February 26, 1989 Memorandum of Conversation Between George H.W
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Ming China As a Gunpowder Empire: Military Technology, Politics, and Fiscal Administration, 1350-1620 Weicong Duan Washington University in St
Washington University in St. Louis Washington University Open Scholarship Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and Dissertations Arts & Sciences Winter 12-15-2018 Ming China As A Gunpowder Empire: Military Technology, Politics, And Fiscal Administration, 1350-1620 Weicong Duan Washington University in St. Louis Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/art_sci_etds Part of the Asian History Commons, and the Asian Studies Commons Recommended Citation Duan, Weicong, "Ming China As A Gunpowder Empire: Military Technology, Politics, And Fiscal Administration, 1350-1620" (2018). Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 1719. https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/art_sci_etds/1719 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Arts & Sciences at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY Dissertation Examination Committee: Steven B. Miles, Chair Christine Johnson Peter Kastor Zhao Ma Hayrettin Yücesoy Ming China as a Gunpowder Empire: Military Technology, Politics, and Fiscal Administration, 1350-1620 by Weicong Duan A dissertation presented to The Graduate School of of Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy December 2018 St. Louis, Missouri © 2018, -
China-Taiwan Relations: the Shadow of SARS
China-Taiwan Relations: The Shadow of SARS by David G. Brown Associate Director, Asian Studies The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies Throughout this quarter, Beijing and Taipei struggled to contain the spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). SARS dramatically reduced cross-Strait travel; its effects on cross-Strait economic ties appear less severe but remain to be fully assessed. SARS intensified the battle over Taiwan’s request for observer status at the World Health Organization (WHO). Although the World Health Assembly (WHA) again rejected Taiwan, the real problems of a global health emergency led to the first contacts between the WHO and Taiwan. Beijing’s handling of SARS embittered the atmosphere of cross- Strait relations and created a political issue in Taiwan that President Chen Shui-bian is moving to exploit in next year’s elections. SARS The SARS health emergency dominated cross-Strait developments during this quarter. With the dramatic removal of its health minister and the mayor of Beijing in mid-April, Beijing was forced to admit that it was confronting a health emergency with serious domestic and international implications. For about a month thereafter, Taiwan was proud of its success in controlling SARS. Then its first SARS death and SARS outbreaks in several hospitals led to first Taipei and then all Taiwan being added to the WHO travel advisory list. The PRC and Taiwan each in its own way mobilized resources and launched mass campaigns to control the spread of SARS. By late June, these efforts had achieved considerable success and the WHO travel advisories for both, as well as for Hong Kong, had been lifted. -
First Contact: Qian Qichen Engages in Wide-Ranging, Constructive Talks with President Bush and Senior U.S
U.S.-China Relations: First Contact: Qian Qichen Engages in Wide-ranging, Constructive Talks with President Bush and Senior U.S. Officials by Bonnie S. Glaser, Consultant on Asian Affairs PRC Vice Premier Qian Qichen’s visit to the United States in March provided an opportunity for the U.S. and China to exchange views on the bilateral relationship and discuss a broad range of security issues. Both sides characterized the discussions in positive terms, acknowledging that differences were aired frankly, yet without rancor. Qian conveyed China’s objections to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, especially Aegis destroyers, and Secretary of State Colin Powell explained that U.S. policy would be guided by both the three Sino-U.S. communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act. Progress toward China’s entry into the WTO stalled over a major disagreement on Chinese agricultural subsidies. U.S. government officials claimed they had evidence that Chinese