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University Microfilms International 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 USA St. John's Road, Tyler's Green High Wycombe, Bucks, England HP10 8HR 77-24,678 NGUYEN, To-Thi, 1940- A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF VOICE OF AMERICA NEWS BROADCASTS TO VIETNAM. The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1977 Mass Communications
Xerox University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan 4sio6 PLEASE NOTE:
Print on pages 299 through 31A is broken and indistinct, Best available copy. Filmed as received. UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS. A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF VOICE OF AMERICA w. NEWS BROADCASTS TO VIETNAM
DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University
by
To-Thi Nguyen, B.A., M.A.
* * * * *
The Ohio State University
1977
Reading Committee;
I. Keith Tyler . r j ' Russell R. Dynes ' / /' ( /V 0 jo Arewa ' v / 1 j • --( Adviser t " Faculty of Curriculum and Foundations ACKNOWIEDGMENTS
I would like to express gratitude to my adviser, Dr. I. Keith
Tyler for his guidance and advice, which made the completion of this research possible.
I would like to thank the late Miss Ruth C. Bailey, Foreign
Students Adviser for making it possible for me to continue my graduate education. Special thanks are given to my long time surrogate parents.
Professor and Mrs. Robert Gatrell whose quiet affection, encouragement and assistance have made me feel at home away from home.
I would also like to acknowledge and thank my friends Mukul Mehta and James Pinto for their thoughtful help in the final typing of this research.
Finally, I would like to dedicate this research to my late father
Nguyen Due Mai, who went against tradition to support the advanced education of his daughter; and to my husband. Dr. Bruno Bosacchi, whose intellect, encouragement, and faithful love have sustained me through difficult times.
XI. VITA
January 29, 1 9 ^ 0 ...... Born - Hanoi, Vietnam
1 9 6 4 ...... B.A in English, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio
1964 - 1967 ...... Teacher Superviser and Instructor in English as a Second language Vietnamese-American Bi-national Center, Saigon, Vietnam
1969 . . M.A. , Radio-TV Education, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio
1969 - 1970 ...... Instructional Television Coordinator, University of Illinois, Chicago Circle Campus, Chicago, Illinois
1971 - 1973 ...... ITV Producer-Director, Instructional Television Office, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.
1973 - 1976 ...... Free lance researcher
FIELDS OF STUDY
Major Field! Educational Communications
111 TABIfî OF CONTENTS
Page
Acknowledgements ...... ü
Vita iii
List of Tables ......
List of Figures ......
CHAPTER
I Introduction ...... 1
The Need to Study the Message in International Communication
II The Scope of the Study ...... 7
1. Why Study the Voice of America's 7 Vietnamese Broadcasts?
2. Review of Literature ...... 10
3. Statement of the Problem ...... 12
4. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses ...... 13
III Methodology ...... 17
1. The Voice of America's Vietnamese Language Service ...... 18
2, Research Procedure ...... 21
IV Descriptive Analysis of Program Format ..... 26
V Theme Analysis ...... 41
VI Source Analysis ...... 75
VII Proposition Analysis ...... a
VIII Objectivity Analysis ...... 1$6
iv IX Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendation ...... 279
APENDIX
A Voice of America's Charter ...... 298
B List of Proposition Headings ...... 300
C U.S.I.A. Director Shakespeare's Directive .... 312
D Organizational Charts of VGA and BBC .... 315 LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1 Amount and Percentage of Hard News and Commentary In VGA's Total Coverage: May 8-1?» 1972 . . . ’...... 29
2 Amount and Percentage of Vietnam-Related Hard News and Vietnam Related Commentary in Total VGA's Coverage...... 30
3 Amount and Percentage of Vietnam Hard News and Vietnam Commentary in Vietnam Coverage Only ...... 31
Amount and Percentage of Vietnam News and Vietnam Commentary In Total VGA Coverage on A Daily B a s i s ...... 33
5 Amount and Percentage of Vietnam Hard News and Vietnam Commentary in Vietnam Coverage Only Gn a Daily B a s i s ...... 3^
6 Amount and Percentage of Vietnam Hard News In Total Hard News Coverage and Vietnam Commentary In Total Commentary Coverage ...... 35
7 Amount and Percentage of Vietnam Hard News In Total Hard News Coverage and Vietnam Commentary In Total Commentary Coverage on a Daily Basis ...... 46
8 Inter-Coder Agreement ...... 47
9 Rank Order of Theme Categories In The VGA's Vietnam Coverage ...... 48
10 Amount and Percentage of "Mining Issue" Coverage (Category l) In Total Vietnam Coverage on a Daily B a s i s ...... 50
11 Amount and Percentage of "Military" Coverage (Category 2) In Total Vietnam Coverage Gn a Daily B a s i s ...... 51
12 Amount and Percentage of "Vietnam Issue" Coverage (Category 3) In Total Vietnam Coverage on a Daily B a s i s ...... 52
13 Amount and Percentage of "S.Vietnam-Domestic" Coverage (Category 4) In Total Vietnam Coverage on a Daily B a s i s ...... 53 vi LIST OF TABLES, cont.
Page Table
14 Amount and Percentage of "Mining Operations Coverage (Category 5) In Total Vietnam Coverage on a Daily B a s i s ...... •
15 Amount and Percentage of "U.S. Events' Coverage (Category 6) In Total Vietnam Coverage on A Daily B a s i s ...... 55
16 Amount and Percentage of "Peace Talks" Coverage (Category 7 ) In Total Vietnam Coverage on a Daily Basis ...... 56
17 Amount and Percentage of "N,Vietnam & Their Allies" Coverage (Category . In,Total Vietnam Coverage On a Daily B a s i s ...... 57
18. Distribution of "Mining Issue" Coverage (Category l) On a Daily Basis ...... 58
19 Distribution of "Military" Coverage (Category 2) On a Daily Basis ...... 59
20 Distribution of "Vietnam Issue" Coverage (Category 3) On a Daily B a s i s ...... 60
21 Distribution of "S. Vietnam-Domestic" Coverage (Category 4) On a Daily B a s i s ...... 6l
22 Distribution of "Mining Operations" Coverage (Category 5) On a Daily Basis-...... 62
23 Distribution of "U.S.Events" Coverage (Category 6 On a Daily B a s i s ...... 63
24 Distribution of "Peace Talks" Coverag;e (Category 7 ) On A Daily B a s i s ...... 64
25 Distribution of "N. Vietnam and Their Allies" Coverage (Category 8) on a Daily Basis ...... 65
26 Amount and Percentage of Subcategory Coverage in "Mining Issue" Coverage ...... 68
vii LIST OF TABIES, cont.
Table Page
27 Amount and Percentage of Subcategory Coverage in "Military" Coverage...... 68
28 Amount and Percentage of Subcategory Coverage In "Vietnam Issue" Coverage ...... 69
29 Amount and Percentage of Subcategory Coverage In "South Vietnam -Domestic" Coverage ...... 69
30 Amount and Percentage of Subcategory Coverage In "Mining Operations" Coverage ...... 70
31 Amount and Percentage of Subcategory Coverage In "U.S. Events" Coverage ...... 70
32 Amount and Percentage of Subcategory Coverage In "Peace Talks" Coverage ...... 71
33 Amount and Percentage of Subcategory Coverage In "N. Vietnam & Their Allies" Coverage ...... 71
3^ Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage in "Mining Issue"- U.S. Reactions" Coverage ...... 72
35 Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage in "Mining Issue- Western Reactions" Coverage ...... 82
36 Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage in "Mining Issue - Asian Reactions" Coverage ...... 83
37 Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage in "Mining Issue - Combined Allies' Reactions" Coverage . . . 84-
38 Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage in "Mining Issue - Communist Reactions" Coverage ...... 87
39 Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage in "Mining Issue - United Nations Reactions" Coverage ...... 88
4-0 Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage in the Total Coverage of "Mining Issue" ...... 89
4-1 Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage in "Mining Issue" Coverage : A Summary...... 90
viii LIST OF TABLES, cont.
Table Page
4-2 Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage in "Military - U.S." Coverage ...... 92
4-3 Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage in "Military - S. Vietnam " Coverage...... 93
44- Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage in "Military - Communist" Coverage...... 93
4-5 Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage in The Total Coverage of "Military"...... 96
4-6 Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage in The Coverage of "Military"; A Summary ...... 97
4-7 Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage in "Vietnam Issue - U.S. View and Allies' View" Coverage . . 98
48 Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage in "Vietnam Issue- Communist View" Coverage ...... 100
49 Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage in The Total Coverage of "Vietnam Issue" ...... 101
50 Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage in The Coverage of "Vietnam Issue"; A Summary ...... • 102
51 Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage in The Total Coverage of "South Vietnam -Domestic".... 104
52. Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage in the Coverage of "South Vietnam -Domestic": A Summary .... 105
53 Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage in the Coverage of "Mining Operations" ...... 106
54 Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage in the Coverage of "U.S.Events": A Summary ...... 10?
55' Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage in "Peace Talks - U.S. View" Coverage ...... I09
56 Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage in "Peace Talks - South Vietnam's View" Coverage ...... 110
i ' X LIST OT TABLES, cont.
Table Page
57 Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage in "Peace Talks' - Communist View Coverage ...... Ill
58 Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage in "Peace Talks - Allies' View" Coverage ...... 112
59 Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage in The Coverage of "Peace Talks" ...... 113
60 Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage in The Coverage of "Peace Talks": A Summary...... 114
61 Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage in "North Vietnam & Their Allies" Coverage ...... 115
62 Total Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage In The Total Coverage of The Period Ife,y 8-17, 1972 . . . 117
63 Inter-Coder Agreement in the Evaluation of Propositions ...... 124
64 Amount and Percentage of Proposition Headings In The Coverage of "Mining Issue - U.S Reactions" .... 126
65 Evaluative Dimensions of Propositions By Sources In the Coverage of "Mining Issue-U.S. Reactions" . . . . 127
66 Amount and Percentage of Proposition Headings In The Coverage of "Mining Issue - Western Reactions" . . 133
67 Evaluative Dimensions of Propositions By Sources In The Coverage of "Mining Issue - Western Reactions" . . 134
68 Amount and Percentage of Proposition Headings in The Coverage of "Mining Issue - Asian Reactions" .... I38
69 Evaluative Dimensions of Propositions By Sources In The Coverage of "Mining Issue -Asian Reactions" . . . 139
70 Amount and Percentage of Propositions Headings in The Coverage of "Mining Issue -Communist Reactions" . . . 142
71 Evaluative Dimensions of Propostions By Sources In The Coverage of "Mining Issue - Communist Reactions" . . 143
X LIST OF TABLES, cont.
Table Page
72 Evaluative Dimensions of Proposition Headings by Sources In the Coverage of "Mining Issue - U.S. . Reactions" ...... 1^5
73 Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions by Subthemes In The Coverage of "Mining Issue" ...... 146
74 Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions in "Mining Issue" Coverage; Summary ...... 146
75 Amount and Percentage of Proposition Headings In The Coverage of "Military - U . S " ...... 148
76 Evaluative Dimensions of Propositions By Sources In The Coverage of "Military - U . S . " ...... 149
77 Amount and Percentage of Proposition Headings in The Coverage of "Military - South Vietnam" ...... 154
78 Evaluative Dimensions of Propositions By Sources In The Coverage of "Military - South Vietnam" .... 155
79 Amount and Percentage of Proposition Headings In the Coverage of "Military - Communist"...... 157
80 Evaluative Dimensions of Propositions By Sources In The Coverage of "Military - Communist"...... 158
81 Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions in the Coverage of "Military"...... I63
82 Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions in the Coverage of "Military": Summary ...... I63
83 Amount and Percentage of Propositions Headings in "Vietnam Issue" Coverage ...... I65
84 Evaluative Dimensions of Propositions By Sources in The Coverage of "Vietnam Issue" ...... I66
85 Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions in the Coverage of "Vietnam Issue" : Summary ...... I7 I
XI LIST OF TABLES, cont.
Table Page
86 Amount and Percentage of Proposition Headings In "South Vietnam - Domestic" Coverage ...... 173
87 Evaluative Dimensions of Propositions By Sources In The Coverage of "South Vietnam - Domestic"......
88 Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions in the Coverage of "South Vietnam - Domestic": Summay .... 17^
89 Amount and Percentage of Proposition Headings in "Mining Operations" Coverage ...... 178
90 Evaluative Dimensions of Propositions By Sources In the Coverage of "Mining Operations" ...... 179
91 Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions in the Coverage of "Mining Operations": Summary ...... 181
92 Amount and Percentage of Propositions Headings In "U.S. Events" Coverage ...... 181
93 Evaluative Dimensions of Propositions by Sources In the Coverage of "U.S. Events"...... 182
94- Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions in the Coverage of "U.S. Events" ...... 18^
95 Amount and Percentage of Proposition Headings in "Peace Talks" Coverage ...... 180
96 Evaluative Dimensions of Propositions By Sources In The Coverage of "Peace Talks"...... 186
97 Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions in the Coverage of "Peace Talks" ...... 188
98 Amount and Percentage of Proposition Headings in "North Vietnam & Their Allies" Coverage ...... 188
99 Evaluative Dimensions of Propositions By Sources in The Coverage of "North Vietnam & Their Allies" . . . I89
XI1 LIST OF TABLES, cont.
TALle Page
100 Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions in The Coverage of "North Vietnam &• Their Allies" ...... I90
101 Total Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions in The Total Coverage During May 8 - 17, 1972 ...... I9I
102 Comparative Coverages Between the VOA and the BBC Vietnam Coverage vs. Total Period Coverage ...... 198
103 Comparison of Vietnam Coverage Between the BBC & VOA . . . 199
104 Rank-Order of Themes Covered By BBC & VOA ...... 200
105 Comparison of Source Coverages By BBC & V O A ...... 201
106 Comparison of Source and Subsource Coverage by BBC & V(DA . 202
107 Comparison of Tendency : Editorial...... 204
108 Comparison of Tendency V Official Sources ...... 205
109 Comparison of Tendency : Political Sources ...... 206
110 Comparison of Tendency : Public Sources ...... 207
111 Comparison of Tendency : Chronicle ...... 208
112 News Covered By BBC and Not By VOA (BBC-Not-VOA) .... 209
113 News Covered by VOA and Not By BBC (VOA-Not-BBC) .... 216
114 News Covered By Both BBC and VOA (BBC+VOA)...... 222
115 Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions in the VOA and BBC Editorials ...... 226
116 Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions in the BBC and VOA Coverage of "U.s. -Official" Sources .... 241
117 Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions in the BBC And VOA Coverage of " Official - S. Vietnam"... 244
118 Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions in the BBC and VOA Coverages of "Official - Communist" Sources. . . 246
Xlll LIST OF TABLES, cont.
Table Page
119 Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions in the BBC and VGA Coverages of "Official -British and Official - Other Allies"......
120 Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions In the BBC and VOA Coverages of "Political - U . S " ...... 251
121 Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions in the BBC and VOA Coverages of "Political -S. Vietnam" ..... 25^
122 Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions in the BBC and VOA Coverages of "Political - Britihs" ...... 255
123 Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions in the BBC and VOA Coverages of "Political - Other Allies" . . . 257
124 Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions in the BBC and VOA Coverages of "Public - U.S." ...... 258
125 Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions in the BBC and VOA Coverages of "Public - S. Vietnam"...... 260
126 Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions in the BBC and VOA Coverages of "Public - British" ...... 261
127 Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions in the BBC and VOA Coverages of "Public -Other Allies" ...... 265
128 Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions in the BBC and VOA Coverages of "Chronicle"...... 267
129 Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions By Sources In The Total BBC and VOA Coverages : May 8 - 17, 1972 . . . 271
XXV LIST OF FIGURES
Page
FIGURE 1 Distribution of Vietnam News and Vietnam Commentary on A Daily B a s i s ...... 33
FIGURE 2 Percentage of Vietnam Commentary in Total Commentary...... 36
FIGURE 3 Total Percentage of Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions in the Total Coverage May 8-17, 1972 . . .192
FIGURE 4 Distribution of VOA and BBC News Coverage Along F-U-N Dimensions...... 276
XV CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Need To Study The Message
In International Communication
Mutual understanding among nations as well as the desire to in fluence the policy and public opinion of another nation through the manipulation of events and messages have been human concerns for years.
The acquisition of influence in international politics has become a stronger concern than ever since the beginning of the Cold War era in which different ideologies compete to "win the hearts and minds of men" to their sides. The twentieth century with its advanced communication technology has witnessed an unprecedented flourishing of international communication. The popularization of radio broadcasting and the wide spread distribution of inexpensive transistor radio sets — not to mention the slow but steady spreading of television — have made it possible for the world's peoples to get to know each other better and for various power blocs to convey their point of view directly to the people of other nations. It is common today to see people in develop ing countries cluster around their radio sets to listen to the Voice of
America, or the British Broadcasting Corporation, or Radio Peking, or
Radio Moscow to find out what is going on in the world power struggle. 2
The fact is that events, resulting from decisions made by world powers such as the United States or Russia, are likely greatly to affect the destiny of the third world and its peoples.
The flow of international communication has always been lopsided with a tremendous output from the developed industrialized countries to the developing areas, and little in return. This state of affairs has been documented, especially for television, by a UNESCO survey and analysis of the international flow of television program material. ^
It noted with alarm the evidence of the unilateral, unbalanced nature of the flow of TV newsfilm in the world. There is little hope for a balanced flow in the immediate future since the underdeveloped state of the communication system and the unstable political atmosphere in the developing countries make it very difficult for them to keep up with the news explosion both within their boundaries and all over the world in order to report such happenings from their own perspective. In the foreseeable future it is most probable that foreign broadcast news sources such as the Voice of America, the BBC, Radio Peking, or Radio
Moscow will remain major sources of information for the people in de veloping countries. Consequently, these peoples are likely to be constantly exposed to American messages, or Russian messages, and those from other developed countries.
Any information a human being exchanges will contribute to his education, the shaping of his personality and his outlook on life, one way or the other. The possibility that the information sender (the encoder) may send out selected messages in an attempt to influence the 3 unsuspecting receiver (the decoder) to see reality through the encoder's eyes, to act accordingly, is a real danger to human understanding. An educator, I. Keith Tyler, has pointed out the need for the individual to see the world as it is, and to relate to other citizens of the world:
Today's citizen, wherever he resides, is deeply involved in the world scene. Indeed, his welfare and very survival are dependent upon his collec tive grasp of world events and his consequent successful handling of competition, conflict,and crisis between and among nations and peoples. The development of international understanding is a necessity if the world is to survive and ^ its peoples are to continue to advance and prosper.
All this understanding of the world is developed from the information the individual receives from the mass media. Yet, the mass media may not do justice to the trust that audiences have in them. Harry Skornia, in Television and Society, critically appraised the American television networks, and accused them of distorting the reality of American soci- 3 ety. Robert Girino, in his study of the news media, concluded that the news media used bias, distortion, and censorship to manipulate
American public opinion, thus inhibiting the American democratic 4 process. Daniel Boorstin pointed out how the mass media flood our consciousness with pseudo-events. ^ I. Keith Tyler discussed the intermediary and interpretative role of the American mass media in re porting international events, and their possible effect on the au dience's world view. He commented:
Indeed, in times of international crisis, this process may prevent Americans from viewing it "like it is" because they see and hear not the event itself but rather an interpretation of it by conscious or unconscious selection reflecting accepted or official viewpoints. 4
Similarly, George Gerbner was well aware of the manipulative role of the mass media in the forming of men and their minds:
In many areas of the world today, media of competing systems play increasing important roles. Through selection, treatment emphasis and tone, mass media l) help define their own set of signifi cant realities 2) structure the agenda of public (and, increasingly, of private) discourse and 3) make available dominant perspective from which realities, priorities, actions and policies might be viewed. '
On the international level, the lack of a realistic view of the world may seriously damage the prospect of world peace and world under standing in this time of international crisis and tension. Knowledge concerning the shaping of human minds through communication has an important bearing on human destiny. Karin Dovring, a European scholar who has had personal experience of propaganda during the last world war, said that an understanding of how this communication process works might increase our political awareness, which is essential for respon sible citizenry, and for the ability of self-determination among the developing nations:
If we know more about the daily communication process in our political, social, and religious community, perhaps we could control war propaganda before it controls us, and probably we should not so easily get lost in the propaganda changes from war to cold war, from peace to cold peace.
While it is neither possible nor feasible to eliminate the manipu lative nature of the flow of information both nationally and interna tionally, the option is to study this flow in order to understand how it can inhibit international understanding and the education of a respon 5 sible world citizenry. In this perspective, organized flows of infor mation on a large scale aiming at overseas audiences, such as those represented by the Voice of America, by Radio Moscow, and by other similar institutions, continue to deserve special attention. 6
FOOTNOTES
1. UNESCO. Television Traffic — A One-Way Street? Reports and Papers on Mass Communications No. ?0. Paris; Unesco, 197^.
2. Tyler, I. Keith. Television and World Understanding. Washington B.C.: National Education Association, 1970, P« 1^.
3. Skornia, Harry. Television and Society. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965•
4. Cirino, Robert. Don't Blame the People. New York: Random House Inc., 1971 .
5 . Boorstin, Daniel. The Image. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1961.
6. Tyler, I. Keith. Op.Cit.
7 . Gerhner, George. "Press Perspective in World Communication : A Pilot Study." Journalism Quarterly, 38:313» 19^1•
8. Dovring, Karin. Road of Propaganda. New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1959, P*6. CHAPTER II
THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY
I . Why Study The Voice of America's Vietnamese Broadcasts?
Literature in the field of international communication and propa ganda abounds in studies of Nazi and communist propaganda activities.
These studies respond to the interest and need of a particular period in the world's political scene, ranging from descriptive to quantita tive studies. During the second world war, Kris and Speier made a psycho-sociological study of Nazi radio Propaganda. ^ When the Cold
War began and attention shifted to the communist bloc, there were such descriptive works as Evron Kirkpatrick's account of the global propa- 2 ganda activities of the Soviet Union and its satellites. Or James 3 Markham's study of the Russian and Red Chinese communication system.
John Connally attempted a quantitative study of the persuasion pattern q. of Radio Moscow s North American broadcasts. These studies were done out of the concern about and interest in the communist use of the commu nication media as effective tools to serve their own ends, and that there was the need to understand the persuasion method of present and potential enemies.
The lack of systematic studies of the western world's propaganda, particularly that of the United States, in international communication 8 probably stems from the traditional American aversion toward propa ganda. Evron Kirkpatrick pointed out that "it is not that we in the
U.S. are unfamiliar with propaganda. But propaganda on an international scale, conducted on behalf of the nation by the government, represents something which is, in some sense, foreign to our way of life, and our way of thinking." ^ Ronald Rubin, in his study of the United States
Information Agency, neatly summarized this attitude:
In the American experience, the term "propaganda" has a derogatory meaning. Propaganda has tradi tionally been looked upon as a dirty business necessitated only by such foreign threats as the Nazis in World War II, and more recently, the Communist powers. °
As a consequence. United States propaganda carried out mostly by the United States Information Agency has been typified by nice names such as the "Campaign of Truth" under the Truman administration, or more recently, information programs. It is taken for granted that the western democracies whose ideologies are principally advocated by the United
States throughout the world are not consciously engaged in such nasty activities as propaganda. Frank Shakespeare, then Director of the
United States Information Agency, in an interview with U.S. News and
World Report magazine on May 1st, 1972, insisted that "what we really do in USIA is try to reflect in a panoramic form the sort of life that is lived in the United States." However, he admitted:
This whole cold war that is going on in the world is essentially a clash of idea. If we are not prepared to at least portray and advocate the ideas we believe in, we won't survive. 7 9
The long U.S. involvement in Vietnam — the battlefield where western democracy and communism clashed — for the first time illus trated a systematic intensification of U.S. propaganda effort, and revealed the use of propaganda as an official policy. John Hohenherg reported that a considerable part of the work of Barry Zorthian, the
Director of the Joint United States Public Affairs Office in Saigon, since his appointment in 196^, was directed toward the Vietnamese them selves, seeking to convince them that they should take a greater part g in the fight against communism for democracy. The USIS in Saigon dropped millions of tons of leaflets in areas not controlled by the
South Vietnamese government and allied troops, "producing almost enough g paper to sink this peninsula," as an USIA operative put it. On July
27, 1967 , the Wall Street Journal ran this headline: "Saigon's Psy-War:
U.S. steps up Efforts to Stiffen Vietnamese Will to Carry Battle."
On the air waves, the Voice of America continuously beamed signals across the Pacific to the Vietnamese audience to "explain and seek sup port for American domestic and foreign policies." The VOA's Vietnamese broadcasts increased to 52 hours and 30 minutes a week. In terms of hours of broadcast, it ranked second in importance after only the Voice's
Chinese service.
In view of the United States efforts to contain communism in South
East Asia, of the need on the part of the United States to convince the
Vietnamese to carry on the torch of western democracy, and the increas ingly important role the Voice of America's Vietnamese Service seemed to have assumed in this propaganda effort, it is of great significance to 10 study systematically the VGA's Vietnamese broadcasts. Such a study will provide the necessary insight into the flow of information between the United States, a major world power, and Vietnam, a third world country.
II, Review of Literature
There is very little in-depth study of the Voice of America or its language services. Robert W. Pirsein studied the development of the
Voice of America during the period 19^0-1962. This massive Ph.D. dis sertation (Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, 1972) is a descriptive historical examination of the growth of the Voice since its inception in the 1^4-0's. In other studies, the Voice of America, as a subsidiary of the USIA, is usually treated in a dozen pages within studies of the USIA organization. Wilson Dizard in The Strategy of
Truth (Washington D.G.; Public Affairs Press, I96I) studied the USIA operations from the perspective of a former USIA official in an attempt to help improve its performance in the struggle for men's minds. He gave a detailed but brief description of the Voice of America's develop ment, its facilities and programming. The functions of the USIA during the period I963-I967 in support of the United States' foreign policy were carefully researched by Robert E. Elder in The Information Machine
(Syracuse, New York; Syracuse University Press, I968 ). Elder looked at the USIA operations from an organizational point of view. Discussing the USIA Media Services, he described at length the VOA's organization and how its broadcast policy guidance was made at various levels.
It is important to note that the VGA has been mostly studied at the descriptive level. If there is any critical analysis, it is usually 11
in the form of opinions or observations of VOA's programming practice.
John Hohenberg reported that the VGA was "expected to act as the
nation's propaganda agency overseas, but it was being attacked on various
grounds for ineffectiveness." Hohenberg cited VOA's own chief, Henry loomis, who, at his resignation in 1965» criticized his own agency for
a lack of objectivity:
We must by our very stance communicate . . . the fact that diversity is preferable to uniformity . . . To sweep under the rug what we don't like, what does not serve our tactical purpose, is a sign of weakness. To acknowledge the existence of forces and views in disagreement with the policy makers, to take them specifically into account in the formation of our output . . . is good persuasive propaganda. We must show that the U.S. gains strength, not weakness, from diversity.
At about the same time, Hohenberg noted. Earnest Wiener, Public Relations
Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, in his private message to the
State Department, criticized the VGA for practicing news selectivity:
. . . In almost every case, news citings and comments seemed too obviously selected to bolster the official government position . . . H
The technique of the VGA concerning controversial issues was
strongly berated by the Nation magazine. In its article entitled "VGA
Technique Concerning Accounts of Anti-War Demonstrations," Nation
pointed out that the VOA's analogy of anti-war demonstrations to pre-
World War II alliances among pacifists, communists, isolationists, and
pro-Nazi German-American organizations was an attempt to smear the oppo- 12 sition to the Vietnam war.
On March 7, 197'^, the Washington Post pointed out that for fear o: undercutting United States detente policy, the Voice of America's broad- 12 casts to Russia were "speechless on Gulag Archipelago," which work was
Alexander Solzhenitsyn's monumental expose of life in Russia under
Stalin. In another issue on April 9, 1975, the Washington Post's correspondent from Belgrade reported "increased administration censor ship of news dealing with the current development in South East Asia."
The reporter remarked that VOA's reporting technique "cast doubts about the radio's asserted function — to tell the truth objectively and quickly to listeners many of whose own media are heavily censored by authoritarian governments."
All these criticisms pointed to VOA's selectivity of news to serve its function as a government policy supporter. Indeed, despite VOA's official claim of objectivity and balanced reporting, a former member of USIA Research and Evaluation Staff, Ralph K. White, admitted that it would be mistaken to assume that "we (the U.S.) are too gentlemanly to descend to Soviet tactics and fight fire with fire . . . We use 13 plenty of fire." He believed that besides other weaknesses in pro gramming such as a lack of understanding of its distant audiences, the
VOA's technique of news reporting was the cause of its low credibility, therefore, ineffectiveness. Both White and the Washington Post seemed to agiee that the BBC was ahead of the VOA in credibility. And according to the Washington Post, the VOA was also trailing behind Germany's
Deutche Welle in Eastern Europe.
III. Statement of the Problem
Since there has been practically no quantitative study of the Voice of America as a medium of international communication with resnect to 13 the developing world, this study will systematically examine a sample of the Voice of America's Vietnamese broadcasts to determine in a quantitative way whether there is a pattern of persuasion in the Voice's output, and how such effort of persuasion is carried out.
IV. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
In his study of French newspapers of professed political tendencies,
George Gerbner suggested that the ideological framework of the mass media plays an important role in news reporting:
All editorial choice patterns in what and what not to make public (and in what proportion, with what emphasis, etc.) have an ideological basis and a political dimension rooted in the struc tural characteristics of the medium. 1^
George Gerbner suggested that "all news are views." His findings led to his conclusion that "there is no fundamentally non-ideological, apolitical, non-partisan news gathering and reporting system."
In another study comparing news reporting in the New York Times and the Hungarian newspaper Nepszabadsag, Gerbner had this to say about the role of the mass media in world communication:
They can establish common ground for communication with other people to the extent that their defini tions of realities seem tenable, their priorities reasonable, and their perspectives acceptable in the light of competing or conflicting assumptions available. 16
On the American scene, U.S. broadcasters are most vocal in promoting the view that U.S. media — specifically the broadcasting networks — do no more than merely mirror reality. In a fascinating analysis of television news operations, Edward Jay Epstein came to the contrary conclusion that as part of a business organization, television network 14 news does not mirror reality; in fact it is an output colored by organizational constraints. He observed:
To describe network news as mirroring events thus necessarily involves seriously neglecting the importance of the chain of decisions made both before and after the fact by executives and news men, or in a word, the organizational processes. '
. . . In sum, constructs such as the "mirror of society, "autonomous professions," or "news consensus," have only limited power in explain ing the selection of network news.
In the same "mirror of reality" line advocated by present day Ameri can journalism, the Voice of America's official line has always em phasized the purely informational nature of the Voice's output. The
VOA's "Charter" stipulates that VOA's news reporting will be accurate, objective, and comprehensive, and that it will present a balanced cover age of United States policy and related opinions and discussions from all segments of U.S. society. (Appendix A).
In the framework of the above discussion, the inevitable question arises: "Is it possible for an information organization such as the Voice of America to be completely rid of its advocate role in its news re porting as it claims to be?" Based on VOA's professed broadcast policy, it would be assumed that news value is the sole criterion of its broad casts. It is therefore hypothesized that:
1) The Voice of America's news reporting does not reflect its organizational functions.
2) Selectivity of news based on ideology is not characteristic of VOA's broadcasts. 15
To test these hypotheses, it is necessary to find out what is conveyed in the VOA's message in terms of content and sources, and ultimately what is the VOA's portrayal of events. Accordingly, the following questions should he answered:
1) What kinds of news is broadcast over the Voice of America to its Vietnamese audience?
2) Does the U.S. official view concerning U.S. policy issues get reported with a comparable frequency as do other viewpoints? In other words, how often do viewpoints advocating the U.S. official line get covered as compared to the coverage of differing opinions?
3) What is the general trend in VOA's reporting? How does it portray friends and foes?
4) Is VOA's portrayal of reality comparable to that perceived by a different broadcasting system?
These points will be clarified in studying the output of the Voice of America's Vietnamese language broadcasts. In the next chapter, the methodology used to arrive at the answer to those questions will be discussed. 16
FOOTNOTES
1. Kris, Earnest and Hans Speler et al. German Radio Propaganda. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 19^-.
2. Kirkpatrick, Evron. Target: The World. New York: The McMillan Co., 1956. 3 . Markham, James. Voices of the Red Giants. Ames, Iowa; University of Iowa Press, 19^7.
4. Connally/ John. Rhetorical Analysis of News on Radio Moscow's North American Broadcasts. Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Minnesota, I962.
5 . Kirkpatrick, Evron. Op.Git.. p. XVII.
6. Rubin, Ronald. The Objectives of the USIA. New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, I968 , p.39.
7 . U.S. News and World Report. May 1st, 1972, pp. 48-$2.
8. Hohenberg, John. Between Two Worlds. New York; Frederick A, Praeger Publishers, 1967, p. 296.
9. Wall Street Journal. 17^:1, December 5, 1969.
10. Hohenberg, John. Op.Git., p. 64.
11. Ibid.
12. Nation. 204:709, June 5, I967 .
1 3 . White, Ralph K. "The New Resistance to International Propaganda." in The Process and Effects of Mass Communications, Wilbur Schramm, Edit. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, I96I, p. 183
14. Gerbner, George. "Ideological Perspective and Political Tendencies in News Reporting." Journalism Quarterly, Vol. 41, 1964, pp. 493-308 .
1 5 . Ibid., p. 3O8 .
1 6 . Gerbner, George. "Press Perspective in World Communications: A Pilot Study." Journalism Quarterly. Vol. 38, I96I , p. 313.
1 7 . Epstein, Edward Jay. News From Nowhere. Vintage Book, 1973, P. 23.
18. Ibid., p. 41. CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
The Voice of America's broadcasts in Vietnamese to the Vietnamese
audience during the blockade and mining of the North Vietnamese harbors,
ordered by President Nixon, beginning May 8, 1972, were chosen for
analysis in this study. This period was a critical time in the Vietnam
war, and it was selected for at least two reasons. First, it was a new
turn in the way the United States handled the Vietnamese war. As a
consequence, it indicated a change in the direction of U.S. policy in
Vietnam. Second, the decision to bomb and mine North Vietnam's harbors was so controversial both within the United States and overseas that
it tended to polarize various opinion sources and to draw strongly articulate opinions from all segments of the American society and the world community. The study of such an issue as treated on the Voice of
America's broadcasts would facilitate an understanding of the Voice's
news treatment in relation to its role as an organ of the USIA.
Before discussing the procedures which were used to analyse the
data, it would be useful to have a cursory view of the organ that pro
duced the output : The Vietnamese Language Broadcasting Service of the
Voice of America.
17 18
I. The Voice of America's Vietnamese Lansuage Service
With the increasing interest of the United States in the Pacific
theater, the Vietnamese Language Service was started in 19^3 in San
Francisco under the Office of War Information. At that time there were
only three employees who took charge of a five-minute news and commen
tary program in Vietnamese which later was increased to ten minutes
long. The content of the program was mainly Pacific war news and
Japanese military activities. After the Japanese surrender, the Viet
namese Language Service was transferred to New York, around 19^5-19^6.
It was then joined to the Voice of America, and its seat was moved to
Washington B.C. around the year 1955-1956 with an increase of personnel
to six employees. ^ At the time of the collection of data for this
study, June-Octoher 1973, the Vietnamese Language Service in Washington
B.C. had a staff of twenty-five persons. These included the chief of
section, his deputy and two producers who were native Americans. The
others were Vietnamese who were naturalized U.S. citizens or Vietnamese
citizens. In addition, depending on the needs, the service also hired
a few Vietnamese announcers/translators on temporary contracts, called
purchase orders. The Chief of the section was a career Foreign Service
Officer, frequently with service experience in the Far East, who was
assigned to the section for a limited period — normally two years.
The weekly amount of broadcast time allotted to the Vietnamese
language program fluctuated widely with the situation in Vietnam.
Before April 1972, the total weekly broadcast time was 35 hours covering both originations and repeats; during the crisis period under study, 19 there was a gradual time build-up to 126 hours a week in July 1972.
The time was stabilized at 56 hours a week at the period when this study began in July 1973. At that time, according to the Section
Chief, there was to be expected in the near future a further reduction in broadcast time in accordance with the degree of priority given the
Vietnam issue. Whatever the fluctuation, the Vietnamese language programs — both originations and repeats — were relayed over several relay stations located in the Phillipines and in Hue, Vietnam.
The format of the Vietnamese language broadcasts basically con sisted of news, commentary, music and features on American life.
During the period under study, broadcast time was also spent on reading names of North Vietnamese prisoners, aiming at a North Vietnamese audience,
The intended audience of the Vietnamese language broadcasts was both North and South Vietnamese. One particular origination at 10;GO -
11:00 A.M. Washington time (10:00 - 11:00 P.M. Vietnam time) was specially intended for North Vietnam. However, the format was basically not different from other broadcasts. In the South, the Vietnamese language broadcasts were aimed at government employees, officials of all levels, the military, students, intellectuals, professionals and business people. In the North, it was hoped to reach cadres of various sorts, both military and civil. In short, VOA's Vietnamese language programs were intended to reach decision-making groups and educated 2 audiences in "both North and South Vietnam. 20
News had always been the most important part of the Vietnamese
language broadcasts. It occupied the largest segment of any one broad
cast, averaging about fifteen minutes per half-hour broadcast time.
As in other language services, the news broadcast on the Vietnamese
language programs came from the Voice of America News Room, the "brain"
of VOA's news operations. Here, various commercial news sources such
as UPI, AP, AFP, and Reuter, and other foreign news agencies, as well
as news reports from VOA's own correspondents and commentators, were
"boiled" or compiled for VOA's use. The Vietnamese Language Service
did not write its own news. Its Service Chief emphasized, "We do not 3 fidget with the news . . . We can only use copy from the news room."
Every day the Vietnamese Language Service received an A.M. and a P.M.
news pattern from the news room which listed the top news stories of
the day and other news stories in sequence of emphasis. The criterion
for the news pattern was said to be audience interest. The language
services were not expected to reshuffle the pattern, especially when
it concerned the order of the top news. According to the Vietnamese
Language Service Chief, "All I do is work within the guidelines I get from the news room, that's all. I have no right whatsoever to put my
own news in." It would seem that the Vietnamese Language Service was
operated within strict bureaucratic constraint.
Once the pattern was received in the Vietnamese Language Service,
the newsscripts were assigned to various announcers/translators who were
responsible for translating the English scripts into Vietnamese. The
translated texts were then revised by the Assignment Head before they 21 went on the air. All origination programs of Vietnamese language broadcasts were recorded on disks for storage at the VOA headquarters.
II. Research Procedures
A. Data Collection
In communication research, the so-called three W's: What, How, and
to Whom, as well as inferences about the effect of the message are of primary concern. The hypotheses of this study (Chapter II) point to
the need to look at the "What's" and the "How's" of the message, that is
to describe and analyze the trend and focus of attention in the VOA's
Vietnamese language broadcasts. The nature of the research question lends itself logically to the use of content analysis in studying the
VOA's broadcasts in Vietnamese.
The data used for this study covered the crisis period from May 8 to May 17 I 1972 . The researcher spent three months at the Voice of
America headquarters in Washington B.C. looking up broadcast materials
of this period and interviewing various staff members of the Vietnamese language Service.
For the sake of this dissertation in English, it was decided that
the data would be analyzed in the original English language. If the
purpose were to study the language connotation of the broadcasts in
Vietnamese, this decision might present some difficulties in making a valid evaluation due to the possible difference in language connotation between English and Vietnamese. However, the stated hypotheses and the related questions were not framed in those terms, and since the Viet namese texts were faithful translations of the English versions, the 22
use of the original English texts did not present any problem.
Using the Vietnamese Language Service's Daily Log as a guide, all
programs from May 8 through May 17, 1972 in Vietnamese recorded on
disks were identified and documented. After that, a search for their
corresponding English versions began. This job was facilitated by the fact that each news segment had a code number corresponding to that appearing on the English texts on file in the VOA News Room File.
The broadcast materials were then typewritten in broadcast script format according to date and broadcast time.
B . Analysis Procedures
This study looks at news about Vietnam as broadcast by the Voice of America. Therefore, only news is of interest here. All other materials broadcast under the topic "U.S. Today", featuring non-news such as talks about scientific progress, entertainment, etc., were not included in the analysis. Besides, all news items not related to Viet nam in any way were computed for quantitatively comparative purposes
(Chapter IV), but were not analyzed.
The analysis of the VOA's Vietnam news materials was based on the technique of unit analysis. As defined by Lawrence W. Lichty and
Joseph M. Ripley, a unit is "a short segment of a broadcast program in which some one type of material is presented, in which one idea domi nates the action, in which the location remains the same, or in which the characters remain the same. The material or idea in one unit is different, no matter how slightly, from that which immediately pre cedes and that which immediately follows." 23
Based on this criterion, the VOA's broadcast materials were studied carefully, and the news broadcasts were divided into units.
These units were then grouped into theme categories which were further classified into subcategories (Chapter V). These classifications served to analyze VOA's focus of attention in its news broadcasts to Vietnam.
The next step was to sort out news units into source categories.
Source was defined as the WHO in the communication pattern ">/ho says what to whom?" The analysis of sources would help to understand VOA's bias in relation to its institutional role (Chapter VI).
A prepositional analysis follows source analysis. While a theme deals with the general topics of a certain news unit, a proposition reveals the content of that particular unit, and therefore, its evaluative tendency.
