fSF: oss: D~0Vc2."I\ F;kJe< Box f
• F:s. F : os_s ~~ "' ....v t' OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON. D. C. 22 S..ot.eJ>ber 194' / ... l ...... \" I j
..i 1ss C,, r -ace 1lully lhe 11hite rlouse ,.ashington, D. C.
Lica.r lo r ace:
01ould you be goou enoui:h to give the enclosed to the t'resiclentl l "" sure he will
be interested in t ~ i• moot recent report fro~ our Ben ofi ice .
l>incerely, a~ •· ! lliam J . Oonovan Oirector
tt••• lw;fli8 -
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON, 0 . C. 22 September 1944 -A'iiiCTAJCl'EO -
MEMORANDUM .f'OR THE PRl!:SIDENT
I am at t achi ng a copy of r adio telephone communication just r ec;:eived from our Bern office
concerning conditions in Germany . Thi s is an excellent job of r eporting,
and I believe that it wi l l ' be of interest to yo~.
, I
1\'illiam J . Donovan • Direct9r • THIS DOCUMENT IS THE BEST AVAILABLE. EVERY TECHNICAL EFFORT HA S BEEN TAKEN TO [NSURE LECIBILITY.
------..- .. ,.,... __ _
2l.l OFFICIAL DISPATCH Berne !UP.- TO DlfUCTOR, OFl"ICI OF llTRATIGIC SERVICES preeo sharpl y at t a oks peopl e wRfCfdY§!i? oapi t ulute. painted in t ho blaokes Allied ooo:;:;i;;;J. o J t tol'lls. The i etrees thut tho Brit would bring int o t he country woul i sh Mna Amer1oans Tho ,1 be 1noomp:Jr ubl e to ~ ha sufferin Deut s ohe Beobuohter publi ~he g of 191 s a speci al warnin_; t o ~ho i n t he bottom of t hei r hearts i t pi;ople .lb.o t h.i po1ote .. oul(. bo bost to hoi ot a .rhite i'l ag .; out thut oup1 t ulut i on •.oul not . I t i Allies ·.voul maUil <.Ill on :I or thoi r t r1ul as th .3 1.=ocli a tely :i ~art f 1l;ht1n ; for the e Wur 11oulc bo apoil s and the Jr cl \'!orl ~ f OUi.:ht on Germany ' :i bnok. Thi o huv e happcno ha .. 1c ',;he ar g\Hrnent: " Whnt :ould t he July ?.0t h block been l:lUOO many• s free: O.'ll un our HOSf\11? The ·.~o.r ::'or Ger conc;u est -.:oul J hcvo :;t oppeC: . But t bat t l.os f or t h~ epoil.ll 11ould be he new bloody rueing. The Brl ti>J h :.ui · l.mer have ::Jr.r chot' in fro;u ~he ;;eot i oUDs .~ould unu t he Ruu. 1ans .-oulc! be in Berlin. ot . eme.r katlon eoroeio tho heurt of A lino di epute .. tha Roi oh .1oulu mark t he liml ts 0 :·one. Ou tlli:s si e of th(Jt line tho 1· the auvi l1 ~ry Bri t i ~ h .oulu r e oruit tho ·ll'lllY and on tho othor ~· 1 ti ir 9.0 in e the Ruaciuno ·.roul ci .. o tho o Huru(.nio to·Jey the ool <: i or s oro f umo . Juet Dol shevi i ,)ltin:; on t.ile1r o :n ::oil .. i th t he bts ap:llin:;t the i"rien,.& or t.:i1er co f 1c;htln.; t.or:~:ma untry- oo .oul J Germano bo on ei t her s1,:o o!" the Reichti ;.ho ant to ,;et out s t front. i(e ask you p oople of tile ~1ar ::hother you prefer to gion:i1res or 111ei11bors or 5 1'1:,;ht aa Enc;li sh l e t ,,l i n ' :;: .Foreign Laci on t o :;tun in,: Fathorl nnd . The victor & h:ive no pec f irm f or your selves oc to : ivo us - they h:ivo no peaoe th . Tb.:iy .. r e 11ni t eli ;:.Olely by hetre em n i:i t ure .;::.1 t oro or l.ior:n:.:ny . Tho in.1m1oul l uwa or o tll& ..1 t o co:.10 to hl o'.1l'l ..i th euch othe Oernan barricr s•.1hich oep r ·.s ooon a.; t he ar :.te t he:u :fall. Tho onemy pr ocl uimfl osp1 tul)!te that t ho ti el u Germt t hut i f we Our lll col d1er :·1111 be perm1 ttelt to go enti re 1v 1 ~' 1on o a re t o :o over to h C111e . l abor . That i the enemy IUl-1 btt f ed into f oroet.. z ::hot Ge1'l!lun ... etoat would m9u , Genn ' COllllJli BGar s Cl(;a! a 11 ~ ol d i era un· er ~ovi ot n s t brothers unc er .EnG].1sh Co.'U.nan have :my lonGer to f i cht .:ers , Our 111en :;oultl not on the West ·:1oll f or the ooouri t y but German '.1omen :1ould be ui r;:;ini; of the Rei oh bands \'1 trenohes on Ge.rmun :;oil ;,here t he oul
• OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES fSP oss 22 September 1944
Miss Grace Tully The Wbi te House Washington, D. C.
Dear Grace: Will you please hand t he attached memorandum to the President? Thank you. Sincerely,
~. L:u.. William J. Donovan Director
DECLASSIFIED s, '·"·h"-.·1t·· ,,1_ e1A ~ Y 0214~~ ·-~_AR_8_197'4 . ' Ol'l'ICE 01' IJTRATEQIC SllRV1Cll9 WAaKINCJTOH. 0 . C.
22 Sept.e•ber 194'
IIDIORAllDUll FOR THE PRfSlllE?lT
The followiog intelligence has just been r elayed .to us from Caserta:
"2 C-47's , with st~rs on the rudders, landed on Vis Monday evening wl th Russian Yak fighter escort . Tito left in one of theJJ near midnight for put a unknown , ac cord!.">& to inforeation we have received here. Source of information la U. S. Air Co:llil8Dd Vi s . Maj or Alston and Colonel Maxwell, British Arm¥, have checked and verified Tito' s departure."
JJ~ llilliu J , Donovan Director
!Al --
, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES. W ASHINpT O N , 0, C.
22 September 1944
Mi ss Grace Tully The White House il1ashington, D. C. Dear Grace: hould you be kind enough to see t hat t he attached memorandum for the Pres ident i s called to hi s attent ion. · Thank you. Sincerely, ~J.)_ \'i i lliam J. Donovan Director
DECLASSlFlEO ~( {).' By ,,,,.._,o, 'l t .v ,.,f-- _:~~--"-::S--:-- • oo ;;L{e..ffl p,_ s197 4 By J\JB£ D;;to MAR OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON, D. C. 22 September 1944 '
~;c~~: :.~ .. ::~ nf e, ai~CREf a MEMORAi~DUM FOR THE P.RESIDE,N'l' ...... ,CY)...... 7...... ,.~"'~'-'0'.l-. _ _ _ _ i\ MAI< ts l~/4 By ~n \ Date_ ,__ _ I have just received the following message from our Bari vffice and•I hasten t0>relay it t o you ; 11 .1:ihai lovich and the National Committee ask to have t he following message com.1iunicated t o t he Supreme J.1llied Command·. They t-1ropose as foll ows : ( 1) The civil war i n
Yu:;oslavic shou_d cease at on~e . (2) hl l r eorisa1s wi l l ' end. ( _?) To enf orce t hese t .vo ..:oints , i>lli ed of* icer s
1 snould enter i mmediat ely. (.4) J. he r e should be u union
01 t art isans ana 1~ati ona ls under t he Allied command to
fieht t he Germ:lns . ( 5J r.:iy additional ar ms and sup9l ies fur nisned wi ll be for use against tne Ge rma.,s alone . ~ • 11 Jur inf ormation i s t nat t he military p osition oi • .11 i hailovich i n berbia is now hopeless an.i t hat i f an armi stice cannot be m:i.de wi t n t he r'a.rtisans, t he ,lat i onal-
ist s will ,go ahead with guerr i lla warfare i., berbi&. and engage in other occupi ed by t he -1artisans. 11 ·/ / - 2 - You are aware that Reuben illlarkham, OWI representa tive for a time in Bari, 'has written claiming t hat Ame rican ar ms delivered to Tito are being used by t he ?artisans against the Nationalists. Under dat e of 8 September, t his Office sent to you my stat ement of facts and of pol i cy concerning t his matter (ii.ppend. ix L to ,1iemo : " Oi::iS Activiti es i ~ Miha ilovich-Controlled r.re&.s" ) . 11: ill i am J . Donovan :U i r ector r OP'P'ICI!: OF STRATEGIC SERVICES fsF .;;:::; WASHINGTO N, D. C. osS 22 September 1944 Miss Grace Tully The White Bouse Washington, D. C. Dear Grace: Will you please band the attached memorandum to the President? Thank you. Sincerely, William J . Donovan Director / OFFICE 01" STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON, D. C. 22 September 1944 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESlmiT We have just r eceived the following report from our intelligence team in Rumania: "By order Russian Command, all Roumanian planes grotmded a.s of 21st. Following villages taken by the German troops: Bozovici, Anina and Oravita.• JJ~ William J . Donovan Director DECLASSlf'Jtll By Author! t)' M C .IA co7~G1. By t&B! :: to MAR 81974 ftllie&&IFIEo Ol"FICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES UJ.i -77 WASHINGTON, o. c. ~ . 22 September 1944 Miss Grace Tully The White House Washington, D. C. De ar Gr ace : Will you please h and the attached memorandum to the President? Thank you. Sincerely, William J. Donovan Director DECLAS~ tru:o Sy ,.1;,t .·1 i;· or_G.:...l:...:A::i.___ ~~=tl-=------By /JBJ De. ta MAR 8 1974 •• fDlli»ilm;IED OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES / WASH. INGTON,. D. C. 22 September 1944 DICLASSIFrzD By Autbori ty or {!_/A MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT By~ Dato MAR 8 1974 Georgescu, Roumanian Under-Secretary of State for Nat ional Economy, and Buzesti , Roumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, recently relat ed the following concerning Roumanian compliance with armistice terms to our intel ligence represen tatives in Bucharest: "The Roumanian Government now intends to comply with the armistice terms even though the conditions were not properly discussed wit h t he representatives of the Roumanian people. The Roumanians now intend t o carry out all their obligations in a cooperative and willing manner. •s ome of the demands which the Russians have made are unreasonable and are beyond Roumania ' s ability to fulfill. They are now waiting for the Russian representatives to administer the terms of the armistice. They lave been encouraged by dis- .cussions with Marshal Malinovski and they have proof that the Soviet Union aoes not intend to sovietize the country. f IMtiBDsIFIED • "According to Georgescu and Buzesti, 85-95% of the peasant s are opposed t o communism although t here is a fair sprinkling of communists among industrial laborers. They quoted a Russian colonel as having said, ' There are few bona fide Roumanian communis t s but many opportunists'. This statement was made soon after he dropped into Roumani a several months ago. "The ruble is fixed, by Government order, at 100 lei. The Russians will no t give an esti mate of the rubl es involved and they st ate simply that the order will continue to be effective until the end of t his month at least. Wi ld speculat ion goes on, in the mez.ntime, since the ruble goes for as l ittle . as 6 l ei in the countryside. The governme~t may lose billions of lei at this r at e, especially if the order remains in effect for any great length of time. '· "The Roumanian armistice delegates are certain that Bungary will be most severely treated by the Russians. They think t here i s still a loophole, however, permi t ting a port ion of Transylvania to go to the Hungarians for purposes of Bargaining. DE~IFIED ) ------D"'1'6lti1IFIED1 - 3 - "Arrests of the war guilty are going on apace and men of cabinet rank are included. Two were at one time prime ministers of the country. The law, which i s called ' The law regarding purification of public departments', has t he signature of King Mi chael. Malinovski indicated his approval when it was discussed with him. The Rouman ians are hoping these stern measures will impress the Rus sians.• Ylilliam J. Donovan Director OFFICE OF STRATEGIC 81!R VIC IE8 WAaHINOTON, D, C. /5F - oss li8@R I!; * . ~~ tliss Crace Tully • The White House W~shington, Dr C. Dear Grace: r believe the attached. report of a talk with Neubacher' a agont will be of interest to the President. Will you ple94e see that it reaches his desk? :hank you. Sincerely, IS~ . lillilllll J . Donovan Director DECLASSIP'IiD /J' A s1 AutborttJ o r_:\.:..