The Evolution of China's Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy

Mingquan Zhu

THE EVOLUTION OF CHINA’S NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION POLICY

by Mingquan Zhu1

Mingquan Zhu is a professor in the Department of International Relations at Fudan University in Shanghai, China. He is also affiliated with Fudan’s Center for American Studies and the Program on Arms Control and Regional Security. He is the author of two recent books: Nuclear Proliferation: Danger and Prevention (1994) and U.S. National Security Policy (1996), both published in Chinese.

hina’s current policy of gime. Moreover, this trend continues. Official documents show that China’s nuclear nonproliferation has The evolution of China’s nuclear leaders often repeated what had been discussed by many nonproliferation policy can be di- been said by the Soviet Union, then C 2 Western writers. In this regard, the vided roughly into three stages: 1) considered its “big brother.” For ex- credibility of China’s nonproliferation emphasis on the national right to ample, as late as 1959, at a meeting pledges often has been a hot topic in develop nuclear weapons (1949- of the Standing Committee of the the U.S. Congress and mass media. 1959); 2) acceptance of the nonpro- National People’s Congress, Chinese Critics see China as a main violator liferation norm and independence Foreign Minister Chen Yi said: “We of the international nonproliferation from the international nonprolifera- hold that the new initiatives suggested regime and as a major contributor to tion regime (1959-1984); and 3) by the Soviet government on arms the danger of nuclear proliferation to- gradual integration with the interna- control are fully in accord with the day. They often emphasize and ex- tional community (1984-present). fundamental interests of the Chinese aggerate the gap and conflicts people and people of all other states between China and the United States in the world.”3 On the same day, this FIRST STAGE: EMPHASIS ON in their perceptions and policies on standing Committee passed a reso- THE NATIONAL RIGHT TO nonproliferation. But, in fact, a seri- lution to support the “Soviet initiatives DEVELOP NUCLEAR ous and systematic analysis of Chi- of complete and thorough disarma- WEAPONS nese nonproliferation policy indicates ment.” China adopted a diplomatic that these views are lopsided and un- The first stage covers the period strategy of “leaning to one side,” the tenable. By tracing the history of from 1949, when the People’s Re- Soviet Union. The field of nuclear China’s nuclear nonproliferation public of China (PRC) was estab- policy was no exception. lished, to 1962, when the United policy, its main elements, and its driv- Nevertheless, the actions and States and the Soviet Union acceler- ing forces, this article shows that words of Chinese leaders at that time ated their cooperation on nuclear non- China’s nonproliferation policy has provide some clues to unique Chi- proliferation. evolved considerably. China has nese perceptions about nuclear non- steadily narrowed the gap between During these 13 years, China had proliferation. To a very great degree, itself and the United States, gradu- no real nuclear policy, and certainly these views were related to China’s ally becoming more cooperative with no nuclear nonproliferation policy. national ambitions to become a ma- the international nonproliferation re-

