Television Viewing: Cultivating Perceptions of Affluence and Support for Capitalist Values

JAMES M. CARLSON

Providence College

Abstract This article examines the proposition that television v/evvmg contributes to unrealistic perceptions ofthe degree of affluence in America and to support for the basic values underlying capitalism. The survey data examined s/iow that heavy television vievifers are more supportive of capitalist values, but are no more likety to misperceive the degree of affluence in America than light viev/ers.

Keywords Affluence, capitalist values, cultivation theory, television entertainment, mainstreaming

Television viewing, of both news and entertainment programming, plays an important role in the development of conceptions about the nature ofthe American political system. Perhaps it is not surprising that the most pervasive medium in American culture makes measurable contributions to conceptions of political reality and to the construction of political values, but there has been surprisingly little empirical research on the influence of television viewing on attitudes that legitimize the political system. Curiously, most of the empirical work on the influence of television has grown out of a concern with the socialization of deviant behavior. Despite the great deal of attention given to the possible antisocial effects of television viewing there is increasing evidence the medium presents programming that encourages values that are supportive of the status quo. It seems especially likely that American television programming supports dominant political values; the major networks are owned and operated by those who have a vested interest in current economic and political arrangements. Indeed the historical role of mass media has always been to promote values that dominate society. More than 40 years ago Lazarsfeld and Merton (1949) asserted that the mass media are financed by the business establishment, which rests on assumptions of capitalism, and contributes to the maintenance of that system. The same argument has been articulated more recently by Ginsberg (1988) and Parenti (1986), among others. This article examines the influence of television viewing on the public's perception ofthe degree of affluence in America and its support for values associated with capitalism. Overwhelming evidence indicates the world of television emphasizes American affluence and celebrates values associated with capitalism. It seems likely that heavy television viewers perceive a reality regarding affluence that is influenced by television and support capitalist values that serve the status quo. The theoretical perspective and research strategy that guides the research reported below is cultivation analysis. The cultivation hypothesis, developed by George Gerbner and his colleagues at the Annenberg School of Communications, states that

The author thanks Lynn Sosnosky for assistance in collecting and analyzing the data. Robert Shapiro and three anonymous reviewers provided insightful comments on the manuscript.

243 244 James M. Carlson

Television cultivates from infancy the very predispositions and preferences that used to be acquired from other primary sources. Transcending historic barriers of literacy and mobility, television has become the primary common source of socialization and everyday information (mostly in the form of entertainment) of an otherwise heterogenous population. The repetitive pattern of television's mass-produced messages and images forms the mainstream of a common symbolic environment. (Gerbner et al. 1986, p. 18)

Gerbner and his associates have conducted many message system analyses (content analyses) over the years that indicate that television programming misrepresents reality in regard to the amount of violence, portrayal of occupations and sex roles, and such demographic characteristics as race and ethnicity (see Morgan and Signorielli 1990). Cultivation analyses have revealed that heavy viewers of television perceive a "reality" that is more consistent with the "television world" than the "real world." The most consistent evidence of cultivation of a television point of view involves perceptions of violence in the United States and the perception of a "mean world." The research of Gerbner and his associates has consistently shown that heavy television viewers overestimate the amount of violence in the United States and tend to have a dim view of the trustworthiness of people in general (see Gerbner et al. 1980). Cultivation analyses have shown that television viewing gives rise to misperceptions of social reality, termed first order beliefs, such as estimates of the incidence of violence and of occupational roles of women. Second order beliefs, or opinions concerning such matters as the meanness of society or sex role stereotypes (see Gerbner et al. 1980 and Signorielli 1989) used in second order cultivation analyses, focus on the development of value systems. Cultivation analysis has been criticized from a number of perspectives. One of the assumptions ofthe cultivation perspective is that viewers watch television nonselectively, so specific programs or types of programs are less relevant than the amount of time spent watching television. The argument presented by Gerbner and his colleagues to support this assumption is that the messages of television are consistent and generally supportive ofthe status quo across different program types. There have been, however, a number of studies that have shown that specific types of programs have unique correlations with perceptions of reality. Carlson (1985) shows that heavy viewers of crime shows had numerous perceptions and opinions concerning the legal system that differed from light viewers. Volgy and Schwartz (1980) show that viewing of medical shows influences perceptions of the medical profession and Buerkel-Rothfuss and Mayes (1981) show that viewing daytime soap operas was associated with perception of the frequency of divorce. As a result of these studies scholars often include both program-specific and total viewing measures in their analyses. Another criticism of cultivation analysis has focused on the strength of relationships between television viewing and perceptions of social reality and opinions. While a very large number of studies have confirmed the cultivation hypothesis, in many instances correlation coefficients between television viewing and television responses to survey questions are quite weak, often in the .10 to .20 range. In some instances, as is the case in many studies ofthe influence of television on opinion, correlations drop below levels of statistical significance when multiple controls for demographic characteristics are imposed. In response to this criticism Gerbner and his associates argue that the discovery of consistent systematic differences between light and heavy viewers has far-reaching consequences. Even a slight, but persistent cultivation of perspectives may alter the nature Television Viewing 245