companies were selling and installing fiber optic cables and other equipment being used to improve antiaircraft equipment in Iraq in violation of UN sanctions. Military exchanges proceeded according to the plan sketched out last November with a U.S. ship visit to Shanghai, several delegation exchanges, and a visit by U.S. Commander in Chief, Pacific Admiral Dennis Blair to China. Chinese Envoy Holds Constructive Talks with Bush Administration PRC Vice Premier Qian Qichen’s visit to the United States in March provided an opportunity for the U.S. and China to exchange views on the bilateral relationship and discuss a broad range of security issues. The face-to-face meetings with President George W. -
PLACE and INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA TIONS INDEX Italicised Page Numbers Refer to Extended Entries
PLACE AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA TIONS INDEX Italicised page numbers refer to extended entries Aachcn, 549, 564 Aegean North Region. Aktyubinsk, 782 Alexandroupolis, 588 Aalborg, 420, 429 587 Akure,988 Algarve. 1056, 1061 Aalst,203 Aegean South Region, Akureyri, 633, 637 Algeciras, I 177 Aargau, 1218, 1221, 1224 587 Akwa Ibom, 988 Algeria, 8,49,58,63-4. Aba,988 Aetolia and Acarnania. Akyab,261 79-84.890 Abaco,178 587 Alabama, 1392, 1397, Al Ghwayriyah, 1066 Abadan,716-17 Mar, 476 1400, 1404, 1424. Algiers, 79-81, 83 Abaiang, 792 A(ghanistan, 7, 54, 69-72 1438-41 AI-Hillah,723 Abakan, 1094 Myonkarahisar, 1261 Alagoas, 237 AI-Hoceima, 923, 925 Abancay, 1035 Agadez, 983, 985 AI Ain. 1287-8 Alhucemas, 1177 Abariringa,792 Agadir,923-5 AlaJuela, 386, 388 Alicante, 1177, 1185 AbaslUman, 417 Agalega Island, 896 Alamagan, 1565 Alice Springs, 120. Abbotsford (Canada), Aga"a, 1563 AI-Amarah,723 129-31 297,300 Agartala, 656, 658. 696-7 Alamosa (Colo.). 1454 Aligarh, 641, 652, 693 Abecbe, 337, 339 Agatti,706 AI-Anbar,723 Ali-Sabieh,434 Abemama, 792 AgboviIle,390 Aland, 485, 487 Al Jadida, 924 Abengourou, 390 Aghios Nikolaos, 587 Alandur,694 AI-Jaza'ir see Algiers Abeokuta, 988 Agigea, 1075 Alania, 1079,1096 Al Jumayliyah, 1066 Aberdeen (SD.), 1539-40 Agin-Buryat, 1079. 1098 Alappuzha (Aleppy), 676 AI-Kamishli AirpoI1, Aberdeen (UK), 1294, Aginskoe, 1098 AI Arish, 451 1229 1296, 1317, 1320. Agion Oras. 588 Alasb, 1390, 1392, AI Khari]a, 451 1325, 1344 Agnibilekrou,390 1395,1397,14(K), AI-Khour, 1066 Aberdeenshire, 1294 Agra, 641, 669, 699 1404-6,1408,1432, Al Khums, 839, 841 Aberystwyth, 1343 Agri,1261 1441-4 Alkmaar, 946 Abia,988 Agrihan, 1565 al-Asnam, 81 AI-Kut,723 Abidjan, 390-4 Aguascalientes, 9(X)-1 Alava, 1176-7 AlIahabad, 641, 647, 656. -
China Nuclear Chronology
China Nuclear Chronology 2011-2010 | 2009-2008 | 2007-2005 | 2004-2002 | 2001 | 2000-1999 | 1998-1997 | 1996-1995 1994-1992 | 1991-1990 | 1989-1985 | 1984-1980 | 1979-1970 | 1969-1960 | 1959-1945 Last update: July 2011 2011-2010 14 June 2011 China completes nuclear inspections of all 13 currently operating power reactors. According to Li Ganjie, Vice- Minister of the Ministry of Environmental Protection, safety evaluations of the 28 reactors under construction should be completed by October. Six weeks earlier, China declared its military nuclear facilities safe. Li emphasizes that the lessons from "Japan's Fukushima nuclear crisis are profound," and that China is working on a comprehensive and effective nuclear safety plan. Li confirms that China still plans to construct more than 100 reactors by 2020. On the other hand, "[China] needs to control the pace of [the nuclear energy] development," according to Zheng Yuhui, director of the research center of the China Nuclear Energy Association. The Chinese Academy of Sciences scholars add that China should maintain a relatively stable policy for nuclear power development and further strengthen nuclear safety. —中华人民共和国中央人民政府 [The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China], "环境保护部副部长会见美国能源部核能助理部长 [Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Environmental Protection Met the United States Department of Energy's Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy]," 14 June 2011, www.gov.cn; "After Inspections, China Moves Ahead with Nuclear Plans," The New York Times, 17 June 2011; "China Suspends New Nuclear Plant Approvals," China Daily (Edition in English), 15 June 2011, www.chinadialy.com; "China May Resume Giving Approvals to New Nuclear Plants-Official," BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 25 June 2011; "Experts: China Should Keep Nuclear Power Policy Stable," People's Daily (Edition in English), 25 May 2011; "Chinese Military Nuke Facilities Declared Safe," Global Security Newswire, 1 April 2011, www.gsn.nti.org. -