=~- •r r ' ~~974 81S@REJ: -.., ~ L / O FFICE OF ~ATEG IC SERVIC&S WASHI NGTON , D, e. • / 22 liept.e=ber l9U SECAHT ·., e have received the follo,,ing report of a recent discussion had by a representat ive oj tnis uaency witn an •"•nt of ,/eubacher, Ribbentrop' s Pol!tlcnl and Dlplolllatic !lcpresentat1ve in the 5alka.os. !ne agent •IS not infoI'llled i.1& t.o t.he size ;.)f the grou., •hicn Ne:ibacher repre&ents. Tne report of t.!le t.all •iln ,,eubacner' s agent. "u. lieubacher want.a t.o d \ scusa tot.al tieraan sur renoer, but ·~ates t ne diffic•llty ot tin:ling a comiJ"tent r ra.up of liberals •itnin t..er.amy to discuss the matter •ith the i.llies and to carr, on ndminietrative functions wui~n t h• i.11 ies ·•ou1n assil!Jl. "B. de desires '-)lied t roops to be in readiness for occupation immed iately upon nurrender . "C. He claims that tlunpary is in danger ol an ;,ternal 61iilllif - 2 - wili@REt explosion wUh anar<:lzy ser iously threatonlng. •o. llort.bem Jugoslavia ii being held only t.o / postpone this explosion which would start trouble wit.bill C.Mlany. •E. There is great inl.eN11t in prevQnting anardzy in a I'tlgion fro~ where it mi£)1t spread t.o ce.... any . •f. !n an effort to hold the Sava line fr°" the east to the west and the Hungarian lines formed by rivers runnine south to the Danuoo , the Cermans are bringing troops fro~ Creece by highway at night throueh ~Qede rovo and IHs. ' G. All Nor t hernJugoslavi• beine evacuated by the Cestopo. ' It is the belief of our representative that if non Sovlot troops held Trieste or Fiu:se t.o the Belgrade line, the Ger- UIS • ould allow lillied entry, and that the only l.opEdiment t.o t.otal surrender is the fear of t.'1e C.naor:r I.hat the Allies will permit a state of chaos t.o exist in deraany over an extended period of time. !)~ ·~Uli am J. Donovan Director St!@REJ i!el!i a OFFICE OF llTRATl:GIC 1£/IVICIUI WAaHJNO'rOH. D, C. 2J S.pt.eaber 191?.})').s lliss Cr ace Tully \ '!'be lhi t.e Bouse W&!lhington , D. C. Dear Crace: I thiok the President will be interested in the attached memorandum . Will you please Gee that it reaches desk. Thank you. Sincerely, 'l'ill iam J . Donovan Direct or orct.,,,ssr,rzn 87 Au thn: t 1 ,.,r C,IA D07G,&;:) 81 itJ& '••• MAR 81974 J!@ftif ' Aa indicated by t he following cooaage fr°" our Bari office we now have teams in Ctecboslovakia: •oss Secret Intel ligence 11J1d Special Opera t i ons personnel were 1"1lded by pla.ne in Czecho slovaki a on September 17. 'o\'e hBve nlready had word fro~ both teams by radio '"1d everything is all r i.81lt. The operatioo included as •ell t he landing or 120 llarl ins and 8.4 , 000 rounds of """'1- DHi oo, 12 Bazookas with 16 roWlda each. The 15th Air Force fle• the teams in 8-l?' s during the day, escorted by fighters. Czech forces of the int erior prepared t he reception tmd arrl!Jl8e=enta were ~ade through OSS Secret Int elligence, London in collabo r ation wit h t he Czech int elligence service. On the return t r ip, the pl anes brought out 2 Britiflh ex pr isoncrs and lJ Americans. ' tU'J.4. 17 4Ul.bQr: lJ ff_ 7t 813Cit£ I a • THE WHITE HOUll WASH I NGTON Sopteaber ~' ' 1944. F. D. R, , fsr·~~ ~ / ' ~· ·>'I' O~~~~c '~~VICES WMHINGTON, O. C. a septaber 1944 M111 Graoo Tully Tb• Whit e Bouae W11h1n&ton, D. C. M7 dear iU.11 Tull7s Wo uld you 't>e aood enou.gb to place the attacbecl betore the President. I aa sure he wlll t1nd it ot interest. Thank you. (}""4- s . ~ Cbarle1 8 . Chtaton .lctin.1 Director : 1 .. t.All!Ftn ~, AU \~Ot 1 tJ or _ _ ___ Cl9 M!et..ST t --.··., •· ' OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASH INGT O N , D , C. 8 Sep~ember 1944 MEMORANDUM FOR TRE • PRESIDENT SUBJF.CT: OSS Activities in Mihailovich-Controlled Areas We relayed to General Donovan your instructions of Sept ember 3. He. asks that you be informed that word has been dispatched to the field to carry out your orders. Your instruction t o withdraw our "missi on " to Mihailovich has been interpreted to include not only the f~ur OSS individuals in that area whose function it has been to obtain strategic and technical intelligence and to i nfiltrate t eams into Central Europe , but also to include the ~our OSS men who, at the request , of the • 15th Air Force, were assigned to the command and opera- • t ional cpntrol of the Air Force's Air Crew Rescue Unit in Mihailovich territory. The British objection to our activities comes at a time when t hey t hemselves feel free to drop per sonnel into Chetnik areas. There have just come t o our attention two State Department dispatches, dated 31 August and 2 September f rom Caserta (Appendix A), which • show that Brigadier MacLean , head of the British Mission DICLAssrrrn 87 Autbor i t y of _____ C.1 ft '°""'' , . - 2 - to Tito, went into the Mihailovich area a few days ago and is sending out intelligence reports.* In the case of Rumania also , the British sent in teams at a time when they had de layed our presence there by diplomatic representations. While such inconsistent action by the British is undoubtedly the result of bad coordination, it demonstrates the advisa bility of independence in the field of intelligence where a change of mind on the part of the objecti ng party alone may give that party a monopoly of first-hand information. The personnel assigned to the Air Crew Rescue Unit were requested by the Air Force because of their peculiar knowledge of t he country, the language and secret signal equipment. They had already succeeded in evacuat ing over 200 airmen from Chetnik country and were maintaining a continuous search for others who had been downed. In Gr eece and Rumania we are doing similar work and have been instrumental in the evacuation of nearly 1,000 airmen from the latter country within the last few weeks. * Brigadier MacLean was formerly a Foreign Office representative j ,· . - J - We believe that if Gener al Donovan were here he would desire to stress that nothill8 has been done with out agreement of the British, and to give.. you the facts concernill8 hi s talk with Marshall Tit o about this matter. At a meeting on August 11 with Ti to, Gener al Donovan i nformed him through Brigadier MacLean (who was present) of the dispatch of an OSS rescue and intelli gence team to Mihailovich. At that time Tito nodded his head and voiced no objection , although he said that the men might not have such a good time with Mihailovich and suggest ed that their names be g iven to him so that he could advise his troops to protect them in the event of trouble. General Donovan had earlier discussed with Sir Alexander Cadogan the right of every s overeign nation to have completely independent secret intelli gence operations. Sir Alexander agreed with this prin ciple and raised no object ion when informed that OSS contemplated dispatch of intelligence \Dlits to various parts of the Balkans. Last J\Dle, General Wilson told General Donovan that no intelligence was being received from the Chetnik T ,....._T - 4 - area and that it was urgently needed by the Allies. Be not only agreed with the basic principle of independent American secret intelligence operations and appr oved General Donovan ' s proposal to dispatch an intelligence team to the Chetnik.s but urged that thi s be done. General Donovan wrote you of this talk on July f ourth and on the sixth of July discussed the matter wi th you in per son. On that same day, he cabled the f iel d of your approval to send an OSS intell igence un i t into the Mihailovich area. Shortly t hereafter, efforts were made to para chute OSS personnel assigned to the Air Crew Rescue Unit. On the night of 2 August , one officer and two errlisted men were successfully dropped to make arrangements for the evacuation of the airmen y;i th Mihailovich. On 3 August, the Joint Chiefs of St aff were informed of General Donovan ' s talks with General Wilson and of OSS plans to send teams into the Balkans (an earlier memorandum to the JCS on this subject had been returned by its secretariat to be revised and expanded) . The .3 August memorandum recit ed your oral approval and GEneral Donovan ' s directions to the f ield for the dispatch of .li .f - 5 - teams into Yugoslavia and other Balkan countries (Appendix B) . On the fifth of August (three days after the air rescue personnel had been dropped under the directions issued at the time of your earlier oral approval) a White Bouse memorandum was received containing written withdrawal of· your April objection with the request t hat t he matt er be cleared with the State Department and the J CS. The State Department was called immediately and informed us that their previous clearance still stood. The memorandum from the White House was shown to a member of the JCS secretariat, who was also told of the prior dispatch of the rescue team.* Meanwhile, the rescue team had completed its arrangements and on the t enth and eleventh of August more than 200 airmen were flown out. The l ast reports we have indicate that a considerable number of wounded airmen still r emained. Indications of increasing Al lied ground and air activity in Yugoslavia underline the necessity for indepen dent American intelligence of all kinds from this * At this time it was thought in Wash ington that the air crew r escue personnel were under direct OSS control, and it was not until l ater t hat copies of the official orders were forwarded to Washington informing us that this personnel had been transferred to the command and operational control of the 15th Air Force Air Crew Rescue Unit. ~ J.i - 6 - - area, which is still the only accurate source of infor mat ion on the highly equivocal .question of alleged Chetnik collaboration with the Germans. This territory is also of real importance at this particular time be cause of its strategic situation as a j umping-off place for projecting int elligence teams into Germany, Austria , and other parts of Centr al Europe , and for co\lllter sub- versive action against German underground movement s. In fact, an intelligence team had already been dispatched into Austria from there; others had been planned. Attention is respectfully directed to Ambas sador Murphy' s letter of July 1, 1944 to the Secretary of Stat e with encl osures (Appenciix C) . The Ambassador's l etter indicates his hope that American personnel to be used in Chetnik areas for air rescue purposes might also · rovide intelligence of a military or general character. The enclosed memorandum to Ambassador Murphy from bis '· Special Assistant, Mr. Frederick T. Merrill, on this subject, contains two paragra!hs we believe to be worth quoting : "Our policy is to give support to anyone willing to kill Germans - a corollary might be - or forward the war effort. The eX'Oeditious re- covery of these ai rmen is cert ainl y forwardi~ I I - 7 - the war effort. lloNOver, although we will to &oa:e ext ent be •recognizin&' llihailovich by t.he necessity of h4vin8 to ask his coopera tion , we will not be aiding him in any material way. " ' l conclude - aDd tlorden concurs - the livea of A.llerican ainoen and U-.e military ad vantage gained by their recovery overrides any objection the British might have on political grounds. 11 The State Department has never objected to having an intelligence \Olit with ll!ha ilovich and , indeed , is arud ouo for information from that area. In a paral lel case, that of Greece , where the Bri tisb bad ordered wi thdrawal of our personnel without previous notice to us , the State Department' s only concern was that n have personnel with Zervas ae well as tAIVELAS in order to avoid political implications which might arise f rom the presence oi pereoMol with one gl"OU!J and not with the other. in accordance with the mandate imposed upon us by the JCS, every effort baa been "ad• by OSS in its activities in the Balltana to avoid political involve ment. The attached message fro~ General Donovan , re viewing our position vie-a-vis both Tito and lllhailovicb , I i&l!