Warships After Washington: the Development of the Five Major Fleets 1922-1930 Pdf

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Warships After Washington: The Development of the Five Major Fleets tells the story of the impact of the Washington Naval Treaty of on warship construction as the victorious nations tried to modernize their navies while facing financial strain, national exhaustion, strategic necessity and strategic ambition. Jordan is a teacher of European languages who began writing in the s about the Soviet navy. He is the author and co-author of many works on naval warfare including French Cruisers, and French Battleships,among others. Presently, he edits the annual publication, Warship. A technical subject requires careful and consistent treatment. Jordan Warships After Washington: The Development of the Five Major Fleets 1922-1930 succeeds, but, though the writing is generally uncomplicated, this is not a book for the nautical novice. For example, the benefits of superheated steam and the problem of dispersion in rounds fired from triple-mount turrets appear without annotation 16,so some familiarity with the subject will be helpful. Warships After Washington will likely be best appreciated by naval enthusiasts. For the knowledgeable reader this work will be a helpful reference to the evolution of naval technology during the heyday of disarmament diplomacy. Jordan draws together summaries of the basic characteristics of the warship classes most affected by the Washington Treaty. Otherwise, the necessarily multilingual reader would be forced to scout widely in the literature for the same information. The first four chapters of Warships After Washington provide the background to the later discussion of s naval developments. The first chapter sketches a history of the naval status of each of the victorious powers, in most cases from the s to The second chapter examines a few important postwar developments relative to established warship classes, and the third lays out the conference program. A short fourth chapter assesses the winners and losers. The discussion of the disarmament conference itself is cursory, and a serious study should begin elsewhere e. However, the latter have often been dismissive of the constraints of the treaty, and have generally had a narrow focus on a particular navy. Trying to describe all the major warships built by five nations during the s in a single volume is a challenge. Jordan generally limits his descriptions to the major weapons carried, general engineering layouts, and armor installations with the level of detail restricted to bore size and caliber of weapons and similar details. He does not discuss emerging technologies such as communications, antisubmarine sensors, or the composition of air wings. As Jordan notes, many studies in this field focus narrowly on a single warship type from a single navy. In contrast, Warships After Washington compares the development warships of the same type, not only within a single navy, but between navies. Comparisons are aided by abundant use of tables, photographs, and some sixty Warships After Washington: The Development of the Five Major Fleets 1922-1930 drawings that show the general layout of major weapons and engineering spaces for battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, and a similar level of detail for aircraft carriers and submarines. One minor aggravation is the unit conversion table. So, the English and U. French and Italians measurements are given in millimeters and the Japanese in centimeters. Two classes are shown with dimensions in feet followed, parenthetically, by their metric equivalents. The other two classes in the table have dimensions given in millimeters without the parenthetical annotation. Displacement is given in tons tW in all cases without indicating whether these are English or metric tons. Appendices contain the texts of the Washington Treaty and the London Treaty. Jordan has carefully mined the secondary literature, and a bibliography is also included. Probably the least developed part of the book is the index. This is little more than a list of warship names sorted by type. No effort is made to sort by nation or characteristics or by other key words. Jordan has performed a very helpful service in compiling Warships After Washington. It will be a useful reference and an accessible entry point to anyone interested in warship development during the s. Larry A. Your email address will not be published. Save my name, Warships After Washington: The Development of the Five Major Fleets 1922- 1930, and website in this browser for the next time I comment. Reviewed by Larry A. Grant Warships After Washington: The Development of the Five Major Fleets tells the story of the impact of the Washington Naval Treaty of on warship construction as the victorious nations tried to modernize their navies while facing financial strain, national exhaustion, strategic necessity and strategic ambition. Leave Comment Cancel reply Your email address will not be published. Washington Naval Treaty - Wikipedia