All news units were carefully studied, and from the reading of their contents, general proposition headings were written up (Appendix
B). Each news unit was then classified according to each appropriate proposition heading. The whole process was performed by the researcher on the basis of the apparent intent or meaning of each unit. No attempt was made to establish an inter-coder co-efficient due to limited re sources .
The evaluative tendency was clarified further by subjecting the prepositional classification to a value scale ranging from Favorable-
Neutral-to Unfavorable. A panel of three judges was used to assure the reliability of this measure. A quantitative as well as a qualitative analysis was carried out (Chapter VII). 24
The final step in the analysis of the VOA's Vietnamese language
■broadcasts was to analyze the degree of objectivity of the VOA's news.
It was done "by comparing VOA's output to that of another reputable broadcasting system. For this purpose, the BBC's Vietnamese language broadcasts of the same period was chosen. The British Broadcasting
Corporation was selected for this comparative purpose on the basis of its reputation as a credible broadcasting institution, and because it is a frequent reference by VOA's critics. Moreover, the British were not engaged in the war in Vietnam, and thus were more likely to be objective in dealing with news of the conflict.
The BBC's Vietnamese language broadcasts from May 8 to May 1?, 1972, were collected at the BBC headquarters in London, England. The broad cast materials went through the same analysis procedures as those per formed on the VOA's materials. A comparison of tendency was made to detect any difference in focus or any omission by the VOA (Chapter VIIl).
The counting unit used in the study was word count and percentage.
This chapter sketched the VOA's news mechanism that broadcasts news to its Vietnamese audience. It also outlined the research pro cedures used in this study. In the next chapter, these procedures will be developed in detail, and conclusions will be drawn from the analyses. 25
FOOTNOTES
1, Interview with Mr. Ly Due Lam, VOA's Vietnamese Language Service Staff, Washington D.C., August 15, 1973.
2. Interview with Mr. Fred Sanders, VOA's Vietnamese Language Service, Chief.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Lichty Madison, Wisconsin: College Printing and Publishing, Inc., 1970. CHAPTER IV
DISGRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF PROGRAM FORMAT
Before the Voice oa America's news programs to Vietnam can he properly analyzed as a medium of persuasion, it is necessary to understand the format through which the message is conveyed. The purpose of this chapter is to describe and quantify VOA' Vietnamese language news programs during the period May 8 to May 17, 1972.
The Voice of America's Vietnamese language broadcasts were often subject to fluctuation in term of their total broadcast time. This fluctuation seemed to be due to the varying degrees of urgency that
U.S. policy makers felt toward the Vietnam situation at various times.
For instance, as previously noted, during the first pa^t of 1972, from a weekly broadcast time of 35 hours, a gradual time build-up to 126 hours per week was in effect by July 1972 which gradually stabilized at 5& hours weekly by July 1973- These hours usually included three daily originations and several repeats. From May 8 to May 17, 1972, the
Voice's origination to Vietnam averaged one one-half-hour morning show
(Vietnam time), and three evening shows (Vietnam time) which consisted of two half-hour and one one-hour programs. Whatever the total amount of allowed broadcasting time, the format of the Voice's Vietnamese language broadcasts remained more or less constant
26 27
A typical program usually began with station identification, then the headlines of the most important news items of the day were read; next came "Billboard" announcing the sequence of news to be broadcast which was followed by a news bulletin and commentary. The program was enlivened by American popular music breaks and ended with a news summary and a standard closing. The Daily log of the half-hour origi nation on May 14, 1972 (6:30 - 7:00 P.M., U.S. time) gives an idea how
VOA's programs to its Vietnamese audience were presented;
LEAD IN FROM PREVIOUS PROGRAM IN ENGLISH: This is the Voice of America.
The following broadcast is in Vietnamese.
THEME MUSIC UP AND UNDER
OPENING: This is the Voice of America broadcasting from the capital
Washington D.G. A good morning to our listeners.
MUSIC UP AND UNDER: We will begin our broadcast this morning with the
most noteworthy news headlines from our most recent international
news bulletin.
NEWS HEADLINES ARE READ
BILLBOARD: This morning broadcast from 6:30 to 8:00 A.M. comes to you
via satellite on shortwave channels 25, 31» and 49 MHZ.
NEWS SEQUENCE OF THE DAY ARE ANNOUNCED.
MUSIC UP AITO UNDER
NEWS BULLETIN AÎID COMI®NTARY ARE READ ALTERNATIVELY BETWEEN A MALE AND
FEMALE ANNOUNCER
MUSIC BREAK
NEWS SUMMARY: To conclude our broadcast this morning, here is a 28
summary of the most important news.
SUMMARY OF NEWS IS READ
CLOSING: You have just listened to the morning broadcast of the Voice of America. We will return to you to present more news of importance and noteworthy happenings on the international scene as well as accounts about the U.S.A. and other countries in the continuous broad cast by the Voice of America from ?:00 P.M. to 1:00 A.M. Saigon time or 6:00 P.M. to 12:00 midnight Hanoi time on shortwaves 23, 31» ^9 MHz and medium waves 263 KHz or 1140 KGs, and 341 and ?60 KHz. Particularly, the broadcast from 12:00 midnight to 1:00 A.M. can be received only on medium wave 39^ KHz.
MUSIC FADE UP AND OUT.
Programs broadcast in the early evening (Vietnam time) also included a feature entitled "U.S. Today" which offered entertainment and various topics such as science, American aspects of life, etc. In these programs the format was basically the same as for other programs. The only dif ference was that the news bulletin was shortened into a news capsule to make room for the feature to be included within the allocated time. Its length averaged 12 to 15 minutes of an half-hour broadcast. In the late evening (10:00 - 11:00 P.M., Vietnam time) the program began to con centrate on news and commentary. It was noticed that the evening programs tended to skip news headlines in order to begin the news bulletin right after the opening whereas the morning programs consistently followed the above script format. Due to this variation no attempt was made to quantify news headlines separately from news bulletins. However, news 29 and commentary were counted separately.
The focus of analysis in this study is upon the Voice of America's news related to Vietnam as broadcast to its Vietnamese audience.
"Features" are considered as non-news, and are not included. Only hard news and commentary — hereafter referred to as news coverage — are counted. All news on VOA's Vietnamese language broadcasts from May 8 to >Iay 17 , 1972 was carefully studied and divided into news units.
Using words as units, all news items were counted. Subsequently, items related to Vietnam were separated from the total and quantified in word number and percentage.
The first analysis of the data (Tables 1,2,3,4) revealed that the
Voice of America devoted a considerable amount of time to hard news.
During the period under study. May 8 to May 17, 1972, hard news was given approximately 83 per cent of the total news coverage with com mentary tailing at a mere I7 per cent. (Table l)
TABLE 1
Amount and Percentage of Hard News and Commentary
In VOA's Total Coverage; May 8 - I7 , 1972
Categories Word Number Percentage
Hard News 94,133 82.7
Commentary 19,636 17.3 fo
TOTAL 113,771 100.0 %
Note : Counting unit is word number and percentage. 30
In news, broadcast to the Vietnamese audiences, it appears that the principle of audience interest was closely observed by the Voice.
It tended heavily to emphasize Vietnam-related news in its news output.
News related to Vietnam was broadcast at the rate of 5^.9 per cent of total news coverage of the period. And commentary seemed to play a negligible role (9.2 per cent) in the over-all news picture broadcast by the Voice of America to Vietnam. (Table 2). Similarly, when only
TABLE 2
Amount and Percentage of Vietnam-Related Hard News and
Vietnam-Related Commentary In VOA's Total Coverage
May 8 - 1?, 1972
VOA Total Non-Vietnam Vietnam Vietnam Vietnam Coverage Coverage Coverage Hard News Commentary
Per Per Per Per Per Words Words Words Words Words cent cent cent cent cent
113,771 100^ 40,818 33.0^ 72,934 64.1^ 62,448 34.9^ 10,506 9.2^
the coverage of Vietnam-related events was considered, hard news was given the major proportion of 85.6 per cent, whereas the over-all role of commentary, 14.4 per cent, was secondary. (Table 3).
In general, the VOA's commentary appeared to play a lesser role than hard news in the Voice's broadcasts. Tables 1, 2, 3» substantiated this observation. The leading role of hard news was more observable in the more detailed daily tabulation where the coverage of Vietnam- 31 related news and commentary was compared with the VOA's total period coverage. (Table 4). Hard news peaked at 82.8 per cent and never went
TABLE 3
Amount and Percentage of Vietnam Hard News and
Vietnam Commentary in Vietnam Coverage Only
May 8 - 1?, 19?2
Vietnam Coverage Vietnam Hard News Vietnam Commentary I 1 Words Percentage Words Î Percentage Words ÎPercentage
72 ,95^ 100 fo 62,448 ; 85.6 # 10,506 I 14.4 % below 30 per cent of total period coverage, whereas commentary plunged to 0 per cent at times and fluctuated considerably between 0 and 30.5 per cent of total period coverage. (Fig. 1). From this analysis, it would seem that the purely informational nature of the Voice's news broadcasts which was emphasized repeatedly by USIA officials was main tained faithfully. However, a futher analysis of the data presented in
Tables 5 and 6 gave some hint of the rather subtly significant role of the Voice's commentary. When only Vietnam-related coverage was tabula ted, although hard news still featured dominantly, the proportion of coverage devoted to commentary increased. Commentary in this case fluctuated between 0 per cent and 43 per cent. (Table 5)» The subtle importance of the VOA's commentary was strongly reflected in the com parison between Vietnam-related news and total news coverage, and Viet nam commentazy vs. total commentary issued. (Table 6 and Fig. 2). TABLE 4
Amount and Percentage of Vietnam News and Vietnam Commentary
In Total VOA Coverage on a Daily Basis: May 8-1?» 1972
Non-Vietnam Vietnam Vietnam Date Total Coverage Vietnam News Coverage Coverage Commentary Words Percent Words Percent Words Percent Words Percent Words Percent
May 8 9,998 100 # 5,206 52.1 # 4,792 4 7 .9 # 4,269 42.7 # 523 5 .2 #
May 9 17,734 100 # 2,403 13.5 # 15,331 86.5 # 14,677 82.8 # 654 3 .7 #
May 10 13,247 100 # 2,160 16.3 # 11,087 83.7 # 9,346 70.5 # 1,741 13.2 %
May 11 11,571 100 # 1,331 11.5 # 10,240 85.5 # 8,151 70.4 % 2,089 18.1 %
May 12 10,849 100 # 3,154 29.0 # 7,695 71.0 # 4,389 40.5 % 3,306 30.5 #
May 13 7,969 100 # 2,938 36.9 # 5,032 63.1 # 4,440 55.7 # 592 7 ^ #
May 14 10,562 100 # 6,749 6 3 .9 # 3,813 36.1 # 3,813 36.1 # 0 0.0 %
Hay 15 9,291 100 % 4,310 '46.3 # 4,981 5 3 .7 # 4,428 4 7 .7 # 553 6.0 #
May 16 10,372 100 # 7,068 68.1 # 3,304 31.9 # 3,304 31.9 # 0 0.0 %
May 17 12,178 100 % 5,499 4 5 .2 # 6,679 54.8 # 5,631 46.2 # 1,048 8.6 #
TOTAL 113,771 100 # 48,817 35.9 # 72,954 64.1 % 62,448 54.9 # 10,506 9.2 # 33
il’€w;s looi ----- C om m
"74 4
Ç5.7
M l . , , ki.-j W.g- 36-1 31.9 • /\ / \
^/S' y/cj 6/10 67/1 67(2. 5/(3 6/(4 7/6' s/fG V/7
Fig. 1. Distribution of Vietnam News and Vietnam Commentary on a
Daily Basis (Data From Table 4). TABLE 5
Amount and Percentage of Vietnam Hard News and Vietnam Commentary
In Vietnam Coverage Only On A Daily Basis: I%y 8 - 17, 1972
Date Total Vietnam Coverage Vietnam News Vietnam Commentary
Words Percent Words Percent Words Percent
May 8 4,792 100# 4,269 89 .1 # 523 10.9 #
May 9 15,331 100 % 14,677 95.7 654 4 .3 #
May 10 11,087 100 % 9,346 84.3 # 1,741 15.7 #
May 11 10,240 100# 8,151 79 .6 # 2,089 2 0 ^ #
May 12 7,695 100# 4,389 5 7 .0 # 3,306 43.0 #
May 13 5,031 100# 4,440 88.2# 592 11.8 #
May 14 3,813 100 # 3,813 100.0 # 0 0.0 #
May 15 4,981 100 # 4,428 88 .9 # 553 11.1 #
May 16 3,304 100# 3,304 100.0 # 0 0.0 #
May 17 6,679 100# 5,631 84.3 ^ 1,048 15.7 #
. TOTAL 72,954 100# 62,448 85.6 # 10,506 14.4 # 35
TABIE 6
Amount and Percentage of Vietnam Hard News in
Total Hard News Coverage and
Vietnam Commentary in Total Commentary Coverage
May 8 - 17, 1972
Non-Vietnam Vietnam 1 1 Î Words Percent Words Î Percent Words Î Percent
News ; 9^,135 100 ?S 31,687 ; 33.7 # 62,448 Î 66.3 ^
Comment.| 19,636 100 ^ 9,130 I 46.3 # 10,306 I 33.5 %
TOTALS ; 113,771 100 % 40,818 ; 35 .8 ^ 72 ,95^ ; 64.1 f.
In relation to total hard news coverage of the period, Vietnam-related hard news stood at 66.3 per cent, a 16.4 percentage point difference in contrast to the 82.7 per cent reported in the preliminary tabulation in
Table 1 (p. 29). And in relation to the total coverage for commentary during the period May 8 - 17. 1972, Vietnam-related commentary was the major type. It stood significantly at 53.5 per cent (Table 6), a con siderable increase in comparison with the percentage reported prelimi narily in Table 1 (p.29). There was obviously a very high daily per centage of commentary dealing with the Vietnam issue as compared to the total daily commentary output; its high was 100 per cent, and it rarely went below 60 per cent (Table 7). This leads to the observation that if the Voice brought in any commentary at all, most of the time it dealt with issues on or related to Vietnam. 36
loot
Total Commentary ##:
Vietnam Commentary
^3.6;
Fig. 2 Percentage of Vietnam Commentary in Total Commentary TABLE 7
Amount and Percentage of Vietnam Hard News in Total Hard News Coverage and
Vietnam Commentary in Total Commentary Coverage on a Daily Basis: May 8 - 1?, 19?2
Total Coverage Non-Vietnam Coverage Vietnam Coverage Date Categories Words Percent Words Percent Words Percent
News 7,908 100 % 3,639 46.1# 4,264 53 .9 # May B Commentary 2,090 100 # 1,567 75.0 # 523 23.0 #
News 17,080 100 % 2,403 14.1 fo 14,677 May 9 85.9 # Commentary 634 100 % 0 0.0 % 654 100.0 #
News 10,029 100 # 683 6.8# 9,346 93.2 # May 10 Commentary 3,218 100 # 1,477 4 5 .9 # 1,741 54.1 #
News 8,335 100 % 184 2.2# 8,151 97 .8 # May 11 Commentary 3,236 100 # 1,147 35.4 # 2,089 64.6 #
News 7,036 100 % 2,647 37 .6 # 4,389 62^ # May 12 Commentary 3,(%3 100 # 507 13.3 # 3,306 86.7 #
News 6,308 100 % 2,068 31 .8 # 4,440 68.2# May 13 Commentary 1,461 100 % 869 59.5 # 592 40.3# TABLE 7 (continued)
Total Coverage Non-Vietnam Coverage Vietnam Coverage Date Categories Words Percent Words Percent Words Percent
News 10,562 100 % 6,749 63.9 # 3,813 36.1 # nay 14 Commentary 0 0 ^ 0 0.0 ^ 0 0.0 %
News 8,373 100 % 3,945 47.1 ^ 4,428 32.9 # Hay 15 Commentary 918 100 % 365 39.8 # 333 60.2 #
News 9,342 100 ^ 6,038 64.6 % 3,304 33.4 # May 16 Commentary 1,030 100 % 1,030 100.0 ^ 0 0.0 #
News 10,548 100 ^ 4,917 46.6 % 3,631 33^# May 17 Commentary 1,630 ' 100 % 582 33.7 # 1,048 6/)..3
News 94,133 100 ^ 31,688 33.7 # 62,448 66.3 ?o TOTALS Commentary 19,636 100 % 9,130 46.5 # 10,506 33.3 #
VjO CO 3 9
Within the confine of the period under study, May 8 - 17, 1972, it could also be observed that the VGA’s news programs tended to react promptly to crisis situation and new happenings on the international scene. On and in the days following the mining decision announcement, coverage on Vietnam balanced between 47-9 per cent and 54.8 per cent of total news coverage (Table 4, p. 32). The lowest points were in a few exceptions that had to do with other important American events such as the attempted assassination of presidential candidate George Wallace on May 16, 1972. In that case, Vietnam related coverage dipped to
31.9 per cent to make room for this special news. However, on the day when the decision to mine the North Vietnamese harbors was made public and on two subsequent days, news coverage related to Vietnam peaked between a high of 86.5 per cent and 88.5 per cent; it then subsided slowly to the average flow (Table 4, p. 32 and Fig. 1, p. 33).
These data illustrate clearly the Voice of America's tendency in reporting news to Vietnam. It points to the important role played by commentary with regard to specific issues. On the surface, commentary seemed to be allocated much less time than hard news and thus, was comparatively insignificant. However, on a further analysis, it can be seen that there was an effort on the part of the Voice of America to influence the audience's opinions on specific issues through the use of commentary.
In this chapter, a format analysis of the Voice of America's broadcasts of news to its Vietnamese audience was performed. From this analysis, several generalizations could be drawn; ko
1. The Voice of America's program format is well structured and easy to follow.
2. The VGA's broadcast programs are divided between news (hard news and commentary) and non-news (music and features).
3 . The VGA's broadcasts tend to respond to crisis and new events in a timely manner.
4. Hard news shares an important time allocation on the Voice's
Vietnamese language broadcasts.
5* Over-all, commentary seems to play a relatively minor role in the VGA's broadcasts.
6. Gn specific issues related to Vietnam, commentary is given a strong lead in the Voice's broadcasts to Vietnam. It is the real political "freight" in the Voice's message, pointing to the Voice's apparent attempt to influence foreign opinion along the desired direc tion.
The analysis presented above has not dealt with the qualitative issue of content. In the next chapter, this problem will be examined to find out what the Voice of America had to say and what kind of message the Voice sent across the ocean to its overseas audience in
Vietnam. CHAPTER V
THEME ANALYSIS
The characteristics of the Voice of America's program format in
the Voice's Vietnamese language broadcasts were discussed in the preceding Chapter IV. While the format analysis clarified the question
of how the Voice of America presented the news it broadcast to Viet nam, it did not touch upon the question of content. This chapter will investigate the message, specifically, what topics and subjects were treated in the Voice of America's Vietnamese language broadcasts during the crisis period of May 8 - 1?, 1972.
In the study of message content, it is essential to first unveil and quantify the kind of themes appearing in the message. Before proceeding to describe the analytical procedures which were used to study the selected sample of the VGA's Vietnamese broadcasts, it is necessary to define what a theme is. According to Webster's Collegiate
Dictionary, a theme is "a subject or topic of discourse." It is the
subject matter, the "what", which is dealt with in a message. In news,
the theme of a news unit refers to the general topic, event, nation, or
person that serves as the central focus of the unit.
41 42
The classification of themes plays a major role in the content analysis of message. It helps to decipher the over-all emphasis con veyed in the communication. Therefore, accuracy and reliability in classification is of prime importance. The procedure used in this theme analysis is first to identify themes and to establish categories in which each theme is classified. Then a reliability test is per formed.
Each news unit in the selected sample of the Voice of America's
Vietnamese language broadcasts from May 8 to Play 1?, 1972 was type written on individual index cards. Each was identified by date, and time of broadcast, thus: VOA - 5/l?/72 - 6:30 - 7:00 P.M. All units were scanned carefully, unit by unit, to discover what topic, event, nation, or personality was dealt with in each particular unit. A ten tative list of themes was made, and similarities or re-currences of the same theme were noted. From this basis, a meaningful list of theme categories emerged. Eight theme categories were established, each representing an area of news concentration. All news units in the selected sample were then studied and grouped into one of the eight following theme categories:
1. Mining Issue; All information in connection with the mining decision, excluding that dealing with category 4, below, is included in this classification. The spectrum of this category included:
a) Reactions toward the mining decision. This refers to comments, opinions, editorials from various parties, interpretations of the significance of related events, assessment of mining effects 43
on big power relations, and demonstrations.
b) Speeches, diplomatic maneuvers and background information related to the mining decision.
2. Military; This classification refers to factual reports,
comments, opinions on the United States, South Vietnamese, as well as
Communist military activities. They range from reports on bombing, fighting, shellings, attacks, casualties to troop reduction, military assessments of conditions, strength or weakness of all sides involved
in the conflict. This category does not include information on the military maneuvers performed as a direct result of the mining decision which is classified in category 4.
3. Vietnam Issues: Grouped under this heading are all reports in connection with views and positions as well as expressions of policy involving Vietnam in general, and not specifically generated by the mining decision.
4. Mining Operations; This classification covers all factual reports such as mining schedule, ship movements, strategic maneuvers of U.S. forces or others, as a result of the mining decision. In addition, comments and opinions on the way the mining operations were carried out are also included.
5. Peace Talks; In this category are grouped reports on the
U.S. and allied views and positions in the peace negotiation vs. the
North Vietnamese and their allies' views and positions. Reports on routine meeting procedures are also included here. 44
6. U.S. Events; This classification covers news reports dealing with U.S. happenings, excluding news in category 1, where
U.S. reactions toward mining is concerned. For example, news units reporting President Nixon's cabinet meetings, Secretary Rogers going home from Europe to attend high level meetings. Senate hearings, etc., are classified under this heading.
7. North Vietnam and their Allies' activities; This category includes reports on the North Vietnamese and their allies movements, activities, and domestic happenings.
8. South Vietnam - Domestic; The domestic happenings in South
Vietnam and related factual reports, opinion, and comments are classi fied in this category.
These eight categories in turn were sub-divided into sub-categories to allow a more in-depth analysis of themes. The nature of each theme generated a very slightly varied number of sub-categories within each theme. The entire tabulation boils down to the following sub-categories:
1. Mining Issue:
IA. U.S. Reactions
IB. Western Allies' Reactions
10. Asian Allies' Reactions
ID. Communist Reactions
IE. United Nations' Reactions
2. Military;
2A. U.S. Military
2B. South Vietnam Military
20 Communist Military 3. Vietnam Issue;
3A. U.S. Views
3B. South Vietnamese Views
30. Communist Views
3D. U.S. Allies' Views
4. Mining Operations;
4A. U.S. Activities
4B. Communist Activities
5. Peace Talks :
5A. U.S. Views and Activities
5B. South Vietnamese Views and Activités
5C. Communist Views and Activities
5D. American Allies' Views and Activities
6. U.S. Events.
7. North Vietnam and Their Allies' Activities.
8. South Vietnam - Domestic
After all news units have "been grouped under appropriate headings, each category and sub-category was computed in terms of word number and percentage. The coding having been done by the researcher, the next step is to ask: "To what extent is the above coding procedure reliable?"
To clarify this question, the researcher used a panel of five judges whose coding judgment was compared with that done by the researcher to determine the reliability coefficient.
The judges were selected from a group of people that could have been among the class of people which the VOA intended to reach had they 4 6 lived in Vietnam. They consisted of two physical scientists, one former British Broadcasting Corporation's Vietnamese translator/ announcer, and two graduate students. All of the five members had been thoroughly acquainted with the coding procedures through a detailed explanation and practice with news unite not included in the sample under study. Each judge was given two complete broadcast programs which were recorded in news units. They studied and classified these units under headings which they thought most appropriate. In this manner, each judge had a number of units in possible agreement with the coding done by the researcher. After they had sorted out their mate rials, the number of units in agreement with the researcher's coding was computed under "Actual Agreement." An inter-coder coefficient between the researcher and each judge was found by comparing the judge's scores (Actual Agreement) and the researcher's scores (Possible Agree ment) . The result of the coding by the judges and the percentage of agreement are shown in Table 8.
The average percentage of agreement in our test reached 83.1 per cent. "Defining the acceptable level of reliability is one of the many problems in content analysis for which there is no single solution," according to Ole R. Holsti. ^ Nevertheless, according to Thorndike, 2 a 75 per cent reliability is at the acceptable level. In our case, a 83.1 per cent indicates a reasonably acceptable level 47
TABLE 8
Inter-Coder Agreement
Units in Units in Judges Percentage Possible Agreement Actual Agreement 1 129 108 83.7 #
2 233 198 85.0 #
3 235 185 78.7 #
4 212 192 90.6 #
5 155 118 76.7 #
TOTALS 964 801 83.1 #
Results
Theme analysis is important in that although it does not reveal the judgmental aspect of a certain report, it highlights the focus that the communicator puts on a particular issue at a particular time.
The tabulation of theme coverage in the Voice of America's broadcasts to its Vietnamese audience during May 8 - I7 , 1972, pointed to the emphasis the Voice put on certain theme at that time.
In term of length of coverage in word number, three leading themes emerged: The most talked about was the mining issue (36,026 words) which apparently was the focus of world's attention during that crisis period. Second in importance was the military issue (12,235 words), and next in rank was the Vietnamese issue (8,767 words). This pattern reflected the inter-related nature of the three aspects of the Viet nam conflict in the international and American political arena of the time. 48
TABLE 9
Rank-Order of Theme Categories
In the VOA's Vietnam Coverage
May 8 - 1?, 1972
Category Total Theme Categories Percentage In Word Number
1. Mining Issue 36,026 49.4 %
2. Military 12,235 16.8 #
3. Vietnam Issue 8,767 12.0#
4. South Vietnam - Domestic 5,442 7 .5 #
5. Mining Operations 3,677 5 .0 #
6 . U.S. Events 3,446 4 .7 # HJ 7. Peace Talks 2,819 3 .9 #
8. North Vietnam & Their 542 0 .7 # Allies
TOTALS 72,954 100.0 %
Table 9 shows the rank-order of themes dealt with in the Voice of
America's news. While the three leading themes occupied 49.4 per cent,
16.8 per cent, and 12 per cent respectively of total Vietnam coverage
of the period, other themes enjoyed less than 8 per cent of total Viet nam coverage. The least important issues of all, as measured by cover age length, were the "Peace Talks" issue, and information about Worth
Vietnam and their allies. 4 9
A further analysis revealed that although an over-all pattern of focus could be discerned, theme coverages tended to fluctuate on a daily basis (Tables 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 1?). Compared to total daily Vietnam coverage, the "Mining Issue", a crucial issue, varied between 6.4 per cent and 70.3 per cent on a daily basis (Table 10).
The "Military" daily coverage varied between 7«2 per cent and 52.1 per cent (Table 11). The "Vietnam Issue", another important aspect of the conflict, varied between 0.0 per cent and the highest point of 26.2 per cent-(Table 12). A similar variability was observed in other minor theme categories (Tables 13, 14, 15, 16, 17).
A day by day analysis of each theme coverage indicated the same pattern of fluctuation (Tables 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25). Of the total material dealing with the theme "Mining Issue", daily coverage varied between 0.9 per cent and 29.9 per cent of this total for the ten days (Table 18). Within "Military", daily coverage fluctuated from
5.6 per cent to 16.2 per cent (Table 19); and daily coverage of "Viet nam Issue" from 0.0 per cent to 23.0 per cent of the category's total coverage (Table 20). The coverage of other themes was observed to behave likewise (Tables 21, 22, 23, 24, 25).
Despite the day-to-day fluctuation, an analysis of themes having some intertwined occurrence such as the "Mining Issue," the "Vietnam
Issue," the "Mining Operations," and "U.S. Events," (Tables 18, 20, 22, and 23), revealed a ooncentration of relatively high coverage on cer tain days during the period I4ay 8 - I7 , 1972. The coverage of the
"Mining Issue" was highest on the three consecutive days following 50
TABLE 10
Amount and Percentage of "Mining Issue" Coverage (Category l)
In Total Vietnam Coverage on a Daily Basis: May 8-1?, 1972
Vietnam Coverage Mining Issue Coverage Date Words Percent Words Percent
May 8 4,792 100 % 309 6.4 #
May 9 15,331 100 % 10,783 70.3 #
May 10 11,087 100 # 6,065 5 4 .7 #
May 11 10,240 100 % 7,101 69.3 #
May 12 7,695 100 % 3,068 3 9.9 #
May 13 5,032 100 # 1,989 39.5 #
May 14 3,813 100 # 488 12.8 #
May 15 4,981 100 # 2,741 55.0 #
May 16 3,304 100 # 871 26.4
May 17 6,679 100 # 2,611 3 9 ^ #
TOTALS 72,954 100 # 36,026 4 9 ^ # 51
TABLE 11
Amount and Percentage of "Military” Coverage (Category 2)
In Total Vietnam Coverage on a Daily Basis; May 8 - 1?, 1972
Vietnam Coverage Mining Issue Coverage Date Words Percent Words Percent
May 8 4,792 100 % 1,349 28.2 #
May 9 15,331 100 % 1,296 8 .3 %
May 10 11,087 100.% 1,433 12.9 #
May 11 10,240 100 % 734 7 .2 %
May 12 7,695 100 % 1,711 22.2 ^
May 13 5,032 100 # 1,252 24.9 %
May 14 3,813 100 % 1,986 52.1 %
May 15 4,981 100 # 913 18.3 #
May 16 3,304 100 % 684 20.7 #
May 17 6,679 100 # 877 13.1 %
TOTALS 72,954 100 # 12,235 16.8 % 52
TABLE 12
Amount and Percentage of "Vietnam Issue" Coverage (Category 3)
In Total Vietnam Coverage on a Daily Basis: May 8-1?. 1972
Vietnam Coverage Vietnam Issue Coverage Date Words Percent Words Percent
May 8 4,792 100 fo 990 20.7 0
May 9 15,331 100 fo 913 6.0 0
May 10 11,087 100# 1,949 17.6 fo
May 11 10,240 100 fo 429 4.2 0
May 12 7,695 100 fo 2,016 26.2 #
May 13 5,032 100 fo 869 17.3 0
May 14 3,813 100# 0 0.0#
May 15 4,981 100 fo 321 6.4 #
May 16 3,304 100 # 473 14.3 0
Play 17 6,679 100 # 808 12.1 0
TOTALS 72,954 100 # 8,767 12.0 # 5 3
TABLE 13
Amount and Percentage of "S. Vietnam-Domestic" Coverage (Category 4)
In Total Vietnam Coverage on a Daily Basis: May 8-1?, 1972
Vietnam Coverage s. Vietnam-Domestic Coverage Date Words Percent Words Percent
May 8 4,792 1 00# 549 11.5 #
May 9 15,331 100 fo 970 6 .3 #
May 10 11,087 100 % 477 4 .3 %
May 11 10,240 100 fo 751 7.3 #
May 12 7,695 100 # 578 7.5 %
May 13 5,032 100 fo 22 0.4 #
May 14- 3,813 100 # 668 17.5 #
May 15 4,981 100 # 431 8 .7 #
May 16 3,304 100 # 333 10.1 fo
Î4ay 1? 6,679 100 # 663 9 .9 %
TOTALS 72,954 100 # 5,442 7.5 # TABLE 14
Amount and Percentage of "Mining Operations" Coverage (Category 5)
In Total Vietnam Coverage on a Daily Basis; May 8-17, 1972
Vietnam Coverage Mining Operations Coverage Date Words Percent Words Percent
May 8 4,792 100 % 0 0.0 #
. May 9 15,331 100 # 598 3 .9 #
May 10 11,087 100 # 513 4.6 fo
May 11 10,240 100 % 1,000 9.8 #
May 12 7,695 100 # 126 1.6 #
May 13 5,032 100 % 204 4.1 #
May 14 3,813 100 # 296 7.8 #
May 15 4,981 100 # 345 6 .9 #
May 16 ' 3,304 100 # 195 5 .9 %
May 17 6,679 100 % 400 6.0 #
TOTALS 72,954 100 # 3,677 5 .0 # 55
TABLE 15
Amount and Percentage of "U.S. Events" Coverage (Category 6)
In Total Vietnam Coverage on a Daily Basis: Uay 8 - 17, 1972
Vietnam Coverage U.S. Events Coverage Date Words Percent Words Percent
May 8 4,792 100# 1,439 30.0 #
May 9 15.331 100 # 734 4 . 8 #
May 10 11,087 100 % 78 0.7 #
May 11 10,240 100 % 0 0 . 0 #
May 12 7,695 100 # 0 0.0 #
May 13 5,032 100 # 0 0.0#
May 14 3,813 100 # 90 2 ^ #
May 15 4,981 100 # 76 1. 5 #
May 16 3,304 100 # 244 7 ^ #
May 17 6,679 100 # 785 11.8 #
TOTALS 72,954 100 # 3,3446 4 . 7 # 56
TABLE 16
Amount and Percentage of "Peace Talks" Coverage (Category ?)
In Total Vietnam Coverage on a Daily Basis: Fiay 8 - 17, 1972
Vietnam Coverage Peace Talks Coverage Date Words Percent Words Percent
I4ay 8 4,792 100 % 76 1.6 #
May 9 15,331 100 # 54 0.4 #
May 10 11,087 100 # 498 4 .3 #
May 11 10,240 100 % 54 0 .3 #
May 12 7,695 100 % 177 2 .3 %
lfe.y 13 5,032 100 # 636 12.6 #
May 14- 3,813 100 # 285 7.5 %
May 15 4,981 100 # 0 0.0 #
May 16 3,304 100 # 504 13.3 #
May 17 6,679 100 % 535 8.0 #
TOTALS 72,954 100 # 2,819 3 .9 # 5 7
■TABLS 17
Amount and Percentage of "N.Vietnam & Their Allies" Coverage
(Cayegory 8) in Total Vietnam Coverage on a Daily Basis
May 8 - 17, 1972
Vietnam Coverage N.Vietnam & Their Allies Coverg Date Words Percent Words Percent
May 8 4,792 100 # 36 0.08 %
I%y 9 15,331 100 # 27 0.02 %
May 10 11,087 100 # 74 0.07 %
May 11 10,240 100 # 171 1 .7 #
May 12 7,695 100 % 19 0.2 #
May 13 5,032 100 # 60 1.2 #
May 14 3,813 100 # 0 0.0 %
May 15- 4,981 100 # 154 3.1 %
May 16 3,304 100 0 0 0.0 #
}üay 17 6,679 100 % 0 0.0 #
TOTALS 72,954 100 # 541 0 .7 % 58
TABLE 18
Distribution of "Mining Issue" Coverage (Category 1)
On a Daily Basis: May 8 - 17, 1972 '
U.S. Western Asian Commu Date nist Re U.N. Sum Percent Reaction Reaction Reaction action
May 8 113 118 78 0 0 309 0 .9 #
May 9 7,129 860 2,170 485 139 10,783 29 .9 #
May 10 4,248 241 216 601 759 6,065 16.8 #
May 11 3,932 1,219 651 1,299 0 7,101 19.7 #
May 12 2,135 192 62 463 216 3,068 8 .5 %
May 13 1,404 153 106 26? 59 1,989 5 .5 %
May 14 488 0 0 0 0 488 1.4 %
May 15 2,575 0 0 166 0 2,741 7 .6 %
May 16 370 243 0 0 256 871 2.4 %
May 17 1,546 543 303 219 0 2,611 7 .2 %
TOTALS 23,940 3,571 3,586 3,500 1,429 36,026 100.0 ^ 59
TABIÆ 19
Distribution of "Military" Coverage (Category 2)
On a Daily Basis: I'lay 8-1?» 1972
South Date U.S. Communist Sum Percent Vietnam
May 8 1,011 173 165 1,349 11.0 %
May 9 179 425 692 1,296 10.6 #
May 10 754 482 197 1,433 11.7 %
May 11 342 43 349 734 6.0 %
May 12 666 288 757 1,711 14.0 %
May 13 103 1,031 118 1,252 10.2 #
May 14 319 1,059 608 1,986 16.2 %
May 15 . 430 264 219 913 7.5 %
May 16 289 272 123 684 5 .6 %
May 17 103 173 601 877 7.2 %
TOTALS 4,196 4,210 3,829 12,235 100.0 % 60
TABLE 20
Distribution of "Vietnam Issue" Coverage (Category 3)
On a Daily Basis; May 8-1?, 1972
S. Vietnam Communist Date U.S. View View View Sum Percent
May 8 990 0 0 990 11.3 #
May 9 912 0 0 912 1 0 ^ %
May 10 1,949 0 0 1,949 22.2 %
May 11 379 0 50 429 4 .9 %
May 12 1,837 0 179 2,016 23.0 #
May 13 812 0 57 869 9 .9 %
May 14 0 0 0 0 0.0 #
May 15 297 0 24 321 3 .7 %
May 16 473 0 0 473 5.4 %
May 17 556 0 252 808 9 .2 %
TOTALS 8,203 0 562 8,767 100.0 ^ 61
TABLE 21
Distribution of "S. Vietnam-Domestic" Coverage (Category 4)
On a Dally Basis: May 8 - 17» 1972
South Date U.S. Communist Allies Sum Percent Vietnam
May 8 0 549 0 0 549 10.1 %
May 9 0 970 0 0 970 17.8 #
May 10 0 477 0 0 477 8.8 #
May 11 0 751 0 0 751 1 3.8 #
May 12 0 578 0 0 578 10.6 #
May 13 0 22 0 0 22 0.4 #
May 14 0 668 0 0 668 12.3 #
May 15 0 431 0 0 431 7 .9 #
May 16 0 333 0 0 333 6.1 #
May 1? 0 663 0 0 663 12.2 #
TOTALS 0 5,442 0 0 5,442 100.0 % 62
TAELS 22
Distribution of "Mining Operations" Coverage (Category 5)
On a Daily Basis: May 8-17. 1972
South Date U.S. Vietnam Communist Allies Sum Percent
May 8 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 # lîay 9 523 0 0 75 598 16.3 #
May 10 513 0 0 0 513 14.0 #
I4ay 11 1,000 0 0 0 1,000 27.2 #
May 12 126 0 0 0 126 3 ^ %
May 13 204 0 0 0 204 3 .3 %
May 14 296 0 0 0 296 8.1 #
I4ay 15 345 0 0 0 345 9 ^ %
May 16 193 0 0 0 193 3 .3 %
May 17 400 0 0 0 400 10.9 %
TOTALS 3,602 0 0 75 3,677 100.0 63
TABLE 23
Distribution of "U.S. Events" Coverage (Category 6)
On a Daily Basis: May 8-17» 1972
South Date U.S. Vietnam Communist Allies Sum Percent
May 8 1,439 0 0 0 1,439 41.8%
May 9 734 0 0 0 734 21.3 %
May 10 78 0 0 0 78 2.3 %
May 11 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 %
May 12 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 %
]}Iay 13 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 %
May 14 90 0 0 0 90 2.6 %
May 15 76 0 0 0 76 2.2 %
May 16 244 0 0 0 244 7.1 %
May 17 785 0 0 0 785 22.8 %
TOTALS 3,446 0 0 0 3,446 100.0 % 64
TABLE 24
Distribution of "Peace Talks" Coverage (Category ?)
On a Daily Basis: May 8-1?, 1972
South Date U.S. Communist Allies Sum Percent Vietnam
May 8 76 0 0 0 76 2.7 #
May 9 54 0 0 0 54 1.9 %
May 10 109 0 389 0 498 17.7 #
May 11 0 0 54 0 54 1.9 #
May 12 177 0 0 0 177 6.3 %
May 13 350 91 195 0 636 22.5 %
May 14 52 233 0 0 285 10.0 #
May 15 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 %
May 16 229 25 213 37 504 17.9 %
May 17 385 130 20 0 535 19.0 #
TOTALS 1,432 479 871 37 2,819 100.0 ^ 6 5
TABLE 25
Distribution of "N.Vietnam & Their Allies" Coverage (Category 8)
On a Daily Basis: llay 8-17, 1972
South Date U.S. Communist Allies Sum Percent Vietnam
May 8 0 0 36 0 36 6 .7 #
I4ay 9 0 0 27 0 27 5 .0 #
May 10 0 0 74 0 74 13.7 %
May 11 0 0 171 0 171 31.6 #
May 12 0 0 19 0 19 3 .5 #
May 13 0 0 60 0 60 11.5 #
May 14 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 #
May 15 0 0 154 0 154 28.5 #
May l6 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 %
May 17 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 #
TOTALS 0 0 541 0 541 100.0 # 66
President's Nixon's decision to mine the North Vietnamese harbors.
"U.S. Events" which were reported mostly in connection with the raining decision reached the highest level on the day the mining decision was to be made (Table 23, p. 63). Similarly, the "Mining Operations" was covered at a greater length during the first three days after the mining decision was made public (Table 22, p. 62). And reports on the "Viet nam Issue" decreased to 0.0 per cent five days after the crisis day to pick up very slowly afterwards (Table 20, p. 60).
Other themes of more constant nature — i.e.,not crisis-related — such as "Military," "South Vietnam - Domestic," "Peace Talks," "North
Vietnam & Their Allies," though varied, remained more evenly distributed throughout the period (Tables I9, P- 59, 21, p. 61; 24, p. 64; 25, p. 65).
