Jiang Zemin's Military Thought and Legacy

International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Volume 6 (2006) 227–247 doi:10.1093/irap/lci144

Jiang Zemin’s military thought and legacy Ta-chen Cheng Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/irap/article/6/2/227/714449 by guest on 28 September 2021

Department of Public Administration, Tamkang University, Taiwan. Email: [email protected] and [email protected]

Abstract Nearly for 15 years as the Chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, Jiang Zemin, albeit lack of real military experience, has gradually developed his military theories and principles in the process of consolidating military authority. Unquestionably, Jiang is not only the core of the third generation leadership in China, but also the most powerful man in China’s military until now. That makes researchers interested in exploring military thought of this man controlling the largest armies in the world. In this paper, Jiang’s basic military framework, ‘Five Sentences’, including ‘Politically Qualified’, ‘Militarily Tough’, ‘Attitudinally Excellent’, ‘Strictly Disciplined’ and ‘Materially Guaran- teed’ will be separately discussed. With interpretations of ‘Five Sentences’, the author will thereafter provide personal comments and analysis.

1 Introduction In June 1989, Jiang Zemin was elected Secretary General of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in the fourth plenum of 13th Party Congress. Later that year, Jiang succeeded Deng Xiaoping as the Chairman of Central Military Commission (CMC) in the fifth plenum. Even so, Jiang himself at that time did not assume the highest authority in the military, although officially Jiang had taken China’s military power. It would require Jiang a longer time to stabilize his seat after a series of struggles for military influences. As the core of the third generation of leadership, Jiang was expected to clearly express his military thought just as his predecessors provided. Admit- tedly, lack of a robust military background, Jiang could hardly become a

International Relations of the Asia Pacific Vol. 6 No. 2 Ó Oxford University Press and the Japan Association of International Relations 2006, all rights reserved 228 Ta-chen Cheng military master. Nevertheless, after a long period of time serving as the Chairman of CMC, Jiang gradually developed his own viewpoints in terms of military establishment and strategic guidance for China, with the assistance of other military advisors. From various proposals and instructions, a clearer picture of Jiang’s military thought thus has taken shape (Wu, 2001), and this makes the topic of this paper. In a communist country like China, it is difficult to do interviews with Jiang himself or his companions in order to directly depict Jiang’s military thought. However, in another way, it is also the political feature of a communist Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/irap/article/6/2/227/714449 by guest on 28 September 2021 country that will openly publish leaders’ military ideas across media, especially nation-sponsored ones. The widespread publications of leaders’ ideology, constituting an authoritative source, help researchers save much effort in studying this topic. Before moving to the main parts of this paper, there are three misunder- standings that are needed to be clarified. First, some analysts have argued that Jiang, as a politician without much military experience, himself was impotent and unqualified to propose serious military ideas. Therefore, this paper, focusing on Jiang’s military thought, was meaningless academically and prac- tically. The author cannot agree with such criticism. It would be unreasonable to believe that Jiang, who has been remaining in his seat as the Chairman of CMC for 15 years, had raised nothing significant in terms of the grand strategy or military guidance for developing China’s new armed forces. Jiang might have acquired intellectual assistance from other military professionals, just like Maoism, which was not born purely out of Mao Zedong’s brain, and it would be unnecessary to ask Jiang to produce all his proposals only by himself. As a matter of fact, as the author believes, if there is anyone whose military thought is worthwhile studying in China in the recent decade Jiang would absolutely be the first one. Second, for many Western observers on China, much of Jiang’s military thought, literally represented by a form of rhymes, was nothing but political slogans and propagandas, which deserved no time to discuss. Such arrogance not only subjectively ignored the specific ways of thinking that are popular among Chinese leaders, but also lost many precious materials for the analysis. In this paper, readers would find such materials introduced that would be useful in understanding what Jiang was thinking for his ideal military. Finally, some critics argued that as China has been moving to an institu- tionalizing stage in which the military has been gradually regularized, there would be no difference in China’s military planning and strategy whoever assumed the Chair of CMC. Such judgment, however, lacks explanatory power. In the United States, different Presidents who have often been civilians except some with military experiences do have made a difference in defense policy and military establishment. There is no point in denying Jiang’s ability Jiang Zemin’s military thought and legacy 229 to make changes. Moreover, Jiang could have chosen to be a quiet leader who ‘governs but not rules’ the military, but he has never hidden his strong intention to actively reform China’s military by introducing important and distinguishing schemes, as this paper will bring up. Truly, some external conditions, e.g. current uni-bipolar international system, or internal situa- tions, e.g. the priority of economic development, may limit the freedom of decision-making of China’s military leaders. But it would be less persuasive to judge that Jiang could not actively select which path his military will go just as other Western leaders. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/irap/article/6/2/227/714449 by guest on 28 September 2021

2 Jiang’s ‘Five Sentences’ According to Jiang’s assumption, current international situation is still complex and volatile, but in general it is moving towards relaxation. All countries in the world are working out their economic strategies and taking them as a task of primary importance to increase their overall national strength so as to take up their proper places in the world in the twenty-first century (Jiang, 1995). In terms of national defense, the essence of military struggle lies in the proposition of ‘wining a regional war in a condition of modern, especially higher technology’ (Zhang, 2000). The approaches, as Jiang claimed in an all-military workshop in December 1990, are the so-called Five Sentences (Wujuhua), namely ‘Politically Qualified’ (Zhengzhi Hege), ‘Militarily Tough’ (Junshi Guoyin), ‘Attitudinally Excellent’ (Zuofeng Youliang), ‘Strictly Disciplined’ (Jiluu Yianming), and ‘Materially Guaranteed’ (Baozhang Youli).1 In July 1991, when CPC celebrated its 70th anniversary, Jiang repeated his theories. Since then, ‘Five Sentences’ almost became official guidance for China’s new military strategy and the foundation of military establishment. Based on Jiang’s sentences, CMC issued a series of publications such as ‘The Outlines of Basic Military Establishment’ in April 1995. With more and more interpretations following in public articles and instructions, ‘Five Sentences’ theories were by and by being matured, and it the became representation of Jiang’s military thought. In the latest 16th Party Congress, Jiang, as expected, reiterated ‘Five Sentences’ in his speech as the major part for military establishment. Important and influential as it can be, the emphasis of this paper, which is aiming at discussing Jiang’s military thought, will focus on his ‘Five Sentences’. Generally speaking, Jiang’s ‘Five Sentences’ is a multi-dimensioned theoretical framework, which is no less organizational than Mao’s ‘People’s War’ doctrine. The following paragraphs will separately discuss each of the ‘Five Sentences’, which are systematically intertwined. Such an approach,

