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Remarks Prior to Discussions with Vice Premier Qian

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Administration of George W. Bush, 2001 / Mar. 22 491 feeling about our strengths and our flaws, our Remarks Prior to Discussions With successes and our needs. Vice Premier Qian Qichen of China The Pope reminds us that while freedom and an Exchange With Reporters defines our Nation, responsibility must de- fine our lives. He challenges us to live up March 22, 2001 to our aspirations, to be a fair and just society President Bush. It’s my honor to welcome where all are welcomed, all are valued, and our distinguished guest from China. China all are protected. And he is never more elo- is a great country. China has got vast poten- quent than when he speaks for a culture of life. tial, and we’ve got common interests in China. And I look forward to discussing our The culture of life is a welcoming culture, interests. Our relationship, of course, will be never excluding, never dividing, never de- a complex relationship; there will be areas spairing, and always affirming the goodness where we can find agreement, such as trade. of life in all its seasons. In the culture of There will be some areas where we have life we must make room for the stranger. We must comfort the sick. We must care for the some disagreements. aged. We must welcome the immigrant. We I look forward to committing to this distin- must teach our children to be gentle with guished leader that any disagreements we one another. We must defend in love the in- will have, we will conduct ourselves with mu- nocent child waiting to be born. tual respect. I will be firm, and I suspect he The center we dedicate today celebrates will be firm, in our opinions, but we will do the Pope’s message, its comfort, and its chal- so in a respectful way. It is in our Nation’s lenge. This place stands for the dignity of best interests that we have good relations the human person, the value of every life, with China. and the splendor of truth. And above all, it And before I introduce our distinguished stands, in the Pope’s words, for the ‘‘joy of guest, I do want to say how much I’m looking faith in a troubled world.’’ forward to going to China. I’ll be going next I’m grateful that Pope John Paul II chose fall; the Government has invited me to go Washington as the site of this center. It to Beijing. I accept the invitation. We’ll work brings honor, and it fills a need. We are out the arrangements, but I’m really looking thankful for the message. We are also thank- forward to it. ful for the messenger, for his personal As a young man, I visited my mother and warmth and prophetic strength, for his good dad in China in 1975, and I look forward humor and his bracing honesty, for his spir- to my return. I can’t wait to see the change, itual and intellectual gifts, for his moral cour- the contrast between when I was a younger age, tested against tyranny and against our fellow and now, kind of an older guy. [Laugh- own complacency. ter] But I’m looking forward to coming to Always, the Pope points us to the things your country, sir. that last and the love that saves. We thank Welcome. God for this rare man, a servant of God and Vice Premier Qian. I fully agree to what a hero of history. And I thank all of you for President Bush just said. Indeed, China and building this center of conscience and reflec- the United States are major countries. To tion in our Nation’s Capital. maintain friendly relations and cooperation God bless. between China and the United States is in the interest of Asia, the Pacific region, and the world at large. NOTE: The President spoke at 1:39 p.m. on the Where we have shared interests, we can Catholic University campus. In his remarks, he referred to his mother, Barbara Bush; Adam Car- advance our relationship forward. Where we dinal Maida, archbishop of Detroit; Edmund Car- disagree, we can have very good exchange dinal Szocka, president, Pontifical Commission for of views. Some issues can be approached in Vatican City State; and Theodore Cardinal the spirit of seeking common ground, while McCarrick, archbishop of Washington. shelving the differences. VerDate 20-MAR-2000 04:13 Mar 28, 2001 Jkt 005300 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 1244 Sfmt 1244 W:\DISC\PD26MR01.000 ATX004 PsN: ATX004 492 Mar. 22 / Administration of George W. Bush, 2001 I’m sure ways can be found to solve all honor our obligations under the Taiwan rela- the problems. I view my visit as a very suc- tions law. I look forward to explaining that cessful one, because in the exchange of let- as clearly as I can to our distinguished guest. ters, President Jiang and President Bush al- If he cares to bring up the subject and wishes ready reached common consensus, which has to make a case, I will be glad to listen, but laid a solid foundation for the growth of our no decision has been made yet. And I’ll do relationship in the new century. what I think is in the best interests of our We are looking forward to welcoming relationships and in the best interests of con- President Bush in China in the coming fall. forming to obligations we have. President Bush. Thank you, sir. Q. Mr. President, may I speak in Chinese? President Bush. Are you with the Chinese Gao Zhan/Taiwan press, because your English is perfect. Q. What do you have to say, sir, to your Q. Yes. visitor about the detention of an American President Bush. You speak better English University professor and, until recently, her than I do. [Laughter] husband and son, who is an American cit- izen? And secondly, are you inclined to allow Human Rights/Former President Bush the sale of destroyers to Taiwan? President Bush. I will echo the senti- [At this point, the journalist spoke several ments that the Secretary of State said today words in Chinese and then resumed in about the fact that a U.S. citizen was detained English.] without any notification. I look forward to discussing this with our honorable guest and Q. ——about the gathering outside of the will do so. Falun Gong. The State Department has de- We have obligations under the Taiwan Re- cided to sponsor a resolution to condemn the lations Act, and we’ll honor those obligations. human rights. And for the past few years it No decision has been made yet as to the sale has been failed. And I just wonder, Mr. Presi- of weapons to Taiwan. dent, what are you going to try to tell the One of our guests from the Chinese press. Chinese side how to improve their human rights? President’s Upcoming Visit to China And my second question is regarding—the Q. Mr. President, what are your expecta- Chinese seem very warm to your father; they tions for your forthcoming trip, October, to come, delegation after delegation, visiting Shanghai and Beijing? your father. Are you going to be teached by President Bush. I look forward to seeing your father regarding your China policy? the modernization that has taken place. I President Bush. Well, the Chinese, I’m look forward to seeing the beautiful country- convinced, like my father because he married side that I remember so well. well. [Laughter] My mother is very well re- But most of all, I look forward to getting spected in China, as is my dad, because they to know the leaders of China. I think the spent time there, and they befriended a lot best thing I can do is to—the best thing our of folks who are now leaders. delegation will do is to be able to sit down, It will come as no surprise to our Chinese face to face, and have an honest dialog. guest that I’m a believer in religious freedom, People will find that I’m a straightforward and I will make a—state it politely and as person, that I represent my country’s inter- clearly as I can that ours is a nation that re- ests in a very straightforward way, but I will spects religious freedom; ours is a nation that do so with respect. honors religious freedom; and that our rela- Q. Mr. President, is there anything that tionship will move forward, but it will cer- China can say or do that would influence tainly be a lot easier to move forward in a your decision about which weapons to sell constructive way when our people with Taiwan? whom we conduct our affairs honor religious President Bush. This meeting will give freedom within their borders. me a chance to confirm the fact that I will Q. Thank you. VerDate 20-MAR-2000 04:13 Mar 28, 2001 Jkt 005300 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 1244 Sfmt 1244 W:\DISC\PD26MR01.000 ATX004 PsN: ATX004 Administration of George W. Bush, 2001 / Mar. 23 493 President Bush. I’d like to thank the press tablishment of educational, social, and reha- for not violating the beeper policy. [Laugh- bilitative institutions bettered the lives of ter] people both in this country and abroad. As Q. We didn’t want to get Gordon [Assist- he once said, ‘‘All educational efforts are ba- ant Press Secretary Johndroe] in trouble sically meaningless unless built on the solid again.
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