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jor world power. Moreover, since the launching of the first Soviet artificial bombs and can only send you lesser guns. Ten years from new government was established satellite, the first successful test of a now, when we have more after a “people’s war” fought with long-range missile, and the conflicts steel and atom bombs, your “millet plus rifles,”4 one would not with Western powers in Egypt, Viet- situation will also be 10 expect serious insights or policies on nam, and Syria, Mao Zedong made changed accordingly. In fact, in a sense, China favored a the advanced nuclear weapons pos- another famous pronouncement kind of multilateral nuclear deter- sessed at that time by only three about the international environment: rence at that time. On September 28, major powers: the United States, the “The east wind now prevails over the 1961, Premier Zhou Enlai repeated Soviet Union, and the United King- west wind.” This optimistic mood what was said by Mao Zedong 16 dom. In fact, even the nuclear poli- was expressed in a speech made in years earlier: “If all countries have cies of these countries were in an Moscow. He said, in a nuclear war, nuclear weapons, the possibility of embryonic form. “even if one-half of the population in nuclear wars would decrease.”11 At this stage, nuclear weapons the world died, another half would Therefore, it was understandable were regarded as one form of “con- survive. Moreover, imperialism would that China did not hide its interest ventional weapon” by Chinese lead- be destroyed and the entire world in nuclear weapons at that time. On ers, although their special killing would be socialized. After some October 23, 1954, Mao Zedong told capability was admitted. A typical years, there would be 2.7 billion 8 the Indian Prime Minister: “China expression of this position appeared people again.” has no atom bombs now and I don’t during Mao Zedong’s talk with Anna Accepting this overly simplistic know whether India has them or not. Louis Strong, an American corre- view of nuclear weapons, Chinese We have just started our research.”12 spondent, in August 1945, immedi- leaders believed that any sovereign ately after the United States bombed state had a legal right to develop Since the development of nuclear Japan with two atom bombs. He nuclear weapons for self-defense, weapons was seen as the legal right said: just as they could develop any con- of sovereign states, Chinese leaders The atom bomb is a paper ventional weapon. China decided to treated cooperation among socialist tiger which the U.S. reac- tionaries use to scare develop nuclear weapons in the mid- countries in this field as a kind of people. It looks terrible, but 1950s. The inherent logic for it was manifestation of proletarian interna- in fact it isn’t. Of course, very clear: “Since many countries tionalism. the atom bomb is a weapon of mass destruction, but the are developing them, surely China When China began to develop outcome of a war is decided has to do the same. We would hope nuclear weapons, it got some impor- by the people, not by one or nuclear weapons could be banned, 13 two new types of weapons.5 tant help from the Soviet Union, but until then we will still have to especially in October 1957, when 9 Nine years later, Mao still adhered develop them.” Marshal Nie Rongzhen, the Chinese to that view of nuclear weapons. In Moreover, China regarded its de- leader who was in charge of the de- October 1954, he was told by Indian velopment of nuclear weapons as velopment of nuclear bombs and Prime Minister Nehru that there was support for the world’s “oppressed missiles, visited Moscow. Nie and a qualitative difference between cold people.” On May 17, 1960, Mao his Soviet counterpart signed the weapons, hot weapons, and atom Zedong told a delegation of the Al- “Agreement on Producing New bombs.6 The basic difference among gerian provisional government: Weapons and Military Technologi- them, Mao responded, lies in the fact There are many people in cal Equipment and Establishing Syn- that only a relatively few people can our country, but only a very thetic Atomic Industry,” in which the be killed and wounded with cold limited amount of steel. France exploded two atom Soviet Union promised to assist weapons, a few more with hot weap- bombs and we don’t even China in its efforts to develop ons, and even more with atom have one. It is understand- nuclear weapons. Afterwards, some bombs.7 In Mao’s mind, their sole able for de Gaulle to look down upon us. The French important equipment was sent to difference was reflected in the scope can only see money, steel, China from the Soviet Union, includ- of causalities. and atom bombs. Thank ing two short-range ballistic missiles you for respecting our posi- In 1957, with the successful tion. We don’t have atom (R-2). Also, at that time, some So-

