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Home , Dai Bingguo, Deng Liqun, Ding Guangen, Hua Jianmin, Jiang Chunyun, Jiang Zemin

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Chapter 3 Foreign Policy of the Post- Era

権利 Copyrights 日本貿易振興機構（ジェトロ）アジア 経済研究所 / Institute of Developing Economies, External Trade Organization (IDE-JETRO) http://www.ide.go.jp シリーズタイトル(英 IDE Spot Survey ) シリーズ番号 26 journal or 's New Leadership publication title page range [25]-38 year 2003 URL http://hdl.handle.net/2344/00010291 Chapter 3 Foreign Policy of the Post-Jiang Zemin Era

Introduction er Jiang Zemin will retire from politics com- pletely. Although he retired from the top par- How will the result of the 16th Nation- ty post of General Secretary, he still occupies al Congress of the Communist Party of China of the CPC Central Military Commission, the ("16th National Congress of the CPC") affect supreme commander of the military forces. It China's foreign policy? Will the "Three Rep- is important to consider how his retirement resents" that was recently added to the party or semi-retirement will affect foreign policy. rules bring about any change in foreign pol- icy? How will the newly elected party leader- 3.1 The Formulation of the "16-word ship be involved in policy-making and what Directive" kind of policy will they adopt? This chapter will examine these ques- On September 4, 1989, just three tions from three angles. First, we look into months after the , continuity of foreign policy from the for- Xiaoping discussed international affairs with mer administration. What did the Jiang Zem- "some responsible persons of the central gov- in administration inherit from the former ad- ernment" (Deng [1995, 324]). Deng's idea- ministration and what will they leave to the which later became known as the "16-word next generation? We will discuss the mean- Directive"-was imparted during this discus- ing of the "16-word Directive," a policy Deng sion. The idea was written in 12 Chinese char- Xiaoping designed. Next, we will examine the acters meaning "observe calmly, stand fi rmly, changes in the attitudes toward foreign coun- respond carefully" (Deng [1993, 321]). How- tries. How has foreign policy changed since ever, the Directive currently referred to in of- 's death in February 1997? We fi cial documents is written in 16 characters will study the features of the foreign policy of (Liu [2002, 11]). Thus, there is a discrepancy the Jiang Zemin administration from the 15th in the numbers of the words. The eight char- National Congress in September 1997 to pres- acters not used in the discussion mean "hide ent. Last, we will consider the foreign policy one's ability to buy time and do whatever nec- of the new leadership elected at the 16th Na- essary." tional Congress of the CPC; will the new lead- Even today, 13 years after the Tianan- ership contine or change Jiang's policies? At men Incident, the 16-word Directive is a core the time of writing, the new administration . Liu Huaqiu, Direc- has not been established; thus, the term "new tor of Central Offi ce of the Central Leading leadership" refers to the party leadership. Group for Foreign Affairs and Director of the Although the National People's Con- Foreign Affairs Offi ce of the State Council, gress is held every year in March, the upcom- said, "China must adhere to the 16-word Di- ing meeting immediately after the CPC Na- rective in order to pursue peaceful diplomacy tional Congress will have special signifi cance, independently by correctly grasping complex as the new government leadership will have international politics and economic situations been decided by that time. Refl ecting the re- (Liu [2002, 11])". General Secretary of the shuffl e of the party leadership, the govern- CPC, Jiang Zemin has followed the policy set ment will probably try to rejuvenate the struc- by Deng Xiaoping immediately after the Ti- ture and promote specialization of each ananmen Incident. function. It will also become clearer wheth- What were the practical outcomes of 26 China's New Leadership

this guideline? They were as follows: future. In December in the same year, he also met Scowcroft of the National Security Coun- 3.1.1 Deng Xiaoping's infl uence over cil sent by then President Bush, and clearly foreign policy expressed his intention to improve relations between China and the U.S. Deng is said to On September 4, 1989, the same day as have asked Scowcroft to deliver his person- the discussion mentioned above, Deng Xiaop- al message to Bush, "One old Chinese retired ing resigned as Chairman of the Central Mil- man in the east wishes for the better of China- itary Commission and recommended Jiang U.S. relations" (Chen, Lin et al. [1999, 684]). Zemin as his successor. Although Jiang Zem- in had no military experience, Deng Xiaop- 3.1.2 Continuity of the Foreign Policy ing did not seem to mind. What Deng wanted Making Bodies most for his successor was obedience to the party leadership, because "the military forces In 1984, when Doak Barnett had the op- should always be under the party leadership; portunity to meet then Premier , the recent uprising made it clearer that this he had a rare glimpse of the Chinese system principle is right." Deng added, "In our tra- of foreign policy-making. Generally speak- dition, the military forces follow the party or- ing, in most countries the authority of foreign ders, form no small groups or factions, and al- policies is centralized. China has, Barnett ob- low no centralization of power in a few hands served, perhaps one of the most centralized (Deng [1995, 321])". With no power in the systems. He explained that since the 12th Na- military forces and not known in the political tional Congress of the CPC in 1982, the poli- center, Jiang Zemin exactly met such require- cy-making body for important issues was shift- ments. However, when Deng Xiaoping retired ed from the Political Bureau and the Standing from the Central Military Commission, he en- Committee of the Political Bureau, to the sured that his reliable aides became members Secretariat of the CPC and the State Coun- of the commission. Deng's comrade since the cil (Barnett [1986, 24]). During the meeting days of the revolution, , as- with Barnett, Zhao said, "Ultimately, we seek sumed the post of First Vice-President; Liu guidance from Deng Xiaoping." Huaqing, Vice-President; as , Although we can trace the policy-mak- Yang's half brother, Secretary General. ing process concerning the Tiananmen In- Although he handed over the top mili- cident by referring to unoffi cial documents tary post to Jiang and retired from all offi cial (Nathan and Link [2001]), we do not know posts, Deng remained in the front line of for- much about the policy-making structure after eign affairs. Thus, the 16-word Directive was the incident. From offi cial data, however, we actually implemented by old party leaders, can draw a rough sketch as follows: and Deng in particular, not by Jiang Zemin. (1) remained as Director of the According to unoffi cial sources, the Political CPC Secretariat (General Offi ce). His Bureau made a regulation that any important meeting with the students together with policy must be consulted with Deng Xiaop- Zhao at Tiananmen Square, however, may ing. In any case, Deng worked hard to break have damaged his credibility. Two out of the sanctions the West was enforcing against three deputy directors of the Secretari- China after the Tiananmen Incident. In No- at remained, and the remaining position vember 1989, when he personally met a del- was fi lled by Jiang Zemin's right-hand man, egation of Japanese business groups, Deng , when Jiang took offi ce as emphasized that China would not change its General Secretary. , who was lat- reform and openness policy for a foreseeable er elected as the sole alternate member of Chapter 3 Foreign Policy of the Post-Jiang Zemin Era 27

