In Living (Techni)color: The Rise of Colour Film in Hollywood and Beyond

CIN201- Film Cultures I AN LI TSANG Professor Brian Jacobson TA: David Davidson Assignment 2 Tuesday March 13, 2018

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Presently, films viewable in full colour have become so commonplace that they are taken for granted. A simplistic divide is often created in the minds of viewers between the ‘old’− films ​ ​ in black and white− and the ‘modern’− cinema which makes use of the colour spectrum as an integral meaning making aspect of film language and syntax. The ubiquity of colour film ​ ​ throughout history is much more fragmented and piecemeal that it appears however, and is not strictly a modernizing phenomenon that at one time became widespread and standardized within the industry. In fact, from its outset in the 19th century, film was already planned to be “the ​ ​ complete and total representation of reality […] the creation of perfect illusion of the outside world through sound, colour and three-dimensionality” by its proponents, some devising colouring processes such as hand tinting or assembly line stenciling to achieve colour effects

(Bazin 15; Belton 339). The need for colour was thus partially fueled by creativity and a desire to ​ ​ replicate our natural perceptive experience of the world, but for the next century it remained peripheral and “relegated to a novelty” mainly attempting to gain popularity as a box office spectacle (Belton 339). In the United States, the 1930s through late 1950s also represent how ​ ​ economic competition and legal influence spurred colour film development, as “over 100 different colour processes (with over 100 different names) introduced to the public” vied for dominance in the free market (339). ​ This paper will thus attempt to explore these forces in the proliferation of colour film through a focus on the metonymic Technicolor company, founded by Herbert T. Kalmus, W. ​ ​ ​ Burton Wescott and Daniel Comstock in 1915, which became the industry leader in colour film after the invention of its three colour cinematography technology in 1932 (Higgins 358; Beatty

9). It will explore its technical processes and effects on the industry, the way it was marketed to ​ ​

Tsang 2 audiences, and its eventual decline through the 1950s due to an antitrust court battle that increased competition from more accessible colour film technologies. ​ Technicolor is reported to have been developing colour film apparatuses like projectors out of a rail-car-turned-laboratory in Florida as early as 1917, but its formal 2 colour system was first made commercially available in 1928, comprising equipment like cameras, transfer machines, and film printers as well as specialized film stock (“Two New Processes Open Bright

Colour Movie Future” C3; Ball 128). Together, these components formed a process where ​ ​ colours of a scene could be photographically reproduced as complementary colour negatives on two separated strips of film made sensitive to the red and green sides of the colour spectrum (Ball

128-129). These were then combined into a single negative, originally by gluing the separate ​ ​ strips together and creating a final positive print with the correct colours, though later the process involved the positive print itself being dyed using “imbibitive” dyes through gelatin matrices, with a separate soundtrack added from a ‘blank’ strip used solely for audio (129). When the ​ ​ footage was projected back, it thus synthesized and displayed colour with a competent degree of fidelity, representing a “natural” process that improved the “artificial” hand colouring methods used previously (Belton 339). A three colour system was planned from the beginning by ​ ​ Technicolor, though it proved difficult to dye the prints using an odd number of colours or to keep consistent image quality when using a “beam splitter” to separate light into three separate colour fields through the camera (Ball 130; “Two New Processes” C3). It took until 1932 for ​ ​ Technicolor to be able to capture and reproduce the entire colour spectrum by adding a blue sensitive strip to their original red and green cameras, and perfecting a film stock version of

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CMYK printing which allowed for a highly accurate and manipulable process where values and tints could also be adjusted on the stock during post-production (Ball 131-132). ​ Partially attempting to tap into an existing desire for colour and partially attempting to manufacture a market demand for their product in a black and white film world, Technicolor began advertising itself as the future of film, as in 1929 when it proclaimed that “in two years or ​ ​ less black and white motion pictures will be as sparse as silent pictures are today [...] Technicolor ​ ​ will be as necessary to the picture as actors” (Beatty 9). Campaigns like these were lofty and ​ ​ somewhat overblown, but they demonstrated the drive of the company to plant the seed of an all colour film market within a public consciousness, as well as their attempts to push the