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 41 Mingquan Zhu viet technical experts on atomic later, it tested its first hydrogen bomb. with the United States, was trying to bombs and missiles went to work in The successful development of strangle revolutionary China. Gradu- China. This cooperation on nuclear nuclear weapons changed China’s ally, they became carried away by weapons was highly praised by Chi- position from a non-nuclear weapon the emotion and domestic and devi- nese leaders. At the April 1959 ses- state to a nuclear weapon state and ated from the principles they had sion of the National People’s improved China’s understanding of wanted to defend. Congress, Premier Zhou Enlai said nuclear weapons and nuclear wars. Against this background, China that “the help of the Soviet Union’’ It was at this stage that two major developed its own perceptions and had played “a tremendous part” in nuclear powers—the Soviet Union policies on nuclear nonprolifera- 14 the development of China. and the United States—entered se- tion—both for pragmatic reasons As Sino-Soviet relations deterio- rious talks and reached some influ- and for purposes of doctrinal debate. rated, however, the situation ential agreements related to nuclear At the same time, China could de- changed. The Soviet government nonproliferation, including the Lim- velop nonproliferation policies be- unilaterally withdrew from all agree- ited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT, 1963) cause it had a better understanding ments related to the development of and the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera- of these issues. nuclear weapons, refusing to provide tion of Nuclear Weapons (NPT, Chinese leaders insisted on the China with sample atom bombs or 1968), which banned the spread of right of peace-loving countries to technical information for atom bomb nuclear weapons to non-nuclear develop their own nuclear weapons and missile production. China con- weapon states, and the Threshold in order to break the so-called nuclear demned this as a naked betrayal of Test Ban Treaty (TTBT, 1974). monopoly and end the nuclear threats the friendship and solidarity among There were various motives for such and nuclear blackmail carried out by socialist countries. agreements, but, one key aim must the major nuclear powers. Accord- have been to prevent China from ing to Chinese leaders, it was the SECOND STAGE: getting nuclear weapons or improv- nuclear monopoly and correspond- ACCEPTANCE OF THE ing its nuclear arsenal. If China had ing behavior of the nuclear powers NONPROLIFERATION NORM signed the LTBT in 1963, it could that had seriously endangered peace, AND INDEPENDENCE FROM not have conducted its nuclear test security, and stability in the world. THE INTERNATIONAL the next year. Also, if China had Obviously, this posture continued NONPROLIFERATION adhered to the TTBT, it could not China’s position shaped during the REGIME have improved its nuclear weapons period from 1949 to 1962. by testing. The second stage covers the pe- When China was developing its riod from 1962 to 1984, when China Also, during this time, a system- nuclear weapons under arduous con- joined the International Atomic En- atic theoretical debate developed be- ditions, the Soviet government in- ergy Agency (IAEA). At this stage, tween China and the Soviet Union formed China of its mutual on various issues, including the China began to build up its own understandings reached with the nuclear arsenal. The collapse of nuclear issue. The Chinese side United States in August 1962. The nuclear cooperation between China claimed its position and policy were Soviets and United States agreed and the Soviet Union was a heavy really Marxist and Leninist, criticiz- that: 1) nuclear weapon states would blow to China in its efforts to de- ing the Soviets’ as revisionist. While assume the obligation not to transfer Chinese leaders had a different un- velop nuclear weapons. At the same nuclear weapons and technical infor- time, China was experiencing severe derstanding of Marxist-Leninist mation needed for their production economic difficulties as a result of theories and were influenced by their to non-nuclear weapon states; and 2) the disastrous “Great Leap For- theoretical divergence with the So- non-nuclear weapon states would as- ward.” China’s time-table for atom viet side, they were dominated by a sume the obligation not to produce unique revolutionary emotion and bomb development was delayed ac- nuclear weapons or to ask for them cordingly. Nevertheless, China made national concerns. They believed from nuclear weapon states and not its first test of an atom bomb on Oc- their views were absolutely right, and to accept technical information tober 16, 1964. Nearly three years that the Soviet Union, in collusion needed for their production. The

42 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 Mingquan Zhu

Chinese government responded in a but suggested nevertheless that and adopted an attitude critical of memo that China could not support nuclear weapons and associated tech- nonproliferation talks and agreements a treaty by which any country nical materials needed for their pro- initiated by the two major superpow- “would have privileges to monopo- duction not be exported and imported ers; China was unwilling to partici- lize nuclear capability in the world under any conditions.19 This position pate in the international and issue orders arbitrarily to other was further developed after China nonproliferation regime centered on countries.”15 possessed nuclear weapons. On Oc- the NPT. This refusal was the main On August 15, 1963, in an official tober 16, 1964, the day China made factor that differentiated China’s non- statement, the Chinese government its first successful nuclear test, the proliferation policy at this stage from said: “It depends on whose hands Chinese government reiterated this that of the later third stage. 20 they have been put into whether position in an official statement. On When the United States, the So- nuclear weapons are beneficial to the November 3 of the same year, at his viet Union, and the United Kingdom peace; ‘no’ in the hands of imperial- meeting with the British Minister of signed the LTBT in 1963, the Chi- ist countries but ‘yes’ in the hands Trade, Zhou Enlai criticized the U.S. nese government pointed out of socialist countries.”16 plan for a multilateral nuclear force sharply: “The key purpose of this by remarking that “it means nuclear treaty is to make all peace-loving On November 19, 1963, in an proliferation.”21 open letter to the Soviet leaders that countries, China included, unable to increase their defensive force by the dealt with the issue of peace and war After the NPT was signed in 1968, in particular, China said: “We have China adopted a position critical of partial nuclear test ban, so that the consistently held that socialist coun- its discriminatory nature and refused United States can make unbridled tries have to get and maintain nuclear to adhere to it. Nevertheless, Chinese threats and blackmail against 24 superiority. Only then can we force leaders declared publicly that China them.” imperialism not to dare to initiate would avoid nuclear proliferation When the three nuclear weapon nuclear wars and make our contri- and would not help other states in states signed the NPT in 1968, Chi- butions to the complete prohibition their efforts to develop nuclear nese leaders lashed out violently and 22 of nuclear weapons.”17 The letter weapons. persistently against its “hypocrisy” concluded with: “The more coun- In the same spirit, China encour- and “discrimination.” Ten years tries develop their own nuclear aged the establishment of nuclear later, the Chinese government, in a weapons, the more possible it is to weapon-free zones. This issue was document submitted to the United prohibit nuclear weapons, and the raised first on August 11, 1963, Nations, made the following state- more possible it is to delay a world when Zhou Enlai met a delegation ment: war.”18 This letter sounded like an- from Columbia. He said: “I have an The so-called NPT is a con- spiracy concocted by the other argument for multilateral idea: A nuclear weapon-free zone USSR and the U.S. to main- nuclear deterrence. should be established in Latin tain their nuclear monopoly. America. It should not be permitted By it, they not only try to However, China made it clear that restrict other countries in it would not approve the import and to use, import, make, or test nuclear their efforts to develop export of nuclear weapons. In ef- weapons, so that this region will not nuclear force for self-defense, but limit their peace- fect, it accepted the norm of nuclear be threatened by nuclear weapons. 23 ful uses of nuclear energy. nonproliferation. Thus, China’s non- Is it not very attractive?” On Au- While the two superpowers proliferation policy made major gust 21, 1973, China signed Proto- are further intensifying the vertical proliferation of progress at this stage. col No. 2 to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in nuclear weapons, they seek China’s position on export and to limit the horizontal pro- Latin America and the Caribbean liferation of nuclear weap- import of weapons can be traced (“Treaty of Tlatelolco”). It was the ons. They praise the NPT back to the time when China did not first of the five nuclear weapon states as a major measure in over- possess its nuclear weapons. In a coming the threat of nuclear to sign. war. This does not convince 1963 statement issued about the others. There is no reason LTBT, the Chinese government dis- While China accepted the norm of to impose the NPT on other 25 closed the “hypocrisy” of the treaty, nonproliferation, it remained vigilant countries arbitrarily.