The Washington Naval Treatyalso known as the Five-Power Treatywas a treaty signed during among the major nations that had won World War Iwhich agreed to prevent an arms race by limiting naval construction. It limited the construction of battleshipsbattlecruisers and aircraft carriers by the signatories. The numbers of other categories of warships, including cruisersdestroyers and submarineswere not limited by the treaty, but those ships were limited to 10, tons displacement each. The treaty was concluded on February 6, Ratifications of that treaty were exchanged in Washington on August 17,and it was registered in the League of Nations Treaty Series on April 16, Later naval arms limitation conferences sought additional limitations of Warships After Washington: The Development of the Five Major Fleets 1922-1930 building. By the mids, Japan and Italy renounced the treaties, while Germany renounced the Treaty of Versailles which had limited its navy. Naval arms limitation became increasingly difficult for the other signatories. Immediately after World War I, Britain still had the world's largest and most powerful navy, followed by the United States and more distantly by Japan, France and Italy. The allies had differing opinions concerning the final disposition of the German fleet, with the French and Italians wanting the German fleet divided between the victorious powers and the Americans and British wanting the ships destroyed. These negotiations became mostly moot when the German crews scuttled most of their ships. News of the scuttling angered the French and Italians, with the French particularly unimpressed with British explanations that their fleet guarding the Germans had been away on exercises at the time. Nevertheless, the British joined their allies in condemning the German actions and no credible evidence emerged to suggest that the British had collaborated actively with the Germans with respect to the scuttling. The Treaty of Versaillessigned soon after the scuttling of the German High Seas Fleet, imposed strict limits on the size and number of warships that the newly-installed German government was allowed to build and maintain. The US, UK, France, Italy, and Japan had been allied for World War I; but with the German threat seemingly finished, a naval arms race between the erstwhile allies seemed likely for the next few years. In response, the Japanese parliament finally authorized construction of warships to enable the Japanese Navy to attain its goal of an "eight-eight" fleet programmewith eight modern battleships and eight battlecruisers. The Japanese started work on four battleships and four battlecruisers, all much larger and more powerful than those of the classes preceding. The British Naval Estimates planned four battleships and four battlecruisers, with another four battleships to follow the subsequent year. The new arms race was unwelcome to the U. The United States Congress disapproved of Wilson's naval expansion plan, and during the presidential election campaign, politics resumed the non-interventionalism of the prewar era, with little enthusiasm for continued naval expansion. During lateWashington became aware that Britain was planning a conference to discuss the strategic situation Warships After Washington: The Development of the Five Major Fleets 1922-1930 the Pacific and Far East regions. To forestall the conference and satisfy domestic demands for a global disarmament conference, the Harding administration called the Washington Naval Conference during November Hughes provided a dramatic beginning for the conference by stating with resolve: "The way to disarm is to disarm". He subsequently proposed the following:. The proposals for capital ships were largely accepted by the UK delegation, but they were controversial with the British public. It would no longer be possible for Britain to have adequate fleets in the North Seathe Mediterraneanand the Far East simultaneously. That provoked outrage from parts of the Royal Navy. Nevertheless, there was huge demand for the UK to agree. The risk of war with the United Warships After Washington: The Development of the Five Major Fleets 1922-1930 was increasingly regarded as merely theoretical, as there were very few policy differences between the two Anglophone powers. Naval spending was also unpopular in both the UK and its dominions. Furthermore, Britain was implementing major decreases of its budget because of the post—World War I recession. The Japanese delegation was divided. The Japanese envisaged two separate engagements, first with the U. Pacific Fleet and then with the U. Atlantic Fleet. The French delegation initially responded negatively to the idea of reducing its capital ships tonnage totons and demanded , slightly above Japan. In the end, concessions regarding Warships After Washington: The Development of the Five Major Fleets 1922-1930 and submarines helped persuade the French to agree to the limit on capital ships. That was considered a great success by the Italian government, but parity would never actually be attained. There was much discussion about the inclusion or exclusion of individual warships. In