Governance and Politics of China

Home , Document Number Nine, Du Qinglin, Gu Junshan, Li Jianguo, Politics of China, Sun Zhengcai

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© Tony Saich 2001, 2004, 2011, 2015 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identiﬁ ed as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First edition 2001 Second edition 2004 Third edition 2011 Fourth edition 2015 Published by PALGRAVE Palgrave in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of 4 Crinan Street, London, N1 9XW. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave is a global imprint of the above companies and is represented throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978–1–137–44528–5 hardback ISBN 978–1–137–44527–8 paperback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

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Contents

List of Maps, Boxes, Figures and Tables x Preface to the Fourth Edition xii Romanization, Chinese Units of Measurement and Statistics xvi List of Abbreviations xvii Introduction xix

1 Diversity within Unity 1 A land of diversity 2 The impact of CCP policy 16

2 Political History: 1949–2012 29 Parameters of policy debate 29 Leaning to one side – China and the Soviet model: 1949–55 32 The origins of a Chinese path to socialism: 1955–62 36 The radicalization of politics and the resurrection of class struggle: 1962–78 40 The Third Plenum and the initial reform agenda: 1978–84 44 Economic troubles and political instability: 1985–91 49 Return to economic reform, boom and moderation: 1992–97 54 Managing reform without Deng: 1997–2002 56 Attempting to balance growth with social equity: 2002–12 58

3 China’s New Leaders and Their Challenges: 2012–Present 65 Succession and the purge of Bo Xilai 65 CCP and NPC congresses: November 2012–March 2013 69 Political priorities 74 Third Plenum of the Eighteenth Central Committee (November 2013): outlining a platform for action 81

4 The Chinese Communist Party 85 Party organization and membership 85 The political culture of the CCP 104 The role of the CCP in the political system 109

5 The Central Governing Apparatus 116 Evaluation and perception of government performance 119 Central government 123 The legal system, coercive control and rights 137 The military and the political system 146

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6 Governance Beyond the Centre 154 The organization of local government 154 The province as a unit of analysis 158 Regional inequality 167 Relations between the centre and the localities: the ﬁ scal picture 172 The consequences for local governance 176 Perceptions of local government performance 184 Analysing the local state: corporatism, predation and negotiation 187

7 The Chinese State and Society 191 The Maoist period: an autonomous state and a state-dominated society 191 State–society relations under reforms: a negotiated state 198 Impact on the sanctioned organizational structure of representation 204 Participation at the grassroots and the role of elections 211 Non-sanctioned participation 217

8 Urbanization and Rural–Urban Relations 224 Rural–urban relations 224 Migration 229 Urbanization 235

9 Economic Policy 244 Policy-making and implementation 245 General outline of economic policy 249 A Chinese model of development? 253 Industrial policy 257 Rural policy 267

10 Social Policy 276 Family planning: problems of policy coordination and policy evasion 277 Social policy and the transition in China 282 Key features of China’s welfare system 285 Pension reform in the urban areas: cutting the Gordian knot of the SOEs 292 Healthcare in rural China 298 Poverty alleviation and social assistance 303

11 Foreign Policy 313 China and globalization 314 China and the region 321

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China and the United States 327 China’s foreign economic relations 338

12 China’s Future Challenges 344 The challenge of constraints: environmental degradation and resource shortages 344 The internal challenge: corruption 354 The information challenge: blogs, tweets and the Internet 364 The ﬁ nal challenge: good governance and political reform 368

Further Reading 375 Bibliography 381 Index 403

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Chapter 1 Diversity within Unity