News events happen every day and every hour. Timely reporting requires that the broadcaster adjust his program time allocation ac cordingly to accomodate the latest developments. This adjustment seemed true with the Voice of America's broadcasts to Vietnam as is witnessed by the distribution discussed above. This feature not only highlighted the Voice's timeliness in reporting, it also reflected the VGA's effort to bring to its audience more information on subjects of prime interest to then.
In the analysis of the theme subcategories, another interesting feature of the Voice of America's Vietnamese language broadcasts sur faced: a strong U.S.-oriented news flow (Tables 26 through 33). The nature of the established theme classifications necessitated the absence of U.S. related theme subcategories in "South Vietnam - Domes- 67 tic," and "North Vietnam & Their Allies." However, theme categories
"U.S. Events" as well as "Mining Operations" featured U.S. aspects predominantly. The Voice's U.S. oriented news reporting was observable in more complex themes where there were many parties involved.
In the "Mining Issue," a controversial matter on which diverse opinions were expressed, 66.$ per cent of all mining coverage was devoted to U.S. reactions (Table 26). The American view on the "Vietnam
Issue" seemed to be carefully elaborated to impress upon the audience with 93.5 per cent of total coverage within this theme category (Table
28 ). In the "Peace Talks" category, American peace theme shared $0.8 per cent of total peace talks coverage (Table 32). The coverage of military theme was divided more or less equally among all three parties directly involved in the war, namely the United States,South Vietnam, and the Communists (Table 2?). However, the coverage of U.S. military- featured rather prominently at 3^.3 per cent, only 0.1 per cent behind the South Vietnamese whose military role in the conflict was theoreti cally greater. As a consequence of this American-oriented tendency, information related to American allies, especially their closest ally, the South Vietnamese, in the Voice of America's broadcasts was minimal, not to mention that of their enemy, the communist side.
South Vietnam was naturally most visible in reports on their domestic affairs with 100 per cent of the category coverage. But this amounted to only a negligible 7.5 per cent of total Vietnam coverage during that period (Table 9, P- 48). The role of the South Vietnamese ally was given some importance in military reports, but still not to a 68
TABLE 26
Amount and Percentage of Subcategory Coverage
In "Mining Issue" Coverage: May 8 - 1?, 72
Subcategories Word Number Percentage
U.S. Reactions 23,940 66.5 #
Western Reactions 3,571 9 .9 #
Asian Reactions 3,586 10.0 %
Communist Reactions 3,500 9.7 #
U.N. 1,429 4.0 #
TOTALS 36,026 100.0 %
TABLE 27
Amount and Percentage of Subcategory Coverage
In "Military" Coverage: May 8 - 17, 1972
Subcategories Word Number Percentage
U.S. 4,196 34.3 ^
South Vietnam 4,210 34.4 #
Communist 3,829 31.3 #
TOTALS 12,235 100.0 # 69
TABLE 28
Amount and Percentage of Sutcategory Coverage
In "Vietnam Issue" Coverage: May 8 -- 17, 72
Subcategories Word Number Percentage
U.S. 8,205 93.5
South Vietnam 0 0.0 %
Communist 562 6 M %
Allies 0 0.0 %
TOTALS 8,767 100.0 %
TABLE 29
Amount and Percentage of Subcategory Coverage
In "South Vietnam-Domestic" Coverage: May 8 - 17, 1972
Subcategories Word Number Percentage
U.S. 0 0.0 #
South Vietnam 5,442 100.0%
Communist 0 0.0%
Allies 0 0.0 %
TOTALS 5,442 100.0 % 70
TABIÆ 30
Amount and Percentage of Sutcategory Coverage
In "Mining Operations" Coverage: May 8 - 1?, 1972
Subcategories Word Number Percentage
U.S. 3,677 100.0 ^
South Vietnam 0 0.0 #
Communist 0 0.0 #
Allies 0 0.0 #
TOTALS 3,677 100.0 %
TABEE 31
Amount and Percentage of Subcategory Coverage
In "U.S. Events" Coverage: May 8 - 17, 1972
Subcategories Word Number Percentage
U.S. 3,446 100.0#
South Vietnam 0 0.0#
Communist 0 0.0 #
Allies 0 0.0 #
TOTALS 3,446 100.0 # 71
TABLE 32
Amount and Percentage of Subcategory Coverage
In "Peace Talks" Coverage: May 8 - 17, 1972
Subcategories Word Number Percentage
U.S. 1,432 30.8 #
South Vietnam 479 17.0#
Communist 871 30.0#
Allies 37 1.3 #
TOTALS 2,819 100.0 #
TABLE 33
Amount and Percentage of Subcategory Coverage
In "North Vietnam & Their Allies" Coverages May 8 - 17, 1972
Subcategories Word Number Percentage
U.S. 0 0.0 #
South Vietnam 0 0. 0 #
Communist 342 100.0 #
Allies 0 0 . 0 #
TOTALS 342 100.0 # 72 very high level, at only 3^.4 per cent of all military broadcasts
(Table 2?). In matters in which the fate of South Vietnam was at stake, information representing that country's stand was negligible. To wit, on "Vietnam Issue," the South Vietnamese were seen as mute (Table 28); on "Peace Talks," South Vietnam's peace view was given only 1? per cent of total peace talks coverage compared to 30.8 per cent for the United
States, and 30 per cent for the communists (Table 32). South Viet nam, together with other Asian allies, in their reactions to the mining issue, were covered at 10 per cent of total mining coverage (Table 26).
The theme analysis in this chapter has highlighted the timeliness of the Voice of America's news reporting. In addition, it revealed a strong tendency toward a U.S.-oriented news flow in the Voice's broad casts to Vietnam. The discussion on this point demonstrates that in terms of the Voice of America's role as a proponent of the American policy and as an organ to inform the world on that policy and related issues, it has done its job, at least as far as the amount of informa tion representing the United States goes. However, the fact that the
American viewpoint was represented dominantly suggests that certainly for a native of South Vietnam who wanted to understand an important issue from all points of view, the Voice of America's Vietnamese lan guage broadcasts could not and should not be his only source of in formation if he could help it.
It can be understood that being a U.S. government organ, the Voice of America may tend to over-represent the United States in its broad casts. The question to ask is whether it allows the spectrum of 73 opinions on various issues to "be reflected faithfully on the air.
In the next chapter, an attempt will he made to analyze the Voice's broadcasts to Vietnam in terms of the sources attributed to each news unit broadcast by the Voice of America. 74
FOOTNOTES
1. Holsti, Ole R. Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities. Addison - Wesley Publishing Company, I969, p. 142.
2. Thorndike, Robert L. "Reliability", Educational Measurement, ed. E.F. Lindquist. Washington B.C.: American Council on Education, 1950» P» 609. CHAPTER VI
SOURCE ANALYSIS
VGA will represent America, not any single segment of American society. It will therefore present a balanced, and comprehensive projection of significant American thought and institutions. (USIA Director's Directive to the VGA, 1959).
. . . We quote expressions of American opinions . . . what we are trying to do is show the general attitude on various issues . . . (USIA Director Frank Shakespeare, U.S. News & World Report Interview, May 1st, 1972).
The theme analysis in the previous chapter has focused on the emphasis given to the various issues related to Vietnam as broadcast by the Voice of America to its Vietnamese audience during the crisis period of Amy 8-17, 1972. In this chapter, the Voice's news will be analyzed in terms of its sources in order to measure the spectrum of opinions presented by the Voice of America.
In the communication process, there is always the message sender
(source), and the receiver (audience). When talking about news sources, the first thing that would come to mind would be the various news agencies such as AP, UPI, New China, etc., and various individual
7 5 76
journalists that irrite and issue the news releases. This could be one definition of news sources. However, this concept of sources was not used in this study. One main reason was that the Voice of America's news coverage was a compilation of a varied number of news agencies' releases, and each news unit broadcast by the Voice was not identified by its origin as such. In addition, in the framework of our hypotheses, it serves no useful purpose to look primarily at the issuing agents as sources.
In the theme analysis, themes were defined by answering the ques tion: "What issue is talked about in this unit?" In this analysis, a source can be defined as the "Who" in the question: "In this news unit, who says/does what about the issue?"
All news units appearing under the eight themes discussed in
Chapter V were examined and sorted out according to their sources.
After the original scanning and subsequent refinement, five main sources and four subcategories emerged:
1. VGA Editorial a) U.S. 2. Official b) South Vietnam 3. Political c) Communist 4. Public d) Allies 5. Chronicle
In order to avoid possible confusion in the classification of source, each source category needs to be defined:
l) VGA Editorial: Any opinion, statement, specifically issued by or attributed to the reporters or commentators of the Voice of America. 77
2) Official! Any story issued by, or attributed to, or re sulted from the action of, the representatives of the then governments, is classified in this category.
3) Political: This category covers any story issued by, or attributed to, or resulted from the action of, political leaders such as congressmen, senators.
4) Public : Under this heading are stories issued by, or attributed to, or resulted from the action of, the general public such as students, clergy, professors, and journalists.
5) Chronicle : When the "Who" is not clearly identified, the news unit is classified in this category. Included in this category are any reports or background information which do not give a specific or implied source that can be classified in any of the above four source categories.
As an example, let us consider some excerpted units classified under the three leading themes:
1) Mining Issue Demonstrations against the (mining)
5/ 9/72 action were reported from a number of
10:00 - 11:00 P.M. college campuses across the country,
most of them described as peaceful.
2) Mining Issue Senate Republican leader Hugh Scott
5/l^/72 says he believes the American mining
6:30 - 7:00 P.M. of North Vietnamese harbors will prove
effective in cutting off the flow of
supplies to Hanoi. 78
He said the move was necessary to
protect remaining U.S. servicemen in
Vietnam. He is confident that the U.S.-
Soviet Summit talks will take place as
scheduled later this month.
3) Military South Vietnamese forces have reoccupied
5/14/72 Fire Base Bastogne — a key defense point
6:30 - 7:00 P.M. for the former imperial capital Hue.
Communist troops seized the "base
eighteen days ago.
4) Vietnam Issue In Washington the State Department said
5/10/72 the United States remains available to
6:30 - 7:00 P.M. discuss President Nixon's latest peace
proposal or any other proposal in any
form which holds promise or serious
negotiations.
The first news unit was a report of reactions toward the mining decision on the U.S. college campuses as reflected in students' staged protests against it. The second news unit was a statement of opinion made hy a political leader in the United States, The third segment was a report about South Vietnamese military activities with no specific mention as to who made it. The fourth was a confirmation of U.S. stand regarding the Vietnamese issue, made by a government organ. The source categories attributed to these four units would be: 7 9
1) Mining Issue — U.S. — Public
2) Mining Issue — U.S. — Political
'3) Military — South Vietnam — Chronicle
4) Vietnam Issue — U.S. — Official.
Results
The period May 8 - May 1?, 1972 was a critical period beginning with the American decision to mine North Vietnam's harbors. The mining decision itself, declared on May 8, 1972 by President Nixon, was a very controversial issue regarding the conduct of the Vietnam war. It drew a profusion of expressed opinions from the U.S. and world community.
In the previous chapters, it has been demonstrated that the Voice of America's reporting was timely with regard to new developments of international events. In addition, an America-oriented news flow was revealed. The question that remains is: "How much was the spectrum of world opinion proportionately covered? And how balanced was the re presentation of all segments of American society in the Voice's report ing, especially when controversial events were involved?" We will analyze the Voice of America's performance in each theme category that the Voice dealt with in its broadcasts during the period under study.
1) Mining Issue
A. U.S. Reactions. The Voice of America's broadcasts por trayed a rather cautious political atmosphere during the days following
President Nixon’s new strong measure in the Vietnam war theater.
Despite the possibility that in the face of such a measure, a great many political leaders in the U.S. might be interested in expressing 80 their opinions on the matter, political reactions were represented hy only 19 per cent of all U.S. reactions. It ranked third in length of coverage after "Public Reactions" and "U.S. Official Reactions."
Reactions from officials sources led the category with 41 per cent, to be followed by coverage of public reactions at 22.5 per cent. The
Voice's editorial occupied a relatively modest share with 1?.2 per cent of total coverage of American reactions (Table 34). However, it should be noted that, as was pointed out in Chapter IV, editorials played an important role in the Voice of America's broadcasts toVietnam.
B. Allies' Reactions. Reactions to the mining decision from both Asian and Western allies of the United States were reported with approximately equal time length.(Tables 35 and 3^). All allies' official reactions were covered at significant length. These official reactions led the entire "Allies' Reactions" coverage at 43.9 per cent, with
"Public Reactions" coming second at 34.8 per cent. The allies' public seemed more active than their political segment which trailed at a mere
6.4 per cent (Table 3?)• Reactions from the principal ally of the
United States, South Vietnam, were reported at a negligible level.
South Vietnam's official source was given 4.9 per cent of total "Allies'
Reactions" coverage (Table 37). Among Asian political opinion sources, the South Vietnamese political segment came out as more active with
17.9 per cent of this category (Table 36:). With all other allies com bined, the South Vietnamese political elements were more than two and a half percentage point ahead of their foreign counterparts (Table 37). 81
TABLE 34
Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage
In "Mining Issue - U.S. Reactions" Coverage; May 8 - 17, 1972
Mining Issue - U.S. Reactions Coverage Sources Word Number Percentage
VGA Editorial 4,114 17.2#
U.S. 9,744 40.7 %
South Vietnam 0 0.0 # Official Communist 0 0.0 #
Other Allies 0 0.0 #
U.S. 4,535 19.0#
South Vietnam 0 0.0 # Political Communist 0 0.0 #
Other Allies 0 0 . 0 #
U.S. 5,453 22.8 #
South Vietnam 0 0.0 # Public Communist 0 0.0 #
Other Allies 0 0.0 #
Chronicle 9^ 0.3 %
TOTALS 23,940 100.0 # 82
TABLE 35
Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage
In "Mining Issue - Western Reactions" Coverage; May 8 - 1?, 1972
Mining Issue - Western Reactions Coverage S our ce Word Number Percentage
VGA Editorial 0 0.0#
, U.S. 0 0.0 # I Î South Vietnam 0 0.0 # Uiiiciai 1 Î Communist 0 0.0# 1 Î Other Allies 1,785 50.0 #
U.S. 0 0.0# L . ! South Vietnam 0 0.0 # X OXX Lj.CctX 1 1 Communist 0 0.0# I i Other Allies 188 5 .3%
; U.S. 0 0.0 # I Î South Vietnam 0 0.0#
Î Communist 0 0.0# 1 Î Other Allies 1,597 W-.7 %
Chronicle 0 0.0 #
TOTALS 3,571 100.0 # 83
TABIE 36
Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage
In "Mining Issue - Asian Reactions" Coverage: May 8 - 17, 1972
Mining Issue- Asian Reactions Coverage Sources Word Number Percentage
VGA Editorial 0 0.0 #
U.S. 0 0.0 #
South Vietnam 3(^-9 9.7 % Official Communist 0 0 . 0 #
Other Allies 1,342 3 7 ^ #
U.S. 0 0.0 %
South Vietnam 642 17 .9 # Political Communist 0 0.0 #
Other Allies 267 7 ^ #
U.S. 0 0 . 0 #
South Vietnam 0 0.0 # Public Communist 0 0 . 0 #
Other Allies 897 25.0 #
Chronicle 89 2.5 #
TOTALS 3,586 100.0 # 8^4
TABLE 37
Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage
In "Mining Issue - Combined Allies' Reactions" Coverage
May 8 - 17, 1972
Mining Issue Combined Allies' Reactions Sources Word Number Percentage
VGA Editorial 0 0.0 ^
U.S. 0
South Vietnam 3^9 4.9 # Official Communist 0 0.0%
Other Allies 3,128 43.7 %
U.S. 0 0.0%
South Vietnam 642 9 ^ % Political Communist 0 0.0%
Other Allies 455 6.4 %
U.S. 0 0 ^ %
South Vietna# 0 0.0 % Public Communist 0 0.0 %
Other Allies 2,494 34.8 %
Chronicle 89 1.2 %
TOTALS 7,157 1 0 0 ^ % 85
Meanwhile, publie opinion on the mining issue might be interpreted as non-exixtent in South Vietnam from the absence of such coverage.
G. Communist Reactions. Whether it is the nature of the communist communication pattern to make available only official views on matters of importance could not be determined within the limits of this analysis. Nevertheless, from the VGA's coverage of communist reactions to the mining decision, their public and political opinions did not seem to exist with regard to such a matter. The communist official view was overwhelmingly reported at 85.2 per cent of total coverage on communist reactions with information of a chronicle nature standing at 14.8 per cent (Table 38).
D. United Nations Reactions. The characteristics of the organization itself tend to generate news of a 100 per cent chronicle nature in the coverage on U.N. activities related to the mining decision (Table 39)•
A comparison between the individual source coverage of "Mining
Issue" and the total sum of category coverage indicated a strong lead by U.S. official source: 27.0 per cent as compared to a mere 1.0 per cent for the South Vietnamese, 8.3 per cent for the communists, and near ly 9.0 per cent for America's other allies interested in expressing their opinions (Table 40).
In the political segment, the Voice of America's coverage re flected a quite inactive political force in the allied countries. The
U.S. political leaders were ten times more often reported than their 86
foreign counterparts. Reactions coming from U.S. political sources
were given almost 13.00 per cent of total mining coverage in contrast
to 1.8 per cent for the South Vietnamese and 1.3 per cent for other
American allies (Table 4o).
The public segment in the U.S. with 15.1 per cent of total mining
issue coverage was also better represented on the Voice's Vietnamese
language broadcasts than its counterparts from other countries (Table 4-0).
Over-all, U.S. views from all opinion sources proportionately
received a higher allocation of coverage than other views in the coverage
of the mining issue. Even though it appeared that samples of all
opinion sources in the U.S. were represented, there was a strong skew
toward official sources. The official reaction to the mining decision
received the highest percentage of mining reaction coverage with 27.0
per cent compared to public sources at 15.1 per cent and political
sources at 12.5 per cent (Table 4o). This skew was confirmed more
strongly in Table in which source denomination was not taken into
account, i.e. source subcategories such as U.S., Communist, South Viet
nam, Allies, were not considered. Reports of official sources appeared
45.0 per cent of the time, with public opinion running second at 22.0 per
cent. In this respect, the Voice of America's reporting appeared not
to be the muckraker-type of reportage. Instead, it tended to play it
safe by sticking to the governmental side most of the time (Table 41). 87
TABLE 38
Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage
In "Mining Issue - Communist Reactions" Coverage: May 8 - 17, 1972
Mining Issue-Communist Reactions Coverage Sources Word Number Percentage
VOA Editorial 0 0.0 #
U.S. 0 0 . 0 #
South Vietnam 0 0 . 0 # Official Communist 2,981 85.2 #
Other Allies 0 0 . 0 #
U.S. 0 0 . 0 #
South Vietnam 0 0 . 0 # Political Communist 0 0 ^ #
Other Allies 0 0 . 0 #
U.S. 0 0 . 0 #
South Vietnam 0 0.0# Public Communist 0 0 . 0 #
Other Allies 0 0.0#
Chronicle 519 14.8 /O^
TOTALS 3,500 100.0 # 88
TABLE 39
Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage
In "Mining Issue - United Nations Reactions" Coverage:
May 8 - 17, 1972
Sources Word Number Percentage
Chronicle 1,429 100.0 %
TOTALS 1,429 100.0 % 89
TABLE 40
Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage
In The Total Coverage of "Mining Issue": May 8 - 1?, 1972
Mining Issue Sources Word Number Percentage
VOA Editorial 4,11^ 11.4 ^
U.S. 9,744 27.0#
South Vietnam 34-9 1.0 # Official Communist 2,981 8.3 #
Other Allies 3,128 8.7#
U.S. 4,335 12.5#
South Vietnam 642 1.8 # Political Communist 0 0.0 #
Other Allies 455 1.3 #
U.S. 5,453 15.1#
South Vietnam 0 0.0 # Public Communist 0 0.0 #
Other Allies 2,494- 6.9 #
Chronicle 2,131 5.9 #
TOTALS 36,026 100.0 # 90
TABLE 41
Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage
In "Mining Issue" Coverage: A Summary
May 8 - 17, 1972
Sources Word Number Percentage
VOA Editorial 4,114 11.4 %
Official 16,202 45.0 %
Political 5,632 15.6 #
Public 7,9^7 22.1 #
Chronicle 2,131 3.9 %
TOTALS 36,026 100.0 % 91
2) Military
A. U.S. Military. In the military matter, the political and public segments in the United States either did not seem to have any thing to express, or their reactions were not reported. The government was the main source of information on the military aspect of the Viet nam war. Official sources occupied 41.8 per cent of total military coverage. Information reported without source identification amounted to 43.2 per cent. Enemy sources were used in a limited way with 15 per cent allocated from total coverage time concerning U.S. military (Table
42).
B. South Vietnamese Military. Information on the activities of the South Vietnamese army was mainly reported from "nobody's point of view." Of total coverage on South Vietnam's military news, 86.9 per cent was classified as "Chronicle." The South Vietnamese official source played a modest role (8.4 per cent). The same was true with U.S. public and official opinions concerning South Vietnam's military (Table 43).
C. Communist Military. The "nobody's point of view" style was also true with coverage of the enemy's military activities; 62.5 per cent of this category's coverage fell under "Chronicle." The communists themselves did not seem to have anything to inform about, or to comment on, their military activities and capacity, or their reactions were not covered. However, the Voice of America itself seemed quite interested in expressing its own opinion in this matter. Of the time devoted to communist military news, 21.5 per cent was reserved to the Voice's editorial. The U.S. official and political segments played a modest 92
TABLE 42
Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage
In "Military - U.S. Military" Coverage
May 8 - 17, 1972
U.S. Military Coverage Sources Word Number Percentage
VOA Editorial 0 0 .0 #
U.S. 1,752 4 1 . 8 #
South Vietnam 0 0 .0 # Official Communist 631 13.0 #
Other Allies 0 0 .0 #
U.S. 0 0 .0 #
South Vietnam 0 0 .0 # Political Communist 0 0 .0 #
Other Allies 0 0 .0 #
U.S. 0 0 .0 #
South Vietnam 0 0 .0 # Public Communist 0 0 .0 #
Other Allies 0 0 .0 #
Chroncile 1,813 4 3 .2 #
TOTALS 4,196 100.0 # 93
TABLE 43
Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage
In "Military - South Vietnamese Military Coverage
May 8 - 17, 1972
South Vietnamese Military Coverage Source Word Number Percentage
VOA Editorial 0 0.0#
U.S. 27 0.6#
South Vietnam 333 8 A # Official Communist 0 0.0 #
Other Allies 0 0.0#
U.S. 0 0.0#
South Vietnam 0 0.0# Political Communist 0 0.0#
Other Allies 0 0.0#
U.S. 173 4 . 1 #
South Vietnam 0 0.0 #
Communist 0 0.0 #
Other Allies 0 0 ^ #
Chronicle 3,637 86.9#
TOTALS 4,210 100.0 # role with 12.9 per cent and 3*0 per cent respectively (Table 44).
There was a clear tendency to report military news from "nobody's
point of view" as seen in the amount of information falling under the
classification "Chronicle" in each source category. A composite
picture (Table 45) shows "Chronicle" amounted up to 64.3 per cent
of total military coverage. The U.S. official voice was propor
tionately well represented with 18.6 per cent of total military Cover age, whereas the representation of other sources and subsources was
negligible (Table 45). In military news reporting, the tendency to
stick to official source, regardless of whose official line it was, ran second only to the tendency of reporting from "nobody's point of
view." The coverage of official source stood at 26.6 per cent of
total military coverage (Table 46).
3) Vietnam Issue
The reporting on this issue revealed that in this complex
issue no one from the South Vietnamese to other U.S. allies seemed to
have anything to say. It was reported as mainly a quarrel between the
United States and the communists. The total coverage was split between
the American view and that of the communists.
On the U.S. side, information from political and public sources
was not given prominent coverage with only 3*5 per cent and 11.0 per
cent of total coverage of U.S. view respectively. The coverage of
information from official sources remained constantly high. It ranked
second only to the Voice of America's editorial at the level of 27.6 per
cent of the total coverage of U.S. view (Table 4?). In the Vietnam 95
TABLE 44
Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage
In "Military - Communist Military" Coverage
May 8 - 1?, 1972
Communist Military Coverage QUULHJCJÜ Word Number Percentage
VOA Editorial 825 21.5 #
U.S. 495 12.9 %
South Vietnam 0 0.0 % Official Communist 0 0 . 0 %
Other Allies 0 0 . 0 %
U.S. 114 3.0%
South Vietnam 0 0 . 0 % Political Communist 0 0.0%
Other Allies 0 0.0 %
U.S. 0 0.0%
South Vietnam 0 0.0 % Public Communist 0 0.0 %
Other Allies 0 0.0 %
Chronicle 2,395 62^ %
TOTALS 3,829 100.0 % oA
TABLE 49
Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage
In the Total Coverage of "Military"
May 8 - 17, 1972
Military Coverage Sources Word Number Percentage
VOA Editorial 825 6.7 #
U.S. 2,2^ 18.6#
South Vietnam 353 2 . 9 # Official Communist 631 5 . 2 #
Other Allies 0 0.0 #
U.S. 114 0 .9#
South Vietnam 0 0 . 0 # Political Communist 0 0 . 0 #
Other Allies 0 0 . 0 #
U.S. 173 1 ^ #
South Vietnam 0 - 0 .0#
Communist 0 0 .0#
Other Allies 0 0.0 #
U.S. 1,813 14.8 #
South Vietnam , Chronicle 3,657 2 9 ^ # Communist 2,393 19.6#
Other allies 0 0 .0#
TOTALS 12,235 100.0 % 9 7
TABLE ^■6
Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage
In The Coverage of "Military: A Summary
May 8 - 1?, 1972
Sources Word Number Percentage
VGA Editorial 825 6.7 #
Official 3,258 26.6 ^
Political 114 0.9 #
Public 173 1.4 ^
Chronicle 7,865 64.3 #
TOTALS 12,235 100.0# 98
TABLE 47
Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage
In "Vietnam Issue - U.S. View and Allies' View" Coverage
May 8 - 1?, 1972
Vietnam Issue-U.S. & Allies'Views Coverage Sources Word Number Percentage
VOA Editorial 4,746 57.8 #
U.S. 1,978 24.1 #
South Vietnam 0 0.0 # Official Communist 0 0.0 #
Other Allies 288 3 .5#
U.S. 289 3.5 #
South Vietnam 0 0 . 0 # Political Communist 0 0.0 #
Other Allies 0 0.0 #
U.S. 904 11.0 %
South Vietnam 0 0.0 #
Communist 0 0.0 #
Other Allies 0 0.0 #
Chronicle 0 0.0 #
TOTALS 8,205 100.0 # 99 issue, the Voice of America seemed to feel a great need to express its opinion; 57*8 per cent of total U.S. view coverage was devoted to the 1 Voice's editorial (Table 4?).
On the communist side, their view of the issue was aired only by means of the official channel; it was 100.0 per cent of all the coverage of the communist view (Table 48).
With respect to the proportion of coverage each side was entitled to on the Voice of America's broadcasts, even if the Vietnam issue was seen as mainly a quarrel between the United States and the Communists, the treatment of the quarrel was a skewed one highly in favor of the
U.S. and its views. In the coverage of the Vietnam issue, the communist official source was allocated 6.4 per cent of the time as compared to
22.6 per cent of the time reserved to the American official sources.
The Voice's editorial was down a few points in the over-all picture, but it still ranked first with 54.1 per cent of total coverage on the Viet nam issue (Table 49).
The over-all picture in the coverage of the Vietnam issue was that the Voice of America's broadcasts on this issue were heavily accented with its own editorials. And the tendency to stick to official sources for information remained dominant (Table 50)-
4) South Vietnam - Domestic
As the theme implied, this category strictly involved South Viet nam's internal affairs. Information sources in the form of opinion or facts from sources other than South Vietnam were not present. The re porting trend of using largely official sources was apparent. Of the 1 0 0
TABLE 48
Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage
In "Vietnam Issue - Communist View" Coverage
May 8 - 1?, 1972
Vietnam Issue - Communist View Coverage Sources Word Number Percentage
VOA Editorial 0 0.0 #
U.S. 0 0.0 0
South Vietnam 0 0.0# Official Communist 562 100.0 #
Other Allies 0 0.0 #
U.S. 0 0.0 #
South Vietnam 0 0.0 # Political Communist 0 0.0 #
Other Allies 0 0.0 #
U.S. 0 0.0#
South Vietnam 0 0.0 # Public Communist 0 0.0 #
Other Allies 0 0.0 #
Chronicle 0 0.0#
TOTALS 562 100.0 # 1 0 1
TABLE >49
Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage
In The Total Coverage of "Vietnam Issue"
May 8 - 1?, 1972
Vietnam Issue Coverage Sources Word Number Percentage
VOA Editorial 4,746 5^.1
U.S. 1,978 22.6 #
South Vietnam 0 0.0 # Off icial Communist 562 6.4 #
Other Allies 288 3.3 #
U,S. 289 3.3 #
South Vietnam 0 0.0 # Political Communist 0 0.0 %
Other Allies 0 0.0 #
U.S. 904 10.3 #
South Vietnam 0 0.0 # Public Communist 0 0.0 %
Other Allies 0 0.0 #
• Chronicle 0 0.0 #
TOTALS 8,767 100.0 % 1 0 2
TABLE 50
Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage
In the Coverage of "Vietnam Issue": A Summary
May 8 - 17, 1972
Sources Word Number Percentage
VOA Editorial 4,746 54.1 #
Official 2,828 32.2 #
Political 289 3.3 #
Public 904 10.3 #
Chronicle 0 0.0 %
TOTALS 8,767 100.0 % 1 103 total coverage of "South Vietnam - Domestic," 68.5 per cent was from
South Vietnamese official sources. The political and public spectra were allocated a modest coverage at 16.4 per cent and 15.1 per cent respectively (Table 51 and Table 52).
5) Mining Operations
As the theme implies, this category was strictly a U.S. operation in connection with the mining decision. Official sources of information were leading all other source categories with 63.9 per cent of the total coverage on the mining operations. The public sources of information were negligibly covered. Proportionately, the Voice of America's editorial also represented a small share of the coverage (Table 53).
6) U.S. Events
Most of the factual information on "U.S. Events" were related to the decision-making process in connection with the mining. Official sources received 73.1 per cent of the total coverage on U.S. events, with the Voice's "Editorial" (15.2 per cent) having somewhat greater coverage than the political segment (Table 54).
7) Peace Talks
In the theme category "Peace Talks," four subcategories were established representing the parties involved in the peace negotiations.
In "U.S. View," which took up the major part of the coverage, the time devoted to official sources was significantly high at 94.7 per cent as compared to 5.3 per cent reserved for political views. And what the
U.S. public thought of the Peace Talks could not be learned by 104
TABLE 51
Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage
In The Total Coverage of "South Vietnam-Domestic"
May 8 - 17, 1972
South Vietnam-Domestic Coverage oources Word Number Percentage
VOA Editorial 0 0.0#
U.S. 0 0.0#
South Vietnam 3,726 68.5 Official Communist 0 0.0#
Other Allies 0 0.0#
U.S. 0 0.0#
South Vietnam 894 1 6 ^ # Political Communist 0 0.0# * Other Allies 0 0.0#
U.S 0 0.0#
South Vietnam 822 Public 15^ % Communist 0 0.0#
Other Allies 0 0.0#
Chronicle 0 0.0#
TOTALS 3,442 100.0 # 105
TABLE 52
Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage
In The Coverage of "South Vietnam - Domestic": A Summary
May 8 - 17, 1972
Sources Word Number Percentage
VOA Editorial 0 0.0#
Official 3,726 68.5 #
Political 89^ 16.4 #
Public 822 15.1 #
Chronicle 0 0.0#
TOTALS 5,442 100.0 # 106
TABLE 53
Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage
In The Coverage of "Mining Operations"
May 8 - 17, 1972
Mining Operations Coverage Source Word Number Percentage
VGA Editorial 298 8.0 #
U.S. 2,350 63.9 %
South Vietnam 0 0.0 # Official Communist 0 0.0#
Other Allies 75 2.0 #
U.S. 0 0.0 #
South Vietnam 0 0.0 # Political Communist 0 0.0 #
Other Allies 0 0.0 #
U.S. 2 .3 %
South Vietnam 0 0.0 # Public Communist 0 0.0 #
Other Allies 0 0.0 #
Chronicle 870 23.7 %
TOTALS 3,677 100.0 # 1 0 7
TABLB 54
Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage
In the Coverage of "U.S. Events": A Summary
May 8 - 1?, 1972
U.S. Events Coverage Sources Word Number Percentage
VOA Editorial 523 15.2 %
U.S. 2,520 73.1 %
South Vietnam 0 0.0 %
Communist 0 0.0 #
Other Allies 0 0.0 #
U.S. 403 11.7 %
South Vietnam 0 0.0 %
Communist 0 0.0 %
Other Allies 0 0.0 #
U.S. 0 0.0 #
South Vietnam 0 0.0 %
Communist 0 0.0 %
Other Allies 0 0.0 #
Chronicle 0 0.0 ^
TOTALS 3,446 100.0 ^ 1 0 8 listening to the Voice of America's broadcasts (Table 55)•
Both the South Vietnamese view and the communist view originated mainly from their government representatives at the maximum 100.o per cent coverage for each source. The various segments of opinion or news from America's allied countries were conspicuously absent. What was reported was merely a reaction from a public source in France which amounted to a negligible 1.3 per cent of the total coverage of the
Peace Talks (Tables 5^> 57> 58).
In general, the American official sources represented 48 per cent of the time devoted to the peace negotiation issue. The communist point of view was given 30.9 per cent of the total coverage. This difference in percentage portrayed a verbal exchange between the two adversaris with the time advantage tilted toward the United States. The South
Vietnamese official position played a very modest role in this exchange
(1? per cent) (Table 59).
The Voice of America's trend toward official news sources was again reinforced here with an over-all picture of official sources standing at 98.0 per cent of the total time devoted to "Peace Talks" coverage. Other source coverage was negligible (Table 6o).
8) North Vietnam and Their Allies
The nature of this category restricted itself mainly to communist activities. The communist official source was covered 100.0 per cent of the time devoted to this category (Table 6l). 109
TABLE 55
Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage
In "Peace Talks - U.S. View" Coverage
May 8 - 1?, 1972
Peace Talks - U.S. View Coverage Sources Word Number Percentage
VGA Coverage 0 0.0 #
U.S. 1,356 9^.7 #
South Vietnam 0 0.0 # Official Communist 0 0.0 #
Other Allies 0 0.0 %
U.S. 76 5.3 #
South Vietnam 0 0.0 # Political Communist 0 0.0 #
Other Allies 0 0.0 #
U.S. 0 0.0#
South Vietnam 0 0.0 # Public Communist 0 0.0 #
Other Allies 0 0.0 #
Chronicle 0 0.0 #
TOTALS 1,432 100.0 # 1 1 0
TABIÆ 56
Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage
In "Peace Talks - South Vietnam's View" Coverage
May 8 - 1?, 1972
Peace Talks— S . Vietnam's View Coverage Sources Word Number Percentage
VGA Editorial 0 0.0#
U.S. 0 0.0#
South Vietnam 479 100.0 # Official Communist 0 0.0#
Other Allies 0 0 . 0 #
U.S. 0 0.0#
South Vietnam 0 0.0# Political Communist 0 0.0#
Other Allies 0 0.0#
U.S. 0 0.0#
South Vietnam 0 0.0 # Public Communist 0 0 .0#
Other Allies 0 0.0#
Chronicle 0 0.0#
TOTALS 479 100.0 # 11
TABLS 57
Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage
In "Peace Talks - Communist View" Coverage
May 8 - 1?, 1972
Peace Talks - Communist View Coverage Source Word Number Percentage
VGA Editorial 0 0.0 #
U.S. 0 0.0 #
South Vietnam 0 0.0 #
Communist 97.0#
Other Allies 0 0 .0#
U.S. 0 0.0 #
South Vietnaçi 0 0 .0#
Communist 0 0 .0#
Other Allies 0 0 . 0 #
U.S. 0 0 . 0 #
South Vietnam 0 0 . 0 #
Other Allies 0 0 . 0 #
Communist 0 0.0 #
Chronicle 26 3.0#
TOTALS 871 100.0 # 1 1 2
TABIÆ 58
Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage
In "Peace Talks - Allies' View" Coverage
May 8 - 17, 1972
Peace Talks - Allies' View Coverage Sources Word Number Percentage
VGA Editorial 0 0.0 %
U.S. 0 0.0 %
South Vietnam 0 0.0% Official Communist 0 0.0 %
Other Allies 0 0.0%
U.S. 0 0.0 %
South Vietnam 0 0.0 % Political Communist 0 0.0%
Other Allies 0 0.0%
U.S. 0 0.0%
South Vietnam 0 0.0% Public Communist 0 0.0 %
Other Allies 37 100.0 %
Chronicle 0 0.0 %
TOTALS 37 1 0 0 ^ % 113
TABLS 59
Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage
In The Coverage of "Peace Talks"
May 8 1- 17, 1972
Peace Talks Coverage Sources Word Number Percentage
VGA Editorial 0 0.0#
f U.S. 1,356 48.1 #
South Vietnam 479 17 .0 # Official Communist 871 30.9#
Other Allies 0 0.0#
U.S. 76 2.7#
South Vietnam 0 0.0# Political Communist 0 0.0#
Other Allies 0 0.0#
U.S. 0 0.0#
South Vietnam 0 0.0# Public Communist 0 0 .0#
Other Allies 36 1.3#
Chronicle 0 0.0#
TOTALS 2,819 100,0 # 11 ^
TABLE 60
Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage
In The Coverage of "Peace Talks": A Summary
May 8 - 17, 1972
Sources Word Number Percentage
VGA Editorial 0 0.0#
Official 2,706 96.0 #
Political 76 2 .7 %
Public 37 1 .3 #
Chronicle 0 0.0#
TOTALS 2,819 100.0# 115
TABLE 61
Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage
In "North Vietnam & Their Allies" Coverage
May 8 - 17, 1972
North Vietnam & Their Allies Coverage Sources Word Number Percentage
VOA Editorial 0 0.0#
U.S. 0 0.0 #
South Vietnam 0 0.0# Official Communist 542 100.0 #
Other Allies 0 0.0#
U.S. 0 0.0#
South Vietnagi 0 0.0 # Political Communist 0 0.0 #
Other Allies 0 0.0 #
U.S. 0 0.0#
South Vietnam 0 0.0 # Public Communist 0 0.0#
Other Allies 0 0.0#
Chronicle 0 0.0#
TOTALS 542 100.0 # 1 1 6
Conclusion
The source analysis in this chapter has pointed out several
interesting aspects in the news coverage of the Voice of America in
its broadcasts to the Vietnamese audience.
Despite some scattered inclusion of news sources from unfriendly nations, an American-oriented tendency in news coverage was highly visible in the Voice of America's broadcasts. Throughout the period under study, source by source, American sources played a major role.
In spite of some effort to portray South Vietnam as politically active
(See Mining Issue — Asian Reactions, Table 36, p. 83), the U.S.'s principal ally in the Vietnam war was seen almost speechless even in
issues of vital importance to its destiny such as the mining issue
(Table 37, p. 84), the Vietnam issue (Table 4-9, p. lOl), and the peace negotiations (Table 59, P- 113)• Other non-American sources were also given nominal coverage. It seems clear that in terms of an interna
tional spectrum of opinion, the Voice of America's broadcasts did not reflect it in a balanced way. As for the spectrum of American opinion,
if the Vietnamese audience wished to find out what America's attitude was about a certain issue, they should certainly tune to the Voice of
America. The America-oriented news pattern was consistent with the
Voice of America's claim of representing America. However, on the question of how balanced this representation was the answer was rather different.
The Voice of America's reporting was not the muclcraking, investi gative type. In all categories, whether the source was American, 117
TABLS 62
Total Amount and Percentage of Source Coverage
In The Total Coverage of The Period May 8-1?, 1972
Sources Word Number Percentage
VOA Editorial 10,506 14.4 %
Official 34,207 46.9#
Political 7,408 10.2 #
Public 9,967 13.7 #
Chronicle 10,866 14.9#
TOTALS 72,954 100.0 # 118
communist, or otherwise, the reporting tended to utilize official
sources. As far as the American spectrum of opinion was concerned, despite some effort to bring into the picture other segments of American
society, the official sources were consistently given a prominent
emphasis. In addition, the Voice of America's editorial itself con
tributed significantly to the official message it sent to its Vietnamese audience. On the surface, this editorial role was over-all modest, but
it was quite visible especially in controversial subjects that called for some kind of clarification or persuasion such as the Vietnam issue,
or the communist military (Table 50» P» 102 and Table 44, p. 95)• As a matter of fact, the Voice of America's editorial, at 14.4 per cent, was proportionately given more time than other sources besides the official source (46.9 per cent), and Chronicle (14.9 per cent) (Table
62).
It could be concluded that in its role as a government organ spread
ing the U.S. government point of view, the Voice of America has reason ably fulfilled its mission. But as a faithful mirror reflecting "a balanced and comprehensive projection of significant American thought and institutions," there were serious shortcomings. The Voice's audi ence could not totally rely on its broadcasts to acquire an in-depth and balanced news comprehension, or an insight into "the general attitude on various issues." The gullible listener would run the risk
of being exposed to considerable persuation on the part of the Voice.