particular, the Japanese delegation was keen to retain their newest battleship Mutsuwhich had been funded with great public enthusiasm, including donations from schoolchildren. Hughes proposed to limit secondary ships cruisers and destroyers in the same proportions as capital ships. However, that was unacceptable to both the British and the French. The British counterproposal, in which the British would be entitled totons of cruisers in consideration of its imperial commitments but the United States and Japan onlyandrespectively, proved equally contentious. Thus, the idea of limiting total cruiser tonnage or numbers was rejected entirely. Instead, the British Warships After Washington: The Development of the Five Major Fleets 1922-1930 a qualitative limit of future cruiser construction. The limit proposed, of a 10, ton maximum displacement and 8-inch calibre guns, was intended to allow the British Warships After Washington: The Development of the Five Major Fleets 1922-1930 retain the Hawkins classthen being constructed. That coincided with the USA's requirements for cruisers for Pacific Ocean operations and also with Japanese plans for the Furutaka class. The suggestion was adopted with little debate. A major British demand during the negotiations was the complete abolition of the submarine, which had proved so effective against them in the war. However, that proved impossible, particularly as a result of French opposition; they demanded an allowance of 90, tons of submarines [15] and so the conference ended without an agreement for restricting submarines. Existing fortifications in Singapore, the Philippines, and Hawaii could remain. That was a significant victory for Japan, as newly fortified British or American bases would be a serious problem for the Japanese in the event of any future war. That provision of the treaty essentially guaranteed that Japan would be the dominant power in the Western Pacific Ocean and was crucial in gaining Japanese acceptance of the limits on capital ship construction. The treaty strictly limited both the tonnage and construction of capital ships and aircraft carriers and included limits of the size of individual ships. The treaty also detailed by Chapter II the individual ships to be retained by each navy, including the allowance for the United States to complete two further ships of the Colorado class and for the UK to complete two new ships in accordance with the treaty limits. Chapter II, part 2, detailed what was to be done to render a ship ineffective for military use. In addition to sinking or scrapping, a Warships After Washington: The Development of the Five Major Fleets 1922-1930 number of ships could be converted as target ships or training vessels if their armament, armour and other combat-essential parts were removed completely. Some could also be converted into aircraft carriers. Part 3, Section II specified the ships to be scrapped to comply with the treaty and when the remaining ships could be replaced. In all, the United States had to scrap 30 existing or planned capital ships, Britain 23 and Japan The treaty marked the end of a long period of increases of battleship construction. Many ships then being constructed were scrapped or converted into aircraft carriers. Treaty limits were respected and then extended by the London Naval Treaty of It was not until the mids that navies began to build battleships once again, and power and size of new battleships began to increase once again. The Second London Naval Treaty of sought to extend the Washington Treaty limits untilbut in the absence of Japan or Italy, it was largely ineffective. There were fewer effects on cruiser building. While the treaty specified 10, tons and 8-inch guns as the maximum size of a cruiser, that was also Warships After Washington: The Development of the Five Major Fleets 1922-1930 minimum size cruiser that any navy was willing to build. The treaty began a building competition of 8-inch, 10, ton " treaty cruisers ", which gave further cause for concern. Unofficial effects of the treaty included the end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. It was not part of the Washington Treaty in any way, but the American delegates had made it clear they would not agree to the treaty unless the UK ended its alliance with the Japanese. Inthe French Navy laid down the battleship Richelieu ; combined with the two Dunkerque -class battleships also under construction, this placed the total tonnage over the 70,ton limit on new French battleships until the expiration of the treaty. The keel laying of Jean Bart in Decemberalbeit less than three weeks before the treaty expired, increased the magnitude of France's violation by another 35, tons. The French government dismissed British objections to the violations by pointing out that Britain had signed the Anglo-German Naval Agreement inunilaterally dismantling the naval disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. German naval rearmament threatened France, and according to the French perspective, if Britain freely violated treaty obligations, France would similarly not be