of political culture (Gerbner et. al. 1986, p. 21). It has also been argued that it is unreasonable to expect television viewing to influence all groups equally. Research by Gerbner and many others shows that even in the absence of an overall relationship under controls for demographic variables, strong relationships exist for specific subgroups (see Morgan and Signorielli 1990). These findings lead to a refinement of the cultivation hypothesis referred to as mainstreaming. The basic idea of mainstreaming is that heavy television viewing may override differences in perceptions of reality or opinions that may be attributable characteristics of specific subgroups. In other words, subgroups who are predisposed to hold views that are outside of the cultural mainstream may be influenced to a greater extent by heavy television viewing than those who are predisposed to hold mainstream (television world) views. The implication of the mainstreaming hypothesis is that television leads viewers toward a common mainstream perception of social and political reality. The evidence of mainstreaming is quite strong and has been related to politically relevant perceptions (see Gerbner et al. 1982 and 1984; Carlson 1985). Cultivation analysis seems especially appropriate as a strategy for examining the influence of television viewing on perceptions of affluence in America and support for capitalist values given the argument by Gerbner et al. (1979, p. 180): "Television is the mainstream of the cultural process. It is the agency of the established order and as such serves primarily to maintain, stabilize and reinforce, not subvert, conventional values beliefs and behaviors." Capitalist values described by McClosky and Zailer (1984, p. 2), as associated with private ownership, the pursuit of unlimited profits from individual effort, economic competition, differential economic rewards based on differential effort, and market determination of production and the distribution of rewards are certainly among the conventional values in American society. Few would argue that those in control of television in America do not support those values. The claim of affluence and economic abundance in America legitimizes the economic and political system. A generalized belief in the "American Dream" is the engine that sustains the system. There is a great deal of evidence that television programming presents an exaggerated view of American affluence and celebrates the values associated with capitalism. Gerbner et al. (1982, p. 105) report that seven out of ten television characters appear in the "middle-middle" of a five-way classification of social class. The same research indicates that 67 percent of Americans engage in blue-collar or service work, but only 10 percent of television characters engage in those occupations. It was noted that the demography of television characters resembles consumer spenders in America more than the U.S. Census. Research by Glennon and Butsch (1982) indicates that working class families portrayed on television are characterised by a dumb, unsophisticated father and a desire of all family members for upward mobility. Middle class families had fathers who were mature and effective. Capitalist values are encouraged in television programming in a number of other ways. Selnow (1986) notes that problem-solving techniques on prime time television revealed a number of themes, among which were "hard work yields rewards" and "ingenuity finds a solution." In a more recent work Selnow (1990) finds that among the values displayed in prime time television were "respect for property" and the importance of a "sense of pride in one's work and respect for the achievements of others." He concluded that "television's lessons are remarkably coherent and congruent with the beliefs of churches, schools and commercial institutions" (Selnow 1990, p. 72). Much television time is given to "consumer socialization." Advertising is aimed at encouraging materialistic values and in some instances nonrational impulse buying. The 246 James M. Carlson advertising industry spends a great deal to portray products and services as needs and encourage viewers to associate "success" with their acquisition (see Burr and Burr 1977). No studies have examined directly the influence of television on support for capitalist values and only one has exannined the perceptions of affluence. Fox and Phil liber (1978) find that perceptions of affluence in America are directly related to the amount of television viewing in a sample of Cincinatti citizens. However, when controls were imposed for education, the size of the relationship dropped below statistical significance. Perceptions of the veracity of television had no effect on the original relationship. As might be expected, education influenced the "accuracy" of perceptions of the degree of American affluence. Fox and Philliber suggest that measures of television exposure that take into account content might be related to perceptions of affluence. They also argue that television is so pervasive in American society that viewing may no longer constitute a "variable," but is instead a constant. Gerbner et al. (1982) finds that heavy viewers, as opposed to light viewers, identified themselves as middle class and also saw themselves as political moderates. They conclude that television viewing cultivates conventional (mainstream), middle- of-the-road orientations. A number of studies have associated television viewing with materialism. Ward and Wackman (1971) report that heavy television viewing among adolescents was associated with the belief that "material goods and money are important for personal happiness and social progress" (p. 423). Churchill and Moschis (1979) also find strong correlations between heavy television viewing among adolescents and materialism. In a study of Swedish citizens, Reimer and Rosengren (1990) find that viewing entertainment programming is associated with materialistic values—a concern with a comfortable life. Weigel and Jessor (1973) examined the influence of television viewing on a wide variety of conventional attitudes among adolescents. In general the relationships were strong. Findings relevant to this study showed that heavy viewers were intolerant of deviant points of view and exhibited low levels of support for independence, which was defined as freedom from conventionally described behavior. Heavy viewers also scored much lower than light viewers on a measure of social criticism. The evidence from previous research that television viewing may be more strongly associated with conventional attitudes than deviant ones is quite strong. It is reasonable to hypothesize that heavy television viewing is associated with unrealistic perceptions of American affluence and support for capitalist values.