In the next chapter, the Voice's news broadcasts will be analysed in
order to understand in what direction the Voice's persuasion was heading. CHAPTER VII
PROPOSITION ANALYSIS
In the previous chapters a subtle pattern of persuasive effort was revealed in the Voice of America's Vietnamese language programs.
Quantitatively, this pattern was evident in the dominant role that the
U.S. official-related news played in the Voice's broadcasts, and in a seemingly modest but yet forceful role that the Voice's editorial enjoyed throughout the period under study. In this chapter, the content of the Voice of America's message will be analyzed in order to find out precisely how the Voice tried to persuade its audience. The proposi tions contained in the Voice's newscasts will be the main concern in the analysis of message content in this chapter.
It is essential to note that there is a difference in a theme analysis (Chapter V) and a proposition analysis. A theme refers to the topic, the subject matter of the message, whereas a proposition in volves the contextual information on that particular topic. Simplistic- ally, if one was to be assigned to write about his pet, his likely title
"My Cat" for the expose would be classified as a theme, and his descrip tion of the cat as black or calico, wicked or sweet tempered, etc., would be considered a proposition. Similarly, in the context of this
119 120 study, the term "proposition" refers to the central contextual idea expressed in each news unit. It bears an evaluative color. A few excerpted news units from the broadcast material will demonstrate the distinction between a theme and a proposition.
1 ) 5/9/72 White House Adviser Henry Kissinger
6:30 - 7:00 P.M. said Tuesday the mining of North
Theme : Mining Issue Vietnamese ports involved some risk
U.S. Reactions of confrontation with Moscow, but
Source: Official not an unacceptable one, and he sal:
the U.S. is continuing its plans fc:
President Nixon's scheduled trip to
the Soviet Union this month.
2) 5/10/72 In Paris, Foreign Minister Maurice
6:30 - 7:00 P.M. Schumann said France is seriously
Theme : Mining Issue concerned about the aggravation of
Western Reactions the Vietnam situation and the possi-
Source: Official bility of a big power confrontation,
3) 5/10/72 Meanwhile, results of a poll conduct
6:30 - 7:00 P.M. ed by the Opinion Research Corpora
Theme : Mining Issue tion say seventy five per cent of
U.S. Reactions Americans questioned supported the
Source : Public President's decision to mine major
North Vietnamese ports, nearly an
identical number also supported the
President's proposal to withdraw all 1 2 1
American forces from South Vietnam
after the return of American prison
ers of war.
4) 5/12/72 Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
10:00 - 11:00 A.M. warned that latest U.S. action in
Theme : Mining Issue Vietnam will have incalculable con
Asian Reactions sequences. In a message to a Uew
Source: Official Delhi gathering, ilrs. Gandhi called
U.S. action totally unacceptable.
5) 5/14/72 Also in the Military Corps I in
7:00 - 8:00 A,M. Quang Nam at 1:50 this morning, com
Theme : Military munist forces fired eleven 82mm and
Communist one hundred 22mm shells into Hoi An
Source : Chronicle killing two civilians and wounding
three. At 2:00A.M. communist forces
fired sixteen 122mm rockets into the
Da-Nang airport, but physical damage
was light. However, a few rockets
fell in Duy Tan hospital near the
airport killing five convalescing
soldiers and wounding nine others.
The themes under which these five news units were classified in dicate what subject the units deal with but they do not give a meaning to the units in their context. The specific meaning in an evaluative contextual sense would be the proposition conveyed in each unit. The 1 2 2 the following are the propositions for the above five units;
1) The mining decision is defended/approved:
- It will not induce big power confrontation.
2) The mining decision is a cause for concern/disapproval:
- It may bring about a big power confrontation.
3) The mining decision is defended/approved:
- The public endorsed it.
4) The mining decision is a cause for concern/disapproval:
- It is unacceptable.
5) The communist forces are ruthless and aggression-prone :
- They shell profusely and indiscriminately.
The propositions at times may not be completely explicit. It en tailed a careful study of the material in the historical and contextual framework to pinpoint accurately the contextual tendency in the units of news. All news units categorized by themes and sources (Chapters V and
VI) were studied thoroughly, and a proposition was written up for each unit as based on its contextual information. The list of propositional statements was revised several times in an attempt to group similar pro positions together under one general heading. Due to limited .resources, the entire process was performed by the researcher with no attempt to establish an inter-coder reliability. After several revisions, the final list of propositions emerged (Appendix B).
Under appropriate proposition headings by themes, each news unit was given a proposition code which corresponded with the codes appearing in Appendix B. This code usually included a Roman number for the pro- 123 positional general heading, and when applicable, an alphabetical subscript representing the news unit's specific contextual message.
Thus as an example, news excerpt No. 5 listed earlier would be coded
B. Military - Communist - Vlll-a. The numeral VIII was for the general heading "North Vietnamese forces are ruthless and aggression-pronethe subscript "a" was for the contextual message that "they shell profusely and indiscriminately."
All proposition-coded news units were then quantified in word number and percentage by themes and sources. To further elucidate the question of how the Voice of America tended to portray issues in its newscasts, an evaluation scale of Favorable - Unfavorable - Neutral was applied to all proposition-coded news units. In judging news units along the evaluative dimension F-U-N, coders were expected to ask whether a parti cular proposition-coded message was favorable, unfavorable, or neutral toward the U.S. and its allies with regards to the issue at hand. Con sequently, a news item that was seen as unfavorable to the opponent of the U.S. and its allies would be graded as favorable (to the U.S.) at the end. Conversely, a news item that was favorable to the enemy would be graded as unfavorable (to the U.S.) in the final tabulation. A reliability test was performed by comparing the coding done by the re searcher and the coding judgment of a panel of three other judges.
Table 63 represents the agreement between the judges.
The average inter-judge agreement was computed to be .85 . A com posite reliability coefficient may be computed by the following formula, in which N denotes the number of judges: ^ 124
TABIÆ 63
Inter-Coder Agreement in the Evaluation of Propositions
Judges A BG
D .97 .89 .79
G .78 .79
B .89
composite Ballability Coefficient =
B'O' = = -9^
Results
Chapters V and VI showed the focus that the Voice of America gave
to various themes and sources treated in its output. It is in this
thematic framework that the propositions in the Voice's news broadcasts would be analyzed. In fact, the pattern of persuation used by the Voice
of America could be discerned more systematically when the propositions were looked at according to themes and sources. It could give an insight
into the Voice's deliberate perception of various issues which it put on
the airwaves and would like its audience to absorb.
A . Mining Issue
l) U.S. Reactions. The reactions from the U.S. population
toward the mining decision was that of approving sympathetic consensus, according to the Voice of America. Of the coverage of U.S. reactions
83.1 per cent pointed to the fact that one way or the other, the American people from all walks of life supported and sympathized with the mining 12^ decision. And if disagreement and criticism were an inevitable fact of life in the American democracy, in the case of the mining issue, the dissenters were in the minority. Only 13.8 per cent of U.S. re action coverage was voices of those dissenters who disapproved the
President's measure (Table 64).
By sources, the pattern in Table 65 reinforced earlier observations in Chapters V and VI concerning the importance attributed to the Voice of America's editorials. The Voice spent 100.0 per cent of its edito rial time defending the mining decision. Further analysis showed that the Voice resorted most often to pointing out the mining measure's public appeal at the rate of 28.2 per cent of all editorial argument
(Table 65). It also attempted to justify the decision by saying that it was prompted by the North Vietnamese intransigence (16.1 per cent).
The Voice's editorial also highlighted the effectiveness of mining in achieving U.S. objectives in Vietnam (15.2 per cent), as well as the risk-free virtue of the decision in international relations (13.4 per cent) and (13.2 per cent). The Voice's editorial did not neglect to attack the integrity of people who were not in favor of President Nixon's course of action (13.9 per cent) (Table 65). For example, on its ilay 12 broadcast, commenting on student protests, the Voice of America's corre spondent from the Berkeley campus said his "impression" of the Berkeley protests was that they were a "senseless reflex destruction" caused mainly by either non-students or a radical minority.
On the F-U-N scale, the Voice of America's editorial concerning the mining issue stacked its argument 100.0 per cent in favor of the 126
TABLE 64
Amount and Percentage of Proposition Headings
In the Coverage of "Mining Issue - U.S. Reactions"
May 8 - 1?, 1972
Proposition Unit Word Number Percentage Headings Frequency I 165 19,883 83.1#
II 57 3,308 13.8 #
IV 25 749 3.1 #
TOTALS 247 23,940 100.0 #
decision (Table 65)•
On the official side, U.S. official reactions were on the side of the President with 96.6 per cent of total coverage of official reactions expressing sympathy and support (Table 65). Their dominant argument
(55*7 per cent) was that the mining decision was worthy of support be cause it would be an effective way to carry out U.S. objectives in end ing the Vietnam war in face of the Vietnamese communist intransigence,
In addition, they also expressed their support by either assuring people that it would not jeopardize big power relations nor lead to a dangerous confrontation (9-5 per cent), or they justified it with clarification of its raison d'etre and objectives (7-3 per cent and 7-1 per cent re spectively) (Table 65).
In terms of the evaluative measure, 96.6 per cent of official coverage was favorable to the mining decision, and per cent was news of a neutral nature (Table 65). TABIE 65
Evaluative Dimensions of Propositions By Sources
In the Coverage of "Mining Issue - U.S. Reactions"
Mining Issue - U.S. Reactions Coverage Evaluative Dimensions Sources Unit Propositions Word Number F u N Frequency I-b 1 662 16.1 # I-f 1 626 15.2 # - - VOA Editorial I-g 1 553 13.4 # I-j 1 541 13.2 # I-n 2 1,160 28.2 # I-o 1 572 13.9 # Subtotal 4,114 100.0 %
1 1 I-b 4 293 3.0 # r I-a 10 509 5.2 # 1 I-e 10 649 6.7 # 1 I-f 13 5,428 55.7 # 1 I-g 21 922 9.5 # I-h 1 73 0.7 # •U.S. I-i 1 25 0.3 # Official 1 • I-j 9 712 7.3 # I I-k 8 691 7.1 # I I-I 1 77 0.8 # 0 .3 # 1 IV-a 1 0.3 # 1 IV-b 1 57 0.6 # IV) -o TABLE 65 (continued)
Mining Issue - U.S. Reactions Coverage Evaluative Dimensions Unit Propositions Word Number F U N Frequency IV-c 3 91 0 .9 # IV-d 2 89 0 .9 # IV-f 1 65 0 .7 # Official U.S. Subtotal 9,7# 96.6 % 3.4 #
South ------Vietnam
Communist ------Other ------Allies
I-a 14 687 15.1 # I-b 1 126 2 .8 # I-d 2 30 0 .7 # I-e 1 42 U.S. 0 .9 # I-f 3 134 3 .0 # I-g 2 52 1.1 % I-h 8 462 10.2 # 1-i 12 16.6 % Political 751 I-k 1 19 0.4 % 1-n 1 74 1 .6 # I 3 97 2.1 # Il-a 4 220 4 .9 # Il-b N 191 4.2 00 TABLE 65 (continued)
Mining Issue - U.S. Reactions Coverage Evaluative Dimensions Sources Propositions Unit . Number F U N Frequency ! 1 II-c 3 ; 172 3 .8 # Il-d 9 ; 730 16.1 % Il-e 2 ; 150 3 .3 # Il-f 1 ; 116 - 2.6 # Political U.S. Il-g 1 : 15 0 .3 # Il-h 7 ; 237 5 .2 # Il-i 3 ; 134 3.0 # IV-c 1 ; 86 1 .9 # IV-i 1 ; 10 0.2 # 1 Subtotal I 4,535 54.5 ^ 43.4 # 2.1 # 1 South Vietnam
Communist - - - - Other j Allies
I-a 2 ; 338 6.2 # _— I-b 1 ! 199 3.6 # -- I-c 1 ! 145 2 .7 # -- I-f 2 ! 227 4.2 # - - I-g 1 ! 182 3 .3 # -- I-h 10 ! 1,224 22.4 # - - I-i 15 ! 1 ,366 25.1 # -- rv) \o TABLE 65 (continued)
Mining Issue - U.S. Reactions Coverage Evaluative Dimesnions Unit Propositions Word Number FUN Frequency I-k 1 109 2 .0 # I-m 3 49 0.9 # I-n 2 44 0.8 # Il-a 2 251 4.6 % Il-b 1 99 1.8 # Public U.S. II-c 1 123 2.3 # Il-g 18 698 12.8 # Il-h 1 113 2.1 # II 1 59 1.1 # IV-g 2 133 2 ^ # IV-h 5 93 1.7 #
Subtotal 5,453 71.2 % 24.7 # 4.1 #
s. Vietnam
Communist Other Allies IV-h 4 72 75.8 # Chronicle IV-G 1 23 - - 24.2 # Subtotal 95 - - 100.0 %
h - L, TOTALS 23,940 C 1 3 1
U.S. political leaders' opinions seemed almost equally divided on the issue. Reportedly, 5^.5 yer cent were in support of the mining decision in contrast to 43.4 per cent in opposition (Table 65). The supporters' main argument revolved around their outright welcome and vote (16.6 per cent); or they urged support of the mining (15-1 per cent). In addition, they showed their support by their prediction that the President's decision would not induce a much feared big power con frontation (10.2 per cent). The opponents, on the contrary, condemned it outright (I6 .I per cent). Their disapproval was expressed through various means among which were attempted legislation against it (5«2 per cent), negative evaluation of its consequences as dangerous (4.9 per cent) and ineffective (4.2 per cent) (Table 65). At any rate, as a political aggregate, the supporters of the mining decision came out ahead. On the evaluative scale, they scored 54.5 per cent in favor of the mining decision in contrast to 43.4 per cent against it. The neutral position accounted for only 2.1 per cent of total political reactions reported (Table 65).
While the political leaders were seen as rather cautious, the public was reported to be overwhelmingly enthusiastic about the President's decision to mine North Vietnamese ports. Of all public reactions re ported, 71.2 per cent were an expression of endorsement. It was a pic ture of substantial support from the public (Table 65).
Seen on the evaluation scale, the public was portrayed as largely in favor of the mining decision with 71.2 per cent of public reaction coverage along the favorable dimension. Only 24.7 per cent were reported 132 unfavorable and 4.1 per cent neutral (Table 65).
2) Western Reactions. From the western allies of the United
States, the Voice of America reported that the majority of their re actions was that of support and sympathy: 6 3 .1 per cent of total western reactions reported. Their disapproval represented only 15.4 per cent of western reaction coverage (Table 66).
From official sources, the western allies explicitly sided with the
American decision at the rate of 49.2 per cent of all official reactions.
Those governments' opinions that expressed misgivings were only 11.3 per cent. The British governmental effort to reconvene the Geneva conference represented 38.1 per cent of official reaction coverage. These reports did not have any direct bearing on the evaluative dimensions of the issue and were seen as non-committal (Table 67 ). Official western sources mostly praised the U.S. mining measure as a sign of determination in face of communist blackmail (15*5 per cent). They expressed understand ing and sympathy toward a difficult decision (10.9 per cent), as well as defended it on various grounds (10.5 per cent). The biggest concern by official western sources who hinted a disapproval of the mining was the possibility of a big power confrontation (10.6 per cent). When official western reactions were measured on the F-U-N scale, 49-2 per cent were favorable to the U.S. mining, 11.3 per cent was unfavorable, and 39.8 per cent were non-committal (Table 67 ).
The western political leaders' attitude was mainly that of justi fying the mining and defending its motives (64.9 per cent) while the opposing fraction — a minority — was openly'challenging the American 133
TABLE 66
Amount and Percentage of Proposition Headings
In The Coverage of "Mining Issue - Western Reactions"
Proposition Unit Word Number Percentage Headings Frequency I 35 2,253 63.1 #
II 17 551 15.4 %
III 17 680 1 9.0 #
IV 2 87 2 ^ #
TOTALS 3,571 100.0 fo wisdom (10.6 per cent) (Table 6?). On the F-U-N scale, the reported reactions of political leaders from western allied countries were 75-5 per cent in favor of the mining, and 24.5 per cent disapproving it
(Table 6?).
The western public sources were reported to be in support of the
American mining measure on various grounds. They were 77*3 per cent favorable to it. Mostly expressed through their newspaper, the western public was reported to believe that mining was supportable as it would not induce a big power clash (20.7 per cent). They saw it as something forced upon the United States by the North Vietnamese rigid attitude, and it was therefore a morale booster (20.4 per cent). In addition, they expressed understanding and sympathy (12.9 per cent), or they em phasized its courageous attributes (9*4 per cent) (Table 67 ). The 18.9 per cent of public opinion unfavorable to the mining was mainly con cerned with the prospect of damaged peace (7 .I per cent), or with the TABLE 67
Evaluative Dimensions of Propositions By Sources
In The Coverage of "Mining Issue - Western Reactions"
Mining Issue - Western Reaction Coverage Evaluative Dimensions sources , . Unit JPropositions Word Number P U N Frequency
VGA Editorial | - - - --
— U.S. ; - - - - -
S. Vietnam* - - -- - f Communist ! - - - -- ; I-b 4 189 10.5 # -- i 2 195 10.9 # - - Official 7 I-d 4 105 5 .9 # -- Other ! I-e 1 276 15.5 # -- ; I-f 1 66 3 .7 # -- Allies J I-k 1 46 2.6 # ; II-c 4 189 - 10.6 # - ; ii-d 1 13 - 0.7 # ; iii-h 17 680 -- 38.1 # ; iv-g 1 27 - - 1.5 #
1 Î Subtotal 1,786 4 9 .1 # 11.3 # 39.6 #
------1------
V- TABLE 67 (continued)
Mining Issue - Western Reactions Coverage Evaluative Dimensions ÛUUXUfcJiD Unit Propositions Word Number F UN Frequency U.S. ------
S . Vietnam ------
Communist ------Political I-b 2 122 64.9 # Other I-o 1 20 10.6# Il-d 1 21 11.2# - Allies Il-i 1 25 13.3 #
Subtotal 188 75.5 ^ 24.3 ^ —
U.S. ------
S.Vietnam ------Public Communist ------
I-b 326 20^ # Other 5 I-c 5 206 12.9 # I-e 1 100 6 .3 # Allies I-f 1 21 1 .3 # I-g 1 100 6 .3 # TABLE 67 (continued)
Mining Issue - Western Reactions Coverage Evaluative Dimensions Sources Unit Propositions Word Number F u N Frequency
I-h 4 331 20.7 # — I-l 2 150 9 A # - - Il-a 1 39 - 2.4 - Public Other Il-b 1 # - 2.8 % - II-c 1 17 - 1.1 % - Allies II-d 2 63 - 3.9 % - Il-e 3 LLl - 7.1 % - Il-f 2 26 - 1.6 % - iv-g 1 60 — — 3 .8 #
Subtotal 1,597 77.3 # 18.9 % 3 .8 #
Chronicle ------
TOTALS 3,571
w ON 1 3 7 questionable goals of the mining (3-9 per cent) (Table 67 ).
3) Asian Reactions. On the Pacific shores, the Voice of
America reported that the American decision to mine North Vietnamese ports was overwhelmingly welcome: 80.2 per cent of total category
coverage was an expression of support (Table 68). Both the political and official segments from South Vietnam were 100.0 per cent behind the
United States (Table 69)• From the coverage of South Vietnamese of ficial reactions, 37.8 per cent cited the measure's timeliness in help ing to stop communism as reason for supporting it; 3^.1 per cent plain ly endorsed it, and 28.1 per cent praised its goal for peace and for shortening the war (Table 69). The South Vietnamese political leaders also found this goal to be praiseworthy (^2.5 per cent) (Table 69).
Among other Asian allies, 86.5 per cent of official reactions reported was on the side of the United States because they felt that among other things the mining demonstrated determination (30.0 per cent) and that it was prompted by the North Vietnamese rigidity (29.7 %)•
On the whole, 86.6 per cent of reported official reactions were favor able to the American stand while 12.0 per cent were unfavorable to it
(Table 69).
The Asian political leaders did not seem as enthusiastic about mining. It was reported that 35*5 per cent endorsed it and thus were favorable to the mining decision, while 6^.5 per cent were unfavorable toward it (Table 69). Those who were against it questioned its goals
(33.7 per cent), and thought it would damage peace prospects (21 per
cent), or cause a big power clash (9-7 per cent) (Table 69). 138
TABLE 68
Amount and Percentage of Proposition Headings
In The Coverage of "Mining Issue - Asian Reactions"
Proposition Unit Word Number Percentage Headings Frequency I 39 2,877 8.2 #
II 12 600 16.7 #
IV 4 109 3.0%
TOTALS 3,586 100.0 %
The public in Asia, on the contrary, was reported as warmly en dorsing the mining measure: ?0.1 per cent of Asian public opinions expressed a favorable attitude about it (Table 69). Mostly through the press, 23.4 per cent of Asian public supporters of President
Nixon's action was reported as seeing justification for the decision;
20.1 per cent to assure the world and themselves that it would neither cause a dangerous big power confrontation, nor affect detente (?.6 per cent). They also endorsed it as a fair and determined step toward peace in Asia (8.9 per cent)(Table 69). The 29.9 per cent unfavorable reactions mainly revolved around doubts about the mining effectiveness
(10.5 per cent), fear of a big power confrontation (8.6 per cent), or disappointment at a damaged peace prospect caused by American escala - tion (10.8 per cent).
As seen from each source reported, except for the political segment, the unfavorable opinions from Asia were not in the majority. TABLE 69
Evaluative Dimensions of Propositions by Sources
In The Coverage of "Mining Issue - Asian Reactions"
Mining Issue - Asian Reaction Coverage Evaluative Dimensions Sources Unit • , Propositions „ , Word Number F u N Frequency ! VGA Editorial - — 1 — - --
U.S. - — 1 — -- -
I-d 1 ; 98 28.1 # I-i 5 ; 119 34.1 # - I-p - S . Vietnam 2 ; 132 37.8 #
Subtotal ! 3(^9 100.0 % --
Communist - - 1 — - - -
I-b 4 ; 399 29.7 # I-e 3 ; 402 30.0 # I-i 5 ; 201 13.0 # I-P 2 ; 160 11.8 # II-b 3 ; 73 3.6 # II-d 1 ; 33 2.3 # Il-e 2 ; 32 3.9 # IV-k 1 ; 20 1.3 # Subtotal ! 1,342 06.3 # 12.0 # 1-5 # TABLE 69 (continued)
Mining Issue - Asian Reaction Coverage Evaluative Dimensions sources I Unit Propositions Word Number F u N 1 Frequency ! U.S. ------4L Political 1-b 2 54 5 .9 # 1-d 2 386 42.5# S. Vietnam 1-e 2 180 19.8 # - 1-i 1 22 2 ^ #
Subtotal 642 100.0 % --
j._ _ _ r - - — -
Communist - - -
1-i 3 95 35.5 # Other 11-d 1 90 33.7 # - 11-e 1 56 21.0 # Allies 11-c 1 26 9 .7 #
Subtotal 267 35.5 # 64.5 # -
- - - U.S. " - - -
Public S. Vietnam ------
Communist ------
■(- o TABLE 69 (continued)
Mining Issue - Asian Reaction Coverage Evaluative Dimensions Sources Propositions Unit . Number F u ; N Frequency I t I-b 2 ; 210 23.4 # I-e 1 ; 80 8 .9 # Other I-i 1 ; 68 7.6 # I-h 2 ; 180 20.1 # Allies 7.6 Public I-g 1 ; 91 Il-b 1 ; 9^ 10.5 % ; II-c 1 ; 77 8.6^1 — Il-e 1 ' 97 10.8% — 1 1
Subtotal ; 897 70.1 # 2 9.9 # ; 1 1 IV-g 3 ! 89 ! 100.0 % Chronicle 1 1 Subtotal - ! 100.0 % ! 1 t 1
TOTALS ; 3,586 J
f 1 4 2
The large favorable percentages from official and public sources
overshadowed the unfavorable reactions reported.
4) Communist Reactions. Communist sources were reported on
the Voice of America's newscasts in a limited dose at 9-7 per cent of
total category coverage (Chapter V - Table 26, p. 68). Out of this
percentage, 85.2 per cent were communist official opinions, and pre dictably, they all criticized the United States action (Table 70).
TABLE 70
Amount and Percentage of Proposition Headings
In The Coverage of "Mining Issue - Communist Reactions"
Proposition Unit Word Number Percentage Headings Frequency II 49 2,981 85.2 <
IV 7 519 14.8 ^
TOTALS 3,500 100.0 5
Mainly, they condemned it outright (57.6 per cent); they thought it was a peace-damaging escalation (20.4 per cent), and they o~enly chal
lenged it (11.1 per cent). On the whole, communist official sources were 100 per cent unfavorable to the American mining decision (Table
71).
5) United Nations' Reactions. The intermediary role of the
United Nations was reflected in reports of its activities and reactions.
One hundred per cent of reports on the U.N. reactions were in regard to
its efforts to mediate among various states, thus a pro or con expression TABLE 71
Evaluative Dimensions of Propositions by Sources
In The Coverage of "Mining Issue - Communist Reactions"
Mining Issue - Communist Reactions Coverage Evaluative Dimensions Sources Unit Propositions Word Number F U i N Frequency
VOA Editorial - - --
U.S. -- - - — —
S. Vietnam - - - - — —
Official Il-a 2 138 4.6 % Il-d 26 1,718 57.6 # Communist Il-e 12 607 20.4 ^ Il-f 1 25 - 0 .8 % II-g 1 63 2.1 % — Il-h 1 98 3 .3 # II-j 6 332 11.1 %
Subtotal 2,981 - 100.0 % Other Allies
U.S. — — Political
•h- TABLE 71 (continued)
Mining Issue - Communist Reactions Coverage Evaluative Dimensions ÛULlXUfcia Unit Propositions Word Number F U N Frequency S. Vietnam ------Political Communist ------Other ------Allies U.S.
S. Vietnam ------Public Communist ------Other Allies
Chronicle IV-b 1 16 - 3.1 # IV-n 7 503 9 6 . 9 #
Subtotal 519 9 6 . 9 # — 3.1 #
TOTALS 3,500 145 was not applicable toward the American mining measure. This was re corded as 100 per cent neutral on the F-U-N scale (Table 72).
In the controversial issue of mining, the anlysis of news broad cast of the Voice of America indicated that all over the world, with the exception of the communist world, the American decision to mine
North Vietnam's harbors was received with warm sympathy and endorsement.
The United States was reported as 83.1 per cent in favor of its Presi dent's action. Its western allies were favorable to it at the rate of
63.1 per cent, and its Asian allies supported its decision at 80.2 per cent (Table 73). In short, while 20.7 per cent of reports of world
TABLE 72
Evaluative Dimensions of Proposition Headings By Sources
In The Coverage of "Mining Issue - U.N. Reactions"
Mining Issue Evaluative Dimensions U.N. Reactions Sources Proposi- ! Unit Word F U N tions !Frequency Number 1 U.N. Official III ! 18 1,429 - - 100.0 J? 1 opinion were unfavorable to its action, 70.8 per cent were behind the
United States in this difficult historical moment, according to the
Voice of America (Table 74).
B . Military
Military reports mainly concerned the three sides involved in the
Vietnamese conflict: the United States, South Vietnam, and the 146
TABLE 73
Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions By Subthemes
In The Coverage of "Mining Issue"; îlay 8 - 1?, '72
Sources Evaluative Dimensions
F UN TOTALS
U.S. Word Number 19,883 3,308 749 23,940 Reactions Percentage 83 .1 # 13.8 # 3.1 # 100.0 %
Word Number Western 2,233 331 767 3,371 Reactions Percentage 63.1 # 13.4 # 21.3 # 100.0 #
Word Number 600 109 3,386 Asian 2,877 Reactions Percentage 80 .2 # 16.7 # 3.0 # 100.0 #
Word Number 303 2,981 16 3,300 Communist Reactions Percentage 14.4 % 83.2 # 0.3 # 100.0 #
Word Number - - U.N. 1,429 1,429 Reactions Percentage - - 100.0 % 100.0 #
TABLE 74
Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions In "Mining Issue" Coverage: Summary
Evaluative Dimensions
,Favorable Unfavorable Neutral TOTALS
Word Number j 23,316 7,440 3,070 36,026
Percentage ; 70.8 # 20 .7 # 8 .3 # 100.0 # 147 coomunists. The proposition analysis and the F-U-N scale would reveal what sort of image of each side was projected on the Voice of America's
Vietnamese language broadcasts
l) Military ; U.S. The message about the United States
Armed Forces fighting in Vietnam projected an over-all image of a power ful and effective force. If they suffered setbacks (17.3 per cent of total reports), or were accused of being ruthless (10.4 per cent) it was only a small part of their total activities. They were reported to prove their prowess and effectiveness on the battlefield at 51.7 per cent of the time. In addition, their Vietnamization was working well enough for them to turn over to their South Vietnamese ally more mili tary responsibilities (Table 75)•
The dominant U.S. official projection on the military matter was that the American Armed Forces were powerful and effective (52.8 per cent) (Propositions I-a through g. Table 76), and that they were able to get the Vietnamization strategy working smoothly (31.5 per cent) (Propo sitions Ill-a-b, Table 76). According to U.S. officials, setbacks suffered by American troops were minimal (Propositions IV-a-b). Offi - cial source coverage of this nature shared only 6.1 per cent of total
U.S. official reports (Table 76).
A somewhat negative image of the United States as aggression-prone and ruthless came from communist sources reported which predictably spent 100.0 per cent of their share in criticizing the U.S. (Table 76). Among the official reports or assessments of the United States military activities, it appeared that the power of the American troops 148
TABLE 75
Amount and Percentage of Proposition Headings
In The Coverage of "Military - U.S."
Proposition Unit Word Percentage Headings Frequency Number 1 45 2,169 51.7 %
11 1 74 1 .8 #
111 15 597 14.2 #
IV 23 728 17.3 #
V 10 436 10.4 #
XI 6 192 4.3 #
TOTALS 4,196 100.0 %
to crush the enemy with powerful Bombers and sophisticated weapons
played a most visible role (24.? per cent). It also seemed important for official U.S. to emphasize that Vietnamization was working so well
as to allow on-schedule U.S. troop reduction in Vietnam (20 per cent).
Negative reports such as those about the loss of planes and pilots, or
the ineffectiveness of the American bombing strategy were minimum at
2.6 per cent and 3*5 per cent respectively (Table ?6).
Reports from communist official news sources were divided between
67 .3 per cent of coverage (Propositions V - a-b-c, Table 76 ) pointing
out the American ruthlessness and aggression with reports of U.S. bombing
of North Vietnam's dikes or other nation’s ships, and 30.9 Per cent in
forming the world that the U.S. suffered losses to the communist forces
(Table 76 ). TABLE 76
Evaluative Dimensionf of Propositions By Sources
In The Coverage of "Military - U.S."
Military - U.S. Coverage Evaluative Dimensions Sources 1 Unit Propositions Word Number F UN Frequency VOA Editorial
S. Vietnam
I-a 1 91 5 .2 # I-c 5 230 13.1 # I-d 2 134 7.6 # I-e 1 21 1.2 # I-f ? 432 24.7 # U.S I-e 1 18 1.0 # Il-a 1 74 4.2 Official # Ill-a 4 200 11.4 % Ill-b 9 353 20.1 # IV-a 3 45 2.6 # IV-b 1 62 3 .5 # Xl-a 1 31 1.8 # XI-b 1 19 1.1 # XI-c 1 42 2 ^ #
Subtotal 1,752 100.0 /O
Communist IV-a 8 -p- 195 30.9 # MD V-a 4 100 15.8 # TABLE 76 (continued)
Military - U.S. Coverage Evaluative Dimensions Sources Unit Propositions Word Number F U N Frequency
V-b 1 11 1.7# - Communist V-c 6 325 - 5 1 ^ # Official Subtotal 631 - 100.0 % -
Other Allies U.S. ------
S . Vietnam ------Political Communist ------Other ------Allies U.S. _
S, Vietnam ------Public Communist ------
Other ------
O TABLE 76 (continued)
Military - U.S. Coverage Evaluative Dimensions Sources Unit Propositions Word Number F U N Frequency
I-a 7 419 23.0 # — — I-b 3 102 5 .6 # - - I-c 5 271 14.9 % - - I-d 1 16 0 .9 # - - I-f 8 327 18.0 % - - I-g 4 108 6.0 % - - Chronicle Ill-b 1 22 1.2 # - - III-c 1 22 1.2 # -- IV-a 8 327 - 18.0 % - IV-b 3 99 - 5 .5 # - XI-a 1 22 - - 1.2 # XI-c 1 23 -- 1.2 # XI-d 1 55 3 .0 # — —
Subtotal 1,813 73.8 # 23.5 # 2.4 ^
TOTALS 4,196 152
On the F-U-N scale, the United States and communist portrayal of
U.S. forces polarized at both extremes: U.S. official sources spoke favorably of U.S. military activities 100.0 per cent, while the com munists cut them down 100.0 per cent. However, the communist over-all share of coverage was so small (at 15 per cent ot total U.S. Military coverage) that their impact on the over-all image of U.S. forces could be seen as rather negligible. And interestingly enough, the fact that the negative message was attributed to communist official sources might seem to have the psychological effect of lightening the charge in the mind of friendly audiences.
As noted previously in Chapter VI, a large part of military news broadcast on the Voice of America to Vietnam was reported from "nobody's point of view" which can be seen in the percentage of coverage clasi- fied under "Chronicle." Here the American troops also came out posi tively as armed forces with power and effectiveness, at 68.6 per cent of total chronicle coverage (Propositions I-a through g , Table ? 6 ).
This was a percentage large enough to overcome any deficiency they might have which was reported at the rate of 23*5 per cent (Propositions V-a-b,
Table ?6). Reports under "Chronicle" reinforced the image portrayed by
U.S. officials. It was an image of power: 23 per cent was reports of
U.S. military sophistication in terms of weapons and bombers. It was an image of military superiority: 18 per cent of the reports said that
U.S. forces could strike their enemy without encountering resistance;
14.9 per cent reported that they succeeded in inflicting heavy casual
ties on their enemy. V/hen the United States suffered any casualties. 153
it was 18.0 per cent of the time that they lost planes and pilots, and
only5.5 per cent of their actions reportedly failed to eliminate their
enemy (Tahle ?6). In sum, 23.5 per cent of chronicle reports were unfavorable to the American military image while 73.8 per cent were favorable to it (Table 78 ).
2) Military; South Vietnam. It could be gathered from the
Voice of America's reports on the South Vietnamese military activities
that the South Vietnamese Armed Forces were resilient, effective, and
capable of a good fight: 83.2 per cent of all reports on South Viet namese military activities were pointing to this positive aspect. Re
ports of their problems occupied only a total of 7*0 per cent (Table
77).
According to the South Vietnamese official sources reported, the
South Vietnamese military capability was illustrated by their ability
to inflict high casualties on their enemy (58.9 per cent), and by the fact that they were helped successfully by other allies (32.6 per cent).
They were also successful in clearing out their enemy and gaining terri
torial control (8.5 per cent) (Table 78).
Under "Chronicle," 89.3 per cent of all reports (Propositions IX -a
through g) pointed to an image of capability and resilience as well as
effectiveness of the South Vietnamese army (Table 78 ). Reporting high
enemy casualties in contrast to their own casualties shared 26.7 per
cent. It was also reported that they were an army on the offensive, full of initiative (33.5 per cent). They often repulsed the cor_munists
to rescue endangered civilians (12.4 per cent), and were well-prepared 15^
TABLE 77
Amoimt and Percentage of Proposition Headings
In The Coverage of "Military - South Vietnam"
Proposition Unit Word Number Percentage Headings Frequency IX 50 3,503 83.2 ^
X 4 293 7.0 ^
XI 3 414 9.8 ^
TOTALS 4,210 100.0 %
to match the communists (10.0 per cent) (Tahle ? 8 ). Their weakness or problem, if any, was a small part, at 2.5 per cent of the total picture.
The only open admittance of problems came from U.S. official and public sources. These sources revealed a lack of leadership as a problem in the South Vietnamese Armed Forces. However, their share of coverage was merely 0.6 per cent and 4.1 per cent respectively of the total coverage of South Vietnamese military activities (Table 43, p. 93)» so that altogether, they did not appear to attract much attention to this weak ness, or raise enough clamor to be detrimental to the over-all image of the South Vietnamese army which scored 97*0 per cent favorable and 2.6 per cent unfavorable on the F-U-N scale (Table 78).
3) Military; Communist. The Voice of America's Vietnamese language broadcasts allocated only 31.2 per cent of its total military coverage of all sides to communist activities (Table 27, p. 68). Within this limited amount of coverage, the reports on the communists revealed TABLE 78
Evaluative Dimensions of Propositions by Sources
In The Coverage of "Military - South Vietnam"
Military - South Vietnam Coverage Evaluative Dimensions Sources Unit Propositions Word Number F u N Frequency
VOA Editorial ------
X-a 1 27 - 100.0 % - U.S. Subtotal 27 - 100.0 % -
Official IX-a 1 208 58.9 ^ IX-G 2 30 8.5 ^ S. Vietnam Xl-d 1 115 32.6 ^ ::
Subtotal 353 100.0 % --
Communist ------Other ------Allies U.S. ------
Political S . Vietnam ------
Communist -- - - - ~ 1-^ Vji TABLE 78 (continued)
Military - South Vietnam Coverage Evaluative Dimensions Sources Unit Propositions Word Number F U N Frequency ^ .... -, ! Other Political , Allies ------
X—a 1 173 - 100.0 % - U.S. Subtotal 173 - 100.0 % - 1 Public 'S. Vietnam - - - - — -
(Communist ------Other ------! Allies IX-a 12 978 26.7 # IX-b 10 453 12.4 # IX-d k 367 10.0 # IX-e 1 19 0.5 # IX-f 14 Chronicle 1,226 33.5 # IX-G 6 222 6.1 # X-d 1 65 1.8 # X-e 1 28 0.8 # Xl-e 1 13 0.4 # X-f 1 286 7,8 # Subtotal 3,657 97.0# 2.6 # 0.4 # M' TOTAToS ! 4,210 Vji 1 o\ 157
TABLE 79
Amount and Percentage of Proposition Headings
In The Coverage of "Military - Communist"
Proposition Unit Word Number Percentage Headings Frequency VI 17 986 25.8 ^
Vll 38 1,578 41.2 %
Vlll 12 1,226 32.0 ^
XI 1 39 1.0 %
TOTALS 3,829 100.0 fo that if the South Vietnamese were reported to be capable soldiers, the communist forces appeared to be their match. Of the total coverage of
communist military activities, ^1.2 per cent conveyed the information
that militarily they were tough and capable while 25.8 per cent reported
their setbacks and failures. The Voice's news coverage on the communists
seemed to emphasize strongly the opinion that they might be tough but they were ruthless and aggression-prone. This emphasis was revealed in
32.0 per cent of the total coverage (Table 79)•
A look at the various news sources in this category indicates that as far as the communist military was concerned, there was an attempt in
the Voice of America's coverage to size it up for the Voice's Vietnamese audience. The Voice spent 100.0 per cent of its editorial time devoted to this subject to denounce the North Vietnamese military establishment
(Table 80). The Voice devoted 56.2 per cent of its editorial to TABLE 80
Evaluative Dimensions of Propositions by Sources
In The Coverage of "Military - Communist"
Military - Communist Coverage Evaluative Dimensions Sources Unit Propositions Word Number F* u * N Freq^uenc;y Vlll-b 1 434 - 52.6 - Vlll-c 1 4 7 .4 % * VGA Editorial 391 ' ■.. . Subtotal 825 100.0 %
Vl-b 4 154 31.1 # Vl-e 1 93 18.8 # U.S. Vll-d 2 83 16.8 # - Vlll-d 4 165 33.3 # Official Subtotal 495 16.8 # 83.2 # -
S. Vietnai - ----
Communist ------
Other ------Allies
I-»- Vn CO TABLE 80 (continued)
Military - Communist Coverage Evaluative Dimensions Sources ■n . , . ! Unit Propositions , Word Number F ** u N
Vll-a 2 114 100.0 fo -- U.S. Subtotal 114 100.0 % --
S . Vietnam ------Political Communist ------Other ------Allies U.S. ------
S Vietnam ------Public Communist ------Other ------Allies
I-*- Ln VO TABLE 80 (continued)
Military - Communist Coverage Evaluative Dimensions Dources Unit Propositions Word Number F ** U * N Frequency Vl-a 1 81 — 3.4 % — VI-b 3 108 - 4 .5 % - VI-c 4 362 - 15.1 % - VI-d 1 49 - 2.0 % - VI -f 2 55 - 2.3 % - Vl-g 1 84 - 3.5 % - VII-a 1 36 — — Chronicle 1.5 # Vll-b 3 169 7 .1 # VII-c 2 106 4.4 # - - Vll-d 20 764 31.9 # -- Vll-e 8 306 12.8# -- VIII-c 4 199 - 8.3 % - Vlll-d 2 37 - 1.5 % - Xl-e 1 39 —— 1.7 #
Subtotal 2,395 5 7 .7 # 40.5 % 1 .7 # -V
TOTALS 3,829
Note: * Unfavorable to the communists, favorable to the U.S. ** Favorable to the communists, unfavorable to the U.S.