&T ...... ' - 8 - demonstrates that scrupulous care has been taken to avoid commitments that may in any way be misinterpreted (Appendix D) . In conclusion, we have been asked t by General Donovan to state that if you wish to have us continue the assignment of our personnel to t he 15th Air Force for the rescue of American airmen in Mihailovich terri- / t ory, he would appreciate word to that effect. Respectfully subnit ted, G, "' 4 UT!! Caserta September 5, 1944 August lll, 19'4 (YugoslaYia: Chetnik'• are • 1d.1n& enecy) M.acLe~n went 1.nto the K1hn.J_tovlc ar ea a rew days a.go and be now reports to AP'HQ that the Chetn.1kl are 8.iding the Gere.ans a ctivel y and &fie keepi ng tb.e Pa rt1s11n1 from aak-1ng th.a ims t Ju1t now out or the German contusion. It ie entirel y PoSft ible t hat the mili tary gain which the Alli es shoUld make rroia the fal l or Bulga.rte 'Alll be lost. the- c 1:tillal'\S do not underseo.nd very c l early • httt ts involved and some of' them a r e hJ.ndorlng operations, und er the 1~prass 1 on tha t the Chetniks have Al lied supp0rt. Brt.eadier .YacLean 11 or the op11\ion that an Allied source should a.y somethlng otticl.al on t.h.11 subject. Be suggests that Gener.J. Wi lson make t he statement. ""'cLean hlls wired a proposed text of th1a to AFBQ which he assert• l s har mless, saying to more than other ottl cia\ dect a r~ tlons h..ivo said. I t mnkes clear th.at so.::.~ o r the Chetnik groups h:i.ve been aiding actively the Ned.ic and German units who ar e seeking to disarm t he Bulgarians. The Chotnik! have even n l~ed t ho enelll;( in their 8ssault1 on the JAHL . The Nazis recei ve benerl t troo th1a. Th• JANL 11 the only rorct i n Yugosl.1•14 '-'hlch J.1 supported by the illled. and those troops or guer i llas Who &ld t he ene ~ wi l l receive no Alll od a id in any • hape or torm. The 8r1(5.ad.1er want s t?Us St3tement publi shed at once. He APPENDIX A (PAGE 2) by certain t~s i t shou1d be put on the air in Serbo-Croatian radi o stati ons and that it should be dropped in leaflet f orm. on The same leafl ets can be distribut ed al so through the cooperati or the Partisans and the Bri t ish Li a ison group. At the close or his r eport MacLean says that Tito i s winning over more and mor e of the Chetnik rank and fil e. MORPHY • r JJ>Pli.NDIX A (PAGE 3) Caserta PW September 6, 1944 Sept ember 2.., 1944 (Yugoslavia: Bulgaria military s ection) Brigadie'r ltacLean has sent word t o SAC that i n ltlhailovi c ' s area where he wus dropped a few days ago Bulgariun forces are provi ding t he Germans with valuable assistance by ma1ntaiflln8 themselves along the chief collllllln1cat i on l i nes and resisting acti vel y the efforts of the Partisans to r each and cut these lines . The motive of t he Bulgarians doubtless is to protect their own avenues of r etreat to their fronti ers, but by this a ction the Germ:ins are securi ng preci ous time for stabilizing t heir positiors. MacLea n•s message then proposes that pr ior to the making of any agr eement wi th the Ar mistice Mi ssi on from Bulgaria, which at pres ent is in Cai ro, that M:lssion shoul d agree to see t hat i n structi ons are sent at once to the Bulgari an forces 1n Serbi a and llacedonJ..a, pending thei r. withdrawal, ei ther to begin to cooperate with the Partisans or i n any case t o c£fer no hindrance to the latter' s operati ons, as t hese a re rega rded by the Alli es as highl y important and formtne part of the current concerted plan. The message ends by:stati ng t hat while i t i s obviously not 1n the Par t i sans ' interests to have the Bulga rians remain on Yugoslav soil, the Pa rtisans a re obliged to r egard them as out right enemies as l ong as they behave us such. It 1116.Y be noted t twt MacLean has wired to General Gammell of AFB~ word thilt he has been i n t ouch with General Popovi c and t hat Popovic has undertaken to destroy the Kralj evo-SkoplJe, . ,• J..PPENDIX A (Px GE 4) Nish-Sofia, and Nish-SlroplJe railroads i n connecti on with the forthcoming offensives. OFF IE DECLASSIFIED st-.t"a. .!>ept . It<., urr,-NNt> , l>-1-?_3. .. APPEIDIX B OFFICE O F STRATEGIC SERVICE S W ASH IN OTON , 0. C. 3 Auguet Hl44 MEt.!ORANDUM OF INFORMATION FOR THE JOINT U. S. CHI1'::FS OF bTAFF SUBJECT : Di spatch of intelli gence and air search teams into Balkan countries • REFErlENCES : ( a) Memorandum to JCS from OSS dated 12 July 1944 rela ting to OSS d ispatch of intelligence team into Rumania (b) JCS 714 (c) Memorandum from Secretary, JCS to OSS dated 8 Apri l 1944, relating to representati ve with Mihailovich 1 . By Reference (a) informati on wus given to the J o i nt Chiefs of Staff concerning conversation with General Si r Henry Maitland Vli lson on 23 June 1944. Gener«l Wi lson stated that the Office of Strategic Services was right i n i t s positi on with reference to di spa tch of cl andestine agents for the purpose . of obtaining intel l i gence. He said we were enti tled (~were t he British) t o undertake to dispatch such teams to Balkan areas without consultation with anyone . The British had not only sent a team i nto RurJ1C.nia (from which we had been temporari l y barred by diplomatic act ion of the British) but intended to send an i nt ell i gence t eam i nto t he M:iha ilovich area. General Wilson also t hought we should a i d him in search for American pil ot s known to be i n that a rea. 2 . While control of t his orga nization's int el ligence und mora l e subversion operations rests only in the United States DI CLASSIFIID By Au t hori t y or____ _ Ctlt oo"rz sr.-S/1- ,, ,.~ APR 211975 .. . , APPENDIX B (PAO! 2) Command ing Oene ral (JCS 714) , the statements of General Wilson Gt. r e pertinent because it was through British representat i ons t hat our ea rlier efforts to send teams i nto t hese areas were delayed or prevent ed . 3. Upon 11\Y return to this country I i nformed t he Pr esident of these conver sations. The President orally with drew his ear l ier directive ag&.inst sendi ng tee.ms to the Mihai lovi ch ~rea , Reference (c), and ga ve me his oral approval to send intelli gence and air se&. rch t eams i nto this area. 4. The Uni ted St utes Co mmand ing Oener~l i n the Ue dl terranean The~ter of Oper~ t ions , Oener~l Jacob L. Deve rs, hus approved the disputch of i ntel l i Bence teams i nto the Balkan countries. I have therefore di rected that teams be sent into Ruw1nia, Jugoslavia and other Balkan countries for clandestine intelligence a nd air r escue purposes . This does not, of course, apply to our operati ons activities, or commtnicati ons concerning t hem; we shall, as in the past , c ontinue t o coordinate these activ'it i es wi th t he Brit i sh under control of the Tbe.. ter Commander. l'• i lli a m J . Donovan Director APPElfDIX C •MP I , , . ' ... _i.... _,...., ,,,_ ... ) ...... 8t.r1 ..... -I -,_- "· ,.... ,...... -~ ,.. _. e ._ •.•._, e -,~ii~=...,: -· .... ""'· ...... • u...... - :• - •-•... ff - J $ • I ,_ llllMA ...... =· . le .. llfl1 - tt, t .... S. .... I ,._ I alee ...... _ flt• rt· ,_ ... ,,....,. f, ....,.U, ..... ,_., ...... -.. -- .... .,.... ' .. .,. ____...... - _._... -.-...... ,., ...... - ..... _ ...... &Me...... -.u...... - _...... _.,_-...... _._ .. __ ...... 2 ... _.'-',...... " ..-.. .. ··= ... _.... "' ,,..., . -· ··-...... --·.,, ..... -- -'"' -_...... -. ...... ' r ' . 1• ' • -·- APPEiDIX C (PAO l $ 1 Ml ,)" 0.,.. el ...... , ... 11, 1'66, ,,_ ._,_ ca.eftl •· r. 111r1a111s. 0 ..... a.-i, lM.. ""'6, ,. ,. ,, ..... a. • ..i. 111/lllO. v.. a.,, fll -.. • ..... ,_ .,, 1966, r ... llr. Pi lnta T. llNftU te ....., .... ·-· D. l'u"lllr• \ f-' 911» - 1 2 M 2 usts DC ., "'D• le trte!!rM • • 698 ' ' " APPENDIX C 3) c • y i.i. o ~ ".u r. Ho. l \- o O.ef4\0)' a&o. "°• ..... ~le - - ~- _ .,~ •• r ... t•• : cl\.-1 ::> \e "" ~ J·o1tc.1.ai .....u.r. AJ. ·. l•.: l o re• !-••1 t• ttr"- r•• I l. A Cf..Df•nnce •• be ld at \~e ...qtm ... N l> 1-.... P'• Jc.ra Gr.••ood aod •ir.eal•••• !Ao ..,. M09ll tllle la.t. llf'tll.. elf ' . t '\,. 6r1 t tah 1. t 111• t~o to M enOWltefl JO Mar tma tM --~ _.. rl t.ory. Tb.. • two ot!1t •n h4 Ille•• la ..rble t• _.. a ,_, ... .. wre wll-tnroa..4 oD acatttt6M tali.; tM tcallariail fMte ... b"°"lt)t out la t ti• ooat.N>•• 1 •• Tbt t atlre ...... 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':«.\lld t a r.~utred. Two ottto.r1, t.brM f'9UO OfllR.... (ai. traSoe4 II. o1yb•re }, d4 '"° 1-od t~ arc~ M>!)~. 1'llle IOfi 1 1 tlo ~ ab0u14 bot •~t1,.lr .c.o•rol lt l ..l. 6. ?be ~r\7 • ltL all m•-.u, .,...,_, ,...... ,.iu. tw lei• t l•l operat.1011 ao.1l•I b9 d9lt••N4 'o Kt-..1io1tu•a t· ,..,..... wlt~ ou o-&,. 111 •441\lon t o parOOMJ .,.,.,_.,,tun'""·-"•• '1"•11, • ._ ud ..-alUon, tao tollOOflac oqool,._\ -it lie _..._., ~ ra4lu •••• - l9BI 1 fl- •Ato °"11• (a.,.U.U. •' -··' I I eplift ..,. ut tu.Mee 1 -n111 Tia" _ ..,. 1... u ..111. -' -•· 'I l • '11 a..... \or luaUallla et -·· I ._, lletl•rl• (aftllalll.- a\ -1. J· I ·- tit .,..oll» foi" ...... ,.. s .. 6'6 ...... __ .. ., ••, •• '• Ila.Jon 0.-..- an4 Oro HJ- oaa ·~ a ..,.le\A U.\ fl TalMbl• aoa... "' l• \• .,.... •· l'llh ,i.u - ...... -,i.w --ot -· ,...._. larl7 •• • .....it ot ow:e-a\U. ..,._,,_Ill' _. - "'Lt. OolOMI fula trl\ll ..... a ""or.n- .... l>alt lf '-•. •· !'!ah plu oloo bu .....,ha4 ..,_...._flt W, Air o,a, ... Pore. 16' ... ·~· Poree. , . l.D. l\ h l>ollo.-.4 \Ila\ - • a pU., ,....,U, ,., .... _._ !Ir * rtn.ootll Air ro,.,. -.Id i-..u --"• « ,...,..,.., .U 1lt- Alr Joroe s-ro-1 r•- "- le ..., .._ ... dJ 0 . ierrtte17. • II • r• l'I~.Lll'l' Ma Jor 0...ral • \Mill, 0-1... .. , I APNID~ 5) iill -,. -~ ... I .. .._... •• llft .... Jlla, lo • 19<4, ,_.... "'° llal - ...... h l US-1 .__, C... r ~r a. "- • ~ ;•rt.n . '-·'°· l9Mo ' Ia aMUl • w •be pela\e oi.aon ..4 lo -1'&1 tlllaS.la'• le \o a.....i ....,,., u. t olloftac •4fl• l4',.,,_. .... 1111• > a ' ia .... • .,..\lOM wltll otn.een of , .. •tt""9~ e.M •h- .. llrt.\.&a _,._, • a...... o.r-.i.... i. ..,. •••laW _, or tftlalac ,., "' .,... -- Le a_,,, ~· =• fl« att«,__ U.111- ___Ml.lane la e..- .,._.__.a-_•U.. m ..... - • - ,. '"' -· fl« _,.... •••'- ...... l .. ~ - ,.,,,_a.ii-...... ~ ..., ...... 1 1 o=•• ~ .- ,. .. - • ,.._ w111• .._. -•.-i, ...,..._ ,_ a u- a. .. . 0 ts -- - -- ... W1-- ._~ _..., , es-. n.-.-.. --:.e-2 - .... - la '""'" '"""""' •• ""-- - Ii'-- a. ... I hl, 116 -, ar ..,_. - - I AhJ fl ...... gj Um -..u- ... - = n .... ';I . • • "'!"'4·--...... • - ., _, :" ...... - ...... • • a ._ . ,. _..__ .,.._._ --·· • iv 2 -a..,_.,,. ---·-...... , r ...... ••a_ ..... f1 - ...... t H• .... ' ' • ..... " ... . ·r .. .. ) • •• • ~ ~ '• OU ,.ia.r .... Clft 4 A I e .. •-· - • ,_,, a .._ • ••fa :=-:' ·--W7fl,...... ~ •·--· 111--... .. •W •1 ne •111111• et w ._we 1 • Illa ••&111 • Mk "• aec;watla. w le •P •terllll ....,, · • • lt ...... ~ ...... $]$ ..., ...... •'-••• 1111-U ...... , .....,. 