Chin1821.Pdf
http://oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt1x0nd955 No online items Finding Aid for the China Democracy Movement and Tiananmen Incident Archives, 1989-1993 Processed by UCLA Library Special Collections staff; machine-readable finding aid created by Caroline Cubé. UCLA Library Special Collections UCLA Library Special Collections staff Room A1713, Charles E. Young Research Library Box 951575 Los Angeles, CA 90095-1575 Email: [email protected] URL: http://www.library.ucla.edu/libraries/special/scweb/ © 2009 The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. 1821 1 Descriptive Summary Title: China Democracy Movement and Tiananmen Incident Archives Date (inclusive): 1989-1993 Collection number: 1821 Creator: Center for Chinese Studies and the Center for Pacific Rim Studies, UCLA Extent: 22 boxes (11 linear ft.)1 oversize box. Abstract: The present finding aid represents the fruits of a multiyear collaborative effort, undertaken at the initiative of then UCLA Chancellor Charles Young, to collect, collate, classify, and annotate available materials relating to the China Democracy Movement and tiananmen crisis of 1989. These materials---including, inter alia, thousands of documents, transcribed radio broadcasts, local newspaper and journal articles, wall posters, electronic communications, and assorted ephemeral sources, some in Chinese and some in English---provide a wealth of information for scholars, present and future, who wish to gain a better understanding of the complex, swirling forces that surrounded the extraordinary "Beijing Spring" of 1989 and its tragic denouement. The scholarly community is indebted to those who have collected and arranged this archive of materials about the China Democracy Movement and Tiananmen Incident Archives. -
人文科学研究所 Zhang Zhenjiang.Indd
China’s Globalization and its Policies: Focusing on Sino-American Relations Zhang Zhenjiang* Many studies have been taken on globalization and its impacts on China’s politics, economy, security, society and foreign policy. Only a few scholars noticed what Chinese government perceives and defines the term of globalization.1) This paper provides a preliminary examination of what Chinese government says about globalization in the current discourse of Chinese leadership and tries to find some characteristics of globalization defined by Chinese government. The second part of the paper examines empirically Chinese government’s policy of globalization, which includes China’s participation in international institutions, its WTO access and implementation of related commitments in the first 5 year’s membership, and China’s role in the emerging East Asian regionalism. In each case, the author will focus on America’s policy as more as possible. Finally, the author will summarize his observations and make his tentative conclusion. Ⅰ.China’s Definition of Globalization The first use of the term of globalization in Chinese official language appears in then- Foreign Minister Qian Qichen’s speech in the United Nations General Assembly in 1996. He said that“ world economic globalization presents a rare opportunity to both developed and developing countries.”2) One year later, in September 1997, then-President Jiang *Professor at Jinan University, Institute of Southeast Asia Studies. 1)Thomas Moore,‘ China and Globalization,’ in Samuel S. Kim, ed., East Asia and Globalization (Lanham, Md.: Rowan and Littleaeld, 2000), pp.111-118; Thomas G. Moore,‘ Chinese Foreign Policy in the Age of Globalization’, in Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang, eds., China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy, New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC., 2005, pp.121-158, p.123. -
Political Succession and Leadership Issues in China: Implications for U.S
