DOCSLIB.ORG

China's Political Succession and Its Implications for the United States

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
China's Political Succession and Its Implications for the United States ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT NO. 96 JUNE 2001 China’s Political Succession and INSIDE Jiang Zemin and Its Implications for the United States China’s Leadership ANDREW SCOBELL • MURRAY SCOT TANNER • CHENG LI Transition: Legacies, Longevity, and Lines PAGE 3 Introduction After Jiang, Hu? Can Hu Jintao Beat the GANG LIN “Successor’s Dilemma”? PAGE 7 hina’s top leader Jiang Zemin is sched- China’s Political uled to resign from his post as Party Succession: Four boss at the 16th national congress of the Misperceptions in C the West Chinese Communist Party in the fall of 2002. PAGE 17 The following spring he will step down as China’s president during the country’s Tenth National People’s Congress. If the Party leader- ship can be smoothly transferred from Jiang to his designated successor Hu Jintao, it will mark • Will Beijing, as part of its leadership transi- the first routine power transition without the tion, adopt a more flexible policy toward the impetus of a political crisis or the death of the United States as well as the rest of the world? top leader in the history of the People’s At a February 21 seminar on “China’s Republic of China. However, the identity of Political Succession and Its Implications for the China’s next leader is contingent upon many United States” sponsored by the Woodrow uncertain factors, including: Wilson Center’s Asia Program, four distin- • Will Jiang Zemin cling to the powerful guished experts on Chinese politics explored chairmanship of the Party’s Military Affairs China’s possible power structure and policy Commission and rule from “behind the cur- direction after next year’s Party congress. tain” after 2002? Panelists agreed that Hu Jintao will become • Will Hu Jintao be able to control the China’s next top leader.They differed, however, Chinese military? as to whether Jiang will remain influential and • Will China’s “fourth generation” of leaders what will be the political agenda for the new endorse Hu’s leadership and replace the leadership in the years to come. Incorporating “third generation” as the principal force in three essays contributed by seminar speakers, this Beijing’s ruling hierarchy over the next few special report looks at Beijing’s upcoming polit- ASIA PROGRAM years? ical succession and its implications for China’s • Is Beijing likely to initiate significant politi- domestic development and foreign relations. cal reforms in an effort to maintain social sta- In the first essay, Andrew Scobell of the bility and economic prosperity, or continue U.S.Army War College argues that it is unlikely to stagnate politically by manipulating the that Jiang Zemin will vacate all his official posi- widespread nationalism and neo-conser- tions and fade away after the Party’s 16th con- vatism inside China? gress in 2002. Jiang is reluctant to relinquish Gang Lin is Program Associate in the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Asia Program. ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT power and wants to leave a legacy of great accom- fective, politically rigid and shortsighted; 2) a vicious plishments comparable to his two predecessors, Mao power struggle is going on among various factions; Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Given Jiang’s good 3) Chinese leaders can be divided into dichotomous health and the allegiance of military commanders to groups such as hardliners vs. reformers; and 4) since his leadership, he could remain China’s paramount some fourth generation leaders were trained in the leader for another decade, Scobell maintains. After United States, they may form a pro-American force Jiang resigns from his positions of Party general sec- in China’s policy-making circle. Li contends that the retary and state president, he will still control fourth generation of leaders is less dogmatic, more Beijing’s general policy direction and be prone to capable and more diversified than previous political intervening in political crises or controversies. generations in the Party’s history. Chinese politics Scobell contends that Jiang’s continued status as has shifted from an all-powerful single leader to a China’s paramount leader will help ensure an impor- greater collective leadership, and Chinese leaders are tant degree of continuity in U.S.-China relations. more likely to unite than to fight among themselves. 