111•11a ,. ' • 698 [ -. r ·. . OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON, D. C. APPENDIX D M~S~AGE FROM GENE&U. DONOVnN , DnTE.U l SEPTEllBER 1944: . "It i s very difficult Yugoslavia to reduce the situation in to simple terms but, in general the same as between Tito , the situati on r emai ns and Mihailovich as it has al ways been." "To both Tito and JU..hai lovi ch we have made posit ion: (l) that we have established clear our no promise of any mission with Tito with kind us to arms , equipment or supplies; We have made clear that we will (2) i nt ernal political not support either side in strife although the f act of deli ·rpry by Briti sh i n which our suppli e of suppl i es construed s to British were inCluded may be as reputation of this and t hat consti tutes ~t i n f act such a cti on erial and politi cal support; (3) Thut we ~o litical f avors t o seek and no h'.!.ve no ( 4) That we political commitments to make; have established mission with Tit effectively to colla o i n order ~re borate with our al l i es; ( 5) That our i n being in this area i s to use i t purpos e bet ter proj as a base from which we may ect our intelligence tea ms i nto Cent particul4rly into Germany; r al Europe and mom w (6) That we hb.ve establi shed no ith Mihailovi ch but that we have placed mission and int.elligence there joint search parties tea ms for purpose of seeking, a ef fecti ng rescue of Amer i c ssemblying and with an pilots and crewmen. This in con American Air Command . I t should be junction has ~en most stated t hat M.ihailovi ch ~elpful in this respect; (7) That insof ure concerned the British have ba ar as suppli es i m:ned i ate d (except for two or three months l y following f all cf Si ci l y) and cont of suppl i es and t r ansport; inue to have control (8) That f or first year begi nning deli veries of a bout 50 tons a month with have now r eached by progressive increase they in l ast two months deli very of about tons a !IX)nth; (9) That mili tary two thousand Bri tish arms and equipment have been of type although certain percentl:l:ge of selves do not know t hem which British them are made i n U. S . (10) Thilt f ood and suppli es have been about 60 percent clothing delivered to of American origin mostly British on lend lease; (11) That in De cember and ear l y May we delivered addi t i on between i n Cairo t o t he Briti sh from our stores between seven and eight thousand plastic, shoes, clothing tons consisting of sup , t rucks whlch v;ere co-mingled wit plies. I n such allotment were a bout h British guns which have f ifteen hundred Marlin ei ther been delivered to or are set of OSS pat rols in t hat ar ea who have .as i de for use encounters with German patrols. " "Consi deration should al so be given to the I have al ready advi sed you , Subas f act that as i ch is convinced t hat best oni nion DI CLASSIFII D • I ,, Autbori tr or _ ____ - CIA ooW:it7 < °" ~ n ••• APR 211975 .. . . ~ . ~ ··' - 2 - APPENDIXD(PAGE 2) • .in ·serbi a i s for eli mination of this political warfa r e between · two gr oups and for organized attack against Germans ." "To summ3.ri ze: our conduct here ha s been most punc t i l i ous in keepi ng out of any of this political controver pl aying sy, no -any part in whatever confli cti ng purposes t here may be between British and Russi ans and i n avoiding any enta i n r 'i val ry ngl ement between Mihai l ovich and Ti to. I n any case i t lllllst be r emembered that we a r e making use of Yugoslav wor i a a s jump- off for k t hat must be done in coming to' grips with Ger many i Europ.e. V.'i sdom n C entr al of t hc::.t cow-s-e i s now bei ng demonstr ated as appea rs from intell i~ enc e tea ms tha t we have alr eady pla ced or and by means a re placirg, of which \ve wi ll be a ble t o carry on our oper ations. We have done this so far wi thout i ncurring hostilit Tito or y of either Miha i l ovich although ea ch one feel s t hat we should not i n any way be working wi th t he other. However within itself Yugoslavi a an Americun soldi er cun still move without fear of harm in Partisan or Chetnil< territory." - Ol'l'IC£ 01'" sn.ATl!OIC 81!RVICU --- WA&HINQTON, D , C. \A' l-0 25 Sep~r 1946 I believe you will be lntere•ted t o see the attached summary of a report on Greek political affairs, dat ed 18 September 1944. The report was prepared by an o:;s representative who haa been In Calro for t.he last four or f ive ?:lOnt.>is and has recenU,y returned to this country. ·~~ William J. Donovan Director / • I .,.. •• / OFFICE OF STRAT EGIC SERVICES WASH INGTON, D. ¢. Among the Greeks in Cairo there is resentment toward the British for their interference in Greek political affairs. This feeling is s hared by liberal and conservative elements alike, and it is said to have been caused by British action in arresti.ng individuals in Cairo and Alexandria for security reasons without preferring charges, by severe censorship and distortion of news, end by British control over the Gr eek Government . The trials which followed the mutinies of last April resulted in the internment of from six to ten thousand men of the Greek armed forces. Aft er the trial s, the British exercised a political screening over the personnel of the Greek forces and discriminated in favor of suitable individuals in facilitating their escape from Greece. This has resulted in the formation of a body of Greek officers with conservat ive political opinions. As examples of Br itish censorship, press dispatches have been altered to omit comments against Premier Papandreou and remarks in f avor of EAM . Deletions have been made of st atements implying excessive interference by the Brit ish in Greek affairs and there have been distortions in the published accounts of the courts ~artial of the mutineers. r-"LI S<; T!'IED . ··t'nty ,..r.....;;;Q...""1'""A..._ _ _ ...... ' .. ·~ • • / -2- The British have also aroused ant agonism by their treatment of resistance groups, for it is charged that they have consistently supported weak parties against strong ones and set Greeks t o fight ing one another. The author of the report suggests the explanation that the British supported EAM unti l the latter became preoccupied with political ideas r ather than wit h fight ing t he Germans. Thereaft er the British gave their help to anti-German groups; t hese were also anti-E.AM . The British have ma intained an ambiguous attitude toward the Security Battalions, which were equ ip~ed by the Germans ostensibly to f ight Communists, but were used f or other German purposes , such as mak ing arrests and search- ing houses for the Gest apo . It i s stated that the British failed to denounce these battalions openl y until September, 1944 • . The Greeks realize that they must cooperate with the Br itish, and they account for the British course of action on the ground that the British are exerting control in order to maintain a Greek government that is not only st able, but ·favorable to them. The Greeks feel, however , that the Brit ish would do better t o r etain the good will of the Greek people by giving them greater freedom to change their own government , r ather than to control t he situation by supporting an unpopular Greek government. -3- It is stated in the r~port that British and American officials both deplore the British policy, with the exception of the British Embassy to the Greek government. The Russians are popular with EAM, but many Greeks are concerned at the prospect of a Pan-Slavic confederati on dominat ed by Russia. In spite of this fear, Russia' s conduct toward the Greeks has involved less interference in Greek internal affairs than has been exercised by the British. DECLASSIFIED , • -=•11cp OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON, D. (:. 30 September 1944 Miss Grace Tully White House Washington, D. C. Dear Grace: Viill you please hand this attached memorandum to the President. Thank you. Sincerely 13~ William J . Donovan Director --· OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON, D. C. 27 September 1944 DlCLAS S!l"J ED By A utbo~ity of C.,(p.. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT M7/o:2_~ B y~ __D'lt.e MAR 81974 I b el ieve that yo u wi ll f ind of interest the following report describing the second and largest in a series of three daylight air operations whereby supplies were dropped to French resistance groups. i . On 14 July 1944, the 3rd Bombardment Division 8th USAAF delivered 320 aircraft loads of arms and o ther suppl ies to seven Maquis groups in central and southeastern France. 2. Designat ed "Operat ion Cadi llac" , the undertaking was initiated by a request of SH.AEF to the Commanding General USSTAF and Speci al Force Headquart ers (the Special Operations Br anch of OSS combined with British SOE) . This request was based upon current i ntelligence and an est imate of the poten tialities of French resistance, furnished by SFHQ. 3. SFHQ agents in the field were instructed to have a radio operator permanently on hand at each dropping point to gi ve immediate and continuous contact. The Maquis were told over clandestine wireless channels that a large dayli ght -2- operation Vlould be talcing place. However, in the interest of security, they were not told the date, the time, or the number of aircraft. Each Maquis was given a pre-arranged message to be broadcast by the BBC on the evening of the day before the operation. Within an hour of t he broadcast on 13 June, all reception grounds but one had repl ied that they VJere fully prepared. The ot her repl i ed in t he early hours of the 14th that all •1,1 as in order. 4. At approximately 5:00 a. m. on 14 July, 349 Flying Fortresses, loaded wit h 4320 containers of supplies, t ook off in bad ¥feather wi th fighter escort fr om nine airfields in England. After crossing the French coast between Caen and Le Havre, the .formation proceeded to a point near Bl ois in • Fr ance, where it broke up to cover the seven target s. 5. The weather was clear and the visibility excellent over the t ar get s, v;hich were identified by three bonfir es form ing an equilater al triangle 200 yards t o a side. The supplies Vlere dropped by parachute at 145 miles per hour at heights varying betv!een 500 and 1, 250 feet, not an easy t ask for Fortresses in formation. Despite this difficulty, the dropping w2.s described as extremely accurate. ., ! DECU...S~1F1E D -3- 6. After t he drop and while the Fortresses were starting to climb and assume format i on, two groups were attacked by German fighter air craft . Two damaged Fortresses l anded in the Normandy beach-head. One crewman was injured. In all , 320 aircraft dropped 3791 containers or 417 short tons of supplies, 98.7 percent of the projected delivery. (The 29 planes which did not participate in the drop were "spares" which were sent ba.ck aft er the formations reached the Engl i sh Channel) The following tot al of supplies was deliver ed : Explosive 18,379 (lbs. ) Sten Sub-Machine Guns 2,843 9 mm Ammunition 5,069,100 (rounds) Grenades #36 4,400 Grenades #82 2, 200 Pistols (50 R. P.G. ) 555 Bren Light Machine Guns 830 .303 Ammunition 6,852,368 (rounds) Ri f les 4,752 P. I.A.T. 109 P. I. P.. T. Bombs 2, 180 (rounds) ?. Ji:nthusiastic reports were transmitted by t he recipient s of the suppl ies: "Operati on unbelievable success hope rest of t his month' s ooerations as well" . • "Operation yesterday very successful stop over 500 \ containers already recovered grouped and dispersed stop D ' , ·r DECLf'£SIFIE •ti., ...... I - -- -4- "congratulations from us both to you and Air Force for a faultless display which has augmented morale of all". "Parachutages de jour pleinement reussis. Containers recus avec joie sans nom. " [)~ William J . Donovan Director Enclosure: Four photoeraphs of Operation "Cadil l ac" TRAINER (CRAYON) ~ "',' ).,, .... r.I? ~:> ... THE APPROACH. NOTE SIGNALFIRES TRAINER (CRAYON) .