the Political Bureau at the 16th National as Head of the International Liaison De- Congress of the CPC, was then appointed partment. Regarding continuity, the career as Deputy Director. path of , one of Deng's aides, (2) Qichen kept his post of Minister of is interesting. Before the incident, Ding was Foreign Affairs after the Tiananmen Inci- Vice-Minister of the State Planning Com- dent, as did two vice ministers out of fi ve. mission; in 1990 he was appointed Head However, four people in a similar rank to of the Work Department; in Vice-Minister were replaced by 1991. Liu 1992 he became Head of the Publicity De- Huaqiu, was appointed Vice-Minister in Oc- partment, where he has remained for 10 tober 1989, and in 1991 both Xu Dunx- years. Although , who was re- in who later became ambassador to Japan moved during the , had and Jiang Enzhu who later became the Di- occupied the post for 12 years, his succes- rector of the and Macao Affairs sors normally moved to other positions in Offi ce, were appointed as Vice-Minister. two to three years. Compared with these Similar changes took place in the assistant predecessors, Ding's long tenure is very un- minister posts; three out of four assistant usual. ministers were replaced by 1992. The posts were taken by who was lat- 3.1.3 Larger weight of economy er appointed ambassador to the U.S., who became Head of the Interna- It was Deng Xiaoping himself who se- tional Liaison Department, and Tang Jiaxu- lected as Vice-Premier of the an who climbed to the Minister of Foreign State Council in April 1991, who was then just Affairs. one of the Alternate Members of the Central (3) Until recently, it was not confi rmed that Committee. The State Council at that time the central body of the CPC has an organ consisted of as Premier, , called the "Central Leading small Group and as Vice-Premiers, for Foreign Affairs". Although it is not yet and as Secretary General of the Gen- clear how they are involved in actual poli- eral Offi ce. All of them had been in offi ce cy-making, the composition of this group since before the Tiananmen Incident. Subse- in late 1989, is very interesting. The group quently, Zhu Rongji and Jiahua joined as leader is Premier Li Peng. There are two Vice-Premiers. Zou was a Central Committee subleaders: the former Minister of Foreign Member and it is said that he has taken over Affairs, Wu Xueqian, and the incumbent military industry department which used to minister, . If this group is an be under control of . Once he be- active organization, not a nominal one, that came one of the members of the State Coun- performs the policy-making function, then cil, Zhu worked boldly on many economic is- it embodies the "continuity" and "central- sues. Without doubt, he was backed by Deng ization" of China's foreign policy-making. Xiaoping who asserted that Zhu understood In 1989, Jiang Zemin is not involved in this the economy. group yet. Zhu Rongji established his leadership in (4) In key party organizations, the structure the economic fi eld at the 14th National Con- before the incident remained. The post gress of the CPC held in October 1992. In this in charge of the CPC personnel, Head of National Congress, he was promoted direct- the Organization Department, was kept by ly to Standing Committee Member of the Po- who was valued by Deng. Wang litical Bureau, skipping the two ranks of Cen- Renzhi remained at his post of Head of the tral Committee Member and Political Bureau Publicity Department, as did Zhu Liang Member. Zhu ranked number 5 after Jiang 28 China's New Leadership

