Grew recommended for the first time gradual applications of sanctions in his famous “green light” telegram to Hull. “The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State,” September 12, 1940, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 4, Diplomatic Papers, 1940 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1955), 827–30 (hereafter cited as FRUS: 1940, vol. 4). Also see Grew, Ten Years in Japan, 289–90. 748 Utley, Going to War with Japan, 110–18; Fred L. Israel, ed., The War Diary of Breckinridge Long: Selections from the Years, 1939-1944 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1966), 140. 749 Adolf Augustus Berle, Navigating the Rapids, 1918-1971: From the Papers of Adolf A. Berle (New York, NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), 344, 355; Utley, Going to War with Japan, 119; Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 1948, 1:902; Morgenthau and Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of Urgency, 1938- 1941, 362.

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Japanese rejected U.S. demands and attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7. I explain how

American liberal internationalist identity motivated the Americans to impose the embargo.

I also argue that the two countries failed to reconcile their differences during the peace negotiation because of the two consequences of an entrenched identity dilemma: enduring enmity and identity indivisibility.

U.S. Oil Embargo

As the Sino-Japanese War continued into 1941, American liberal internationalists intensified their national campaigns to sanction Japan to save China. This resulted in an oil embargo.

Henry Luce spearheaded this political movement. As discussed in Chapter 4, Luce long believed in American internationalist identity as a “crusader nation” and its “civilizing” mission to democratize and Christianize China. In early 1941, he authored the famous article, “The American Century,” arguing for America’s role as “the Good Samaritan” to promote freedom and democracy.750 He also published another article titled, “The New

China,” that defended America’s mission to help China’s struggle for democracy against

Japanese invasion.751 Moreover, Luce established the United China Relief (UCR), one of the largest pro-China internationalist organizations in America at the time, to shore up public support for China. URC membership included many religious and peace organizations, as well as prominent public figures including Eleanor Roosevelt, novelist

750 Henry R. Luce, “The American Century,” Diplomatic History 23, no. 2 (1999): 161, 171. 751 Henry R. Luce, “The New China,” Fortune 13, no. 4 (April 1941): 93–97.

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Pearl Buck, and the 1940 Republican presidential nominee Wendel Willkie.752

URC members gained public support by making pro-China arguments in internationalist identity language. URC’s President argued that Chiang Kai-shek was the only leader who could lead “a United China toward a democracy.”753 Luce claimed that “a democracy like the United States should try to help a democracy like China.”754 Buck asserted that “China’s war is a war of the democracies. … The Chinese people deserve every honor that can be given them, every penny that can be sent to help them, every aid that can be found to preserve their democracy.”755 Willkie argued that “we should assist

China. … because the men of China are outpost of freedom. … The American people overwhelmingly are resolved that they are going to maintain the outposts of democracy.”756

And many other public figures expressed similar opinions, raising public support for stopping the sale of American war materials to Japan. 757 Consequently, public enmity against Japan and support for China became stronger than ever.758 The New York Times wrote, “Sentiment for a complete embargo on oil and metal shipments to Japan appears to be at a new crest.”759

One may wonder whether there was any strategic rationale behind this anti-

752 “$5,000,000 Sought For China Relief,” New York Times, March 3, 1941; “United Relief for China,” New York Times, March 9, 1941; Bradley, The China Mirage, 231–32. 753 Jespersen, American Images of China, 1931-1949, 140. 754 “China Relief: U.S. Opens Purse,” Life, June 23, 1941, 59; Merle Curti, American Philanthropy Abroad (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1988), 425. 755 Pearl Buck, China as I See It (New York, NY: John Day Company, 1970), 123, 126; Bradley, The China Mirage, 236. 756 “Willkie Demands a United America,” New York Times, May 26, 1941; “Text of the Address by Willkie,” New York Times, March 27, 1941. 757 For instance, “China Hold Line for Freedom: Bullitt Says Urging Funds Aid,” The Washington Post, March 22, 1941; Ida Hoyt Chamberlain, “Letter to the Editor,” The Washington Post, June 3, 1941; Bradley, The China Mirage, 236; Curti, American Philanthropy Abroad, 425. 758 Over only three months since its establishment, the URC raised over $500,000 for its aid to Chinese civilians and refugees. “China Fund Tops $500,000,” New York Times, June 8, 1941. 759 “Northwest Backs Ban on Oil to Japan,” New York Time, June 22, 1941.

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Japanese enmity. Indeed, the conventional explanation for U.S. embargoes is strategic: helping China fight the Japanese was important for winning World War II. Following the passage of the Lend-lease Act in March 1941, the United States became committed to the defense of Britain and the war in Europe. The fall of China would undermine Britain’s empire in Southeast Asia, which in turn would undercut the Allies’ war against the Nazis.760

Therefore, as Roosevelt wrote, “the hostilities in Europe, in Africa, and in Asia are all parts of a single world conflict. We must, consequently, recognize that our interests are menaced both in Europe and in the Far East. … Our strategy of self-defense must be a global strategy.”761 In short, China was part of the Allied-Axis geopolitical dynamics, and the

Allied powers could not afford Japan defeating the Chinese.

This strategic account is questionable because most U.S. leaders opposed an embargo. Roosevelt, Hull, and the military all showed opposition because it would provoke

Japan to advance southward, beyond French Indochina and into Singapore or the

Philippines. This would ultimately lead to U.S.-Japan war. 762 Indeed, anti-Japanese internationalist cabinet members and State department officials, including Morgenthau,

Stimson, and Ickes disagreed and advocated sanctions. But Roosevelt and Hull silenced these dissenting opinions and made it clear that the United States would not impose further sanctions.763

However, the Roosevelt administration ended up imposing an oil embargo on Japan.

760 Justus D. Doenecke and John E. Wilz, From Isolation to War: 1931-1941, 4th ed. (Malden, MN: Wiley- Blackwell, 2015), 191–93; Iriye, Across the Pacific, 200–207; Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, chap. 26. 761 Grew, Ten Years in Japan, 313–14. 762 Utley, Going to War with Japan, 151; Herbert Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor: The Coming of the War Between the United States and Japan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1950), 232; Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, Vol. 3, 3:567. 763 Morgenthau and Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of Urgency, 1938-1941, 374–75; Utley, Going to War with Japan, 132, 147.

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And identity politics played a key role in making this happen. On June 22, Germany invaded the Soviet Union. On July 2, the Japanese Imperial Conference seized this opportunity and decided to take southern half of French Indochina.764 The U.S. government learned of Japan’s decision through its code-breaking device called “MAGIC.” In response,

Roosevelt decided on July 18 to call the Philippine army into federal service, appoint Field

Marshal Douglas MacArthur as the commanding general of all U.S. forces in the

Philippines, and start a major reinforcement of Philippine defenses. He also decided to freeze all Japanese assets in the United States, release funds for the purchases of oil and gasoline up to the 1935/36 export level, and require an export license before any goods could be shipped to Japan.765

Importantly, Roosevelt did not intend to stop oil and gasoline shipments to Japan.

Hull and Navy Department officials remained opposed to embargoes for the strategic reasons discussed above. The President repeatedly told the cabinet members “why we should not make any move because if we did, if we stopped all oil, it would simply drive the Japanese down to the Dutch East Indies, and it would mean war in the Pacific.”766 As one historian posits, “Roosevelt intended the freeze to be not the first blow in a program of economic warfare but a final warming, designed to bring Japan to its senses, not its knees.”767

However, anti-Japanese liberal internationalists revolted and put in place a

764 Ike, Japan’s Decision for War, 77–90. 765 Utley, Going to War with Japan, 151–53; Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945, 273–75. “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State,” July 3, 1941, FRUS: 1941, vol. 4, 289-90; “Captain Roscoe E. Schuirmann, of the Office of Naval Operations, to the Under Secretary of State (Welles),” July 9, 1941, FRUS: 1941, vol. 4, 298-303. 766 Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, Vol. 3, 3:583–84, 588; Morgenthau and Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of Urgency, 1938-1941, 377–79; Anderson, The Standard-Vacuum Oil Company and United States East Asian Policy, 1933-1941, 175. 767 Utley, Going to War with Japan, 154.

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complete embargo. Roosevelt put Undersecretary of State Welles in charge of drafting the export licensing system. Welles followed the instructions, and Roosevelt approved on July

31. On August 3, Roosevelt left for Argentia, Newfoundland to meet with Winston

Churchill to discuss the Atlantic Charter, which was signed on August 14. Taking advantage of Roosevelt’s absence, anti-Japanese hawks in the administration singlehandedly stopped oil export to Japan. Dean Acheson was now Acting Secretary of

State due to Hull’s illness. As the head of the Foreign Funds Committee, which had sole authority to release frozen foreign assets, Acheson refused to release Japanese funds for the already issued licenses for oil purchases. Acheson continued this practice for the entire month of August. Until September 4, neither Roosevelt nor Hull had realized that there was a de facto oil embargo on Japan.768

However unintended, the embargo enjoyed so much public support that Roosevelt and Hull “elected to leave the situation as it was, and in effect ratified the unplanned embargo.”769 Polls showed 70 percent of the Americans urging the government to “take

768 Irvine H. Anderson, “The 1941 De Facto Embargo on Oil to Japan: A Bureaucratic Reflex,” Pacific Historical Review 44, no. 2 (1975): 219–30; Utley, Going to War with Japan, 153–56; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 1987), 23– 27. 769 William Leonard Langer and Sarell Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War: 1940-41 (New York, NY: Harper, 1953), 655. In later years, the War Department admitted, “Our public opinion had changed against Japan faster than preparations for war could be made. This left the Department of State with the most difficult task of negotiation without means of enforcing its views by force of arms. It likewise left the War and the Navy Departments unable to fully support the State Department in its negotiations. This led to a compromise solution, due to this public opinion as expressed by the press, in the form of a resort to economic sanctions.” The U.S. War Department Army Pearl Harbor Board, The Official Reports Concerning the Attack On Pearl Harbor, September 1, 1945 (Washington, DC: The United States News Publishing Corporation, 1945), 8. Many historians agreed that Roosevelt tacitly acknowledged the de facto embargo because he did not want to upset the anti-Japanese public in America and to show weakness to Great Britain and Japan by rescinding the embargo. Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, 655; Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, 242–48; Jonathan G. Utley, “Upstairs, Downstairs at Foggy Bottom: Oil Exports and Japan, 1940-41,” Prologue: The Journal of the National Archives 8 (Spring 1976): 25–28; Utley, Going to War with Japan, 155–56; Anderson, “The 1941 De Facto Embargo on Oil to Japan,” 228–30. Another interpretation is possible: Roosevelt knowingly left anti-Japan hawk Acheson in charge and let him implement an embargo that he actually desired. And this was part of his larger plan to push the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor in order to get America enter WWII. George Morgenstern, Pearl Harbor: The Story of the Secret War (Chicago, IL: Devin Adair, 1947); Charles

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steps now to keep Japan from becoming more powerful, even it means risking a war with

Japan.” 770 59.5 percent advocated sending China military supplies. 771 Given that 79 percent still opposed U.S. entry into the European war,772 this willingness to punish, and even go to war with, Japan shows how much enmity the Americans held toward the

Japanese. And behind this enmity was their commitment to America’s standing as a

“crusader nation” and its mission to save the fellow Christian democracy China.

Another source of evidence to show the role of identity is isolationists’ reactions to the embargo. Not sharing the internationalist identity worldview, they dismissed America’s interests in China and Japan’s threat to the United States, questioned China’s prospect for democracy, and opposed embargoes as a catalyst for war in the Pacific. The isolationist organization America First Committee criticized the internationalist cause of “romantic crusades” against Japan, a country the New York Daily News hailed as “far and away our best customer in the Far East.” 773 “We sympathize with China,” claimed the Committee.

A. Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War 1941 (London, UK: Transaction Publishers, 1948); Charles Callan Tansill, Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy 1933-1941 (Chicago, IL: Henry Regnery Company, 1952); Harry Elmer Barnes, ed., Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace: A Critical Examination of the Foreign Policy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Its Aftermath (Caldwell, ID: Caxton Printers, 1953). But this interpretation is questionable in light of Roosevelt’s longstanding opposition against a complete embargo, his interest in a modus vivendi with Japan, and his lack of knowledge about a Japanese surprise attack (see the later discussion this chapter). In the end, “[a]n absence of evidence prevents an undisputed conclusion as to whether Roosevelt accepted the unconditional freeze of Japan’s dollars because it was thrust upon him or because it was the policy he desired.” Edward S. Miller, Bankrupting the Enemy: The U.S. Financial Siege of Japan Before Pearl Harbor (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 203– 4. 770 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, 1:296, emphasis added. 771 Fortune, 24: 4 (October 1941): 108. Also see “Gallup and Fortune Polls,” Public Opinion Quarterly 6, no. 1 (1942): 163. 772 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, 1:290. 773 For instance, “Do We Have to Fight Japan?,” New York Daily News, February 17, 1941; “China as a Democracy,” New York Daily News, March 31, 1941; “What the President Didn’t Say,” New York Daily News, June 2, 1941; “War in the Pacific?,” New York Daily News, July 26, 1941; “A Choice of Evils,” Chicago Tribune, February 9, 1941; “China and Democracy,” Chicago Daily Tribune, July 13, 1941; Doenecke, In Danger Undaunted, 46–47, 127–29, 313–14, 361–66, 448–50. For an overview of the isolationist position, see Doenecke, Storm on the Horizon, chaps. 20, 21; Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932-45, 492–95.

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“But we must not plunge America into war … for sentimental reasons.” 774 U.S.