ON o 161 disparage the North Vietnamese for their destruction in the name of liberty; 4?.4 per cent of its editorial was to point out the North
Vietnamese ruthlessness as reflected in their lack of concern for civilian sufferings, and their reckless shelling (Table 80).
On the official side, 49.9 per cent of reported U.S. official opinions was to comment on the ineffectiveness and setbacks suffered by the communists ; 33*3 per cent were reports of the North Vietnamese aggression (Table BO). The official focus was mainly on the communist high loss of hardware such as planes and tanks (31.1 per cent), and their seemingly lack of initiative (18.8 per cent). While their tough ness and capability were given some credit by U.S. officials (16.8 per cent), the credit was outweighed by reports of proofs of their invasion of South Vietnam characterized by ruthlessness and aggressiveness (33.3 per cent).(Table 80). The only time the North Vietnamese came out ahead as a military forces of some caliber was when they were mentiened by the political segment in the U.S. The American political leaders reportedly admitted that the communists were gaining by being able to increase their territorial control. The same was true in reports under "Chronicle":
57.7 per cent of reports were news that gave the North Vietnamese sol - dier an image of capability (Table 80). Mostly, the reports highlighted the communist initiative (31.9 per cent), their ability to inflict ca sualties on the allied side (12.8 per cent), or their resilience to fight under heavy bombing (7.1 per cent) (table 80). However, a significant percentage of chronicle reports (30.9 per cent) dealt with the incapacity of the North Vietnamese. It mostly pointed out that the communists 162 suffered high casualties both in personnel (15 •! per cent) and hard wares (4 .5 per cent), or they were just plain ineffective and easily repulsed by the allied troops. They were also reported to be aggres sion-prone and ruthless (9.8 per cent) (Table 80).
In general, as armed forces, the communists were portrayed on the
Voice of America's news reports as militarily tough and capable. How ever, they were also seen as suffering considerably from serious set backs, and their Integrity as a "liberation army" was put under consi derable doubt. Percentage-wise, the Voice's editorial spoke 100.0 per cent unfavorably about the communist troops. Similarly, U.S. official sources were 83.2 per cent unfavorable toward the communists, whereas the U.S. political segment seemed to give them quite a positive evalu ation (100.0 per cent). Reports under "Chronicle" registered 57-7 per cent in favor of the North Vietnamese troops (Table 80 ). Nevertheless, the U.S. and its allies came out slightly ahead: 57*8 per cent of information reported under "Military- Communist" were favorable to the allied side, and 41.2 per cent was unfavorable (Table 81).
Militarily, whatever side scored higher would tend to come out to be the more favored champion. Despite the fact that favorable elements about the communist troops were reported on the Voice of America's
Vietnamese language newscasts, an over-all computation of the Voice's military coverage on the F-U-N scale revealed that 75*3 per cent of the
VGA's military reports were favorable to the United States and its allies (Table 82). 163
TABLE 81
Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions
In The Coverage of "Military": May 8-17»'72
Subthemes Evaluative Dimensions F u N TOTALS
Military Word Number 3,094 1,057 45 4,196
U.S. Percentage 73.7 # 25.2 # 1.1 ^ 100.0 %
Military Word Number 3,904 293 13 4,210 S, Vietnam Percentage 92.7 % 7.0 # 0.3 # 100.0 #
Word Number 2,212 1,578 Military 39 3,829 Communist 57.8 # 41.2 ^ 1.0 # 100.0 #
TABLE 82
Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions
In The Coverage of "Military"; Summary
Evaluative Dimensions 1 Î Favorable Unfavorable Neutral TOTALS
Word Number J 9,210 2,928 97 12,235
Percentage \ 75-3 % 23 .9 # 0 . 8 # 100.0 # l6^■
C. Vietnam Issue
As previously noted in Chapter V, on the Voice of America's news
casts, the Vietnam issue was seen as mainly a quarrel between the United
States and the communists as to who was doing it right concerning the
issue. Of all coverage regarding the Vietnam issue, 55*0 per cent was
devoted to defending the virtue of the American policy in Vietnam in
contrast to the rigid and irreconcilable North Vietnamese policy. The
United States policy in Vietnam was also portrayed as supportable, ef fective and moral in 21.5 per cent of this category coverage. The
coverage of critics of the official policy at only 4.9 per cent indi
cated that they were in the minority. The same was true with people who found some supportable points in the North Vietnamese policy.
Their share of the Voice's news on the Vietnam issue was 2.8 per cent
(Table 83).
The prepositional analysis of the Vietnam issue coverage by sources
highlighted the advocate role by the Voice of America's editorial. As
noted in Chapter VI, on this issue, the Voice's editorial was allocated
54.1 per cent of the category sum total (Table 49, p. 101). Out of this amount, the Voice devoted 62.8 per cent of its time (Propositions I-a
through i. Table 84) to defending the United States policy by pointing
out its qualities in contrast to the North Vietnamese policy; 25-7 per
cent of its editorial aimed at praising the success of U.S. policy under various aspects. The rest of the time 11.5 per cent, was devoted to
comments on the contradiction between the Soviet detente policy and
their support of the North Vietnamese policy. If one read the lines 165
TABLE 83
Amount and Percentage of Proposition Headings
In "Vietnam Issue" Coverage
Proposition Unit Word Number Percentage Headings Frequency 1 29 4,826 55.0 #
11 14 1,882 21.5 #
111 8 426 4 .9 #
IV 2 246 2.8 #
VI 4 150 1 .7 #
Vll 6 1,236 14.1 %
TOTALS 8,767 100.0 %
carefully, such a comment could be seen as an indirect defense of the
American policy (Table 8^).
Among the official sources reported, the contrast between the noble aims of the United States policy and the aggressive aims of the North
Vietnamese policy was expounded by U.S. official sources during 6l.O per cent of their coverage time; 29.8 per cent (Propostions ll-a through i, table 8^) of their issuance was straightforward defense of the U.S. policy by pointing out its various facets that were just and moral, and therefore supportable. The partnership relationship between the United
States and the South Vietnamese ally seemed to be a sensitive issue at that time, and it was treated with some emphasis at the rate of 7.6 per cent of all official statements (Table 84). TABLE 84
Evaluative Dimensions of Propositions By Sources in The Coverage of "Vietnam Issue"
Vietnam Issue Coverage Evaluative Dimensions ouurces Unit Propositions Word Number F U N Frequency I-a 1 625 13.2 # I-b 1 51 1.1 ^ 2 25.8 # VOA Editorial I-g 1,223 1-i 2 1,082 22.8 # Il-d 2 1,218 2 5.7 # VII-h 1 5^7 11.5 # [ Subtotal 4,746 100.0 %
I-a 3 289 14.6 % I-b 1 32 1 . 6 # I-c Official U.S. 5 251 1 2 . 7 # I-f 2 107 5 ^ # I-g 2 165 8 . 3 # I-h 5 319 1 6 . 3 # - I-j 1 42 2 . 1 # Il-a 2 92 4 . 7 # Il-b 1 39 2. 0 # - II-d 3 64 3 . 2 # Il-f 2 178 9 . 0 # Il-h 1 86 4 . 4 #
ON ON TABLE 84 (continued)
Vietnam, Issue Coverage Evaluative Dimensions OULLLUtiü Unit Propositions Word Number F u N Frequency Il-i 2 130 6.6 % III-c 1 33 1 . 7 # - IV 4 150 Official U.S. 7 . 6 #
Subtotal 1,977 9 8 . 3 # 1 . 7 # -
S . Vietnam ------
I-d 1 168 2 9 . 9 # I-f 1 51 9 . 1 # Communist III-S 2 1 7 9 3 1 . 9 # Vll-f 1 57 10.1 % Vll-g 3 107 19.0 #
Subtotal 562 39.0 # 5 0 . 9 # 10.1 % Vll-a 1 288 100.0 % — - Other Allies Subtotal 288 100.0 % - -
o\ TABLE 8^ (continued)
Vietnam Issue Coverage Evaluative Dimensions Û U U X UU o Unit Propositions Word Number F u N Frequency II-c 1 75 26.0 # Ill-a 1 18 6.2 # Political U.S. Ill-b 2 85 2 9 ^ # III-c 1 60 20.8 # Ill-d 1 51 17.6 #
Subtotal 289 26.0 # 74.0 # -
S. Vietnam ------
Communist -- - - Other - -- - Allies I-e 2 421 46.4 % IV-a 1 104- U.S. 11.5 # IV-b 1 143 16.0 % - VII-c 1 1Z|4 15.9 # Public Vll-h 1 93 10.3 #
Subtotal 905 72.6 # 27.5 # -
ON CO TABLE % (continued)
Vietnam Issue Coverage Evaluative Dimensions OULU-UtîÎDa. Unit Propositions Word Number F U N Frequency
S . Vietnam ------
Communist ------Public Other ------Allies
Chronicle ------
TOTALS 8,767
ON VC 170
The communist official statements were reported merely 6.4 per
cent of the sum of Vietnam issue coverage (Table 4-9, p. 101). Out of
this percentage, 39*0 per cent of their statements appeared to reflect badly about them. They informed the audience of the communist stand, but reinforced the contrast between the American policy characterized by its supporters as just and detente-oriented and the communist own policy as aggressive, What threw a bad light on them consisted of re - ports of their refusal of the United Nations peace mediation (29.9 per cent), and their insistence that either negotiations be carried out along their own terms or a communist military solution would take place
(9.1 per cent) (Table 84). The communist statements criticizing the insensitiveness of the American policy amounted to 31.9 per cent (Table
84). Mostly their criticism centered on the fact that the United States policy did not consider the political Question in South Vietnam as suggested by the communists. The coverage content did not elucidate a great deal on the communist over-all stand. At any rate, the over-all percentage share the communists got on the Voice of America's news cover age was not proportionate to that given to the United States official sources.
The American political segment seemed rather critical of the Ameri can Vietnam policy. While 26.0 per cent of the political coverage was in support of the official policy through legislative measure, 74.0 per cent was outspoken against it (Table 84). According to the Voice of
America's reports, 29.4 per cent of political opinions thought the United
States policy was disastrous, 20.8 per cent declared that it would not 171 get legislative support, and 1?.6 per cent thought that the nature of the policy was such that even China, which was on good terms with the
United States, would not he able to get along with it (Table &+).
The public attitude was more favorable to the official policy in Vietnam. While 27.5 per cent gave some credit to the North Viet namese stand on the issue, 46.4 per cent was reported as leaning toward the present course set out by the government (Table 84). The dominant argument of the public supporters pointed out that North Vietnam was bent on a military solution instead of reconciliation with South Viet - nam, thereby justifying U.S. current policy. The opposing arguments were promoted by reports that criticized the United States for support ing a South Vietnamese president seen as stubbornly anti-communist
(l6.0 per cent), and that perceived common grounds between the United
States and communist policies for a peaceful solution (11.5 per cent)
(Table 84).
TABLE 85
Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions
In the Coverage of "Vietnam Issue": Summary
Evaluative Dimensions
Favorable Unfavorable Neutral TOTALS
Word Number 7,930 533 303 8,767
Percentage 90.5 % 6 . 1 # 3.5 % 100.0 # 172
In summary, the Voice of America's editorial was 100.0 per cent
"behind the official policy. Official sources expressed favorable at titudes 98.3 per cent of the time, and the public was reportedly favor able to the American course of action in Vietnam ?2.3 per cent of the time. The only sources that were critical of it were the communists
(50.9 per cent of communist coverage), and U.S. political leaders (7^*0 per cent of political coverage)(Table 8^). Considering reports from all ifiturces together, it appeared that in the Vietnam issue, the United
States was popular and well-judged as represented by 90.5 per cent of favorable coverage (Table 85 ).
D. South Vietnam - Domestic
Solidarity (22.6 per cent), humanitarian concern (19.4 per cent), democracy (15.7 per cent), and national development (12.8 per cent) were the major characteristics of Souih Vietnam, reported the Voice of America
(Table 86).
From the South Vietnamese side, at about one fourth of coverage time (23.6 per cent), the Voice of America reported an official schedule of a new decree and martial law imposed upon the country as a result of the U.S. mining measure. The remaining dealt with various aspects of
South Vietnam domestically. The highest percentage of coverage from official sources (28.4 per cent) highlighted the South Vietnamese govern ment's monumental efforts in helping the refugees who were pushed out of their homes by the communists. The next major proposition from official sources concerned developments in the economic sectors (18.7 per cent)
(Table 8?). 1 7 3
TABIÆ 86
Amount and Percentage of Proposition Headings
In "South Vietnam - Domestic" Coverage
Proposition Unit Word Humber Percentage Headings Frequency I 2 199 3 .7 #
II 8 1,057 I9A#
III 1 3^ 0.6 %
IV 5 696 12.8#
V 10 1,228 22.6#
VI 14 853 15.7 #
VII 5 174 3 .2 #
VIII 16 1,201 2 2 ^ #
TOTALS 5,442 100.0 #
In the public sector, the people of South Vietnam were reported to be united behind their government to fight communism. They represented solidarity and unity: the people joined civil defense forces; they collected money and blood to support the front; they gave up the class rooms to join social services in support of the front (96.8 per cent)
(Table 8 ?).
Politically, the democratic institution in South Vietnam was work - ing well. There was evidence (80.5 per cent) that there was a harmo nious working rapport between the legislative and the executive branches,
There was a small opposing minority who did not support the South Viet namese President by protesting his request for the emergency power to TABLE 87
Evaluative Dimensions of Propositions By Sources
In The Coverage of "South Vietnam - Domestic"
South Vietnam - Domestic Coverage Evaluative Dimensions Sources Unit Propositions Word Number P U N Frequency
VOA Editorial ------
U.S. ------I 2 199 5.3 % --
II 8 1,057 28.4 % _ III 1 34 0.9 % -- IV 5 696 18.7 % -- V 3 432 11.6 % — - S . Vietnam Official VI 4 133 3.6 % - - Vlll-a 2 144 3.1 % -- Vlll-b 2 51 - 1.4 ^ - VIII-c 9 878 - - 23.6 % Vlll-d 1 90 2.4 % - - Vlll-e 1 42 — - 1.1 %
Subtotal 3,726 74.0 ^ 1.4 % 24.7 Communist ------Other Allies TABLE 8? (continued)
South Vietnam - Domestic Coverage Evaluative Dimensions Sources Unit Propositions Word Number F u N Frequency U.S. ------
VI 10 720 80.5 # - - VII 174 S. Vietnam 5 19.5 # Political Subtotal 894 100.0 ^ —-
Communist _ - - - - - Other ------Allies U.S. ------V 7 796 96.8 # VlII-f 1 26 3 .2 # - S. Vietnam : Public Subtotal 822 100.0 fo --
1 Communist ■■ Public and Otller Allies' Public: No coveraj :e
Clironicle - — — — — —
TOTALS 5,442
LA 176
TABLE 88
Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions
In The Coverage of "South Vietnam - Domestic": Summary
Evaluative Dimensions I Favorable \ Unfavorable Neutral TOTALS
Word Number 4,471 Î 51 920 5,442
Percentage 82.2 # ; 0 . 9 # 16.9 # 100.0 fo rule by decree (19.5 per cent)(Table 8?). Yet even that opposition could be seen as a healthy sign in a budding democracy.
On the F-U-N scale, reports from official sources were per cent favorable to South Vietnam. The same was true with the public and political coverage with 100.0 per cent favorable reports. All sources considered, the image of South Vietnam portrayed on the Voice of Ameri ca's newscasts was 82.2 per cent favorable, with 16.9 per cent neutral and a negligible percentage of unfavorable reports (0.9 per cent)
(Table 88). It could be said that South Vietnam's portraiture was that of a nation characterized by humanitarian concern, unity, progress, and a smoothly-run democratic machinery.
E. Mining Operations
The mining operations were mainly an American official affair.
U.S. official sources shared a major part of coverage time reserved for this category. The effectiveness of the mining operations was empha sized 59-9 per cent of the time. In addition, the seriousness and 177 determination on the American part ot keep the mining effective was an important point relayed by official sources 26.3 per cent of coverage time (Table 89 ). Among official reports, ?^,6 per cent (Propositions II,
Ila - b. Table 90) reported the success of the mining operations, and
U.S. determination was emphasized I9.8 per cent of coverage time (Pro positions I-a-b, Table 90). The Voice of America's editorial used 100.0 per cent of its editorial time share to emphasize the American determina tion and capacity to carry out the mining operations with effectiveness
(Table 90).
Outside the official domain, little of importance was expressed by the political or public sectors. Under "Chronicle", apart from reports of mining time schedule (3^.4 per cent), it was also indicated that the mining was a success (33*^ per cent). Success was also reflected in the fact that the military maneuvers to carry out the mining was effectively done (23.6 per cent), and that the mining regulations were obeyed (8.6 per cent) (Table 90)•
In short, no unfavorable reports were carried, and the Voice of
America's reports highlighted the extent of success in the American mining mission at the rate of 88.3 per cent favorable and 11.7 per cent neutral (Table 91)•
F . U.S. Events
In this category, the major part of the reports involved the move- metns and meetings of American officials (73*1 per cent of total cover age). It gave a sense of urgency regarding the South East Asia situation
(Table 92). 178
TABLE 89
Amount and Percentage of Proposition Headings
In "Mining Operations" Coverage
Proposition Unit j Word Number Î Percentage Headings Frequency 1 10 968 I 2 6 .3 #
11 31 2,203 1 3 9 .9 %
111 10 306 ; 13.8 %
TOTALS 3,677 ; 100.0 %
The refugee problem bore some importance in U.S. official circles as it was featured in 19*7 per cent of official thinking, and even more from the political sources with 42.7 per cent of political reports dealing with the issue (Table 93)• The rest of the coverage from all sources dealt with routine matters such as announcements. The excep tion was the Voice of America's editorial which spent 100.0 per cent of its editorial time to explain that any upcoming U.S. decision would be prompted by the communist intransigence (Table 93)•
Measured on the F-U-N scale, the Voice's editorial was 100.0 per cent favorable to the United States action; the official sources express-
34 .3 per cent favorable and 65.5 per cent neutral information. Politi
cally, unfavorable reports dealing with congressional hearings of official policy as in the Pentagon Papers case occupied only 16.9 per
cent of political coverage, and 59*1 per cent of political coverage was favorable to the official side (Table 93)• TABLE 90
Evaluative Dimensions of Proposition By Sources
In The Coverage of "Mining Operations"
Mining Operations Coverage Evaluative Dimensions OULLLCeS Unit Propositions Word number F u N Frequency I-a 1 298 100.0 % -- vu/i iuu±uorj.ax Subtotal 1 298 100.0 % - -
I-a 4 217 9.2# I-b 2 248 10.6 % Il-a 10 571 24.3 # Il-b 643 2 ? A # U.S. 7 II 6 539 22.9# - Ill-a 2 92 3.9# Ill-b 1 40 1.7# Official Subtotal 2,350 94.4 # - 5 .6#
S. Vietnam ------
Communist ------Other III-c 1 75 100.0 # - - Allies
Subtotal 75 100.0 % -- 1-^ \Q■'-1 TABLE 90 (continued)
Mining Operations Coverage Evaluative Dimensions Sources - Unit 1 JPropositions 1 Nord Number u Frequency 1 ^ ! ! ^
Political No Coverage
; ii-c 1 ! 84 1 100.0 % — U.S. Public 1 Subtotal 1 84 100.0 fo -- 1
1 No Coverage for S, Vietnam, Communist, Other Allies' Public • ; I-a 3 205 23.6 # -- ; Il-a 2 75 8.6 % - - ; ii-b 5 291 3 3 ^ # -- Chronicle | Ill-a 6 299 — — 34.4 ^
1
! Subtotal 870 65.6 fo - 34.4 # 1 TOTALS 3,677
00o 181
TABLE 91
Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions
In The Coverage of "Mining Operations": Summary
Evaluative Dimensions J 1 1 Î Favorable Unfavorable J Neutral J TOTALS
Word Number j 3,246 0 ; 431 ; 3,677
Percentage \ 88.3 % 0 ; 11.7 # ; 100.0 %
TABLE 92
Amount and Percentage of Proposition Headings
In "U.S. Events" Coverage
Proposition Unit Word Number Percentage Headings Frequency I 4 668 1 9 . 4 #
II 34 2,520 73.1 #
III 5 165 5.6 %
IV 2 93 1.9#
TOTALS 3,446 100.0#
All sources considered, 4?.2 per cent of reports about U.S. events were favorable to the government, with 50*8 per cent neutral, and a mere 2.0 per cent unfavorable (Table ÿ+). TABLE 93
Evaluative Dimensions of Propositions By Sources
In The Coverage of "U.S. Events"
J U.S. Events Coverage J Evaluative Dimensions Sources 1 TT^-î + » f 1 1 Propositions | : ‘'“^ 4 Number j F j U j N II-C 1 523 100.0 fo - VOA Editorial Subtotal 1 523 100.0 % - -
I 2 496 19.7 f o il 21 1,106 - - 4 3 .9 # II-b 9 547 - - 21.6 ^ Official U.S. Il-d 3 344 13.7 # IV-a 1 27 1.1 %
Subtotal 2,520 34.5 # 65.5 #
No Coverage for S. Vietnam, Communist and Other Allies' Official.
I 2 172 42.7# Ill-a 2 68 - - U.S. 16.9# III-c 2 44 -- 10.9 # Ill-b 1 53 -- 13.2 # IV-b 1 66 16.4 # -- CO Sub to kil 403 3 9 . 1 1 6 . 9 % 24.1 % K) TABLE 93 (continued)
; ; 1 U.S. Events Coverage , Evaluative Dimensions Sources , i Unit ' i i f ; Propositions j , Word Number j F j U j N
Political No Coverage for S. Vietnam, Communist and Other Allies' Political.
Public No Coverage for S. Vietnam, Communist, Other Allies and U.S.'s Public.
Chronicle No coverage for Chronicle.
TOTALS 3,446
w00 184
TABIE 9^
Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions
In The Coverage of "U.S. Events"
Evaluative Dimensions
Favorable Unfavorable Neutral TOTALS
Word Number 1,628 68 1,750 3,446
Percentage 47.2^ 2.0# 5 0 .8 # 100.0 #
TABLE 95
Amount and Percentage of Proposition Headings
In "Peace Talks" Coverage
Proposition Unit Word number Percentage Headings Frequency I 50 2,264 80.3 #
II 6 325 11.5 %
III 7 230 8.2#
TOTALS 2,819 100.0 #
G . Peace Talks
The stalling difficulty in achieving a peace settlement was mainly
caused by the communists, according to the Voice of America's news re
ports. This proposition took up 80.3 per cent of total category cover age (Table 95). 185
The American official line expounded upon the contrast between
the American and the communist negotiation approaches (100.0 per cent
of official coverage) (Table . Specifically, 64.0 per cent of the
time official reports played up the American generosity and serious
ness in negotiation as compared to the communist rigidity and lack of good faith. They criticized the communists for their aggressive ambi
tion 13*3 per cent of the time; 22.6 per cent of the official reports were devoted to reports on the American positive negotiation stand
(Table 96).
The South Vietnamese modest share of the negotiation coverage
mainly pointed out the communist aggressive ambition to take over South
Vietnam (20.9 per cent), as well as their lack of seriousness and good faith in comparison to the allied side (67.6 per cent). Of the South
Vietnamese coverage, 11.5 per cent was devoted to praising the American negotiation stand (Table 96).
Reports on the communist negotiation stand reinforced the contrast between their ambitious rigidity and the American generous flexibility
in the peace negotiations (49.3 per cent) (Table 96). The communist
stand on non-aggressive matter such as their desire for a government
of national concord, or their criticism of the American insensitivity
to their demands occupied 7*9 per cent and 27.1 per cent respectively
of total coverage of communist sources (Table 96).
In the end, as far as the peace negotiations coverage was concerned,
the Voice of America's reports showed clearly who was the hero and who was the villain in the search for peace: 81.6 per cent of the peace TABLE 96
Evaluative Dimensions of Propositions By Sources
In The Coverage of "Peace Talks"
Peace Talks Coverage Evaluative Dimensions Sources Unit Propositions Word Number F u N Frequency
VOA Editorial ------
I I 20 868 64.0 # I-a 4 181 13.3 # - - Official U.S. 1-b 8 307 22.6 # — —
Subtotal 1,356 100.0 % - -
I 3 100 20.9 # I-a 6 324 67.6 % - - S . Vietnam I-b 2 55 11.5 # — —
Subtotal 479 100.0 % - -
I 1 26 3 .0 # I-a 6 403 46.3 # - - Communist II 1 20 - 2 .3 # - Il-a 4 236 - 27 .1 # - Il-b 1 69 7 .9 #
■
CO ON TABLE 96 (continued)
Peace Talks Coverage Evaluative Dimensions Sources Unit Propositions Word Number P u N Frequency
Ill-a 3 11? - - 13^ # Official Communist Subtotal 871 4 9 .3 # 37 .3 # 13.4 % Other Allies III-c 3 76 - 100.0 % - U.S. Subtotal 76 - 100.0 % - Political No Coverage for S. Vietnam, Communist and Other Allies' Political.
No Coverage for U.S., S. Vietnam, Communist Public.
Ill-b 1 37 100.0 % - -
Subtotal 37 100.0 %
Chrorlicle No Coverage for Chronicle.
TOTALS 2,819
00 -o 188
TABLE 97
Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions
In The Coverage of "Peace Talks"
1 Evaluative Dimensions
, Favorable Unfavorable Neutral TOTALS
Word Number ; 2,301 401 117 2,819
Percentage ; 81.6 % 14.2 % 4 . 2 # 100.0 %
Table 98
Amount and Percentage of Proposition Headings
In "North Vietnam & Their Allies" Coverage
Proposition Unit Word Number Percentage Headings Frequency I 9 290 53.6 #
II 1 45 8.3#
III 1 91 16.8 #
IV 4 115 21.3%
TOTALS 541 100.0 #
negotiation coverage was favorable to the United States and its ally's
stand (Table 9?)
H . North Vietnam & Their Allies
The coverage of this category occupied a very small part of the
Voice of America's newscasts: 0.? per cent of the entire period TABLE 99
Evaluative Dimensions of Propositions By Sources
In The Coverage of "North Vietnam & Their Allies"
North Vietnam & Their Allies Coverage Evaluative Dimensions Sources Propositions j F ; u ; N
VOA Editorial — — — — — —
No Coverage for U.S., S. Vietnam, and Other Allies' Official
I-a ! 9 ! 290 ! - ! 53.6 % II 1 45 8 .3 ^ III 1 91 - 16.8 ^ Official Communist IV-a 1 20 - - 3.5 % IV-b 1 36 - - 6 .7 % IV-c 2 60 - - 11.1 #
Subtotal 542 8.3 # 70.4# 21.3 #
Political No Coverage for U.S., S. Vietnam, Communist and Other Allies’ Political
Public No Coverage for U.S., S. Vietnam, Communist and Other Allies' Public
Chronicle No Coverage for Chronicle.
TOTALS 542 œ VO 190
TABLE 100
Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions
In The Coverage of "North Vietnam & Their Allies"
Evaluative Dimensions
Favorable Unfavorable Neutral TOTALS
Word Number 381 45 116 542
Percentage 70.4 # 8.3 # 21.3 # 100.0 %
coverage (Table 9» P- ^8). Out of this small time share, the dominant proposition was the suggestion that North Vietnam maintained strict consultation with their powerful communist allies, China and Russia.
Of the total coverage, 53-6 per cent were devoted to reporting the frequency of trips made by the North Vietnamese chief negotiator from
Paris to Peking and Moscow, Although it was not explicitly stated as such in the reports, the implication was that North Vietnam was acting as a puppet to the communist powers in the Vietnamese conflict. The second emphasis in this coverage was the message that the communist powers were not getting along well among themselves (l6.8 per cent)
(Tables 98 and 99)•
In sum, 70.4 per cent of the coverage on North Vietnam and their allies cast an unfavorable image of them, whereas only 8.3 per cent of the coverage was favorable to them, and 21.3 per cent was of a neutral nature (Table lOO). 191
TABLE 101
Total Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions
In The Total Coverage During May 8-1?, 1972
Total Period Coverage I 1 J Favorable Unfavorable J Neutral TOTALS
Word Number 1 54,683 11,466 Î 6,805 72,954 Percentage I 75.0# 15.7 # I 9.3 # 100.0 %
Conclusion
On the basis of the prepositional analysis in this chapter, it became apparent that in an effort to sustain its credibility, the Voice of America reported both friendly and hostile sources of information.
However, it must be noted that information hostile or adverse to the
United States and its allies was kept at a low profile. During the period îlay 8 - 17 , 1972 analyzed in this study, out of the total news reports broadcast by the Voice of America to Vietnam, the coverage of news favorable to the United States side was nearly 5 times higher than unfavorable news (Table 101). Figure 3 shows graphically the partisan difference in the amount of coverage.
The analysis revealed a pattern of persuasion used by the Voice of America through the news broadcasts to Vietnam during the 1972 crisis. This pattern served to portray the United States and its allies in a favorable light. It can be identified as follows:
l) In controversial issues, the Voice of America tended to re port a high percentage of news favorable to the allied side and its 192
i m 0
.3
ig. 3 Total Percentage Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions
In The Total Coverage: flay 8 - 1?, 1972. 193 stand.
2) The Voice's news reports tended to emphasize the positive image of the allied side and play down its weaknesses.
3) Even if reports from unfriendly sources were used, they often tended to highlight the enemy's negative aspects.
4) Contrasting the virtue of the allied side against the enemy's evil acts was an often-used tactic.
The role of the Voice of America's editorial was noteworthy.
Sbutly, it was the main vehicle in defending U.S. official stand on various issues. The editorial persuasion method was varied. It con sisted of several rhetorical devices:
1) It used background briefing to cushion against any possible shock or disagreement resulted from official actions.
2) It openly reinforced, praised, and endorsed the official stand.
3) It highlighted the virtue and appeal of official policy.
4) It contrasted the positive aspects of the official stand against the negative aspects of the enemy.
5) It put in doubt the integrity of the opponents or enemy of the allied side.
In The History of the Voice of America (Washington B.C., USIA,
Office of Public Information, November 1971. p.6), the Voice's offi cials claimed:
While the VOA is the official voice of the United States government, and the administration in officç, the viewpoints of opposition leaders and other im portant segments of American public opinion are presented in perspective and balance. The editorial 194 opinions of American newspapers and radio and television commentators are used to inform foreign audiences about the attitudes and feelings of the American people on subjects of international interest.
The results of the analysis in this chapter as well as in the preceeding chapters suggest that the Voice of America's news broadcasts to Vietnam were not value-free as the Voice's officials would like to claim about the Voice's output. In the next chapter, a comparison between the news reported by the Voice of America and the news output of the British Broadcasting Corporation during the same period will be presented in order to establish the level of objectivity of the
Voice of America against the reputable British broadcasting network. 1 9 5
FOOTNOTES
1. Holsti, Ole R. Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, I969, p. 137- CHAPTER VIII
OBJECTIVITY ANALYSIS
The analysis of the Voice of America's output in the previous
chapters Brought to light the VGA's projection of the Vietnam reality
to its Vietnamese audience through its pattern of news reporting. In
this chapter, the VGA's news output will he compared with the British
Broadcasting Corporation's news output of the same period I-!ay 8-1?,
1972 in order to establish the VGA's level of objectivity and accuracy.
The measurement of objectivity is usually difficult. A reliable base is needed to achieve a valid evaluation. The BBC was chosen as a model for the VGA's objectivity and accuracy in news reporting for at least two main reasons.
First the BBC has been credited with high credibility by its own audience and by critics of the VGA's broadcasts. Second, and most im portantly, in the framework of our hypotheses (Chapter ll), the BBC
External Service's organizational structure is different from that of
the VGA's Language Services (Appendix D : Organizational Charts of the
VGA and BBC). A comparison of the news output by the two institutions would certainly help to elucidate the question of whether organiza
tional functions and constraints are reflected in the way news was
196 197 reported over each channel, and consequently, in the over-all pro
jection of events.
News broadcast by the BBC's Vietnamese Language Service during
the crisis period May 8-17, 1972, underwent the same quantification
and analytical procedures as those applied to the VOA's materials.
The comparison of news broadcast by the VOA and BBC to their Vietnamese
audiences was performed in the following order:
I . Comparison of General Focus :
1) Comparison of total coverage by both Networks
2) Comparison of themes covered by both networks
3) Comparison of sources covered by both networks.
II. Comparison of Tendency : This was based on a comparison of
propositions according to the following guidelines;
1) News covered by the BBC and NOT by the VOA (BBC-Not-VOA)
What did the news omitted by the VOA convey?
2) News covered by the VOA and NOT by the BBC (VOA-Not-BBC)
What did the news omitted by the BBC convey?
3) News covered by BOTH the VOA and BBC (BBC+VOA)
Was there any difference in the message between the two
networks?
4) Comparison of over-all tendency.
I . Comparison of General Focus
1) Comparative Coverages by the VOA and the BBC.
The analysis of total news output during the period May 8 - 17,
1972 broadcast by both the VOA and the BBC revealed that both networks 198 put emphasis on Vietnam-related news for their Vietnamese audiences.
The BBC's Vietnam-related news coverage represented 72.8 per cent as compared to 6^.2 per cent issued by the VOA of all news broadcast directed to Vietnam during the period under study (Table 102).
TABLE 102
BBC VOA Period Vietnam Vietnam/ Period Vietnam Vietnam/ Categories Coverage Coverage Period Coverage Coverage Period News 40,319 27,393 6 7 .8 # 9t,135 62,448 6 6 .3 %
Commentary 12,721 11, 304 8 8 .9 # 19.636 10.506 3 3.5 %
TOTALS 53,040 38,697 72.8 113,771 72,954 64.2 ^
Percentage-wise, hard news played a similar role on both the BBC and the VOA. While the role of commentary concerning Vietnam-related issues was considerable on the VOA (53«5 per cent of total commentary output), the BBC's Vietnam-related commentary played a more prominent role with 88.9 per cent of total period commentary output (Table 102).
Table 103 highlighs the consensus on the importance of hard news by both the BBC and the VOA. Within Vietnam-related coverage, the BBC devoted 70-7 per cent, and the VOA 85.6 per cent to hard news. The BBC put more evident emphasis on its commentary than did the VOA. It broadcast twice the proportion of commentary related to Vietnam (29.3 per cent) as did the VOA (14.4 per cent). 199
TABLE 103
Comparison of Vietnam Coverage Between BBC & VOA
BBC VOA Categories Word Number Percentage Word Number Percentage
Vietnam News 27,393 70 ^# 62,448 85.6 ^ Vietnam 11,304 10,506 14.4 ^ Commentary 29.3 # 100.0 % 100.0 # TOTALS 38,697 72,934
2) Comparison of Themes
Both the BBC and the VOA seemed to agree upon the news focus as
witnessed hy the identical rank order of themes covered during the pe
riod îîay 8 - 17, 1972. With some slight percentage variations, on both
networks, the three leading themes turned out to be a) mining issue, h) military, and c) Vietnam issue (Table 104). The "Mining Issue" was
weighed equally on both networks. The BBC treated the "Military" theme
a little more extensively, and the "Vietnam issue" with less coverage
than did the VOA. Other themes were covered at the lower end of the
percentage scale on both networks.
3) Comparison of Sources
In terms of sources reported by the VOA and the BBC, Table lOp
indicates that "Editorial" and "Public" sources were placed highest
in coverage by the BBC (29.2 per cent and 27.9 P@r cent respectively).
Official sources were not too far behind in importance (24.8 per cent).
The Voice of America, on the contrary, put strong emphasis on official 200
TABLE 104
Rank-Order of Themes Covered By BBC & VOA
BBC VGA Total Total Themes Percentage Percentage Word Number Word Number 1) Mining Issue 19,4-57 50.4 # 32,026 49A#
2) Military 10,917 28.1 # 12,235 16.9 # Vietnam 2,534 6,6 % 12.0 # ^ Issue 8,767 r\ S. Vietnam - 1,882 5,442 Domestic 4 .9 # 7.5 # Mining 5.0 # Operations 2,135 5 .5 # 3,677 6) U.S. Events 728 1 .9 # 3,446 4.7#
7) Peace Talks 697 1 .8 # 2,819 3.9 # N. Vietnam & 542 0 .7 # ' Their Allies 347 0 .9 # TOTALS 38,697 100.0 # 72,954 100.0 #
sources (4-6.9 per cent), followed by "Chronicle" second and "Editorial"
third. Public sources on the VGA's coverage was fourth in rank, and
compared to that covered by the BBC at 27.8 per cent, they were half as
important (13•7 per cent) to the Voice. The coverage of political
sources was not as significant as other sources on both networks.
A more detailed analysis (Table i06) showed that while the VGA was American-oriented in its flow of communication to Vietnam, the BBC
was no less British-oriented. Of the BBC's Vietnam coverage, 29.2 per
cent was allocated to its own editorial, and 24.1 per cent was for
British public sources of news. Gn the VOA, the American-oriented ' 201
TABLE 105
Comparison of Source Coverages By BBC & VOA
BBC VOA Total ! Total ...... Percentage Percentage Sources Word Number !Word Number Editorial 11,304 29.2 # ; 10,506 14.4 #
Official 9,610 24.8 # ; 34,206 46.9#
Political 2,057 5 . 3 # ; 7,408 10.2 #
Public 10,781 27.9 # ; 9,967 13.7 #
Chronicle 4,945 12.8 # ; 10,867 14.8 #
TOTALS 38,697 100.0 % ; 72,954 100.0 # reporting pattern tended to emphasize U.S. official sources (27.7 per cent) with "Chronicle" running second (14.9 per cent), and "Editorial third (14.4 per cent). Public sources did not receive a prominent coverage.
It appeared that from the source analysis, the two networks differed in focus. The BBC coverage demonstrated that the BBC attributed more importance to its own editorial opinion, and to British public sources.
The VOA , by contrast, focused on U.S. official sources and its own editorial. As "a mirror reflecting society at large", it could be said that the BBC did a more thorough job in communicating the British public mood to its audience than the VOA did in bringing into focus the Ameri can people's thought on various issues. Similarly, it could be inferred that percentage-wise, the VOA reflected a strong official leaning in 202
TABLE 106
Comparison of Source and Subsource Coverage By BBC & VGA
BBC VOA Sources Total Total Percentage Percentage Word No. Word No. Editorial 11,304 29.2 # 10,506 14.4 %
i U.S. 3,135 8.1 # 20,221 27.7 #
S. Vietnam 1,804 4 .7 # 4,907 6.7 #
Communist 2,911 7 .5 # 5,587 7 .7 # Official British 1,369 3 .5 # 1,141 1.6 # Other 1.0 # 2,350 3 .2 % Allies 391 U.S. 1,139 2 .9 # 5,417 7.4 %
S . Vietnam 212 0 .5 # 1,536 2.1 % Political Communist 0 0 0 0
British 695 1.8 % 188 0 .3 % Other 11 0.0 # 0.4 % Allies 267 U.S. 528 1.4 # 6,614 9.1 0
S . Vietnam 0 0 822 1.1 7Ô
Communist 0 0 0 0
British 9,336 2 4. 2 # 450 0.6 ^ Other 2 A # 2,081 Allies 917 2 .9 % Chronicle 4,945 12.8 % 10,867 14.9 #
TOTALS 38,697 100.0 % 72,954 100.0 % 203
its news coverage, whereas the BBC's news coverage tended to reflect
the British public mood and the BBC's own opinion.
II. Comparison of Tendency
The comparison of tendency aimed at revealing any difference or
similarity between the VOA and the BBC in projecting events to their
respective Vietnamese audience. In this analysis, propositions and
evaluative dimensions of news units as broadcast by the VGA and BBC were
compared. Tables 10?, 108, 109,110, and 111 indicate the type of l)news
covered by covered by the BBC but not by the VOA (BBC-Not-VOA), 2) news
by the VOA and not by the BBC (VOA-Not-BBC), and 3) news covered by both
networks (BBC+VOA).
1. News Covered by the BBC and Not Covered by the VOA (BBC-Hot-VOA)
A. Editorial. The BBC editorial coverage was matched with
that of the VOA (Table 107) theme by theme. Three themes were found to be neglected by the VGA's commentator: 1) Military - U.S, 2) Military-
South Vietnam, 3) South Vietnam - Domestic.