2 Likewise, the second essay by Scot Tanner of Li believes Jiang’s successors will likely push Jiang Western Michigan University maintains that Jiang’s aside and accelerate China’s political reform, but designated successor, Hu Jintao, is likely to inherit modify the pace of economic reforms. Western- Jiang’s general secretaryship and presidency, while trained Chinese leaders will still be a minority in the Jiang will emulate Deng by continuing to control foreseeable future, and China’s new leaders are cyni- the Chinese military and rule from “behind the cur- cal about the alleged moral superiority of the tain.”According to Tanner, Hu’s dilemma is that any- United States, Li concludes. thing he does to strengthen his own power base risks In commentary delivered during the seminar, eroding Jiang’s trust; but actions designed to reassure Carol Hamrin of George Mason University Jiang risk leaving Hu too weak when Jiang passes argued that China is unlikely to experience sweep- from the scene. At present, Hu has apparently pro- ing change during the period of power succession. moted a noteworthy but hardly overwhelming cadre Jiang may not entirely leave China’s political stage of allies into significant Party and state posts. No after the Party’s 16th Congress, and political reform matter whether Jiang really trusts Hu,Tanner argues, in China will remain marginal, given the widespread Jiang lacks the power to dislodge Hu as designated money politics and ongoing neo-conservatism in successor and build sufficient support for an alterna- China. On the other hand, social issues, the global tive candidate in Hu’s place. However, once Hu takes context and the factors of Hong Kong and Taiwan over the general secretaryship next year, the willing- will continue to force China’s new leaders to be ness of Jiang to stand by Hu during a major political more open and transparent in dealing with domestic crisis will become the single greatest question in and international affairs. Hu’s effort to beat the successor’s dilemma. Offering various perspectives on Beijing’s In the third essay, Cheng Li of Hamilton College upcoming political succession as well as its implica- challenges four widespread misperceptions in the tions for China’s domestic development and foreign West regarding China’s political succession.These relations, this Special Report reveals the difficulty of misperceptions are that 1) Chinese leaders are inef- evaluating political changes and continuities in this complicated country. In the absence of political THE ASIA PROGRAM transparency and institutionalization in China, it is difficult to avoid speculation in examining Beijing’s The Wilson Center’s Asia Program is dedicated to the proposi- leadership transition. Studies of China’s political tion that only those with a sound scholarly grounding can begin succession could be enhanced, however, by looking to understand contemporary events. One of the Center’s oldest at economic, social, cultural and foreign factors most regional programs, the Asia Program seeks to bring historical and cultural sensitivity to the discussion of Asia in the nation’s pertinent to Beijing’s internal politics.We hope this capital. In seminars, workshops, briefings, and conferences, Special Report will contribute to a better under- prominent scholars of Asia interact with one another and with standing of China’s upcoming leadership transition policy practitioners to further understanding of the peoples, tra- and its implications for the United States. ditions, and behaviors of the world’s most populous continent. • CHINA’S POLITICAL SUCCESSION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES Jiang Zemin and China’s Leadership Transition: Legacies, Longevity, and Lines ANDREW SCOBELL hen political leaders think about political I argue that the most likely scenario is that Jiang succession, they also tend to think about Zemin stays in power for another decade. In my W their legacies. They think about their view Jiang will not willingly give up power for at most significant accomplishments and how they will least four reasons.The first two have to do with the be remembered. Of course many leaders become nature of the succession process in contemporary addicted to the power and privilege of their positions China, while the second two are related to the per- and seek ways to prolong their leadership tenures. sonal drive of the man himself.This essay first con- Eventually, however, even long-serving leaders must siders the succession process itself, with particular 3 face their own mortality,reconcile themselves to how attention to the role of the paramount leader and they will be remembered, and plan for the succession. the process of leadership selection. Second, personal When we examine the case of the People’s ambitions are examined — specifically, Jiang’s fond- Republic of China, it is worthwhile to consider ness for power and his quest for an enduring legacy. both the process of political succession and the nature of China’s current paramount leader Jiang SUCCESSION PROCESS Zemin.A fundamental aspect of the looming leader- 1. Role of the Paramount Leader ship transition in China is Jiang’s fate:Will he leave In Chinese communist politics, political power tends quietly after presiding over the 16th Party Congress to be concentrated not in institutions but in individ- in 2002? I posit four possible scenarios. uals.The most powerful individual is usually referred First, Jiang could actually retire. Jiang could grad- to as the paramount political leader.This person does ually vacate all his official Party, government and not necessarily hold a formal position of authority, military positions and fade away.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • China Data Supplement