Data and Method The data in this analysis were collected in the spring of 1990 from a sample of registered voters in Providence, Rhode Island. A systematic sample with a random start of 1000 was drawn from the most current voter registration list provided by the city. Questionnaires were distributed by mail to the sample with a personalized cover letter asking for cooperation. Of the 1000 questionnaires that were sent out 214 were returned by the postal service as undeliverable. The final return consisted of 343 completed questionnaires for a return rate of those delivered of 43.5 percent. The demography of the population of registered voters is unknown, but the resulting sample is not significantly different from the population with respect to gender. The sample appears to be more highly educated and more affluent (indicated by family income) than the general population. However, a sample of registered voters can Television Viewing 247 reasonably be expected to be of a higher socioeconomic status than the general population.' The two dependent variables in the study are perceptions of affluence in America and support for capitalist values. The measure of perception of affluence is taken directly from the research of Fox and Philliber (1978) with only slight modification. Respondents were asked to estimate, "About how many Americans or American families out of 100* (1) can afford at least one major trip a year, (2) own a luxury car, (3) have homes that cost more than $100,000, (4) can afford a built-in swimming pool, (5) belong to a country club, and (6) are in the upper middle or upper classes. The responses to the six questions were averaged to create individual scores that range from 0 to 100. As Fox and Philliber (1978) note, the questions are posed in such a way that there are no "correct" answers because such terms as "luxury car" and "major trip" are quite vague. However, the purpose of the scale is to measure relative perceptions of American affluence. The scale attained an Alpha coefficient of reliability of .87. The mean scores for each item along with their standard deviations are shown in Table 1 .^ From the figures in Table 1 the sample generally misperceives the extent of affluence in America. For example, the sample believes that, on average, 31.2 percent of American families live in homes that cost more than $100,000. The sample classifies nearly one- quarter of American families in the upper middle or upper class. Fox and Philliber (1978) among others would argue that television is so pervasive that misperception of American affluence is widespread. The second dependent variable is support for capitalist values. It is measured by a scale based on McClosky and Zailer (1984). Items in their Capitalist Values Scale were pretested, and, based on reliability tests, seven were chosen for inclusion on the questionnaire. Each of the seven items asks respondents to choose between two alternative answers, only one of which reflects capitalist values. Respondents are also given the opportunity to "decline to choose." Scale scores are simply the number of responses that are supportive of capitalist values. The scale achieved an Alpha of .66 (Table 2).^ The figures in Table 2 show that the Providence sample is quite supportive of

Table 1 Perceptions of Affluence in America

Estimate of How Many Families Out of 100 Mean Standard Deviation

Can afford at least one major trip per year 30.0 24.2 Owns a luxury car 21.4 20.4 Have homes that cost more than $100,000 31.2 24.0 Can afford a built-in swimming pool 17.3 17.1 Belong to a countty club 12.4 14.8 Are in the "upper middle" or "upper" classes 23.5 19.6 Alpha - .87