Ambassador to France told FDR, “We have large emotional interests in China, small economic interests, and no vital interests.” 775 These isolationist opinions show that

America’s enduring enmity toward Japan over China was less about its strategic interests than about its liberal internationalist identity.

In sum, American liberal identity as a “crusader nation” played a significant role in making the oil embargo happen. Later, the British and the Dutch joined the United States in imposing embargoes. This multilateral sanction regime, known as “ABCD (American-

British-Chinese-Dutch) encirclement,” meant that U.S.-Japan confrontation reached “the point of no return.”776 The United States and Japan were now on the “Road to Pearl

Harbor.”777

Showdown

Before Pearl Harbor, the United States and Japan negotiated a modus vivendi in vain. According to one Japanese top official, “Though the talk first started smoothly, it became a direct showdown between Japan and America.”778 What led to this failure was the China issue. “The United States did not recognize the Japanese occupation of China,

774 Doenecke and Wilz, From Isolation to War, 167. 775 Craig Nelson, Pearl Harbor: From Infamy to Greatness (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2017), 40; Gordon H. Chang, Fateful Ties (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 160; David M. Kennedy, The American People in World War II: Freedom from Fear, Part Two (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 76. 776 Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific, 146. 777 Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor. 778 Yoshio Jouho, Tojo Hideki (Tokyo: Fuyo Shobo, 1974), 85.

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but Japan insisted on the approval of Japan’s occupation,” posits one historian. “As long as neither side made any change in its fundamental principle, there was no possibility of reaching an agreement.”779 “Reduced to its simplest terms,” wrote one American diplomat,

“a war with Japan would be a war about China.”780

Why did the two nations fail to reconcile their differences over China? Two consequences of an entrenched identity dilemma—enduring enmity and identity indivisibility—help explain this. Recall that, as discussed in Chapter 1, states in an entrenched dilemma may seek confrontation in defending their identities (enduring enmity).

Moreover, they may reject compromise to reach cooperation because doing so undermine their identities (identity indivisibility). In U.S.-Japan context, the Americans refused to abandon China in making peace with Japan, because such action would go against their liberal internationalist identity as a crusader nation. Despite knowing the slim chance of victory against the Americans, the Japanese decided to wage war, because they viewed confrontation as necessary to defend their national identity as a leader in Asia, and because compromise would have meant giving up this national identity.

The Modus Vivendi Negotiation

Before proceeding, it is necessary to establish some background. The negotiation first started informally in November 1940 and became direct talks between Secretary Hull

779 Akira Fujiwara, “The Road to Pearl Harbor,” in Pearl Harbor Reexamined: Prologue to the Pacific War, ed. Hilary Conroy and Harry Wray (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1990), 155. 780 John K. Emmerson, “Principles Versus Realities: U.S. Prewar Foreign Policy toward Japan,” in Pearl Harbor Reexamined: Prologue to the Pacific War, ed. Hilary Conroy and Harry Wray (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1990), 44. Also see John K. Emmerson, The Japanese Thread: A Life in the U.S. Foreign Service (New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978), 119.

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and Japanese Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura in March 1941.781 In the Hull-Nomura talks, Hull suggested four principles as “a basis for conversations”: “(1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations; (2) Support of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries; (3) Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity; (4) Nondisturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.”782 Focusing on the Sino-Japanese War, Japan’s southern advance, and the Tripartite Pact, Hull demanded the withdrawal of all Japanese troops from China, an assurance of no further southward expansion, and Japan’s neutrality in case of America’s entering the European war against the Axis powers.783 He described U.S. stance as follows: “neither should we make concessions so sweeping that Japan would accept them as a basis for agreement and then bide her time to make further demands or take further steps, nor should we embark upon military or economic action so drastic as to provoke immediate war with Japan.”784

A tentative proposal on April 17 designated Honolulu, Hawaii for a place for a summit between Roosevelt and Konoe.

The negotiation was disrupted by Japan’s southward expansion in July and

America’s oil embargo in August. As a last resort, Prime Minister Konoe proposed a

781 Robert Joseph Charles Butow, The John Doe Associates: Backdoor Diplomacy for Peace, 1941 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1974); Hiroaki Shiozaki, Nichieibei Senso No Kiro: Taiheiyo No Yuwa Wo Meguru Seisenryaku (Tokyo: Yamagawa Shuppansha, 1984), 171–250. 782 “Memorandum by the Secretary of State,” April 16, 1941, Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 2, Japan: 1931-1941 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1943), 406–10 (hereafter cited as FRUS: 1931-1940, vol. 2); Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. 2 (New York, NY: Macmillan Company, 1948), 995. 783 Utley, Going to War with Japan, chap. 8; Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 1948, 2:982–1015; Kazuo Yagami, Konoe Fumimaro and the Failure of Peace in Japan, 1937-1941: A Critical Appraisal of the Three- Time Prime Minister (London, UK: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2006), 104–19; Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyo Senso Genin Kenkyubu, ed., Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi: Kaisen Gaikoushi, New Edition, vol. 7 (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1987), 147–201. 784 Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 1948, 1:899.

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summit with President Roosevelt on August 4.785 On September 4, the U.S. government told Japan that it must accept Hull’s four principles prior to the summit.786 In response,

Japanese leaders convened the Imperial Conference on September 6 and authorized war preparation against the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands “[i]n the event that there is no prospect of our demands being met by the first ten days of October through the diplomatic negotiations.”787 Next day, Ambassador Nomura proposed Secretary Hull that

Japan would not make further advancement into Southeast Asia and to seek an agreement with the Chinese to withdraw Japanese troops as soon as possible, and that the United

States, in turn, would lift its embargos and refrain from taking any military measures in the

Far East and the Southwestern Pacific Area.788 While Roosevelt supported Konoe’s summit idea and suggested Juneau, Alaska as a summit site,789 Hull insisted to Nomura on October

2 that Japan first accept all four principles and agree to withdraw troops from China and

Indochina.790 Unable to obtain domestic consensus to meet U.S. demands due to Army

Minister Hideaki Tojo’s opposition, Konoe resigned on October 15.

After Konoe’s resignation, Japanese leaders chose Tojo as a new prime minister because he was thought to be the only leader capable of controlling the Army and proceeding with a further peace negotiation.791 The Emperor told Tojo that he must “scrap”

785 Konoe, Heiwa e No Doryoku, 72–77. 786 “Oral Statement Handed by President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on September 3, 1941,” FRUS: 1931-1941, vol. 2, 589-91; “The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew),” September 4, 1941, FRUS: 1941, vol. 4, 423-25; Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 1948, 2:1026; Yagami, Konoe Fumimaro, 123. 787 Ike, Japan’s Decision for War, 133–63. 788 “Draft Proposal Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State on September 6, 1941,” FRUS: 1931-1941, vol. 2, 608-609. 789 “Memorandum by the Secretary of State,” August 28, 1941, FRUS: 1931-1941, vol. 2, 571-72. 790 “Memorandum of a Conversation,” October 2, 1941, FRUS: 1931-1941, vol. 2, 654-56. 791 Kido, Kido Koichi Nikki, 1966, 2:915–17, 928–31; Sokichi Takagi, Takagi Sokichi: Nikki to Joho, ed. Takashi Ito, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 2000), 575–80; Teiji Yabe, Konoe Fumimaro (Tokyo: Yumani Shobo, 2006), 627–37.

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the September 6 war decision and give the negotiation a second chance.792 Tojo listened and continued the negotiation, setting November 25 as the deadline. On November 26, Hull issued an ultimatum, demanding Japan to “withdraw all military, navy, air, and police forces from China and from Indochina.”793 The prospect of war for Japan was grim: the

Navy desired no war, the Office of the Supreme Command predicted a tie or a slim victory, and the Emperor admitted a likely defeat.794 But the Imperial Conference on December 1 reconfirmed the September 6 war decision. On December 7, the Japanese attacked Pearl

Harbor, starting a war that they knew they might lose.

Why did America keep on insisting Japan’s withdrawal from China, an issue that is not vital to its strategic interests? Why did Japan refuse to accept U.S. demands and to make the necessary compromises to avoid war?

Going to War with Japan

One standard explanation for America’s insistence on Hull’s four principles and

Japan’s troop withdrawal is strategic: U.S. leaders mistrusted Japan and demanded costly compromises before agreeing to hold a Roosevelt-Konoe summit. In one State official’s account, “the President and Hull were convinced that Konoye’s purposes were murky and his freedom of decision small. Therefore they concluded that to meet with him before Japan proved its intentions would be a great mistake.”795 In this regard, the U.S. Army and Navy

792 Terasaki, Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku, 68–69. 793 “Document Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on November 26, 1941,” FRUS: 1931-1941, vol. 2, 768-70. 794 Imperial Household Agency, Showa Tenno Jitsuroku, 8:560. 795 Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, 276. Other State officials shared a similar opinion. Shinji Sudo, Nichibei Kaisen Gaiko no Kenkyu: Nichibei Kosho no Hottan kara Haru Noto made (Tokyo: Keio Tsushin, 1986),

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saw the modus vivendi negotiation as a way to buy time for war preparation. According to one official, “Both Stimson and Knox approved ‘stringing out negotiations.’ But neither wanted Roosevelt to meet Konoye or to soften American terms just to gain time.”796 Thus, the U.S. government told Japan to agree to Hull’s four principles prior to the summit on

October 2.

After Konoe’s resignation, U.S. leaders became more skeptical of the Japanese government, now led by Prime Minister Tojo, who torpedoed the initial talk as army minister. Moreover, the U.S. governments intercepted Japanese communications through its decoding device “MAGIC” and learned of Japan’s reluctance to swallow U.S. demands.797 Pessimistic Roosevelt told Churchill, “I am not very hopeful and we must be prepared for real trouble, possibly soon.”798 On November 25, the War Council discussed the possibility of Japanese surprise attacks. Next day, Roosevelt was notified of Japanese troop movements to the south of Taiwan, possibly en route to Indochina.799 War Secretary

Stimson saw this as evidence of Japan’s untrustworthiness.800 It was in this circumstance that State Secretary Hull issued the Hull note. After doing so, Hull told Stimson: “I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and the

Navy.”801 In short, after searching for a diplomatic solution for months, U.S. leaders had become more distrustful of Japan and ultimately concluded that diplomacy had its

222–25. 796 Stimson diary, October 6, 28, 1941; Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, 276–77. 797 Benjamin D. Rhodes, United States Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period, 1918-1941: The Golden Age of American Diplomatic and Military Complacency (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2001), 203–10. 798 Rhodes, 206. 799 Rhodes, 207. 800 Stimson diary, November 26, 1941. Therefore, some historians view Japan’s southward advance as the primary cause of the Hull note. Sudo, Nichibei Kaisen Gaiko no Kenkyu, 218–22, 225–30, 271–79. 801 Stimson diary, November 27, 1941; Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, 321.

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chances.802

In addition, American policymakers made strategic miscalculations that Japan would capitulate to economic pressures because of its resource dependence on the United

States. Anti-Japan cabinet members such as Ickes, Morgenthau, Stimson, and Acheson seemed to have shared this belief.803 In fact, Stanley Hornbeck, political advisor for the Far

Eastern Division of the State Department and arguably the most outspoken anti-Japan official, had offered odds of five to one that America and Japan would not be at war by

December 15.804 Such miscalculations, combined with the strategic mistrust discussed above, pushed U.S. leaders to take a hardline stance toward Japan.

These strategic explanations beg the question of why the United States cared so much about its principles and China. Although U.S. leaders, as discussed above, viewed

China through the larger Allied-Axis conflict, 805 many downplayed China’s strategic importance. Ambassador Grew criticized U.S. China policy as “completely inflexible”806

802 James Macgregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom, 1940-1945 (New York, NY: History Book Club, 2006), 154–61. Revisionist historians argue that Roosevelt approved the Hull note knowing that this would result in a Japanese surprise attack. Wanting to get America involved in WWII, he used the attack as “the backdoor to war.” Morgenstern, Pearl Harbor; Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War 1941; Tansill, Back Door to War; Barnes, Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace. For a review of this debate, see John Zimmerman, “Pearl Harbor Revisionism: Robert Stinnett’s Day of Deceit,” Intelligence and National Security 17, no. 2 (2002): 127–46. Yet, most historians agree that there is no archival evidence to back this claim. According to archival records, Roosevelt did not anticipate the Pearl Harbor attack, took no preparatory measures against it, and “really thought” that Japan would seek to avoid war with America. Robert Joseph Charles Butow, “How Roosevelt Attacked Japan at Pearl Harbor: Myth Masquerading as History,” Prologue 28, no. 9 (1996); Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York, NY: Harper & Brothers, 1947), 427–29, 956 n. 428. 803 Utley, Going to War with Japan, 154–56. 804 Rhodes, United States Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period, 1918-1941, 208–9. Also see Thomson, Jr., “The Role of the Department of State,” 101–6; Sudo, Nichibei Kaisen Gaiko no Kenkyu, 207–18. Importantly, because of his too strong anti-Japan views, Hornbeck was kept out of the peace negotiation, which was run by other State officials in favor of a modus vivendi. In fact, by the spring of 1941, Hull had lost trust in Hornbeck’s opinions. Chihiro Hosoya et al., eds., Nichibei Kankeishi: Kaisen ni Itaru Junen, 1931-41, New Edition, vol. 1 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2000), 278. 805 Doenecke and Wilz, From Isolation to War, 201–3; Iriye, Across the Pacific, 200–207. 806 Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945, ed. Walter Johnson, vol. 2 (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), 1334.