    China Data Supplement October 2008 J People’s Republic of China J Hong Kong SAR J Macau SAR J Taiwan ISSN 0943-7533 China aktuell Data Supplement – PRC, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan 1 Contents The Main National Leadership of the PRC ......................................................................... 2 LIU Jen-Kai The Main Provincial Leadership of the PRC ..................................................................... 29 LIU Jen-Kai Data on Changes in PRC Main Leadership ...................................................................... 36 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries ......................................................................... 42 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Laws and Regulations .............................................................................................. 45 LIU Jen-Kai Hong Kong SAR................................................................................................................ 54 LIU Jen-Kai Macau SAR....................................................................................................................... 61 LIU Jen-Kai Taiwan .............................................................................................................................. 66 LIU Jen-Kai ISSN 0943-7533 All information given here is derived from generally accessible sources. Publisher/Distributor: GIGA Institute of Asian Studies Rothenbaumchaussee 32 20148 Hamburg Germany Phone: +49 (0 40) 42 88 74-0 Fax: +49 (040) 4107945 2 October 2008 The Main National Leadership of the
    [Show full text]
  • Continuing Crackdown in Inner Mongolia
    CONTINUING CRACKDOWN IN INNER MONGOLIA Human Rights Watch/Asia (formerly Asia Watch) CONTINUING CRACKDOWN IN INNER MONGOLIA Human Rights Watch/Asia (formerly Asia Watch) Human Rights Watch New York $$$ Washington $$$ Los Angeles $$$ London Copyright 8 March 1992 by Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. ISBN 1-56432-059-6 Human Rights Watch/Asia (formerly Asia Watch) Human Rights Watch/Asia was established in 1985 to monitor and promote the observance of internationally recognized human rights in Asia. Sidney Jones is the executive director; Mike Jendrzejczyk is the Washington director; Robin Munro is the Hong Kong director; Therese Caouette, Patricia Gossman and Jeannine Guthrie are research associates; Cathy Yai-Wen Lee and Grace Oboma-Layat are associates; Mickey Spiegel is a research consultant. Jack Greenberg is the chair of the advisory committee and Orville Schell is vice chair. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH Human Rights Watch conducts regular, systematic investigations of human rights abuses in some seventy countries around the world. It addresses the human rights practices of governments of all political stripes, of all geopolitical alignments, and of all ethnic and religious persuasions. In internal wars it documents violations by both governments and rebel groups. Human Rights Watch defends freedom of thought and expression, due process and equal protection of the law; it documents and denounces murders, disappearances, torture, arbitrary imprisonment, exile, censorship and other abuses of internationally recognized human rights. Human Rights Watch began in 1978 with the founding of its Helsinki division. Today, it includes five divisions covering Africa, the Americas, Asia, the Middle East, as well as the signatories of the Helsinki accords.
    [Show full text]
  • Female Infanticide in China: an Examination of Cultural and Legal Norms
    FEMALE INFANTICIDE IN CHINA: AN EXAMINATION OF CULTURAL AND LEGAL NORMS Julie Jimmerson* I. INTRODUCTION For the past ten years China has been carrying out an ambi- tious program to keep its population under 1.2 billion by the year 2,000 by limiting most couples to one child.' The program is his- torically one of the most extensive exercises of state control over fertility and is especially significant in a society where the state has traditionally intervened in family matters only rarely and with much reluctance. Not surprisingly, the policy has encountered great resistance, particularly from rural areas, where roughly eighty percent of China's population lives. Pronatal norms have been tra- ditionally strong in the countryside, and these norms have been re- inforced by the recent introduction of economic policies that tend to encourage large families. Government policies have thus placed much of rural society in a dilemma. Couples may either reject the one-child limit and at- tempt to have more children, thereby increasing their net household income (but subjecting them to government sanctions); or they may obey the one-child limit and suffer the economic consequences of a smaller income. Couples whose one child turns out to be a girl are in an even more painful dilemma: cultural norms dictate that daughters marry out and transfer their emotional and economic * J.D. expected 1990, UCLA School of Law; B.A. 1981, University of California, Berkeley. The author would like to thank Professors William Alford and Taimie Bry- ant for their help and encouragement. Any errors are the author's alone.
