View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Academic Research Repository at the Institute of Developing Economies Chapter 3 Foreign Policy of the Post-Jiang Zemin Era 権利 Copyrights 日本貿易振興機構（ジェトロ）アジア 経済研究所 / Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization (IDE-JETRO) http://www.ide.go.jp シリーズタイトル(英 IDE Spot Survey ) シリーズ番号 26 journal or China's New Leadership publication title page range [25]-38 year 2003 URL http://hdl.handle.net/2344/00010291 Chapter 3 Foreign Policy of the Post-Jiang Zemin Era Introduction er Jiang Zemin will retire from politics com- pletely. Although he retired from the top par- How will the result of the 16th Nation- ty post of General Secretary, he still occupies al Congress of the Communist Party of China of the CPC Central Military Commission, the ("16th National Congress of the CPC") affect supreme commander of the military forces. It China's foreign policy? Will the "Three Rep- is important to consider how his retirement resents" that was recently added to the party or semi-retirement will affect foreign policy. rules bring about any change in foreign pol- icy? How will the newly elected party leader- 3.1 The Formulation of the "16-word ship be involved in policy-making and what Directive" kind of policy will they adopt? This chapter will examine these ques- On September 4, 1989, just three tions from three angles. First, we look into months after the Tiananmen Incident, Deng continuity of foreign policy from the for- Xiaoping discussed international affairs with mer administration. What did the Jiang Zem- "some responsible persons of the central gov- in administration inherit from the former ad- ernment" (Deng [1995, 324]). Deng's idea- ministration and what will they leave to the which later became known as the "16-word next generation? We will discuss the mean- Directive"-was imparted during this discus- ing of the "16-word Directive," a policy Deng sion. The idea was written in 12 Chinese char- Xiaoping designed. Next, we will examine the acters meaning "observe calmly, stand fi rmly, changes in the attitudes toward foreign coun- respond carefully" (Deng [1993, 321]). How- tries. How has foreign policy changed since ever, the Directive currently referred to in of- Deng Xiaoping's death in February 1997? We fi cial documents is written in 16 characters will study the features of the foreign policy of (Liu [2002, 11]). Thus, there is a discrepancy the Jiang Zemin administration from the 15th in the numbers of the words. The eight char- National Congress in September 1997 to pres- acters not used in the discussion mean "hide ent. Last, we will consider the foreign policy one's ability to buy time and do whatever nec- of the new leadership elected at the 16th Na- essary." tional Congress of the CPC; will the new lead- Even today, 13 years after the Tianan- ership contine or change Jiang's policies? At men Incident, the 16-word Directive is a core the time of writing, the new administration foreign policy of China. Liu Huaqiu, Direc- has not been established; thus, the term "new tor of Central Offi ce of the Central Leading leadership" refers to the party leadership. Group for Foreign Affairs and Director of the Although the National People's Con- Foreign Affairs Offi ce of the State Council, gress is held every year in March, the upcom- said, "China must adhere to the 16-word Di- ing meeting immediately after the CPC Na- rective in order to pursue peaceful diplomacy tional Congress will have special signifi cance, independently by correctly grasping complex as the new government leadership will have international politics and economic situations been decided by that time. Refl ecting the re- (Liu [2002, 11])". General Secretary of the shuffl e of the party leadership, the govern- CPC, Jiang Zemin has followed the policy set ment will probably try to rejuvenate the struc- by Deng Xiaoping immediately after the Ti- ture and promote specialization of each ananmen Incident. function. It will also become clearer wheth- What were the practical outcomes of 26 China's New Leadership this guideline? They were as follows: future. In December in the same year, he also met Scowcroft of the National Security Coun- 3.1.1 Deng Xiaoping's infl uence over cil sent by then President Bush, and clearly foreign policy expressed his intention to improve relations between China and the U.S. Deng is said to On September 4, 1989, the same day as have asked Scowcroft to deliver his person- the discussion mentioned above, Deng Xiaop- al message to Bush, "One old Chinese retired ing resigned as Chairman of the Central Mil- man in the east wishes for the better of China- itary Commission and recommended Jiang U.S. relations" (Chen, Lin et al. [1999, 684]). Zemin as his successor. Although Jiang Zem- in had no military experience, Deng Xiaop- 3.1.2 Continuity