Zemin, Li Peng, and . European Communist Block and the USSR. He became the First Vice-Premier directly un- China endured and did not collapse as the der Li Peng and was able to take drastic mea- USSR had, despite the expectations of some sures in economic policies. Deng Xiaoping's observers. Chinese leaders came to realize so-called the Southern Tour in January 1991 that Deng's 16-word Directive was extremely helped Zhu's rise. Being greatly unhappy with effective. the economic operations by Jiang Zemin and Foreign minister Qian Qichen, who was Li Peng, Deng Xiaoping visited for himself concurrently State Councilor, outlined Chi- the Special Economic Zones in na's foreign policy at the Central Party School province and praised the active introduction in September 1992. In his lecture, Qian fi rst of foreign capital in China. Deng decleared, pointed out the "objective reality" of the slug- "Without implementing reforms and open gishness of and the rise of Amer- policy, nothing but death is in store for us. ica as the "only superpower" (Nakai [1997, Cadres who don't understand this must re- 35-36]). Under these circumstances, Chi- place their brains with better ones." In re- na could overcome the "crisis of system" with sponse to this infl ammatory appeal made by the 16-word Directive mentioned above. Qian the "retired elder", the Party Center and State also pointed out that the collapse of the Cold Council urgently made an upward revision of War structure brought advantages to China in their economic goal. Jiang Zemin's political international affaires. According to him, the report clearly stated that China's goal was to advantages to China in the international are- establish a "" (Chen, na were the extinction of the threat from the Lin, et al. [1999, 775]). China, for the fi rst north due to the collapse of the USSR, the de- time, offi cially approved of the market econ- cline of Gorbachev's infl uence, and that Chi- omy. Although the 14th National Congress of na gave the impression to the world that it was the CPC was hosted by General Secretary Ji- stable and impervious to sanctions. Based on ang Zemin, the personnel focus was on the this assessment, Qian proposed the following rise of Zhu Rongji and the economic focus three directions for the future foreign policy was on the Socialist Market Economy. Conse- of China: quently, this National Congress represented (1) To pursue "Omni directional diplomacy." largely the Southern Tour of Deng Xiaoping Such a policy sould be free from ideology instead of the new party leader, Jiang Zemin. to avoid the "crisis of system": (see Table 1 for the historical characteristics Specifi c policies include cooperative relations and main issues of the National Congresses). with the U.S., good-neighbor and amica- ble relations with neighboring countries in- What was the foreign policy of China in cluding Japan, and the re-establishment of the age of the Socialist Market Economy? At diplomatic ties with as many countries as the time of the 14th National Congress of the possible. CPC, the critical situation that followed the (2) To build a friendly external environment Tiananmen Incident was already a thing of for economic development: the past. The economic sanctions imposed on Specifi c policies include participation in inter- China virtually disappeared and foreign in- national cooperation activities in relation vestment started fl owing in after the Southern to the post-Gulf War, nuclear non-prolifer- Tour. The world's attention, which had once ation, the embargo on weapons and peace- been intensively focused on the Tiananmen keeping operations, taking part in region- Incident, turned to a series of other historical al organizations such as APEC and ASEAN, incidents, including the collapse of the Berlin and opening the huge Chinese market to Wall, the Gulf War, and the collapse of East foreign countries. Chapter 3 Foreign Policy of the Post-Jiang Zemin Era 29 n ress our ress s “Souther ress ress ress ress ress ress ress aobang our” Cong Characteristics Liu & Deng Cong Cong The Gang of F Cong Cong Hu Y Cong Zhao Ziyang Cong Deng’ T Jiang & Zhu Cong Jiang Zemin Cong ter aobang ang Hongwen Main Repor Lin Biao W Hua Guofeng Hu Y Zhao Ziyang Jiang Zemin Jiang Zemin Jiang Zemin m man Mao opic nizations Major T our Principles, Refor our Moder and Opening) One Center (economic development) and Two Basic Points (F Socialist Market Economy The Flag of Deng Xiaoping F “Two Alls” of Chair General Line of Socialism Completion of the Cultural Revolution Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius ang President 1959 Liu Shaoqi 1983 1988 Y Shangkun 1993 Jiang Zemin Jiang Zemin 2003 ty of China r en Premier unist Pa Zhou Enlai 1968 Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping step down Zhou Enlai Zhou Enlai 1975 (Vice Premier) Deng Hua Guofeng Zhao Ziyang 1988 Li Peng Li Peng 1998 Zhu Rongji Jiabao 2003 W man) ty of China (1999). y Commission man of Central Chair Militar Mao Zedong Mao Zedong Deng Mao Zedong 1975 (Vice Chair Hua Guofeng Deng Xiaoping Deng Xiaoping 1989 Jiang Zemin Jiang Zemin Jiang Zemin Jiang Zemin man) man) man ears of the Communist Par aobang Fifty Y fice ty Chair aobang Par eb. 1997 Deng dies Mao Zedong 1959 (Vice Chair Lin Biao Mao Zedong 1971 Lin Biao dies Mao Zedong Hua Guofeng 1977 (Vice Chair Deng 1980 Hu Y Hu Y 1982 Deng Chief Advisor 1986 Hu steps down Zhao Ziyang 1989 Zhao steps down; Jiang Zemin takes of Jiang Zemin F Jiang Zemin Hu Jintao w of National Congresses the Comm ress ress ress ress ress ress ress ress ress Name teenth teenth our enth National Eighth National Cong Ninth National Cong T Cong Eleventh National Cong Twelfth National Cong Thir National Cong F National Cong Fifteenth National Cong Sixteenth National Cong . . . ble 1 Overvie ime T Sept. 1956 Apr 1969 Aug. 1973 Aug. 1977 Sept. 1982 Nov 1987 Oct. 1992 Sept. 1997 Nov 2002 Ta Source: Prepared by the author using 30 China's New Leadership