1 It is difficult to translate Jiang’s ‘Five Sentences’ into English for their profound meanings. The author has tried his best and welcomes any better suggestion on translation. 230 Ta-chen Cheng despite some potential doubts for its effectiveness, is the better option, as the author believes, to know Jiang’s ideas as each sentence has its own uniqueness and represents different perspectives of the military or the grand strategy. It needs to be mentioned that the contents of each sentence introduced, however, are not completely official interpretations of CPC, but the comprehension of the author from various credible sources, especially from China. Western materials, despite their rarity in this field, are used as supplementary matter. Subjective judgment is possible, but it is also the hope of the author to inspire readers, particularly western ones, to have more discussions on this topic. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/irap/article/6/2/227/714449 by guest on 28 September 2021

3 Politically qualified

3.1 The Party commands the gun As well known, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has always been defined by CPC as a proletariat force. Communist political ideology is still the foundation of the army since the principle of ‘the Party Commands the Gun’ (Dang Zhihui Qiang) never changes even in this modern age.2 The system of party control was challenged in the Tiananmen incident. According to a report of CMC in December 1989, there were 110 military officers, including 21 generals, violating regulations with the abscondence of 1,400 soldiers in Tiananmen (Shambaugh, 1993). Since then, massive political reeducation was enforced from the top to the bottom of the PLA in a very comprehensive scale, and was taken as a prior task in the military. Jiang knew well how important the political control in the military is in Tiananmen. In addition to this impact, Jiang’s focus on political control particularly made sense when he and other Chinese leaders witnessed the collapse of the former Soviet Union, which was viewed as an ideological deba- cle vis-a`-vis the triumph of Western values. However, the fall of Soviet Union should not be equal to the failure of communism, according to CPC. Jiang claimed in many occasions that ‘the differentiation from the West’ still remained, and it was the major task for PLA to resist such ideological invasion under the leadership of CPC (Yue, 2000). Preservation of the communist rule in China has always been the first priority of the PLA missions.

3.2 Three requests Since 1995, Jiang has begun raising a point asking the military cadre stressing politics (Jiang Zhengzhi). He argued that the so-called politics should include

2 For example, in January 1993 Jiang addressed this in an enlarged conference of CMC: ‘Ideological and political consolidations are a very special feature of our armies. No matter in terms of military establishment in the peace time, or preparation for a regional warfare under modern technology, ideological, and political educations are always a must.’ (Jiang, 1995, p. 313). Jiang Zemin’s military thought and legacy 231 political direction, political standing, political viewpoint, political regulations, political discernment, and political sensitivity (Lin, 1999). He also argued that the most fundamental element of stressing politics is to assure CPC’s absolute command (Chinese Communist Research Publisher, 1999). Jiang further extended his point as ‘Three Stresses’ (San Jiang): ‘to stress politics’ (Jiang Zhengzhi), ‘to stress learning’ (Jiang Xuexi), and ‘to stress righteousness’ (Jiang Zhengqi), which should be implanted into the center of PLA’s military education.3 Jiang’s request was not taken seriously by most of the military units due to Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/irap/article/6/2/227/714449 by guest on 28 September 2021 his then weaker authority. Since 1997, however, the proposal of ‘Three Stresses’ had gradually acquired much more attention. CPC had demanded that military cadres above the county level should seriously engage in ‘Three Stresses’ education. While Jiang was consolidating his military influence, ‘Three Stresses’ had become an essential part of PLA’s political indoctrination material.

3.3 Four basic propositions for cadre training Based on the principle of ‘Politically Qualified’, PLA had developed political criteria to cultivate qualified cadres. In China, unlike other western countries, cadres must first prove themselves meet such political requirements before their promotion are considered. Those who failed to meet these requirements were not allowed to be considered for higher duties. Nevertheless, Jiang was not a pure ideologist, and had tried to balance his view to professionalism. For example, Jiang in a memorial meeting of CPC’s 75th anniversary in June 1996 had delivered a speech concerning the effort to nurture troops with higher military qualities. In the 15th and 16th Party Congresses, Jiang also raised four basic propositions to develop ‘refined’, ‘revolutionary’, ‘young’, ‘knowledgeable’, and ‘professional’ cadres. In short, Jiang’s discourses somewhat reflected ‘red and expert’ tradition of the CPC.

3.4 Re-proposition of Deng Xiaoping’s instructions In the 15th National Party Congress of 1997, Jiang made a significant report entitled ‘Raise High the Great Banner of Deng Xiaoping Doctrines to Comprehensively Carry out Socialism with Chinese Characters towards the 21st century’ to the Congress. In the next February, Jiang made another speech on ‘In-depth Study on Deng’s Doctrines’. In these speeches, Jiang claimed that Deng’s doctrines would still be the ultimate guidance for CPC

3 ‘To stress politics’ is to stress political direction, political standing, political viewpoint, political regulations, political discernment, and political sensitivity, which is basically the same with Jiang’s original idea. ‘To stress learning’ means to learn theories, knowledge, and technology. ‘To stress righteousness’ means to insist in truism, to stick to principles, justice, and self-discipline, and to struggle with corruption and misbehaviors. The last two stresses are to serve for ‘to stress politics’. 232 Ta-chen Cheng and PLA. In other military publications and even in the main speech to the 16th Party Congress of CPC in 2002, Deng’s doctrines again were to be called as ‘Contemporary Marxism in China’, which would be the spiritual motivation for a modern, regular, and revolutionary army.