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 43 Mingquan Zhu

In fact, Chinese leaders were very weapons. On September 24, 1961, amount of nuclear weapons would sensitive to any suggestion made by he asked the British Marshall Mont- only serve for the purpose of self- the two superpowers on nonprolif- gomery whether it was possible to defense. This principle also embod- eration and other arms control is- reach an agreement not to use ied China’s new understanding of sues. In November 1977, the Soviet nuclear weapons.27 On August 22, the catastrophe of nuclear war. Union made some suggestions on a 1964, in meeting with foreign visi- comprehensive nuclear test ban and tors, Mao Zedong said: THIRD STAGE: GRADUAL consolidation of the nonproliferation It is possible for our coun- AND OVERALL try to produce a few atom regime. Chen Chu, the Chinese del- bombs, but we are not go- INTEGRATION WITH THE egate, said in the United Nations: ing to use them. Why do we INTERNATIONAL Everyone knows that the want to produce them if we COMMUNITY Soviet Union has conducted are not going to use them? several hundred nuclear We will use them as defen- The third stage began in 1983 and tests. After enough nuclear sive weapons. Some nuclear continues today. At this stage, Deng tests in the atmosphere had powers, especially the been made, then it sug- United States, like to use Xiaoping, the de facto Chinese para- gested a limited nuclear test atom bombs to threaten mount leader, initiated a program of 28 ban. Now, after enough un- other countries. developing the national economy derground nuclear tests This no-first-use principle was for- have been conducted, it sug- and improving the people’s living gests a ‘temporary’ ban of mally made public on October 17, standards. Guided by this pragmatic any nuclear test. Actually it 1964, the next day after the first line, China is experiencing a new went ahead boldly with Chinese test of atom bomb. On be- nuclear tests when they “Long March” of reform and open- were needed, and would not half of the Chinese government, ing up. let others conduct such tests Zhou Enlai sent a telegram to all after it has done enough.26 heads of government in the world. In order to achieve these goals, as Finally, Chinese leaders suggested a It said that “the Chinese government Deng Xiaoping pointed out, both a no-first-use principle as the first step declares solemnly: At any time and stable domestic environment and a toward the goal of the complete pro- under any situation, China will not peaceful international environment hibition and thorough destruction of use nuclear weapons first.” Also, this are needed. He said, “only with a nuclear weapons. This was China’s letter recommended a conference of peaceful environment can [eco- major contribution to nonprolifera- government heads of all countries to nomic] development be accom- 30 tion thinking. Since then, it has stuck discuss the comprehensive prohibi- plished smoothly.” Furthermore, in to this principle. tion and thorough destruction of his mind, a peaceful international environment was emerging. On In the late 1940s, the Soviet Union nuclear weapons. As a first step, the first promoted the slogan of the com- conference should reach an agree- March 4, 1985, in a meeting with a ment on the following points: Japanese delegation, he said: plete prohibition of nuclear weap- For many years, we have ons. Significantly, since its “Countries which own or will own always emphasized the dan- establishment in 1949, the PRC has nuclear weapons soon, should as- ger of war. Now there have always seen complete prohibition as sume the responsibility not to use been some changes in our views. We feel that forces a fundamental goal of nuclear disar- nuclear weapons against non- which can restrict the dan- mament, even after the Soviet Union nuclear weapon states, against ger of war have made en- turned away from this slogan be- nuclear weapon-free zones, or couraging progress in spite against each other.”29 of its continuous exist- cause of its unrealistic nature. But, ence.31 at the same time, China devised a no- The no-first-use principle is con- With this recognition, China not only first-use policy as an initial step to- sistent with China’s repeated state- opened up its national gate to foreign ward the final goal. Thus, China ments that its nuclear weapons were traders and foreign investors gradu- integrated an ideal approach with a developed to break the nuclear mo- ally, but also became more willing to realistic goal. nopoly, nuclear threats, and nuclear cooperate with the outside world on The idea was suggested by Mao blackmail of the major nuclear political and security issues, includ- Zedong before China owned nuclear weapon states. China’s very limited ing nonproliferation.