Technicolor brand name as one synonymous with colour motion pictures on the whole. Already targeting, rather transparently, Hollywood’s bottom line in order to create a sense of urgency for colour film, they also cited box office statistics that accentuated the profits of colour film marketed as spectacle, trying to convince audiences and industry alike that “‘Technicolor’ must be made a box office name [...] so that producers and exhibitors-- grossing more with ​ ​

Technicolor-- will find that [it] ought to be used for every motion picture” (9). ​ At first, the two colour system held a degree of traction with 12 studio features made using Technicolor between 1929-1933 (Higgins 548). Although, it’s real market gains were ​ ​ through a lucrative relationship with animation studios like Disney, able to easily adapt to using the Technicolor process they created eye catching shorts like the Silly Symphonies that would ​ ​ prove extremely popular among audiences (Higgins 359-360; “Two New Processes” C3). By the ​ ​ time of the three colour process however, most studios were convinced to finally experiment on a greater level with Technicolor, due to its marketable qualities of spectacle (Beatty 9; “Domestic

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Picture Brighter, Foreign in Doubt: Johnston”). Following the positive public reception of the ​ ​ first three colour “demonstrative” but also commercially motivated film Becky Sharp (1935) ​ ​ produced by the Technicolor-invested Pioneer Pictures and distributed by RKO, the audience draw of seeing a film “in living colour” was hard to ignore, essentially turning the original idea of a total realist cinema itself into a novelty (Higgins 358-360, 376-37; “Fascinating, Colorful

‘Becky Sharp’” 4-5). These methods of using Technicolor to impress and entice audiences with ​ ​ spectacle would also create its lasting association with musicals which already relied on showy, subjects using song and dance. They adopted colour along these lines, and the genre pushed ​ ​ stylization rather than realism to find a distinct look and feel that would be continually reproduced to the point that “almost every important picture in the musical classification” was made in Technicolor by the 1950s (Leyendecker 18). Colour films largely remained secondary to ​ ​ regularized black and white production until the 1960s but the amount of colour footage processed by Technicolor did increase periodically between 1932 and 1948, suggesting and uptake in the popularity and viability of colour films during that period (White, Weld & Co. ​

384-387). ​ Gradually integrating, albeit extremely slowly, the presence of color cinematography began tangibly affecting the industry over time. Other competitive processes, most notably the ​ ​ bitone Cinecolor, would allow for market alternatives to Technicolor, but the significantly increased accuracy of recorded colours in the Technicolor three colour system kept it as the top choice for major studios (Leyendecker 18-19). There took place a shift in aesthetics as well as ​ ​ requisite production modes for colour motion pictures as the Technicolor company itself, alongside individual film workers, experimented with techniques for shooting in colour so that

Tsang 5 films would translate well through development and make full use of potential graphic possibilities (“Technicolor Film Improvement Shown by Studio Tests” 34; Handley 169). This ​ ​ ranged from subtle makeup and costuming choices that were previously obscured in black and white, to new ways of designing and painting sets and matte shots for special effects; many productions switched to new kinds lower cost of arc lighting since fewer and less powerful lamps were needed to make the mis en scene intelligible (Haskin 29; “Technicolor Film Improvement”

34-35; Handley 170). Additionally, while it is too broad of a topic to discuss at length in this ​ ​ historically focused account, colour brought new creative meaning-making possibilities to cinema inasmuch as it could align films more closely with viewers’ natural perceptions of reality and be used expressively or symbolically by filmmakers to further storytelling, characterization, or other motifs. President Herbert T. Kalmus’ ex-wife Natalie worked extensively on this ​ ​ ​ ​ dimension within the company, serving as an on set liaison and writing a guide to her stylistic approach called “Color Consciousness” in 1935 which detailed the emotional, artistic and narrative ways colour might be considered during before and during production (Kalmus

138-147). ​ As a result, the Technicolor company was able to cleverly consolidate its ubiquity within the industry throughout the 30s and 40s because of these productive shifts. It became clear that education and consultation was essential within the black and white dominated system so that colour pictures could utilize the entire spectrum offered, and ensure the most attractive, marketable film possible (White, Weld & Co. 387). As such, Technicolor took steps to include ​ ​ ​ ​ these services under their corporate umbrella, seamlessly inserting more of their own staff into productions as ‘experts’ and shaping their brand image to project a unique professionalism and