4 Militarily tough

4.1 Technology as a major factor For those who are familiar with China’s military traditions cannot deny that Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/irap/article/6/2/227/714449 by guest on 28 September 2021 Mao’s focus on ‘people’, rather than ‘weaponry’, constituted the nucleus of Chinese strategy. Nevertheless, for Jiang, who was formerly a technocrat, he might be more willing to discuss the impacts of new technologies on an economically growing China. Jiang pointed this out in the fourth PLA plenum of the 7th National People’s Congress in 1991. He stressed that modern war would be a competition of technology. Modernization of weaponry would play a more important role in military establishment.4 Accordingly, PLA has to pay more attention to military sciences and technologies (Huang and Liu, 2001). Not only shall domestic research and development of new military technologies be encouraged, but also attention to foreign development be paid more. The basic principles of military establishment will be ‘elite, combined, effective, and all-purposed’ within the budget of national defense (Lin, 1999, p. 21). It is also necessary to ‘shorten the battle lines, protrude the points, concentrate the resources, insist in the independent policy, and streamline the systems of research, development and production’ (Yiao and Liu, 1998). Under the principle of ‘Scientific Research Goes First’ (Keyian Xianxing), China shall research more, produce less, emphasize on high-tech equipments, and catch up militarily developed countries in order to reach the objective of strengthening the armies (Pan and Tai, 1999).

4.2 People’s defense According to Jiang, although international politics is reaching to a more moderate environment, regional warfare and armed conflicts never cease. The basic principle of ‘Active Defense’ (Jiji Fengyu) established in Mao’s days should be followed now also with new implications. He reckoned that ‘the principle of Active Defense is our heritage. We need to do our best for a systematic studying, comprehensive understanding and insistent dedication. At the same time, we need to hold a practical view in this changing situation for further realization.’ (Lin, 1999, p. 149)

4 Jiang asserted that ‘At present, the struggle among nations is crystallized into competitions of scientific technologies and human resources. The development of technology and innovation of knowledge will be more and more decisive to the development of a nation or a state’ (Jiang, 2000). Jiang Zemin’s military thought and legacy 233

Jiang further interpreted Mao’s ‘Active Defense’ as ‘an effective response for final control and combination of defensive and offensive characters’. Despite the duel characters, however, in terms of the grand strategy, China’s principles should still be defensive. For meeting these requirements, PLA must especially focus on a combination of training and fighting, consistence of education and nurturing, classification of various instructions, regularization of military development, formalization of troop training, and assurance of the quality and quantity of the armies (Yiao and Liu, 1998, p. 130). To make a difference, Jiang proposed that China’s new strategy be ‘People’s Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/irap/article/6/2/227/714449 by guest on 28 September 2021 Defense’, which includes the cooperation of field armies, regional troops, and militia.5 Jiang also claimed that China would not seek hegemony, not violate the sovereignty of other countries, and not initiate war of any kind first (Yu and Hu, 1999). Meanwhile, China will not make any concession to hegemonies. If being provoked or attacked, China will make every effort to retaliate (Cheng, 2001a). It has always been PLA’s basic assumption that ‘if you don’t offend me, I don’t, either. But if you do so, I do, too’ (Zhang, 2000, p. 91).

4.3 Military refinement with Chinese characters In October 1992, Jiang delivered a speech of ‘Military Refinement with Chinese Characters’ at the 14th National Party Congress of CPC. He reasserted this point both in the 15th and 16th Party Congresses. His speeches were chiefly based on the concepts as follows. In terms of military establishment, China should develop forces from its own national traditions. Also, he talked much on the combination of technological improvement and manpower reduction in the Chinese way. Jiang declared that PLA be reduced another half million based on Deng’s ‘Great Disarmament’ (Dacaijun). He claimed that through systematic reforms, PLA must meet scientific requirements in the new era (Lin, 1999, p. 7). Jiang’s cut and refinement proposal gained public support among most PLA leaders. The military furthered his proposal as ‘From One Base Point of Military Struggle to Two Fundamental Transformations’: On one hand, PLA should prepare for a regional warfare of high technology; on the other hand, it should shift its emphasis from quantity and manpower-intensiveness to quality and technology-intensiveness (Huang and Liu, 2001, p. 51). ‘According to the features of modern war, the military should make effort

5 Jiang particularly mentioned about this in the 15th National Party Congress: ‘No matter for the Party, Government or the People, everyone needs to concern about national defense and military establishment. Defense education and patriotic cultivation should be strengthened since the power of armed forces always originates from the people. Relations between soldiers and civilians should be positively developed, so should the welfare of military families. Additionally, the preparation for general mobilization, and the training of militia, the reserved units, the armed police, public security and other related national services should never be lessened.’ 234 Ta-chen Cheng to promote its technological standard and military system.’ (Yiao and Liu, 1998, p. 983) Practical approaches include ‘Four Key Purposes’ (Sida Zhongdian) and ‘Five Key Objectives’ (Wuda Mudi). ‘Four Key Purposes’ is ‘to rationalize the overall military organization’, ‘to clear the command and leadership relations’, ‘to define the authorities of different levels’, and ‘to streamline the military configuration’. ‘Five Key Objectives’ comprises ‘refinement, unity, effectiveness, economy and anti-red tape’. In June 1997, General Yu Youngpo, Head of PLA Political Department proposed a ‘Jiang’s Instruction’ (Jiang Zhishi), i.e. ‘Two Armaments’ (Liangge Wuzhuang). Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/irap/article/6/2/227/714449 by guest on 28 September 2021 Yu asked PLA be well armed with correct political ideology and modern technological knowledge. Yu’s order was viewed as a further interpretation on Jiang’s proposal of military refinement with Chinese characters.