(3) To keep a trilateral balance among China, ly, China is actively approaching not only to the U.S. and Japan: neighboring countries including Russia and Specifi c policies are to focus on the U.S. those in Southeast Asia, but also countries in as the main target of diplomacy for the Europe, Central Asia, Africa and South and time being, to avail of inconsistencies in Central America. This gives the impression the Japan-U.S. relationship for building re- that the "omnidirectional diplomacy" pro- lations between China and the U.S., to ad- posed by Deng Xiaoping and Qian Qichen just relations with Russia, Europe and Asia- has fi nally bloomed. No doubt these improve- Pacifi c countries in order to restrain the ments in foreign policy are backed by the de- trilateral relation between China, the U.S. velopment of economic interdependence. and Japan, to maintain restraining factors In this section, I will analyze how Ji- against both Japan and the U.S., to open ang Zemin took the leadership in foreign re- the Chinese market to the U.S. while taking lations before and after the death of Deng advantage of the war liability issue with Ja- Xiaoping and how he interpreted Deng's ba- pan (Nakai [1997, 40-41]). sic directives and implemented them as actual China took the directions proposed by policies. The conclusions in this section can Qian throughout the . Its perception of be outlined in advance as follows: the world and organization remained large- (1) Jiang Zemin did not alter the 16-word Di- ly the same during that period. The directive rective as a framework of foreign policy. Ji- issued by Deng Xiaoping immediately after ang held up the "fl ag of Deng Xiaoping" in the Tiananmen Incident was put to the test by regards to foreign policy and used his po- drastic changes in the world that took place sition as Deng's successor as a basis for au- thereafter. In late 1992 the directive took the thority. form of the policy mentioned above. Jiang Ze- (2) Jiang Zemin took the lead in forming an min had only to follow these prearranged pol- organization and personnel arrangement icies. A proverb in America says: "If it ain't who were to fulfi ll Deng's directives. He broke, don't fi x it." Jiang Zemin, having taken built, in his own style, an organization and top position, had no power to correct even a personnel network in relation to the for- gaping problem if one arose. Thus, continuity eign policy. of Chinese foreign policy resulted. (3) Jiang Zemin entrusted Zhu Rongji with economic issues and he himself chose to 3.2 Jiang Zemin's Foreign Policy specialize in the administration of the Par- ty. Economic reform had a high risk of fail- Deng Xiaoping died in February 1997. ing. Contrary to the predictions of some experts (4) Consequently, this division of labor for a revolt in the whole country, no such dis- worked effectively. Jiang Zemin left to Zhu turbance happened and international affairs the fi nancial and administrative reforms surrounding China underwent a peaceful which were likely to face domestic opposi- transition. In particular, the China-U.S. rela- tion, while involving himself in top-level di- tions, which had been deteriorating on and plomacy and ideology and education cam- off since the Clinton administration, remark- paigns, thus maintaining continuously his ably improved following the September 11 in- position as the leading fi gure and the top cident in 2001. As for relations with Japan, policymaker of China. there was a sign of recurrence of the "his- toric problem" when Jiang Zemin visited Ja- Now look at the characteristics of Jiang pan in late November 1998, but the situation Zemin's approach towards foreign policies. has been improving since then. More recent- Chapter 3 Foreign Policy of the Post-Jiang Zemin Era 31

3.2.1 The Establishment of Personal framework in charge of foreign affairs estab- Leadership lished by Deng was not changed, the member- ship changed gradually. First of all, when and how did Jiang es- Meanwhile a remarkable change was tablish his leadership in foreign policy? As happening in several "leading small groups" seen in the previous section, the main weak in the center of the Party. Jiang Zemin started point in the transition of power from Deng appointing his close associates to these small to Jiang was the problem of leadership in the groups. For details of these Central Leading military. For Jiang, the turning point came Groups, refer to Table 2. The division of work earlier than expected. In March 1993, First between Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji is ob- Vice-President of the Central Military Com- vious at the central level. Further, Zeng Qin- mission, Yang Shangkun, and Secretary Gen- ghong, who was promoted to an Alternate eral, Yang Baibing were dismissed, and Liu Member of the Political Bureau at the same Haoging and , who were close- time as to a Central Committee Member in ly trusted by Deng, were inaugurated as Vice- the 15th National Congress of the CPC in Presidents. At the same time, other than Chi 1997, became a member of the Central Lead- Haotiau, who remained as a member of the ing Group in 1993 and 1994. Zeng was a rank- Central Military Commission, Zhang Wann- and-fi le member at that time. ian, Yu Yongbo, and Fu Quanyou were newly In regard to foreign policy, there are appointed as Members of the Central Military two points to note here. First, Jiang Zemin was Commission. Thereafter, they occupied ma- inaugurated as the head of the Central Lead- jor positions in the military under Jiang Zem- ing Group for Taiwan Affairs in January 1994. in. The Jiang Zemin regime started at the mil- With Qian Quichen as Deputy Head, the line- itary center. up strongly suggested that Jiang Zemin's fi rst During the same period, Jiang became task in foreign policy would be Taiwan affairs. President in succession to Yang Shangkun, In fact, Jiang Zemin proposed an "eight-point and Zeng Qinghong, who had been Jian's key proposal for the peaceful unity of China" in intellect since the period, was ap- January 1995. It gave the impression at home pointed as Director of Secretariats of the CPC and abroad that it was Jiang Zemin who took (General Offi ce). Considering that Zeng was the responsibility for China's new policy to- a rank-and-fi le member at that time, and the wards Taiwan. (Ijiri [1997,75]) Chinese pol- predecessor, Wen Jabao, was a Central Com- icy towards Taiwan hardened after Taiwan's mittee Member, this was an extremely unusual Li Denghui administration turned down the promotion. Zeng was also appointed as Secre- proposal and President Li Denghui visited the tary of the Work Committee for Organs under United States in 1995. After the so-called Tai- Central Committee, and strived to build the wan Straits Crisis in March 1996, Chinese-Tai- Jiang regime. At the same time, the Minis- wanese and Chinese-American relations set- ter of Foreign Affairs, Qian Qichen, was in- tled down. Taiwan affairs, however, remain augurated as Vice-Premier of the State Coun- the biggest issue in Chinese-American rela- cil with , and the position of those tions. In other words, the person in charge of in charge of foreign affairs was raised by one Taiwan affairs virtually takes the initiative in rank. In the Party, the aforementioned Head foreign relations. Therefore, it is necessary to of the Publicity Department, Ding Guangen, monitor who will be the Head of the Leading Head of the United Front Work Department, Group for Taiwan Affairs after the 16th Na- , and Li Shuzheng of the In- tional Congress of the CPC. ternational Liaison Department were new- Secondly, Jiang Zemin was inaugurat- ly appointed, and though the organizational ed as the Head of Leading Group for Foreign 32 China's New Leadership

Table 2 Leading Small Groups at the Party Center (as of 2002)