of the Foreign Policy ing did not seem to mind. What Deng wanted Making Bodies most for his successor was obedience to the party leadership, because "the military forces In 1984, when Doak Barnett had the op- should always be under the party leadership; portunity to meet then Premier Zhao Ziyang, the recent uprising made it clearer that this he had a rare glimpse of the Chinese system principle is right." Deng added, "In our tra- of foreign policy-making. Generally speak- dition, the military forces follow the party or- ing, in most countries the authority of foreign ders, form no small groups or factions, and al- policies is centralized. China has, Barnett ob- low no centralization of power in a few hands served, perhaps one of the most centralized (Deng [1995, 321])". With no power in the systems. He explained that since the 12th Na- military forces and not known in the political tional Congress of the CPC in 1982, the poli- center, Jiang Zemin exactly met such require- cy-making body for important issues was shift- ments. However, when Deng Xiaoping retired ed from the Political Bureau and the Standing from the Central Military Commission, he en- Committee of the Political Bureau, to the sured that his reliable aides became members Secretariat of the CPC and the State Coun- of the commission. Deng's comrade since the cil (Barnett [1986, 24]). During the meeting days of the revolution, Yang Shangkun, as- with Barnett, Zhao said, "Ultimately, we seek sumed the post of First Vice-President; Liu guidance from Deng Xiaoping." Huaqing, Vice-President; as Yang Baibing, Although we can trace the policy-mak- Yang's half brother, Secretary General. ing process concerning the Tiananmen In- Although he handed over the top mili- cident by referring to unoffi cial documents tary post to Jiang and retired from all offi cial (Nathan and Link [2001]), we do not know posts, Deng remained in the front line of for- much about the policy-making structure after eign affairs. Thus, the 16-word Directive was the incident. From offi cial data, however, we actually implemented by old party leaders, can draw a rough sketch as follows: and Deng in particular, not by Jiang Zemin. (1) Wen Jiabao remained as Director of the According to unoffi cial sources, the Political CPC Secretariat (General Offi ce). His Bureau made a regulation that any important meeting with the students together with policy must be consulted with Deng Xiaop- Zhao at Tiananmen Square, however, may ing. In any case, Deng worked hard to break have damaged his credibility. Two out of the sanctions the West was enforcing against three deputy directors of the Secretari- China after the Tiananmen Incident. In No- at remained, and the remaining position vember 1989, when he personally met a del- was fi lled by Jiang Zemin's right-hand man, egation of Japanese business groups, Deng Zeng Qinghong, when Jiang took offi ce as emphasized that China would not change its General Secretary. Wang Gang, who was lat- reform and openness policy for a foreseeable er elected as the sole alternate member of Chapter 3 Foreign Policy of the Post-Jiang Zemin Era 27 the Political Bureau at the 16th National as Head of the International Liaison De- Congress of the CPC, was then appointed partment. Regarding continuity, the career as Deputy Director. path of Ding Guangen, one of Deng's aides, (2) Qian Qichen kept his post of Minister of is interesting. Before the incident, Ding was Foreign Affairs after the Tiananmen Inci- Vice-Minister of the State Planning Com- dent, as did two vice ministers out of fi ve. mission; in 1990 he was appointed Head However, four people in a similar rank to of the United Front Work Department; in Vice-Minister were replaced by 1991. Liu 1992 he became Head of the Publicity De- Huaqiu, was appointed Vice-Minister in Oc- partment, where he has remained for 10 tober 1989, and in 1991 both Xu Dunx- years. Although Lu Dingyi, who was re- in who later became ambassador to Japan moved during the Cultural Revolution, had and Jiang Enzhu who later became the Di- occupied the post for 12 years, his succes- rector of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs sors normally moved to other positions in Offi ce, were appointed as Vice-Minister. two to three years. Compared with these Similar changes took place in the assistant predecessors, Ding's long tenure is very un- minister posts; three out of four assistant usual. ministers were replaced by 1992. The posts were taken by Li Zhaoxing who was lat- 3.1.3 Larger weight of economy er appointed ambassador to the U.S., Dai Bingguo who became Head of the Interna- It was Deng Xiaoping himself who se- tional Liaison Department, and Tang Jiaxu- lected Zhu Rongji as Vice-Premier of the an who climbed to the Minister of Foreign State Council in April 1991, who was then just Affairs.