5 Attitudinally excellent

5.1 Three standards High-tech weaponry has changed the face of modern war. However, Jiang was convinced that the essence of war is not completely changed. Maoist People’s War still has its own value, but needs to be endowed modern meanings. In this respect, manpower would be no longer the most decisive factor in a regional war of modern technology. Quality is more important than quantity of the army, and the military should develop its forces in a multiple but small and flat approach (Wang, 2000, p. 983). Jiang himself believed that in a battlefield of information, knowledge would become a leading feature of armed forces (Zhu, 2001). He also pointed out in the 16th Party Congress that preparation for ‘mobilized and information Warfare’ would be PLA’s two-fold historical mission in the future. As such, a great promotion of the quality of manpower would be necessary. All military training and education must focus on the enhancement of knowledge with approaches of strictness, severity, and pragmatism. More resources must be poured into new education systems to promote ‘Three Levels’ (Sange Shuiping), including ‘scientific culture’, ‘military theory’, and ‘military training’ (Yue, 2000, p. 373).

5.2 Three Styles and Four Educations In addition to the promotion of manpower in military levels, the ‘excellence of PLA’ lies in ‘Three Styles’ (Sange Zuofeng): ‘pursuit for truism, struggle for diligence and connection to the mass’ for their personal and political cultivations (Yue, 2000, p. 374). According to internal publications of CPC, the realization of ‘Three Styles’ is the insistence on the principles of ‘the Party commands the Gun’ and other traditions of PLA. Bureaucratism and factionalism must be absolutely banned. Soldiers with excellent attitudes should be fearless against hardship, be disciplined in order and rules, and be attentive to Jiang Zemin’s military thought and legacy 235 political and military training (Yiao and Liu, 1998, p. 20). In order to keep the armies attitudinally excellent, Jiang initiated a series of campaigns for ‘Four Educations’ (Sige Jiaoyu), namely ‘Patriotic Devotion Education’, ‘Revolutionary Philosophy Education’, ‘Respecting the Cadre and Caring the People Education’, and ‘Diligent Contribution Education’, in December 1994. Jiang’s ‘Four Educations’ later became the outline for basic training programs for Chinese soldiers. As a final objective, Jiang asked PLA must be superior to other armies in terms of spiritual establishment. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/irap/article/6/2/227/714449 by guest on 28 September 2021 5.3 Strengthening moral establishment of socialism Jiang argued that China is currently at the initial stage of socialism and is expanding its international power. Moral establishment of socialism is the vital point to develop advanced civilization. In the process of economic development, it is dangerous if only material interests were emphasized while ignoring idealism and morality. The military must accordingly stress moral aspects of patriotism, collectivism, and socialism, which are the very realization of socialism with Chinese characters. PLA has the responsibility to preserve and protect them (Jiang, 2001).

5.4 Three Represents theory With the opening of economic policies, PLA has encountered severe challenges especially from material attraction. In a serious speech in December 1994, Jiang first touched the corruption issues by asking PLA not to be seduced by materialism. Pure spiritual health must be assured (PLA, 1997). In his famous theory of ‘Three Represents’ (Sange Daibiao),6 Jiang never for- got to address this repeatedly. He asserted that in the 16th Party Congress that PLA should follow his ‘Three Represents’ theory, and make good connections with people. ‘No Corruption’ (Bu Bianzhi) and ‘No Failure’ (Da De Ying) would be the two major historical topics to PLA.

6 Strictly Disciplined

6.1 Leveled control in the military The principle of ‘Strictly Disciplined’ lies in Party’s leveled control over the military. With the highest authority in the hands of CMC, separation and cooperation of work, not power, could be implemented in PLA armies. Such distribution of ‘responsibilities’ is purely out of the consideration of

6 Three Represents are as follows: the Party must always represent the requirements of the development of China’s advanced productive forces, the orientation of the development of China’s advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the people in China. ‘Three Represents’ also occupied a large portion of Jiang’s address to the 16th Party Congress in 2002. 236 Ta-chen Cheng the nature of duties, not privileges. According to Jiang, company level should play a fundamental role to realize Party control and military management. From company level upwards, cadres shall undertake the responsibilities to ‘strictly discipline their subordinates’, ‘effectively manage organizations’, and ‘duly execute military order and regulations under the will of Party’. It is also their duties to assure normal process of military training, preparation, and other work (Zhang, 2000, p. 92).

6.2 Unity of the leadership Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/irap/article/6/2/227/714449 by guest on 28 September 2021 Apart from leveled control, Jiang strongly opposed to the existence of ‘Big Heads’ or ‘Clans’ in the military, and particularly put emphasis on the chain of command. Unity of the military leadership must be of the first priority. The chain of command of PLA is from CMC, to the Department of General Staff (DGS), to military regions, and then down to group armies. Jiang’s request for unity of leadership was reflected on two measures. First, the power of deploying troops has been restricted. In the peace time, without the command of DGS, division level commanders could only deploy one platoon, group army level commanders one company, and military region level commander one battalion. Second, through DGS, Jiang could issue orders directly to group armies without noticing military region commanders. Such power was to prevent disobedience, if any, of military region commanders.

6.3 Improvement of military management Jiang recognized that the armies in his hand, especially in the first years, were ill-managed, despite their huge size, and could be hardly called as a modern force. As such, Jiang, with the support of some military seniors, launched a series of actions for self-disciplining within the military. Since 1994, under Jiang’s instruction, CMC has enlisted improvement of management, especially military accountings, as one of their significant tasks. More workshops have been constantly held just in order to find ways to effectively improve management.