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and repeatedly urged Hull and Roosevelt to meet Japan half way. 807 The British

Ambassador to Japan called it “foolish” that America insisted on Japan’s complete acceptance of its principles regarding China.808 “The error, the fault, in American policy— if there was one—was not in the refusal to trust what Konoye could honestly offer,” wrote one State official. “It was in insisting that Japan entirely clear out of Indo-China and China

(and perhaps out of Manchukuo) and give up all exclusive privileges in these countries.”809

Historian John Toland puts it more bluntly: “America made a grave diplomatic blunder by allowing an issue not vital to her basic interests—the welfare of China—to become, at the last moment, the keystone of her foreign policy. … America had two limited objectives in the Far East: to drive a wedge between Japan and Hitler, and to thwart Japan’s southward thrust. She could easily have obtained both these objectives but instead … insisted on the liberation of China. Her major enemy was Hitler. … The Pacific War was a war that need not have been fought.”810 Thus, strategic factors cannot explain why the United States refused to compromise on China to avoid war with Japan.

Identity indivisibility, one consequence of an entrenched identity dilemma, helps explain this. Specifically, the Americans refused to abandon China to make peace with

Japan because doing so would have contradicted their liberal internationalist identity and

807 Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyo Senso Genin Kenkyubu, Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi, 1987, 7:263. “Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew),” August 18, 1941, FRUS: 1931-1941, vol. 2, 560-65; “The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State,” September 29, 1941, FRUS: 1931-1941, vol. 2, 645-50; “The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State,” August 30, 1941, FRUS: 1941, vol. 4, 416-18. 808 Yagami, Konoe Fumimaro, 126; Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyo Senso Genin Kenkyubu, Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi, 1987, 7:268. 809 Feis blamed the October 2 note, which emphasized the Hull hour principles and criticized Japan’s insistence on its troops in China, for making the war outcome inevitable. “This, the note of October 2, rather than the one of November 26 on which controversy has centered, ended the era of talk. For the crisis that followed in Japan brought into power a group determined to fight us rather than move further our way. Thereafter war came first, diplomacy second.” Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, 276–77. 810 John Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945 (New York, NY: Random House, 1970), 146, 186–87, emphasis added.

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their civilizing mission to democratize and Christianize China. Thus, the emotional identity-based argument for saving China trumped the strategic argument against it.

Historian Akira Iriye explains: “America’s friendship with China was not on account of any consideration of power politics but was by then a moral concern for China’s plight and heroic struggle against odds. Given an image of the Chinese placing their trust in American leadership, and an image of the American people eager to help the Chinese, there was no psychological possibility of coming to terms with Japan, however temporarily, if it meant sacrificing China. In the end, military considerations were subordinated to moral principles.”811

U.S. officials explained the China policy in terms of American internationalist identity. “Our national sentimental commitment to China did not allow any compromise toward Japan, and was so strong that it made out of the question any negotiation with Japan that includes ‘give and take,’” wrote one U.S. diplomat. “The theme for all of us at the time, a kind of a theme song that the pro-China faction repeatedly sang in the State Department, was ‘We cannot sell China down the river,’ and this was a claim that put an end to any kind of discussion.’” 812 In fact, emphasizing America’s “historic policy” of protecting the

Chinese from Japan, Stimson, Morgenthau, and Knox urged Roosevelt not to abandon

China. Knox was even ready to resign if the President did.813 Hornbeck, the most outspoken anti-Japanese State official, held an internationalist view of America’s “moral obligation” to China’s welfare.814 He had argued that U.S. concerns with China were not about material

811 Iriye, Across the Pacific, 222–23, emphasis added. 812 Quoted in Hosoya et al., Nichibei Kankeishi, 1:280–81, emphasis added. The same offficial also wrote, “our obsession with China … made it impossible for us to, in the phrase current in the corridors of the State Department, ‘sell China down the river.’” Emmerson, “Principles Versus Realities,” 43. 813 Stimson diary, November 6, 1941; Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom, 1940-1945, 159; Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, Vol. 3, 3:654–55. 814 Thomson, Jr., “The Role of the Department of State,” 88–91, 104–6.

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interests: “Our great problem … in the Far East is that of defending principles rather than that of salvaging investments.” 815 Ambassador Grew explained that the reason why

America and Japan could not meet halfway was that the Japanese “cannot understand that we are not to be swayed by mere expediency and that our position is based upon principles deeply embedded in the American creed.”816

Identity politics also played a key role in issuing the Hull note. Prior to the Hull note, the State Department drafted a modus vivendi proposal that would have required no immediate withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and spared breathing room for three months. The U.S. military supported the proposal as a strategic necessity to focus on the

Atlantic theatre. 817 However, Chiang Kai-shek and Winston Churchill both voiced explosive opposition. In his telegram, the Chinese leader claimed that the Chinese would take any modus vivendi deal to mean that “China has been completely sacrificed by the

United States,” and “suffer such a shock in their faith in democracy that a most tragic epoch in the world will be opened.” In a cable, Churchill inquired Roosevelt whether Chiang would not be “having a very thin diet,” emphasizing “We are sure that the regard of the

United States for the Chinese cause will govern your action.” This opposition moved

Roosevelt and Hull to scrap the proposal and issue the ultimatum.818

815 “Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck),” August 26, 1939, FRUS: 1939, vol. 3, 211-12. 816 Grew, Ten Years in Japan, 308. 817 The proposal was a counterproposal to two Japanese proposals presented by the Tojo cabinet. For more see, Atsushi Moriyama, Nichibei Kaisen No Seiji Katei (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Koubunkan, 1998), chap. 7; Utley, Going to War with Japan, chap. 9. 818 Stimson diary, November 26, 1941; Morgenthau diary, Vol. 465, 313; “The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt,” November 26, 1941, FRUS: 1941, vol. 4, 665-66; Tansill, Back Door to War, 648–50; David Klein and Hilary Conroy, “Churchill, Roosevelt, and the China Question in Pre-Pearl Harbor Diplomacy,” in Pearl Harbor Reexamined: Prologue to the Pacific War, ed. Hilary Conroy and Harry Wray (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1990), 127–40; Norman A. Graebner, “Nomura in Washington: Conversations in Lieu of Diplomacy,” in Pearl Harbor Reexamined: Prologue to the Pacific War, ed. Hilary Conroy and Harry Wray (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1990), 114. Interestingly, Churchill himself did not anticipate his opposition to the modus vivendi meant immediate war with Japan. In fact, he did not mean to

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One U.S. official recounted that the ultimatum decision was made in light of the

“emphatic objections, arguments, and pleas of the Chinese” and of Churchill’s opposition.819 Another official later lamented, “if Americans had not been so encumbered by the emotional cloud that surrounded our approach to China and Japan, diplomacy might have had a better chance.”820 “If it had not been for the strenuous intervention of Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek, the appeasers in the State Department, with the support of the

President, would have resumed at least a partial commercial relationship with Japan,” wrote Interior Secretary Ickes.821 Historian Warren Cohen puts it elegantly: “The United

States, having once ceased to supply Japan with the ‘sinews of war,’ could not again accept the role of merchant of death. Once solidarity with China was proclaimed, there could no return to the role of passive observer of China’s sorrows. And the war came.”822

The role of American liberal internationalist identity in its refusal to compromise is further supported by the fact that isolationists opposed saving China and fighting war with

Japan because they shared no identity worldview of America’s mission to protect a

Christian democratic China. Until Pearl Harbor, isolationist congressmen and organizations vehemently criticized Roosevelt for not compromising with Japan and bringing the country into war. 823 However, the internationalist identity-based debate

oppose the modus vivendi altogether but merely reflected on China’s plight. Puzzled by America’s preoccupation with China, he later said that he was shocked at “the extraordinary significance of China in American minds,” and that it was “strangely out of proportion,” even in top-level official thinking. Klein and Conroy, “Churchill, Roosevelt, and the China Question,” 123. 819 Emmerson, The Japanese Thread, 121. 820 Emmerson, 394. 821 Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, Vol. 3, 3:655. 822 Cohen, America’s Response to China, 125. Other historians instead emphasize the reports of Japanese troop deployment toward southern Taiwan discussed earlier as the primary reason why Roosevelt and Hull changed their minds and scrapped the modus vivendi proposal. Yet, there is no conclusive archival evidence to judge this debate. Shinji Sudo, Hull Note Wo Kaita Otoko: Nichibei Kaisen Gaiko to “Yuki” Sakusen (Tokyo: Bungei Shunshu, 1999), chap. 4. I maintain, however, that we cannot ignore the accounts by top policymakers and many scholarly studies that emphasize the China factor. 823 See reports by the America First Committee. Doenecke, In Danger Undaunted, 451–53. John Flynn, a

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swayed the overall public opinion, leaving no room for Roosevelt to work out a compromise with Japan on China. As Secretary Ickes wrote, had Roosevelt taken such action, “the President would have lost the country on this issue and … hell would have been to pay generally.”824 Therefore, identity politics played a key role in the collapse of

U.S.-Japan peace negotiation.825

Going to War with America

If the Americans refused compromise with Japan due to identity indivisibility, what about the Japanese? Why did they reject U.S. demands and start a war?

One common explanation is strategic: Japan sought a quick victory before U.S. embargoes would further weaken its capabilities. For instance, the naval chief of staff told the Emperor that Japan must strike as soon as possible: “The United states is daily tightening its encirclement of Japan and increasing its aid to Chiang Kai-shek and the

Soviet Union. Japan will dwindle away into nothing. The time to start war with the United

States is today.”826 The Emperor’s brother also told him: “It is difficult to avoid war with

leader of the America First movement, later criticized Roosevelt of bringing America into war with Japan. John T. Flynn, The Truth About Pearl Harbor (New York, NY: J.T. Flynn, 1944); John T. Flynn, The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor (New York, NY: J.T. Flynn, 1945). 824 Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, Vol. 3, 3:655. 825 There are continuing debates about whether the United States could have avoided war with Japan if it had not insisted the liberation of China. For instance, Schroeder, The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations, 1941., 200–216; Morison, Turmoil and Tradition, 530–32; Hilary Conroy and Harry Wray, eds., Pearl Harbor Reexamined: Prologue to the Pacific War (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1990); Bruce M. Russett, No Clear And Present Danger: A Skeptical View Of The United States Entry Into World War II (Boulder, CO: Routledge, 1997); Iguchi, “Japanese Foreign Policy and the Outbreak of the Asia- Pacific War: The Search for a Modus Vivendi in US-Japanese Relations after July 1941.” I do not intend to put an end to this debate, but my argument still holds that the China factor made war difficult to avoid. 826 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 274; Imperial Household Agency, Showa Tenno Jitsuroku, 8:444– 45.

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America. If we are to fight, the sooner the better.”827 The brother also pushed the Navy

Minister: “Unless we speedily open hostilities, we shall lose the opportune moment to strike.”828 The Emperor explained in his postwar monologue: “The oil embargo really drove Japan into a corner. The thinking that we had better take the one-in-a-million chances and fight war became dominant. I have to say that this happened naturally.”829

Moreover, some leaders miscalculated that war would be short, followed by a negotiated settlement. One navy officer wrote, “before the opening of hostilities, I saw this as a limited war. … Our plan was to cause the enemy a great damage and thus to win a balance of force in our favor and terminate hostilities on the basis of compromise settlement while Japan still had a margin of strength left.”830 Based on this miscalculation and the fear of being weakened by the embargoes, Japanese leaders waged war.

However, one should not overemphasize embargoes and miscalculations as the primary cause of Pearl Harbor. First, the navy leadership had no such miscalculations and opposed war. They had no confidence in war and thought that “[i]t is the height of absurdity to fight Japan-U.S. war over only the withdrawal issue [in China].”831 The Chief of the

Combined Fleet argued that it was “obvious” that war would be protracted. Since “we will not be able to contend with” America over such a war of attrition, “[w]e must not start a war with so little a chance of success.”832 Second, given this dire prospect, U.S. embargoes

827 Imperial Household Agency, Showa Tenno Jitsuroku, 8:498. 828 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 272. 829 Terasaki, Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku, 71. 830 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 287. 831 Yorio Sawamoto Diary (hereafter Sawamoto diary), October 6, 1941. The diary is published in Takashi Ito, Tsuneo Sawamoto, and Minoru Nomura, “Sawamoto Yorio Kaigun Jikan Nikki: Nichibei Kaisen Zenya,” Chuo Koron 103, no. 1 (January 1988): 434–80. Also see Moriyama, Nichibei Kaisen No Seiji Katei, 227; Takagi, Takagi Sokichi, 2000, 2:560–61. 832 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 277. Many other navy leaders shared Yamamoto’s assessment. Sawamoto diary, September 19, 29, 1941. The Navy indeed expected a protracted war and requested tremendous amount of resources for war preparation. Foreign Minister Togo also expected a protracted war.

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alone should not automatically lead to a war decision. In fact, Prime Minister Konoe thought that it was “absurd” to start war and waste resources in pursuit of war materials, and that the country should instead use those resources to strengthen its national production. 833 Thus, embargoes and miscalculations alone cannot explain why these moderate voices could not win over the war advocates.