· : - ...... --·+ THE DROP TRAINER (CRAYON) CO NTAINERS ON GROUND AYON ) TRAI NER (CR I THE DEPARTURE ...._ ...... fS~ D~S 30 September 1944 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PP.EoIDENT We have just received f r om our r epresent ative in Bucharest the following report which I bel ieve will be of interest to you: "My staff and I are '"orking daily on the renorting of military i nt elligence end the exchange of such i ntel l i gence between the Russian C~mmand and 15t h Air Force in It aly. Our communications are t he means t hrough whi ch t his mil itary informati on is t ransmitted and therefore has the exol icit approval of the Russ ians. Our BO are used for the coordination of all American military activit ies here in cluding t he Ploest i study group and the air per sonnel evac uation group. This f urther str engthens our position and our cover as the Russians have recogni z.ed these operations as l egitimate and necessary. "Re the proposed purge f rom the Romenian Government and Army , and the arrest and trail of Romanian war guilty S!CftET - 2 - persons, this mat t er is proceeding very slowly. The Roman ians have not yet been able to bring themsel ves to take decisive action in this regard, and i t appears probabl e t hat the Russ i ans may soon t ake a hand. De spite the pressure brought to bear by the younger and more vindictive elements in the Government, t he Old Guard has succeeded t o date in delaying Romznian act ion, an::1 few i mportant r emovals from office and arrests of import ant !>ersons have t aken )Jlace. Younger elements recogni 7-e t hat ·unless the Romani ans do the j ob t hemselves the Russ i zns will do it for them and t hat the entire Gove;rnment wil l suffer. The Old Guard 'does not wish to see bloodshed '. Mr. Maniu recogn i zes the necessity for removing col laborati onist s f rom off ice but wishes to include collaborators wi th for mer Ki ng Carol. \ "T'nis so broadens the base and raises so many col- l ateral issues that t he enti re !Jroposal has been stalled. ~nether difficulty results from the ?resence in the Govern ment of certain individuals who would 9resumably be i ncluded in any l ist of war gu ilty. 11 J)~ Vlilliam J . Donovan ~EeftET 1 Director OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON, D. C. 30 September 1944 Miss Grace Tully The Whi t e House Washingt on 25 , D. C. Dear Grace : Will you kindly hand t he attached memorandum to the President? Thank you. Sincerely, • Will iam J . Donovan Direct or Attachment DECLASSIFIED By Auth" ~i ty or_:f_-.J::::.!l-:A:;;i.._ MAR !:! 1.. ~f QRFl ...... 1.... .... 81111 ...... ,. st•,_ Os• ...... tlllg ...... ~..,. le.... - -.-...n.. 1 ...1 ...... to ...... , .....u ..u ... Alwp ...... 11. \) ~~· \I~- • ...... WUla.. -1 ...... Ottt• .1 ...... lent••· ·~ .•. '· (ft. hNllsat .._. rt as ..a ....,_l d etts¢sl-) / GIC ERVICES • OFFICE F STRATE WASHINGTON, D. ~~ 1J1" 5 October 1944 Mia• Grace Tull, Tbe lhite Bouse Waahlngton 25, D. C. Dear Grace: I bel ieve the encl osed stamps will make an unusual item for the President ' s collectioo. Will you please give the• t o hill with t he enclosed .11eJDorandua? Thank you. Sincerely, lilliaa J. Donovan Director Attachaent .. WASHINGTON, O. C. 5 October 1944 The encl osed stamps were printed in the l!OUiltainB of Yugoslavia by the Chet.ni.ks under General Mihailovic and were sent out by Master Sergeant Michael Rajachich of the Office of Strategic Sel'Tices with a request that they be f orwarded t o you for your collection. Sergeant Rajachi ch was a member of the three-man air rescue team which we mentioned in our memorandum to you of 8 September 1944- He and his t wo associates made a night jump into Chet.nik territ~ry without reception and were responsibl e for the eYacuat ian of approximately 200 American airaen, many of whoa were wounded and several of whom had been in Yugoslavia since the first Ploesti raid about a year before. DECLASSIFIED 87 Au~!> c ~ i ·- e r~C...<'1,< ~AL--_ Wi l l iam J. Donovan Director \..-··· ·- • • - DaAJtTM!Kf °' STAtt ~ ~ THE SECRETARYi)' Octob•r 25. 1944 llEllOMNDIAI POR THE PRESllEMT Colonel W11llcs J . Donovan to tho Secretary. wi th an ex- proealon or his belief th.at you olght be lntorosted ln ooetns 1 t . Office of Strategic Services Washington, ~ . c . 14 October 1944 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE I believe that the following report which we have Just received from our representative 1n Bucharest will be of interest to you: "Staroea advises that the situation i s more critical now than at any other time since the coup. The different political factions in the government are bickering while the country is falling apart. He said that in spite of the fact th.at the King wants to stay out of politics,· it may be necessary for him to interfere and take decisive action to form a strong government. Two more observers agree that this government impasse will not stop until King or the Russians act decisively. It is believed that Starcea may be influencing KinB to act. "An American Air Force Colonel motored from Bucharest t~ Craiova and back on October 1-2. He reports that peasants in the villages and the city inhabitants seem to have enough food . • "Two American Offi cers who went to Brasov from Bucharest on October 3-4 reported the Brasov stores to be well- stocked and the city prosperoua. Russian mounted military police and troops were in the town, but not 1n the stores. Everybody seemed to behave well, and the general impression was of quiet and order." , ·. DONOVAN William J . Donovan Director ,( "" -..- - , • ' t THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON October Jl, l.944· WEalO RIJJDUM FOR GEHERAL DOJfOVil: I 1111 sending the encl.oaed to • you tor your eyes. onl.y. Will you be thinking about this 1n connection ~th the poat-war period? P.D.R. D!:CLASSill'! D IJ • 12t1 Arch i vi st of Use U. S • .... ~.... wart JJate JUN 1 1972 I Ill ti -: .. • L ' ,. JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER 1.i.1 m•Ulol 1210 NATIONAL PUSS IUILOINS WASl:UNSTON 4, 0. C. ··w• . th. P.ople.. ..Th • WMl ln Weolll1191oft .. Mottopolitao 4112 Motropollten 411 l rct obar 26 , 1~44 . Dear Mr. Prasictent : , It wus " kind hnd t:.lntle t • inc you d i d , to sand a t alarr um t o l!tll!lilton Bry1m, u 11 ha lvy d:1ine. Hie ,.· 1ra was u hle to recd it t o h 1.l!I befr.tre hll loe t C<'n- scionsna 1111 , und his ayes !'Ul a "ours ver:1 sincere ~:' ~~"(I ~, I Psp: DSs , Do .... o,,a.... ~ I ~ JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER / IJ*1 J:tuliA-1 UIO HA.llOHAL ,~ us IUILDING WASMi.HGfOH ._ 0. C. ?PJ°W!"'"" 111trutton. lr ~'flu Ohfi•l\d ;.S1-1h , 1 " ''"~ llkft tr •rrunt •• ••nl\ ~Srcx:t tt. , 11 11 n• DECLASS1FI&D &J D•JYtf Aro- 1• 11\ or ttl• U.S. JUN 1 11 I . J. S\e• arl Da \·• I • • • I ·./ THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON , 1 / TO !AU UP II'l:ll TU CJElllAI· IOAJU> fOR l'JU:IR RiOOIDllJIJ)AfIOI, r. o. a. l ' ~. OFFICE OF s:rRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINQTON, D. C. 18 November 1944 Miss Grace Tully The White Bouse Washington , D. C. Dear Grace : I am attaching a memorandum for the President dealing with the organization of an intelligence ser vice for the post-war period. Will you please see that it reaches his desk. Thank you. Sincerely, William J . Donovan Director D!CLASSIF IED By Author i t:· nf_.:..'2.d4JA::l--- By o:..~ S£.P 1 0 197 4 OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGT O N , D . C. • 18 November 1944 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRF..':iIDENT Pw;-suant to your note of 31 October 1944 I have given con sideration to the organization of an intelligence service for the post-war period. In the early days of the war, when the demands upon intelli gence services were mainly in and for military operations, the 088 was placed under the direction of the JC8. Once our enemies are defeated the demand will be equally pressing for information that will aid us in solving the problems of peace. This will require two things: 1. That intelligence control be returned to the supervision of the President. 2. The establishment of a central authority reporting directly to you, with responsibility to frame intelligence objec- ' t i ves and to collect and coordinate the intelligence material re quired by the Executive Branch in planning and carrying out national policy and strategy. I attach in the form of a draft direct ive (Tab A) the means by whi ch I think this could be realized without dif f iculty or loss of time. You will note that coordination and centralization are placed at the policy level but operat ional intelligence (that pertaining primarily to Department act ion) remains within the existing agencies concerned. The creation of a central authority - 2 - would not conflict with or limit necessary intelligence func- tions within the Army, Navy, Department of 8tat e and other agencies. In accordance with your wish, this is set up as a permanent long-range plan. But you may want to consider whether this (or part of it} should be done now, by executive or legislative act ion. There are common-sense reasons why you may desir e t o lay the keel of t he ship at once . The i mmediate revision and coordination of our present intelli gence system would effect substantial economies and aid in t he more efficient and speedy termination of the war. Information i mportant to the national defense, being gathered now by certain Departments and agencies, is not being used to full advantage in the war. Coordination at the strategy level would prevent wast e, and avoid the present confusion that leads to waste and unnecessary duplication. Though in the midst of 'l'lar, we are also in a period of transi tion whi ch, befor e we a re aware, will take us into the t umult of rehabil itation. An adequate and orderly intelligence system will contribute to informed decisions. We have now in the Government the trained and specialized personnel needed for the task. This talent should not be dispersed. /j,~~S)~ William { Donovan Director DECLf..S .... 11' lL.D ~ cn pgg z TAB A SUBSTANTIVE AUTHORITY NECESSARY IN ESTABLISHMENT OF A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE In order to coordinate and centralize the policies ~nd actions of the Government rel ating t o intell igence: 1. There is est abl i shed in the Executive Office cf the President a central intelligence service, to be known as the ------' at the head of which shal l be a Director appointed by the Pr esident. The Direct or shall di scharge and perform hi s functions and duties under t he direct i on and supervisi on of t he Presi- dent. Subjectio the approval of t he Presi dent, the Director may exercise his poV1ers , authorities and dufus through such officials or agencies and in such manner as he may deter mine . 2. Ther e is established in the ------an Advisory Board consi sting of the Secret ary of Stat e, t he Secretary of War, t he Secretary of t he Navy, and such other memb~rs as t he President may subsequentl y appoint. The Board shall advise and assist the Director wi th respect to t he formulation of basic pol icies and plans of the - 2 - 3. Subject to the direction and control of the President, and with any necessary advice and assistance from the other Departments and agencies of the Govern- ment, the shall perform the follow- ing functions and duties : (a) Coordination of the functions of all intell igence agencies of the Government, and the est ablishment of s uch policies and objectives as wi ll assure the integration of national intelligence efforts ; (b) Coll ection either directly or through existi'8 Government Departments and agencies, of pertinent infor mation, including military, economic, political and scientific, concerning the capabilities, intentions and activit ies of for eign nations, with particular reference to the effect such matters may have upon the national security, policies and interests of the Un i ted St ates; (c) Final evaluation, synthesis and dissemination within the Government of the intelligence r equired to enable t he Government to determine policies with respect to national planning and security in peace and war , and the advancement of broad n ational policy; - 3 - (d) Procurement, t rainin_g and supervision of its intelligence personnel; (e) Subversive operations a broad; (f) Determination of policies for and coordination .of facilities essential to the collect ion of information• under subparagr aph "(b)" hereof; and (g) Such other functions and duties relating to intel ligence as t he President from time to time may direct. 