7 Materially guaranteed

7.1 Improvement of logistic systems Principles of ‘Materially Guaranteed’ is concerned with material prospectives of ‘Five Sentences’: out of an overall estimate of necessity and reality, Government should try to fulfill practical demands of the military (Yiao and Liu, 1998, p. 197). The realization of the principle of ‘Materially Guaranteed’ would be the improvement of logistic and supply systems. In January 1990 Jiang ordered PLA to implement ‘Three Substitutions’ Jiang Zemin’s military thought and legacy 237

(San Dai) on ‘supply, maintenance and medical services’. The ultimate objective would be ‘Combined Logistics’ (Lienqin). According to the concepts of ‘Combined Logistics’, a well-operated logistic system needs a multi- dimensional and matrix-style management. In other words, it requires cooperation and division of units (Yiao and Liu, 1998, p. 293). As such, CMC revised ‘The Decision Concerning the Logistic Organizational Principles and Leadership Relations of All Armies’ of 1952, and planed to combine various overlapping systems into a new military region-based structure for a more effective logistics institution. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/irap/article/6/2/227/714449 by guest on 28 September 2021

7.2 Three inclinations and two points The principle of ‘Materially Guaranteed’ demands shifting more resource to the weaker parts of current systems by proposing ‘Three Inclinations’ (Sange Qinxie) and ‘Two Points’ (Liangge Zhongdian). ‘Three Inclinations’ meant to channel more resource into the troops deployed in places of ‘the lowest level’, ‘the most remote’, and ‘the most difficult’ circumstances. ‘Two Points’ referred to guarantee ‘the general requirement of soldier lives’ and ‘the urgent need for military preparation’. According to these principles, missile and air bases, as well as remote units, were been allocating more supplements (Yiao and Liu, 1998, pp. 300–301).

7.3 Smaller standing armies, more mobilized forces As decided, the military should follow and serve for the comprehensive national development schemes and positively take part in the economic buildup (Wang, 2000, p. 941). According to Jiang, who was following Deng’s path for a more open economic policy, a healthier economic macro-structure would effectively provide the military with sufficient support of various kinds. As such, PLA must compress the scale and modify the structure of its standing armies for economic development. Meanwhile, military-industry structures should also adjust their production scale as China could no longer preserve large resource for them as before. Clearly speaking, an aim of ‘Smaller Standing Armies and More Mobilized Forces’ must be pursued. Past concepts such as ‘Big and Comprehensive; Small but also Comprehensive’ (Da Er Quan, Xiao Er Quan) should no longer be suitable. More professional, more systematic, and more cooperative approaches would be more appropriate for a new PLA. Industries also need to undertake responsibilities for a fast and massive military mobilization for future warfare if any (Zhang, 2000, pp. 125–126).

7.4 Banned military-operated business Unlike other armed forces in Western countries, PLA was allowed to run business for its own interests. It was estimated that in the early 1990s, PLA managed nearly 15,000 enterprises, yielding annual revenues of reportedly 238 Ta-chen Cheng

US$ 10 billion (Folta, 1992). Due to negative problems generated, however, Jiang decided to call off PLA’S privileges of running its own business, which was at first aimed to self-help the military without increasing more governmental subsidies. Addressing to this, Jiang publicly asserted that the purpose of the military was for national defense, not for profits. Even in the peacetime, there were still many challenges against PLA, which should not shift its focus to business. As such, PLA must ‘eat the food from the central Government’ (Chi Huangliang), namely be fully supplied by Beijing. From 1993 onwards, operation units and higher-level agencies (above division Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/irap/article/6/2/227/714449 by guest on 28 September 2021 level or the second level in the HQs) could no longer manage productive business. In July 1998, Jiang moreover ordered that all military services be banned from operating any kind of business expect those agricultural activities just for self-use. Former military-run business must immediately be trans- ferred to the hands of regional or central government (Shambuagh, 1999). Jiang claimed that only the military be away from business, the principle of ‘Materially Guaranteed’ could possibly be assured, and the pure spirit of the military be preserved.

8 Assessment Before taking the chair of Deng Xiaoping in CMC, Jiang, unlike his predecessors, did not have much experience in the military. In a country where political power comes from the barrels of gun, Jiang’s succession was not optimistically favored either inside or outside the military (Cheng, 2001a, pp. 19–20). Some observers on China’s military even suggested that Jiang might possibly adopt a more open-mined policy vis-a`-vis his predecessors, but could not likely have a full control over this largest army in the world (Lin, 1999, p. 1). These observations, even somehow proven incorrect now in certain perspectives, were not reasonless at that time. A clear fact reflected that anxiety. In the early 1990s, admittedly, it was Brothers Yang, i.e. Yang Shangkun and Yang Baibing, rather than Jiang who had more influences over the military. There would be no other way but to get rid of ‘Old Guys’ like Brothers Yang if Jiang attempted to consolidate his military power. For so doing, Jiang frequently visited seven major military regions and armed services from 14th Party Congress onwards. In terms of personnel arrangement, Jiang has promoted over 100 high-ranking military officers for over eight times after his coming to CMC, and that has successfully cultivated a group of Jiang’s henchmen. With the departure of military seniors such as Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen from CMC, and political rival Qiao Shi from Politburo, Jiang had step by step solidified his military authorities (Shin and Pin, 2000). Jiang’s triumph of power consolidation was not purely out of Deng Xiaoping’s endorsement. Under the ultimate guidance of ‘the Party Jiang Zemin’s military thought and legacy 239

Commands the Gun’, Jiang’s unbeatable ‘red background’ in CPC was also his precious assets against his other peers. Both conditions made Jiang’s status unchallengeable. Also, Jiang’s ‘Five Sentences’ has become the ‘Five Golden Rulers’ for the overall establishment of the military (Wang, 2000, p. 967). In practice, unlike other void slogans in China, ‘Five Sentences’ has been developed into a detailed intellectual system. Aiming at ‘Five Sentences’, Jiang asked PLA should have ‘Two Musts’ (Liangge Wubi): must fully realize and must make them down to the basic levels. Jiang’s ambition to make ‘Five Sentences’ his historical contribution as he implied in the 16th Party Congress Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/irap/article/6/2/227/714449 by guest on 28 September 2021 cannot be any clearer. The following pages would be devoted to assess his effort.