Another explanation involves domestic politics: Military leaders irresponsibly brought the country into war by pursuing their organizational interests over national interests.834 The Navy had long engaged in anti-Anglo-American warmongering to expand its fleet.835 The Army refused any compromise on troop withdrawal from China because this was a matter of “vital” organizational interests.836 One navy leader recalled: “The atmosphere was such that it put a premium on parochial and selfish concerns for either the

Army or the Navy; considerations of the nation and the world were secondary.” When it came to avoiding war, “[e]verybody wanted to evade responsibility and no one had the grit to sacrifice himself to do his duty.”837

For instance, when Prime Minister Konoe asked the Navy to officially oppose war and help his peace effort, navy leaders told him: “It is impossible for the Navy to say

Boueicho Boeikensyujo Senshishitsu, Senshi Sosho, vol. 76 (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbunsha, 1974), 238–40, 252. 833 Fumimaro Konoe, “Saigo No Gozenkaigi,” Juyo Kokumin, no. 19 (February 15, 1946): 5. Former Army Minister Shunroku Hata shared a similar opinion in his diary. Ito and Terunuma, Zoku Gendaishi Shiryo, 4:539–41. Navy top leaders also argued against war in fear of being squeezed by U.S. embargo. Sawamoto diary, October 7, 1941. 834 Snyder, Myths of Empire, chap. 4; Moriyama, Nichibei Kaisen No Seiji Katei. Japan suffered from what prominent political scientist Masao Maruyama calls the “system of irresponsibility” (musekinin no taikei). Masao Maruyama, Gendai Nihon No Shiso to Kodo, New Edition (Tokyo: Miraisha, 2006). 835 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 273; Moriyama, Nichibei Kaisen No Seiji Katei, 165–67, 181–82. 836 Moriyama, Nichibei Kaisen No Seiji Katei, 205, 220, 222–35. Tojo later explained that the Army was “uniformly firm” on its opposition to withdrawal, and that “the atmosphere was such that there was no room for thinking about withdrawal.” Sanae Sato, Tojo Hideki “Waga Munen”: Gokuchu Nikki, Nichibei Kaisen no Shinjitsu (Tokyo: Kobunsha, 1991), 62–63; Masayasu Hosaka, Tojo Hideki to Tenno no Jidai (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 2005), 287–88. 837 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 296.

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officially: ‘The Navy does not want the war.’ All it can say is that the Navy leaves it to the

Prime Minister.”838 When Konoe faced the Army to consider withdrawal from China, army leaders said that they would consider it if the Navy officially admitted its lack of confidence in winning the war.839 Faced with this situation, Konoe lamented: “The Army is seeking a war we have no chance to win. The Navy says they have no confidence. The Emperor opposes the war. Yet no matter what we say, the Army does not understand. This is indeed absurd!”840 He ended up postponing war initiation by resigning in mid-October.841 By the time America had issued the Hull note in late November, it was too late to reverse the course. Thus, the entire process was a series of inactions resulting in the December 1 war decision.842 One cabinet member told Konoe, “Waging war is about domestic politics.”843

While this explanation contains some truth, it still raises some questions: Why was it so politically difficult for top leaders who saw little hope for war victory to capitulate to

America? What created this political environment? Two consequences of an entrenched identity dilemma—enduring enmity and identity indivisibility—help answer these questions.

Recall that states in an entrenched identity dilemma may internalize their zero-sum identity relations and pursue confrontation to defend their identities. In fact, many Japanese concluded that confrontation was necessary to defend their identity as a leader in Asia, and demanded war with America. This anti-American enduring enmity made it politically

838 Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyo Senso Genin Kenkyubu, Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi, 1987, 7:286– 88; Konoe, “Saigo No Gozenkaigi,” 50. 839 Moriyama, Nichibei Kaisen No Seiji Katei, 234; Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyo Senso Genin Kenkyubu, ed., Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi: Kaisen Gaikoushi, New Edition, vol. 8 (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1987), 535; Yabe, Konoe Fumimaro, 621–22. 840 Yabe, Konoe Fumimaro, 622; Yagami, Konoe Fumimaro, 129. 841 Moriyama, Nichibei Kaisen No Seiji Katei, 235. 842 Moriyama, Nichibei Kaisen No Seiji Katei. 843 Konoe, “Saigo No Gozenkaigi,” 5.

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suicidal for any leader to make peace with America.

Specifically, many military officers argued for war because “America’s central policy fundamentally clashes with the Greater Asia Co-Prosperity policy,” and because accepting U.S. demands would mean “the collapse of Japan’s historical national policy.”844

These war advocates overwhelmed moderate voices in the Army and the Navy.845 Under the influence of the pro-Axis factions in the military, media also opposed the peace effort.846 And pan-Asianist factions dominated the Foreign Ministry. 847 “By the end of

August,” writes one historian, “it was clear to Konoe that the voice demanding an immediate decision to go to war against the United States became rather dominant and increasingly difficult to suppress.”848 There were assassination plots and actual attacks against some moderate leaders in charge of the peace efforts.849 Some leaders thought that

Prime Minister Konoe would “certainly be killed” if he carried out a summit with

Roosevelt. 850 In short, enmity against America was so dominant that it was politically impossible to promote peace.851

844 Shinichi Tanaka, “Tanaka Shinichi Chusho Gyomu Nissi,” (hereafter Tanaka diary), November 27, 1941, Military Archival Library, National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan. 845 Moriyama, Nichibei Kaisen No Seiji Katei, 174. The opinion of the war advocates in summarized in Kaigun Kokuboseisaku Iinkai Daiichi Iinkai, “Genjosei ni oite Teikoku Kaigun no torubeki Taido,” June 5, 1941 in Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyo Senso Genin Kenkyubu, Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi, 1987, 8:427–36. For discussions on this document, see Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyo Senso Genin Kenkyubu, Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi, 1987, 7:206; Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 177; Yuji Nakao, “Kaigun Bunsho ‘Genjoseika Ni Oite Teikoku Kaigun No Torubeki Taido’ No Hyoka,” Senshi Kenkyu Nenpo, no. 4 (2001): 63–79. 846 Shigekazu Matsumoto, “Nichibei Kosho to Chugoku Mondai: Terazaki Gaimusho America Kyokucho No Shuhen,” Kokusai Seiji, no. 37 (1968): 83; Tobe, Gaimusho Kakushinha, 271–74. 847 Matsumoto, “Nichibei Kosho to Chugoku Mondai,” 80; Shiozaki, Nichieibei Senso No Kiro, 279–80. 848 Yagami, Konoe Fumimaro, 124. Also see Grew, Ten Years in Japan, 415; Grew, Turbulent Era, 2:1331; Kido, Kido Koichi Nikki, 1966, 2:896. 849 Robert Joseph Charles Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), 232–53. 850 Grew, Ten Years in Japan, 425–28; Grew, Turbulent Era, 2:1330–32; Konoe, “Saigo No Gozenkaigi,” 41– 42; Yabe, Konoe Fumimaro, 595–96. 851 One navy leader shared this perspective in his memoir. Fukudome, Kaigun No Hansei, 41. Hull seemed to have well understood this domestic situation, citing this as a reason why Japan could not accept the four principles prior to the summit. Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 1948, 2:1024–25.

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Another sign of enduring enmity, as discussed in Chapter 1, is that states develop deep threat perception and suspicion due to the high level of enmity. In fact, distrust against the United States was so entrenched that many Japanese viewed war as an inevitable

“destiny” and even feared a preemptive attack by the Americans. 852 Navy Minister

Shigetaro Shimada said, “As it is, there is no telling when the United States will make a preemptive strike.” If the U.S. fleet sails across the Pacific in full force and Japan runs out of oil, “Japan’s operational plan will be completely nullified and our chance for victory will disappear.” In such a case, “I of course will commit hara-kiri, but no matter how many navy ministers committed hara-kiri, it would be no good.” However, such fear was unrealistic. As other navy officials emphasized, “in light of its national character and the need to obtain Congressional approval, the United States is unlikely to make a preemptive attack on Japan.” Yet, “Shimada’s distrust of the United States,” explains one historian,

“ran too deep to be assuaged by a reasoned argument.”853 In other words, the anti-American environment was so entrenched that there was little room for reason to calm the distrust toward the United States.

Despite this, moderate leaders sought peace instead of warmongering. Before and during the Imperial Conference in September 6 on the first war decision, the Emperor made highly unusual political intervention by pushing top civilian and military leaders to reassure that “diplomacy be given precedence.”854 But war demands kept on rising among citizens, newspapers, politicians, and military officers.855 “There was widespread atmosphere that

852 On the U.S.-Japan-war-as-destiny thesis, see Suetsugu, Sekai no Doran to Komei no Shimei. 853 All the quotes are from Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 272–73. 854 Yabe, Konoe Fumimaro, 606–7. Ike, Japan’s Decision for War, 133–63. Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 266–67; Ike, Japan’s Decision for War, 151; Yabe, Konoe Fumimaro, 607; Kido, Kido Koichi Nikki, 1966, 2:905, 928–31. 855 Daihonei Rikugunbu Sensoshidohan, “Kimitsu Senso Nisshi,” November 18, 1941, Ref. C12120319300, JACAR; Kido, Kido Koichi Nikki, 1966, 2:911–12; Matome Ugaki, Senso Roku: Ugaki Matome Nikki, New

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we must team with Germany and fight war,” later recalled one navy officer. “The general atmosphere in Japan was boiling up with the war thesis.” 856 Military officers in fact rejoiced that the Hull note was “the grace of Heaven. It ensures war. A happy ending.”857

By Pearl Harbor, this “emotional public sentiment” had swept the debate, making impossible for moderate leaders to stop the war drum.858

When the Imperial Conference was reconvened on December 1 to make the final war decision, the Emperor did not intervene. He explained in his postwar monologue:

“Because I thought it would be futile to oppose [the war], I didn’t utter a single word. If I repressed war advocates, domestic opinion would have reached a boiling point accusing the government of surrendering the United States without putting up a fight, and this would have occasioned a coup d’état.” 859 Many civil and military leaders shared the same opinion.860 In sum, with the antagonistic discourse of enduring enmity calling for war to defend national identity as a leader in Asia, Pearl Harbor was politically inevitable.

In addition, the Japanese rejected compromise with America because doing so would have undermined their national identity as a leader in Asia. The emotional identity- based argument against compromise thus trumped the rational strategic argument for it. It

Edition (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1996), 11. 856 NHK, Nihonjin ha Naze Senso he to Mukatta no ka: Media to Minshu, Shidosha Hen, 51. 857 Daihonei Rikugunbu Sensoshidohan, “Kimitsu Senso Nisshi,” November 27, 1941, Ref. C12120319400, JACAR; Daihonei Rikugunbu Sensoshidohan, “Kimitsu Senso Nisshi,” December 1, 1941, Ref. C12120319500, JACAR; Boueicho Boeikensyujo Senshishitsu, Senshi Sosho, 76:488; Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 284. 858 NHK, Nihonjin ha Naze Senso he to Mukatta no ka: Media to Minshu, Shidosha Hen, 69–72. This hostile discourse was unlikely a product of government-led warmongering, as suggested by some studies. Kakegawa, “The Press and Public Opinion”; NHK, Nihonjin ha Naze Senso he to Mukatta no ka: Media to Minshu, Shidosha Hen, 51–52. The government in fact directed newspapers to avoid “incendiary, provocative rhetoric.” Uchikawa, Gendaishi Shiryo, 41:354–56, 365. 859 Terasaki, Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku, 71, 75–76. 860 Yabe, Konoe Fumimaro, 625–26. Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyo Senso Genin Kenkyubu, Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi, 1987, 7:368. NHK, Nihonjin ha Naze Senso he to Mukatta no ka: Media to Minshu, Shidosha Hen, 152.

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was this identity indivisibility effect—another consequence of an entrenched identity dilemma—that made war inevitable. Historian Akira Iriye explains: “At the bottom was the image of Japan as the leader in Asia, as opposed the policies of the United States which stood for ‘the maintenance of the status quo, the conquest of the world, and the protection of democracy. … Acceptance of the Hull note would have been tantamount to the rejection of the ideology that had underlined Japanese policy for a decade [since the Manchuria

Crisis].”861

The identity indivisibility effect appeared throughout the decision-making process.

The members of the Konoe cabinet repeatedly pressured Army Minister Tojo to accept U.S. demands to avoid war. During the five-minister meeting on October 12, Prime Minister

Konoe told Tojo: “We should avoid war against the United States at all costs even if we have to give in to U.S. demands and withdraw the troops from China. … We should not be so concerned with our ‘pride’ but with what is best for the nation.” He stressed that there is still room for compromise: “It is fine to listen to America nominally but get a result same as stationing troops substantially.” But Tojo rejected such compromise based on identity- related grounds: “although you say that we should forget our pride but concern ourselves with what is best for the nation, I cannot agree at all to the withdrawal of our troops, and we should maintain the good spirit of our troops.”862 The meeting ended with Tojo saying that he “absolutely has no intention to abandon the holy war purpose.”863 During a meeting next day, Tojo rejected a compromise proposal by the Foreign Ministry, insisting that

861 Iriye, Across the Pacific, 225, emphasis added. 862 Yagami, Konoe Fumimaro, 127; Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyo Senso Genin Kenkyubu, Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi, 1987, 7:288–89; Konoe, “Saigo No Gozenkaigi,” 47–48; Yabe, Konoe Fumimaro, 617–18, emphasis added. 863 Daihonei Rikugunbu Sensoshidohan, “Kimitsu Senso Nisshi,” October 12, 1941, Ref. C12120319100, JACAR.

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agreeing to U.S. terms would “bring Japan to its small power status prior to the Manchuria

Incident” and calling such act “unpatriotic diplomacy designed to abandon the holy war.”864

During the last cabinet meeting on October 14, Tojo argued that it was for this “holy war purpose” that tens of thousands of soldiers had sacrificed their lives and their families and the nation as a whole had suffered tremendously. Thus, he claimed, “there was no need to succumb to America’s pressures.”865 Tojo then told Konoe, “We as persons sometimes need to jump from the platform of Temple Kiyomizu with our eyes closed (taking a chance even when there is a risk of losing life).”866 One military officer recorded on October 15, the day Konoe resigned: “We must avoid war. The Army desires no war, more than does the Navy and the Government. But, alas, the Army dares to fight a one-hundred-year war to accomplish the China Incident.”867 National identity as a leader in Asia was something worth dying for.

