Mingquan Zhu THE EVOLUTION OF CHINA’S NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION POLICY by Mingquan Zhu1 Mingquan Zhu is a professor in the Department of International Relations at Fudan University in Shanghai, China. He is also affiliated with Fudan’s Center for American Studies and the Program on Arms Control and Regional Security. He is the author of two recent books: Nuclear Proliferation: Danger and Prevention (1994) and U.S. National Security Policy (1996), both published in Chinese. hina’s current policy of gime. Moreover, this trend continues. Official documents show that China’s nuclear nonproliferation has The evolution of China’s nuclear leaders often repeated what had been discussed by many nonproliferation policy can be di- been said by the Soviet Union, then C 2 Western writers. In this regard, the vided roughly into three stages: 1) considered its “big brother.” For ex- credibility of China’s nonproliferation emphasis on the national right to ample, as late as 1959, at a meeting pledges often has been a hot topic in develop nuclear weapons (1949- of the Standing Committee of the the U.S. Congress and mass media. 1959); 2) acceptance of the nonpro- National People’s Congress, Chinese Critics see China as a main violator liferation norm and independence Foreign Minister Chen Yi said: “We of the international nonproliferation from the international nonprolifera- hold that the new initiatives suggested regime and as a major contributor to tion regime (1959-1984); and 3) by the Soviet government on arms the danger of nuclear proliferation to- gradual integration with the interna- control are fully in accord with the day. They often emphasize and ex- tional community (1984-present). fundamental interests of the Chinese aggerate the gap and conflicts people and people of all other states between China and the United States in the world.”3 On the same day, this FIRST STAGE: EMPHASIS ON in their perceptions and policies on standing Committee passed a reso- THE NATIONAL RIGHT TO nonproliferation. But, in fact, a seri- lution to support the “Soviet initiatives DEVELOP NUCLEAR ous and systematic analysis of Chi- of complete and thorough disarma- WEAPONS nese nonproliferation policy indicates ment.” China adopted a diplomatic that these views are lopsided and un- The first stage covers the period strategy of “leaning to one side,” the tenable. By tracing the history of from 1949, when the People’s Re- Soviet Union. The field of nuclear China’s nuclear nonproliferation public of China (PRC) was estab- policy was no exception. lished, to 1962, when the United policy, its main elements, and its driv- Nevertheless, the actions and States and the Soviet Union acceler- ing forces, this article shows that words of Chinese leaders at that time ated their cooperation on nuclear non- China’s nonproliferation policy has provide some clues to unique Chi- proliferation. evolved considerably. China has nese perceptions about nuclear non- steadily narrowed the gap between During these 13 years, China had proliferation. To a very great degree, itself and the United States, gradu- no real nuclear policy, and certainly these views were related to China’s ally becoming more cooperative with no nuclear nonproliferation policy. national ambitions to become a ma- the international nonproliferation re- 40 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 Mingquan Zhu jor world power. Moreover, since the launching of the first Soviet artificial bombs and can only send you lesser guns. Ten years from new government was established satellite, the first successful test of a now, when we have more after a “people’s war” fought with long-range missile, and the conflicts steel and atom bombs, your “millet plus rifles,”4 one would not with Western powers in Egypt, Viet- situation will also be 10 expect serious insights or policies on nam, and Syria, Mao Zedong made changed accordingly. In fact, in a sense, China favored a the advanced nuclear weapons pos- another famous pronouncement kind of multilateral nuclear deter- sessed at that time by only three about the international environment: rence at that time. On September 28, major powers: the United States, the “The east wind now prevails over the 1961, Premier Zhou Enlai repeated Soviet Union, and the United King- west wind.” This optimistic mood what was said by Mao Zedong 16 dom. In fact, even the nuclear poli- was expressed in a speech made in years earlier: “If all countries have cies of these countries were in an Moscow. He said, in a nuclear war, nuclear weapons, the possibility of embryonic form. “even if one-half of the population in nuclear wars would decrease.”11 At this stage, nuclear weapons the world died, another half would Therefore, it was understandable were regarded as one form of “con- survive. Moreover, imperialism would that China did not hide its interest ventional weapon” by Chinese lead- be destroyed and the entire