Central leading small group for Taiwan affairs Central leading small group for Party organization Title Name date Title Name date chair Jiang Zemin 1994.1 chair Hu Jintao 1994 vice chair Qian Qichen 1994.1 vice chair Li Lanqing 1994 chief secretary Zeng Qinghong 2000.10 vice chair 1994 member 1995.9 vice chair Zhang Quanjing 1999.3 member Xiong Guangkai 1996.2 vice chair Zheng Keyang 1999.11 member Xu Yongyao 1998.5 member Zeng Qinghong 1994.6 member Chen Yunlin 1998.5 Central leading small group for propaganda and ideology Central leading small group for foreign affairs Title Name date Title Name date vice chair Wang Maolin 1999.3 chair Jiang Zemin 1998.6 member Zeng Qinghong 1993.1 vice chair Zhu Rongji 1998.6 vice chair Qian Qichen 1989.12 Central leading small group for Party history chief secretary Liu Shuqing 1989.12 Title Name date secretary Liu Huaqiu 1994.12 vice chair 1990.3 vice secretary Lu Fengding 1999.12 vice chair 1990.8 Central leading small group for financial and economic affairs Central leading small group for village affairs date Title Name date Title Name chair Zhu Rongji 1994 chair Wen Jiabao 1998 vice chair 1994.11 vice chair Ma Zhongchen 2000.10 member 1994.11 member 1994.11 member Liu Zhongli 1994.11 member Zhou Zhengqing 1994.11 member 1994.11 chief secretary Wen Jiabao 1993.3 vice secretary 1993.2 vice secretary 1998.4 vice secretary Ma Zhongchen 2000.10 Source: Radiopress, China Directory 2003.

Affairs relatively recently in June 1998. Zhu display his own initiatives. Rongji was appointed as deputy at the same What kind of initiatives did Jiang Zem- time. The group may well be one of the cen- in try in his foreign policy? First, let me intro- tral organs which is the most directly involved duce the latest views of Chinese governmental in foreign policy. As mentioned above, Li research institutes. The report titled "Inter- Peng was in offi ce as the Head of the Group national Strategy and Evaluation of Safety" by from 1989 until Jiang Zemin took his place. the China Institute of Contemporary Inter- Then Qian Quichen and Wu Xueqian were national Relations, states as follows in regard Deputy Heads. Judging from the line-up, the to Chinese diplomatic strategy from 2001 to function of the group might have been to 2002 (Lu [2002, 254-272]): guarantee the continuity of Deng Xiaoping's (1) China promoted multipolarity against the directives. The position as Head of the Group unilateralism by the U.S. Specifi cally, China might have enabled Li Peng, who was los- consistently opposed America's Missile De- ing infl uence within the party in spite of be- fense Plans. China established the Shang- ing No.2, to desperately protect his interests hai Cooperation Organization in June by exercising a kind of veto. In any case, it was 2001, and China, Russia and central Asian more than one year after Deng Xiaoping's countries confi rmed the diversity of civiliza- death and half a year after the 15th National tions and opposed hegemonism, China also Congress of the CPC that Jiang Zemin could defeated America's anti- Chinese human Chapter 3 Foreign Policy of the Post-Jiang Zemin Era 33

rights proposals at the United Nations. (1) The conceptualization of Deng Xiaoping's (2) China dealt appropriately and calmly with Judgement diffi cult incidents between China and the As mentioned before, Deng Xiaop- U.S. The emergency landing of the U.S. re- ing's 16-word Directive originated in the crisis connaissance plane did not damage China's just after the Tiananmen Incident. Deng was national statue. a genuine realist and not concerned much (3) After the terrorist attacks against the U.S. about creating political slogans. Jiang Zemin on September 11, China promptly joined is different. The Jiang administration has dis- the international anti-terrorism actions. Ji- seminated many slogans across China. Some ang Zemin made a phone call to President of those slogans were about foreign policy. Bush, promising his support for anti-terror- Let me discuss two examples here. ism efforts, soon after the attacks. China First, Jiang editted Deng's 16-word Directive held an APEC summit meeting in Shanghai and gave it a broader interpretation. Deng's in November 2001, and adopted an anti- 16-word Directive became an offi cial guide- terrorism resolution. As a result, President line of China's foreign policy. Deng's judge- Bush promised to work towards a construc- ment represents the current consensus tive partnership with China. among the Chinese people. The 16-word Di- (4) In regard to Taiwan affairs, China re- rective as an offi cial slogan, however, has con- gained its initiative. The Bush administra- cealed differences of opinion about China's tion sold huge amount of weapons to Tai- foreign policy. For example, Li Shenzi, who wan in April 2001. But the U.S. now seek served as Vice-President of the Chinese Acad- China's cooperation in anti-terorism cam- emy of Social Science and had the support of paigns. The U.S. become less aggressive in progressive intellectuals in the 1980s, quot- its policy towards Taiwan. ed Deng's 24-word Directive in a recent ar- (5) The Chinese economy continued to grow. ticle. According to Li, Deng's Directive, that It raised the status of China internationally. is, "observe calmly, respond carefully, stand Undoubtedly, all of the above are no fi rmly, behave wisely, do not stand out, act de- small diplomatic achievements. But is was cisively" (Li [2000, 4]), indicates that Chi- Deng Xiaoping who built a foundation of na should pursue cooperative relations with these policies. Jiang's measures do not deviate the United States despite many confronta- from the direction of the Qian Report pub- tions and disputes between the two countries. lished in 1992. Regarding to economic devel- On the other hand, the report prepared by opment, China in 2002 is surely much rich- the China Institute of Contemporary Inter- er and much more powerful than it was in national Relations, quotes a slightly different 1992. However, the person who contribut- 24-word Directive. In the report, the directive ed to these good results was not Jiang Zem- is "observe calmly, stand fi rmly, behave wisely, in, but Zhu Rongji. Since 2002, Jiang Zemin defend tightly, do not stand out, act decisive- took charge of politics, while Zhu Rongji took ly" (Lu [2002, 258-259]). According to this re- charge of the economy. port, China should take much more cautious stance towards the U.S. than that of Li Shen- 3.2.2 Jiang Zemin's Foreign Policy zi. Second, slogans often do not refl ect re- What changes has Jiang Zemin brought ality and tend to get out of control. One ex- in China's foreign policy? The major points ample is "constructive strategic partnership," are reviewed as follows. a slogan declared by Jiang Zemin during his visit to the U.S. in October 1997. As the U.S.- China joint statement on October 29 shows 34 China's New Leadership

