ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT NO. 96 JUNE 2001 China’s Political Succession and INSIDE Jiang Zemin and Its Implications for the United States China’s Leadership ANDREW SCOBELL • MURRAY SCOT TANNER • CHENG LI Transition: Legacies, Longevity, and Lines PAGE 3 Introduction After Jiang, Hu? Can Hu Jintao Beat the GANG LIN “Successor’s Dilemma”? PAGE 7 hina’s top leader Jiang Zemin is sched- China’s Political uled to resign from his post as Party Succession: Four boss at the 16th national congress of the Misperceptions in C the West Chinese Communist Party in the fall of 2002. PAGE 17 The following spring he will step down as China’s president during the country’s Tenth National People’s Congress. If the Party leader- ship can be smoothly transferred from Jiang to his designated successor Hu Jintao, it will mark • Will Beijing, as part of its leadership transi- the first routine power transition without the tion, adopt a more flexible policy toward the impetus of a political crisis or the death of the United States as well as the rest of the world? top leader in the history of the People’s At a February 21 seminar on “China’s Republic of China. However, the identity of Political Succession and Its Implications for the China’s next leader is contingent upon many United States” sponsored by the Woodrow uncertain factors, including: Wilson Center’s Asia Program, four distin- • Will Jiang Zemin cling to the powerful guished experts on Chinese politics explored chairmanship of the Party’s Military Affairs China’s possible power structure and policy Commission and rule from “behind the cur- direction after next year’s Party congress. tain” after 2002? Panelists agreed that Hu Jintao will become • Will Hu Jintao be able to control the China’s next top leader.They differed, however, Chinese military? as to whether Jiang will remain influential and • Will China’s “fourth generation” of leaders what will be the political agenda for the new endorse Hu’s leadership and replace the leadership in the years to come. Incorporating “third generation” as the principal force in three essays contributed by seminar speakers, this Beijing’s ruling hierarchy over the next few special report looks at Beijing’s upcoming polit- ASIA PROGRAM years? ical succession and its implications for China’s • Is Beijing likely to initiate significant politi- domestic development and foreign relations. cal reforms in an effort to maintain social sta- In the first essay, Andrew Scobell of the bility and economic prosperity, or continue U.S.Army War College argues that it is unlikely to stagnate politically by manipulating the that Jiang Zemin will vacate all his official posi- widespread nationalism and neo-conser- tions and fade away after the Party’s 16th con- vatism inside China? gress in 2002. Jiang is reluctant to relinquish Gang Lin is Program Associate in the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Asia Program. ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT power and wants to leave a legacy of great accom- fective, politically rigid and shortsighted; 2) a vicious plishments comparable to his two predecessors, Mao power struggle is going on among various factions; Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Given Jiang’s good 3) Chinese leaders can be divided into dichotomous health and the allegiance of military commanders to groups such as hardliners vs. reformers; and 4) since his leadership, he could remain China’s paramount some fourth generation leaders were trained in the leader for another decade, Scobell maintains. After United States, they may form a pro-American force Jiang resigns from his positions of Party general sec- in China’s policy-making circle. Li contends that the retary and state president, he will still control fourth generation of leaders is less dogmatic, more Beijing’s general policy direction and be prone to capable and more diversified than previous political intervening in political crises or controversies. generations in the Party’s history. Chinese politics Scobell contends that Jiang’s continued status as has shifted from an all-powerful single leader to a China’s paramount leader will help ensure an impor- greater collective leadership, and Chinese leaders are tant degree of continuity in U.S.-China relations. more likely to unite than to fight among themselves. 