    [Show full text]
  • Elite Politics and the Fourth Generation of Chinese Leadership
    Elite Politics and the Fourth Generation of Chinese Leadership ZHENG YONGNIAN & LYE LIANG FOOK* The personnel reshuffle at the 16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party is widely regarded as the first smooth and peaceful transition of power in the Party’s history. Some China observers have even argued that China’s political succession has been institutionalized. While this paper recognizes that the Congress may provide the most obvious manifestation of the institutionalization of political succession, this does not necessarily mean that the informal nature of politics is no longer important. Instead, the paper contends that Chinese political succession continues to be dictated by the rule of man although institutionalization may have conditioned such a process. Jiang Zemin has succeeded in securing a legacy for himself with his “Three Represents” theory and in putting his own men in key positions of the Party and government. All these present challenges to Hu Jintao, Jiang’s successor. Although not new to politics, Hu would have to tread cautiously if he is to succeed in consolidating power. INTRODUCTION Although the 16th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress ended almost a year ago, the outcomes and implications of the Congress continue to grip the attention of China watchers, including government leaders and officials, academics and businessmen. One of the most significant outcomes of the Congress, convened in Beijing from November 8-14, 2002, was that it marked the first ever smooth and peaceful transition of power since the Party was formed more than 80 years ago.1 Neither Mao Zedong nor Deng Xiaoping, despite their impeccable revolutionary credentials, successfully transferred power to their chosen successors.
    [Show full text]
  • Journal of Current Chinese Affairs
    China Data Supplement March 2008 J People’s Republic of China J Hong Kong SAR J Macau SAR J Taiwan ISSN 0943-7533 China aktuell Data Supplement – PRC, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan 1 Contents The Main National Leadership of the PRC ......................................................................... 2 LIU Jen-Kai The Main Provincial Leadership of the PRC ..................................................................... 31 LIU Jen-Kai Data on Changes in PRC Main Leadership ...................................................................... 38 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries ......................................................................... 54 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Laws and Regulations .............................................................................................. 56 LIU Jen-Kai Hong Kong SAR ................................................................................................................ 58 LIU Jen-Kai Macau SAR ....................................................................................................................... 65 LIU Jen-Kai Taiwan .............................................................................................................................. 69 LIU Jen-Kai ISSN 0943-7533 All information given here is derived from generally accessible sources. Publisher/Distributor: GIGA Institute of Asian Studies Rothenbaumchaussee 32 20148 Hamburg Germany Phone: +49 (0 40) 42 88 74-0 Fax: +49 (040) 4107945 2 March 2008 The Main National Leadership of the
    [Show full text]
  • China's Domestic Politicsand
    China’s Domestic Politics and Foreign Policies and Major Countries’ Strategies toward China edited by Jung-Ho Bae and Jae H. Ku China’s Domestic Politics and Foreign Policies and Major Countries’ Strategies toward China 1SJOUFE %FDFNCFS 1VCMJTIFE %FDFNCFS 1VCMJTIFECZ ,PSFB*OTUJUVUFGPS/BUJPOBM6OJGJDBUJPO ,*/6 1VCMJTIFS 1SFTJEFOUPG,*/6 &EJUFECZ $FOUFSGPS6OJGJDBUJPO1PMJDZ4UVEJFT ,*/6 3FHJTUSBUJPO/VNCFS /P "EESFTT SP 4VZVEPOH (BOHCVLHV 4FPVM 5FMFQIPOF 'BY )PNFQBHF IUUQXXXLJOVPSLS %FTJHOBOE1SJOU )ZVOEBJ"SUDPN$P -UE $PQZSJHIU ,*/6 *4#/ 1SJDF G "MM,*/6QVCMJDBUJPOTBSFBWBJMBCMFGPSQVSDIBTFBUBMMNBKPS CPPLTUPSFTJO,PSFB "MTPBWBJMBCMFBU(PWFSONFOU1SJOUJOH0GGJDF4BMFT$FOUFS4UPSF 0GGJDF China’s Domestic Politics and Foreign Policies and Major Countries’ Strategies toward China �G 1SFGBDF Jung-Ho Bae (Director of the Center for Unification Policy Studies at Korea Institute for National Unification) �G *OUSPEVDUJPO 1 Turning Points for China and the Korean Peninsula Jung-Ho Bae and Dongsoo Kim (Korea Institute for National Unification) �G 1BSUEvaluation of China’s Domestic Politics and Leadership $IBQUFS 19 A Chinese Model for National Development Yong Shik Choo (Chung-Ang University) $IBQUFS 55 Leadership Transition in China - from Strongman Politics to Incremental Institutionalization Yi Edward Yang (James Madison University) $IBQUFS 81 Actors and Factors - China’s Challenges in the Crucial Next Five Years Christopher M. Clarke (U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research-INR) China’s Domestic Politics and Foreign Policies