clearly, the "constructive strategic partner- plomacy between Zhou Enlai and Richard ship" is just a target which both states should Nixon is generally cited as a successful diplo- make efforts to achieve, and does not mean macy. What Chinese diplomacy needs now is that such partnership had existed between perhaps more openness. Closed-door diplo- them. In the offi cial text, a conditional clause, macy may not help much in this regard. Was "both countries will make concerted efforts it necessary for Jiang Zemin to visit the Unit- to establish the relationship" was inserted be- ed States in October 2002? If the 16th Nation- fore the main sentence of "constructive stra- al Congress of the CPC had been postponed tegic partnership" (Fan [1998, 4]). But when for two months just to hold this meeting, the Jiang's visit to the U.S. became a symbol of cost of summit diplomacy was too much. Chi- good U.S.-Chinese relations, the condition- na cannot afford to leave alone mounting al clause was often forgotten. Chinese peo- problems for two months. ple felt as if the national power of China were now equal to that of the U.S. Needless to say, (3) Commitment to regionalism such exaggeration was another side of China's China joined the Asia Pacifi c Corpo- smoldering antipathy towards the U.S. (Song ration (APEC) in 1991 and participated in and Zhang et al. [1996]). Misunderstanding peace-keeping operations of the U.N. (PKO) did more harm than good to its real foreign in Cambodia in that year. China attended the policy. ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 and participated in ASEAN as an observer. It was (2) The emphasis on summit diplomacy not until recently, however, that China posi- Deng Xiaoping liked to go abroad. He tively committed itself to these regional activ- lived in France as a student worker when he ities. China could have just "observed calm- was young. In the early 1960s, Deng visited ly, stood fi rmly and played for time without and debate with Khrushchev. Deng's standing out" according to Deng's 16-word Di- visits to the U.S. and Japan were both diplo- rective. China could not afford to be exclud- matic breakthroughs. Present Chinese leaders ed from the regional community. often let their children study abroad, follow- Since 1997, China has begun to make ing Deng's example. aggressive efforts to engage in regionalism. Since Jiang Zemin became the top lead- Multiple elements are likely to have driven er, Chinese leader's foreign visits have in- the country to make such a move. First, Deng creased remarkably. Generally speaking, it is Xiaoping passed away, which enabled Jiang not a bad thing for a head of state to visit for- Zemin to establish his own diplomatic initia- eign countries. As Jiang's visit to the U.S. in tives. Second, Hong Kong was returned to the 1997 indicates, a summit meeting is an effec- country, which allowed China to forge mul- tive means to give the impression of improved tilateral relationships with Southeast Asia. In relationships between two countries, both at the same year when the fi nancial crisis struck home and abroad. Hu Jintao's visit to the U.S. Asia, China remained unaffected, and could in May 2002 was signifi cant in that the next elevate its international status. Furthermore, head of China met U.S. leaders. Zhu Rongji China may be intending to counteract Tai- visited the U.S. in April 1999 to discuss Chi- wan's infl uence and exclude U.S. infl uence in na's accession to the WTO, which represents the region by engaging in regionalism aggres- an example of a visit to discuss a specifi c is- sively. sue. In 2001, China served as the host coun- However, frequent visits to foreign try for the APEC Summit Meeting in Shang- countries do not necessarily mean improved hai and established the Shanghai Coopera- quality of diplomacy. In China, the secret di- tion Organization, and in 2002, it advocated Chapter 3 Foreign Policy of the Post-Jiang Zemin Era 35

free trade zones for "ASEAN +3." China has Directive, Jiang says that China should address greatly committed itself to regionalism in re- international affairs, respect cultural diversity cent years. This should be welcome since the of the world, and promote democratization in U.S. and Japan have long been arguing that international relations through "the policy of China should join the international commu- calm observation and careful response." Jiang nity. The problem is that China regards such also stresses that China will put aside differ- regionalism as a major means to expand its ences while common ground is being sought interests in the region and tends to utilize it in order to achieve a peaceful international to improve its international status (Lu [2002, environment and to establish favorable rela- 262-264]). Such tendency might be inevita- tionships with its neighboring nations" (Jiang ble when a country begins to commit itself to [2002, 10]). global affairs. However, China needs to un- Deng's Directive, which initially consist- derstand that merely a veneer of engagement ed of 12 words, evolved into the 16-word Di- in regionalism would result in extremely lim- rective and into the 24-word Directive later, ited returns. then fi nally settled into the 8-word Directive. The last half of the 16-word Directive, "do 3.3 Foreign Policy after the 16th Na- not stand out, behave wisely, and act decisive- tional Congress ly," has clearly become outdated. This indi- cates that the basic foreign policy of China What shift might the 16th National has been shifting gradually from crisis preven- Congress of the CPC bring in Chinese for- tion in the political system, which was Deng eign policy? If the above analysis is correct, Xiaoping's major concern, to international the range of shifts is unlikely to be large. Chi- cooperation. This shift has, however, just be- na's new leaders are expected to follow Deng gun. Jiang's new Directive such as a "spirit of Xiaoping's Directive and fi ne-tune individual putting aside differences while seeking a com- approaches in light of changing internation- mon ground" and "respecting cultural diver- al circumstances. It would take the new lead- sity of the world" has not been tested by histo- er, currently Hu Jintao, a long time to inject ry yet. While Deng's 16-word Directive passed his own ideas into foreign policy. The implica- through historic ordeals such as the Gulf War tions of the 16th Partyl Congress of the CPC and the collapse of the . are reviewed below in terms of basic guide- China is unlikely to give up the core of line, organization and practical policy. Deng's 16-word Directive, "observe calmly and respond carefully," for a long time in the fu- 3.3.1 Basic Guideline ture. This is because the likelihood of a minor or signifi cant crisis is expected to grow even Was Deng Xiaoping's 16-word Direc- though the possibility of war has diminished tive still valid after the recent National Con- (Liu [2002, 5-7]). As a matter of fact, when gress? Yes, but with qulifi cations. Jiang Zemin the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia was mistak- says in the fi rst section of his political report, enly bombed by a U.S. jet fi ghter, Li Shenzi "Past fi ve year's efforts and 13 years' basic ex- quoted the 16-word Directive and maintained periences," that China entered a new phase that China should respond calmly to the is- in diplomatic policy; he sings his own prais- sue. es, saying that China conducted bilateral and Will the "Three Represents" which the multilateral diplomacy effectively, engaged 16th National Congress adopted as a signif- in international exchanges positively, and im- icant thought, replace Deng's directive? In proved China's status in the global communi- terms of foreign policy, this is unlikely. The ty (Jiang [2002, 4]). In respect of the 16-word "Three Represents" shows only what the Com- 36 China's New Leadership