Order Code RL30990 Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Political Succession and Leadership Issues in China: Implications for U.S. Policy Updated September 30, 2002 name redacted Specialist in Asian Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress Political Succession and Leadership Issues in China: Implications for U.S. Policy Summary In 2002 and 2003, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will be making key leadership changes within the government and the Communist Party. A number of current senior leaders, including Party Secretary Jiang Zemin, Premier Zhu Rongji, and National Peoples’ Congress Chairman Li Peng, are scheduled to be stepping down from their posts, and it is not yet clear who will be assuming these positions from among the younger generation of leaders – the so-called “fourth generation,” comprised of those born in the 1940s and early 1950s. It is expected that new leaders will be ascending to positions at the head of at least two and possibly all three of the PRC’s three vertical political structures: the Chinese Communist Party; the state government bureaucracy; and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). During a period likely to last into 2003, the succession process remains very much in flux. Some who follow Beijing politics have raised questions about how vigorously China’s current senior leaders will adhere to their self-imposed term limitations. Party Secretary Jiang Zemin, for instance, is expected to try to keep his position as head of China’s military on the grounds that the global anti-terrorism campaign and internal challenges to Chinese rule create a special need now for consistent leadership. -
Imperial Tombs of the Ming and Qing Dynasties
WHC Nomination Documentation File Name: 1004.pdf UNESCO Region: ASIA AND THE PACIFIC __________________________________________________________________________________________________ SITE NAME: Imperial Tombs of the Ming and Qing Dynasties DA TE OF INSCRIPTION: 2nd December 2000 STATE PARTY: CHINA CRITERIA: C (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (vi) DECISION OF THE WORLD HERITAGE COMMITTEE: Criterion (i):The harmonious integration of remarkable architectural groups in a natural environment chosen to meet the criteria of geomancy (Fengshui) makes the Ming and Qing Imperial Tombs masterpieces of human creative genius. Criteria (ii), (iii) and (iv):The imperial mausolea are outstanding testimony to a cultural and architectural tradition that for over five hundred years dominated this part of the world; by reason of their integration into the natural environment, they make up a unique ensemble of cultural landscapes. Criterion (vi):The Ming and Qing Tombs are dazzling illustrations of the beliefs, world view, and geomantic theories of Fengshui prevalent in feudal China. They have served as burial edifices for illustrious personages and as the theatre for major events that have marked the history of China. The Committee took note, with appreciation, of the State Party's intention to nominate the Mingshaoling Mausoleum at Nanjing (Jiangsu Province) and the Changping complex in the future as an extention to the Imperial Tombs of the Ming and Qing dynasties. BRIEF DESCRIPTIONS The Ming and Qing imperial tombs are natural sites modified by human influence, carefully chosen according to the principles of geomancy (Fengshui) to house numerous buildings of traditional architectural design and decoration. They illustrate the continuity over five centuries of a world view and concept of power specific to feudal China. -
The CCP Central Committee's Leading Small Groups Alice Miller
Miller, China Leadership Monitor, No. 26 The CCP Central Committee’s Leading Small Groups Alice Miller For several decades, the Chinese leadership has used informal bodies called “leading small groups” to advise the Party Politburo on policy and to coordinate implementation of policy decisions made by the Politburo and supervised by the Secretariat. Because these groups deal with sensitive leadership processes, PRC media refer to them very rarely, and almost never publicize lists of their members on a current basis. Even the limited accessible view of these groups and their evolution, however, offers insight into the structure of power and working relationships of the top Party leadership under Hu Jintao. A listing of the Central Committee “leading groups” (lingdao xiaozu 领导小组), or just “small groups” (xiaozu 小组), that are directly subordinate to the Party