ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT

NO. 96 JUNE 2001

China’s Political Succession and INSIDE and Its Implications for the United States ’s Leadership ANDREW SCOBELL • MURRAY SCOT TANNER • CHENG LI Transition: Legacies, Longevity, and Lines PAGE 3 Introduction After Jiang, ? Can Beat the GANG LIN “Successor’s Dilemma”? PAGE 7 hina’s top leader Jiang Zemin is sched- China’s Political uled to resign from his post as Party Succession: Four boss at the 16th national congress of the Misperceptions in C the West in the fall of 2002. PAGE 17 The following spring he will step down as China’s president during the country’s Tenth National People’s Congress. If the - ship can be smoothly transferred from Jiang to his designated successor Hu Jintao, it will mark • Will , as part of its leadership transi- the first routine power transition without the tion, adopt a more flexible policy toward the impetus of a political crisis or the death of the United States as well as the rest of the world? top leader in the history of the People’s At a February 21 seminar on “China’s Republic of China. However, the identity of Political Succession and Its Implications for the China’s next leader is contingent upon many United States” sponsored by the Woodrow uncertain factors, including: Wilson Center’s Asia Program, four distin- • Will Jiang Zemin cling to the powerful guished experts on Chinese politics explored chairmanship of the Party’s Military Affairs China’s possible power structure and policy Commission and rule from “behind the cur- direction after next year’s Party congress. tain” after 2002? Panelists agreed that Hu Jintao will become • Will Hu Jintao be able to control the China’s next top leader.They differed, however, Chinese military? as to whether Jiang will remain influential and • Will China’s “fourth generation” of leaders what will be the political agenda for the new endorse Hu’s leadership and replace the leadership in the years to come. Incorporating “third generation” as the principal force in three essays contributed by seminar speakers, this Beijing’s ruling hierarchy over the next few special report looks at Beijing’s upcoming polit- ASIA PROGRAM years? ical succession and its implications for China’s • Is Beijing likely to initiate significant politi- domestic development and foreign relations. cal reforms in an effort to maintain social sta- In the first essay, Andrew Scobell of the bility and economic prosperity, or continue U.S.Army War College argues that it is unlikely to stagnate politically by manipulating the that Jiang Zemin will vacate all his official posi- widespread nationalism and neo-conser- tions and fade away after the Party’s 16th con- vatism inside China? gress in 2002. Jiang is reluctant to relinquish

Gang Lin is Program Associate in the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Asia Program. ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT

power and wants to leave a legacy of great accom- fective, politically rigid and shortsighted; 2) a vicious plishments comparable to his two predecessors, Mao power struggle is going on among various factions; Zedong and Xiaoping. Given Jiang’s good 3) Chinese leaders can be divided into dichotomous health and the allegiance of military commanders to groups such as hardliners vs. reformers; and 4) since his leadership, he could remain China’s paramount some fourth generation leaders were trained in the leader for another decade, Scobell maintains. After United States, they may form a pro-American force Jiang resigns from his positions of Party general sec- in China’s policy-making