constrained. The Italian Navy nevertheless misrepresented the displacement of the vessels as being within the limits imposed by the treaty. The naval treaty had a profound effect on the Japanese. With superior American and British industrial power, a long war would very likely end in a Japanese defeat. Thus, gaining strategic parity was not economically possible. Many Japanese considered the ratio of ships as another snub by the West, though it can be argued that the Japanese had a greater force concentration than the U. Navy or the Royal Navy. It also contributed to controversy in high ranks of the Imperial Japanese Navy between the Treaty Faction officers and their Fleet Faction opponents, who were also allied with the ultranationalists of the Japanese army and Warships After Washington: The Development of the Five Major Fleets 1922-1930 parts of the Warships After Washington: The Development of the Five Major Fleets 1922-1930 government. For the Treaty Faction, the treaty was one of the factors that contributed to the deterioration of the relationship between the United States and Japanese governments. Some have also argued that the treaty was one major factor in prompting Japanese expansionism by the Fleet Faction during the early s. The perception of unfairness resulted in Japan's renunciation of the Second London Naval Treaty in Isoroku Yamamotowho later masterminded the attack of Pearl Harborargued that Japan should remain in the treaty. His opinion was more complex, however, in that he believed the United States could outproduce Japan by a greater factor than the ratio because of the huge US production advantage of which he had expert knowledge, since he had served with the Japanese embassy in Washington. After the signing of the treaty, he commented, "Anyone who has seen the auto factories in Detroit and the oil-fields in Texas knows that Japan lacks the power for a naval race with America. On December 29,the Japanese government gave formal notice that it intended to terminate the treaty. Its provisions remained in force formally until the end of and were not renewed. What was unknown to the participants of the Conference was that the American " Black Chamber " the Cypher Bureau, a US intelligence servicecommanded by Herbert Yardleywas spying on the delegations' communications with their home capitals. In particular, Japanese communications were deciphered thoroughly, and American negotiators were able to get the absolute minimum possible deal that the Japanese had indicated they would ever accept. As it was unpopular with much of the Imperial Japanese Navy and with the increasingly active and important ultranationalist groups, the value that the Japanese government accepted was the cause of much suspicion and accusation among Japanese politicians and naval officers. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Warren G. Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved 6 April Milano: Mondadori. Comparative Studies in Society and History. Washington Naval Treaty, Warships After Washington: The Development of the Five Major Fleets, by John Jordan

Goodreads helps you keep track of books you want to read. Want to Read saving…. Want to Read Currently Reading Read. Other editions. Enlarge cover. Error rating book. Refresh and try again. Open Preview See a Problem? Details if other :. Thanks for telling us about the problem. Return to Book Page. The Warships After Washington: The Development of the Five Major Fleets 1922-1930 Treaty ofdesigned to head off a potentially dangerous arms race between the major naval powers, agreed to legally binding limits on the numbers and sizes of the principal warship types. In doing so, it introduced a new element of constrain into naval architecture and sponsored many ingenious attempts to maximise the power of ships built within hose re The Washington Treaty ofdesigned to head off a potentially dangerous arms race between the major naval powers, agreed to legally binding limits on the numbers and sizes of the principal warship types. In doing so, it introduced a new element of constrain into naval architecture and sponsored many ingenious attempts to maximise the power of ships built within hose restrictions. It effectively banned the construction of new battleships for a decade, but threw greater emphasis on large cruisers. This much is broadly understood by anyone with an interest in warships but both the wider context of the treaty and the detail ramifications of its provisions are little understood. The approach of this book is novel in combining coverage of the political and strategic background of the treaty - and the subsequent London Treaty of - with analysis of exactly how the navies of Warships After Washington: The Development of the Five Major Fleets 1922-1930, the USA, Japan, France and Italy responded, in terms of types of warships they built and the precise characteristics of those designs. This was not just a matter of capital ships, carriers and cruisers, but also influenced the development of super-destroyers and large submarines. Now for the first time warship enthusiasts and historians