4. The ------shall have no police or l aw-enforcement functions , either at home or abroad. 5. Subject to Paragraph 3 hereof , existing intel l i - gence ~.gencies within the Government shall collect, evalu ate, synthesize and disseminate departmental operating intelligence, herein defined as intelligence r equired by .such agencies in the actual performance of their functions and duties. 6. The Director shall be authorized to call upon Departments and agencies of the Government to furnish appropr iate specialists f or such supervisory and functional positions within the ------as may be required. 7. All Government Departments and agenci es shall - 4 - make avai lable to the Director such int el ligence material as t he Director, with the approval of the President, fr om time to time may request. 8. The ------shall operate under an independent budeet . 9. In t i me of war or unlimited national emergency, all progr ams of the in areas of actual or projected military operations shall be coordinated with mi litary plans and shall be subject to t he approval of t he Joint Chiefs of Staff. Parts of such programs which are to be execut ed in a theat er of mili tary operations shall be subject to the control of the Theat er Commander. 10. ?.'i thin the l imits of such funds as may be made avai l able to the , the Director may employ necessary personnei and make provision for necessary supplies, facilities and services. The Director shall be assigned , upon t he approval of t he President, such mil itary and naval personnel as may be re~uired in the per f ormance of t he functions and dut ies of the ------ The Director may provide for the internal organ izat ion and management of the in such manner as he may determine. ' OFFICE 0 STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHl~QTON, D. C. 23 December 1944 Ml!MORANDUV FOR THE PRESIDENT I believe you will find of interest the enolosed photographs of port facilities at Antwerp and Bordeaux. These photographs are samples of the work wliioh we are now undertaking as part of e. program of stre.tegio photography in liberated oountries. The pr 0gram is being carried out with the approval of SHAEF and in• oonjunotion with t he Ninth Air Force. To provide full intelligence coverage of selected areas the work has been coordinated with both research and field intelligence. It is believed that the completion of this program wi ll furnish a valuable fund of basic information for fQture use. Wi lliam J. Donovan Director D'ICLASS 1F!ED (' £P., By 1;ut hori ty of_ - ' - ()0~1. 2- L.. - - Date __SEP_..... i 0.- J 974 llY __i.~ OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON , D. C. · 23 December 1944 .Mi s11 ()"e.oe Tully The \Vhi ta House Washington , D. C. Dear Grace: I t hink the enclosed memorandum will be of interest to the President. Will you please see th~ t it reaches his desk. Thank you. Sincerely, · . ·~~ William J, Donovan Director Enc. DECLASSIFIED , .. OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES -- WASHINGTO N, D, C. 25 J a.nuary 1945 t lCLA18T1 In IJ Autbor1 l f o!'.,!C:,;..£jl et::i..,__ 001(,'Z." l- llOOIWIDOll FOR THE PRFSIDFNi' : The following i.D.fon1ation baa been tranS..itt ed by the ass r eprecentative i n London: On 24 January, af t er seeing Subnsich and Ambassador Pat t erooa , Hne Peter sent the following let t er t o Prime Mi n ist er Churchill: ' I had • loo;: talk with Dr. Sub11i~ this afternoon. l e discueeed t he next steps. I told Dr. Subaaich th~t if he subioitted hia resignation and that of bis Cabinet, I would en trust him wi t h the forming of the new Goverrutent and with the t ask of concl udine the agreement , t akine into cons iderat ion my proposals. I also •U88est ed that I would then use my best ef forts to bring into t he Royal Yll!loslav Govel'DJlent other deOIO cratic political ele~ents . ' I have aince talked with hia by Lelophone and he baa informed me t hat he baa already held a Cabinet meeting and ia giving t he tiinisters until t omorrow, when he wi ll br i.ng me the definite answer. .. TIP 1111• '· . TOP 82011£1. - 2 - •1 •ill not. giv• 11:J conaent to the Royal Yugoslav Government to leave London befoNt thb situation is cleared up. • a.w.. r. ULt;::: Charl e& S. Cheston Actina Director C&C1.ASS t r rio If AuUior tl.y ot·_,:C.i!1.eA1-_ dUll 1 1 1973 · ' Jl• t • TS! SECl!Si OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON, D. C. 26 January 1945 DI OLASSIFUD B:r Autbori t:r ot-'Q"""""/A...___ 007&2..Z- MEMORANIXJlA FOR THE PRESIDENT : B:r l[4R Date 4WN 1 11973 The following information has been transmitted by the OSS representative in London : On 24 January, King Peter summoned Premier Subasich for' new consult ations. He again proposed that the Subasich gov- ernment resign, and suggested that Subasich form a new govern- ment to include Yuray Irnjevich and Milan Grol, after which steps would be taken to resolve the King ' s objections to t he Tito-Subasich draft agreement. Subasich consulted with his cabinet and the King' s proposals were accepted. A few hours later, however, Subasich informed the KiD8 that General Velebit ffartisan military liaison officer in London? had strongly ad vised Subasich to make no decision pendill8 a reply from Tito, who had been informed of the situation. Although Subasich and his cabinet appear definitely to have been frightened by Vele bit' s request, they are still inclined to accept the King ' s proposal. In this connection the State Department communique delivered to King Peter on the evening of 24 January by Patter son bas carried considerable weight. GA~ .r . &1.. ;;,. . Charles S. Cheston ...... Acting Director ---- The 1t.t.achod chart. 1llu•t.ra.t.e$ t. he 1npol"1.a,nce of the U?Pt"I' S11• •1a lndu.st.r Ul a,..,, the most. lr.J>O"tvt ~ c_i:.1• s or _.,!ch t-.a,..,, b"n c:apt.W'ad b1 ~ Sowtew • • ' ...... •• .. c&il lbllti&tt • 1£ 0 Rl.IN t·l Oe"ANOEN&URO p 0 l A N 0 O .. aoocau1to ERMANY CZECH(; SLOV AK '-. I A ' , -- ...." '·- ~j'I..,n ;: ,, • '/"),/M VI _,. . •. ,, "! TI50Yt 'J~ "'~ ~ " ... •I -< ... ,.. F RANCE ~ ,,.--' ~"' '-r--..-/'- -.,.. J • , 7 • ...... •• • WEST ... lt.>IT f\l•WAGl t Ofll~Y CENTRAL EUROPE JJ,fJlJl,I. Olli! MO\l( ..( NTt ~ CO.Al. • OY'C • f"11 SELECTED •UIOftAL ~ ln COAL, IR l\AI. ll"ltOOUCT) Oil 1~ I ON AND JTt:U. STEEL HIOOIJOl,lf0 C(ll'fl:ltl. " CENTERS cJ OVltfS lfll lNOAf l MU..IOflll Ol' TOlliJ. • ... - OJI •• ~AllY Of IO:ro«'f &Il l' Psr: oss . .P~ ~®Jliif nli~~~lf~9Xt T H E WHI TE Hou se WASHI NGTON April !. , J.945 TO : rRUl: lh . LUt>Ui L.;.,TNu.1ZE.IJ 11JTz.Li.lCl:.i:ICi:. ~.t.RVICE f,s you ,.-robably :aiu1. , tne iaeli or hi.vinb I' centralized 1ntelH- 5cuco Service, t..s ,Jl'Opo:JC.:d b:,' Lcner ;1.l ilonovan, hUS sta.Llea in ono of t:.~ Jllo><•i\'1: Icns of tl.e Joi:1t Chiefs 01· St.a!'!' . Pc,-,;or.uly, l t.nlru. ti.t.t t.his ic t.r.L tl.uoe to ht.ve L ciefil1ite :•lw: ro:n:.ul:..tc" . 'l'ne a11 f' cult.)' see::>s to liv in t.ho fct.r ot' certain q;er.ciuc of t .>e govcr1~oent. tlli.t they Toil! r.ot be ,it1mitted to ph.y t .. cir ,x.rt in tlie pro,<>:.cc setup. 1 think thu t tnu Gitm tion cW1 bo cl~ril'ied ii' tne various t 1;~:1cico 1 re brouilht tor.otncr ill on~ r oom 11nd given M opportunity to r..W:o oucLestions for or objectione Lo tl1e propoocd plan. I reb.lly bclic.vc thut a frwik, t cross-the-t..bl c discu•oion Ylould eliodnute SC!~I) ol' th& ciifficultic a . hnOl'lf. tl,e ~[encittC tl~t. Shoulo be invited LlT• , er cow·se, tit;. \' t.1' t.l1C.. lh:1.VJ l>ep.:..:.rttitnts, ttil: Ue,nirt...1tnt or Ju~t.ice (incJ.ua.ing t.ne t'Br) 1 1..1~ De,x.rt...cnt. ot CoCl!lcrce, U•t De)l..rt :::cnt uf '·tr iculturc w1c. otn&r aepurt::tents tiu.t. i..re cn;;t.ged in colloct1q, v1t.&l 1r.rom::.tion concomini; .rolitictl, econoriic lltla social conditions .• brou.d . inc...eec: , it. t.t-'•'eu.rn t.ht..t "-ll of tilt ton executive dep... rt.l~nto, i11ctu H you thi:1k tlwt ~oocthinc ou.;nt to be oono alont: tnoso linon, the (•tt£>co1ed m61>oruntlwn mit;ht bti s 1mt to Bill Oono vun ...... , rset1t .AN.lnn.,, .. '"' Jlr ' · •· " art Jlde JVN i 19n 'b cc J w wt.::.. \.. J '' u 4336 PSF; C5:S: THI ll'!IIT! liOllS£ ....hiilgton J,prU 6, 194$ WEll:CIU.ND!Jll TOt MAJOR 0.6Nt.RAL D~O!JA>i J.propoe oI )'WI" Dl!!CICl"&ndwa ot ~O'f cber e, 1944, relat.i•c to t.ho eaw.bli.ahoont or a c:entral intAll1gonc• ••rvice, I ahould •PP-•d.•t.• YC'tJr call.1n& t.Clll•U.r the cb1et'• or 't.bt iri\.el.ligence f(!~ien an:1 ln\.f:t'Ml HC\ll'lt.7 _,n1\.a 1A i.M various encut.in agencies, •o t.Mt. a oon.aena\l.I ot opinion can bt eecur•d. l t. • P pN:"• "° • that. all ot \.ht t..cn •~· tive de~t.o, •• • tll •• Uie fortd.9'1 Econoaic Adaitl1strt1.t.ton , a. rd \.he Yedtral CCllNIW'lioat iord C0111- m.1.111on have • direct.. 1nt.er-e1t. iD the JZ'Opoeed .ent\\1"8. fbt7 should all be: a.eted t.o coat.r1buW t.beir m.ggea\.lc:ma t.o the propotld cent.raJ.iaed 1nt41. 11'm. ce 1ervio e. • f.O,R.• f.D.R. Or1g1s'lal sent. to IU.j . Oen . 1'Ul1A• J , Dono~-.. , Oft'ic• o! St.rat•J1C elb Strrlcet, 4/6/45, . ... t~LAll1 fl ..., \M Q.I. , 1 'Depa\.J Aro),1•1 •\ of ., '-!. J. 1\.-r\ »At• "' 1 ' I tMI~ OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES Ij.;-"/i WASHIHGTON, 0 . C:. 1i.A •, 6 Ailril 1945 Jiss c:rsee Tully l'he ,lhi te House :ls•hin11ton , :J. c. De\U" r.race: I believe the President .. i ll be intcre1ted in the attached aunorsndum eonoe.rning Colonel de .:avrin. ',iill you kindly ue thst it re9ches his desk. i'hank yo11. ,/lllia:n J. Do~ova n llircotor AttMh.~ent us a \ OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON, D. C. 6 April 1945 ui1i.iCJRiJ'fiJ1J1! l<'OH THE .PH~IDENT On my return frolll China I learned of the FBI and At- torney General i:ieJJor anda conceruing Colonel JUldre de ilavrin. I ilJl!Uedi ately consulted studies which we had already pi;epared on t his matt!lr , and I attach appropri ate excerpts f r om a repor t of our Hesearch and hnalysis Branch, dated 11 J anuary 1945 . 'rhis indicates that the charges against Colonel Passy were made be- cause of political dissension within resistance organizatios. In addition I iJJ.vestigated the facts and sent the follmving cable to our r epr esent ative in London: "Can you obtain from Br i t ish fUll and compl ete a !>praiseoent of charges that Passy fde oiavrinJwas guilty of participation in alleged tortures of French refugees in his inquisitional offices in London and also reason British decor ated Passy?" I received in reply a message st11ting that the news paper accounts on wnich the oe~oranda of the iBI and Attorney General see..i to have been principally based resulted fron oaneuvering within t lt!l Fr ench poli t i c:a1 elelllents i r. ~ngland . The text of this answer stated: l.,; . ' - , Ir" ' - 2 - "Q.uestion charges against subject discussed with D. C. of 1IT -5'!'