Tsang 6 experience. Productions working with Technicolor might have been reassured by their corporate ​ ​ belief that “know how is a far more important element than patent protection” while trying to exploit their technology, but studios were often upsold by Technicolor’s encouragement to hire members of the corporate Camera Department who would assist with the proprietary equipment, or their “specially trained” camera operators (387). Relating to the work of Natalie Kalmus, an ​ ​ entire Colour Consultant Department could further be brought on to work alongside a film’s creatives to “ assist in the various artistic problems involved in using colour to the best advantage”(387). To reinforce the corporate propriety Technicolor had for the pictures it worked ​ ​ on, filmmakers were lastly required to use Technicolor’s processing and printing labs to ensure the best results for their footage (386). This brought to fruition some of the company’s earlier ​ ​ goals of positioning itself as the most knowledgeable and synonymous colour film firm, and despite the emergence of alternatives such as Cinecolor, Technicolor eventually gained the exclusive position of producing “the positive prints for all Class A pictures and [...] most of the ​ ​ shorts and cartoons” between 1934 and 1947 (Stokes 1). ​ Despite the success of these tactics in growing the company's prevalence and desirability in Hollywood, there were also many dissidents who complained of Technicolor’s 90% hold over the colour market; their requirement to use their private labs had led to back ups, delays and even ​ ​ postponement of film releases due to the limited capacity (“Two New Processes” C3; Hift 23). ​ ​ ​

Technicolor’s exclusive business model and its tightening grip on the U.S. market thus led to it ​ ​ ​ ​ being targeted with legal action by the United States Department of Justice in 1948, since anti-collusion campaigns by the Truman government had begun a year prior, seeking to break up trusts in varying industries wherein “price fixing, patent pooling, territorial division, collusive

Tsang 7 bidding and various other monopolistic practices” were occurring (Wood 50; Stokes 1). ​ ​ ​ Technicolor, alongside film giant Eastman Kodak were named in the larger Hollywood investigation, though they were specifically singled out for their perceived attempts to “restrain and monopolize the business of professional colour cinematography” by fostering an exclusive relationship between their companies (“Technicolor Companies, Eastman Kodak Named in

Anti-Trust Action” 3). The government alleged “a series of agreements [...] whereby patents, new ​ ​ ​ ​ developments and information relating to colour photography would be ‘reserved for

Technicolor’s exclusive use’” as reason to believe why the two companies were engaging in trust actions (“Technicolor Companies” 3). Kodak, though defensive at first settled by consent decree ​ ​ fairly readily in 1948, but Technicolor, arguably the more monopolistic of the two, fought the claims until it 1950 when it and the Justice Department finally declared terms that would allow the charges could be rescinded (“Technicolor Companies” 3; “Technicolor To Let Its Patents” ​ ​

11). This was met with backlash by certain critics of the company, since Technicolor was not ​ ​ required to admit any legal violations (“Wider Use of Technicolor Seen as Decree Result” 10). ​ The decree was a major blow to Technicolor’s industrial omnipresence as well despite their claim of consent to the terms. These stipulated that 92 of the company’s patents would be ​ ​ made freely accessible to the entire film industry, while 12 others, all its pending patents, and any it acquired before 1953 could be licensed on the basis of a “reasonable royalty” (“Wider Use of

Technicolor Seen as Decree Result” 10). It also stopped Technicolor from forcing studios to rent ​ ​ their proprietary cameras, hire their operators or special colour consultants, or use their lab facilities (“Wider Use” 10). Similarly, the plans for its 3 strip cameras became freely available to ​ ​ other manufacturers, and required Technicolor to train anyone interested in their ‘know how’,

Tsang 8 techniques, or corporate practices (“Technicolor To Let” 11). Any competitors, such as Cinecolor ​ ​ or the newer Republic Studio-owned Trucolor could now take advantage of Technicolor’s innovations in addition to any of their own original processes (“Two New Processes” C3).