    [Show full text]
  • The Danger of Deconsolidation Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk Ronald F
    July 2016, Volume 27, Number 3 $14.00 The Danger of Deconsolidation Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk Ronald F. Inglehart The Struggle Over Term Limits in Africa Brett L. Carter Janette Yarwood Filip Reyntjens 25 Years After the USSR: What’s Gone Wrong? Henry E. Hale Suisheng Zhao on Xi Jinping’s Maoist Revival Bojan Bugari¡c & Tom Ginsburg on Postcommunist Courts Clive H. Church & Adrian Vatter on Switzerland Daniel O’Maley on the Internet of Things Delegative Democracy Revisited Santiago Anria Catherine Conaghan Frances Hagopian Lindsay Mayka Juan Pablo Luna Alberto Vergara and Aaron Watanabe Zhao.NEW saved by BK on 1/5/16; 6,145 words, including notes; TXT created from NEW by PJC, 3/18/16; MP edits to TXT by PJC, 4/5/16 (6,615 words). AAS saved by BK on 4/7/16; FIN created from AAS by PJC, 4/25/16 (6,608 words). PGS created by BK on 5/10/16. XI JINPING’S MAOIST REVIVAL Suisheng Zhao Suisheng Zhao is professor at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver. He is executive director of the univer- sity’s Center for China-U.S. Cooperation and editor of the Journal of Contemporary China. When Xi Jinping became paramount leader of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 2012, some Chinese intellectuals with liberal lean- ings allowed themselves to hope that he would promote the cause of political reform. The most optimistic among them even thought that he might seek to limit the monopoly on power long claimed by the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
    [Show full text]
  • Governance and Politics of China
    Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–44527–8 © Tony Saich 2001, 2004, 2011, 2015 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identifi ed as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First edition 2001 Second edition 2004 Third edition 2011 Fourth edition 2015 Published by PALGRAVE Palgrave in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of 4 Crinan Street, London, N1 9XW. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave is a global imprint of the above companies and is represented throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978–1–137–44528–5 hardback ISBN 978–1–137–44527–8 paperback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.
    [Show full text]
  • Journal of Current Chinese Affairs
    3/2006 Data Supplement PR China Hong Kong SAR Macau SAR Taiwan CHINA aktuell Journal of Current Chinese Affairs Data Supplement People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan ISSN 0943-7533 All information given here is derived from generally accessible sources. Publisher/Distributor: Institute of Asian Affairs Rothenbaumchaussee 32 20148 Hamburg Germany Phone: (0 40) 42 88 74-0 Fax:(040)4107945 Contributors: Uwe Kotzel Dr. Liu Jen-Kai Christine Reinking Dr. Günter Schucher Dr. Margot Schüller Contents The Main National Leadership of the PRC LIU JEN-KAI 3 The Main Provincial Leadership of the PRC LIU JEN-KAI 22 Data on Changes in PRC Main Leadership LIU JEN-KAI 27 PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries LIU JEN-KAI 30 PRC Laws and Regulations LIU JEN-KAI 34 Hong Kong SAR Political Data LIU JEN-KAI 36 Macau SAR Political Data LIU JEN-KAI 39 Taiwan Political Data LIU JEN-KAI 41 Bibliography of Articles on the PRC, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, and on Taiwan UWE KOTZEL / LIU JEN-KAI / CHRISTINE REINKING / GÜNTER SCHUCHER 43 CHINA aktuell Data Supplement - 3 - 3/2006 Dep.Dir.: CHINESE COMMUNIST Li Jianhua 03/07 PARTY Li Zhiyong 05/07 The Main National Ouyang Song 05/08 Shen Yueyue (f) CCa 03/01 Leadership of the Sun Xiaoqun 00/08 Wang Dongming 02/10 CCP CC General Secretary Zhang Bolin (exec.) 98/03 PRC Hu Jintao 02/11 Zhao Hongzhu (exec.) 00/10 Zhao Zongnai 00/10 Liu Jen-Kai POLITBURO Sec.-Gen.: Li Zhiyong 01/03 Standing Committee Members Propaganda (Publicity) Department Hu Jintao 92/10 Dir.: Liu Yunshan PBm CCSm 02/10 Huang Ju 02/11
    [Show full text]
  • China-Taiwan Relations: the Shadow of SARS