1) Military - U.S. The BBC's commentator devoted 100.0
per cent of the editorial share to "Military- U.S" to raise doubts about
the effectiveness of American bombing policy. This was a comment unfa vorable to the American policy regarding the conduct of the war in Viet
nam (Table 112 and Table 115)•
2) On "Military - South Vietnam", 88.5 per cent of BBC
editorial sought to either point out the South Vietnamese capacity to
match the communist forces, or to express belief in the South Vietnamese 204
TABLE 107
Comparison of Tendency: Editorial
Themes BBC VOA
Mining Issue X X
Military - U.S. X 0
Military - South Vietnai 1 X 0
Military-Communist X X
Vietnam Issue X X
Mining Operations X X
South Vietnam-Domestic X 0
Peace Talks 0 0
U.S. Events XX THp i T* North Vietnam & 0 0 Allies
Note : X = coverage; 0 = no coverage military potential strength. It was a favorable assessment of the South
Vietnamese armed forces (Table 112 and Table 115)•
3) South Vietnam - Domestic. Concerning the internal affairs of South Vietnam, 100.0 per cent of editorial on this issue
alluded to South Vietnam as a political system in crisis in which the executive branch seemed to act in ways that might have serious conse
quences on the legislative structure in this budding democracy. Th.e
comment was rated as unfavorable to South Vietnam (Tables 112 i 115)•
Among the themes which the VOA chose not to editorialize upon, the ratio was 2 to 1 unfavorable to the allied side from the standpoint of the BBC. 205
TABL3 108
Comparison of Tendency: Official Sources
BBC VOA S.VieiiCommu Brit Other S.VielbCommu Brit other Themes U.S. ,u.s nam nist ish Allie: nam nist ish Allies Mining XXX X XX X XX X Issue Military X 0 X 0 0 X 0 X 0 0 U.S. Military 0 X X 0 0 XX 0 0 0 S.Vietnam Military 0 0 X 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 Communist Vietnam X 0 X 0 0 X 0 X 0 X Issue S . Vietnam 0 X 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 Domestic U.S. Event ; 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 Mining X 0 X 0 0 X 0 0 0 X Operations Peace X 0 X 0 0 XX X 0 0 Talks N. Vietnam 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 & Allies
Note : X = Coverage; 0 = No Coverage 206
TA3LB 109
Comparison of Tendency: Political Sources
BBC VGA S.VieiiCommu Brit other! „ _ s.Vie!bCommu Brit other Themes U.S nam nist ish Alliei nam nist ish Allie Mining X 0 0 X XX X 0 X X Issue Military- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 U.S. Military 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 S . Vietnam Military- 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 Communist Vietnam 0 0 0 X 0 X 0 0 0 0 Issue S . Vietnam 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Domestic U.S Events 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 . . Mining 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Operation Peace 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 Talks N. Vietnam 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 & Allies
Note : X = Coverage; 0 = No Coverage 207
TABIS 110
Comparison of Tendency: Public Sources
BBC VGA S.VieiiCommu Brit other S.Viel;Commu. Brit other Themes U.S. . U.S. nam nist ish Allied nam nist ish Allies Mining Issue X 0 0 XXX 0 0 X X Military 0 0 0 X X 0 0 0 0 0 U.S. Military 0 .0 0 X 0 X 0 0 0 0 S.Vietnam Military 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 Communist Vietnam 0 0 0 X 0 X 0 0 0 0 Issue S.Vietnam 0 0 0 X 0 0 X 0 0 0 Domestic U.S. Event; > 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Mining 0 0 0 X X X 0 0 0 0 Operations Peace 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Talks N. Vietnam 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 &Allies
Note ; X = Coverage ; 0 = No Coverage 208
TABLE 111
Comparison of Tendency; Chronicle
Themes BBC VGA
Mining Issue X X
Military - U.S. X X
Military - S . Vietnam X X
Military - Communist X X
Vietnam Issue 0 0
S . Vietnam - Domestic X 0
U.S. Events X 0
Mining Operations 0 X
Peace Talks 0 0
N.Vietnam & Their Allies X 0
United Nations XX
Note : X = Coverage 0 = No Coverage 209
TABLE 112
News Covered By BBC and NOT By VGA (BBC-Not-VOA)
Total Sources Themes F U ! N Percent Word No . f Military 132 , 131 - 100.0 % - U.S. 100.0% I Military 753 98 853 _ i 100.0 % Editorial S.Vietnam 88.5 # ; 11,5% S . Vietnam 268 ; 268 - 100.0 % Domestic 100.0 %; 98 TOTALS 1,252 755 399 100.0 % 60.3 # 31.9 % 7.8% Military 48 48 - 100.0 % S.Vietnam 100.0 % Military 49 1 Official - 49 - 100.0 % Communist 100.0 %; Communist Mining 165 ; 41 206 - 100.0 % Operations 80.1 %; 19 .9 % 262 41 TOTALS 303 - 100.0 % 86.5 % 13.3 % Vietnam 202 213 28 Political 443 100.0% Issue 4 5 .6 % 48.0% 6 .3 % British 202 213 28 TOTALS 443 100.0 % 4 5 .6 # 48.0 % 6 .3 % Military 374 50 424 — 100.0 % U.S 88.2% 12.9 % Military 1,142 414 1,645 89 100.0 % S.Vietnam 6 9.4 % 25.1 % 5 ^ % Military 244 474 231 Public - 9^9 100.0 % Communist 2 5 ^ % 4 9 .9 % 24.3 % Vietnam 122 207 British 329 - 100.0 % Issue 37.1 % 6 2 ^ % S.Vietnam 187 410 60 657 100.0 % Domestic .8.5 % 6 2 .4 % 9.1 % Mining 324 48 372 - 100.0 % Onerations 87.1 % 12.9 % N.Vietnam 168 168 - - 100.0 % & Allies 100.0 % 428 4,544 2,393 1,723 100.0% TOTALS 52.7 % 37 .9 % 9 ^ % Military 111 165 31 307 100.0 % U.S. ^ 36.2% 10.0 % 1 Public - Mining 309 309 - 100.0 % Other Allies Onerations 100.0 % 111 474 31 TOTALS 618 100.p % 18.0% 7 7 ^ % 5 ^ % 210
TABLE 112 (continued)
Total Sources Themes FU N Percent Word No. S.Vietnam 34 134 168 - 100.0 % Domestic 79 .8 # N. Vietnam 102 60 17 Chronicle 179 100.0 % &Allies 57.0% 33.5# 9.5# 23 567 490 - 100.0 # U.S Gvents 4.6# 95.3# 1 # 83 618 TOTALS 837 100.0 # 39.2# 17.3 4 3 .5# 3,597 3,154 1,244 GRAND TOTAL 7,995 100.0# 45.0% 39.5# 15.5#
B . Official
From the official source coverage, the VGA did not inform its audience of what communist official sources had to say on l) Military-
South Vietnam, 2) Military - Communist, and 3) Mining operations (Table
108).
1) Military - South Vietnam vs. Military - Communist.
According to the BBC, communist official sources reported that the
South Vietnamese Armed Forces'resistance was on the verge of collapse under communist pressure (100.0 per cent), and that meanwhile the com munist forces had the strength and privilege to treat South Vietnamese military prisoners with leniency in the northern battlefield (100.0 per cent (Table 112 and Table 118).
2) Mining Operations. The news from official communist sources broadcast on the BBC concerning the mining operations showed the communist audacious challenge against American power. Of the cover age allocated to this theme, 77.4 per cent reported the communists 211 managed to damage U.S. ships involved in the American mining mission as well as defying U.S. mining regulations to continue with their ship ping movements. All of these news units were rated as unfavorable to
the allied side (Table 112, and Table 118).
C. Political
I . Political - British
l) Vietnam Issue. Concerning the Vietnam issue, the mood of the British political segment was not reported on the Voice of America's broadcasts. Within the share devoted to British political sources on this subject on the BBC, there was a slight variation between favorable and unfavorable reports: ^5-5 per cent favorable vs. 48.0 per cent unfavorable to U.S. policy in Vietnam. Apparently, on this basis, it could be said that as seen on the BBC coverage, British politicians were divided and were not wholeheartedly behind the American policy in
Vietnam (Tables 112 and 122).
D. Public
Table 110 indicates several themes that were not covered by the
VGA. They were mainly in the domain of British public sources which were covered more extensively by the BBC: l) Military - U.S., 2) Mili tary - South Vietnam, 3) Military - Communist, 4) Vietnam issue, 5) S .
Vietnam - Domestic, 6) Mining Operations, and ?) North Vietnam & Their allies. Public sources from other non-British allies concerning
1) Military - U.S., and 2) Mining Operations were also omitted from the
VGA's coverage. 212
I . Public - British
1) Military U.S. From what was reported on the
BBC, the British public seemed to be impressed by American military efficiency and power. Reports on the success of U.S. planes in striking the enemy's targets occupied 88.2 per cent of British public source coverage. This information could reflect positively on the American military activities (Tables 112 and 126).
2) Military - Communist. Reports from British public sources tended to be unfavorable to the U.S. at the rate of ^9»9 per cent, since they informed the audience of how capable the communist forces were in their offensive moves and in gaining territorial control
(Tables 112 and 126).
3) Military - South Vietnam. On the BBC, British public sources were seen as reacting favorably to the South Vietnamese military: 69.4 per cent of the coverage was favorable to the South Viet namese. The initiative of the South Vietnamese army and their potential strength as well as their increased morale were observed by the British public as pluses for the South Vietnamese army, according to reports on the BBC (Table 112 and Table 126).
4) Vietnam Issue. The British public mood was rather unfavorable to U.S. policy in Vietnam, as witnessed by 62.9 per cent unfavorable reports from public sources in Britain broadcast by the
BBC (Table 112 and Table 126).
5) South Vietnam - Domestic. Tlie internal develop ments in South Vietnam were viewed as symptoms of crisis by the British 213 public. British journalists reported that the South Vietnamese people lacked faith in their government and were apathetic (21.8 per cent).
Others pointed out weaknesses in the Vietnamese leadership and society
(17.2 per cent), or they were alarmed that the South Vietnamese legis lative structure might he endangered by executive actions in emergency situations (11.0 per cent). Still, other public sources reported the reshuffling and investigation of South Vietnamese generals for wrong doing. All in all, 62.5 per cent of all reports from British public sources on the BBC created an unfavorable image of South Vietnam (Table
112 and Table 126).
6) Mining Operations. British public sources were seen as favorable to the U.S. at the rate of 87 .1 per cent of coverage on the basis of the demonstrated effectiveness of U.S. raining(Tables
112, and 126).
7 ) North Vietnam & Their Allies. What little coverage there was of the British public concerning the North Vietnamese and their allies's activities was 100.0 per cent unfavorable to the
U.S. since it informed the audience of the communist successful ad ministrative control of north central Vietnam (Tables 112 and 126).
II. Public - Other Allies
1) Military - U.S. Reports from public sources in other non-British countries allied to the U.S. regarding the U.S. military policy in the main were not favorable to the U.S.: 53.8 per cent reported the American loss of planes and pilots to communist fire
(Tables 112 and 127). 214
2) Mining Operations. Of total coverage from
allied public sources, 80.3 per cent reported hostile acts on the part
of U.S. planes toward Russian ships; 19»7 per cent reported active com
munist ship movement despite the American mining warnings, as well as
communist mine sweeping activities being actively prepared. All this
information was rated as unfavorable to the U.S. as it put in question
the U.S. official claim of not aiming at confrontation, as well as the
question of mining effectiveness (Table 112 and Table 12?).
D. Chronicle
Table 111 shows that l) South Vietnam - Domestic, 2) U.S. Events,
and 3) North Vietnam & Their Allies, were themes not covered in the
"Chronicle" coverage of the Voice of America.
1) South Vietnam - Domestic. Chronicle coverage dealing with information about the promulgation of martial law in South Vietnam
as a result of the mining measure occupied 79.8 per cent. This percent age was classified as neutral. The ramining of the coverage, 20.2 per
cent reported the unity between the people and government of South Viet
nam. It was a positive assessment of the condition in South Vietnam
(Tables 112 and 128).
2) U.S. Events. In this category coverage under "chroni
cle" 95*3 per cent was of a neutral nature (Tables 112 and 128).
3) North Vietnam & Their Allies. Fifty seven per cent
of the coverage was information unfavorable to the communist which,thus,
was favorable to the U.S. side in the sense that it informed the audience
of the "strict consultation" the Vietnamese communists seemed to have to 215 keep with their powerful allies, China and Russia. The reports un favorable to the allied side occupied 33*5 per cent. They told of the communists' successful consolidation of their control in north central
Vietnam (Table 112 and Table 128)
Summary. Theme by theme, source by source, out of 19 themes cover ed by the BBC and omitted by the VOA, five themes were definitely favor able to the allied side, percentage-wise. They were :
1) Editorial: Military - South Vietnam
2) Public - British : Military U.S.
Military - South Vietnam
Mining Operations
North Vietnam & Their Allies
The rest of the themes covered by the BBC and omitted by the VOA were unfavorable to the allied side while 39*5 per cent of BBC-Not-VOA news was unfavorable with 15*5 per cent neutral information (Table 112).
This is an indication that while the BBC tended to be objective in re porting both the negative and the positive of an event, it managed to retain a degree of loyalty to Britain's ally by tilting the scale very slightly toward a favorable treatment of the allied side, at about 5*5 per cent.
2. News Covered By the VOA and NOT By the BBC (VOA-Not-BBC).
A . Official
I. Official - U.S.
1) Military - South Vietnam. Military conditions in South Vietnam were reported from U.S. official sources as unfavorable 21'
TABLE 113
News Covered by VOA and Not By BBC (VOA-Not-BBC)
Total Sources Themes F ; u N Jrercent Nord No. Military 27 27 - - 100.0 % S. Vietnam 100.0 Military 412 83 - 100.0 2 Communist 495 83.2 # 16.8 Official U.S. 867 2,520 - 1,653 100.0 U.S. Events 34.5 # 65.6 % 110 TOTALS 3,042 1,279 1,653 100.0 ^ 42.0 # 5 .7 # 54.3 % Peace 479 - - 100.0 Official - Talks 479 100.0 # S . Vietnam TOTALS 479 - - 100.0 ^ 479 100.0 # N. Vietnam 381 116 542 45 100.0 % Official & Allies 8.3 # 70.4 # 21.3 # 381 116 Communist TOTALS 542 45 100.0 8 .3 % 70 ^ # 21.3 # Vietnam 288 288 -- 100.0 % Issue 100.0 4: Official - Mining 75 - - 100.0 Operations 75 100.0 Other allies 363 TOTALS 363 -- 100.0 % - 100.0 # Military 114 114 - 100.0 % Communist 100.0 Vietnam 75 214 289 - 100.0 ^ Issue 26.0 74.0 # Political- U.S. 238 ! 68 97 403 Events 59.1 16.9 2.4 100.0 ^ U.S. Peace 76 76 -- 100.0 ^ Talks 100.0 396 97 TOTALS 882 389 100.0 ^ 44.1 44.9 # 10.9 % Mining 642 642 - 180.0 2 Political Issue 100.0 642 S. Vietnam TOTALS 642 - - 100.0 2 100.0 % Military - - 173 - 100.0 ^ S. Vietnam 173 100.0 Public - Vietnam 658 246 904 - 100.0 2 Issue 72.8 27.2 % U.S. Mining 84 84 -- 100.0 % Operations 100.0 742 TOTALS 1,161 419 , 100.0 % 6 3 .9 % 36.1 x: 21?
ta bl e 113 (continued)
Total Sources Themes F u N Percent Word No. Military - 173 - 100.0 # S . Vietnam 173 100.0 % Public Vietnam 638 246 904 - 100.0# Issue 72.8 # 27 .2 # U.S. Mining 84 84 - - 100.0 # Operations 100.0 % 742 TOTALS 1,161 419 - 100.0 # 63.9 # 36.1 ^ S . Vietnam 822 822 - - 100.0 # Public Domestic 100.0 # 822 S . Vietnam TOTALS 822 - - 100.0 # 100.0 % Peace 3? - - 100.0 # Public Talks 3? 100.0 % 37 Other Allies TOTALS - - 100.0 # 3? 100.0 Mining 870 5?l - 299 Operations 65.6 % 34.4 $2 100.0# 5?1 299 TOTALS 870 - 100.0 # 65.6 % 34.4 # 3,369 1,306 2,163 GRAND TOTALS 8,839 100.0# 6 2 .9 # 16.7# 20.4 # to South Vietnam. However, it was minimally covered hy the Voice of
America : 2? words out of a total of 62,44? words broadcast i.e. 0.04 per cent, a quite insignificant figure (Table 113 and Table 116).
2) Military - Communist. Official sources covered by the VOA concerning the communist military were 83.2 per cent unfavor able to the communist, thus was favorable to the allied side. Of this coverage, 33-3 per cent informed the Voice's audience of the communist military build-up and invasion; 31.1 per cent pointed out their set back such as losses of planes and tanks; 18.8 per cent indicated they were on the defensive (Table 113 and Table 116). 218
3) U.S. Events. As it would be expected of this theme category, 65.6 per cent of the coverage was neutral. However,
34.3 per cent was favorable. These reports highlighted U.S. humanita rian concern for Vietnamese war refugees as well as U.S. determination to support South Vietnam as expressed in the American Vice President's visit to South Vietnam (Tables 113 and 116).
II. Official - South Vietnam.
1) Peace Talks. On this issue, the VOA reported
South Vietnamese official approval and support of U.S. genrous and serious negotiation stand as contrasted to the communist lack of faith.
It was 100.0 per cent favorable to the U.S. (Tables 113 and 11?).
III. Official - Other Allies
1) Mining Operations. The allies seemed to per ceive the effectiveness of U.S. mining by saying that it might affect
Japan's import of North Vietnamese coals. It was an assessment 100.0 per cent favorable to the U.S. (Tables 113 and 119).
2) Vietnam Issue. This coverage was 100.0 per cent favorable to the allied side as indicated by the confirmed support of other allies in non-military assistance to South Vietnam (Tables 113 and
119).
B . Political
Tables 109 indicates themes not covered by the BBC but covered by the VOA. 219
I. Political - U.S.
1) Military - Communist. Political sources in the
U.S. pointed out that the communists has territory control in South
Vietnam. It was an information unfavorable to the allied side (lOO.O per cent) (Tables 113 and 120).
2) Vietnam Issue. The political source coverage was .0 per cent unfavorable to the American policy in Vietnam (Tables
113 and 120).
3) U.S. Events. In this coverage, 59*1 per cent was favorable to the U.S. by highlighting the U.S. humanitarian concern for Vietnamese refugees, and the outstanding job performed by U.S. per sonnel in refugee affairs (Table 113 and 120).
U-) Peace Talks. Here the VOA reported U.S. Senator
Stennis's belief that the role of Russia was needed in solving the Viet nam problem. It was a statement that indicated the communist dependence on Russia, and was an information favorable to the U.S. (Tables 112 and
120).
C. Public
Table 110 shows themes covered by the VOA but omitted by the BBC.
I. Public - U.S.
l) Military - South Vietnam. Information coming
U.S. public sources reported on the VOA seemed to be 100.0 per cent unfavorable to South Vietnam,as they pointed out the problems the South
Vietnamese army was facing (Table 113 and Tables 124-). 220
2) Vietnam Issue. From the VOA's coverage, the
U.S. publie seemed to be 72.6 per cent in favor of U.S. policy in
Vietnam, mainly because they recognized the communist irreconciable
military ambition (46.4 per cent) (Table 113 and Table 124).
3) Mining Operations. Public sources in the U.S. acknowledged the American superiority in the mining, a factor favorable
to the U.S. (Table 113 and Table 124).
II. Public - Other Allies
l) Peace Talks. Reports of public allied sources regrading Peace Talks were 100.0 per cent favorable to U.S. policy.
They pointed out that the communist request to return to talk was the
outcome of their military deterioration (Tables 113 and 12?).
III. Public - South Vietnam
l) South Vietnam - Domestic. The South Vietnamese population was portrayed as enthusiastically in support of its govern ment's effort to fight communism. They actively engaged in social work of various kinds to support the front. The coverage was 100.0 per cent favorable to South Vietnam (Tables 113 and 125).
D. Chronicle
Table 111 shows themes covered by the VOA and omitted by the BBC.
l) Mining Operations. The mining operations were seen as mainly successful and effective as reflected in 65.6 per cent favorable
information, and 34.4 per cent neutral (Tables 113 and 128). 221
Summary
The above analytical discussion shows that most items covered by the VOA which were not deemed necessary to be included in the BBC broadcasts tended to be favorable to the United States and its policy one way or the other. Out of 17 subthemes covered by the VOA and not by the BBC, 13 were definitely favorable to the U.S. and two contained substantial amounts of favorable information.
Over-all, quantatively, 60.7 per cent of all VOA-Not-BBC coverage was favorable to the U.S. while 14,8 per cent was unfavorable and
24.5 per cent was of a neutral nature (Table 113).
The above analysis pointed to VGA's tendency to broadcast propor tionately a higher percentage of news favorable to the allied side.
3» News Covered By Both The VOA and The BBC (BBC+VOA).
A. Editorial.
Table 107 shows the themes covered by both the VOA and the BBC.
l) Mining Issue. On this issue, the VGA's editorial was staunchly behind official U.S. policy with 100.0 per cent editorial share favorable to the U.S. mining decision. The BBC editorial reflect ed a certain British loyalty to British closest ally, the United States, with 54.2 per cent favorable editorial. However, it also pointed out the objectionable aspect of the U.S. decision such as the dubious effect iveness of such a measure on the conduct of the war (Tables 114 and
115).
The BBC editorial seemed to be more concerned with the question of big power confrontation (l4.2 per cent), with effectiveness (8.2 per TABLE 114
News Covered By Both BBC and VOA (BBC+VOA)
BBC VOA Total Total Total Total Source Themes F U N F U N Word No Percent Word No Percent Mining 4,324 1,190 2,456 4,114 7,970 100.0# 4,114 - - 100.0# Issue 54.2^ 14.9# 30.8# 100.0# Military 232 825 232 - - 100.0 $ - - 100.0# Communist 100.0# : 825 100.0# Vietnam 1,269 106 4,746 1,375 - 100.0# 4,746 - - 100.0# Editorial Issue 92. 3% 7 . 7^ 100.0# Mining 298 - - 237 100.0# 298 - - 100.0# Operation 237 100.0# 100.0# 60 178 523 U.S. Events 238 - 100.0# 523 - - 100.0# 25.2# 74. ^ 100.0# 4,384 2,691 10,506 TOTALS 10,052 2,977 100.0# 10,506 -- 100.0# 4 3 .6# 26.8# 29.6# 100.0# Mining 619 9,412 ' 332 619 - - 100.0# 9,744 100.0# Issue 100.0# 96.6#! 3.4# Military 725 199 67 1,752 ! 991 100.0# 1,752 - 100.0# U.S. 73.3% 20.0# 6.?# 100.0#! Official - Vietnam 129 1,944 ! 129 - 100.0# - 100.0# Issue 100.0# 1,977 98.3# ! U.S. Mining 814 ! 197 2,218 ! 132 1,011 100.0# 2,350 100.0# Operations 80.5#, 19. 5# 94.4#! 5.6# Peace 302 ; 83 1,356 : 385 100.0# - 100.0# Talks 78.4#' 21.5# 1,356 100.0#! 2,589 ! 199 347 16,682 ! 497 TOTALS 3,135 100.0# 17,179 100. 82.6#! 6.3# 11.1# 97.1#! 2 . 7# K3 to TABLE 114 (continued)
BBC VOA Total Total Total Total Sources Themes F UN F U N Word No Percent Word No Percent. Mining 30 349 30 - 100.0# 349 - - 100.0# Issue 100.0# 100.0# Military 1,149 ; 48 353 1,197 100.0# - - 100.0# Official - S.Vietnam 96.0# " ; 4 .0# 353 100.0# S .Vietnam 36 385 ; 156 2,755 51 920 S.Vietnam 577 100.0# 3,726 100.0# Domestic 6.2# 66.8^^ 2 .7 % 74 .0# 1.4# 24.7# 385 , 204 920 TOTALS 1,804 1,215 100.0# 4,428 3,457 51 100.0# 6 7 .4# 21.30^ 11.3^ 78.1# 1.2# 20.8# Mining 1,511 2,981 - - 100.0# 2,981 - - 100.0# Issue 1,511 100.0# 100.0# Military 527 527 - - 100.0# - 631 - 100.0# U.S. 100.0# 631 100.0# Vietnam 125 133 219 286 258 - 100.0# 562 57 100.0# Issue 481^G 5 1 .6# 38.0# 50.0# 10.1# Official - Peace 216 96 429 117 312 - 100.0# 871 325 100.0# Talks 30.8 13.4# Communist 6 9.2% 4 9 .3# 37 .3# 125 2,387 96 648 4,223 174 TOTALS 2,608 5,045 4 .Eÿ6 91.5# 3 .?# 100.# 12.8# 83.7# 3 ^ 100.# 479 890 434 707 Mining Issu< 1,369 - 100.0# 1,141 - 100.0# Official - 34.9^ 6 5 .0# 38.1# 61 .9# British 479 890 434 707 TOTALS 1,369 - 1,141 - 100.0# 34.9# 6 5 .0# 100.0# 38.1# 6 1 .9#
w tV) w TABLE 114 (continued)
BBC VOA Total Total Total Total Sources Themes Word No F UN Percent Word No . F U N Percent Mining 6^ 273 54 1,605 362 20 391 1,987 Official - Issue 16. 6 9.8 # 13. 100.0# 80 .%% 18.2# 1 .0# 100.0# 6^ 273 54 1,605 362 20 Other Allies TOTALS 391 1,987 16. 6 9.8 # 13.8 % 100.0& 80.7% 18.2# 1 .0# 100.0# Mining 421 603 115 2,474 1,965 96 1,139 4,535 Political Issue 37.0# 52.9# 10.1# 100.0# 54.5# 4 3 .4# 2 .1# 100.0# 421 603 115 2,474 1,965 96 U.S. TOTALS 1,139 4,535 37.0# 52.9# 10.1# 100.0# 5 4.5# 4 3 .4# 2.1# 100.0# S .Vietnam 212 894 212 - - 894 -- Domestic 100.Q& 100.0# 100.0# Political 100.0# 212 894 TOTALS 212 - - 894 - - S . Vietnam 100.0# 100.0# 100.0# 100.0# Mining 12 154 86 142 46 252 188 Political Issue 4.8# 6 1 . 34.2# 100.0# 75.6# 24.4# 100.0# 12 154 86 142 46 British 252 188 - 100.0# TOTALS 4 . ^ 6 1 . 34.2# 100.0# 75 .6# 24.4# Mining 11 95 172 11 - 100.0# 267 - Poltical - Issue 100.0# 35.6# 64.4# 100.0# 11 95 172 Other Allies - 100.0# 267 - 100.0# TOTALS 11 100.0# 35.6# 64.4 Mining 20 508 3,883 1,343 226 528 - 100.0# 5,452 Public- U.S. Issue 3.e# 96.2# 71 .2# 24.?# 4.1# 100.0# 20 508 3,883 226 TOTALS 528 - 100.0# 5,452 1,343 3 . ^ 96.2# 71 .2# 24.7# 4.1# 100.0# Mining 2,971 883 938 393 57 4,792 450 - Public - Issue 60.6# 20.3% 19.1# 100.0# 87.1# 12.9# 100.0# 2,971 } 883 938 Pr i 1. i :.',h TOTAT.S 4,792 450 393 57 - 100.0# 6 0 .6# 1 20.3# 19.1# 100.0# 87 .1# 12.9# TABLE 114 (continued)
BBC VOA Sources : Total Total Total p Total Themes FU N U N Percent Word.No. Percent Mining 264 1,470 514 60 301 I 37 2,044- Public Issue 87 .7 % 12.3% 100.0% 71.8% 25.1% 2 .9% 100.0% 264 1,470 514 60 Other Allies TOTALS 301 - 37 2,044 87 .7 % 1 2.3% 100.0% 71 .8 % 25.1% 2 .9% 100.0% Mining 259 285 530 1,629 544 - 2,132 - Issue 4 7 .6# 52.4# 100.0% 23.6% 76.4{% 100.0% Military 661 83 1,342 426 45 744 - 1,813 U.S. 88.8% 11.2% 100.0% 73.8% 23.3% 2.4% 100.0% Military 538 717 112 3,551 93 13 1,367 3,657 S. Vietnam 39.3% 52.5% 8.2% 100.0% 97 .0% 2.6% 0.4% 100.0% Military 206 1,247 975 1,381 39 1,453 koo.0% 2,395 Communist 14.%% 85.8% 40.6% 57 .%% 1.6% 100.0% 1,664 1,964 480 j 6,371 1,900 1,726 TOTALS 4,108 9.997 41.7% 4 9 .2% 9.1%ÏOO.O% 63.7% 19.C# 17 ,3% 100.0% 14,156 10,322 6,224 ! 49,054 10,633 4,426 GRAND TOTALS 30,702 64,133 46.1% 33.6% 20.3% 100.0% 76 .5% 1 6 .6% 6 .9% 100.0%
K) N Vn TABLE 115
Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions
In the VOA and BBC Editorials
BBC VOA Sources iProposi Word Proposi Word Themes U N UN j tions Number tions Number I-b 722 9.?^ I-a 662 16.2# I-e 137 1 .7^ I-f 626 13.2# Mining I-f 670 8.4# I-g 333 13.4# I-g 642 8 .1# I-j 341 13.2# Issue I-h 1,133 14.2# I-n 1,160 28.2# I-k 633 8.2# I 372 13.9# I-l 29 0.4# I-r 70 0 .5# Il-b Editorial 973 12.2# II-c 31 0.4# Il-k 24 0 .3# Xll-bis 1,340 16.6# IV - i 896 1-m-p 11.2# IV-n-s 218 2.?# IV-r 220 2.8# IV-t 162 2.(
TOTALS 7,970 4,324 1,190 2,436 TOTALS 4,114 4,114 34.2# 14.9# 30.8% 100.0# K) TABLE 115 (continued)
BBC VOA Proposi Word IProposi Word Sources Themes F u F u N tions Number 1 tions Number Military „ 131 0 100.0% ------U.S. i TOTALS 131 - 100.0% -- -- Editorial IX-d 363 4 3 .5% IX-1 4 5 .0# - - - - Military 392 Xl-g 98 0 11.3% - • V1© "cnS/rrï " TOTALS 853 88 .5# - 11.3% - - - - -
Vll-d-b 232 100.0#:* - VIII 1 825 - *100.# - Military Communist TOTALS 232 *100.0% Totals j 825 - *100.0%
Ill-e 1 593 4 3 .1% I—a—b- 2,981 6 2 .8 % g-i Vll-e j 106 Il-d 1,218 Vietnam - - 7."# 25.6% VIII 6?6 4 9 . ^ Vll-b 547 11.5% Issue TOTALS^ 1,375 j 92.3% 7 .7# Totals 4,746 100.0% —-
Mining Ill-e j 237 1 - j - 100.0% I-a 298 100.0% - - opérations poTATiS 237 i - j 100.0% TOTALS 298 100.0% — tV) 1 1 N TABLE 115 (continued)
BBC VOA Proposi Word Proposi Word Sources Themes F u N F u N tions Number tions Number
IX-a 268 - 100.0# ------S.Vietnam Domestic TOTALS 268 - 100.0# ------
Editorial Il-a 178 74.^ II-c 523 100.0# - - U.S. Il-d 60 25.2# - Events TOTALS 238 25.2# - 74.E# TOTALS 523 100.0# - -
GRAND TOTALS 11,304 47.5# 25.3# 27.2# 10.506 92.1# 7 .9# -
Note ; *F = Favorable to the communist, thus unfavorable to the U.S.
■''•U = Unfavorable to the communist, thus favorable to the U.S.
!\) ÏV) 00 229
cent), and with detente (8.4 per cent), and the reason the U.S. acted
(9*7 per cent). It tended to explain and show its audience that the
U.S. decision was prompted hy North Vietnam's attitude, and that the
mining measure would he effective in itself as well as that it would not
trigger a hig power clash (Tables 115).
The VGA's editorial differed in that it concentrated on showing
the mining's public appeal, and support (28.2 per cent and 13.9 per cent respectively); it openly urged for support of a worhtwhile cause (l6.2
per cent) and predicted the effectiveness of the mining measure on the
conduct of the war (16.2 per cent). The VGA's commentator also tended
to spend time to clarify U.S. generous negotiation terms (13.2 per cent)
and the minimal negative effect it might exert on detente (13.4 per cent)
Tahle 115).
2) Military - Communist. The BBC's assessment of
the communist militarily was completely different from that hy the VGA.
In the eyes of the BBC's commentator, the communist forces were tough
and were on the offensive. It resulted in 100.0 per cent comment of a favorable nature to the communists, thus 100.0 per cent unfavorable to
the allied side.
On the VGA, the communist forces were seen as a ruthless and aggres
sion-prone military force, having no concern for civilians and destroy -
in the name of liberty. It was 100.0 per cent unfavorable to the com munists, thus 100.0 per cent favorable to the allied side (Tables 114 and 115). 230
3) Vietnam Issue. There was a discrepancy between the BBC and the VGA's look at the Vietnam issue. According to the BBC editorial, U.S. policy in Vietnam was questionable since it would not give the U.S. a strong bargaining power (43.1 per cent), especially so because North Vietnam was strongly oriented toward a bilateral negotia tion. And for this reason they repeatedly rejected a U.N. intervention.
On the whole, 92.3 per cent of BBC editorial showed an unfavorable ten dency toward U.S. policy regarding the Vietnam issue (Tables 114 & 115).
The Voice , on the contrary, emphasized the qualities of the Ameri can policy such as its flexibility and generosity in contrast to the communist rigidity; its detente-oriented stand, or its aim toward short ening the war (62.8 per cent). In addition, the VOA commentator also emphasized the effectiveness of U.S. policy by pointing out that Viet- namization was working very well (25.6^). VOA editorial also took an occasional swipe at Russian contradiction between their proclaimed policy and their military assistance to North Vietnam (11.5 per cent). On the whole, by generalizing the qualities of U.S. policy, the VOA editorial was 100 per cent favorable to the official policy (Table 114 and Table
115).
4) Mining Operations. The BBC's commentator tended to stay 100 per cent neutral in this matter by merely repeating the mining schedule. The VOA used the mining information to reaffirm U.S. power and efficiency in carrying out the mission, thus highlighting at
100 per cent the favorable aspects of the American positions (Tables 114 and 115). 231
5) U.S. Events. The BBC strictly treated the domestic happenings and U.S. official movements in a neutral manner,
trying not to read into those happenings any significance. The only
editorial favorable to the allied side (25.2 per cent) was when the BBC's
commentator saw U.S. concern and determination to support South Vietnam reflected in the American Vice President's visit to Saigon.
The VOA editorial spent 100 per cent of the editorial allocation for U.S. Events to point out that all the high ranking officials' move ments relfected an upcoming decision; and moreover, whatever decision would be made, it would be prompted by the North Vietnamese intransigence.
The VOA editorial was thus 100 per cent in defense of the U.S. official
stand (Tables 114 and 115)•
B. Official
Table 108 shows the themes that were covered by both networks.
I. Official - U.S.
1) Mining Issue. Similar treatment was observed on both the BBC and the VOA. Official sources reported were seen as wholeheartedly behind the American government policy (Table 114 and 116).
2) Military - U.S. The VOA's reports from official sources concerning the American armed forces were 100 per cent favorable with a strong emphasis on American military power (52.8 per cent) and
the effectiveness of Vietnamiaation strategy (20.1 per cent).
The BBC's reports of U.S. official sources, among other things, also reflected the American official ovenfnelning focus on U.S. military power (6l.2 per cent). However, 20 per cent of the BBC's reports ' reflected ‘badly on the U.S. military. The consisted of information about their setbacks (3.8 per cent), losses (10.2 per cent) or their loss of a high ranking officer on the battlefield (4.2 per cent) (Tables 114 à
116).
The image of the American armed forces was not so infallible on the
BBC as it was on the VOA.
3) Vietnam Issue Similar information was
4) Mining Operations reported on both networks
5) Peace Talks with strongly favorable in
formation. A slightly
higher favorable percentage
was observed on the VOA
(Tables 114 & ll6).
II. Official - South Vietnam
1) Mining Issue Similar information was
2) Military - South reported on both networks Vietnam with favorable reports
ranging between $6 per cent
and 100 per cent (Tables
114 and 116).
3) South Vietnam - Domestic. The reality of the
South Vietnamese society was perceived differently by the VOA and the
BBC. The reports broadcast by the BBC reflected an unfavorable image of
South Vietnam. The talked about prison riots (24.1 per cent), about the precarious security situation in the South Vietnamese capital (23.6 233 per cent), or the possible negative effect of executive actions on the legislative structure (10.9 per cent). All in all, 66.7 per cent of
BBC reports tended to he negative about the conditions in South Vietnam.
By contrast, the South Vietnamese society ween by the VGA was quite different. It was an image of a government trying its best to help refugees made homeless by the communists (28.4 per cent), or of a socie ty in progress (18.? per cent) where the democratic machinery was run ning smoothly (11.6 per cent). In sum 74.0 per cent of VOA reports were favorable to South Vietnam (Table 114 and Table 117)•
III. Official - Communist
1) Mining Issue. With slight percentage variations, the BBC and the VOA reported the same information, resulting in 100 per cent of communist official sources unfavorable to the U.S. policy (Table
114 and Table 118).
2) Military - U . S . With slight percentage varia tions, the total reports on both the BBC and VOA reflected the communist view of the U.S. military as ineffective and aggression-prone, resulting in 100 per cent news unfavorable to the U.S. (Tables 114 and 118).
3) Vietnam Issue. The VOA tended to emphasize the communist rejection of the United Nations intervention as proof of their rigidity toward a peace solution (29.9 per cent), whereas on the
BBC, the U.S. position was enhanced by reports of the communist insist ence on their own solution to the Vietnam conflict (48.4 per cent).
Over-all, the treatment of the Vietnam issue was similar on both net- 2}:; works, with a slight percentage variation. The result was: BBC 's
48.4 per cent favorable to the U.S. vs. VGA's 38 per cent (Tables 114 and 118).
4) Peace Talks. On this issue, the BBC reports reflected a 69.2 per cent unfavorable attitude toward U.S. policy.
They talked about the communist readiness for negotiation (20.2 per cent), their concilliatory and patriotic stand for a government of nationa concord in South Vietnam (25.6 per cent) or their criticism of
U.S. insensitiveness (23.4 per cent). On the VOA, 49.3 per cent of its coverage was favorable to the U.S. as it pointed to the communist rigid ity (4 9 .3 per cent). And the unfavorable reports were half of those broadcast by the BBC, at the rate of 37.3 per cent. They mainly focused on the communist complaint that Kissinger distorted their views (2?.l per cent). On balance, there was more news unfavorable to the U.S. on the BBC than on the VOA (Tables 114 & 118).
IV. Official - British
The only theme "Mining Issue" from "Official - British" sources was reported similarly on both networks reflecting a high percentage of neutral opinions and between 34 per cent and 38 per cent favorable in formation (Tables 114 and II9).
V. Official - Other Allies
1) Mining Issue. If one was to rely on either the
BBC or VOA reports of official allied sources regarding their reactions to the mining decision, as a basis for approval or disapproval, the end result would turn out to be quite different. Reports broadcast by the BBC indicated that only 16.3 per cent
of allied sources endorsed the U.S. mining decision, and a very high
percentage (69.8 per cent) of the reports was condemnation of its
peace-damaging effect, or was doubt about its effectiveness. By con
trast, according to reports from the VOA, 80.7 per cent of allied
sources reported was in support of the American mining measure mainly because they believed it demonstrated fairness and determination (3^.1 per cent); or that it was supportable because it was the result of the
communist intransigence (21.2 per cent). The image projected on the
BBC broadcasts about allied reactions was that of doubt and hostility, whereas on the VOA, they came out as overwhelmingly welcoming the Ameri
can decision (Tables 114 and 119)■
C . Political
I . Political U.S.
1) Mining Issue. It could be said that on both networks, the reports from U.S. political sources gave the idea that
the U.S. political segment was rather divided on the mining issue. How
ever, percentage-wise, on the BBC, the favorable reports were lower
than on the VOA: BBC-37 per cent vs. VOA-54.5 per cent. And the poli
tical opposition was seen stronger from the BBC reports: BBC- 52.9 per
cent vs. VOA- 43.4 per cent. For the listener to the VOA broadcasts,
it could be inferred that opposition was an inevitable fact of life in
the American democracy, yet, the political opposition to the official
mining decision was still smaller than those supporting President Nixon. 236
The same inference could be drawn for the BBC reports. However, it seemed a more pessimistic assessment regarding American political sup port for President Nixon's mining measure (Table 114 and Table 120).
II. Political - South Vietnam
l) South Vietnam - Domestic. Both networks report ed the efficient working of the South Vietnamese constitutional demo cracy as viewed by the South Vietnamese political segment, resulting in
100 per cent favorable news for South Vietnam (Tables 114 and 121).
III. Po. itical - British
l) Mining Issue. There was a marked difference between the coverage by the VOA and that by the BBC. British political sources were seen as 61.1 per cent in opposition to the American mining decision, mainly because they thought it might bring about a big power clash (31.3 per cent), that it was dangerous (13.5 per cent), or that its goal was questionable (I 6.3 per cent). Only 4.8 per cent of British political sources reported by the BBC were in favor of the American mining.
The mood of the British political segment was seen differently on the VOA. Tlie VGA's coverage of British political reactions was 75.6 per cent favorable to U.S. policy, reportedly because British political sources believed the action was justified and constructive as it was prompted by the communist intransigence (65 per cent). One was led to wonder which network read the British political mood more accurately.
(Tables 114 and 122). 237
IV. Political - Other Allies
l) I’lining: Issue. The same discrepency was found between the coverage of the BBC and of the VOA. Reports from political allied sources by the BBC reflected a 100 per cent allied condemnation of the U.S. mining. However, the total coverage was quite small to be very significant. Meanwhile, on the VOA, political allied sources were reportedly not so unanimously against the U.S. At least 35«6 per cent of them endorsed the U.S. action and 64.4 per cent were against it
(tables 114 and 122).
