The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking Revised Edition Michael D. Swaine Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense R National Defense Research Institute Approved for public release, distribution unlimited The research described in this report was supported by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), under RAND’s National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center supported by the OSD, the Joint Staff, and the defense agencies, Contract DASW01-95-C-0059. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Swaine, Michael D. The role of the Chinese military in national security policymaking / Michael D. Swaine. p. cm. “Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense by RAND’s National Defense Research Institute.” “MR-782-1-OSD.” Includes bibliographical references (p. ). ISBN 0-8330-2527-9 1. China—Military policy. 2. National security—China. I. National Defense Research Institute (U.S.). II. Title. UA835.S83 1998 355' .033051—dc21 97-22694 CIP RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of its research sponsors. © Copyright 1998 RAND All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. Published 1998 by RAND 1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1333 H St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005-4707 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org/ To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Internet: [email protected] PREFACE This report documents one component of a year-long effort to ana- lyze key factors influencing China’s national security strategies, policies, and military capabilities, and their potential consequences for longer-term U.S. national security interests. Specifically, this re- port examines the current and future roles of the Chinese military in China’s national security policy process. The report was produced under the aegis of a project entitled Chi- nese Global and Regional Strategy and U.S. Policy: Dynamics and Implications. A second document resulting from this project is Professionalization of the Senior Chinese Officer Corps, by James C. Mulvenon, MR-901-OSD, 1997. This research was sponsored by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. It was carried out under the auspices of the In- ternational Security and Defense Policy Center within RAND’s Na- tional Defense Research Institute (NDRI), a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the defense agencies. Supplemental funding was provided by the RAND Center for Asia-Pacific Policy. This volume is a revised version of the original report that appeared in 1996. iii CONTENTS Preface ......................................... iii Figures ......................................... vii Summary of Key Findings ........................... ix Acknowledgments................................. xv Acronyms ....................................... xvii Chapter One INTRODUCTION .............................. 1 Chapter Two NATIONAL STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES SUBARENA ...... 7 Chapter Three FOREIGN POLICY SUBARENA..................... 19 Chapter Four DEFENSE POLICY SUBARENA..................... 37 Chapter Five STRATEGIC RESEARCH, ANALYSIS, AND INTELLIGENCE SUBARENA................................... 57 Chapter Six CONCLUSIONS................................ 73 Bibliography ..................................... 83 v FIGURES 1. China’s National Security Policy Arena ........... 5 2. National Strategic Objectives Subarena ........... 16 3. Foreign Policy Subarena ...................... 23 4. Defense Policy Subarena ...................... 42 5. Strategic Research, Analysis, and Intelligence Subarena ................................. 59 vii SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS This report identifies and defines the leadership, structures, and pro- cesses governing Chinese military involvement in China’s national security policy process. It emphasizes the specific mechanisms, both personal and bureaucratic, formal and informal, by which the Chi- nese military currently participates in national security policymak- ing, as well as the likely views and interests that the military seeks to advance in the national security arena. The report reaches the following judgments and conclusions: China’s national security policy arena is composed of four distinct but closely related subarenas, each performing a core set of policy functions: (1) national strategic objectives; (2) foreign policy; (3) de- fense policy; and (4) strategic research, analysis, and intelligence.1 China’s national security policy leadership, structures, and processes do not function in a highly integrated, systematic, or formalized manner. Parts of the policymaking system (e.g., elements below the senior civilian and military leaderships) display considerable regular- ity and structure, while others (e.g., interactions among senior lead- ers) remain highly informal and personalistic. All levels of the system involve both regular and irregular features, however. Moreover, throughout the system, the level of influence in the policy process enjoyed by a specific civilian or military policy organ is often deter- ______________ 1Chinese leaders and strategists do not always employ these terms. The author uses them, however, because they are easily recognizable to Western readers, and because they roughly correspond to identifiable functional areas in the Chinese system. ix x The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking mined primarily by the personal prestige and power of the individual who heads it. Linkages among the four policy subarenas vary considerably. No single subarena operates in a completely independent fashion, in- cluding the defense policy subarena. Vertical connections between the national strategic objectives subarena and both the foreign and the defense policy subarenas are relatively close and dense, as are linkages between the latter and the strategic research, analysis, and intelligence subarenas that support them. The least formal and ar- guably weakest linkages are horizontal, between the defense and foreign policy subarenas. Yet even here, interactions are by no means insignificant and are apparently increasing in number and relevance to the overall national security policy process. Military involvement is evident in all four security policy subarenas, albeit to widely varying degrees, ranging from near total control over defense policy to limited but significant influence over foreign policy. Overall, the dividing line between military and civilian spheres in the formulation and implementation of national security policy is not as clear and absolute as in the past. The military’s role in shaping na- tional strategic objectives and in providing strategic analysis and in- telligence to civilian leaders is significant and apparently increasing, even though the avenues for military influence over the national strategic objectives subarena remain relatively few. Military influ- ence over foreign policy is also probably on the rise as military views are increasingly expressed and military influence exerted on specific issues in this subarena. The military does not dictate policy in any one subarena, however. At the top of the system, senior military leaders interact in a generally collaborative, consultative fashion with their civilian counterparts, although military views on certain primarily defense-related issues probably often come close to directives. Senior party leaders un- doubtedly play a complex and nuanced game in their policy interac- tions with the military leadership, seeking to retain the initiative and maintain overall flexibility by alternately placating, resisting, or dilut- ing military views and pressures through a complex mixture of per- sonal persuasion, balancing of bureaucratic interests, and direct control over formal organs and policy channels. The outcome of this effort can vary greatly, depending upon the level of unity or agree- Summary xi ment among the senior party elite, the specific external policy issue addressed, and the perceived success or failure of the prevailing pol- icy line under discussion. The formulation and revision of national strategic policy objectives will become increasingly subject to a leadership system marked by the absence of a paramount leader and hence by the need for greater consultation, coordination, and agreement among senior party and military heads, in order to deal with a growing array of problems and concerns. At the same time, lower-level bureaucratic leaders could exert increasing influence over the entire national security policy agenda, as organizational interests become more influential in the context of a diffuse and fragmented pattern of authority at the top. The emergence of complex, multiple personal and bureaucratic voices in the upper reaches of the policy process could result in constantly shifting, ambiguous, or contradictory policy directives from above. Such a diffusion (and confusion) of power might provide the Chinese military with increasing leverage over the national strategic objec- tives subarena. Alternatively, the national security policy process