Secretariat and report to the Politburo and its Standing Committee and their members is appended to this article. First created in 1958, these groups are never incorporated into publicly available charts or explanations of Party institutions on a current basis. PRC media occasionally refer to them in the course of reporting on leadership policy processes, and they sometimes mention a leader’s membership in one of them. The only instance in the entire post-Mao era in which PRC media listed the current members of any of these groups was on 2003, when the PRC-controlled Hong Kong newspaper Wen Wei Po publicized a membership list of the Central Committee Taiwan Work Leading Small Group. (Wen Wei Po, 26 December 2003) This has meant that even basic insight into these groups’ current roles and their membership requires painstaking compilation of the occasional references to them in PRC media. -
Chapter 3 Foreign Policy of the Post-Jiang Zemin Era
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Academic Research Repository at the Institute of Developing Economies Chapter 3 Foreign Policy of the Post-Jiang Zemin Era 権利 Copyrights 日本貿易振興機構(ジェトロ)アジア 経済研究所 / Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization (IDE-JETRO) http://www.ide.go.jp シリーズタイトル(英 IDE Spot Survey ) シリーズ番号 26 journal or China's New Leadership publication title page range [25]-38 year 2003 URL http://hdl.handle.net/2344/00010291 Chapter 3 Foreign Policy of the Post-Jiang Zemin Era Introduction er Jiang Zemin will retire from politics com- pletely. Although he retired from the top par- How will the result of the 16th Nation- ty post of General Secretary, he still occupies al Congress of the Communist Party of China of the CPC Central Military Commission, the ("16th National Congress of the CPC") affect supreme commander of the military forces. It China's foreign policy? Will the "Three Rep- is important to consider how his retirement resents" that was recently added to the party or semi-retirement will affect foreign policy. rules bring about any change in foreign pol- icy? How will the newly elected party leader- 3.1 The Formulation of the "16-word ship be involved in policy-making and what Directive" kind of policy will they adopt? This chapter will examine these ques- On September 4, 1989, just three tions from three angles. First, we look into months after the Tiananmen Incident, Deng continuity of foreign policy from the for- Xiaoping discussed international affairs with mer administration. -
Projecting the Next Politburo Standing Committee
Projecting the Next Politburo Standing Committee Alice Miller1 Analysis of appointments to the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party shows that over the past two decades three simple rules have been followed. These rules offer a means to project appointments to the Standing Committee at the upcoming 19th Party Congress in 2017. Whether in fact the Xi leadership follows the precedents set down in past appointments or instead sets them aside offers a key benchmark against which to assess Xi Jinping’s strength as party leader. The Politburo Standing Committee has been the party’s key decision-making body since the beginning of the reform era in the late 1970s. Appointments to the body are routinely made at the party’s national congress, held every five years, and the subsequent first plenum of the new Central Committee appointed by the party congress. The party has never publicly explained how it makes decisions as to whom it appoints to the Politburo Standing Committee. Observers outside the party in China, Hong Kong, and elsewhere have filled this information vacuum with speculation based on presumptions of factional competition, bargaining among factional chieftains, and intense jockeying among potential candidates in the run-up to a party congress. Three Rules Close analysis of Standing Committee appointments over the past four party congresses, however, sheds different light on leadership procedures in this highly sensitive area. Specifically, examination of Standing Committee leader retirements and appointments at the 1997 15th, 2002 16th, 2007 17th, and 2012 18th Party Congresses shows that three basic rules have been followed: • First, retirement of both Standing Committee and regular members of the Politburo has followed a defined age limit.