Note. The number of respondents range from 311 to 315. 248 James M. Carlson

Table 2

Support for Statements of Capitalist Values

Item Response

A person's wages should depend on How much he needs to I ive decently 21.1 The importance of his job 60.1 (Decl i ne to choose) 18.7 The profit system Brings out the worst of human nature 11.0 Teaches people the value of hard work and success 78.0 (Decline to choose) 11.0 Under a fair economic system All people would earn about the same 6.3 People with more ability would earn higher salaries 85.0 (Decline to choose) 8.7 When people fail at one thing after another it usually means they Weren't given a good chance to begin with 19.6 Are lazy and lack self-discipline 37.9 (Decline to choose) 42.5 The poor are poor because The wealthy and powerful keep them poor 26.7 They don't try hard enough to get ahead 28.3 (Decline to choose) 45.0 When businesses are allowed to make as much money as they can Workers and the poor are bound to get less 18.5 Everyone profits in the long run 59.9 (Decline to choose) 21.6 Men like Henry Ford, Andrew Carnegie, J. P. Morgan, and John R. Rockefeller should be held up to young people as Selfish and amibitious men who would do anything to get ahead 11.4 Models to be admired and imitated 57.1 (Decline to choose) 31.5 Alpha - .66

Note. The number of respondents ranges from 325 to 336. capitalist values. On every item respondents chose the "capitalist" response over the "noncapitalist" response. The only two items that reflect a lack of consensus involve explanations for individual economic failure and explanations for poverty. Responses to those items reflect some ambivalence because the largest proportion of respondents declined to choose one ofthe two explanations. However, generally, the sample exhibits the widespread consensus on capitalist values found in the exhaustive study by McClosky and Zailer (1984). The independent variable in this study is the amount of time given to television viewing. It was noted earlier that there is some debate about whether people view television nonselectively, by the clock or whether specific types of programs are chosen. Te/ev/s/on Viewing 249

Gerbner and his associates always argue that the overall amount of viewing is most relevant (see Morgan and Signorielli 1990). Others find specific types of programming important (see Carlson 1983; Hawkins and Pingee 1980). The measure used in this study takes into account various types of programs, but also indicates estimates of total viewing in the average week. The measure, developed by Potter (1989), asks respondents to estimate the number of hours per week spent viewing 11 types of programs: situation comedies, action-adventure, prinne time soap operas, news, movies, sports, talk shows, musical programs, game shows, daytime soap operas, and other types. For the purposes of the analysis that follows the total number of hours per week is tabulated for each respondent. The sample mean for total television viewing is 21.5 hours per week. Situation comedies were the most watched with an average of 5.4 hours per week. For purposes of control five demographic variables were measured. They include age, sex, race, education, and income. It is the general practice in cultivation analyses to compare zero-order correlation coefficients between media use and dependent variables for various demographic subgroups. I believe that this practice is statistically inadvisable, so it is not employed in this research. In a very useful article on conditional relationships, Gerald Wright (1976) points out that standardized nfieasures such as correlation coefficients are not comparable across subgroups because they are sensitive to changes in standard deviations. In other words subgroup differences in correlation coefficients may be entirely attributable to differences in variability. Wright argues persuasively that unstandardized regression coefficients provide a more reliable basis for subgroup comparison. He provides a method for assessing the significance of subgroup differences between regression coefficients that is used in the analysis that follows.

Findings

Cultivation of Perceptions of Affluence and Capitalist Values In the figures showing the influence of television viewing on perceptions of affluence in America and support for capitalist values (Table 3), none of the regression coefficients for the television viewing-perception of affluence relationship are significantly different from zero. On the other hand television viewing seems to have a relatively strong influence on support for capitalist values. Controls for education substantially reduce the coefficients for perceptions of affluence, while controls for all five demographic characteristics reduce the relationship between television viewing and support for capitalist values—though not below the level of significance. These findings contain some expected and some unexpected results. The findings with respect to perceptions of affluence are consistent with those of Fox and Philliber (1978). However, most studies of cultivation have found stronger correlations between television viewing and first-order dependent variables (perceptions of television reality) than with second-order variables (social and political values and attitudes) (Potter 1988). Perceptions of affluence may be one set of variables that are overestimated by populations regardless of viewing habits because television saturates communications networks with positive messages concerning economic conditions. It may also be the case, as Fox and Philliber (1978) suggest, that the message of affluence is so pervasive that differences in viewing frequency are not relevant. In any case, lack of influence in the sample as a whole does not mean that some demographic groups may not be distinguished in terms of their vulnerability to television's 250 James M. Carlsor)