· personally and with officer in charge invest i gation. rtecei ved cat egorical denials subject himself had any connection with any Bl ack inte~rogat ions . These were conducted by another Branch. Latter concerned with local security whil e subject with intell igence in occu pied France. Linking oi' subject personall y with affair was pol itical ua.neuvering . Incidents did occur and interrogation centre was cl osed. Other i..llied nations simi larl y invol ved in methods nor- mal to cont i nental pr actice but uncongenial here. "Discussed reasons for Brit ish decoration of subject wi t h C of ;.!I-6* personally who instigated award . GiTen u.S.O. for valor in f ield where risked life by goi'ng ahead as known to you. Pre f erred decorate hi m for mi l i tary valor rather t han give O. B.E. for domesti c service as higher award and mor e f i t ting sol dier . " *i.t.I -5 is responsible for domestic security in t he Unit ed Ki ngdom and .dritish possessi ons. 1.iI-6 is r esponsible for gather i ng secret intelligence out side t he Uni tad ; ~ i ngdo :n and Br i t i sh possessions. - 3 - From my own knowledge t he services -· of this man have been of value t o t his country and t o our allies. Great Britain has already decorated hi m t wice. I understand that the awal'd to de \'/avrin of t he Distinguished ~ervice Cross, although re- commended by the Theater Commander, General Eisenhower, was not presented because of a ~t ate uepartment objection. In Janu ary of t his year General Bedell dmith , Chief of ::>taff for oHM:B', discussed this matter witu me and t old me that General Eisen- bower had decided on the award only after t he i;.ost careful exa.lli - nation under the close supervision of General ~mith . Because of the debt we owe to de \'iavrin and in the interest of fairness, I shoul d like t o place in proper focus t he meL.Loranda submitted to you by the Department of Justice. I believe I can do this by giving you the facts which we have ascertained by a carefUl check. Colonel de 'rtavrin is a career officer . At present ae is dead of t he uirection des ::>ervices de rlenseignelilents et ~ecurite Wilitaire, which has under its cognizance secret in- telligence , research and analysis and counter-espionage acti- vi ties. He was formerly executive head of the .:>ervices .:>peciaux , the ~·ra nch intelligence servi ces. In 1~40 he nad orgBLlized its predecessor, t ue :£nA ( bUreau Centrale des 1tensei gne;;ients et - 4 - l : f • d 1Act ion) , and as its EU!e cutive head directed for four years t he l'Fl.' s intelligence and sabotage activities in occupied France. Under de llavrin the .dCRA contr ibuted gr eatly to the success of French resistance, and in April 1944 he was named Chief of ~taff to General ~oenig , Cowmander of the FFI . In addition, i t 'is estimated that the BCRA provided to the British and hlller ican armies , through OS~ and rlritish ch8.llllels, dOJ~ of the i ntelligence on which the l\ormandy invasion was based. It will be remembered American strategic intelligence had been barred for the greater part of tile period. (These figures did not hold t rue in the invasion of ~outhern France, where t he theater G-2 stated: "a rough estimate of the proportion of accepted ground Intelligence supplied by the three allied agen- • cies silows t hat 50-,.6 was provided by 0.8.S., ( 30;6 by the !:> .R. /i..renchJ and 20;$ by I . :'> .L.D. [""BritishJ)." In august 1944 (when General Patton through t he 0 . ~ . 8 . uetachr!ient asked the FFI to serve as infant ry to pro tect the flank of his armored di visions ) Golonel de \la.vrin parachuted into an area alll!ost enti1·ely hel d by Gerl!l8.IlS in order to assuoe personal leadership of eighteen llI companies . These compafiies provided protection for the communications - 5 - lines of t he 11'ourth and Sixth Armored Ji visions. ;Ster central Bri tta.ny had been secured, de 'rl avrin preceded task force "A" of the 'fhird ArJllY into the 1'reguir and Lezardiux areas , incited and stimulated a general uprising of the resistance forces and returned with intelligence on which the successful reduction of these towns was based. .n.t the re quest of the task force comm.antler he then assumed personal com mand of an FFI fo rce of 1500 which successfully attacked t he city of Paimpol, defended by 2500 Geruans . ue 11avrin received the british Jilitary Cross for gallantry in No rnay. He was awarded the British Distinguished ~ervice Order for a mission behind enemy lines in occupied t rance in February 1943. Thi s mission was for an extended period. Its purpose wa.s the organization of ~'ranch resist ance. ue .1avrin' s capture would have lllee.nt torture anC1 deatn, yet during this period he r escued a wounded .i.l.erican aviator at great risk of capture. These i3ritish awards furnish suffici ent refutation of the statement t hat the Bri tish do not trust de .. avrin. In nearly two years 1 actual experience wi th de 1/av rin I have found hi m always ready to cooperate with Americans - 6 - lifltE and always of great assistance tq us. I invit ed Colonel de li avrin to coll.le' to this country to meet selected l.llembers of my staff for the purpose of carrying through plans for t he pene tration of Ger many. These plans involve t he reintroduction into Ger filaFny of rench workmen, formerly there, who had es caped to France. Clearance for t he trip was obt ained from t he Department of ~t ate and G-2 . I do not know on what t he f>ttorney General and t he .Jirector of t he FBI base t heir charge that Colonel de ,;avrin Calle to thi s country to organize a French intelligence service • .hn open visit by a man clearl y i dentified with i r ench secret intelligence is an unlikely llieans to establish a clandestine intelligence service, particularly since t here 'are many French of ficers in this count ry who, because less conspicuous, could accompl i sh t he purpose better. In view of de 11 avrin' s record of service to t he J•l lies, it hardly s eems necessary to r eply t o t he other charges made by t he .l!'BI . I neverthel ess feel I should co.Lllllent on some of t he apparent deficiencies i n the melllorandum in order t o poi nt 01;lt the character of t J.ie evidence on which t he charges ar e basecl . ------II . - 7 - 1 • I I I The charge that de Ge.ulle appointed de ·,1avrin head of the Jo'rench ~ecret Police in 1940 is inaccurate. t:ol onel de uavrin is an intelligence officer and organizer of resistance operations. He has never headed the French secret police. The BCRA di d have a counter-espionage branch, which was respon- sible for the safety of ]'rench intelligence agents operati ng in France and cooperated with the Bri tish intell igence services in the detection and i nvestigation of Frenchmen suspected of worki ng for Ger1lfillY in Engl and . The accusations as to t ue methods used by de ttavrin as head of t he BCilil. are based on three i ncidents : t b.e Dufour court action reported i n t he New York Ti mes on 115 0eptember 1943 , t 11e Pucheu t rial and tne trial o!' Lt . Carre. 'l'he w four action nruo.ed General de Ge.ulle and si:x: other officers as defendants i n addi tion to de \lavrin. The statel!lents quoted from the complaint are unproved allegations. Sven if true , there seems to have been reason to suspect Dufour of being an enemy agent . The Pucheu trial was not , as all eged, a pur15 ~ "with- in t he de Gaulle regime" . Pucheu was never connected wi t h de Gaulle. .Iis arrest was or dered by Gir aud. ·,, e have been able - 8 - BIS t.o rind DO evidence to show th.at ae 0ourln pl.4,od 8IJ1f iaportant role in his trial. ih9r e i s also no evidence prenntod with respect to '"o truu of Lt. t:11rre . ~., """ trio• ai.d convictod i!! ai> .!Wllli onrly in 1:143 for hls activiti9s llit;1 the Vichy Tri oolor Lo15ion. J'ue iJepertinent of Ju~tice womorandum prosonts no ovidonco to snow this .,;cs tarou(lh •l'forts of t:olonol de ,1avrin: s orcaui zation. Lt . Carro ' s Je1110biliwtion and intern .i•nt 'KOro ordorod not by de .. avrin but lr/ 1uidro lo 'iroquer, tio...i.::is&ion!'lr for ,jar of tile tc:J.. tt. IArro's death at valerno is citad O/ tue -e~:-and~ as "inaicativo or t~e probuble natlll"e Of ti.10 ~r1al a,..COrdeY t..liS t'rencho...an• , but t ... Bl"O is no s.l01fir.g "3 to U0\1 t.lC proceedin;;s ...,.,, illei;al uador mnc:i la•. J'lle !'ill ..o.ioranJum also states teat Lt. 1,11rre ' • deot11 io tue figltt- 1"0 ut ,aJ.orno ..... sufficient to •iPO out his provious collai>o rutioniat record, but J on tho othor hand , feiln to recognize tnnt ou ti.ill sruii.e bnsis i.:ol onel de .1avriu 1 u indisputable services Lo too ,.llied causo sinco 1940 s~ould oro9o '"" sti:;ma of his a.llegoii (Wld unp:ro·;ed) connection wi tll tile ~aaoule . •'Uq stste;,igDts aOout de oavri:i1G disclosuroa Of ;.iilitary infnrU>tion are ilard to creJ1 t . 1.0 fee ts ar<1 (liven. - 9 - Je onjoya tae conf t donco of de Gaulle and he.a recently been appointed to a now position. The ilri tiah (despite the state ...ent creQited to tun.a tllat t~e7 "inforued de Ceullo tMt tiley ~s• rei'rained tro::i solz.ica de .. er.in only bocauso of the scan dal tlllit woulJ follow") ;iava continue• to show i'ull confidence ia uim a1'd to cooporute closely with him in Yroneh operations. In view of the 1;v1111'<10 alxoady wade 8lld tho continuina inti::iate end Jll"Ofesoional relationship between de 1oavrin and the heads of tno dritisn !ntolllsence ~•rvice, it would bo Interesting to know to whoa t.10 ter~ "tnn a~tiso" ia uea.nt to refer . I ""' also Ulkini; a•;ailable to ~no .A>part:>ed of vtote i nfor..iation as to the value of de Kevrin 'a servi ce$ to tho ..uorica,n lllilitary offort. On t he basis ot' thts inforirill.tion it UJ.Y be that tM Wopur t ..ont of o.>tate will wish to review its action in bringino about the refUsal of the award of the )is till&'lished ~•r1ico ..;roaa to hio. ne are doi11& &rave injustice to volonol ae ..arrin by wiiilholdill,3 ::erit&d 1'9cosnition tor hls ser1ices 1 c3PJcia.lly sinco several of Jlia subord.inatos have receiveJ tna anard or thq .Ji sti u.gu.isnoci vervica i.:ross for ooniovo..10nts leos outatandilltl tuan hla. 1~ . "illiu J . ilono"8II SEeRH ,irector ' ittitl E;i:C::RPrs [IRO:.i 03.3 Rl:A Rj]'ORT uo. 2553 * From the kncwin appointments to the high i>.r administra t ive offices in the new intellirence a~ency , it appears that the 3eryices ill:. Recherche .tl Contr e-Espionnage Hill be :iirected chi efly by t he former BCRA element . The return of Colonel Passy to the intel lieence services es:iecielly, has caused sane mis- 11ivings in the more leftist 9olitical circles of France where the intelli r,ence services have recently been chareed with fo:nentinp civi l war an:l preparina th'? Vl':iY for ~ictatorship . It is of inter est, therefore , to :ietermine the possibilities of 9olitic1l acti on afforded by the or izanization and person..~el of t~e intel liaence s ~ rv i ces . 1. Parti san NA.ture of the Distrust of the Fr ench Int elli- "'ence o"rvices. Tn the fe'.1 ,·1ee.1 3ervices .:ipeciawr to f orm the .Services ~ Reoher che tl 9& .2:>ntre- 11.'!"'ionnage, t he r'r e::ch i nt elli :;ence services wer e sub- jected to a bitter attack by the e xtr eme l eftist political cir cl es which d e:nnnded their d issolut ion on t he ~ound s that t~ey ·,1 er e not sufficient ly a'lenable to ~vernment authority. I n fact , while t he reorpanization of the intelli?,ence system was nccessi t 11 ted by the chanped s i tu~tion of ~'re.nee , the de~ision to :iron t~e n~~e of t he 3erviccs 3neciaux nrob ~t "I' *·;o·>ies of this r enort have been d isseminate:t t o the Den~ of Jtat0 1nd t he Jepartrnent of . Tustice. - 2 - was not unrelated to the !J.ostile att i tude exhibited toward the pre- liberation aqency. The distrust which surrounds the irench intelligence services i s nothini:: new , hC1ilever , end hos always had some t hing of a part i san tone. In the pre-l iberation ne.riod '.ln:l until the Allied r~cQPni ti on oft he Fc:-rr. as the 'ld,i~istrat ive authority for liberated France , the B~RA and its successor , the ,;)ervices .3neciaux, were the object of various char~es by gener ally conservative and anti- Gaul l ist groups of l r ench refu~ees located in :C:n-'1and and America. Predicated ori a professed belief that the r:'lullist intelli<>Pnce services were ai:nin>Z at the establish:lent of dictatorshiJ> in liberated ~'ranee , these ch.