2 Likewise, the second essay by Scot Tanner of Li believes Jiang’s successors will likely push Jiang Western Michigan University maintains that Jiang’s aside and accelerate China’s political reform, but designated successor, Hu Jintao, is likely to inherit modify the pace of economic reforms. Western- Jiang’s general secretaryship and presidency, while trained Chinese leaders will still be a minority in the Jiang will emulate Deng by continuing to control foreseeable future, and China’s new leaders are cyni- the Chinese military and rule from “behind the cur- cal about the alleged moral superiority of the tain.”According to Tanner, Hu’s dilemma is that any- United States, Li concludes. thing he does to strengthen his own power base risks In commentary delivered during the seminar, eroding Jiang’s trust; but actions designed to reassure Carol Hamrin of George Mason University Jiang risk leaving Hu too weak when Jiang passes argued that China is unlikely to experience sweep- from the scene. At present, Hu has apparently pro- ing change during the period of power succession. moted a noteworthy but hardly overwhelming cadre Jiang may not entirely leave China’s political stage of allies into significant Party and state posts. No after the Party’s 16th Congress, and political reform matter whether Jiang really trusts Hu,Tanner argues, in China will remain marginal, given the widespread Jiang lacks the power to dislodge Hu as designated money politics and ongoing neo-conservatism in successor and build sufficient support for an alterna- China. On the other hand, social issues, the global tive candidate in Hu’s place. However, once Hu takes context and the factors of Hong Kong and Taiwan over the general secretaryship next year, the willing- will continue to force China’s new leaders to be ness of Jiang to stand by Hu during a major political more open and transparent in dealing with domestic crisis will become the single greatest question in and international affairs. Hu’s effort to beat the successor’s dilemma. Offering various perspectives on Beijing’s In the third essay, Cheng Li of Hamilton College upcoming political succession as well as its implica- challenges four widespread misperceptions in the tions for China’s domestic development and foreign West regarding China’s political succession.These relations, this Special Report reveals the difficulty of misperceptions are that 1) Chinese leaders are inef- evaluating political changes and continuities in this complicated country. In the absence of political THE ASIA PROGRAM transparency and institutionalization in China, it is difficult to avoid speculation in examining Beijing’s The Wilson Center’s Asia Program is dedicated to the proposi- leadership transition. Studies of China’s political tion that only those with a sound scholarly grounding can begin succession could be enhanced, however, by looking to understand contemporary events. One of the Center’s oldest at economic, social, cultural and foreign factors most regional programs, the Asia Program seeks to bring historical and cultural sensitivity to the discussion of Asia in the nation’s pertinent to Beijing’s internal politics.We hope this capital. In seminars, workshops, briefings, and conferences, Special Report will contribute to a better under- prominent scholars of Asia interact with one another and with standing of China’s upcoming leadership transition policy practitioners to further understanding of the peoples, tra- and its implications for the United States. ditions, and behaviors of the world’s most populous continent. • CHINA’S POLITICAL SUCCESSION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES Jiang Zemin and China’s Leadership Transition: Legacies, Longevity, and Lines ANDREW SCOBELL hen political leaders think about political I argue that the most likely scenario is that Jiang succession, they also tend to think about Zemin stays in power for another decade. In my W their legacies. They think about their view Jiang will not willingly give up power for at most significant accomplishments and how they will least four reasons.The first two have to do with the be remembered. Of course many leaders become nature of the succession process in contemporary addicted to the power and privilege of their positions China, while the second two are related to the per- and seek ways to prolong their leadership tenures. sonal drive of the man himself.This essay first con- Eventually, however, even long-serving leaders must siders the succession process itself, with particular 3 face their own mortality,reconcile themselves to how attention to the role of the paramount leader and they will be remembered, and plan for the succession. the process of leadership selection. Second, personal When we examine the case of the People’s ambitions are examined — specifically, Jiang’s fond- Republic of China, it is worthwhile to consider ness for power and his quest for an enduring legacy. both the process of political succession and the nature of China’s current paramount leader Jiang SUCCESSION PROCESS Zemin.A fundamental aspect of the looming leader- 1. Role of the Paramount Leader ship transition in China is Jiang’s fate:Will he leave In Chinese communist politics, political power tends quietly after presiding over the 16th Party Congress to be concentrated not in institutions but in individ- in 2002? I posit four possible scenarios. uals.The most powerful individual is usually referred First, Jiang could actually retire. Jiang could grad- to as the paramount political leader.This person does ually vacate all his official Party, government and not necessarily hold a formal position of authority, military positions and fade away.