None of this is to say that the war decision solely fell on Tojo. First, he faced tremendous opposition against any compromise from the subordinates. Many leaders recounted that Tojo had to “go with the flow” because he would have been treated as a

“traitor” and even be killed by the subordinates if he had opposed war and capitulated to

America. 868 Second, other leaders also came around to reject compromise on identity-

864 Daihonei Rikugunbu Sensoshidohan, “Kimitsu Senso Nisshi,” October 13, 1941, Ref. C12120319100, JACAR. 865 Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyo Senso Genin Kenkyubu, Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi, 1987, 8:534. 866 Appalled at Tojo’s irresponsible comments, Konoe said, “We as individuals may face such a situation once or twice in our lifetime. If we consider the two thousand and six hundred years of polity of our nation and the fate of our hundred million Japanese nationals, we as government officials holding responsible positions should not do such a thing.” Konoe, “Saigo No Gozenkaigi,” 48–49. 867 Daihonei Rikugunbu Sensoshidohan, “Kimitsu Senso Nisshi,” October 15, 1941, Ref. C12120319100, JACAR, emphasis added. 868 “Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi Dai 7 Kan: Doshiryohen no Ichibu ni taisuru Syoken nado (5),” in Akiho Ishii, “Ishii Shiryo (2) Ishii Akiho Taisa Nikki, Vol. 2, 1941,” Ref. Chuo-Sensoshidojuyokokusakubunsho, Military Archival Library, National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan. Fukudome, Kaigun No Hansei, 86–87. Kenryo Sato, Tojo Hideki to Taiheiyo Senso (Tokyo: Bungei Shunshusha, 1960), 216; Fukudome, Kaigun No Hansei, 75–76.

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based reasons. For instance, despite the slim chance of victory, the Navy Minister rejected making compromise on the China question because such action would be “inexcusable to the spirits of the twenty thousand war dead” and because “the accomplishment of the China

Incident will come to nothing.”869 Other senior statesmen initially opposed Tojo on “the use of national power for obsession with ideals such as the establishment of the Great East

Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.”870 But the Hull note infuriated even these rationally-minded leaders.871 They viewed the note an attempt to “ruin Japan’s leadership status in East Asia” and accepted war as inevitable.872 They all felt that the note “utterly disregards the long years of Japan’s sacrifices and forces giving up great-power status in the Far East. This is tantamount to Japan’s suicide.”873

Thus, Japanese leaders ultimately voted for war. During the December 1 Imperial

Conference, they claimed that America was “being utterly conceited, obstinate, and disrespectful.” If Japan accepted the Hull note, “[t]he prestige of our Empire would fall to the ground,’ “[o]ur great undertaking, the establishment of a New Order in East Asia, would be nipped in the bud,” “the international position of our Empire would be reduced to a status lower than it was prior to the Manchuria Incident,” and “the great achievements of the Emperor Meiji would all come to naught.” The leaders agreed, “This we cannot do.”874

In sum, capitulation would have meant giving up Japan’s national identity as a leader in Asia. This was unacceptable. In this regard, Pearl Harbor, historian Akira Iriye concludes, “demonstrated the failure of American policy, a policy that had been unable to

869 Sawamoto diary, October 30, 1941. 870 Imperial Household Agency, Showa Tenno Jitsuroku, 8:558–59. 871 Hosaka, Tojo Hideki to Tenno no Jidai, 340. 872 Boueicho Boeikensyujo Senshishitsu, Senshi Sosho, 76:486–90. 873 Shigenori Togo, Jidai No Ichimen (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1985), 252–53. 874 Ike, Japan’s Decision for War, 262–83; Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyo Senso Genin Kenkyubu, Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi, 1987, 8:593–610.

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imagine … the irrationality of pan-Asianism.” 875 In another historian’s account, the

Americans failed to understand that pan-Asianism “reflected honor and national pride, the prestige and standing of a great power,” and that any compromise would have meant

“defeat, humiliation, ignominy, and an end to great-power status in permanent subordination to the United States”876 Policymakers in Washington failed to comprehend the counterparts in Tokyo and their psychology of fighting for national identity. In the end, identity was not up for negotiation.

Alternative Explanations

Before concluding the chapter, let us recap how my identity dilemma argument stands against the competing strategic and domestic explanations. In doing so, I elaborate on some strategic and domestic factors that I have not fully addressed in this chapter.

As discussed earlier, U.S. embargoes, Japan’s southward expansion, and its signing of the Axis alliance makes the period of 1940-41 an easy case for the strategic explanation that conflict of interests and material threats caused American-Japanese enmity. Yet, this explanation is weak because the conflict of interests between America and Japan was minimal. U.S. commercial interests in China were very small, its security interests in the

Philippines were very limited, and the isolationists dismissed these interests altogether and emphasized that U.S. commercial interests rather aligned with Japan, its second-largest trade partner. Moreover, enmity preceded the material threats such as U.S. embargos, the

875 Iriye, Across the Pacific, 226, emphasis added. 876 Ian Kershaw, Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions That Changed the World, 1940-1941 (New York, NY: Penguin, 2007), 380.

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Tripartite Pact, and Japan’s southward advance. Instead, enmity resulting from the identity dilemma pushed America and Japan to take these threatening measures.

Lastly, even after the material threats became acute, there were still considerable differences between the reactions of identity groups in both countries; only incompatible identity groups—American liberal internationalists and Japanese pan-Asianists— developed enmity and pursued confrontation, while compatible groups—American isolationists and Japanese moderate internationalists—did not. Material threats alone thus did not determine the behavior of both sides.

This last point applies to one strategic factor I have not fully discussed: naval arms race. U.S.-Japan naval race accelerated with the U.S. 1940 Two-Ocean Navy Act.

According to the Japanese Navy’s estimate, the Act would reduce Japan’s naval strength to 70 percent of the U.S. Navy’s by the end of 1941, 50 percent by 1943, and 30 percent by 1944. This led Japan to counter with its Fifth Replenishment Program in January 1941, with an emphasis on the Yamato-class super-battleship procurement. Also, the deployment of the U.S. Pacific Fleet to Pearl Harbor in April 1940 posed significant challenges to the

Japanese Navy. 877 I do not suggest that this naval factor played no role in American-

Japanese enmity. Yet, it alone cannot provide a full picture because political actors in both countries acted very differently according to their identity worldviews: only the incompatible identity groups developed enmity and pursued confrontational countermeasures, and the compatible groups did not.

Meanwhile, the increased logrolling and media control by the Japanese military makes the period of 1940-41 an easy case for the domestic explanation that warmongering

877 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 235, 240–41.

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caused Japan’s anti-American enmity. However, the continuous efforts by Japanese moderates to avoid war was the opposite of warmongering.

None of this is to say that there was no warmongering and logrolling. Japanese leaders certainly used pan-Asianist rhetoric to mobilize the public for the war efforts in

China. The Navy long used potential war with America and Britain as a justification for gaining more military budgets and policy influences over the Army. This partly explains why navy leaders could not openly oppose confrontational measures such as the Axis alliance, southward expansion, and ultimately Pearl Harbor.878

However, this still does not diminish the broader identity dynamics in which many

Japanese supported pan-Asianism, became anti-Anglo-American, and pressured moderate leaders to pursue confrontation. Moreover, contrary to the conventional wisdom that the government manipulated the anti-Western public opinion,879 it instead banned any news articles that “incite America’s hostile emotions” or “claim immediate war with America,” and emphasized the need to avoid any “emotionally-driven,” “reckless” xenophobic movements.880 According to one historian, as the public opinion turned into national fervor and became increasingly anti-Anglo-Saxon in a “snowball” fashion, even the media, which helped create the public opinion in the first place, could no longer stop it.881 Moderate leaders, according to another historian, “ended up constraining themselves with the public opinion they instigated, which led to the outbreak of U.S.-Japan war.”882 In other words, despite some instrumental use of identity rhetoric, the identity dilemma took a life of its

878 Asada, “Nihon Kaigun to Taibei Seisaku Oyobi Senryaku,” 120–25; Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 210, 222–25; Moriyama, Nichibei Kaisen No Seiji Katei, 100–108. 879 Kakegawa, “The Press and Public Opinion,” 547–49. 880 Uchikawa, Gendaishi Shiryo, 41:274–76. 881 NHK, Nihonjin ha Naze Senso he to Mukatta no ka: Media to Minshu, Shidosha Hen, 49–50. 882 NHK, 69–72.

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own and made U.S.-Japan confrontation unavoidable. This was the tragedy of identity politics.

Conclusion

U.S.-Japan relations deteriorated following Germany’s conquests of Belgium,

Holland, and France in World War II in May-June 1940. U.S. embargoes provoked Japan to declare the Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, to expand into Southeast Asia, to sign the Tripartite Pact, and ultimately to attack Pearl Harbor. Why and how did the two countries develop enmity and fight war?

I argued in this chapter that an identity dilemma led to this increased American-

Japanese enmity. Germany’s victories amplified the anti-Western pan-Asianist debate among the Japanese, prompting them to take assertive actions to establish Japan’s standing as a leader in Asia. Seeking to fulfill its internationalist role identity as a crusader nation and to save China from Japanese aggression, the Americans imposed embargoes on Japan.

The embargoes created anti-American backlash among pan-Asianists and prompted Japan to ally with the Axis powers and to expand in Southeast Asia.

The United States and Japan negotiated peace but failed due to the two consequences of an entrenched identity dilemma: enduring enmity and identity indivisibility. The Americans refused to abandon China to make peace with Japan, because doing so would have contradicted their liberal internationalist identity. The Japanese refused U.S. demands to withdraw from China and voted for war, because they internalized zero-sum identity relations and viewed confrontation as necessary for defending their pan-

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Asianist identity, and because compromise would have undermined this national identity.

In short, the United States and Japan marched into war because of an identity dilemma. The Pacific War was a clash of identities.

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Conclusion

Identity plays an important role in international politics. Many scholars have shown how states form identities through domestic discourse or interaction with other states and how identity shapes state interest and behavior. However, existing studies have rarely analyzed how one’s actions to enact its identity threatens the other’s identity and how this zero-sum interaction affects interstate relations. Neither have they theorized how such international dynamics shape and are shaped by domestic identity politics.

The main purpose of this study has been to address these underexplored questions.

Chapter 1 laid out the identity dilemma theory, which explains how zero-sum identity contestation produces interstate enmity and how this dynamic develops as domestic identity groups organize political coalitions and push for confrontation. In addition to establishing a novel way of understanding why and how states fight over their identities, the theory provides an alternative explanation of interstate enmity to a strategic account that material threats or conflict of interests make states enemies or to a domestic account that warmongering by political actors lead to interstate enmities.

In the following chapters, this study tested the identity dilemma by examining U.S.-

Japan pre-WWII relations. The two countries became enemies and marched toward war during the 1930s because of an identity dilemma. Japan’s assertion of its pan-Asianist identity as a “leader in Asia” through expansion into China challenged America’s liberal internationalist identity as a “crusader nation” and prompted many Americans to support retaliatory embargoes. These embargoes precipitated Japan’s further expansionist policies and ultimately Pearl Harbor. In making these empirical claims, these chapters questioned the conventional wisdom that power politics or domestic politics primarily drove

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American-Japanese enmity, offering an alternative historiographical narrative that the

Road to the Pacific War as a clash of identities.

In this conclusion chapter, I discuss how these findings contribute to the broader discussions on IR theory, Pacific War historiography, and foreign policy. I examine how this study expands our theoretical understanding of international politics, challenges our conventional view on the origins of World War II, and broadens our approach to current policy issues, particularly U.S.-China competition. I also identify this study’s limitations, which in turn suggest potentially productive new areas of future research on identity in world politics.

The Identity Dilemma and IR Theory

How does the identity dilemma theory help our understanding of international politics? I suggest that the theory contributes to three broader fields in IR: identity, security, and enmity.

This study’s most important contribution is to broaden our conception of the role of identity in international politics. As discussed in the preceding chapters, despite their argument that identity is relational (that is, states form identities in relation to others), existing studies have rarely examined what happens when one’s action to enact its identity challenges the other’s identity. Neither have they theorized how interstate identity politics affects and is affected by domestic identity debates, resulting in a lack of what Christian

Reus-Smit calls a “holistic” constructivist approach that “treats the domestic and the

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international as two faces on a single social and political order.”883 The identity dilemma theory has addressed these issues by stipulating how states develop enmity in an action- reaction manner and how such identity-driven enmity can be intractable due to two consequences of an entrenched identity dilemma, enduring enmity and identity indivisibility. It also links the international and the domestic by stipulating that an identity dilemma happens between two states when incompatible identity groups hold power on both sides and that the dilemma deepens as these identity groups make domestic coalitions to gain more influence and push through confrontational policies. In brief, this study offers a new theory of zero-sum interstate identity politics and its domestic mechanism.

This study also suggests that the identity dilemma is a generalizable phenomenon in international politics. As explained in Chapter 1, I have studied U.S.-Japan prewar relations not only because of its historical importance but also because of its paradigmatic significance; if the identity dilemma theory explains the rise of American-Japanese pre-

WWII enmity, which is usually explained by strategic or domestic factors, this suggests that the theory has survived a crucial, least-likely case and should be able to explain other instances of interstate enmity. In fact, the previous chapters have illustrated the identity dilemma by referring to cases such as the Anglo-German naval rivalry before WWI, the

Sino-Soviet split and the U.S.-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War, and the Israel-Palestine conflict, the China-Taiwan dispute, and the Sino-Japanese history dispute today. Moreover, the last section of this chapter will examine ongoing U.S.-China competition as another potential case. Taken together, these empirical analyses show the generalizability of the theoretical claims made in this study.