8.1 More than Deng’s theories? The trend of professionalism in China’s military has been a progressive process since the end of the Cultural Revolution. For a long time, Jiang has stressed the role and value of Deng Xiaoping theories in the establishment of a modern military. His purposes were basically from two considerations. On one hand, Jiang’s status was mostly endorsed by Deng in spite of the original plan of the latter before 1989. Jiang needed Deng’s support to consolidate his power in the military (Saich, 1992). Similar is Jiang’s discourse. If inherited from Deng’s theory, Jiang’s ‘Five Sentences’ could be more legitimate as a supreme military guidance of new generation. On the other hand, PLA undoubtedly needs to be reformed, but Jiang alone could not have sufficient authorities to engage in a wide campaign especially in his early years in CMC. With Deng’s backup politically and militarily, reforms would be easier to Jiang (Cheng, 2001b). Nevertheless, Jiang’s blueprint for a new PLA was somehow different from that of Deng. First, compared with his profound discussions on economic matters, Deng had fewer military publications. Deng’s theory may be politically useful, but new path still required Jiang’s down-to-earth effort. Moreover, although the emphasis on ‘Red’ was enshrined both in the minds of Deng and Jiang, there are several outstanding differences between the two leaders. Deng himself never hid his preference on commissars, whose authorities should often be above commanders of the same level.7 The promotion of Brothers Yang and General Chi Haotien might likely demonstrate Deng’s such inclination (Chin and Pin, 2000, pp. 336–337). In contrast, Jiang seemly favored more professional commanders. For Jiang, ‘Red’ does matter, but ‘Expert’ could be more meaningful in order to establish a modern and

7 In Deng’s era, commissars and commanders could be interchanged in terms of duty and post. Both commissars and commanders could have profound experiences in the long process of wars. It was easier to suggest that to Deng, if both were familiar with fighting experience, commissars with more political cultivation could better assure the purity of the military. 240 Ta-chen Cheng professional armies. Political requirements still make sense, as Jiang claimed in his 16th Party Congress speech, but without comprehensive command and operation experience, commander posts, especially of higher levels, should not be easily taken by political officers. Jiang’s trust on Zhang Wannien was widely viewed as an example that Jiang would not like to have a PLA that was just commanded by a group of commissars. Second, during Deng’s days, the immediate problem PLA faced was ‘bloating’ (Xiaoping, xxxx). He therefore had ordered China’s military force be reduced by about one million, and all organizational set-up including the Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/irap/article/6/2/227/714449 by guest on 28 September 2021 leading bodies be streamlined from top to bottom to a reasonable size in order to increase effectiveness and fighting capacity (Shichor, 1996). While making several reductions of the military size, Jiang himself, as noted, stressed military modernization and professionalization more. He, almost every time in public military occasions, urged PLA step up its military reform, and to set the target of fully equipping itself with higher technology. He urged that all military soldiers, particularly the high ranking ones, must bear their fundamental responsibilities in mind and improve PLA’s defense capabilities under high-tech conditions (People’s Daily, 2003). Third, the use of military force in domestic pacification, which has not been too unfamiliar in the history of Chinese communists to stabilize its rule, is more difficult to be justified in Jiang’s days. It is hard to envisage that Jiang nowadays could exercise military power to pacify national chaos like Deng, even in a situation like Tiananmen. Except the time when the existence of CPC had been under grave danger, the consequences of using force for domestic purpose could lead to not only political but also economic disasters which most Chinese are not willing to see. Fourth, in the post-cold war period the Chinese have identified newly emerged threats from the southeast. After the disappearance of the Soviet threats, the re-stationing of major military forces has aimed for not only potential American, or even Japanese, involvement in the Taiwan questions but also preparation for power struggles in East Asia. Not hailing group armies as principal defense instruments as in old days, Jiang has approved increase of navy budget corresponding to Admiral Liu Huaqin’s request for establishing a blue navy in the future. China is no longer satisfied as a land power. The abilities of projection of mobile force and preservation of overseas interests are more of Jiang’s concerns.8

8 The pursuit of naval expansion has changed Chinese thinking concerning sea power. The Chinese have realized the significance of having a competent Navy although their naval capacity is still far behind other Asian Powers like Japan and India. As compared with the recessive policy of the Ming and Qing Dynasties, the PLA Navy expresses a new intention in protection national interests from the sea. Jiang Zemin’s military thought and legacy 241