Table 3 The Effects of Television Viewing on Perception of Affluence in America and Support for Capitalist Values

Control Perception Support for Variable of Affluence Capitalist Values

Uncontrolled .106 .021 (.060) (.007) Controlling for Age .118 .016 (.061) (.007)

Sex .102 .022 (.060) (.007)

Race .105 .021 (.061) (.007)

Education .067 .017 (.059) (.007)

Family Income .104 .019 (.063) (.007)

All Demographic Variables .085 .015 (.063) (.007)

Final df (287) (289)

Note. Figures in the table are unstandardized regression coefficients. The standard errors are in parentheses. If the coefficients are at least twice their standard errors they are significantly different from zero. messages regarding affluence or capitalist values. Therefore it is necessary to examine subgroups.

Mainstreaming of Perceptions of Affluence and Capitalist Values The "mainstreaming" hypothesis advanced by Cerbner et al. (1980) holds that cultivation of perceptions and attitudes consistent with television reality is most likely among groups of people who hold views that are outside of the mainstream. To determine which characteristics are associated with nonmainstream views, it is necessary to conduct intergroup comparisons of perceptions of affluence and support for capitalist values. Mean scores for demographic groups defined by five variables are shown in Table 4. The figures in Table 4 indicate that, for the most part, the demographic groups considered in this study are not distinguished by differing views of the perception of affluence in America or support for capitalist values. With regard to perceptions of affluence all of the groups defined by age, sex, race, and income hold views that are within the mainstream (defined in terms of sample means). The only exception to the pattern is among college graduates who appear to have a more "realistic" assessment of the degree of affluence. It appears that those who have college degrees are able to Television Viewing 251 make relatively reliable estimates regarding the distribution of wealth in the United States. The results with regard to capitalist values are somewhat surprising. Respondents 55 or older, those with less than a college education, and those in the lower income groups are most supportive of capitalist values. It is curious that the highly educated and the high income groups are relatively less likely to support statements reflecting capitalist values, since those groups seemingly have benefited the most from the current economic arrangement. However, these results are somewhat consistent with those reported by McClosky and Zailer (1984, pp. 295-296) who find some elite groups to be less supportive of capitalist values than the mass public. If the mainstreaming hypothesis is to be supported, then television viewing should be associated with perceptions of affluence among college graduates and with capitalist values among the young and middle aged, college graduates, and those with relatively high incomes. The regression coefficients relating television viewing to perceptions of affluence and support for capitalist values for demographic subgroups are shown in Table 5. There is little support for the mainstreaming hypothesis in the table. While some subgroups were more likely to be influenced by television, with one exception they are not .the groups that have perceptions and attitudes outside of the mainstream. The exception is an important one and illustrates the concept of mainstreaming. College graduates, who, taken as group, are less likely to give inaccurate estimates of American affluence, are influenced by television to a greater extent than those without college degrees. What this means is that television viewing ainong college graduates produces estimates of American affluence similar to nongraduates. Table 4 Mean Scores on Measures of Perceptions of Affluence and Support for Capitalist Values by Demographic Groups

Independent Perceptions Support for Variable of Affluence Capitalist Values

Age 18 to 29 24.50 5.22 30 to 54 22.27 p- ns 5.36 p < .001 55 to 88 21.57 5.93 Sex Male 21.56 5-60 D _ ns Female 23.26''" "^ 5.46 P "' Race White 22.68 5-52 n . ns Nonwhite 5.52" "' Education Less than college 5-68 p < .001 College graduate 5.30'^ Family income Less than $25,000 21.35 5.56 $25,001 to $55,000 24.99 p •=• ns 5.62 p < .05 More than $55,000 20.38 5.29

Note. The number of respondents ranges from 297 to 303. 252 James M. Carlson

Table 5 The Effects of Television Viewing on Perceptions of Affluence in America and Support for Capitalist Values by Demographic Characteristics