883 Reus-Smit, “Constructivism,” 228–29. Also see Nia, Holistic Constructivism, Identity Formation and Iran’s Foreign Policy.

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In doing so, this study also speaks to the status and recognition literature, a subfield within the state identity studies. As discussed in Chapter 1, many scholars have argued that due to instrumental and sociopsychological reasons, states compete for status in international society, and that one of the ways in which status competition leads to conflict is a status dilemma, a situation in which one’s status-seeking actions threaten the other’s status.884 Similarly, others claim that states seek others’ recognition of their own identities to maintain ontological security, and that conflict arises when states face “recognition games” in which one’s actions fail to recognize or misrecognize the other’s identity.885

While I agree with these scholars that status and recognition matter in international politics and draw on their research to formulate the identity dilemma theory, there are two areas in which the theory disagrees with or expands on the literature. First, these studies only focus on the status aspects of state identity, even suggesting that states do not develop hostilities over identity issues that have no status implications.886 This study casts doubt on these claims, showing that states do care and even fight over non-status-related identities. For instance, the U.S.-Japan identity dilemma before the Pacific War involved America’s role identity as a “crusader nation” to spread democracy and Christianity abroad. Although this identity had little to do with status, the Americans did develop enmity against the Japanese pan-Asianists who challenged their “civilizing” mission in China. In brief, by expanding the focus beyond status concerns, the identity dilemma theory provides a more general account of interstate identity competition than the status dilemma theory.

Second, existing studies often assume that states have monolithic conceptions of

884 Wohlforth, “Status Dilemmas and Interstate Conflict.” 885 Ringmar, “The Recognition Game Soviet Russia Against the West.” 886 Wolf, “Respect and Disrespect in International Politics,” 108. Wolf notes that although recognition is not only about status, existing studies on recognition tend to only emphasize status concerns.

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their status, and ignore domestic contestation over the meanings of status. This study challenges this view by showing that domestic actors have competing visions of status and that this domestic debate affects the country’s relationship with others. For instance, an increasing number of scholars argue that today’s China is a status seeker who wants to be recognized as a great power by the international community, and may fight with the United

States, the currently dominant power, to fully realize its status aspirations.887 Despite their important insights into the social motives behind China’s rise, these scholars rarely discuss how different domestic actors in China view their nation’s great-power status differently and how this domestic debate shapes Beijing’s relationship with Washington. The importance of this domestic-international dynamic is clear when one considers how different identity groups in Imperial Japan viewed their great-power status and how this affected U.S.-Japan relations. As discussed in the earlier chapters, Japanese moderate internationalists and pan-Asianists had competing visions of status; the former embraced

Japan’s great-power standing as a member of the West, while the latter espoused the country’s standing as a leader of Asia. American-Japanese relationship remained friendly when the moderates held power and solved foreign policy problems through Western multilateral regimes like the League of Nations and the Washington Treaty System. The relationship deteriorated when the pan-Asianists took power and pursued more independent, confrontational policies against the West. A similar dynamic seems to be at play in Sino-American relations. Since Deng Xiaoping’s “Reform and Opening Up” policy,

China have sought to enhance its status by integrating itself into the existing West-led

887 Larson and Shevchenko, “Status Seekers”; Yong Deng, China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers, chap. 7; William C. Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Politics 61, no. 1 (2009): 28–57.

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economic and institutional international order. In response, the United States has welcomed and assisted China’s rise as a member of the Western order through its engagement policy.

This cooperative bilateral relationship has recently started to collapse, however. The

Chinese now seem to assert themselves as a leader of Asia and have implemented many initiatives to assert their sphere of influence in the region. Many Americans recognize this as a challenge to America’s standing as a leader of the liberal international order and advocate confrontation against China. In short, U.S.-China relations are becoming more hostile as the Chinese’ understanding of its status shifts from Westernism to pan-Asianism.

While the last section of this chapter will return to this issue and discuss whether China and the United States could face an identity dilemma, it is for now suffice to say that scholars should take seriously domestic debates on status and their affects on interstate relations.

In addition to exiting state identity literature, this study also contributes to the international security field. Specifically, this study has established an identity dilemma as an alternative framework to the standard model of thinking about international conflict— namely, the security dilemma. While the conventional wisdom holds that states develop hostilities because their policies threaten each other’s national security, I have argued that states can also become enemies because their actions challenge each other’s national identity. In Chapter 1, I have made this claim by departing from the conventional view that states are rational actors and by drawing on social psychology to suggest that people within states are emotional actors. That is, people emotionally respond to threats to their national identity and develop enmity because they are nationalistic (i.e., identify themselves with and are emotionally attached to their nation) and view foreign policy issues through an

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identity lens. I then showed in the following chapters that the Americans and the Japanese indeed emotionally reacted to each other’s actions, became hostile, and pursued confrontation, even though many of these actions are not materially threatening. In brief, this study therefore challenges the dominant realist/rationalist understanding of world politics by demonstrating that states fight over not only security but also identity issues, and that not only rational but also emotional, sociopsychological dynamics drive state behavior.888

Lastly, this study contributes to the broader IR scholarship by suggesting the importance of studying enmity as a variable. Chapter 1 explained that enmity matters in international politics because it can promote demonization, delegitimation, suspicion, threat perceptions—all of which can lead to conflict. It also theorized how people develop enmity in response to identity threats and interstate enmity can escalate in an action- reaction manner. The following chapters then empirically showed how enmity rose between the United States and Japan and ultimately led to Pearl Harbor. Despite this theoretical and empirical significance, enmity remains an understudied subject in IR scholarship.889 This omission is problematic when one considers the fact that political theorists such as Thomas Hobbes and Carl Schmitt viewed enmity as the essence of the state of nature and of the political,890 and that IR scholars have drawn inspirations from these theorists to argue that the international system is a Hobbesian anarchy where all states

888 I hereby join the emerging scholarship on state emotion in highlighting the important role that emotions play in world politics. On the emotion literature, see Neta C. Crawford, “The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships,” International Security 24, no. 4 (2000): 116–56; Hall, Emotional Diplomacy; Lupovici, The Power of Deterrence; Mercer, “Feeling like a State”; Sasley, “Theorizing States’ Emotions.” 889 There are only few studies on enmity. Wendt, Social Theory; Herrmann and Fischerkeller, “Beyond the Enemy Image and Spiral Model”; Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration. 890 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London, UK: Penguin Classics, 1982); Schmitt, Concept of the Political.

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are adversaries competing for their own survival. Moreover, psychologists have studied enmity for decades and regard it as “a key source and amplifier of international tensions.”891 While by no means an exhaustive analysis of all potential causes of interstate enmity, this study has established the identity dilemma as one mechanism through which states become enemies. IR scholars are encouraged to investigate other variables and mechanisms in the making of interstate enmity.

In addition to these theoretical contributions, this study suggests promising areas for future research on IR theory. First, future studies may analyze how states de-escalate the identity dilemma and overcome enmity. While primarily focusing on identity dilemma escalation, I acknowledged in Chapter 1 that de-escalation is at least theoretically possible; compatible identity groups gain power and promote cooperation on both sides, and a cooperative action-reaction dynamic help them lock in cooperative policies and establish enduring friendly relations. Meanwhile, I suspect that analyzing de-escalation would likely involve a whole new set of alternative explanations that this study has not covered. For instance, Wendt suggests that states establish a Kantian culture and become friends due to four “master” variables: interdependence, common fate, homogenization, and self- restraint.892 Kupchan argues that institutionalized restraint, compatible social orders, and cultural commonality provide opportunities for adversaries to become friends.893 Given these complexities, this study has not focused on de-escalation dynamics. However, future research on this topic would be valuable because it would help us understand how states could escape the identity dilemma and pursue peace.

891 Psychologists for Social Responsibility, Dismantling the Mask of Enmity. 892 Wendt, Social Theory, 343–69. 893 Charles A. Kupchan, How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).

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Second, and relatedly, future research may consider how states develop amity because of the opposite of the identity dilemma, that is, a situation in which one’s actions to enact its identity reinforces the other’s identity. Theoretically, such a positive-sum identity spiral is possible and would be resemble the identity dilemma de-escalation process: states have compatible identities so that one’s identity-enacting actions affirm the other’s identity; states develop amity in response to such identity affirmation; and this action-reaction dynamic promotes cooperative relations. This is similar to the existing

“security community” argument that states with similar identities and values view themselves (e.g., democracies) as “we” and maintain peace while viewing others with different identities and values (e.g., autocracies) as “them” and as threats.894 While this study does not intend to investigate this argument, there is a question to what extent a group of states can truly establish a sense of community. For instance, while many scholars have long viewed the European Union as an exemplar of a security community, the recent challenges such as the Euro crisis, the migration crisis, the Brexit, and the rising far-right populism all question the premise of a cohesive, pan-European political entity.895 Instead of expecting states to transform into a family of nations, the positive-sum identity spiral discussed here could provide an alternative heuristic to understand how states can establish a relationship based on mutual identity affirmation and foster friendly relations.896 This, if true, could shed new light on the cases of security communities and interstate cooperation.

Lastly, future researchers might further examine the relationship between the

894 Risse, “Democratic Peace — Warlike Democracies?”; Adler and Barnett, Security Communities. 895 Jennifer Mitzen, “Anxious Community: EU as (in)Security Community,” European Security 27, no. 3 (2018): 393–413. 896 An astute reader may recall Ringmar’s argument that states play “recognition games” in seeking affirmation of their own identity from others. A positive identity spiral may be one pathway through which states playing such games reach mutual identity affirmation. Ringmar, “The Recognition Game Soviet Russia Against the West.”

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identity dilemma and the security dilemma. Although this study has established the two dilemmas as alternative frameworks and not as competing explanations, it is possible that two interact. For instance, interstate confrontation could start as an identity dilemma and then spill over into the security realm and turn into military confrontation, as it did in the

Pacific War case. I have not closely theorized the mechanism through which this transformation happens, given that my aim has been to explain enmity, not war, as a dependent variable. I have made this analytical choice, not only because I believe that enmity is an important phenomenon that merits an analysis for its own sake, but also because I do not argue that an identity dilemma always leads to war. As I explained in

Chapter 1, enmity creates hatred, mistrust, and threat perception—factors that can increase the likelihood of conflict—but this does not mean that being enemies always result in fighting wars. This distinction is critical for understanding not only the identity dilemma but also the security dilemma, because the latter does not always result in conflict either.

The security dilemma only potentially drives states to war by sparking fear, threat perception, and military competition.897 In this regard, both dilemmas view war as potential, not inevitable, outcomes. Having said that, it is important to study how the identity dilemma could turn into security competition and ultimately war. Future studies are needed to explore this link. Additionally, it is possible that the cases of conflicts that scholars think are security dilemmas are in fact identity dilemmas. I have not pursued this line of inquiry because it would be beyond the scope of one study; it would require creating a list of all security dilemma cases and examining each one. But this would be a worthy undertaking because the security dilemma is one of the most popular concepts scholars use to explain

897 Tang, “The Security Dilemma.”

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interstate conflicts.

Understanding the Origins of the Pacific War

In addition to these theoretical implications, this study contributes to our historiographical debate on the origins of World War II in the Pacific. I have argued that the conventional accounts based on strategic factors (e.g., U.S.-Japan conflict of interests over China) and domestic factors (e.g., Japanese militarist warmongering) are inadequate to explain the rise of American-Japanese enmity leading up to Pearl Harbor. I have shown that the enmity arose because Japan’s pan-Asianist worldview and its expansion into China during the 1930s clashed with America’s liberal internationalist worldview and its civilizing mission to uphold the post-WWI peace system and to democratize and

Christianize China. In short, identity politics over China led to the Pacific War.

Importantly, none of this is to suggest that U.S.-Japan confrontation over China was the only factor that contributed to the war.898 Scholars have examined other factors not fully covered in this study,899 such as: the impacts of the Soviet-Japan rivalry and of the Soviet support for the Chinese nationalists on Japan’s expansion into China; 900 the British-

898 On this point, see Iriye, Across the Pacific, 202. 899 For reviews on the origins of the Pacific War, see Michael A. Barnhart, “The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific: Synthesis Impossible?,” Diplomatic History 20, no. 2 (1996): 241–60; Antony Best, “Imperial Japan,” in The Origins of World War Two: The Debate Continues, ed. Robert Boyce and Joseph A. Maiolo (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 52–69; Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific; Young, “Japan at War.” 900 John W. Garver, Chinese-Soviet Relations, 1937-1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1988); Parks Coble, Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931-1937 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 1991); Jonathan Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Threat from the East, 1933-41: Moscow, Tokyo, and the Prelude of the Pacific War (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992); Youli Sun, China and the Origins of the Pacific War, 1931-1941 (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 1993); Michael M. Sheng, Battling Western Imperialism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); Yukiko Koshiro, Imperial Eclipse: Japan’s Strategic Thinking about Continental Asia before August 1945 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013).

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Japanese commercial conflict in East Asia and its effects on the larger Allied-Axis geopolitical competition; 901 the effects of the Great Depression and of the resulting worldwide protectionism on Japan’s expansion in search for autarky; 902 and the relationship between of Japan’s fascism, militarism, and pan-Asianism.903 I do not discount any of these factors. My purpose in the preceding chapters was to show that the identity politics over China consistently played an important role in American-Japanese enmity leading up to Pearl Harbor.