8.2 Reduction is easy, refinement is not Jiang has announced in September 2003 that the Government planed to cut 200,000 troops from its force by the end of the year 2005. That is in addition to a reduction of a half-million troops announced earlier. The newest cuts would bring the number of Chinese troop force below two million. However, the refinement of PLA, which Jiang has paid much attention, is much harder than just a series of cuts in its force size. Admittedly, Gulf War had imposed tremendous impacts on China’s Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/irap/article/6/2/227/714449 by guest on 28 September 2021 military. Almost immediately after the end of the war, Jiang asked PLA to explore new features of modern wars (Wang, 2000, p. 962). A concept of preparation for a regional war under the condition of high technology was soon introduced. Military refinement has become the main task in the 1990s (Yu and Hu, 1999, p. 429). Nevertheless, the long-term indiscretion and igno- rance in PLA, such as ‘bloating, laxity, conceit, extravagance and inertia’ (Zhong, San, Jiao, She, Duo) first identified by Deng had never been seriously rectified (Wang, 2001). This situation mostly explained the anti-reformed attitude of some conservative Chinese soldiers. Even the element of ‘men’ was eliminated; however, whether the scientific policy required by Jiang could be effectively enforced remained doubtful. Thanks to the lower priority of defense in overall national plans (Yu and Hu, 1999, p. 439), it would take China more time to modernize its armies in order to abridge the technological gap with other militarily advanced countries (Zhang, 2000, p. 76). Jiang himself ever admitted that such gap with other countries gave China much pressure (Ya, 2000). After the war of anti-terrorism in Iraq, criticism of Jiang’s military policies has emerged after the US has successfully toppled down the Saddam regime in a short period of time. Jiang’s reform of military modernization was criticized as too slow to catch up with other Western countries, let alone the US. All these suggest that China’s road to modernization would be anything but easy (Huang and Liu, 2001, pp. 98–100). 8.3 Corruption lingering? The application of Jiang’s ‘Five sentences’ is strictly depending on how much the vested interests had been influenced. The requirements of ‘Politically Qualified’, ‘Militarily Tough’, and ‘Materially Guaranteed’ are relatively easier to meet even in a slow but gradual fashion. ‘Attitudinally Excellent’ and ‘Strictly Disciplined’, in contrast, have encountered more obstacles, or even simply become rhetoric. Not surprisingly, an opening economic environment has generated many incentives of corruption, even in a closed military system like PLA. Economic openness has significantly widened the gaps of living standards between soldiers and civilians. Material attraction from outside the military has entrapped many service men, especially in those areas with better export revenues. Corruption has eroded the military spirit in a very 242 Ta-chen Cheng quick pace and hampered the coherence of leadership (Yiao and Lui, 1998, p. 269). Moreover, without privilege to operate business, it was never news to learn that some individuals had used their military power to collect ill- gotten wealth in order to reach better living standards. Ordinary civilians could do nothing more but tolerate. Acknowledging these problems, however, little effort substantial except some empty slogans, such as ‘Patriotism’, ‘Collectivism’, ‘Socialism’, and ‘Four Educations’, has been made by the Government and CPC. The pace of introducing new laws can never catch up the speed of corruption. Indeed, Jiang has been hailed by the Chinese Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/irap/article/6/2/227/714449 by guest on 28 September 2021 people for dismantling the army’s sprawling business empire, but it would be very naive if China’s military and political leaders including Jiang believed that political propaganda would be enough to ask soldiers to resist enticement from the outside (Wang, 2001, pp. 64–74). 8.4 Logistics problems unsettled In terms of military logistics and supply systems, Jiang’s ‘Three Inclinations’ and ‘Two Points’ properly channeled resources into some regions in need. His emphasis on ‘Fist Forces’ (Quantou Buduei), which refer to those units with advanced technologies, also meets the priority of national development for China in peacetime. Nevertheless, long-term logistic problems could not possibly be removed overnight. Since the 1980s, the shortcomings of multi- leadership, mismanagement, overlapping organizations had never been erased in Chinese military. In an occasion in December 1996, Jiang himself has ever publicly complained that ill-operated logistics systems and weapons supply of PLA had wasted China so much money and time (Yiao and Liu, 1998, p. 268). In order to systematically change the logistic structure, PLA was ordered to establish a new General Headquarters of Equipment (Zhong Zhuangbei Bu)in April 1998, responsible for the control and management of weapons and other equipments of all PLA. Nevertheless, it was Jiang’s idea of ‘Combined Forces’ within a smaller and flatter military system. Is it reasonable to separate logis- tical systems into two HQs of Equipment and Logistics (Zhong Houqin Bu)?9 Is it possible that the long-term inefficiency of logistic systems could be changed just because of the establishment of another HQs? Not many observers are so optimistic.

8.5 Progress of rule of law in the military? Compared with two leaders of previous generations, Jiang apparently highlighted rule of law in the military more. As early as in a 1989 press conference, Jiang promised that there was no way to make Party replace Government or Law. CMC also issued a series of military regulations and

9 General Logistics HQs is responsible for Logistics, including Finance, Hygiene, Preparation, Ammunitions, Transportation, Petroleum, Assets, and related production. Jiang Zemin’s military thought and legacy 243 orders under the requirement of China’s ‘Eighth Five-Year Project’ (Ba Wu Jihua) in 1993 (Lin, 1999, p. 329). On March 14, 1997, China’s highest leg- islative organ, the National People’s Congress, passed the ‘National Defense Act’. Mobilization, military service, political work, technological research, logistic supply, and assets management were more institutionalized than before. Compared with other countries, China’s process for rule of law was still far behind even though there was a huge progress to reduce the influences of men. China’s so-called institutionalization is merely to rationalize the principle of ‘the Party commands the Gun’ by law. There would be still a long way Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/irap/article/6/2/227/714449 by guest on 28 September 2021 from ‘rule by law’ towards ‘rule of law’ in China. The achievement of institutionalization should never be exaggerated.

8.6 Factionalism as a potential threat Unlike Deng, who can exercise his own solid factionary support as the basis of military reforms, Jiang had no military establishment of his own to effectively carry on his schemes. Although Jiang insisted the principle of ‘the Party commands the Gun’ as the supreme guidance of military establishment, factionalism never ceased to be a lasting problem. Various kinds of background and relations (Guanxi) constituted a complicated network of factions and cliques looking for group interests, and damaged the unity of the military.10 By using sticks and carrots simultaneously, the problems of factionalism might still be Jiang’s greatest challenge to manage and reform PLA. Jiang even tried to employ extensive political work to eliminate budding or existing factionalism, but unsurprisingly in vain. For a long time, factionalism has always been too difficult an issue to handle. Mao and Deng did not settle it well (Dreyer, 1985), so might not Jiang. Furthermore, lack of charisma and authority as a strong man, Jiang had fewer assets to manage personnel matters. For example, it would not be unacceptable that Deng reassigned the semi-retired senior Admiral Liu Huaqin back to the first line just in the name of ‘necessity of work’ while clearly violating the retirement and promotion regulations. But now, it would be a political blunder if Jiang were trying to do a similar thing. Of course, Jiang knows that China will not get back to the old way of ‘rule by man’. So how to solve factionalism may just become too tough an issue that Jiang always needs to face.