<1rges included : ( 1) thn 1l5P. of ~estapo- like methods in pr ocessing lrench escapees viho ca11e to Bn:-land Yihere th'.? BCRA exercised 1·1i de control over i r ench nationals , (2) the manip·1Uition of political :~esistance ·1i thin .?ranee in s•tch 11 i'l!IJ as to ensure the undisputed leadership of de Gaulle , <1nd (3) discrimination in t he '3I'Illin~ and s uup lyin~ of fililitary • 1lesistance in a maMer calculated to facilitate the foundAtion o: ~n authoritarian st<1te. .ihilP. 50":1"! of t hese <1ccusntions, 5trinnei o: t heir i~nlicetion5 of dictatorship, h'.1.d so,e basis in fact 'lni l'rer e echoed in t he ·~onf'!ttltl\ti ve Asse,'1!b l y , they reuresonted, for the nogt nart , ~ross ex~"~cr~t i ons and ~is - nut forward vii th t hEl'dea o~ 1i screditin~ t~e .. lit.till - 3 - .,,~,~ In Allied c ircles and of oreatinli- ttiJ~r · for • cor e conservative ~ench authority or~ized undc.r Oenere.l r..ir std. '!:ith th.., llbrr11tion of :'-ranee ,__rui the institution o~ the ne:r Provisional r-overa:ient ~t Paris, ~he oonsern.ti•e critics of th• ~re · liberetio:i !)eriod •ith•r r•llied to the new re,..i"1e or :ii"intaintKt a dis cr eet silenoo. !'he .)gryic;es jpeeiaux , however , round t hfP s el\~es attnokcd !'r tion , this tine bv the ~cri,,,uni sts and oth9r elem onto or Resist · encc Mho are aooarentlv dis~a tisfioJ with the railure or th.a t>Olitical, econtcic , a~i so-:i~l policies of th~ ~o:-e ertre:ae lort. Bece\l$e or th• nro· libere.tio:i boc•r;round of t>e cher-;es of ~ictator shin comin~ rrO'!l consnr?ati ve tToupa , but mor e because of tho \ndisn11tGbly conser•rative natlU"o of. their per- sonnel, the intellirPnc~ services offe: to these leftist r,r-ouns ftn exce lle~t te.r...,.t ror politicP.l ~ropat""'llld~ jesiM'lPd to arotse !"ab lie opi:ii:>n 'l'":llliMt '1 ....l!t. is dee::url to be t'e "'co:L,e.rva;i 70" l\ttitude o~ t11(" Pro·1isio:ial ri0ve:-roe..1t . 2. Political ?ganlr.xion of the IntA'liry:nge Jc;rvices Tho ,tt,olts which have b••n lovoll,..t ~f"linst the )(lrvices 3nooi0,ux by extrO!le lef tis t circlo::i "tnd l'liieh nrobP.bly •.vill be revived tv..,.ins: the ne.Y or-ni-.:.'ltion ,"·be ftttributed in pSTt tot he political c o~p lexion of tho i ntelli13"noe oersonncl. '.:Ith tho exception er .laoques 3oustolle, the leadin" personalities of th• intelli~nce services aoDPer to be of quite c~nscnatlve beo~v,rou!ld an:! vi..,.. 1'he traditional c~naerV nnd not Ill reu . dra\o:n fr~ the !"otner r,iraudiat :tll'rvices , hove • r ecord of fom er Vichy service. ·rhcn, too , t he char"" tnnt tho intellireno• •arvices havo n liberal snrlnkl- in" of ex· -:S<'<>ul'l.l'ds is still re"Oeat1t:! , with P.,ssy o~fered •• :he chssic tx'l:lnlr. .ihile foe ch'lr"" •• S"l!'lied to ""'''~av be ooubte~ . it is reaso~sb lr to brlirve th.-.~ the -enoral noous.tion hes 11n elll!lellt of truth. ~t the ti~o of the 1940 l\l'i:listice the Ca"oulc , w'.tich h•d been in the v111.n~ of .:" 1'.scist. conspirooies in nre-.·ai.r !llrnnoe , is sl\id to h.r.ve :iplit into three fTO:.J.'.'S · One section, '.T ~1ie!t ,.,.,th·red. ~t Pnris, ~~~l')ri ~ten it,elf wit~ coll•bor~tionist ele:i~nts . to u.i~ccunie:! ·'ranee where it Passe~ under the le,dership or _:1\I'cel PejTouton , t~rn ''.inister o:" IntArior . Prosu."llably so:ne ccr>bers of this M'OU~ crossed to ·:or th Africa 11.ftor the \llied r•portedly ~ent to London to join th• do ~.oulle ~O• If It is true t!lot these ex-~•ro111nrd • are now assochted with the present intelli...,nce service, It con onl; be ass:z:iei t~·t their oolBic•l 9J'"l1'e.thie• lit with th• ,ore con.:ierv1t· tivc 'oliticel "TOUps in Yran~e . ThfS oersonnel of' th~ .'rench intAllinlnce services , e.lonr with certain conscrvnti vo mcnb{\ts or the Pl"ovi3ional ".ovcro~ent have • lso been identified r1l!h eyn_'ll"chl s":l , 1·1hic!i ,., be iefi,ed l oosely as ~ oolitic•l .n1 eco:icriio ~ovc::e n t •i,od ot the control of th• state bv an iniustriel, financial an1 technocratic elit... J;'Ml"ch!:c 'tes b•ro l!:iked i:it~ ~he or• --radu.•tcs or the i:ilit.rrenc-inoorinr cello~ ' the -wl· !'olyt•ghilillll!: , where the ~ov As "Tnduotion fra~ the ,J:.2k Polylcchn!mto ie tho solo evi - • 1once otfc:-ed in stnpcrt o~ •v~.re'list 'lffll!ations in !he t':is ch.r..,,. ':'!le •cc'.lSetion , bn•el '15 H Is on tho flbsiest evi1Pn~•, S•'!"7"' only to undPrline the.. l'!li8 .. i"'I .. iistriat of ~h,. :Jrr 1:ices as an ar""'ft.:li ~-=ior:. c~'°3e! or or~ici'lls ..ho se ' arc ;f"'"" w - ~ - nolitio•l S\'l'IO•thioa ore such th6t they ma:; be exi>eoted to ai7e willinu a11·loort. oily to a "Over:n.-1 .. of ,oierate left or distinctly conservative viC':is . r~ view o~ tb~se ~•et, . ~o~,unist s ~~"!.kers ¥ rP ablr to COnrie!!l n tha jAr viQQ? JnegiQ,UX AS oomnosed Of 11 ce'!9\ll.,rds11 s.c:! "£'ii'th col\nnis ts" wio .,.er,. erll:i... "non-i~un.iat r;rouns in nrensration ror t:10 ' civil \1Br ' . " :ven thP ne·.,. 'jO'IL'!luniat .i:iist.rr o:' ~ir . ..'illon . e~f'."red th• li 3ts, r P•urrP{'lti ri. ... t?i• ol:l chnr"' th't the ~~R\ -dooinated intelli · t1a! t~~ ierviA~~ ?':'coi~nx nisiei ~o overthrcr1 t~e :>rov is io~al ...10vcrn::i1•nt and renl"'co i '"s !ilMbArshi ,, Hi th cl1nP,nt5 drftwn fl• \'lholP 1 nove:'lrnt 111n ,1ni•r c 1.l"rent o~ ~nn!"lllhensioi. re-irdinr- th., '""Oliti"'~l i:U'l~ence of the ~nttlliroennP , 0 rvicnq i~ t~P even~ th .. t _,n o.-,tio,, brPV. O"'f'l'lrS bl"ltWr"'l th.. ·1~ ""'ull_. -O..-rri.1c;:t ~i! til"I ~o:-e rxtrC!le ol,.1ents. .- . OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON, D. C. ~/ 10 April 1945 Mi ss Grace Tully The White House Dear Miss Tully: The attached memorandum, sequel to previous memoranda concerning the possible surrender of German forces in North Italy, will probably be of interest to the President. Sincerely yours, 21~~~ G. Edward Buxton Acting Director Enclosure. JllCLABBIJllD By Author i ty ot_ _,C....,(A.....,_ man ore I OFFICE OF STRATEG IC SERVIC ES TUI' Ub""L WASHIN GTO N , O . C. 10 April 1945 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT : The following information, transmitted by the 0SS rep resentative in Bern, is a s equel to previous memoranda concern ing the possible surrender of German forces in North Italy. It i s a summary of a mor~ comprehensive report which has been com municated to AFHQ. Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff, the Higher SS and Police Leader in Italy; Generaloberst Heinrich von Vi etinghoff, Commander of the German forces in It aly; and Generalleutnant Roettiger, v on Vietinghoff's Chief of Staf f , have request ed the text of the :Allied surrender formula, but have made certain stipulat ions regarding "military honor" and the disposition of forces to be surrendered. Wolff reports, through his emissary, t hat he held long conferences with von Vietinghoff and Roettiger on 5 and 7 April at which the principle of unconditional surrender was not ques tioned provided such surrende~ be "honorable". All three rec ognize that since the German armies in Italy soon will be iso lat ed, von Vietinghoff i s justified in acting on his own initia- REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ·....- ' . - 2 - TSP. 8!8AET tive . 'folff r ecognizes the futility of further fighting, but reports t hat von Vietinghoff, an old- line soldier, insists thst the surrender be ' dressed up• so as to be compatible with bis ' mi l itary honor• and to avoid placing him in the position of a traitor . Subjoct to solving this ' military honor• problem, t he t hree men have proposed s point on the front l i nes through which Al l ied representatives may pass safely to conclude the surrender, and they have pr ociised "8•in to do everything possible to prevent destruction, to l imit warfare against I talian partisane, and to prot ect pr isoners and host"8es. They state, however, that Ad mi ral Doenitz has ordered marine destruption and they doubt whether they can effoct ively prevent this. &&w.J~ C. F.dward Buxton Acting Di rector REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED I 5 I t OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTO N, D. C. 9 April 1945 Miss Urace Tully The White House Dear Miss Tully: I believe the attached report will be of interest to the President. Sincerely yours, }j~&;;/h. G. &lward Buxton Acting Director Enclosure. DI CLASS:Um By Authori t y ot._lllilk1111i161/""/}-..__ OFFICE O F STRATEGIC S ERVICES L -"/1 WASHINGTON, D. C. ~11 - ~ 1 9 April 1945 ME.\IORANIX.JM FOR THE PRESIDENT : The following information, transmitted by t he OSS rep resentative in Bern, is a sequel to a memorandum dated 27 March concerning approaches via Heinz Heintze of the German Foreign Office, from a Bavarian Nazi group headed by Franz Xaver Ritter von Epp, the Reichsstadthalter (Governor) of Bavaria: A trusted messenger who is working with Heintze re t urned to Swit zerland on 6 April from Munich, where he made contact with the von Epp group. Source confirms that von Epp arid several other high-ranking officers are prepared to do ev- in Bavaria' . , erything within their power to cut short warfare • to prevent unnecessary destruct i on in Bavaria, and, if possible, to prevent est ablishment of the "redoubt". Among those working with von Epp are Gener al Karl Kriebel, commanding lehrkreis VII, Munich ; Generalleutnant (X.) Wolfgang Vorwald, c ommandant of Luftgau VII , llunich, who controls the ground personnel of the large airfields in the Munich area (including Schleisshei.m and Ri ehm) and at the Reichenhall airdrome near Salzburg; and Ober gruppenfuehrer Benno Martin, Higher SS and Police Leader for REGRADED UNCLJ\ ~C: fFIED T-- - 2 - Wehrkreis XIII, Nuremberg. The group also includes several younger officers and government officials. The messenger reports that the group is prepared im mediately to receive a radio operator ,LOperati onal details are here omitteg7. (The OSS representative comments that while the von Epp group may not be able to tii.ke effective act i on against t he SS in Bavari~ , the dropping of a radio operator appears worth the gamble and should at least produce useful military infor mati on.) The messenger reports that the •redoubt" i s becoming a reality. Large quantities of supplies are accumulating in the Salzburg area, prominent hostages are arriving, and the lo~al popul ation is being evacuated. There are indications that the Oii is being t ransferred from the Bendlerstrasse, Berlin, to Bad Reichenhall, and that parts of the Foreign Of fice are being transferred to Badgastein, 75 miles south of Salzburg. Only a small number of troops are at present in the •redoubt ", including an estimated 6000 SS troops in the Salz burg-Berchtesgaden area. General Iarl Weissenberger , the com mandant of Wehrk:reis XIII, Nuremberg, i s an ardent Nazi and REGRADED U!\CLASSIFIED - .3 - must be expected to fight to the end. Obergruppenfllehrer Wilhelm Ioppe, Higher SS and Police Leader for Wehrkreis VII , Munich, is a Nazi of the worst type, who was guilty of many crimes while he was on the staff of Hans Frank, the former German Governor of Poland. No cooperation can be expected of Koppe. 9/~fktt. G. Edward Buxton Acting Director • REGRAD.EL' Ul\-...... AGSfo1ED