world in nuclear weapons at that time. On ers, although their special killing would be socialized. After some October 23, 1954, Mao Zedong told capability was admitted. A typical years, there would be 2.7 billion 8 the Indian Prime Minister: “China expression of this position appeared people again.” has no atom bombs now and I don’t during Mao Zedong’s talk with Anna Accepting this overly simplistic know whether India has them or not. Louis Strong, an American corre- view of nuclear weapons, Chinese We have just started our research.”12 spondent, in August 1945, immedi- leaders believed that any sovereign ately after the United States bombed state had a legal right to develop Since the development of nuclear Japan with two atom bombs. He nuclear weapons for self-defense, weapons was seen as the legal right said: just as they could develop any con- of sovereign states, Chinese leaders The atom bomb is a paper ventional weapon. China decided to treated cooperation among socialist tiger which the U.S. reac- tionaries use to scare develop nuclear weapons in the mid- countries in this field as a kind of people. It looks terrible, but 1950s. The inherent logic for it was manifestation of proletarian interna- in fact it isn’t. Of course, very clear: “Since many countries tionalism. the atom bomb is a weapon of mass destruction, but the are developing them, surely China When China began to develop outcome of a war is decided has to do the same. We would hope nuclear weapons, it got some impor- by the people, not by one or nuclear weapons could be banned, 13 two new types of weapons.5 tant help from the Soviet Union, but until then we will still have to especially in October 1957, when 9 Nine years later, Mao still adhered develop them.” Marshal Nie Rongzhen, the Chinese to that view of nuclear weapons. In Moreover, China regarded its de- leader who was in charge of the de- October 1954, he was told by Indian velopment of nuclear weapons as velopment of nuclear bombs and Prime Minister Nehru that there was support for the world’s “oppressed missiles, visited Moscow. Nie and a qualitative difference between cold people.” On May 17, 1960, Mao his Soviet counterpart signed the weapons, hot weapons, and atom Zedong told a delegation of the Al- “Agreement on Producing New bombs.6 The basic difference among gerian provisional government: Weapons and Military Technologi- them, Mao responded, lies in the fact There are many people in cal Equipment and Establishing Syn- that only a relatively few people can our country, but only a very thetic Atomic Industry,” in which the be killed and wounded with cold limited amount of steel. France exploded two atom Soviet Union promised to assist weapons, a few more with hot weap- bombs and we don’t even China in its efforts to develop ons, and even more with atom have one. It is understand- nuclear weapons. Afterwards, some bombs.7 In Mao’s mind, their sole able for de Gaulle to look down upon us. The French important equipment was sent to difference was reflected in the scope can only see money, steel, China from the Soviet Union, includ- of causalities. and atom bombs. Thank ing two short-range ballistic missiles you for respecting our posi- In 1957, with the successful tion. We don’t have atom (R-2). Also, at that time, some So- The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 41 Mingquan Zhu viet technical experts on atomic later, it tested its first hydrogen bomb. with the United States, was trying to bombs and missiles went to work in The successful development of strangle revolutionary China. Gradu- China. This cooperation on nuclear nuclear weapons changed China’s ally, they became carried away by weapons was highly praised by Chi- position from a non-nuclear weapon the emotion and domestic and devi- nese leaders. At the April 1959 ses- state to a nuclear weapon state and ated from the principles they had sion of the National People’s improved China’s understanding of wanted to defend. Congress, Premier Zhou Enlai said nuclear weapons and nuclear wars. Against this background, China that “the help of the Soviet Union’’ It was at this stage that two major developed its own perceptions and had played “a tremendous part” in nuclear powers—the Soviet Union policies on nuclear nonprolifera- 14 the development of China. and the United States—entered se- tion—both for pragmatic reasons As Sino-Soviet relations deterio- rious talks and reached some influ- and for purposes of doctrinal debate. rated, however, the situation ential agreements related to nuclear At the same time, China could de- changed. The Soviet government nonproliferation, including the Lim- velop nonproliferation policies be- unilaterally withdrew from all agree- ited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT, 1963) cause it had a better understanding ments related to the development of and the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera- of these issues.