Control Perceptions Support for Variable of Affluence Capitalist Values

Uncontrolled .106 .021 (.060) (.007) Age 18 to 29 .180 .003 (.090) (.009) 30 to 54 .206 .010 (.082) P < -05 (.009) P*^"^ 55 to 88 .022 .035 (.062) (.008) Sex Male .053 .029 (.079) (.009) Female .118 P" "5 .019 P ° "* (.062) (.007) Race White .101 .021 (.060) (.004) Nonwhite .094 P " "5 .017 P~ (.099) (.011) Education Less than college -.018 .027 (.077) (.008) ^ -, College graduate .164 P < 01 .012 P < -^^ (.064) (.009) Family income Less than $25,000 -.014 .019 (.071) (.008) $25,001 to $55,000 •25^ D < 001 .027 (.079) P (.009) P" More than $55,000 .072 .012 (.092) (.011)

Note. Figures in the table are unstandardized regression coefficients. The standard errors are in parentheses. If the coefficients are at least twice their standard errors they are signfiicantly different from zero. The significance levels are the results of F-tests for differences between the regression coefficients for the groups.

Other groups that appear to be especially susceptible to the messages of television did not reveal perceptions and values that were outside of the mainstream. Middle-aged respondents appear to be most receptive to television's messages regarding affluence, but older respondents (who were well within the mainstream) were cultivated with respect to capitalist values. The gender and race of respondents had little influence on differential Television Viewing 253 cultivation. Respondents with less than a college education, whose views were closer to the mainstream than the college educated, were significantly more likely to be cultivated with respect to capitalist values. Interestingly, middle income respondents were influenced by television's messages concerning American affluence more than any other group represented in the table. In the absence of clear support for the mainstreaming hypothesis explanations for intergroup differences must by necessity be ad hoc. With regard to perceptions of affluence television seems to be most influential among those in the middle; middle-aged, college graduates with middle incomes were most susceptible to the television point of view. It may be the case that the "middle" group is the most concerned with its place in the American economic scheme and most concerned about material gain. With regard to capitalist values the pattern of results in Table 5 reflects what Cerbner et al. (1980) have called "resonating." The messages of television regarding the positive value of capitalism tend to support and enhance the views of groups that were predisposed to be supportive in the first place, such as pider respondents, those without a college degree, and those with middle incomes.

Specific Types of Programs and Cultivation Effects While Cerbner and his associates have argued that people view television nonselectively by the clock, a number of studies show that specific types of programming are especially influential with respect to specific types of perceptions or values. For example Carlson (1985) finds that crime shows cultivate a variety of opinions concerning the legal system and Volgy and Schwarz (1980) find that viewers of medical dramas have positive images of medical doctors. The measure of television viewing used in the research discussed in this article can be disaggregated to examine the influence of viewing particular program types on the perceptions and values related to American capitalism. Correlation coefficients indicating the relationship between viewing choices and thie dependent variables are shown in Table 6. Table 6 shows that the viewing of only two types of shows is significantly related to perceptions of affluence. As might be expected, heavy viewing of situation comedies is related to a perception of exaggerated affluence. The characters and families on situation comedies are for the most part quite affluent. Mahy have observed that money problems are seldom central issues or themes on these shows. Furthermore, the characters on such programs as The Cosby Show are often dressed in the latest fashions. To the extent that characters portrayed on situation comedies are perceived as typical Americans, it is not surprising that heavy viewers misperceive the degree of American affluence. The other type of programming significantly associated with a perception of affluence was the news. The correlation is quite weak. It is possible that because news content emphasizes the powerful and important and perhaps poverty abroad, as opposed to poverty in America, those who are heavy viewers misperceive the extent of affluence in America. Seven different types of programmihg were significantly associated with support for capitalist values. The strongest correlation is with viewing of game shows. This result would seem to make perfect sense. Came shows are essential ly a celebration of materialism, where the most able (and sometimes the most lucky) prosper. Heavy viewing of situation comedies, action-adventure programs, prime-time soaps, news, sports, and talk shows is also correlated with positive attitudes toward capitalism. It appears that viewing specific types of programs has differing effects. Future analyses should focus on specific program types. 254 James M. Carlson

Table 6 Viewing Specific Program Types and Cultivation of Views Concerning Perception of Affluence and Capitalist Values (Pearson Product-Moment Correlations)

Hours per Week Perception Support for Viewing of Affluence Capitalist Values

Situation comedies .14** .09* Action/adventure .08 .13** Prime time soaps -.01 .10* News .10* .15** Movies -.03 .04 Sports .03 .12* Talk shows .04 .09* Music .02 -.01 Game shows .08 .20*** Daytime soaps .07 -.03 Others .00 .01

Note. The number of respondents ranges from 289 to 317. *p < .05; '"p < .01; •**p < .001.