munist Party of China should be; the ideal of also limited experience. the Party. So far, the party does not represent Although it remains to be seen how Ji- "Advanced forces of production, Advanced ang maintains his grip on power, the latest culture, and Primary interests of Chinese peo- personnel appointments inside the Commu- ple." The "Three Represents" is reported to nist Party indicate that a transfer of power to give an opportunity for private entrepreneurs the younger generation is happening. Deng to join the CPC. But such people have not Xiaoping had direct contacts with foreign been elected even as an Alternate Member of VIPs even after his retirement, and he stood the Central Committee yet. It will be a long as No.2 only behind Jiang at the podium of time before representatives of private busi- the 1989's National Anniversary. We must re- ness to take part in the central government in member, however, that Deng was the kind of China. It will also take a very long time before a person who always liked to put himself be- they exert infl uence on China's foreign poli- hind the scenes. , Zhao Ziyang, cy, which is still determined by an extremely and Jiang Zemin took charge of political re- limited number of people. ports between the Twelfth and Fourteenth The signifi cance of the "Three Repre- National Congresses of the CPC when Deng's sents" lies not in its contents but in its symbol- infl uence was still strong. Deng let his hand- ic effects. As the "Three Represents" has been picked subordinates take offi cial duty (see Ta- stated in the party platform as an important ble 1). In contrast to Deng, Jiang Zemin likes thought, the "Four Principles" (Path to Social- to keep a high profi le himself. Indeed, he ism, People's dictatorship, Leadership of the read a political report by himself taking Hu Communist Party and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Jintao's place in the last National Congress. Zedong Thought) have not been advocat- As Jiang Zemin's statue remains unclear, ed recently as had been stressed many times there arises the problem as to who makes the since the Tiananmen Incident. While the fi nal decision on foreign policies. In other "Four Principles" are waning now, the "Three words, power struggle between Jiang and Hu Represents" are showing more. Chinese intel- may occur. Jiang might transfer his power to lectuals describe this trend as "Four (Princi- Zeng Qinghong, but this too would cause a ples) go and Three (Represents) enter." confl ict between Hu and Zeng. Until the real leader of the party steps out, the composition 3.3.2 Organization of the Leading Small Group cannot be decid- ed. The power shift will have a tremendous It might be too early to declare at this impact on the Leading Small Group for For- point that Jiang Zemin has stepped down eign Affairs (see Table 2). It is unlikely that Ji- from the political arena or will do so in the ang, Zhu, and Qian all quit at once. The ques- near future. The process and the selection tion is, who among the three will remain in of personnel appointments has been hidden power, and at what position? The same can from the public. The question remains why be said regarding the Leading Small Group China, which is trying to democratize its at- for Taiwan Affairs. The problem of this group titudes in international relations, had to re- is greater than the Leading Small Group for shape its organization in such a secretive way. Foreign Affairs. The Leading Small Group Who will take over Deng's policies if Jiang for Taiwan Affairs is aging. Wang Daohan has completely steps down? Hu Jintao, who be- been the chief negotiator for the Chinese came a Standing Committee Member of the government on China-Taiwan affairs. Wang, Political Bureau ten years ago, has only lim- now 89, was from the New Fourth Army which ited experience in foreign affairs. Another fought against Japanese troops mainly in cen- name could be Zeng Qinghong, but he has tral China during the Sino-Japan war. When Chapter 3 Foreign Policy of the Post-Jiang Zemin Era 37