D. Public
Table 110 shows the themes under public sources reported by both networks.
1. Public - U.S.
l) Mining Issue. The BBC and the VOA reflected the
American public mood differently. From reports by the BBC, ,2 per cent of U.S. public sources covered were unfavorable to the American mining decision. They expressed their opposition by demonstrating against it, the BBC reported. According to the VOA reports, ?1*2 per cent of U.S. public sources covered reflected public approval. They approved it by openly endorsing it or emphasising its generous negotiation terms.
Demonstrations by the public as a sign of dissent was negligible, accord ing to VOA reports. Those reportedly agaainst it (24.7 per cent) were not on the street protesting as reported by the BBC. They mostly op posed it by verbalizing their fear that it would damage big-power rela tions (12.8 per cent), or that it was a risky step (4.6 per cent). 238
therefore, they would legislate against it (2.1 per cent) (Tables 114 and 124).
The VOA apparently tended to play down public mass emotion as ex
pressed by demonstrations, and to emphasise the working procedures of
the status quo in resolving any difference of opinion.
II. Public - British
l) Mining Issue. According to the VGA's reports of public British sources, a much higher percentage was in support of the mining decision than that reported by the BBC itself. VOA reports favor able to the mining occupied 87.1 per cent of mining issue coverage as
compared to 60.6 of BBC reports rated as favorable to the U.S. cause.
On the BBC, almost half of British public sources reported vacillated between neutral (19.1 per cent ) and unfavorable (20.3 per cent). They were seen as more decisively pro-U.S. on the VOA (Tables 114 & 126;
E . Chronicle
Table 111 shows the themes covered by both networks under Chronicle.
1) Mining Issue. The coverage trend on both the BBC and the VOA was similar. The BBC's coverage was 6O .5 per cent favorable to the U.S. as compared to 71.5 per cent of the VOA coverage favorable to the American decision. However, as a whole, the VOA had a tendency to have a lower percentage of unfavorable news (Table 114 and Table 127).
2) Military - U.S. Over-all coverage was also similar
on both networks. Percentage-wise, favorable coverage was comparable between the BBC and the VOA: BBC-88.8 per cent vs. VOA- 73.8 per cent.
Both mainly emphasized the American military power and effectiveness. 239
On this theme, the VOA reported a higher percentage of unfavorable news involving American losses and setbacks : VOA-23-5 fer cent vs.
BBC-0.0 per cent. (Tables 114 and 128).
3) Military - South Vietnam. VOA reports showed the South Vietnamese forces as effective (26.7 per cent), as full of initiatives (33*5 per cent), and resistant (22.4 per cent), resulting in 97 per cent favorable reports for the South Vietnamese.
The BBC reports pointed to problems faced by the South Vietnamese army. They were reported to be under the enemy's pressure (27.8 per cent). They also suffered casualties and were on the defensive (18.7 per cent), as well as they were on the verge of collapse in resistance
(6 per cent). The BBC reports tended to portray the South Vietnamese armed forces as an army in crisis (52.5 per cent) rather than an in vincible and efficient army (Tables 114 and 128).
4) Military - Communist. The BBC coverage was 85.8 per cent favorable to the communists and therefore, unfavorable to the allied side. The communist forces were reported as tough (13.8 per cent) and that they were full of initiatives (6l.8 per cent). They also had the capacity to gain territory control (10.2 per cent)
The VOA coverage seemed to agree on the capacity of the communist forces, but to a lesser degree (57.7 per cent). They might be tough, according to reports on the VOA, but they suffered high casualties, were ruthless and aggression-prone (40.6 per cent). Thus, any credit they had were balanced out by their negative characteristics (Tables 114 & 2:4-0
128).
Summary
The analysis of news covered by both the VOA and the BBC indicated that, theme by theme, most of the time the VOA broadcasts tended to project a different reality, and to treat news in a manner different from the BBC's style.
l) I-Iinine: Issue. Editorially, the BBC tended to be deliberate.
Its editorial appeared to stimulate its audience to contemplate on the issue. It showed a general favorable attitude, but it did not neglect to point out the unfavorable aspects of the issue. The VOA editorial, instead, seemed to be occupied with either showing that U.S. policy was well-liked and effective, or trying to rally support for the official policy. It looked like a mild form of instigation.
From official sources, both networks tended to reflect official attitudes as to be expected from the official parties involved in the conflict. The allied sources were reported to be favorable, and the communist official sources to be unfavorable to the mining issue.
Both networks also reported similarly on South Vietnamese political reactions as favorable. However, in the coverage of Political - U.S.,
Political- British, Political - Other Allies, as well as Public- U.S., and Public - British, there was a marked difference in what was pro jected. The analyses of these sources as reported by the VOA in the previous section indicated more clearly the VOA's tendency to emphasize, if not inflate, the favorable facets of an issue along official line. TABLE 116
Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions
In the BBC and VOA Coverages of "U.S. Official" Sources
BBC VOA Proposi Word Proposi-Word Sources Themes F UN F u N tions Number tions Number
I-b 275 44.4% —_ I-b 293 3 .0# = — I-f 20 3.2# - - I-a 509 5 .2# - - I-g 51 8.2# -- I-e 649 6 .7# - - Mining I-h 113 18.3# - - I-f 5,428 5 5 .7 # -- Official - I-j 83 13.4# -- I-g 922 9 .5# -- Issue I-n 77 12.4% - - I-h 73 0 .7# -- U.S. I-i 25 0 .3# -- I-j 712 7 .3# - - I-k 691 7 .1# -- I-l 77 0.8% -- I-o 33 0 .3# -- IV-a 30 -- 0 .3 # . IV-b 57 -- 0.6% IV-c 91 -- 0 .9% IV-d 89 -- 0 .9% IV-f 65 —— 0 .7%
TOTALS 619 100.0% - - TOTALS 9,744 96.6% - 3 .4#
, Military I-c 298 30.1% -— I-a 91 5 .2# —— I-f 243 24 .5% -- I-c 230 13.1% - U.S. - I-g 65 6.6% -- I-d 134 7 .6# - TABLE 116 (continued)
BBC VOA Proposi Word Proposi Word Sources Themes F UN FU N tions Number tions Number
Il-b 51 5.1^ I-e 21 1.2# Official - IV-a 1 0 1 - 10.2# - I-f 432 24.7# - - III-c 68 6.7^ - - 18 1 . 0 # - — Military I-g U.S. IV-c 18 - 1.8^ - II-a 74 4.2# - - IV-d 38 - 3.e# - Ill-a 200 11.4# - - TTU • w Q ■ Xl-a 3^ -- 3 . ^ Ill-b 353 2 0 . 1 # -- XI-c 16 -- 1.6# IV-a 45 2.6# -- Xl-h 17 -- 1.7# IV-b 62 3.5# - - Xl-k 42 - 4.2 - Xl-a 31 i.e # - - Xl-b 19 1.1# - - XI-c 4 2 2 . 4 # - -
TOTALS 991 73.2# 20.0# 6 . 7# TOTALS 1,752 100.0# - - S . Vietnam — — — — — - - - - Domestic I 496 19.7# II 1,106 - U.S. 43.9# Il-b No Coverage 547 21.7# Il-d 344 Events 13.7# IV-a 27 1.1#
TOTALS — — — TOTALS 2,520 34.5# - 65.6#
Mining I 40 4.0# _— I-a 217 9.0# —— I-a 5.E# -- I-b 248 10.6# -- i\) Operations 59 I-b 97 9.6# - - Il-a 571 24.3# - - TABLE 116 (continued)
Proposi Word Proposi Word F U N FU N tions Number tions Number Sources Themes
I-c 72 7 .1# __ Il-b 643 27 .4# _ Mining Il-a 393 38.9% -- II 539 22.9% - - Official - Il-b 112 11.j# - - Ill-a 92 - - 3.S% Operations Il-d 16 1.6# - - Ill-b 4o -- 1 .7% U.S. II 25 2 .5# -- Ill-b 152 - - 15.0# Ill-f 45 — — 4 .5#
TOTALS 1,011 80 .5# - 19.5% TOTALS 2,350 94.6#- 5 .6#
I 302 78 .4# _ I 868 64.0# Peace IV-d 83 -- 21.5% I-a 181 13.3% -- I-b 307 22.6# -- Talks
TOTALS 385 78.4# -- TOTALS 1,356 100.0# -- N.Vietnam &Allies
GRAND TOTALS 3,135 2,589 199 347 20,221 17,549 555 2,117 100.# 82.6# 6.:^ 11.1# 100.0# 86.8# 2 . ^ 10.4# TABLE 117
Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions
In The BBC and VOA Coverages of "Official - South Vietnam"
BBC VOA Proposi Word Proposi Word Sources Themes F u N F u N tions Number tions Number I 30 100.0# I-d 98 28.1# Mining I-i 119 34.1# - - Official - I-P 132 37 .Q& — — Issue S.Vietnam TOTALS 30 100.0# - - TOTALS 349 100.0# - -
VI-c 91 7 .6# _ — IX-a 208 58.9% _ _ IX-a 473 39.5# IX-g 30 8 .5# - - — IX—b 208 17 .4# Xl-d 115 32.6# -- IX-e 29 2.4# - - IX-f 298 - - S.Vietnam 24.9# IX-k 50 4.2# -- X-e 48 — — 4.0#
TOTALS 1,197 96.0^ 4.0^ TOTALS 353 100.0# Vietnam Issue
S. Vietnam VI 36 6.2# I 199 5 .3% - - Vlll-a'. 63 - 1 0 .9% II 1,057 28.4# -- Vlll-b - 24.1# III 34 0 .9# -- Domosi.i c ,,, , I 139 I VIli-c 156 -- 27 .0# IV 696 18.7# -- TABLE 117 (continued)
BBC VOA _ _ Proposi Word ^ Proposi Word F U F u N + Souces Themes ^lons Humher tions Number VlII-i 47 8.1# V 432 11.6# 136 23.6# VI . # s. Vietnam ^ 133 3 6 VlII-a 144 3.j# Official - VlII-b 31 1.4# VIII-c 878 23.6# S.Vietnam Domestic VlII-d 90 2.4# - VlII-e 42 1.1#
TOTALS 377 6.2# 66.8# 27 .0# TOTALS 3,726 74.0# 1.4# 24.?# U.S. No Coverage Events Mining Operations No Coverage I 100 Peace 20.9# I-a 324 6 7 .6# - No Coverage Talks I-b 33 11.3# :
N. Vietnam No Coverage & Allies GRAND TOTALS 1,804 1,213 383 204 4,907 3,936 31 920 100.0# 6 7 .4# 21.3& 11.3# 100.0# 80.3# 1 .0# 18.6#
Vj\ TABLE 118
Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions
In The BBC and VOA Coverages of "Official - Communist" Sources
BBC VGA Proposi V/ord ProposiWord p Themes F U N u N tions Number tions Number Il-a 65 4 .3# Il-a 138 4.6# Mining Il-d 1.152 - 76 .2# - Il-d 1.718 57 .6# - Official - Il-e 148 - 9.e# - Il-e 607 20.4# - II-f 146 — — II-f 25 0.8# Issue 9.?# 2.1# : Communist Il-g 63 Il-h 98 3 . ^ - II-j 332 11.1# —
TOTALS 1.511 - 100.0# - TOTALS 2,981 100.0#
IV-a 123 — 23.3# — IV-a 195 30.9# _ V-a 201 — 38.1# V-a 100 — Military 15.8 # V-b 67 12.7# : V-b 11 1 .7# V-c 136 — 25.8 # — V-c — U.S. 325 51.5#
TOTALS 527 100.Q& TOTALS 631 100.0#
Military XI-c 4-9 100.( TOTALS 631 100.0# Communist TOTALS 49 100.Q& TOTALS 631 100.0# ON TABLE 117
Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions
In The BBC and VOA overages of "Official - Communist"
BBC VOA Proposi Word Proposi Word Sources Themes F U N F U N tions Number tions Number
X-f 48 100.0# - No Coverage Official - Military - S.Vietnam Communist TOTALS 48 100.0# -
I-f 125 48.4# — I-d 168 29.9% Vietnam Ill-f 27 10.5# - I-f 51 9 .1# IV-c 106 41.1# Ill-g 179 31.9% Issue Vll-f 57 10.0# Vll-g 107 19.Q&
TOTALS 258 48.4# 51.6# - TOTALS 562 38.0# 5 0 .9# 10.1#
S.Vietnam No Coverage Domestic U.S. No Coverage Events Mining Ill-g 41 19. IV-a 20 9 .7 # No Coverage Operations IV-b 145 70 .4# ------vj TOTALS 206 80.1# 19.9# TABLE 118 (continued)
BBC VOA Proposi Word Proposi Word Sources Themes F UN F UN tions Number tions Number Il-b 80 25.6# II 26 3 .0# II -d 63 - 20.2# - I-a 403 46.3# -- Peace II 73 - 23.4# - II 20 - 2 .3# - IV-a 96 -- 30.8# Il-a 236 - 27 .1# - Talks Il-b 69 - 7 .9# - Ill-a 117 — — 13.4#
TOTALS 312 - 69.2# 30.8 # TOTALS 871 4 9 .3# 37 .3# 13.4#
I-a 290 — 5 3 .6# N .Vietnam II 45 8 .3# --
III — No Coverage 91 16.8 # & Allies IV-a 20 3 .5# IV-b 36 -- 6 .7# IV-c 60 —— 11.1#
TOTALS 542 8 .3# 70 .4# 21.3#
GRAND TOTALS 2,911 125 2 ,649 137 5,587 693 4,604 290 100.0% 91.0# 4.0# 100.0# 12.4# 82.4# 5 .2#
00 TABIE 119
Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions
In the BBC and VOA Coverages of "Official - British and Official - Other Allies"
BBC VOA Proposi Word Proposi Word Sources Themes F u N F u N tions Number tions Number I-b 399 29.1% I-b 166 14.6% Mining I-c 80 5.8% I-c 117 10.3% - Official - Ill-b - 890 - 6 5 .0% I-d 105 9.2% Issue I-k 46 4.0% Ill-b 680 59.6% British IV-g 27 2 .3%
TOTALS 1,369 34.9% - 6 5 .0% TOTALS 1,141 38.1% - 6 1 .
I-i 64 16.3% — — I-b 422 21.2% _ — Il-a 76 - 19.4% - I-c 78 4.0% - - Il-e 47 - 12.0% - I-e 678 34.1% - - Mining Il-d 150 _ 38.4% — I-f 66 3 .:^ —— Official IV-k 54 -- 13.8 % I-i 201 10.1% - - Issue I-P 160 8.0% - - Il-b 75 - 3 .# - Other II-c 189 ■ - 9.50 - Il-d 46 — 2 .3% — Allies Il-e 52 - 2.6% — IV-k 20 __ 1 .0%
: VO TOTAI.S 391 16.3% 69.0%l/U 13.8% TOTALS 1,907 80.7% 18.2% 1.0% TABLE 119 (continued)
BBC VOA Proposi Word ^ ^ Proposi Word Sources Themes N F U N tions Number tions Number
Vietnam Vll-a 288 100.0% - - No Coverage Official - Issue TOTALS 288 100.0% -- U'Ll'ier Allies .... Mining III-c - - No Coverage 75 100.0% Operations TOTALS 75 100.0% --
GRAND TOTAL 1,760 543 273 9^4 3,491 2,402 362 727 100.0% 30.8% 15.5# 53.6% 100.0% 68.8% 10.4% 20.8%
O TABLE 120
Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions
In The BBC and VOA Coverages of "Political _ U.S."
BBC VOA Proposi Word Proposi Word Sources Themes P u N F UN tions Number tions Number I-d 22 1.9^ I-a 687 15.1# I-g 44 3.9^ -- I-b 126 2 . ^ -- I-i 66 5.8# -- I-d 30 0.?# - - Political - 1-0 147 12.9# -- I-e 4 2 0.9# - - I-r 142 12.5# - - I-f 13^ 3.Q# -- Mining Il-d 134 - 11.8# - I-g 52 1.1# -- U.S. Il-g 97 - 8.5# - I-h 462 10.2# -- Il-h 271 - 23.8# - I-i 751 16.6# -- Issue Il-k 30 - 2.6# - I-k 19 0.4# -- II-l 71 - 6.2# I-n 74 1.6# -- Ill-bis 58 -- 5.1# I 97 2.1# -- IV-i 25 -- 2.2# Il-a 220 -- IV-p 32 -- 2.8# Il-b 191 - 4.2# - II-c 172 - 3 . ^ - Il-d 730 - 16.1# Il-e 150 - 2.3# - Il-f 116 - 2.6# - Il-g 15 - 0.]# - Il-h 237 - 5.2# - Il-i 134 - 3.0# - IV-e 86 -- 1.9# IV-i 10 -- 0.2# TABLE 120 (continued)
BBC VOA Proposi Word ProposiWord ^ Sources Themes F U N u N tions Number tions Number Mining TOTALS 1,139 37.52. 10.1% TOTALS 54.^ 43.4% 2.1% Issue 4,535 Political - Military No Coverage U.S. Military No Coverage S. Vietnam U.S. II-c 75 26.0% Vietnam Ill-a 18 6.2% - No Coverage Ill-b 85 29.4% Issue III-c 60 20.8% Ill-d 51 17 .6%
— — — — — TOTAIS 289 26.0% 74 .0% -
No Coverage No Coverage
I 172 42 . # U.S. Ill-a 68 16.9% No Coverage Ill-b 53 13.2% III-c 44 Events 10.9 IV-b 66 16.4%
TOTALS 403 59.1% 16.9% z it.ia „ N> TABLE 120 (continued)
BBC VOA Word p, ^ Proposi Word Source Themes u F u N tions Number tions Number Mining No Coverage Operations Peace IV-c 100.0# - - Talks No Coverage 76
TOTALS 76 100.0# - - N.Vietnam No Coverage & Allies
GRAND TOTAL 1,139 421 603 115 5,417 2,863 2,361 193 100.Q# 37.Q& 52. 9% 10.1# 100.0# 52.8# 4 3 .6# 3 .6#
V) TABLE 121
Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions
In The BBC and VOA Coverages of "Political - South Vietnam"
BBC VOA Proposi Word ProposiWord Sources Themes F UN F U N tions Number tions Number I-b 5^ 5 - - Mining I-d 386 42.50 I-e 180 19.80 No Coverage Issue I-i 22 2.40
TOTALS 642 100 .(^ — — Military No Coverage U.S. Military No Coverage S .Vietnam Vietnam No Coverage Issue VI 212 100.00 - - VI 720 80.50 VII 174 1 9 .0 TOTALS 212 100.00 TOTALS 894 100.00
No Coverage for U.S. Events, Mining Operations, Peace Talks and N. Vietnam & Allies
to GRAND TOTAL 212 100.00 1,536 100.00 TABLE 122
Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions
In the BBC and VOA Coverages of "Political - British^
BBC VOA Proposi Word Proposi Word Sources Themes F u N F u N tions Number tions Number I-b 12 4.E^ I-b 122 6 5.0# Il-a 34 1-0 20 10.6# - Political Mining 13.5# Il-d 41 16.3& Il-d 21 11.1# II-c 79 31.3# Il-i 25 13. Issue IV-p 12 4.0# British IV-k 74 29.4#
TOTALS 252 4.0^^ 61. 34.2 TOTALS 188 75 .6# 24.4# -
No Coverage for Military - U.S., Military - South Vietnam, and Military - Communist.
I-c 62 14.0# - I-e 105 - Vietnam 23.7 # II 35 7 .9# - III 36 - 8.1# No Coverage Issue Ill-b 116 - 26.2# III-c 61 - 13.8 # Ill-i 28 — —
TOTALS 443 4 5 .6# 48.0# v.n TABLE 122 (continued)
BBC VOA Proposi Word „ „ „ Proposi Word Sources Themes , F U N . F U N tions Number tions Number Political- No Coverage for S.Vietnam -Domestic, U.S. Events , Mining Operations, Peace Talks, British and North Vietnam & Their Allies
GRAND TOTAL 695 214 36? 114 188 142 46 100.0% 30.0% 52. 8% 16.4% 100.0% 75.6% 24.4% -
a ON TABLE 123
Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions
In The BBC and VOA Coverages of "Political - Other Allies"
BBC VOA Proposi Word p u Proposi Word Sources Themes F U N tions Number tions Number
Il-d 11 - 100.q# I-i Political - Mining 95 35.6# Il-d 90 33. 7# Il-e 21.0^ Issue 56 Other Il-f 26 9. 7#
Allies TOTALS 11 - 100.0# TOTALS 267 35.6# 64.4^
No Coverage for Military U.S., Military - S.Vietnam, Military -' Communist, Vietnam Issue, S. Vietnam Domestic, U.S. Events, Mining Operations, and N,Vietnam & Their Allies.
GRAND TOTAL 11 - 100.0# - 267 35.6# 64 .h% -
-o TABLE 124
Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions
In The BBC and VGA Coverages of "Public - U.S."
BBC VGA Proposi Word Proposi Word Sources Themes F UN FU N tions Number tions Number Mining I-n 20 I-a 338 6.2% - - Il-f 508 96.2^ I-b 3 .6% -- Issue 199 I-G 145 2.?% -- I-f 227 4.2% -- I-g 182 3 .3^ - - 1-h 1,224 22.4% - - I-i -- Public - 1,366 25 .1% I-k 109 2.0% - - I-m 49 0.9% - - U.S. I-n 44 O.E% -- Il-a 251 - 4.6% - ll-b 99 - i.e% - II-c 123 - 2 .3% - Il-g 698 - 12.8% - Il-h 113 - 2.1% - II 59 - 1.1% - IV-g 133 - 2.4% IV-h 93 - - 1 .7%
TOTALS 5O8 3 .8# 9 6 .2# TOTALS 5,452 71 .2^ 24.7^ 4 . 1 % CO TABLE 124 (continued)
BBC VOA
„ Proposi Word „ ,, ,, Proposi Word F ources emes tions Number tions Number U N Military No Coverage U.S.
Public Military X-a 173 - 100.0# -
y g S.Vietnam TOTALS 173 - 100.0# - Military No Coverage - Communist I-e 421 46,4# Vietnam IV-a 104 11.5# No Coverage IV-b 142 16.0# - Issue VII-c 144 15. 9# Vll-h 93 10.3#
TOTALS 904 72.8# 27.2# —
No Coverage for S. Vietnam - Domestic and U.S. Events. II-c 84 100.0# — — Mining No Coverage Opexa Lions TOTALS 84 100.0# - -
No Coverage for Peace Talks, and N.Vietnam & Their Allies.
GRAND TOTAL 528 20 502 6.613 4,625 1,662 226 100.0# 70.0# 26.6# 100.0# 3L8# 96.2# 3 ; ^ \o TABLE 125
Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions
In the BBC and VOA Coverages of "Public - South Vietnam"
BBC VOA Proposi Word Sources u N U N tions Number
No Coverage for Mining Issue, Military-U.S., Military-S.Vietnam, Military-Communist,
Vietnam Issue. Public - S.Vietnam V 796 96.Q& Domestic Vlll-f 26 3.2^ S.Vietnam TOTALS 822 100.0^
No Coverage for U.S. Events, Mining Operations,Peace Talks , and North Vietnam & Their Allies.
GRAND TOTALS — — — — 822 100,0% — —
o TABLE 126
Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions
In The BBC and VOA Coverages of "Public - British"
BBC VOA Proposi Word Proposi Word F u N F U N Sources Themes tions Number tions Number
I-b 105 2.2^ _ I-b 204 4 5 .8 # I-c 78 1.6 -- I-c 119 26 . ^ — — I-d 81 1.7# - - I-I 70 15.5# — — I-e 51 1.1# - - II-c 17 - 3 .8 # I-f 144 3.0# - - Il-e 14 - Public Mining 3.Ü& I-g 1,118 23.3# -- Il-f 26 - 6 .0# I-h 105 2.2# -- Issue I-j 103 2.1# -- I-q 6.1# -- British 291 I-n 895 18.7# -- Il-a 251 - 5.2# - II-b 433 - 9.0# - Il-e 86 - 1.8# - Il-d 113 - 2 . ^ - Ill-bis 29 - 0.6# IV-a 72 -- 1.5# IV-i 371 -- 7.7# IV-I 466 —— 9.9#
TOTALS 4,792 6 2 .0# 18.4^ 19.6# TOTALS 450 87 .1# 12.%# - TABLE 126 (continued)
BBC VOA Proposi Word Proposi Word Sources Themes F UN U N tions Number tions Number I-f 374 88.2# Military - V—a 50 12.1 No Coverage Public - U.S. TOTALS 88.38 12.1
British IX-d 154 9 .4# IX-e 83 3 .0# IX-f 235 13.3# IX-h Military 217 13.2# IX-1 319 19.4# IX-i 65 3 .5# X-b 117 No Coverage S.Vietnam 7 .1# X-d 102 6 .2# X-h 193 11.8# Xl-e 28 1 .7# XI-1 49 3.( Xl-m 61 3, ^
TOTALS 1,645 6 9.4# 25.1# 5 .4#
VI-c 180 19.0# Military Vl-h 64 6.E# No Coverage Vll-a 72 7 .6# Communist Vll-b 61 6.4# N) VII-d 3'il 33.9# TABLE 126 (continued)
BBC VOA Proposi Word Proposi Word ^ Source F UN U N emes tiens Number tions Number 231 - - 24.3# Military ^ No Coverage
Communist TOTALS 9^9 23.8 # 49,9% 24.3#
122 Vietnam ^ ^ 37 .1# No Coverage Ill-h 207 6 2.9^ -
Issue TOTALS 329 37 .1% 62.9% -
Mining Il-a 136 36.6 % Il-d 188 3 0 .3# - No Coverage Operations Ill-i 48 12.9#
TOTALS 372 8 7 .1% - 12.9#
V- 187 28.4^ S.Vietnam vill-b 82 12.3# ^ VIII-j 60 No Coverage Domestic 9.1# 72 11.Q# IX-b 143 21.8# IX-d 113 17 .2#
TOTALS 637 28.4ÿ& 6 2 .4# - U) TABLE 126 (continued)
BBC VOA ProposiWord Sources Themes Proposi F U N F U N tions Number tions Number
Public - No Coverage for U.S. Events, and Peace Talks. rririsn .... V 168 - 100.0# No Coverage
TOTALS 168 - 100.0#
GRAND T0TAI5 9,336 5,299 2,666 1,431 450 393 57 - 100.0# 5 6.4# 28.4% 15.2% 100.0# 87 .3# 12.4 &
I TABLE 127
Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions
In The BBC and VOA Coverages of "Public - Other Allies"
BBC VOA Proposi Word ProposiWord Sources Themes UN F U N tions Number tions Number
Il-f 264 - ' 87 .7 # - I-b 332 16.2# -- IV-k 37 12.3# I-c 87 4.:^ — — I-e 180 8.8^
Public - Mining I-f 21 1.0# -- I-g 191 9.3 s -- Other I-h 511 25.0# — Issue : I-i 68 3 .3^ Allies I-I 80 3 .9^ -- Il-a 39 - 1 .9# - Il-b 138 - 6 .8 # - II-c 77 - 3 .8 # - Il-d 63 - 3 .0# - Il-e 197 - 9 .6# - IV-g 60 - 2 .9#
TOTALS 301 87 .7% 12.3% TOTALS 2,044 71.8# 25.1#:
I-c 55 17 . Military I-g 56 18.3# V-a 165 53.! No Coverage U.S. XI-j 31 10.0#
TOTALS 307 36.2# 53.8# 10.0# TABLE 127 (continued)
BBC VOA Proposi Word u FUN Sources Themes Number tions Number
No Coverage for Military - s.Vietnam, Military - Communist, Vietnam Issue, S.Vietnam - Domestic, and U.S. Events>.
Mining Ill-h 248 80. 3% - No Coverage Operations ^ I9.7&
Public - totals 309 100.0% - Other ------Peace „ IV-b 37 100.0% - Allies Coverage Talks TOTALS 37 100.0% -
N.Vietnam & Allies No Coverage
GRAND TOTALS 91? Ill 738 68 2,081 1,507 514 60 100.0% 12. 80.4% 7.4% 100.0% 72.4% 24. 7# 2.9#
o\ TABLE 128
Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions
In the BBC and VOA Coverages of "Chronicle"
BBC VOA Proposi Word Proposi Word Sources Themes F u N F UN tions Number tions Number
I-e 8 1.4^ _ — IV-h 72 __ _ 3 .4;^ IV-c 33 - - 6.(# IV-g 23 -- 1.1# — IV-i — — Mining IV-n 119 21. 89 4.1# IV-g 14 2 .5# IV-b 16 0 .9# I- 28 - - IV-n -- Issue 5 .1# 503 23.3% I-j 12 -- 2.2^ Ill-a 1,429 -- 6 7 .Q& IV-o 44 8 .0# - — Chronicle IV-p 25 4 .6% IV-g 12 2.2ÿS IV-d 45 8 .3^ I-g 88 16.2# - Ill-a 116 21.4^
SUBTOTALS 5AA 4 7 .5#: 52.4^ TOTALS 2,132 23.0# 76 .5I/O:^
I-a 55 7.4# I-a 419 23.0# Military - I-c 125 16 .E# - - I-b 102 5 .6# -- I-f 367 49.3# - - I-c 271 14.9# -- U.S. I-g 68 9.1# - - I-d 16 0.9# - - XI-j 46 - - 6 .2# I-f 327 18. 0# --
-o TABLE 128 (continued)
BBC VOA Proposi Word Proposi Word Sources Themes F UN F u N tions Number tions Number Xl-h 37 _ 5 .0^ I-g 108 6.0# _ Ill-b 46 6.2?% -- Ill-b 22 1.2# - - Military III-c 22 1.2# -- IV-a 327 - 18.0# - IV-b - - Chronicle U.S. 99 5 .5# Xl-a 22 - 1.2# XI-c 23 - - 1.2# Xl-d 55 3 .0# ——
TOTALS 744 88.Q& - 11.2# TOTALS 1,813 73 . ^ 23.5# 2.4#
. IX-a 137 10.0# IX-a 978 26.7# IX-b 191 14.0# - - IX-b 453 12.4# -- IX-d 40 2 .7# -- IX-d 367 10.0# - » IX-f 110 8.0# -- IX-e -- Military 19 0 .5# ix-g 31 2 .3# - - IX-f 1,226 33.5# -- IX-i 29 2.1# -- IX-g 222 6.1# -- X-e 380 - 27 .6# - X-d 65 - 1 . ^ - ^ X-f 82 - 6.0 - X-e 28 - O.E# = X-g 255 - 18 .7# - Xl-e 14 -- 0.4# Xl-e 112 8.2# Xl-f 286 7 .8 #
TOTALS 1,367 39.:^ 58.^^ 8 . ^ TOTALS 3,657 97.0% 2.6^ 0.4^
00 TABLE 128 (continued)
BBC VOA Proposi Word ProposiWord Sources Themes U N F U N tions Number tions Number
VI-C 44 - - Vl-a 81 3 .4# -- Vl-d 54 -- Vl-b 108 4 .5# -- Vl-f 26 1 .8 ^ - - VI-c 362 -- Chronicle 15.1# Vll-a 76 - 5 .2# - Vl-d 49 2 .0^ -- VII-c 72 - 5 .0# - Vl-f 55 2 .3 ^ -- Vll-b 201 - - VI-g 84 -- Military 13.8 % 3 .5^ Vll-d 898 - 61 ,Q% - Vll-a 36 - 1 .5# - Vlll-a 82 -- Vll-b 169 - 7 .1# - VII-c 106 - 4 .4% - Communist Vll-d 764 - 31.9^ - Vll-e 306 - 12.8 ^ - VIII-c 199 8.:^ -- Vlll-d 37 1 .5^ -- Xl-e 39 -- 1.6^
TOTALS 1,453 14.1^ 85 .8 ^ TOTALS 2,395 40.6^ 5 7 .?# 1.6^
Vietnam No Coverage Issue No Coverage V 34 2 0.2^ S.Viet VIII-c 62 nam 36.9# No Coverage Vlll-k 72 42.9# Domestic TOTALS 168 20.2^ 79 .8 # rv) VO TABLE 128 (continued)
BBC VOA Proposi Word ^ ^ Proposi Word Sources Themes U F U N tions Number tions Number II 46? U.S. 93.3^ IV-c 23 4.6^ No Coverage Events TOTALS 490 4.6^ 95.3^
I-a 205 23.6# II-a 8.6^ Mining 75 Il-b - Ne1 Coverage 291 33.4# III-a 34.4^ Opérations 299
TOTALS 870 6 5 .6% - 34.4# Peace No Coverage Talks I-a 102 57 .Q# _ IV-c 17 - 9 9 .3# V- 60 - 33.5# No Coverage
TOTALS 179 57 .0# 33.3% 9 .3#
GRAND TOTALS 4,495 1,800 2,04? 1,098 10,867 6,942 1,900 2,025 100.0^ 36.4?g 41 M 22.2# lOu .O'# 6 3 .9# 18.3# 18.6:^ — w TABLE 129
Distribution of Evaluative Dimensions
By Sources In The Total BBC and VOA Coverages: May 8 - 17, 1972
BBC VOA Total Total FUN F U N Word No. Word No.
Editorial 10,304 5,371 2,858 3,075 10,506 10,506 - -
Official U.S. 3,135 2,589 199 347 20,221 17,549 555 2,117
Official - S.Vietnam 1,804 1,215 385 204 4,907 3,936 51 920
Official - Communist 2,911 125 2,649 137 5,586 693 4,604 290
Official - British 1,369 479 - 890 1,141 434 - 707
Official- 391 64 272 54 2,350 1,968 362 20
Political - U.S 1,139 421 603 115 5,417 2,863 2,361 193
Political - 212 212 -- 1,536 1,536 -- — nam 214 114 188 142 46 - Political - British 695 367 Political - 11 - 11 - 267 95 172 -
-o TABLE 129 (continued)
BBC VOA Total Total F UN F U N Word No. Word No. public - U.S. 528 20 508 - 6,613 4,625 1,762 226
Public -S. -- - - 822 822 - - nam
Public - British 9.336 5,364 2,667 1,305 450 393 57 -
111 738 68 2,081 1,507 514 60 m S s 917 Chronicle 4,9^5 1,800 2,047 1,098 10,867 6,942 1,900 2,025
GRAND TOTAL 38,697 17,985 13,305 7,407 72,954 54,011 12,384 6,558 100.0^ 46.5^ 34.4^ 19.1^ 100.0^ ?4.0^ 17.0^ 9.0^
-o N 273
2) Military. When an issue seemed to have a certain unpalatable aspect for the U.S., such as the BBC's favorably reported toughness of the communist forces, the VGA's coverage tended to characterize it negatively to discredit it. This could be seen from the analysis of
Military - Communist under Editorial and Chronicle.
Officially, the United States and South Vietnam were glowing over the capacity and effectiveness of the South Vietnamese forces. The BBC seemed to report the same thing along this official line. However, under Chronicle, the BBC was more reserved about the South Vietnamese forces. BBC reports were 39*3 per cent favorable in contrast to 97 per cent favorable reports from the VOA.
American military power was reported favorably on both networks.
When it was looked at unfavorably, it was usually the reported point of view of communist officials.
3) Vietnam Issue. The difference in style between the BBC and the VOA was again demonstrated itself clearly in their respective edito rial concerning the Vietnam issue. The VGA's editorial appeared to be busy aluding the official policy and rallying support for it. By con trast, the BBC editorial was more concerned with issues and consequences.
Where Vietnam issue was reported similarly by both networks, it was mostly favorable to the Agierican policy, with a slight higher favorable coverage on the VOA.
4) South Vietnam - Domestic. The BBC coverage tended to reflect a more critical view of South Vietnam than that by the VOA, as seen in the analysis of reports from official South Vietnamese sources. 2?4
Although hoth networks reported that politically South Vietnam was a maturing democracy, the BBC appeared to view South Vietnam as a society in crisis whereas the VOA viewed it as a society in progress.
5) U.S. Events. Editorially, the BBC avoided attributing mo tives and interpretations to U.S. official movements. It remained neutral mostly. By contrast, the VOA sought to interprets these events in such a way that it provided a defensibel cushion for any eventual . .
American actions such as the mining. The VOA message appeared to say: blame the communists for any strong U.S. measure that you do not like.
This tendency reinforced the general VGA's tendency to emphasize aspects favorable to the American official stand.
6) Mining Operations. As in (5), the VOA reports only served to highlight the favorable elements beneficial to the U.S. policy and image.
This was reflected in the analyses of VOA editorial, and official U.S. sources.
7) Peace Talks. The VOA reports also showed VGA's partiality in the different reality they portray as compared to that by the BBC. As seen in the analysis of official communist sources reported, the VOA was more concerned with discrediting the communist stand, while the BBC reports were more concerned with issues by informing the audience on the substance of the communist stand even though that resulted in 69.2 per
cent unfavorable information to U.S. policy.
Percentage-wise, after all the news covered by both the BBC and the
VOA was analyzed, there was an indication that the VOA was more heavy- handed in its attempt to stand behind official policy. A favorable image 27j of the American policy was projected in per cent of VOA coverage; only 17 per cent of VOA coverage was unfavorable news. By contrast, the BBC was more even-handed. It succeeded in retaining its loyalty to its closest ally, the United States, with a coverage ratio of 46.5 per cent favorable vs. 34.4 per cent unfavorable information toward the
U.S. official stand (Table 129 and Fig. 4). However, it is important to note that the BBC did not neglect to point out a significant number of unfavorable aspects of events even at the expense of its allies.
The BBC news coverage, therefore, could be considered as more balanced than the VOA news coverage. Figure 4 graphically shows the different tendency in news reporting between the VOA and the BBC.
CONCLUSION
The following generalization could be drawn from the comparison of news coverages during the period I'lay 8 - 17, 1972 broadcast by the BBC and the VOA;
1) Both networks considered audience interest as an important factor in selecting news to broadcast.
2) Hard news played an important role on both networks.
3) Both networks gave considerable emphasis to editorials. How - ever, the BBC commentary enjoyed more prominence. The VOA editorial's role in general was more subtle, but more forceful in favor of the of ficial stand.
4) Both networks agreed on the type of themes covered during the period under study. 276
%
U N ^ig. 4 Dis '.riouiion of VOA and BBC 'Ie” s Coverage Along F-U-N Dimensions. 277
5) While the VOA was American-oriented in its news coverage, the
BBC was British-oriented. Both differed in style and tendency:
a. The VOA gave official sources the highest coverage;
Chronicle and Editorial came next.
h. The BBC focused on Editorial and Public sources; Official sources ran third.
This led to the next generalization:
6) The VOA could be considered as a true spokesman and defender of U.S. official policy, regardless of the rightness or wrongness of that policy. The BBC could be seen more as a spokesman for the British public and its mood.
7) The VOA news coverage tended to be heavy-handed and one-sided in favor of the U.S. official stand while the BBC's pattern appeared to be even-handed and more balanced;
a. VOA news coverage was characterized by a very high per centage of news favorable to the U.S. and its allies in contrast to a more reasonable balance on the BBC.
b. VOA news coverage tended to be slanted in favor of U.S. official policy by discrediting foes of the United States. On the other hand, the BBC coverage seemed to be characterized by a touch of English phlegm, giving credit where credit was due, just enough to bring in a different dimension without doing harm to its friends.
c. The VOA'8 coverage was also characterized by an almost missionary zeal to gloss over issues in order to show the virtue of U.S. policy and to extract support. It tended to aim at achieving a band- 278 wagon effect from among its audience. The BBC coverage, on the con
trary, appeared to focus more on issues with their various dimensions and consequences. In other words, the BBC's communication style was more deliberate than that of the VOA.
As John Harding, Head of the BBC's Vietnamese Section asserted in an interview: "We want to present a British point of view," the BBC's broadcasts to Vietnam seemed to succeed in projecting the British
society's thinking about world events. Yet, while the BBC could not be
completely rid of its traditional partiality toward the western world and its policy as represented by the United States, its news coverage demonstrated a certain degree of objectivity in the way it looked at events. The comparison of news coverages between the Voice of America and the British Broadcasting Corporation seems to enhance the BBC's reputation. It put in doubt the VGA's claim of objectivity as well as
its claim to represent all segments of American society to overseas peoples.
It is possible that Britain's official neutrality in the Vietnam war might have made it easier for the BBC to be more balanced in its reporting during the crisis period May 8 - 17, 1972, whereas the Ameri
can deep involvement in the war might have had some effect on the Voice
of America's reporting style during the period under study. Neverthe
less, the analyses in this chapter indicated that objectivity and bal anced representation of the spectrum of American opinions concerning world issues did not seem to be evident in the Voice's broadcasts to
Vietnam. CHAPTER IX
SUÎ4HARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOIRffiKDATIONS
This study examined the flow of information from the United States
to Vietnam via the Voice of America during a crisis period in the
American involvement in Vietnam, Hay 8 to Hay 1?, 1972. The content
of the Voice of America's news output on its Vietnamese language broad
casts to Vietnam for the period of ten days after the American decision
to mine North Vietnam's harbors to cut off all communist supply routes were analyzed and compared with the news broadcast by the British
Broadcasting Corporation in Vietnamese during the same period.
SUffl'lARY
The problems that this study was concerned with were :
1) Is the nature of the flow of information on the Voice of Ameri
ca to Vietnam consistent with the Voice professed objectivity?