Herbert T. Kalmus insisted however, that Technicolor’s reputation and quality would maintain its ​ ​ reign over colour films, and might even propel it to more success as colour films became ​ ​ widespread and normalized (“Two New Processes” C3; “Wider Use” 10). ​ ​ ​

Kalmus was partially correct, since colour cinematography exploded in popularity after ​ ​ the consent decree ruling and into the 1950s, but in this competitive market Technicolor would ​ ​ not remain the leading colour company. Instead of reserving colour solely “for important feature ​ ​ pictures” that had previously gone to Technicolor, studios looking to stimulate film attendance ​ ​ could make use of a plethora of smaller and sometimes studio-specific processing firms, allowing ​ ​ for a total of 137 colour films to be scheduled for release in the 1951-52 film season

(Leyendecker 18). As mentioned, Cinecolor had been a competitor for some time, catering to the ​ ​ ​ ​ independent market as a lower profile alternative, but after the release of the Technicolor patents ​ ​ they brought out their three colour method of ‘Supercinecolor’ and were hired to process more than 40 features, compared to Technicolor’s 76 (19). Similarly, Trucolor, which had been ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​

Republic’s draw for their routine output of Westerns, began using it’s own three colour model in ​ ​

1950, later being picked up by RKO as well (“Republic Works on Trucolor” 20, Leyendecker ​ ​ ​ ​

19). Though Technicolor had seemingly always advocated for an all colour film market, only ​ ​ ​ ​ 16-18% percent of films were made in colour when it held a majority stake processing in the late

1940s, the numbers only growing after the end of its monopoly, when the overall number of films ​ ​ ​ ​ per season dropped, but the number of colour films rose to 23.8% of the market in 1951 and to ​ ​ ​ ​

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39.8% by 1952 (“Domestic Picture Brighter” 9). Nonetheless,Technicolor still maintained ​ ​ ​ ​ influence over colour in film and planned to fight back against its competitors by expanding globally where there were high foreign demands, stating in a 1952 report to stockholders that ​ ​ “barring revolutionary and unforeseen developments” they would remain profitable and productive within Hollywood, Europe and Japan (White, Weld & Co. 391; Hift 23). ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ A final democratization of the colour film world soon destabilized Technicolor completely and more quickly than it expected, but it was not completely unforeseen as ​ ​ Technicolor had researched and considered implementing the technology that further engineered it’s deposition, before deciding it was “of much less importance” than its other operations (White, ​ ​ ​

Weld & Co. 386). Just as its patents were being made public in 1950, former partner Eastman ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​

Kodak delivered on a ‘monopack’ film that had previously been a joint venture, undercutting ​ ​ Technicolor at their lowest point by introducing a stock with three colour-sensitized emulsion layers that worked in any regular black and white camera and which could be processed at virtually any lab (“Technicolour, Eastman Work on 1-Colour Negative Camera” 1,3 ;“Eastman ​ ​ ​ ​

May Pop New Color” 5,63). They undermined the unique quality, machinery and services offered ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ by Technicolor and potentially boasted savings at least on raw stock costs, making it a more ​ ​ flexible and accessible medium than ever before (“Eastman May Pop” 5,63). It is also easy to see ​ ​ ​ ​ that Technicolor’s disinterest in monopack was related to its business model, which would be made obsolete by a low maintenance stock that did not require their specialized equipment or the close watch of their brand officers (White, Weld & Co. 384). Consequently, colour film continued ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ to grow as a force within filmmaking as the means became more widely available and user friendly. Technicolor’s returns lowered year after year and its processing and printing capacity ​ ​

Tsang 10 decreased by almost half between 1953 and 1957 (White, Weld & Co 384). Colour film became ​ ​ so commonplace and divided into hundreds of similar processes, it was eventually irrelevant to ​ ​ viewers and studios alike which colour company they utilized . ​

As this essay has discussed, the story of colour coming to film was a gradual and ​ ​ fragmented shift that took place over several decades, largely driven by the innovative and ​ ​ synonymous Technicolor company which emerged into an American industry established for black and white. Partially playing back to the desires of early filmmakers to create a ‘total ​ ​ cinema’ with colour and sound that mimicked our natural way of seeing the world, and partially ​ ​ relying on the economic gains they made using colour as an attractive spectacle, Technicolor ​ ​ attempted to convince Hollywood and its audiences to accept and experiment with colour in order to explore all the creative, narrative and industrial possibilities it presented. By the 1950s, ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ colour cinematography exploded ironically as a result of Technicolor’s loosening hold on the industry, due to antitrust legal issues and the introduction of the democratizing Eastmancolor ​ ​ monopack film. This led to an unprecedented integration of colour into motion pictures, defining ​ ​ ​ ​ to some what made cinema unique in the face of the encroaching world of television (“Films