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Also, since 1985, a widespread and courage nuclear proliferation, and we ponent of the international nonpro- thoughtful exchange of views has don’t help other states to develop liferation regime, calling it “discrimi- been promoted between Chinese of- nuclear weapons.”34 In 1987, Wu natory.” However, in August 1990, a ficials and scholars and their West- Xueqian, China’s Foreign Minister, delegation from China attended the ern counterparts. This exchange has said to the 42nd Session of the U.N. Fourth NPT Review Conference, as played a very positive role in bring- General Assembly: “We don’t stand observers, held in Geneva. In its ing about a kind of consensus be- for, encourage, or engage in nuclear “Document on Basic Positions” sub- tween China and Western countries proliferation.”35 This statement ex- mitted to the conference, the delega- on the negative affects of nuclear presses the so-called policy of “three tion admitted that “the NPT has proliferation on global and regional not’s.” Especially since the late played a certain positive role in the stability and on approaches for pre- 1980s, the Chinese government has prevention of nuclear proliferation venting nuclear proliferation. reiterated this “three not’s” policy and the maintenance of world peace 37 Therefore, China has become again and again in response to criti- and stability.” Then, one year later, more integrated with and more ac- cisms of China’s position on nuclear on August 10, 1991, Premier Li Peng commodating of the international exports. announced that “the Chinese govern- nonproliferation regime. First, con- More significantly, after a long ment has in principle decided to ac- trary to its previous position, China period of caution and hesitation, cede to the NPT in order to promote now has established a position of China has gradually developed its the goal of achieving the comprehen- objecting to any nuclear prolifera- overall cooperation with the inter- sive prohibition and thorough destruc- 38 tion. national nonproliferation regime. tion of nuclear weapons.” On March 9, 1992, China acceded to the As late as in the early 1980s, In 1984, China joined the IAEA. NPT formally. In May 1995, at the China was “emphatically opposed to Since then, China has undertaken to Fifth review conference of the NPT, any production of nuclear weapons fulfill the obligations stipulated by the China supported the decision to ex- by racists and expansionists such as IAEA Statute, including the obliga- tend the treaty indefinitely. South Africa and Israel.”32 After- tion to apply IAEA safeguards as a wards, this “selective” attitude condition for its nuclear exports. In A new development related to the changed. Particularly in the early 1985, China declared that, of its own change of China’s attitude to the 1990s, Chinese leaders repeated free will, it would submit part of its NPT is the publication of its three China’s absolute opposition to civilian nuclear facilities to IAEA safe- principles on nuclear exports: 1) they nuclear proliferation on various oc- guards. In 1988, China and the IAEA should serve peaceful uses only; 2) casions. On April 1, 1991, in a meet- signed an agreement on voluntary IAEA safeguards should be accepted; ing with Director General Hans Blix safeguards under which China pro- and 3) no transfers to a third country of the IAEA, Premier Li Peng said: vided the IAEA with a list of facili- should be made without China’s con- 39 “China’s position is clear-cut, that ties subject to such safeguards. In sent. is, China won’t practice nuclear pro- November 1991, China officially an- While China was preparing to ac- liferation. Meanwhile, we are nounced that on a regular basis it cede to the NPT, it also adopted a against the proliferation of nuclear would report to the IAEA any ex- more amenable attitude toward the weapons by any other country.”33 ports to or imports from non-nuclear Missile Technology Control Regime Also, at this stage, China promul- weapon states involving nuclear ma- (MTCR). In November 1991, when gated a policy, in unequivocal lan- terials of one effective kilogram or U.S. Secretary of State James Baker guage, of not helping other countries more. In July 1993, China formally visited Beijing, the Chinese govern- in their efforts to develop nuclear promised that it would voluntarily ment showed its willingness to abide weapons. report to the IAEA any imports or by the guidelines and parameters of exports of nuclear materials and all the MTCR on the condition that the In January 1984, when the Chi- exports of nuclear equipment and re- United States would cancel three nese premier visited New York City, lated non-nuclear materials.36 sanction measures it had imposed on he told leaders of The New York China one year earlier.40 On Febru- Times: “We neither support nor en- For years after 1968, China refused to sign the NPT, a crucial com- ary 1, 1992, Chinese Foreign Minis-