This contributes to existing studies on the identity politics of America and Japan before the Pacific War. Many scholars have examined American internationalism and its foreign policy implications, including the activities of American missionaries in China and their anti-Japan embargo campaign.904 Other have studied Japanese pan-Asianism and its role in Japan’s prewar foreign policy.905 However, very few have analyzed the interaction

901 Antony Best, “Economic Appeasement or Economic Nationalism? A Political Perspective on the British Empire, Japan, and the Rise of Intra‐Asian Trade, 1933–37,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 30, no. 2 (2002): 77–101; Antony Best, “Intelligence, Diplomacy and the Japanese Threat to British Interests, 1914–41,” Intelligence and National Security 17, no. 1 (2002): 85–100; Greg Kennedy, Anglo- American Strategic Relations and the Far East, 1933-1939: Imperial Crossroads (London, UK: Routledge, 2002); Shigeru Akita, ed., Gentlemanly Capitalism, Imperialism and Global History (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Ian Nish, ed., Anglo-Japanese Alienation 1919-1952: Papers of the Anglo- Japanese Conference on the History of the Second World War (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 57–76, 283. 902 Barnhart, Japan Prepares Total War; Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy. 903 Miles Fletcher, The Search for a New Order: Intellectuals and Fascism in Prewar Japan (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1982); Tessei Matsuzawa, Ajia Shugi to Facism: Tenno Teikokuron Hihan (Tokyo: Renga Shobo Shinsha, 1979); Masao Maruyama, Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics, ed. Ivan Morris (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1963); Christopher W. A. Szpilman, Kindai Nihon no Kakushin Ron to Ajia Shugi―Kita Ikki, Okawa Shumei, Mitsukawa Kametaro ra no Shiso to Kodo (Tokyo: Ashi Shobo, 2015). 904 Weinberg, Manifest Destiny; McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State; McCrisken, “Exceptionalism”; Mead, Special Providence; Reed, The Missionary Mind and American East Asia Policy, 1911-1915; Jespersen, American Images of China, 1931-1949. 905 Takeuchi, Gendai Nihon Shiso Taikei Dai; Matsuura, “Dai Toa Senso” ha Naze Okita noka; Hotta, Pan- Asianism and Japan’s War; Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann, eds., Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders (London, UK: Routledge, 2006); Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman, eds., Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History, 2 vols. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011); Cemil Aydin, The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan- Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2007).

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between American and Japanese identity politics to suggest that a clash of identities paved the Road to the Pacific War. One exception I must note is historian Akira Iriye, whose work this study builds on.906 Iriye has studied the role of images and cultures in U.S.-Japan prewar relations by analyzing the interplay between American internationalist and Japanese pan-Asianist worldviews and policies. However, he does not explicitly argue that identity politics led to the Pacific War. Neither does he, as a historian, systematically shows the origins of the war in IR theory terms. His analysis takes a form of a historical narrative. As a political scientist, I thus contribute to the historiographical debate by analyzing the war through a theoretical lens and rigorously testing the causal effect of identity politics on

U.S.-Japan prewar relations.

Avoding Another Pacific War

I conclude this study by discussing its policy implications. I first talk about general policy lessons we can learn from the identity dilemma theory and the Pacific War case study. I then look at Sino-American competition today, asking whether the two superpowers could face an identity dilemma and march toward another Pacific war and how they could avoid such an outcome.

This study offers three general policy lessons. First, it shows the danger of escalatory enmity dynamics driven by the identity dilemma. It is difficult to stop these dynamics and make compromise and promote cooperation because identity politics is emotional, entails nationalism, and undermines pragmatism. It is therefore advisable for

906 Iriye, Across the Pacific; Iriye, Power and Culture.

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leaders to be wary of those political actors who frame foreign policy issues in identity terms and mobilize political coalitions. Leaders also should be careful not to play identity politics and use it for personal political gains because this could get out of control and backfire. In the Pacific War case, American leaders should have been warier of those internationalists who pushed for anti-Japan embargoes based on the identity-based argument that the United

States had a moral obligation to save China. Without the embargoes, Japan would likely have not allied with the Axis powers, invaded Southeast Asia, and attacked Pearl Harbor.

Similarly, Japanese leaders should have not so carelessly used pan-Asianist rhetoric to gain power and mobilize the public for the war in China because this fueled anti-Western nationalism and undermined their pursuit of cooperation with the West. Without this anti-

Western political environment, Japanese moderates would have had a better chance at pursing peace with the United States.

This leads to the second lesson about the importance of differentiating strategic interests and identity concerns and prioritizing the former over the latter. As the earlier chapters showed, the Americans had very limited commercial and security stakes in China.

What they viewed at stake in China was American internationalist identity as a crusader nation and its civilizing mission to democratize and Christianize China. From a strategic, realist perspective, these are not national interests and worthwhile fighting war for. This was the reason why many U.S. policymakers and isolationists opposed sanctioning and fighting Japan for the “sentimental reasons” of saving China.907 Had the Americans not been swayed by their internationalist identity concerns and focused on the strategic picture, they might have been able to avoid the war. As historian John Toland writes, “The Pacific

907 Doenecke and Wilz, From Isolation to War, 167.

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War was a war that need not have been fought.”908 This episode supports the argument by realists such as Hans Morgenthau and George Kennan that countries should conduct their foreign policy based on strategic interests, not moral issues concerning values, principles, and identities.909 Thus, the challenge for statesmen is to separate realpolitik from identity politics and focus on the former.

Taken together, these two points point to the third lesson about not threatening another state’s identity and provoking counteractions. Specifically, a state should not intervene in areas that have no strategic significance for its interest but symbolic importance for the other’s identity. Such intervention is unwise, not only because the state does not have strategic interests to fight for, but also because the other state could view the action as an identity threat, develop enmity, and take countermeasures. This would lead to strategically unnecessary conflict. In the U.S.-Japan context, the Americans should have not intervened in China, not only because they did not have vital interests there, but also because Japanese pan-Asianists viewed the U.S. intervention, even symbolic measures such as diplomatic condemnation and moral embargoes, as identity threats, became anti-

American, and took retaliatory actions. Therefore, it is important for statesmen not to play fire with their own county’s identity politics as well as others’.

Given these policy implications, what does this study say about today’s world politics, particularly Sino-American relations? Many observers warn that the two superpowers are headed for conflict: The rising China seeks to expand its influence and to establish regional hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, the United States responds in kind to

908 Toland, The Rising Sun, 146, 186–87. 909 Hans J Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York, NY: A.A. Knopf, 1948); George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 95; George F. Kennan, “Morality and Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 64 (1985): 205–18.

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maintain its supremacy in the region, and this competition ultimately leads to war.910 This study points to one factor that is often underappreciated in this debate: the potential role of zero-sum identity politics in shaping the trajectory of Sino-American relations.

To start, there seems to be some incompatiblity between Chinese and American identities. Since the global financial crisis and the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008, China has become more confident and nationalistic in asserting its Sino-centric, pan-Asianist identity as a rightful leader of Asia.911 Under President Xi Jinping, the country has declared its intentions to overcome the “century of humiliation,” to achieve the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” and to reestablish its leadership and sphere of influence in Asia.912

Meanwhile, America has long viewed itself as a leader of the free world and promoted a liberal international order. Since 1945, the country has led Asia in promoting democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and a free and open economic system. 913 These two

910 Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Boston, BA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017); Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2011); John J. Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3, no. 4 (December 21, 2010): 381–96. Many scholars challenge the idea that U.S.-China conflict is likely. For instance, see Michael Beckley, Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018); Thomas J. Christensen, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2015); G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 1 (2008): 23–37; Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness?,” International Security 37, no. 4 (April 1, 2013): 7–48, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00115; David C. Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2007); Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for Security (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2012); Joseph S. Nye, “Will the Liberal Order Survive?,” Foreign Affairs 96, no. 1 (2017): 10–16. 911 Suisheng Zhao, “Chinese Foreign Policy as a Rising Power to Find Its Rightful Place,” Perceptions 18, no. 1 (2013): 101–28. 912 Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower (New York, NY: Henry Holt and Co., 2015); Rush Doshi, “Xi Jinping Just Made It Clear Where China’s Foreign Policy Is Headed,” The Washington Post, October 25, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/10/25/xi-jinping-just-made-it-clear-where- chinas-foreign-policy-is-headed/; Howard W. French, Everything Under the Heavens: How the Past Helps Shape China’s Push for Global Power (New York, NY: Knopf, 2017); Jianwei Wang, “Xi Jinping’s ‘Major Country Diplomacy:’ A Paradigm Shift?,” Journal of Contemporary China 28, no. 115 (2019): 15–30. 913 Ruggie, Winning the Peace; Jeffrey Legro, Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), chap. 3; Stewart Patrick, The Best Laid Plans: The Origins of American Multilateralism and the Dawn of the Cold War (New York, NY: Rowman &

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worldviews are incompatible because China and America cannot be the leader of Asia at the same time. Only one can be the leader, and the other must become a follower. To borrow a Chinese proverb, “Never are there two suns in the heaven. Never should there be two emperors on the earth.”

Given this identity incompatibility, each side seems to be taking actions to enact its identity that challenge the other’s identity. To reestablish its leadership in the region, China has proclaimed its “New Asian Security Concept,” which calls for the establishment of

“Asia of Asians.”914 It has rapidly built up its military and claimed much of the South China

Sea through land reclamation. 915 And it has implemented initiatives such as the Asian

Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Belt and Road Initiative, both of which promote

Beijing-led infrastructure projects across Asia. 916 The Americans have viewed these actions to be a direct challenge against America’s internationalist identity as a leader of the free world. The U.S. government has declared that China is challenging American leadership and the “liberal international rule-based order” by promoting authoritarianism and state-led capitalism abroad.917 Many American experts and policymakers have argued that U.S. engagement toward Beijing has failed because it has not liberalized and democratized China, and that the clash of Western liberalism and Chinese authoritarianism

Littlefield Publishers, 2008). 914 David C. McCaughrin, “What Does China’s ‘New Asian Security Concept’ Mean for the US?,” The Diplomat, January 21, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/what-does-chinas-new-asian-security- concept-mean-for-the-us/. 915 M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 33, no. 3 (2011): 292–319; Michael Yahuda, “China’s New Assertiveness in the South China Sea,” Journal of Contemporary China 22, no. 81 (2013): 446–59. 916 Nadège Rolland, “China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’: Underwhelming or Game-Changer?,” The Washington Quarterly 40, no. 1 (2017): 127–42; Kevin G. Cai, “The One Belt One Road and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Beijing’s New Strategy of Geoeconomics and Geopolitics,” Journal of Contemporary China 27, no. 114 (2018): 831–47. 917 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White House, 2017); Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018).

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and Sino-American rivalry are inevitable. 918 As Henry Kissinger once warned, the competition is increasingly looking like a clash of Chinese exceptionalism and American exceptionalism, or that of Chinese pan-Asianist identity and American internationalist identity.919

This action-reaction dynamic of identity contestation seems to be contributing to the rise of Sino-American enmity. One the one hand, the Chinese “century of humiliation” discourse paints the Western powers, including the United States, as evil imperialists intending to contain China. Those who espouse this view and support Beijing’s Sino- centric, pan-Asianist policies to restore its great-power status increasingly regard the

United States as an enemy.920 On the other hand, many Americans increasingly view the

Chinese authoritarian regime as “evil” and inherently malign and untrustworthy.921 The

U.S. government has named China “our most stressing competitor,” declared the new era of “great power competition,” and pledged to maintain a “free and open order” in the Indo-

Pacific against Chinese “revisionism.”922 In October 2018, Vice President Mike Pence

918 Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner, “The China Reckoning,” Foreign Affairs 97, no. 2 (2018): 60–70; Christopher Ford, “The Death of the ‘Liberal Myth’ in U.S. China Policy,” New Paradigms Forum, December 20, 2014, http://www.newparadigmsforum.com/NPFtestsite/?p=1896; James Mann, “America’s Dangerous ‘China Fantasy, ’” The New York Times, January 20, 2018, sec. Opinion, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/opinion/americas-dangerous-china-fantasy.html; Thomas Wright, “The Return to Great-Power Rivalry Was Inevitable,” The Atlantic, September 12, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/liberal-international-order-free-world-trump- authoritarianism/569881/; Suisheng Zhao, “Engagement on the Defensive: From the Mismatched Grand Bargain to the Emerging US–China Rivalry,” Journal of Contemporary China, January 14, 2019, 1–18. 919 Henry Kissinger, On China (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2011), xi–xii, 497. 920 Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon, chap. 5; Suisheng Zhao, “Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: The Strident Turn,” Journal of Contemporary China 22, no. 82 (2013): 535–53. 921 Lyle J. Goldstein, Meeting China Halfway: How to Defuse the Emerging US-China Rivalry (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015), 13, 337. 922 Ash Carter, “Remarks Previewing the FY 2017 Defense Budget,” U.S. Department of Defense, February 2, 2016, http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/648466/remarks-previewing-the-fy- 2017-defense-budget; The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America; “President Donald J. Trump’s Administration Is Advancing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” The White House, accessed September 14, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps- administration-advancing-free-open-indo-pacific/; Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy of the United States of America.

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delivered a major address on U.S. China policy, which many observers saw as the

“declaration of a new Cold War.”923 In February 2019, Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific

Command Phillip Davidson testified before the Senate that the China threat is not just about the changing balance of power but more fundamentally about “a fundamental divergence in values that leads to two incompatible visions of the future” and about Beijing’s attempt to “bend, break, and replace the existing rule-based order international order” with “one with ‘Chinese characteristics’ and led by China.”924 Identity-driven enmity is mounting across the Pacific.