in Shanghai, he was Jiang Zemin's boss and (3) China can negotiate political status of Tai- introduced Jiang to the central government. wan's government and so on. The generation shift in the Leading Small What do these so-called "Three New Group for Taiwan Affairs seems to be inevi- Phrases" imply? They are not likely to impress table. Will China be able to carry out drastic Taiwan's leadership. It is the notion of "One change in such an organization? China" that President Chen Shubian and the In contrast with the Party organizations, leaders of Democratic Progressive Party have the reshuffl e in the government's foreign af- opposed, and so it would be naive to think fairs section appears to be going smoothly. that "New Three Phrases" will break the ice The government has succeeded in churning and lead to the resumption of dialogue be- out young offi cials competent in dealing with tween both sides of the Strait. But why did Ji- foreign matters. , who has been promot- ang announce the New Three Phrases at this ed to offi cial member of the Political Bureau timing? of the Communist Party from its Alternate Along with the "Three Represents" in- Member, is thought to be in charge of foreign troduced at the 16th National Congress was affairs for the government. She has also been the phrase "yo-ji-gu-sin" which means to "keep promoted to Vice-Premier from State Coun- pace with the times". This new term suggests cilor, although not elected to become a Stand- that he felt a strong need to refresh old pol- ing Committee Member of the Political Bu- icy. If Jiang put the "Three Represents" poli- reau in the party. As for Minister of Foreign cy into practice (although there is little such Affairs, two names are circulated. One is Li possibility at present), the differences be- Zhaoxing, former ambassador to the United tween the and States, and the other is Dai Bingguo, Head of Koumintang Party (Taiwanese National Par- the International Liaison Department. Anoth- ty) may diminish in the end. Jiang might have er source says the incumbent Minister, Tang wanted to show his leadership regarding Tai- Jianxuan, will remain in the seat. Whatever wan. He might wish to retain sway over Tai- happens, the government's diplomatic policy wanese affairs after his retirement. Retaining will not be greatly affected. infl uence over Taiwan affairs means keeping relations with Japan and the U.S. Perhaps this 3.3.3 Policies scenario is what he meant by "keeping pace with the times". The political report announced at the 16th National Congress of the CPC lists up Conclusion: Pending Problems for targets but lacks details. One point in the re- the Seventeenth National Con- port concerning the policy toward Taiwan is gress worth noting. Jiang's report basically follows his predecessors' attitudes toward Taiwan, The 16th National Congress of the CPC but has listed up the content China is will- was the fi rst and the last opportunity for Ji- ing to talk in the dialogue with Taiwan "under ang to show his true colors. At the 15th Na- the condition of One China" (Jiang's Report tional Congress of the CPC held after Deng's 2002, 45): death, Jiang decided to hoist the fl ag of Deng (1) China can negotiate the termination of Xiaoping. Zhu Rongii put the Socialist Mar- hostilities across the Taiwan Strait ket Economy into practice.The most notable (2) China can negotiate Taiwan's status in in- characteristics of this post-Deng era are the ternational society and its operating fi elds collaborations between Jiang and Zhu. in economic, cultural, and social areas in As noted already, after Deng's death in accordance with its status. 1997, Jiang started showing his own colors in 38 China's New Leadership

foreign affairs. Jiang changed the style of di- Problems in the Twenty-First Century, pp.32-54: Hito to Bunka sha plomacy from careful observation to outgoing Yoshifumi Nakai [1998] Chinese Politics and Economy in actions. But he changed little in substance. Ji- Transitional Time - Roadmaps Seen from the 15th Na- ang met with many foreign VIPs in and out tional Congress of the Communist Party - Topic Report: Institute of Developing Economies China, held various international conferenc- Radio Press Directory of Chinese Leaders es in his country, and pursued diplomacy in (Chinese) all directions as Deng had never done before. Chen Wenbin et al. eds. ［1999］Zhongguo gongchangdang zhizhen wushinian. : Zhonggong dangshi chuban- The Party organizations supported Jiang be- she cause under Jiang the party could enjoy great- Deng Xiaoping ［1993］Deng Xiaoping wenxuan vol. 3. er infl uence in foreign policy. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe Jiang Zemin［2002］Quanmian jianshe xiaokang shehui ka- The next fi ve years before the 17th Na- ichuang zhongguotese shehuizhuyi shiyexinjumian. Bei- tional Congress will be the period Deng's Di- jing: Renmin chubanshe rective faces serious tests. There are two chal- Li Shenzhi ［2000］"Guanyu quanqiuhuade jige wenti." She- hui kexue vol. 1. pp.2-5. lenges. The fi rst is a peaceful and smooth Lu Zhongwei ［2002］Guoji zhenlue yu anquan xingshi transfer of power in foreign affairs. In other pingjia. Beijing: Zhongguo xiandai guojiguanxi yanjiusuo, words, it is still unclear as to how deeply Jiang Shishi chubanshe Liu Huaqiu ［2002］"Jubu jinzhang zongti huanhe." Shang- will interfere with the process of political de- hai guojiwenti yanjiusuo bian 2002 Guoji xingshi nianji- cision-making. The lack of detailed informa- an. Shanghai jiaoyu chubanshe pp.3-14. tion on the composition and function of the Pan Jianmin ［1998］Nuli jianli zhongmei jianshexingde zhanluehuobanguanxi. Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe Central Leading Small Group is another fac- Song Qiang et al. eds.［1996］Zhongguo keyi shuo bu: leng- tor. Hu Jintao needs a long time to establish zhanhou shidaide zhenzhi yu qinggan kuaizhe. Beijing: fi rm political leadership. Confusion and the Zhonghua gongxiang lianhe chubanshe Zhongguo gongchangdang ［2002］Zhongguo gongchang- power struggles in the central political arena dang zhangcheng. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe will pose a grave threat to China in case of an (Other Languages) unpredicted crisis. Nathan, Andrew and Perry Link eds. [2001] The Tianan- The second challenge is the economy. men Papers, New York: Public Aff airs As we have seen, the succession from Deng to Jiang happened when China achieved near- ly 9% annual growth. Jiang could strengthen his grip on central power for 13 years, while Zhu Rongii took charge of economic affairs. Is Hun Jintao able to control his Party and country hand in hand with Premier Wen Jian- bao? Are they able to deal with the problems with full consideration of economic setbacks? Will China face trade friction between Japan and the U.S. as they did before? The future leaders of China have a heavy burden to carry on their shoulders. (Yoshifumi NAKAI)

References: (Japanese) Hidenori Ijiri [1997] The Structure of the China-Taiwan Crisis - What the crisis means - Keisou shobo. Deng Xiaoping [1995] A Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Letters 1982-1992, Ten Books Yoshifumi Nakai [1997] "Direction and Problems for Chi- nese Foreign Diplomacy" in Jyunichi Abe eds. China