Table 7 The Relative Influence of Six Variables on Perceptions of Affluence in America and Support for Capitalist Values (Beta Weights)

Perceptions Support for Variable of Affluence Capitalist Values

Age .078 .112* Sex -.078 .270*** Race .011 .018 Education -.236*** -.177*** Family income .068 .034 Television viewing (hours per week) .082 .112* Final df (287) (289) R .256 .368 R2 .066 .136

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. Television Viewing 255

Summary and Conclusions

The evidence that television viewing cultivates perceptions of affluence in America and support for capitalist values is mixed. The relative influence of television viewing, compared to personal characteristics, is shown in Table 7. The beta weights in the table indicate that television viewing does not have a significant effect on perceptions of affluence, but its influence on capitalist values survives controls for demographic variables. Of all the independent variables in the table the only one with a significant effect on perception of affluence is education. It is clear that the accuracy of respondent perceptions increases with years of education. Support for capitalist values is greatest among older respondents, females, and those with lower levels of education. It is also significantly greater among respondents who are heavy viewers of television, regardless of their background characteristics. In several ways the results reported here are puzzling. Earlier research (see Potter 1988) would lead one to expect television to have a stronger influence on first-order dependent variables, such as perceptions of affluence in America, than second-order orientations, such as support for capitalist values. Perhaps Fbx and Philliber (1978) are correct when they argue that television is so pervasive that it is a "constant" and that light viewers are not easily distinguished from heavy viewers when it comes to some variables such as perception of affluence. It may also be the case that messages concerning affluence are so pervasive from other sources such as newspapers, magazines, and advertisements that television viewing is less relevant than it is for other perceptions of reality. The general findings indicating that heavy television viewing is associated with support for capitalist values are consistent with a number of earlier studies that focus on materialism (Ward and Wackman 1971; Churchill and Moschis 1979) and with studies that show that television encourages conventional attitudes (Weigel and Jessor 1973; Carlson 1985). This is the first study in which heavy viewing has been associated with responses to items concerning values that go to the heart of the legitimacy of the system. Earlier studies have focused more narrowly on consumerism and conformity. A puzzling aspect ofthe findings reported in this article relates to the mainstreaming hypothesis. The idea of mainstreaming points of view regarding the economic system makes so much sense and is so appealing that it is surprising that results are not supportive. On the other hand, consensus is so widespread with regard to capitalist values that few respondents were truly outside of the mainstream. Perhaps there are alternative means for identifying the mainstream that may be employed in future analyses. One aspect of the findings of the study is particularly intriguing and important. McClosky and Zailer (1984) conclude, after their exhaustive analysis of democratic and capitalist values held by elites and the mass public, that when democratic values conflict with capitalist values, it is democratic values that dominate. The findings of this study, taken in combination with earlier research, would seem to indicate that in the world of television capitalist values may be given greater attention than democratic values. Research by Carlson (1985) has shown that heavy viewers of television are among the ieast likely to be supportive of civil liberties. Cerbner and his associates (1982) show that heavy viewers are not as disposed as light viewers to support freedom of speech. In their examination of data from Britain Wober and Cunter (1988, p. 72) find that heavy viewers of television were more authoritarian than light viewers. As television becomes more pervasive it is possible that within the American political ethos capitalist values will dominate democratic values. Future research should focus on a direct comparison of cultivation of values related to democracy and capitalism. 256 James M. Carlson

Notes

1. A sample of registered voters and a mail survey were used because the study reported in this article was designed to accompany one that focused on the behavior of potential jurors. Registered voters are the pool from which actual juries are drawn, and a mail survey was deemed best for administering a jury simulation. The demography ofthe sample is as follows: 53.4 percent women, 46.6 percent men; mean age 46.8 years; 84.2 percent white, 15.8 percent nonwhite; 78.6 percent had at least graduated from high school; and 60.8 percent had family incomes exceeding $25,000 per year. 2. The overall mean score for the measure of perceptions of affluence is 22.8. Throughout the analysis a pairwise, as opposed to a listwise, deletion of missing cases is used. While the use of this method means that the number of cases involved in the calculation of statistics varies, the largest possible number of cases are retained for each calculation. 3. The measure of support for capitalist values ranges from 0 to 7. The overall mean is 5.52. All ofthe items developed by McClosky and Zailer (1984) were included in a pretest. A reliability analysis of the items was undertaken using the Reliability program of SPSSX. Seven items were selected based on their correlations with total scale scores. Other items were excluded because they did not contribute significantly to a Cronbach's Alpha Coefficient of Reliability achieved by the scale.