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 45 Mingquan Zhu ter Qian Qichen furnished Baker with Judging by experience and the les- as violations of its obligations under written confirmation of this obliga- sons learned by the international com- the NPT. In the case of the MTCR, tion. According to Baker, Qian agreed munity on nuclear proliferation the same problem exists. Moreover, specifically to observe the MTCR prevention, only when these issues there are still some disagreements guidelines when transferring M-9 and have been answered and solved prop- between the two nations over the M-11 missiles.41 On May 28-29, erly can the existing nuclear nonpro- pledges that have been made by 1992, at the third round of conven- liferation regime be strengthened. China and the responsibilities that tional arms talks among the five per- The true goal of nuclear nonprolif- China should accept according to manent U.N. Security Council eration, namely, the achievement of certain international conventions. members, the “Interim Guidelines” a just and lasting peace in the world, Nevertheless, the PRC’s nonpro- were agreed upon for exports of tech- can then be advanced very effec- liferation policy has gone through a nologies related to weapons of mass tively. very positive process of gradual evo- destruction. That document referred lution and improvement since its again to China’s “support for” the CONCLUSIONS founding in 1949. China has become MTCR.42 Because of their own international more cooperative with the policies At this stage, China developed a positions, political philosophies, and of most other countries in the world. complete and systematic policy security perspectives, China and 1. China has accepted the perspec- framework on nuclear nonprolifera- Western countries, especially the tive supported by most other coun- tion. Generally, China has contem- United States, still have substantial tries on the danger of nuclear plated the issue of nonproliferation differences in perceptions and poli- proliferation. In the 1950s and early in a broader context than most other cies on nonproliferation. As an ex- 1960s, not only did Chinese leaders countries. In China’s view, nonpro- ample, China has laid more stress on claim that “peace-loving” and social- liferation is not a goal in itself. Sign- the special responsibilities and obli- ist countries had a right to develop ing and extending the NPT are not gations of the major nuclear pow- nuclear weapons, but they also be- sufficient. In order to rid mankind ers—the United States and lieved that this spread of nuclear of the threat of nuclear war and bring Russia—for nuclear nonprolifera- weapons would strengthen interna- about a world free from nuclear tion. In addition, China has paid tional peace. By the 1990s, China weapons, nonproliferation should be more attention to the right of devel- had formally declared its opposition pursued together with other mea- oping countries in the peaceful uses to nuclear proliferation by “any sures: the signing of a no-first-use of nuclear energy. Moreover, China country.” Thus, over the course of treaty by nuclear weapon states, the still has some reservations about the 30 years, China’s position has been conclusion of a Comprehensive Test nature and functions of some inter- adjusted radically. Ban Treaty (CTBT), the promotion national institutions and agreements. of nuclear disarmament, and inter- 2. China has completely accepted There are also some important national cooperation on the peace- the international norm of not help- differences between China and the ful uses of nuclear energy.43 ing other countries in their efforts to United States on whether China has develop nuclear weapons. By 1987, This policy framework provides kept the pledges it made and ac- China had developed the policy of insight into the real aim of nonpro- cepted responsibility under the in- the “three not’s,” the essence of liferation as well as practical means ternational nonproliferation regime. which is to eschew nuclear prolif- of achieving nonproliferation. In other words, are there any discrep- eration. Also, Chinese leaders have Moreover, it offers a firm basis for ancies between what China has said affirmed that China has not helped dealing with various issues involving and what it has done? The Chinese any country develop nuclear weap- nuclear nonproliferation: How to bal- government claims that it has never ons. Despite some differences over ance the relationship between non- exported sensitive technologies such the discrepancies between China’s proliferation and nuclear as those for uranium enrichment, words and deeds, it is very apparent disarmament? And how to balance reprocessing and heavy water pro- that, as a whole, China has accepted the relations between nonproliferation duction. The United States, however, the obligations established by the in- and peaceful uses of nuclear energy? has criticized some of China’s exports ternational community.