8.7 Taiwan Issue and USA Relations In the early 21st century, the Taiwan question is apparently the most prominent military challenge that the Chinese will envisage. The complicacy

10 For example, General Zhang, who is from the Shandong Province, would be more willing to promote those from his home province. 244 Ta-chen Cheng of Taiwan issue is because it has involved in not only sovereignty unification, but also American interference. Jiang’s viewpoint, which is basically the same as other senior leaders’, is clearly shown in his well-known ‘Eight-Point’ offer to Taiwan in 1995. He insisted that there is no guarantee of peaceful solution to the Taiwan question and foreign intervention is strictly not welcomed.11 While PLA is preparing for the capability of fighting for unification, if necessary, the likelihood of American and Japanese involvement, however, increases the risk of China’s use of force to solve the Taiwan question. During the process of economic development, which has been identified as the first Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/irap/article/6/2/227/714449 by guest on 28 September 2021 priority since Deng’s era, although the military option has never been ruled out, Jiang has undertaken more domestic pressures worrying economic impacts if war broke out. In other words, unlike Mao and Deng, who could be more at ease using force to settle sovereignty or territorial disputes, Jiang has to consider more about China’s budding economy. In fact, since retiring from the posts of Secretary General and President, Jiang has more frequently mentioned ‘the harmonious relations of national defense and economic growth’. He also urged the army should take China’s overall situation into consideration and contribute to the country’s economic development. It seemed Jiang has been leaving the final decision open to other new generation leaders. In terms of Sino-American relations, Jiang has been more practical about the US Governments, which had become the no. 1 economic partner, even in the crises of US bombing of the Chinese embassy and the mid-air collision between planes of two countries. Jiang’s silence for the wiretapping in his plane particularly showed his caution to the US. He also did not let the Cox Report become obstacles between Washington and Beijing regardless of many domestic misgivings for national security in the US.12 The shift

11 He said that ‘there are only two ways to settle the Taiwan question: One is by peaceful means and the other is by non-peaceful means. The way the Taiwan question is to be settled is China’s internal affairs, and brooks no foreign interference. We consistently stand for achieving reunification by peaceful means and through negotiations. But we shall not undertake not to use force. Such commitment would only make it impossible to achieve peaceful reunification and could not but lead to the eventual settlement of the question by the use of force’. Jiang’s forth point also clearly stated that ‘We should strive for the peaceful reunification of the motherland since Chinese should not fight fellow Chinese. Our not undertaking to give up the use of force is not directed against our compatriots in Taiwan but against the schemes of foreign forces to interfere with China’s reunification and to bring about the ‘‘independence of Taiwan’’. We are fully confident that our compatriots in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao and those residing overseas would understand our principled position.’ Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s ‘Eight-Point Offer to Taiwan’. 12 The Cox Report even clearly pointed out ‘The PRC’s appetite for information and technology appears to be insatiable, and the energy devoted to the task enormous. While only a portion of the PRC’s overall technology collection activities targeted at the United States is of national security concern, the impact on our national security could be huge’. see ‘The United States House of Representatives Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China’, Cox Report 2000, Ch. 1; available at http:// www.house.gov/coxreport/pdf/ch1.pdf. Jiang Zemin’s military thought and legacy 245 from a more friendly Clinton administration to a more combative Bush government, however, has strengthened Jiang’s will that military modernization and force upgrading are necessary measures if the Chinese want to avoid being ‘bullied’ as in the last two centuries.

9 Conclusion Jiang, as the center of the third generation of Chinese leaders, has provided much food for military thought for Chinese military researchers. As time goes Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/irap/article/6/2/227/714449 by guest on 28 September 2021 by, Jiang has gradually been transforming from a rookie leader who had to follow Deng’s instructions and compete with other senior generals for influences in military matters to a matured civilian commander willing to express his view and plans for national defense and grand strategy. By showing his ambition, Jiang has proposed a larger vision than other authoritarian one-party leaders in communist countries such as North Korea or Vietnam, who have to worry more about domestically preserving communist rule and economic viability. This differentiation was surely because now China is becoming an potential great power, at least in East Asia, and its leaders must know how to effectively develop due military capability to protect national interests of a great power. Jiang’s military thinking is surely evolutionary. In the beginning, he seemed to be more concerned about de-factionalism and consolidating his personal power in the military. Through the process of appointing new generals and combining various units Jiang has been building his influences. The change of American policy and a series of modern warfare in the last decade, however, strengthen his will that PLA must fasten its pace of modernization in order to catch up other Powers in a near future. Jiang began to put many more resources with two-digit budget increase annually in the military although he emphasized that the troop must contribute to China’s overall economic development. Jiang set a process of ‘Three Leap Developments’ (Sange Kuayueshi Fazhan): the first step is for preparation for military establishment of every kind by 2000; the second step is to become the greatest military power in Asia by 2020; and the third step is to accomplish military modernization to a standard of advanced countries by 2049 (Wang, 1999). For meeting such goals, Navy has been promoted to a higher status among PLA, which has never happened before. If these developments are fairly implemented, most Asian countries, as well as the US, may face a powerful China that begins to care much more about its ‘out-of-area’ interests. More interest conflicts can be expected then. In the 16th Party Congress of 2002, unsurprisingly, Jiang did not yield his chair in CMC although he allowed Hu Jintao to take his other two important positions in CPC and Government. Two of Jiang’s prote´ge´s, Generals Guo 246 Ta-chen Cheng

Boxiong and Cao Gangchuan, were also appointed CMC vice-chairmen in addition to Hu. In Chinese politics those who controlled the military power have always been the most powerful man. Before Hu consolidates his military power as Jiang ever did 15 years ago, Jiang’s military control will still make PLA impossible to deviate from his instructions and discourses for several years. Will Jiang’s ‘Five Sentences’ be lasting after Jiang left China’s politics? There is perhaps no definite answer so far, but at least it could be believed that, despite the fact that Jiang’s ‘Five Sentences’ has now been officially implanted into PLA’s military planning, devoid of clear ideological colors, Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/irap/article/6/2/227/714449 by guest on 28 September 2021 Jiang’s proposals have pointed out a path for PLA. Among these proposals, modernization, professionalism, and party control seem to continue being the trends of PLA’s development in the long run. Jiang’s request for anti- corruption is perhaps more uncertain, but there is no reason to suppose the Chinese could not find effective measures deterring military corruption (e.g. strengthening institutional and legal control while increasing pay and other benefits). However, even in that case, will ‘Five Sentences’ acquire similar historical status as ‘People’s War’ or ‘Active Defense’? It still needs more time to find out.

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