References

Buerkel-Rothfuss, Nancy L., and Sandra Mayes. (1981). Soap opera viewing: The cultivation effect.' Journal of Corr)munication 31, 108-115. Burr, Pat, and Richard Burr. (1977). Product recognition and premium appeal. Journal of Communication 27, 115-127. Carlson, James. (1985). Prime time law enforcement: Crime show viewing and attitudes towards the criminal justice system. New York: Praeger Publishers. Churchill, Gilbert A., and Ceorge P. Moschis. (1979). Television and interpersonal influences on adolescent consumer learning, lournal of Consumer Research 6, 23-35. Fox, William S., and William W. Philliber. (1978). Television viewing and the perception of affluence. Sociological Quarterly 19, 103-112. Cerbner, Ceorge, Larry Cross, Michael Morgan, and Nancy Signorielli. (1980). The 'mainstreaming' of America: Violence profile No. 11. Journal of Communication 30, 10-27. Cerbner, Ceorge, Larry Cross, Michael Morgan, and Nancy Signorielli. (1982). Charting the mainstream: Television's contributions to political orientations. Journal of Communication 32, 100-127. Cerbner, Ceorge, Larry Cross, Michael Morgan, and Nancy Signorielli. (1984). Political correlates of television viewing. Public Opinion Quarterly 48, 283-300. Cerbner, Ceorge, Larry Cross, Michael Morgan, and Nancy Signorielli. (1986). Living with television: The dynamics ofthe cultivation process. In John Bryant and David Zillman (Eds.), Perspectives on media effects. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Cinsberg, Benjamin. (1988). The captive public: How mass opinion promotes state power. New York: Basic Books. Clennon, Lawrence M., and David Butsch. (1982). The family as portrayed on television, 1946- 1978. In David Pearl, Lawrence Bouthilet, and John Lazar (Eds.), Television and behavior: Ten years of scientific progress and implications for the eighties. Rockville, MD: National Institute of Mental Health. Hawkins, Robert P., and Suzanne Pingee. (1980). Some processes in the cultivation effect. Communication Research 7, 193-226. Lazarsfeld, Paul F., and Robert K. Merton. (1949). Mass communications, popular taste, and organized social action. In William Schramm (Ed.), Mass communications. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Television Viewing 257

McClosky, Herbert, and John Zailer. (1984). The American ethos: Public attitudes toward capitalism and democracy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Morgan, Michael, and Nancy Signorielli. (1990). Cultivation analysis: Conceptualization and methodology. In Nancy Signorielli and Michael Morgan (Eds.), Cultivation analysis: New directions in media effects research. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Parenti, Michael. (1986). Inventing reality: The politics of mass media. New York: St. Martin's. Potter, W. James. (1988). Three strategies for elaborating the cultivation hypothesis. Journalism Quarterly 65, 930-939. Potter, W. James. (1989). The cultivation of television themes in adolescents. Unpublished paper. Reimer, Bo, and Rosengren, Karl E. (1990). Cultivated viewers and readers: A lifestyle perspective. In Nancy Signorielli and Michael Morgan (Eds.), Cultivation analysis: New directions in media effects research. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Selnow, Gary W. (1986). Solving problems on prime time television. Journal of Communication 36, 63-72. Selnow, Gary W. (1990). Values in prime time television. Journal of Communication 40, 64-74. Signorielli, Nancy. (1986). Selective television viewing: A limited possibility. Journal of Communication 36, 64-75. Signorielli, Nancy. (1989). Television and conceptions about sex roles: Maintaining conventionality. Sex Ro/es 27, 341-360. Volgy, Thomas J., and John E. Schwarz. (1980). TV entertainment programming and sociopolitical attitudes. Journalism Quarterly S7, 150-155. Ward, Scott, and Wackman, David. (1971). Family and media influences on adolescent consumer learning. American Behavioral Scientist 14, 415-427. Weigel, Russell, and Richard Jessor. (1973). Television and adolescent conventionality: An exploratory study. Public Opinion Quarterly 37, 76-90. Wober, J. Mallory, and Barrie Gunter. (1988). Television and social control. New York: St. Martin's. Wright, Gerald. (1976). Linear models for evaluating conditional relationships. American Journal of Political Science 20, 349-373.