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3. China has made substantial possible for China to strengthen its International Security 20 (Winter 1995-96); Shirley Kan, “Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass progress towards cooperation with cooperation with the international Destruction: Current Policy Issues,” CRS Issues the international nonproliferation community in many ways, including Brief, October 17, 1996; Wendy Frieman, “New regime. Since the early 1980s, it has nonproliferation. Members of the Club: Chinese Participation in Arms Control Regimes 1980-1995,” The Nonprolifera- stopped isolating itself from the in- Third, China has been involved in tion Review 3 (Spring-Summer 1996). 3 Xie Yixian, Zhongguo Waijiaoshi 1949/1979 (A ternational community and has taken a continuous learning process. It a more approving attitude toward Diplomatic History of China) (Zhengzhou: Henan learns from itself. For example, the People’s Press, 1988), p. 298. various international organizations development of its nuclear arsenal 4 Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung (Pe- and conventions on nonproliferation, king: Foreign Language Press, 1968), p. 302. Mao has deepened its understanding of Tse-tung is the old spelling of Mao Zedong. either by joining them or by agree- the dangers of nuclear proliferation. 5 Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Volume 4 (Pe- ing to abide by them. In general, More importantly, by frequent ex- king: Foreign Language Press, 1967), p. 100. China has begun to play a more im- 6 Cold weapons are those made of “cold” metal, changes with the outside world, such as spear and sword; hot weapons are those portant role in these regimes. many new concepts and ideas relat- using powder, such as gun and cannon. 7 Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan (Selected Works 4. China has established a system- ing to arms control and nonprolif- of Mao Zedong on Foreign Affairs) (Beijing: atic policy framework for nonproliferation have increased in their World Knowledge Press, 1994), pp. 170-172. eration. In time, it will be considered influence on Chinese leaders and the 8 Ibid., p. 294. 9 Zhou Enlai Waijiao Wenxuan (Selected Works more seriously and not just treated professional segment of society. of Zhou Enlai on Foreign Affairs) (Beijing: Cen- as propaganda. China’s nonprolif- tral Archives Press, 1990), p. 319. Differences and conflicts on non- 10 eration efforts will then become Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan, p. 420. proliferation policy between China 11 Zhou Enlai Waijiao Wenxuan, p. 319. much more effective. and the United States exist. But, this 12 Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan, p. 170. 13 See John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China There are three broad trends that gap has been significantly narrowed Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University support this positive evolution of in spite of some twists and turns in Press, 1988), pp. 39-41; Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, China’s Arms Acquisition from Abroad (Ox- China’s nonproliferation policy, and the process. Since the world is un- ford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 28-30. they can be expected to continue and dergoing a profound transformation 14 O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov, Soviet-Chi- accelerate for a long time in the fu- in terms of its material environment nese Relations 1945-1970 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975), p. 140. ture. as well as ideological perceptions, 15 Xie, Zhongguo Waijiaoshi, p. 300. 16 First, China’s international stand- these differences and conflicts can Ibid., p. 302. be reduced further. Cooperation 17 Guanyu Guoji Gongchan Zhuyi Yundong ing has improved because of the re- Zongluxian de Bianlun (Debate on the General inforcement of its national defense between China and the United States Line of the International Communist Movement) can improve if both sides take more ( Beijing: People’s Press, 1965), pp. 264-265. and the improvement of the interna- 18 positive attitudes and refrain from Ibid., pp. 264-265. tional environment. It has shifted from 19 Xie, Zhongguo Waijiaoshi, p. 303. being vulnerable to being more se- simple censure or defense. In fact, 20 Ibid., p. 305. this is a field for the two countries 21 Zhou Enlai Waijiao Wenxuan, p. 433. cure. China has become more self- 22 Xie, Zhongguo Waijiaoshi, p. 305. confident in dealing with the two to find common interests and there 23 Ibid., p. 331. are plenty of reasons to be optimis- 24 Ibid., pp. 301-302. major nuclear powers and has been 25 tic about this prospect. Xinhua, “Quanmian Jielu Sulian de ‘Huanhe’ less hesitant to collaborate with the ‘Caijun’ Pianju”(Comprehensive Disclosure of international nonproliferation re- Soviet Fraud of ‘Detente’ and ‘Disarmament’), Rennin Ribao, May 30, 1978, p. 2. gime. 26 Xinhua, “Woguo Daibiaotuan Tuanzhang Huang Hua de Fayan” (The Speech of Huang Hai, Second, China’s national con- Our National Delegation Head), Rennin Ribao, cerns have become more pragmatic December 1, 1977, 6. 27 Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan, p. 476. especially after Deng Xiaoping ush- 1 I would like to express my special thanks to Monte 28 Ibid., p. 540. ered in a new epoch in its history. Bullard, Clay Moltz, and Bates Gill for their com- 29 Zhou Enlai Waijiao Wenxuan, p. 433. Development of the national ments on the drafts of this paper. 30 Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan, Volume 3 (Selected 2 Among them, I would mention Alstair Iain economy and promotion of living Works of Deng Xiaoping) (Beijing: People’s Press, Johnston, “China’s New ‘Old Thinking’,” Inter- 1983), p. 56. standards have become more urgent national Security 20 (Winter 1995-96); Zachary 31 Ibid., p. 105. issues for Chinese leaders. These new Davis, “China’s Nonproliferation and Export 32 Xinhua, “Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping to Control Policies,” Asian Survey 35 (June Indian Journalists,” Chinese Statements on Pro- priorities have made it necessary and 1995); Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser: liferation Issues—1979-1991; in FBIS-SM-91- “Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control,”