    China-Taiwan Relations: The Shadow of SARS by David G. Brown Associate Director, Asian Studies The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies Throughout this quarter, Beijing and Taipei struggled to contain the spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). SARS dramatically reduced cross-Strait travel; its effects on cross-Strait economic ties appear less severe but remain to be fully assessed. SARS intensified the battle over Taiwan’s request for observer status at the World Health Organization (WHO). Although the World Health Assembly (WHA) again rejected Taiwan, the real problems of a global health emergency led to the first contacts between the WHO and Taiwan. Beijing’s handling of SARS embittered the atmosphere of cross- Strait relations and created a political issue in Taiwan that President Chen Shui-bian is moving to exploit in next year’s elections. SARS The SARS health emergency dominated cross-Strait developments during this quarter. With the dramatic removal of its health minister and the mayor of Beijing in mid-April, Beijing was forced to admit that it was confronting a health emergency with serious domestic and international implications. For about a month thereafter, Taiwan was proud of its success in controlling SARS. Then its first SARS death and SARS outbreaks in several hospitals led to first Taipei and then all Taiwan being added to the WHO travel advisory list. The PRC and Taiwan each in its own way mobilized resources and launched mass campaigns to control the spread of SARS. By late June, these efforts had achieved considerable success and the WHO travel advisories for both, as well as for Hong Kong, had been lifted.
    [Show full text]
  • China's Fear of Contagion
    China’s Fear of Contagion China’s Fear of M.E. Sarotte Contagion Tiananmen Square and the Power of the European Example For the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), erasing the memory of the June 4, 1989, Tiananmen Square massacre remains a full-time job. The party aggressively monitors and restricts media and internet commentary about the event. As Sinologist Jean-Philippe Béja has put it, during the last two decades it has not been possible “even so much as to mention the conjoined Chinese characters for 6 and 4” in web searches, so dissident postings refer instead to the imagi- nary date of May 35.1 Party censors make it “inconceivable for scholars to ac- cess Chinese archival sources” on Tiananmen, according to historian Chen Jian, and do not permit schoolchildren to study the topic; 1989 remains a “‘for- bidden zone’ in the press, scholarship, and classroom teaching.”2 The party still detains some of those who took part in the protest and does not allow oth- ers to leave the country.3 And every June 4, the CCP seeks to prevent any form of remembrance with detentions and a show of force by the pervasive Chinese security apparatus. The result, according to expert Perry Link, is that in to- M.E. Sarotte, the author of 1989: The Struggle to Create Post–Cold War Europe, is Professor of History and of International Relations at the University of Southern California. The author wishes to thank Harvard University’s Center for European Studies, the Humboldt Foundation, the Institute for Advanced Study, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the University of Southern California for ªnancial and institutional support; Joseph Torigian for invaluable criticism, research assistance, and Chinese translation; Qian Qichen for a conversation on PRC-U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • China | Freedom House
    China | Freedom House https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/china A. ELECTORAL PROCESS: 0 / 12 A1. Was the current head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections? 0 / 4 There are no direct or competitive elections for national executive leaders. The National People’s Congress (NPC) formally elects the state president for five-year terms and confirms the premier after he is nominated by the president, but both positions are decided in advance at the relevant CCP congress. The CCP’s seven- member Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), headed by Xi Jinping in his role as the party’s general secretary, sets government and party policy in practice. Xi also holds the position of state president and serves as chairman of the state and party military commissions. Xi was awarded a second five-year term as general secretary at the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, and at the NPC session in March 2018 he was confirmed for a second five-year term as state president. Also at that session, the NPC approved amendments to China’s constitution that abolished the two-term limit for the state presidency and vice presidency. Combined with the absence of another PSC member young enough to serve as Xi’s successor in 2022, the move reinforced predictions that he planned to break with precedent and remain China’s paramount leader for the foreseeable future. A2. Were the current national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections? 0 / 4 The 3,000 NPC members are formally elected for five-year terms by subnational congresses, but in practice all candidates are vetted by the CCP.
    [Show full text]