2) Do the Voice's broadcasts reflect its organizational role as an organ of the United States Information Agency?
In international politics today, international communication by
shortwave broadcasting plays an important role. From the standpoint
of the shortwave broadcaster, it is a means to bring his views directly
to his overseas audiences in an attempt to "win their hearts and minds".
279 280
This friendship will ultimately result in political maneuverability working for his national interest. In the developing world, the role of shortwave news broadcasts is no less vital. The underdeveloped state of the communication system, and possibly governmental censorship, make it difficult for the peoples in the third world to have access to information necessary for their understanding of the world, and the development of an adequate world view in order to be able to control their own destiny and to survive in today's complex power struggle
(Chapter l).
The literature in mass media communication revealed that basically
"all news are views." Therefore, the risk is real that short wave radio audiences in the third world may be exposed to a distorted reality, dangerous for their self-determination and for their survival as a responsible citizenry. In the meantime, in the tradition of the "mirror of reality" school advocated by present day American journalism, the
Voice of America, an organ of the United States government, broadcasting to overseas audiences, professes to be accurate, objective, and compre hensive, and to present a balanced coverage of U.S. policy and related opinions and discussions from all segments of U.S. society. In this perspective, two hypotheses for this study were set forth:
1) The Voice of America's news reporting does not reflect its organizational functions.
2) Selectivity of news based on ideology is not characteristic of
VOA's broadcasts. 281
Testing these hypotheses would give an insight into the flow of communication between the United States and the third world via the
Voice of America. (Chapter II)•
The news related to Vietnam broadcast by the Voice to Vietnam during the crisis period May 8-17, 1972 was studied by the technique of content analysis. All the news materials were divided into news units which were quantified, using word and percentage as counting units.
They were then analyzed in terms of format, themes, sources, and propo sitions as well as being subjected to an evaluative measure of "Favor able-Unfavorable-Neutral." These analyses served to reveal the VOA's focus of attention, its reporting tendency in relation to its institu tional role, and its portrayal of events in its news broadcasts.
Furthermore, the Voice’s news output was compared with the British
Broadcasting Corporation's output of the same period in order to esti mate the Voice's degree of objectivity in news reporting. (Chapter III).
Major Findings
The analysis of format in Chapter IV showed that, in general, during the period under study May 8-17, 1972, the Voice of America's reporting reacted to new happenings in the world in a timely manner.
Quantitatively, hard news represented a major allocation, but commentary played a forceful role, also, on specific issues related to Vietnam.
Thus, there appeared to be an attempt on the Voice's part to influence foreign opinion along the desired direction.
The analysis of themes in Chapter V indicated that not only the
Voice’s reporting was timely, it also featured American point of view 262 predominantly. This characteristic was seen in theme coverage where there were many parties involved. This American-oriented news flow was reinforced further by the findings in the analysis of so'jrces
(Chapter VI). American sources played a major role in the international spectrum of opinion. Moreover, official and editorial sources were given a prominent share in the Voice's coverage. If one considers that the Voice and official sources are more or less the sane, the dominance of official thinking in the Voice's news reports was striking.
A pattern of persuasion used by the Voice of America was revealed in the proposition analysis in Chapter VII. In its news reporting, the Voice of America tended to portray the United States and its allies in a highly favorable light by the use of varied devices, nanely:
1. Reporting a high percentage of favorable news.
2) Emphasizing the positive image of the allied side, or playing down its weaknesses.
3) Contrasting the virtues of the allied side against the enemy's evil acts.
5) Using a limited amount of unfriendly sources which often tended to highlight the enemy's negative side.
The Voice's commentary was also the main vehicle in supporting
U.S. official stand on various issue. It sought to influence its audience in the direction of U.S. official line by the use of:
1. Background briefing favorable to the U.S. position.
2) Open endorsement of official stand by highlighting its virtue. 283 and appeal, as well as contrasting the positive aspects of the official policy against the negative aspects of the enemy’s policy and practice.
3) Putting in doubt the integrity of the opponents or enemies
of the official policy.
The comparison of the Voice of America and the British Broadcasting
Corporation, two organizationally different broadcasting networks, in
Chapter VIII, revealed that both networks were outwardly similar in terms of a) using audience interest as a criterion for news coverage b) giving a major role to hard news, c) placing strong emphasis on their own editorials 4) and in terms of the kind of themes covered. As might be expected, the VGA was American-oriented in its news coverage while the BBC was British-oriented. They differed in style and in ten dency :
1) The BBC reflected the British public mood while the VGA acted as a spokesman and defender of U.S. official policy.
2) The VGA coverage tended to be heavy-handed and one-sided in favor of the U.S. official stand whereas the BBC's broadcasts appeared to be even-handed and more balanced
CONCLUSIONS
In Chapter III, for the purpose of hypothesis testing, the follow ing questions were raised:
1) V/hat kind of news is conveyed over the Voice of America to its
Vietnamese audience?
2) Does the U.S. official view concerning U.S. policy issues get reported with a comparable frequency as do other viewpoints? In other 2%. words, how often do viewpoints advocating the U.S. official line get covered as compared to the coverage of differing opinions?
3), What is the general trend in VGA's reprting? How does it portray friends and foes?
4) Is VGA's portrayal of reality comparable to that perceived by a different broadcasting system?
Through the analyses of format, themes, sources, propositions, and the comparison with the BBC, the following conclusions relating to these questions were drawn from the study;
1) The U.S. official view tended to predominate in comparison to other views on the Voice of America's broadcasts.
2) The general tendency of the VGA was to broadcast a high per centage of news favorable to the U.S. and its official policy. The
VGA's news coverage to Vietnam could be termed "truth", but not "the whole truth." It was the half-truth that the VGA deemed favorable to the official line.
3) The VGA's portrayal of reality was different in a number of ways from that which was broadcast by the BBC. The VGA's tendency was to color everything rosy, to play down weaknesses or negative aspects of the United States and its allies, or to minimize enemies of the U.S. official policy.
Those conclusions challenge the hypotheses set forth in Chapter II.
Apparently, both hypotheses cannot stand in view of the evidence to the contrary gathered in these analyses and the derived conclusions. More 285 accurately, they shoud be restated:
1) The Voice of America's news reporting reflects its organiza
tional constraints as a United States government organ.
2) The selction of news based on ideology is a characteristic
of the VGA's news output.
The foregoing analyses and conclusions have brought into focus
the credibility gap between the VGA's "Charter" and its practice. They
consequently challenge the VGA's credentials as a source of objective
information for the information-hungry third world listeners. limitations of The Study '
The generalizations about the Voice of America's credibility gap
drawn from this study may be limited to the period under study May 8 -
May 17 , 1972 . However, there is no reason to believe that the treatmentt
of news during other crisis periods would be much different. The
question of whether the Voice's observed tendency remains constant in
non-crisis periods was not answered by this study, since it covered only
the one crisis period.
Methodologically, the use of content analysis was a logical choice
in this study of message content. The comparison of the Voice of
America's output with that of the BBC was especially useful in gaining
an insight into the Voice’s practice. While it might be interesting to
make a comparison between the VGA and a network such as the French Broad
casting System, which operated under a policy in opposition to the U.S.
policy in Vietnam at ■'he time, the objectivity levels probably could
not be compared as meaningfully as with the Voice and the BBC, since 286
Britain's policy toward the U.S. tended to be congenial. On this
basis, when the two systems’ projections of the same event differed,
their objectivity levels could be compared quite directly.
In the search of the literature related to both the VGA and BBC
news broadcasts, studies dealing with content analysis of news output
to the Far East by both networks appeared to be absent. Therefore,
conclusions regarding the BBC's observed objectivity and the VGA's bias
in this study are limited to the particular period under study May 8 -
May 17, 1972.
Implications of the Study
This study of the news flow via the VGA and the BBC to Vietnam
during the period May 8 - 17, 1972 suggests several implications.
From the standpoint of the United States, the findings in this
study have brought into focus the inconsistencies of the American
international communication philosophy. Admittedly, in the inter
national arena today, nations feel the need to get their ideas across
to friends and foes alike in order to gain support and thus, inter
national political maneuverability. This is a role international broad
casting can fulfill as a supplement to statist diplomacy. David Abshire
called it "broadcast diplomacy." ^ While absolute objectivity is
humanly impossible, the BBC's broadcasting philosophy is well taken:
Impartiality does not imply an Glyrapian neutrality or detachment from those basic moral and constitutional beliefs on which the nation's life is founded. The BBC does not feel obliged, for example, to appear neutral as between truth and untruth, justice and injustice, freedom and slavery, compassion and cruelty, tolerance and intolerance (including racial 287
intolerance). This is an important reservation, hut not one which detracts from the BBC’s over-all de termination to he impartial in its presentation of controversial issues. ^
Indeed, information broadcast to the third world whose alliance
today may mean potential world peace, shoud not he directed to merely
serve immediate foreign policy interest. As David Ahshire put it,
"in today’s world, the United States has to speak freely and forth- 3 rightly on human rights and valued." Otherwise, it its zeal to defend
the administration in power, the VGA will have sacrificed impartiality
And as for the discerning listeners on the receiving end, they may
listen for a while, and then becoming aware of the credibility gap of
the news source, they may either become indifferent to its message, or
just stop listening. This would contribute little to the American effort at communication with the third world, nor enhance the credibili
ty of the U.S., and consequently, its prestige. It follows that there is a need for the United States to reassess its current international broadcasting philosophy as well as the present organizational structure
of its mouthpiece, the Voice of America.
Educationally, if the goal of today’s education for democracy is a responsible, well-informed citizenry, studies such as the present one
concerning the flow of media news message both nationally and inter nationally have important implications for the perpetuation of demo
cracy and world peace. A people that is.well aware of possible news manipulation on various media channels will be more capable of making the right decisions which are free of manipulation. This is the kind of 288 decision-making so essential for the survival of a democracy.
The present study also offers a meaningful implication for the audience in the third world. An understanding of the nature of inter national communication would make them more keenly aware of the possi bility of a distorted image of reality being conveyed to them over the airwaves. For without realizing adequately the extent of possible half truth in these messages, they could be misled to shape their world view and make decisions accordingly in such a way that might endanger world peace and their own national interest. In fact, they need more communication than manipulation. As Jacques Ellul pointedly remarked: ij, "propaganda ceases where simple dialogue begins," the study of the flow of information across borders remains an important contribution to world peace and understanding.
Recommendations
In view of the findings in this study and the subsequent discussion, it appears that the major problem faced by the Voice of America is the inconsistency between its practice and its professed objectivity, resulting in its credibility gap. It is recommended that the American
Congress, who ultimately controls the Voice's operations through con gressional appropriations, reconsider the international communication policy of the United States, and put it in proper perspective to be
carried out consistently by the VOA. It is essential that the American people and Congress understand properly the role of international com munication in today's world scene. Whether it is to broadcast "propa ganda" or "information"as dictated by the reassessed goals of the.U.S. 289
international communication policy, the Voice of America should be
specifically assigned the task of serving the long-range goals of the
American foreign policy and national interest instead of acting as
an advocate and defender of any particular administration. The fact
is that administrations may come and go, and playing the role of a
particular administration's advocate hardly enhances the VGA's credibi
lity and thus, its effectiveness.
Suggestions For Further Research
The influence of organizational constraints reflected in the VOA's
lack of objectivity as discussed previously could also be investigated
further and more directly in a detailed study of the Voice's structure
within the United States Information Agency.
Another possible study concerns the Voice's news processes. This
study can analyze the VGA's news operations in the framework of the
USIA's bureacracy, and the kind of bureacratic constraints undergone by the Voice's news operations, which may ultimately affect the nature
of its output.
The results from these studies could serve as an useful empirical basis in the reassessment of the American philosophy of international
communication, and ultimately, if necessary, in the reorganization of
the Voice of America, and in the reassessment of the Voice's role.
In terms of persuasion study, it might be helpful to compare the
VGA's news coverage in a crisis period, such as the period chosen for
the present study, with a normal period. Such a study night help to discern any differences in the persuasive methods used by the VGA. It 290
might also prove further whether the VGA's organizational influecne
is a constant element in its news operations.
In addition, since the Voice also offers news over its English
language "broadcasts, it might "be enlightening to compare the English
broadcasts with the VGA's news outputs in the various language services
Such a study would serve to identify any common elements in the per
suasive methods used by the VOA for varied audiences.
EPILOGUE
South Vietnam fell to the North Vietnamese communist military
forces on April 30, 1975* The last days of a non-communist South Viet
nam witnessed the tragedy of untold numbers of Vietnamese, desperate,
disappointed and disillusioned with a world rather indifferent to their
plight, despite their being a pawn for many years in the test between
democratic and communist ideologies. The collapse of South Vietnam was
the accumulation of many historical events which future historians will
judge. But the development of events at the time of the collapse seemed
to point to the refusal of the American Congress to grant further aid
to South Vietnam as the basic decision which triggered the demoralizing
disintegration of the South Vietnamese army, and consequently of its
national structure.
It has been noted from this study that the Voice of America's
broadcasts to Vietnam were aimed mainly at the decision-making body
of the South Vietnamese society. It has also been noted that the VGA's broadcasts tended to reflect official line more than the U.S. public 291 mood. From the perspective of the role of international communica tion, several questions could he posed:
- What would have happened to South Vietnam if the Voice of
America , in its broadcasts to Vietnam, had reflected more fully and faithfully the American political and public mood?
- If the South Vietnamese audience had accurately diagnosed the
American public mood regarding the war through the information relayed to them on the Voice of America, would they have exerted pressure on their own government to be more conciliatory with the communists before it became too late?
- Would they have been as strong-headed about anti-communism if they had not believed in the U.S. continued support and in an over- optimistic diagnosis of the whole political and military situation as learned from the VOA? Or perhaps they would have been more accommo dating with the National Liberation Front and North Vietnam to work out an agreeable solution much earlier in the conflict, if they had been informed accurately about the American public disgust with the war?
It is certainly unfair to put the total responsibility on the shoulders of the Voice of America for the collapse of South Vietnam.
However, in view of the increasingly important role the Voice of Ameri ca’s Vietnamese language broadcasts assumed during the American involve ment in Vietnam, the VGA's broadcasting policy toward that country probably shared some of the responsibility.
On a larger scale, the fact the world opinion was not solidly behind the U.S. policy in Vietnam reflects a dramatic failure of - 292
American international communications. A reassessment of the U.S.
"broadcast diplomacy" is, therefore, vital to the national interest of the United States.
At any rate, in connecting the collapse of South Vietnam to the role of the Voice of America's broadcasts to Vietnam, and further to
the shortcomings of the American international communication policy, this epilogue might offer some food for thought. Further research along these lines might be of interest to students of communications. 293 FOOTNOTES
1. Abshire, David. International Broadcasting; A News Dimension of Western Diplomacy. The Washington Paper, Vol. 4, No. 35* Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1976.
2. BBC Handbook (1974). London: British Broadcasting Corporation, p. 281.
3. Abshire, David. Ibid., p. 81.
4. Ellul, Jacques. Propaganda■ New York: Knopf, 19Ô5» P- 6. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abshire, David. International Broadcasting; A News Dimension of Western Diplomacy. The Washington Papers, Vol. IV, No. 35- Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1976.
BBC Handbook (197^). London: British Broadcasting Corporation.
Barghoorn, Frederick C. The Soviet Image of the U.S: A Study of Dis tortion. Yale University Institute of International Studies Publication: Harcourt, 1950 »
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Boorstin, Daniel. The Image. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, I96I.
Christenson. Reo M. (Edit). Voice of the People. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1962. f Cirino, Robert. Don't Blame the People. New York: Random House, 1971
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Davidson, W. Phillips. International Political Communication. New York: Frederick Praeger, Publishers, I965.
Dizard, Wilson. The Strategy of Truth. Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1961.
Dovring, Karin. Road of Propaganda. New York: Philosophical Library Inc., 1959.
Efron, Edith. The News Twister. Manor Books, 1972.
Elder, Robert. The Information Machine: The U.S. Information Agency and American Policy. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1968. Epstein, Ed. Jay. News From Nowhere. Vintage Book, 1973.
Fischer, H.D. & Merrill, J.D. (Edit). International and Intercultural Communication. New York; Hasting House, 1976. 295
Gerbner, George. "Ideological Perspective and Political Tendencies In News Reporting," Journalism Quarterly, vol. 41, 1964.
"Press Perspective in World Communications: A Pilot Study," Journalism Quarterly, vol 38, 1961.
Gordon, George, Falk, Irving, and Kodapp, William. The Idea Invaders. New York: Hasting House Publishers, Inc., 1963*
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PERIODICALS
VHow the U.S. Tells Its Story to the World." Interview with L.H. Ilarks & John Chancellor. U.S. News & World Report, 62:76-9, February 20, 1967 .
"How the U.S. Has One Propaganda Voice in Vietnam." U.S.News à. World Report 58:22, April 19, 1965« 297
"Saigon's Psy-War; U.S. Steps Up Efforts to Stiffen Vietnamese Will to Garry on Battle ..." Wall Street Journal, 166:i+, July 27, 1965.
"Television and the New Diplomacy." Variety. Septemher 16, 1970, P*30.
"The War of Words: As Propaganda Battle Rages in Vietnam, Some Question U.S. Tactic.” Wall Street Journal, 17^:1+, December 5, 1969-
"VOA Technique Concerning Account of Anti-War Demonstrations." Nation 204:709, June 5, 1967.
"VGA's Asian Reporting Strained Credibility." Washington Post, April 9, 1975-
'Voice of America Speechless on Gulag Archipelago." Washington Post, March 7, 1974.
INTERVIEWS
Interview with Mr. John Harding, Head, Vietnamese Language Section The British Broadcasting Corporation, London, July 23, 1973
Interview with Mr. Ly Due Lam, VGA's Vietnamese Language Service Staff, The Voice of America, Washington D.C., August 15, 1973*
Interview with Mr. Fred Sanders, VGA's Vietnamese Language Service, Chief, The Voice of America, Washington D.C., Gctober 26 1973- 298
APPENDIX A
Voice of America's "Charter" 299
/.//-/ DIRECTIVE TO THE VOICE OF AMERICA
Tiie lo,'10- range interests of the United States are served by coiTiniLinicating directly with the peoplesof the world"by radio. To be effective, the Voice of America win must the attention and respectof listeners. These principleswill govern VGA broadcasts: ■;
1. VOA will be a consistently reliable and authoritative source of news. VGA news will be accurate, objective, and comprehensive. ' ‘ : 2. VGA will represent America, not any single segment of American society. It will therefore present a balanced and ;.h . comprehensive projection of significant American thought and =. •• institutions. . 3. As an official radio,VGA will present the policies of ' • ' the United States clearly and effectively. VGA w ill a Iso present responsible discussion and opinion on these policies,
< ' • ' I "1 ' 'r ' • : * r ■ / 1 r'.» r - ,...... 300
APPENDIX B
Lists of Proposition Headings 300
A. Mining Issue
"r.e rining decision is delendcd and sy.igatnined i-rith. a) ieople urge suçport for the decision. h) They justify/defend/errlnin the action as nronetod by forth Vietnan's intransigence, as positive, constructive, as a a norale rally/ or as caused by th.e lad: o:7 dussian coo neraticn. c) They c::yrss3 undGr3tandi::g/synnathy. d) Th.ey praise/jerceivG its goal for yeacc and for shortening the nar. e) They thini: it deccnctmtes fairness, and deter:::!nation not aggression/ a reflection of a deter'ined ;.:ocd. They predict/point out its short or long range effectiveness. They point out/inyly it rill not affect foviet-Chinese- A: ;erican detents. h) They thin;: it rill not induce 3. big yoverc conjfrontation. i) T'he^endorse/vote for/uelco:,:s it. j) They explain it to clarify its ai:.: and/or its generous teir'.c. I:) They gr.ve tiie rea.sons the/t underlie it. 1 ) They stress that is is the right decision, that it is courageous, and persistent. ■') They deuonstrate in support of it. n) They point cut its p'ubllc appeal/and/or the ::c eligible effect of adverse public opc.nion on official decision. The disparage/criticise yeople uho are against it. The thine it is ti:.:el;'/it heirs to stov co:::riunis;e. 0 ; it ::ight pap' off/it ;eiyht have litiited effect. :c) The sec congressional vote for it s, victory for 1 residott I'iron's nining decision.
It.e nining decision is a cause :?or concor::/disaTp:roval/sieyticis:.. a) ..copie thinb it is dnn;;erous/cnlneis/rishy/un;riso/ it ’;:cinps about serious ccnsecuences. b) They doubt its effectiveness/declare it vill hove livilc L. c) The;.- vs.rn of possible big souse: co::frc::tation. i; Th.ey conden.:/criticise/di::;a_.'prove/re,pect it and/or they question its goals/dcujind c:i insediate ending to the :ininp.
0 ) They viinh it daragcs peace p:rcs_eetc/they consider it an
0 s c a1a ti o ; : /aggression. f) T'.'.c,y de:'.c.'.strate 0 gainst it. g) T'vyp thing so tn:n?o.tcn:o/tar::ishos doviet-.i..erican-Chino: 0 5
' ' /a I • • ' '-1 sa t -c ••• • — j) they chell u.'g'O the decssics;. : is "c f or :a oic: al units behind oh-? . rcsidcn.t'o -decision oclla; sod. 1 ; Thssy "’.vs r-y p'ortirs;- docu:sentatior. or chon th.at it voul.' III. oo'lo are rn.n-co.".: ribovt It. a ) 1 .1 . Ilylc irutlc cfCort: In cnnv^niri; :-ectI:-3 of nil d i c e . ':■) .1 1 1 1 -3 z ' llllo :ntIc/'Ionnz Lie :n;n;;-"orr: relntïl to tl:0 IocI.:Ion irl •r eoi'lic" on nt clt'. dlnnl nonot/Ionz , III-II". '. co ;lo r,ro vncortnln In tnlln; n ntnnd.
IV, ;'ircoj-lnnyonn. n) II3 /O'.ran roactlon G:n;ected nilhout e^Tpro.-zsecl ovnlnation. b) Al~snc3 3 of 1:1 / nciror roaction in renonted --ri clout évalua cion, c,' .'0 ocn:.;ent, f ) liu V evens ' ste.ton.sntn are under .otucly. e) At IITA3 no-5 tin.;, tie 111. objects to Cuban /ro/ooal to discuss tlo Vletnnu irnuo. f) Ixpert "ill iiscuss ninin-/ ouosticn, ..iron. rGuocIono reported witlout specif I-on. 1 ) leactiers ,po nlorn far-b” linos, i) I-oad-in/intrcduction c." announcer and topic, j; Ji'cuv.tlon seen as sensitive "itncut evaluation, l) ill silos are condernel. 1 ^ f pcc:0 .ations of possible 1 .1 . action ritrout évalua bio.i. r;) i'inel roacticrs seen as first response o."aitinp nore c?.refullp arpued position. n) Absence of bip nouer reaction or/r.rd cvndt pre para tiens continue o) fur.n.it ncetinn 'rill undoubtellp tale place, n) Con-rccsicnal c.cbats reported rithout specifics. -A •• •* been a'-.onp Auerican contI -or-cop' p2.a,ns but l a s been ro invcl'-.'i.np li-;l. ioliti cal ri:n. blG surnit ^ .i ' . 1 - - - • - r", rp "2 f- ■■•'V'l'} • r-' •' / nose stron expected, but sun:-I t
cor:-:_.::Me. : in inn stratepp- is a. bi/ruous corcernin y; slab A: .erica nill do and Aon it reacts to co;,;:.:unist cnlllenpo . 302
B. Military
D , ■:s'23Z r.re active, voverTvl, and effective, a) Tt.cy oycrate a lar.-]e vu;V3cr ee -j-5 2 'g ani soyhisticaeeà c'eayor.s. t) They aid allies to victory. c) They iceTlict heavy casualties on their oneny. d) They slov dovn encuy's iri'iltro.tior.. ol They uaintain a lor casualty rata. T; They strihe encay's taryets successfully/uithout auceu.u; iny resistance. :;) They have the initiative to strihe when necessary.
II. T.3. Torces are nercLTul. a) They are concerned about civilian casualties, id The choose not tc bc:.ib ôihes in Tcrth Tietnav..
III. in the nilito,ry side, Vi elnanisation is •ror'-in- veil. a) Jouth Viotnan's arr.ed Tnrces have be core ca^ able c: ban: Vietnauication strateyy in coyiny with horth Vietns.uese invasicn. b ; Troop reduction is yoiny on schedule. cl Ih.e T.3. can now turn bases ever to .South Viotnan.
, Torc.e s e.re inoT.Testive.-'.suhTer oetbach.s. a) Th ey lo se pianos a.nd yi lois. b' 't; bono without bein able to eli"inate th2 01:0: lies. b a." have to withdraw non-essertio.l personne1 d) They h.e.ve to slow down troop reducti on. o) ' i.'hei r s trn te pic oTTsctivenesG in bo.: biny is lO n'lio-W.ble , f ) It ouest iono.ble thont .\nerican bo nibiny has Is1.Stiny essfct on -•ort ietn.an' s Tiny.tiny ca:;acity •
ê J » Tore ruthless an.; rone. c-0 ’ - bono civilians and dih.es and hospitals. 'y! T shell cities/rosi■ential areas. G.' ey ','0..lb •3 *~0-1 »- -Î- ” r~> - r-» 'iys and .Tacilities OS v'- '.or t sirs nations.
/■•i"'*'** "7 "*'n“. >'W ’ : a ’ * C"'"' .'1' ' y r\ ' - y: •'1 ,-T. n. v, . .. b 1 -. 7- « 1 t- • - .
- T ^ " .-n a* •* *** ,'-i ' r -
r :*• • I** ~ y 'V / »,• . . u. .* « .* .i. • ^ c. ^
• - --, a-i r, r : - m ^ ,3
1 r~\ i *• * ^ 303
i’orcos r,:- ros'.l.tert anù Jin . a) I'hay have torvilorial control. b; They continue to Tiyht fjven after beinr bonbei . c' They overrun yevernrsnt'n out ; cstG/br.eee . c.) T-'-sr have initiative s/on the offensive. e; Th.ey inflict casualtèoo.
ii. ,'orthvnth /iot: /ietno.nece forcée arc ruthless nni a.-yrcs3 io: yoone . -hoy '-hey ' ' do" ' S''--- in tne nanc of liner tv-. f:e„The-' have no concern far civil banc. i' fl'rey nave couth and build nr . :ili iariltc invade Jouth "V - 'a * ■
'or 00 3 are ro .cillent, effective ?.nd cayable . L; They inflict hi.yhcr cacualtios on eu'-uy'c tree y a than t'.ic ee
u 'They inhibit the connunitt advance, reyulec attac-'c or rescue civiliann. c) the;- can vi the band lev: d r a m ene..'.y' e a : ta etc . • are resistant and cacable of : .aten.inn their enony/thoy vrcll nroyarod. c; 'The,.' via battles . f y They have initiativcc/t!:ey are on th.c ra'fensive/arc ncbilc. y) Th;v- yain territorial control/clear onoi.y' a hold, h) 'fanir nov nilitary leo,dorshiy increases ;hnir ccnfIdence and norale. i' Thoi nahe _rc,-;rc3s .".ilitaril_:.y crcaninati-nvlly and ;;.o::ale-vise. They can rally o :en-ar.ns returnees. 1': Tiio" have t' lo 'otcnti-al "'.T vtrcn. ;th.
A. .in .'th /ietvanese forcer: o.:;c ineff ective avi have voblens. a, .-hoy I'cc' loa'inrchic.
.-> 1 ' y \ ”] ' • ( , - > ■ '■} Tt/vy 7.'-'SC territeria]. c-uvtrol/f.oy have to ecv.cuat'e civ ill; out of tom.
-* J V. c * - V.' t. ' —• y- ». V ». ■ • u'rnTer canm lti....-,,v:v on -;h: 1:."". - v,-.^ . ■/ . \ C ■ vi th the hol : Ç- 304
'Ico'lla.'.yor.s. ->J I'o.i-’iDrroil'- rc'.zT.r.lt'.c( resent f tc \ ..r.c./.rernu tniTornatioc or :ocorrJ. rovort. t'nirô T,r:y oilier- r.re oucceoofnl in irilitary esciobonce, ncnorts of clo.cnec "itiont scores. nejortr: cc cnpturcd reorcnc disolo,-' os procf of ne~.v;' Lot orn scftlios -to iorto iietnor., ; .-.r- il'b sit'.r.ticn to joi-yc one roy or the other. < I 13 oeriol ottac‘:s of lhine.se s' .i 's rill he in'.'co:i-,o:o: f'.nc rr.nist ;olicy -be:.'arc. prisoner;: is lenient and "en?r. \ ( h i r bivitics reported 1.1. < :or Adr.irol hilled in helico-;ter in the Gnlf of lc.'i in .boc.o.boonin': is effective cncn-rh to holt off cor.'.ronist ottc chs. ) p f*; T "0 rill net he re-established for strotc-ic-lc -istic reasons. 305
G. Vietnam Issue
;Jhi].e J.3. policy in Viotnan airs at negotiation and detente, dorth Vietnam's policy is dlinarily ambitious, irreconcilable, and detente disruptive, a) dorth Vietnam'n riyidity yronnts the U.3. to react atronyly and uith difficult choices. dorth Vietnamese stubbornness discorrayes all peace efforts c) forth Vietnanese policy ai: .s at disrupting detente. d) berth Viotnaro ro ;so,tsdly rejects the assistance to;:ard a peace soi''tlon. e) dort:: Vietnan is deter::ined/has a;i advantaye of a .nilitary solution in Viotna.n. f ) 'iorth Vio-tnan insists on acceptance of its orn solution, y) fhe d.i. hopes fcr/recffirnc/ favorable J.S.-doviet relations. h) The d.3. is "Ivays ;ceafy for serious neyotiations or is flexible and penorcus in its dsalinps. i) P.3. policy biclus shortens the -'ar/points at a desire for a just settlonent/and renounces the use of force. j) It's stra::p;e for ueople tc clain to love peace and at the sane tic.e air ire _.crth Vietna;;:'s nilitary rover.
II. V.3. policy is correct, supportable, and moral. a) it is characterised by a cetciriiuation to prevent an u: ran ted co;:;;::unist tade-over of forth Vietnam. b) It is concerned about civilian i'o.r suiferiny end casualties. c} It h?,3 lepislativ? su" port. d) Vietna:ûnaticn is uorninp. e) dussian role apalnst P.p. policy is ncylipiblo. f) It ai .‘.s .at a ceasefire : ni yrctectlcn of Ü.3. yri;':ov:ers p; Veoylc uho believe only nope tintions vill lead to a peaceful solutio;- are naive.
III. b.J. :olic.y is r/lec:tionablo/lecs than offcctive/vrony:. a,' Victnanination ' c proyrosc and effectiveness arc questioned. b; ,.t is seen as disastrcns/j out cf forco/nnacco, -':e.t:lc ,/leadiny to a deed cni. o ; It d-cs'::ot has'o Inyislative support. 1; It von't bo able tc pot .Jhina tc I.ol, to cntrlcatc fr
0 ; It inoe;i't ivo tic 1,3. a trcn ; bar paininy yovor. “) It riales In 11.; era use aff', 1rs. 'b I t 10 0 t tel::'. I : t o aeccun-, thep e ll tic a l pp:ostic:i of 3o':u:b b let ne,:;.. b; I. f . :r ill:: ' peltc • nay ‘eav-^ .a:- -ativc effect on 1.3. vill -' c infc:.d no:; tor:: .Uwo c . 306
s relie:' i": rreoecilelle ye;c'bir.ble. ".) l'iero are ici s il le areas a: ;\"rae ae:rb le'braea :lr . l.ortl. Vietr.,?.-;. i; Tls rosi rr.atica of fo r t ’-. Vietaa.:i'o Ireoiàsat '/orle ti'.e clancs fer v'saco. c) lortl vietrea is alrays rroaây for ro-o-ciatioaE.
V. TIj .-.o":i'.'os cf loti aides arc discra-asd roBultir;' la s.r eff era. to c-nt tic.': tcastlor for an acen.-talle soir tien rithcrt reorir.lna-
:'0 _.f. and truth '.'iotnan's rola'tion is eased on the ta-'--'5r:hi_;
..iscollaneous a; Ihtre-tart;- all" eo'efir.":s non-?:ilitar/ sr.-:crt to i:'.:.ti. 7ieti.an. 1; Soviet detente policy and their actual Ishavior on tne ■■istnan issue are corrbraiiotory. c) South fast Asia eruert lelieves U . 3. would su;.sort South 7iotnane.se enti-connunist s'.irit f',illy. d) Syeculation on various alternatives the U.S. will choose with cut evaluation. e) head in/intord.ucticn of announcer and tori: to :3 CIS eus c: -.o sonnent. lo.vTur.ist -cowers ylsd^e sur sort to forth Vletnanese rolic h) The co:tnvmist chanrins; stratevy/tactic is iis.'-". t; harlia-,:entary discussion on Viet'na:i re r or ted .
north Vietnan’ s relic:/ ia oriented toward li-lateral no./e- tiaticns hetween the two sides instead of h.h. interverti: 30? D. South Vietnam - Domestic------■ ■ -■,- I. The South v'ietnauss? *'.:v:ed horces and t:i3 :;eoal'2 care about their soldiers' relfa.re, II. The South Vietnamese rovernrent Is tryin - its host to tahe oars of rofu.res3 irhile the communists croate rotule es.
III. The horth Vietnamese causo sufforiny and death in SouthVietnam.
IV. national and economic develocaents are ?.n active narr aspect of South Viotnansss life. a) Theyinnrove transportation and road netuor::. h) They seen to improve the country's economic and bureaucratic efficiency. c) They reçoive aid in development.
V. The South Vietnamese people unite behind their movornnent to fiyht communis:.: in the front and stronuthon their sol id ar it:' in the rear.
VI. The South Vietnamese constitutional democracy is "crhinm -roll between the legislative and executive hra:nches.
VII. There is opposition in the South Vietnamese larliament.
VIII. hiscellaneous. a) mrison riots in _hu V,uoc island caused b:' horth Vietnamese rebellious prisoners are quelched. b) heshuffling of ar:p' rani: General replaced/investigated,
c) I romulyation of docree and martial law/
d) Open Ar::s pro.prams attracts communist cadres to rally to the South Vietns.mese side. "'- j V.3. Vice ^resident's visit to Vietnam anticipated/.
f) risoiay of communist weapons attracts lar :o crowd. :p) South Vietnam government ^.remised :o recapture territory lest. h) in: orphan,3 are adopted b:' ySO lriti:-h couples.
l) fund for refugees provided by allies.
South Vietnam is a political systa:: in cri._: is. a; Partial lau is pres ih enti.al way to cutein full emor,pe:;cy ower which:': hnve effect cm tl:e South. Vie tna: wee leyislo tu.re ntruc uuru .
V; . eoyle lace faith in in.; Sent!: '.iot;a::use govern:.or.t, uni
C; Jai'cn ayer ^:'i;-,ru 'f re::i'uwts of :ritic.al s: tvat.icm. -n-ununl V'e cuyitul/' ti 'lutenef security i.: effec^u
South '. o-m.a:o has wêah::acs in laadarohin and ccciet". 308 E . Mining Operations
I. i'he U . 3. is deterr.incd to toay r.ir.in- effective, ?.) The J.3. :ei.forris military ;io,neuver3 to co,rry ont the riir.iny operations effectively. b) i.ins danysrs are named for ships tryinp to enter the nininp barriers. c) i.ininy also x covers horth Vietnam's canals and rivers. d) hiphtiest force used in -.ir.inp operations.
II. The operation is considered effective. a) Ships obey U.S. rules and ship movement is r . i n i r m . b) ho encounter with hostile forces are reported. c) It is iTithin the 'J.3. pouer to turn on or off the nines. d) ..ininp operations have cut an inuortant fuel line/caused entenslve damage .
III. miscellaneous a / hininr schedule is reported. b) , ininr regulations are explained : no blochinp or searching in effect. c) lining nay effect Japan's import of horth Vietnam's coal. d) The U.3.-South Vietnam supply system is in good shape. e) lining operations against possible mine-sueeming challenge by hussia arc uncertain. f) There's the possibility of ship hit in crossfire during mining. g) fhelling in connection vith mining reported. h) lead-in. g) U.3. planes machine guns russian ships. 1/ American cruiser joins bombardment force for mining. IV. . hininp: operations meet uith adverse conditions. a) U.S. flips damaged by hostile fire. b) Soviet ships on their to orth Vietnam:/ have ;i.ctive movement c) Active ship m.cvements and mi:ie aree" in.g arc being mropared. 309 F. U.S. Events
II. . ov;:'OiVls and .ictlvltics nf t. nddloials
p . ) II- y rcdl-Dct r.n n. oo.dn-- in;;orIant declrrion/;; "ssl'vly : a.‘?r ; :o'.‘n ' . l) 7.13 30 novo--.3nts and nestings ara nntcr^zotsd as I.avin.-; no"?thin:; to do i.'dth .loutn ^ant Asia's oitoatlon. o; '7.13y in :ly o.nl m 'conino iscioion yncr.ytoc. cy Ans ocnnaniot i;:transi~3no5. âj_ The Vice -resident's visit devonstrates i.S. concern and ds- t3r:'ina.tion to suyyort .douth Viotnan.
711. .jonyrnosional Activitioc a) Cl..- "rossio.oal '.'o.arin % s en ths ocntayon ' aysrs tcon ylnco. üy donyross requests .residential rs'ort on tenth last .Asia.
7'. .■ iscolla.ioons. a) Asniatant Jous’-ss Sscrotary says A.i. -louth iiotuan suuyly syston adoGuato. h) i.'J. iorsonnol in rofiny'o affairs y raison dy Asnatcr .lonnedy. c; Itoch yricos ;;o donn due to fear over Vietnan. 310
G . Peace Talks
/eace negotiation is inhibits! by the oonnunist rinii stani, t'-.sir lack cf sericnsnsss, lack of nood faith and their a:hi' a) The cormnirt brin': to the negotiations rsiyidit- b; The U3 a.'.:roaches negotiations with generosity and seriousness^
The T.i. is insensitive to ..orth Vietnan's view. a' forth Tistnan criticised "issinrer for distcrtiny their views. b) The forth Vietnar.ese stand is "r.inly for o. .roverr.-.ens of national concord in Couth Vietnan. c' 'hrth Viotnan accused the f.3. of aabotayins the nerotiations. d) ’’orth Vietnan is always ready for nssotiaticns.
:iscellanecos a) The corrninist request tic re sun otic n of toff:. b) Ths conn.unist request to ta,lu is the ontcone of their wilitary detarioticn, C; The hussic.n role is needed for a solutiontc the Vietnan yroblen. d. Allies susyendrd/turnw down requests to resuno tall in ^rris. 311
H. North Vietnam à Their Allies
. ..OT’th Vietnar .lai itair.r : corsrltation %\th th:?i?r cornTi.îr.ist allies; jhina ari huaaia. aj hcrth Viahaar-esa hala/atas "aie tri'a to . ahin'i aaâ hoaco',.'.
I, .'.orth Vi'tnam i a smjaorteâ militarily and eccnari.oally by China.
II. Tho carnunista are not ysttiny alony anony themociras.
hiaoallanoouc aj horth /i?tna;:S32 ielo-ate hold yroos coniorei.c^. b) horth '/ie inamese .roti.y: irith other restera loaders rcyortod a; horth Vietnamese aoloyatos' novoaortc rerortad.
.’orth Vietnam i s oottir: ;; ro ^ i '.inistrativo systar.s cn horth Vletna.T.ose territory/ conaolioatiny thair control i central 'r.otran. 312
APPENDIX G
USIA Director Shakespeare's Directive 1970: SHAKE^TF.ARE DIRECTIVE ON VGA nPACTIir; TT MJlcL FiiLLUOM OF ACTION a i t e i:d ix I I
UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY W ASHINGTON 20547
OFFICE OF June 9, 1970 THKOIHECTOR
4 -J
INSTRUCTION TO THE VOICE OF AMERICA, lOP, AREA DIRECTORS, j
i In order to carry out mo s t effectively the principles established
in the "Directive to the Voice of Am e r i c a " issued in 1959, V O A is^^
henceforth to be operated in accordance with the following lines of A
authority over p r o g r a m content: r S i i A" POLICY GUIDANCE The Office of Policy and Plans is
responsible for providing policy
guidance and is the sole source of,
such guidance. V O A is responsible
for applying the guidance to its output.
NEV/S Content is to be determined by VOA.
BACKGROUNDING, Content is to be determined by VOA. ANALYSIS, AND COMMENTARY It is the intent of this instruction that
V O A exercise m a x i m u m flexibility to
create timely, imaginative, and
effective programs. 314
lONSULTATION There will be frequent consultation
among VOA, lOP, the offices of the
Area Direc'/.ors, and fiel-d posts to
ensure an exchange of information and
views leading to most effective
implementation of Public Lav/ 402 and
the "Directive. "
Frank Ehaiuapearc
1
Agency, bochington D.2. 315
APPENDIX D
Organizational Charts of VOA and BBC 316
Royal Charter Board of Governors
Director General
Internal Service External Service
News Operations Language Services
BBC's Organizational Chart o'o ;u T.y U xrcciioi- •cc'tor (.olicy y
•O'tior ic e r v i •01 Oil
VGA's Organizational Chart VoO !->■