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 47 Mingquan Zhu

10007, p. 1. 33 Xinhua, “Premier Li Peng in a Meeting with Di- rector General Hans Blix of the IAEA,” Chinese Statements on Proliferation Issues—1979-1991; in FBIS-SM-91-10007, p. 3. 34 Shanghai Institute of International Studies, Guoji Xingshi Nianjian 1985 (Survey of Interna- tional Affairs) (Shanghai: Shanghai Branch of Chinese Encyclopedia Press, 1985), p. 296. 35 Ibid. 1988, p. 283. 36 International Office of the State Council of the PRC, “China: Arms Control and Disarmament,” Beijing Review, 38, 46 (1995), p. 18. 37 Xinhua, “Bixu Quanmian Jinzhi he Chedi Xiaohui Hewuqi” (Must Prohibit and Dismantle Nuclear Weapons Comprehensively), Renmin Ribao, September 13, 1990, p. 6. 38 Xinhua, “Zhongguo Zhengfu Yuanze Jueding Canjia Bukuosan Hewuqi Tiaoyue” (Chinese Government Decides to Accede to the NPT in Principle), Renmin Ribao, August 11, 1991, p. 1. 39 International Office of the State Council of the PRC, “China: Arms Control and Disarmament,” Beijing Review, 38, 46, (1995), p. 18. 40 Xinhua, “Waijiaobu Fayanren Tan Beike Fanghua Chengguo” (Spokesman of Foreign Min- istry Talk about the Result of Baker’s Visit of China), Renmin Ribao, November 18, 1991, p. 1. 41 Jane A. Morse, “U.S. Lifts Missile Sanction on China,” Foreign Policy Background (Press and Cultural Section, U.S. Embassy in China), FP- 1744, April 9, 1992. 42 Lee Feinstein, “Third Round of Arms Talks to Resolve Notification Issue,” Arms Control Today 22 (June 1992), p. 21. 43 Xinhua, “Chanshu Zhongguo Zhengfu Helichang” (Elaboration of the Nuclear Position of Chinese Government), Beijing Ribao, Septem- ber 21, 1994, p. 4.

48 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997