Stress Color As Answer to TV” 17). Ultimately, as television itself gained colour, a new market ​ ​ ​ ​ opened for syndicated colour films, and as cinema became routinely colourful, further moving to ​ ​ video and digital modes, it was apparent that colour on film was not simply a gimmick or trend ​ ​ that would have come and gone, but an important addition to film style and language influenced ​ ​ by economics, technology, artistry and industry in varying ways. Though it was eventually ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ overcome by its competitors, it is still worth recognizing the way that colour film and the brand ​ ​ name ‘Technicolor’ remain interchangeable even in the modern day. ​

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Works Cited

Ball, J.A. “ The Technicolor Process of Three Colour Cinematography.” Journal of the Society of ​ Motion Picture Engineers vol. 25, no. 2, July 1935, p. 127-138. ​ Bazin , André. “The Myth of Total Cinema” (1946) What is Cinema?, translated by Timothy ​ ​ Barnard, Caboose, 2009, p. 13-20.

Beatty, Jerome. “ Black and Whites Fading Out, Says Technicolor-That’s Why for Ads.” Variety, ​ ​ December 18, 1929 p. 9.

Belton, John. “Introduction: Colour Film.” Film History, vol.12, no. 4, 2000, p. 339-40. ​ ​ “Domestic Picture Brighter, Foreign in Doubt: Johnston.” Boxoffice, vol. 64 ,no.9, May 15 1954 ​ ​ p. 9.

“Eastman Pops New Color; Substantial Rawstock Savings Seen, Plus Techni Competition.”

Variety, Vol. 193, no. 3, December 23 1953 p.5, 63. ​ “Fascinating, Colorful ‘Becky Sharp’.” Motion Picture Daily, vol. 37, no. 142, p.4-5. ​ ​ "Films Stress Color As Answer to TV: Studios and Distributors See Box Office Aided.” New ​ York Herald Tribune, July 15, 1952, p. 17. ​ Handley, C.W. “The Advanced Technic of Technicolor Lighting.” Journal of the Society of ​ Motion Picture Engineers vol. 29, no. 2, August 1937, p. 169-177. ​ Haskin, Byron. “Making Modern Matte Shots.” American Cinematographer, vol. 21, no. 1, ​ ​ January 1940, p. 29-31.

Hift, Fred. “Worldwide Switch to Colour: U.S. Labs in Other Lands” Variety, May 18, 1953, p. ​ ​ 23.

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Higgins, Scott. “Demonstrating Three-Colour Technicolor: Early Three-Colour Aesthetics and

Design.” Film History, vol.12, no. 4, 2000, p. 328-383. ​ ​ Kalmus, Natalie. “Colour Consciousness.” Journal of the Society of Motion Picture Engineers ​ vol. 25, no. 2, July 1935, p. 138-147.

Leyendecker, Frank. “Plenty of Color Coming; 137 Films on Schedule.” Boxoffice, September ​ ​ 29, 1951, p.18-19.

“Republic Works on ‘Trucolor.’” Chicago Defender, September 23, 1950, p. 20. ​ ​ Stokes, Dillard. “Monopolies Charged in Auto Tires, Color Movies.” The Washington Post,

August 19, 1947

“Technicolor Companies, Eastman Kodak Named In Anti-Trust Action.” Wall Street Journal, ​ Aug 19, 1947, p. 3.

“Technicolor Film Improvements Shown by Studio Tests.” Motion Picture Projectionist, vol.4, ​ ​ no.9, July 1931, p.34-35.

“Technicolour, Eastman Work on 1-Colour Negative Camera.” The Film Daily, vol.72, no. 17,

July 1 1937, p. 1,3.

“Technicolor To Let Its Patents.” New York Times, Feb 25, 1950, pg. 11. ​ ​ “Two New Processes Open Bright Color-Movie Future.” New York Herald Tribune, October 23, ​ ​ 1949, p.C3

TCP of White, Weld & Co. “Analysis of Technicolor Stock” (Originally published 1952) Film ​ History, vol.12, no. 4, 2000, p. 384-392. ​ Wood, Lewis. “U.S. To Push Drive Against ‘Trusts’.” New York Times, January 3, 1948, p. 50. ​ ​ “Wider Use of Technicolor Seen as Decree Result.” Boxoffice, March 4, 1950, p. 10. ​ ​