International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Volume 6 (2006) 227–247 doi:10.1093/irap/lci144 Jiang Zemin’s military thought and legacy Ta-chen Cheng Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/irap/article/6/2/227/714449 by guest on 28 September 2021 Department of Public Administration, Tamkang University, Taiwan. Email: [email protected] and [email protected] Abstract Nearly for 15 years as the Chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, Jiang Zemin, albeit lack of real military experience, has gradually developed his military theories and principles in the process of consolidating military authority. Unquestionably, Jiang is not only the core of the third generation leadership in China, but also the most powerful man in China’s military until now. That makes researchers interested in exploring military thought of this man controlling the largest armies in the world. In this paper, Jiang’s basic military framework, ‘Five Sentences’, including ‘Politically Qualified’, ‘Militarily Tough’, ‘Attitudinally Excellent’, ‘Strictly Disciplined’ and ‘Materially Guaran- teed’ will be separately discussed. With interpretations of ‘Five Sentences’, the author will thereafter provide personal comments and analysis. 1 Introduction In June 1989, Jiang Zemin was elected Secretary General of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in the fourth plenum of 13th Party Congress. Later that year, Jiang succeeded Deng Xiaoping as the Chairman of Central Military Commission (CMC) in the fifth plenum. Even so, Jiang himself at that time did not assume the highest authority in the military, although officially Jiang had taken China’s military power. It would require Jiang a longer time to stabilize his seat after a series of struggles for military influences. As the core of the third generation of leadership, Jiang was expected to clearly express his military thought just as his predecessors provided. Admit- tedly, lack of a robust military background, Jiang could hardly become a International Relations of the Asia Pacific Vol. 6 No. 2 Ó Oxford University Press and the Japan Association of International Relations 2006, all rights reserved 228 Ta-chen Cheng military master. Nevertheless, after a long period of time serving as the Chairman of CMC, Jiang gradually developed his own viewpoints in terms of military establishment and strategic guidance for China, with the assistance of other military advisors. From various proposals and instructions, a clearer picture of Jiang’s military thought thus has taken shape (Wu, 2001), and this makes the topic of this paper. In a communist country like China, it is difficult to do interviews with Jiang himself or his companions in order to directly depict Jiang’s military thought. However, in another way, it is also the political feature of a communist Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/irap/article/6/2/227/714449 by guest on 28 September 2021 country that will openly publish leaders’ military ideas across media, especially nation-sponsored ones. The widespread publications of leaders’ ideology, constituting an authoritative source, help researchers save much effort in studying this topic. Before moving to the main parts of this paper, there are three misunder- standings that are needed to be clarified. First, some analysts have argued that Jiang, as a politician without much military experience, himself was impotent and unqualified to propose serious military ideas. Therefore, this paper, focusing on Jiang’s military thought, was meaningless academically and prac- tically. The author cannot agree with such criticism. It would be unreasonable to believe that Jiang, who has been remaining in his seat as the Chairman of CMC for 15 years, had raised nothing significant in terms of the grand strategy or military guidance for developing China’s new armed forces. Jiang might have acquired intellectual assistance from other military professionals, just like Maoism, which was not born purely out of Mao Zedong’s brain, and it would be unnecessary to ask Jiang to produce all his proposals only by himself. As a matter of fact, as the author believes, if there is anyone whose military thought is worthwhile studying in China in the recent decade Jiang would absolutely be the first one. Second, for many Western observers on China, much of Jiang’s military thought, literally represented by a form of rhymes, was nothing but political slogans and propagandas, which deserved no time to discuss. Such arrogance not only subjectively ignored the specific ways of thinking that are popular among Chinese leaders, but also lost many precious materials for the analysis. In this paper, readers would find such materials introduced that would be useful in understanding what Jiang was thinking for his ideal military. Finally, some critics argued that as China has been moving to an institu- tionalizing stage in which the military has been gradually regularized, there would be no difference in China’s military planning and strategy whoever assumed the Chair of CMC. Such judgment, however, lacks explanatory power. In the United States, different Presidents who have often been civilians except some with military experiences do have made a difference in defense policy and military establishment. There is no point in denying Jiang’s ability Jiang Zemin’s military thought and legacy 229 to make changes. Moreover, Jiang could have chosen to be a quiet leader who ‘governs but not rules’ the military, but he has never hidden his strong intention to actively reform China’s military by introducing important and distinguishing schemes, as this paper will bring up. Truly, some external conditions, e.g. current uni-bipolar international system, or internal situa- tions, e.g. the priority of economic development, may limit the freedom of decision-making of China’s military leaders. But it would be less persuasive to judge that Jiang could not actively select which path his military will go just as other Western leaders. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/irap/article/6/2/227/714449 by guest on 28 September 2021 2 Jiang’s ‘Five Sentences’ According to Jiang’s assumption, current international situation is still complex and volatile, but in general it is moving towards relaxation. All countries in the world are working out their economic strategies and taking them as a task of primary importance to increase their overall national strength so as to take up their proper places in the world in the twenty-first century (Jiang, 1995). In terms of national defense, the essence of military struggle lies in the proposition of ‘wining a regional war in a condition of modern, especially higher technology’ (Zhang, 2000). The approaches, as Jiang claimed in an all-military workshop in December 1990, are the so-called Five Sentences (Wujuhua), namely ‘Politically Qualified’ (Zhengzhi Hege), ‘Militarily Tough’ (Junshi Guoyin), ‘Attitudinally Excellent’ (Zuofeng Youliang), ‘Strictly Disciplined’ (Jiluu Yianming), and ‘Materially Guaranteed’ (Baozhang Youli).1 In July 1991, when CPC celebrated its 70th anniversary, Jiang repeated his theories. Since then, ‘Five Sentences’ almost became official guidance for China’s new military strategy and the foundation of military establishment. Based on Jiang’s sentences, CMC issued a series of publications such as ‘The Outlines of Basic Military Establishment’ in April 1995. With more and more interpretations following in public articles and instructions, ‘Five Sentences’ theories were by and by being matured, and it the became representation of Jiang’s military thought. In the latest 16th Party Congress, Jiang, as expected, reiterated ‘Five Sentences’ in his speech as the major part for military establishment. Important and influential as it can be, the emphasis of this paper, which is aiming at discussing Jiang’s military thought, will focus on his ‘Five Sentences’. Generally speaking, Jiang’s ‘Five Sentences’ is a multi-dimensioned theoretical framework, which is no less organizational than Mao’s ‘People’s War’ doctrine. The following paragraphs will separately discuss each of the ‘Five Sentences’, which are systematically intertwined. Such an approach, 1 It is difficult to translate Jiang’s ‘Five Sentences’ into English for their profound meanings. The author has tried his best and welcomes any better suggestion on translation. 230 Ta-chen Cheng despite some potential doubts for its effectiveness, is the better option, as the author believes, to know Jiang’s ideas as each sentence has its own uniqueness and represents different perspectives of the military or the grand strategy. It needs to be mentioned that the contents of each sentence introduced, however, are not completely official interpretations of CPC, but the comprehension of the author from various credible sources, especially from China. Western materials, despite their rarity in this field, are used as supplementary matter. Subjective judgment is possible, but it is also the hope of the author to inspire readers, particularly western ones, to have more discussions on this topic. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/irap/article/6/2/227/714449 by guest on 28 September 2021 3 Politically qualified 3.1 The Party commands the gun As well known, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has always been defined by CPC as a proletariat force. Communist political ideology is still the foundation of the army since the principle of ‘the Party Commands the Gun’ (Dang Zhihui Qiang) never changes even in this modern age.2 The system of party control was challenged