can understand fully the rationale behind much of inter-war naval procurement. Warships After Washington: The Development of the Five Major Fleets 1922-1930 Washington Treaty was a watershed, and this book provides an important insight into its full significance. Get A Copy. Hardcoverpages. More Details Other Editions 8. Friend Reviews. To see what your friends thought of this book, please sign up. Warships After Washington: The Development of the Five Major Fleets 1922-1930 ask other readers questions about Warships After Washingtonplease sign up. Be the first to ask a question about Warships After Washington. Lists with This Book. This book is not yet featured on Listopia. Community Reviews. Showing Average rating 4. Rating details. More filters. Sort order. Apr 12, Mark rated it really liked it. The Washington Treaty signed in represented the major effort by the victorious powers from the First World Warships After Washington: The Development of the Five Major Fleets 1922-1930 to halt a budding and prospectively expensive naval arms race between them. Ratios and displacement limits were set for all major types of warships, which shaped construction for the rest of the decade. John Jordan's book is an account of how the navies of the five signatories -- the United States, Britain, Japan, France, and Italy -- developed and built warships within the confine The Washington Treaty signed in represented the Warships After Washington: The Development of the Five Major Fleets 1922-1930 effort by the victorious powers from the First World War to halt a budding and prospectively expensive naval arms race between them. John Jordan's book is an account of how the navies of the five signatories -- the United States, Britain, Japan, France, and Italy -- developed and built warships within the confines of these limitations. This requires Jordan to define not just what those limitations were, but the often differing missions each navy set for themselves and how they attempted to develop vessels that would fulfill them, which he does in chapters that examine them by the type of ship, which makes for an effective means of comparing both the missions and the respective design choices. Supplemented by photos and sketches of the warships described, it makes for a useful study of a key period of warship development, one with important ramifications for the Second World War that shortly followed. Warships after Washington is excellent, discussing the design and development of the fleets of the US, Britain, Japan, France and Italy in the context of the Washington Treaty of and the economic and political context of the period. The book effortlessly intertwines the treaty limitations, the goals of the navies and the designs of the ships themselves in a way that seems effortless, but required great skill given the many competing threads of information. The structure of the book is excell Warships after Washington is excellent, discussing the design and development of the fleets of the US, Britain, Japan, France and Italy in the context of the Washington Treaty of and the economic and political context of the period. The structure of the book is excellent, the quality of writing top-drawer, and the diagrams, prepared specifically for the book, help readers visualise the ship design decisions that are the text discusses, while tables present key data in a way that is easily understandable. There is also a very helpful bibliography for further reading, the text of the Washington and first London naval treaties, and descriptive footnotes providing further information and context on a number of points. The editing is of a very high standard, and I think I noticed four slips throughout the entire work, none of which materially impacted the information being presented. Oct 23, Paulo Migliacci rated it really liked it. Very interesting, if that's the sort of thing that interests you. For me, it is. It's also thought-provoking: every arms-limitation treaty I know of had, as an immediate consequence, considerable effort on the part of all signatories to circumvent whatever it was the accord was trying to limit or forbid, in the first place. And thus, something conceived to put an end to a big arms race usually ends up by begetting a dozen small ones. Worthwhile all the same? A tentative Warships After Washington: The Development of the Five Major Fleets 1922-1930, regarding the Washi Very interesting, if that's the sort of thing that interests you. A tentative yes, regarding the Washington Treaty. As for arms control as a whole, I really can't say. Jul 17, Jeff rated it really liked it. A very good, readable description of the Washington Naval Treaty and its effect on the naval development of all its signatories in the s and early s. The book explains each nation's naval concerns and objectives, how the Washington treaty addressed or did not address their respective needs, and eventually how the treaty and its ramifications affected the later naval treaty negotiations in Geneva and London. 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Readers also enjoyed. About John Jordan.