Certainly, this Sino-American competition has not just ideational but also material dimensions. One the one hand, the Chinese view America’s military preponderance and its alliances and military bases in Asia as a threat to their national defense and the rules of existing international organizations and agreements as biased toward the West. They fear that the Americans seek to contain China. On the other hand, the Americans see China’s military buildup, its assertive behavior in the East and South China Seas, its protectionist trade practices, and its cyberattacks against U.S. official and commercial entities as a threat to their national security and prosperity. They think that the Chinese aim to overthrow the

American supremacy and the U.S.-led international order. This strategic side of competition—and the power transition and security dilemma dynamics underlying it— cannot be ignored.925

923 Mike Pence, “Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration’s Policy Toward China,” The White House, October 4, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence- administrations-policy-toward-china/; Jane Perlez, “Pence’s China Speech Seen as Portent of ‘New Cold War,’” The New York Times, October 5, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/05/world/asia/pence-china- speech-cold-war.html. 924 Phillip Davidson, “Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) Testimony Opening Remarks,” Senate Armed Services Committee (February 12, 2019), https://www.pacom.mil/Media/Speeches- Testimony/Article/1755445/senate-armed-services-committee-sasc-opening-statement/. 925 Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy; Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm”; Nathan and Scobell, China’s

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These strategic differences should not be overstated, however. First, the two superpowers have many common interests such as combating climate change and terrorism, preventing nuclear proliferation, maintaining a stable economic international order, promoting peace on the Korean Peninsula, and, above all, avoiding another Pacific war.926

Second, they do not seem to have such an adverse conflict of interests that warrants war.927

Historically, Taiwan has been the most contentious issue in U.S.-China relations, with the

1995-96 Cross-Strait Crisis being a prime example. But the issue has subsided significantly in recent years, and the two countries could resolve their differences in a reciprocal manner, with Washington weakening its military support for Taipei and Beijing stopping its assertive behavior against Taiwan as well as in the South China Sea.928 Recently, the South

China Sea has emerged as a crucial point of contention given its sea lanes, its oil and natural gas reserves, and its territorial disputes.929 Yet, the United States does not have direct stakes in these disputes and would not want to fight war with China over some uninhabited rocks and reefs. Washington has viewed Chinese island building there as a threat to freedom of navigation and responded with military exercises and patrols. But this threat should not be overexaggerated since Beijing is unlikely to close off the sea lanes it heavily relies on. At least in theory, the two countries should be able to cooperate on protecting the trade routes

Search for Security. 926 Kissinger, On China, 528–29; Wu Xinbo, “China and the United States: Core Interests, Common Interests, and Partnership,” Special Report (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, June 2011). 927 James Steinberg and Michael E. O`Hanlon, Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: U.S.-China Relations in the Twenty-First Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 12–14; Michael D. Swaine, America’s Challenge: Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011), chap. 1. 928 Goldstein, Meeting China Halfway, chap. 3; Charles L. Glaser, “A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security 39, no. 4 (2015): 49–90. 929 Robert D. Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific (New York, NY: Random House, 2014).

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as global commons.930 While I cannot address all the issues in U.S.-China relations here, it suffices to say that conflict is hardly inevitable.931

Some predict that the conflict is based on more abstract principles, such as Chinese threats to the “liberal international rule-based order.” This also does not make a war inevitable. First, China has willingly and thoroughly integrated into the international institutional order and cooperated in many issue areas such as security, economy, and environment.932 While Washington criticizes Beijing’s insufficient economic liberalization and state-led development, China has successfully integrated into the global economy by joining the World Trade Organization and a number of free trade agreements.933 Although some experts are concerned that China’s development aid practices and other economic initiatives with a little emphasis on liberal values like human rights would help other autocratic regimes, there is very little evidence that China is deliberately promoting its

“Beijing Consensus” as an alternative to the “Washington Consensus.”934 Not to mention that it is the United States itself that is increasingly threatening the liberal international order, given the Donald Trump administration’s assaults on international organizations and multilateral agreements such as the NATO, the WTO, the Paris Agreement, and the Trans-

930 Goldstein, Meeting China Halfway, chap. 10. 931 Goldstein, Meeting China Halfway; Swaine, America’s Challenge; Steinberg and O`Hanlon, Strategic Reassurance and Resolve; Hugh White, The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013). 932 Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter, China, the United States, and Global Order (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Ann Kent, Beyond Compliance: China, International Organizations, and Global Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007); Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?,” International Security 27, no. 4 (2003): 5–56. 933 Yang Jiang, “China’s Pursuit of Free Trade Agreements: Is China Exceptional?,” Review of International Political Economy 17, no. 2 (2010): 238–61; Ka Zeng, “Multilateral versus Bilateral and Regional Trade Liberalization: Explaining China’s Pursuit of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs),” Journal of Contemporary China 19, no. 66 (2010): 635–52. 934 Swaine, America’s Challenge, 295–96; Scott Kennedy, “The Myth of the Beijing Consensus,” Journal of Contemporary China 19, no. 65 (2010): 461–77.

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Pacific Partnership.935 Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Americans themselves disagree what the liberal order is and whether it even exists.936 While this issue is partly conceptual—terms like “liberal” and “international order” are hard to define937—it is also historical—the United States during the Cold War focused on realpolitik and containment of the Soviet Union and did not clearly stipulate liberal order building as a strategy.938 In fact, the term liberal international order only gained prominence after the 1990s, partly thanks to the work of American scholar G. John Ikenberry,939 and did not appear in the New

York Times until 2012.940 Given these conceptual and historical ambiguities, it remains unclear what U.S. interests are at stake in the liberal order debate. It seems that what is at stake is what the liberal order symbolizes—America’s internationalist identity as a leader of the free world—and whether China’s pan-Asianist agenda is challenging it.

935 Doug Stokes, “Trump, American Hegemony and the Future of the Liberal International Order,” International Affairs 94, no. 1 (2018): 133–50. 936 For skeptic accounts of the liberal order, Graham Allison, “The Myth of the Liberal Order,” Foreign Affairs, June 14, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-06-14/myth-liberal-order; Naazneen Barma, Ely Ratner, and Steve Weber, “The Mythical Liberal Order,” The National Interest, March 1, 2013, https://nationalinterest.org/article/the-mythical-liberal-order-8146; Patrick Porter, “A World Imagined: Nostalgia and Liberal Order,” Cato Institute, June 5, 2018, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy- analysis/world-imagined-nostalgia-liberal-order; Paul Staniland, “Misreading the ‘Liberal Order’: Why We Need New Thinking in American Foreign Policy,” Lawfare, July 29, 2018, https://www.lawfareblog.com/misreading-liberal-order-why-we-need-new-thinking-american-foreignpolicy; Stephen M. Walt, “Why I Didn’t Sign Up to Defend the International Order,” Foreign Policy, August 1, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/01/why-i-didnt-sign-up-to-defend-the-international-order/. Fort accounts by the proponents of the liberal order, see G. John Ikenberry, “The Plot Against American Foreign Policy: Can the Liberal Order Survive?,” Foreign Affairs 96, no. 3 (2017): 2–9; Robert Kagan, “The Cost of American Retreat,” Wall Street Journal, September 7, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/thecost-of- american-retreat-1536330449; Nye Jr., “Will the Liberal Order Survive?”; Rebecca Friedman Lissner and Mira Rapp-Hooper, “The Liberal Order Is More Than a Myth,” Foreign Affairs, July 31, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-07-31/liberal-order-more-myth; Michael J. Mazarr, “The Real History of the Liberal Order,” Foreign Affairs, August 7, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-08-07/real-history-liberal-order. 937 Stephen M. Walt, “What Sort of World Are We Headed For?,” Foreign Policy, October 2, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/02/what-sort-of-world-are-we-headed-for/. 938 Allison, “The Myth of the Liberal Order.” 939 G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011). 940 Wright, “The Return to Great-Power Rivalry Was Inevitable.”

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In sum, it appears that Sino-American enmity is rising as both sides are increasingly framing the competition in not only strategic but also identity terms. The competition seems to be evolving into an identity dilemma, a symbolic battle over the competing worldviews of Chinese pan-Asianism and American internationalism. If history is any indication, this trend is worrisome. Before Pearl Harbor, Japan and the United States had strategic reasons to avoid war, but identity politics dragged them to it. Today, Beijing and Washington have much more to gain from cooperating than fighting, but identity competition could promote conflict. Particularly, if the emerging trend toward identity competition continues and the identity dilemma becomes locked in, it will become difficult to promote cooperation due to the two consequences of an entrenched identity dilemma: enduring enmity and identity indivisibility. As for enduring enmity, where states internalize their zero-sum identity relations and pursue confrontation to defend their identities, the Chinese and the Americans could conclude that since their identities are inherently oppositional, confrontation is inevitable. As for identity indivisibility, where states reject compromise since doing so undermines their identities, China and America could come to believe that the competition is fundamentally about asserting their identities and cooperation is unacceptable since it would contradict their identity assertations. Fortunately, at the time of this writing, Sino-

American relations do not seem to be locked in such an entrenched identity dilemma. The expressions of enmity in identity terms are emerging only recently, and there is little agreement on both sides whether conflict is inevitable.

But both Chinese and American leaders should be cautious in managing their identity relations going forward. What policy advices does this study offer for Chinese and

American leaders to avoid an identity dilemma? How can we apply the policy lessons

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discussed above to Sino-American relations? The foremost advice for Chinese and

American political actors would be to avoid framing the competition as identity politics and arguing for confrontation. Defining Sino-American relations as a zero-sum identity contestation could shift the debate from a pragmatic discussion of common interests and cooperation to a nationalistic discussion of conflicting worldviews and confrontation. Once such a discursive environment gets established, it could lead to the entrenchment of the identity dilemma. To prevent this from happening, Chinese and American policymakers must separate strategic and identity issues and prioritize the former to seek common ground.

As discussed above, the two countries have many areas of common interests to foster cooperation, and do not seem to have significant points of contestation that merit military conflict. If they respect each other’s core interests and cooperate where these interests align, they can become partners, if not friends.941

Moreover, each side should not antagonize the other side by intervening in areas of symbolic significance for the other’s identity. For instance, the United States may reconsider its hardline approach to the South China Sea not only because it does not have vital interests there to fight war over, but because the Chinese may view U.S intervention as a threat to their pan-Asianist identity and become anti-American.942 As discussed in

Chapter 3, U.S. involvement in the Manchuria Crisis only prompted Japan’s League withdrawal and its further anti-Western pan-Asianist policies. The United States does not want to go down a similar path with China. Meanwhile, the Chinese leaders should not overestimate U.S. decline and directly challenge its leadership. Grand initiatives such as

941 Steinberg and O`Hanlon, Strategic Reassurance and Resolve, 12–14. 942 Ward warns that China could view the U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea as a denial of their great-power identity and become anti-American. Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers, 43.

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the Belt and Road Initiative could make the Americans insecure about their internationalist identity as a champion of the liberal order and provoke further anti-Chinese sentiment and confrontation. Given its rise, Beijing might feel emboldened to reflex its muscle, but should not underestimate Washington’s identity-laden commitment to its leadership in world affairs.

Lastly, Chinese and American policymakers should resist the temptation to use identity politics for instrumental reasons because it could backfire and fuel an identity dilemma. Historically, Chinese leaders have engaged in patriotic education based on the history of national humiliation to foster nationalism and rally public support.943 Today, they might be similarly using Sino-centric rhetoric to legitimate the communist party’s rule.944

The liberal international order could be U.S. imperialism by another name, 945 and

American leaders might be using internationalist language to mask the containment of

Beijing.946 Without access to private records and official documents, it is difficult, if not impossible, to tell whether the leaders are using identity expressions genuinely or instrumentally. But the Pacific War showed that leaders could lose control of the debate once the domestic audience buys into their identity framing and pressures them to pursue confrontation. The Chinese people might embrace the century-of-humiliation discourse about restoring their nation’s greatness and pressure their leaders to seek reckless,

943 Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2012); Suisheng Zhao, “China’s Pragmatic Nationalism: Is It Manageable?,” The Washington Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2005): 131–44. 944 Suisheng Zhao, “The Ideological Campaign in Xi’s China: Rebuilding Regime Legitimacy,” Asian Survey 56, no. 6 (2016): 1168–93. 945 Inderjeet Parmar, “The US-Led Liberal Order: Imperialism by Another Name?,” International Affairs 94, no. 1 (2018): 151–72. 946 The Chinese have been skeptical of the U.S.-led liberal international order as a plot to contain China. Robert Kagan, “What China Knows That We Don’t: The Case for a New Strategy of Containment,” The Weekly Standard, January 20, 1997, https://www.weeklystandard.com/robert-kagan/what-china-knows-that- we-dont.

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confrontational foreign policies. 947 The Americans could buy into the internationalist narrative of upholding U.S. global leadership and the liberal international order and demand competition with China. At the very least, leaders should be careful with playing fire with identity politics.

Ultimately, only time will tell the future of Sino-American relations.948 China’s economy could collapse, making its pan-Asianist projects empty promises. America might turn isolationist, giving up its leadership and the liberal international order. This study does not predict that the two countries will become trapped in an identity dilemma and become enemies. It argues that they should learn from the Second World War and avoid a clash of identities. Let us not repeat the history—and establish peace across the Pacific.

947 Zhao, “Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited.” 948 Joseph S. Nye, “Time Will Tell,” Foreign Affairs 97, no. 4 (August 2018): 190–92.

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