Some years ago, I was in a jeep driving down a mountain road in rural Sichuan and was held up by a long queue of traffic meandering down the hill to a new bridge that was being dedicated. Getting out of the jeep I wandered down to the bridge to witness an elaborate ceremony complete with the lighting of incense and various actions to ward off the evil spirits. Somewhat facetiously, I began to ask those waiting what the Communist Party must think about this ceremony as it clearly represented an example of ‘superstitious practice’ so soundly denounced during the Cultural Revolution (1976–77) and still denounced today, albeit with less severity. I was greeted with puzzled faces before one person replied that the man in the exotic robes leading the ceremony was the party secretary. As the most important person in the village, he had no choice but to dedicate a new bridge that would link it to the world outside and bring greater wealth. The event set me thinking about the relationship between the party, the state and society and between China’s tradition and modernity. Did the party secretary believe in the ceremony and its power to conjure up good spirits to protect the bridge or was he simply going through the motions to increase credibility among the local population? Was the party secretary importing the power of the party into the village community or bringing heterodox beliefs into the party or both? The traditional nature of the ceremony contrasted with the objective of building the bridge that would integrate the local community with the world outside. The bridge provided the link to the market that is the driving force for development in the post-Mao years. Such small events are daily occurrences throughout rural and urban China and they cause us to question any notion of the country as a monolith. China comprises a patchwork of local cultures and histories that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its nationalist and imperial predecessors have tried to weld into a unitary entity. While the CCP may have tried to penetrate society more thoroughly than its predecessors, the last 35 years have revealed the residual power of local cultures. More recently, I was walking out of the tranquillity of the cradle of the communist revolution in Yan’an, where Mao had moved his Red Army in the mid-1930s, only to be besieged by the trinket sellers who are the products of China’s economic reform – from Mao Zedong’s

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China to Deng Xiaoping’s within a few paces. The market responds to the desires of consumers rather than to those of communist ideo- logues, something clearly seen by the books on sale. While those sold inside Yan’an, such as Mao Zedong Enters Yan’an, tell the official story of the revolution, the books on sale outside, often under the counter, tell a different tale. They range from Mao Zedong’s notorious womanizing, through the inner secrets of who destroyed whom in the party’s new headquarters (Zhongnanhai in Beijing), the corruption of former leaders of Beijing and Shanghai, to unofficial biographies of former general secretaries, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. These are the CCP’s hidden histories, those the conservative party veterans do not want their people to know about – yet they are the ones that the people with interest and money want to buy. Rather than a revolutionary world full of selfless heroes, they tell stories of betrayal, corruption and greed. Whose history, whose politics? This warns us not to take official pronouncements at face value but to peer behind the public facade to discover the reality of how the Chinese polity really works. This chapter and subsequent ones seek to introduce the reader to the diversity of China, its land and its peoples, and how CCP policy since 1949 has affected them.

A land of diversity

As the two anecdotes reveal, China is a very complex land where mul- tiple realities are operating beneath a facade of a unitary nation-state. However, this does not mean, as some have claimed, that China may fall apart into its regional components as a result of the reforms (Segal, 1994) or that a de facto federalist structure is emerging (Wang, 1995). Rather we should be careful about any generalization we make and be aware that the same policy will impact on different areas and different groups in China in a variety of ways, sometimes with unexpected results. China’s land, climate and peoples exhibit a broad diversity. The country’s land mass is roughly equal to that of the USA (9.6 million sq. km) but is home to a population of around 1.36 billion (just over four times that of the USA). Every fifth child is born in China. However, this population is not spread evenly across the land and, while the images of teeming cities full to bursting are correct, there are massive expanses of China where one can roam the hills or deserts for days and barely see a soul. While the population density is 144 per sq. km for the country as a whole, the figure is 2,747 per sq. km for Shanghai and only 2.23 per sq. km for Tibet. In general, the density of the western provinces is under 100, while it is over 600 in the wealthier eastern coastal provinces.

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This population spread has always been the case, with the pre- dominantly peasant population concentrated along the river deltas and basins of the east, providing the bodies for the development of the mega-cities of Shanghai, Tianjin, Beijing and, further west, Chongqing (see map). By contrast, the high Tibetan–Qinghai plateau is home to a sparse, scattered population engaged in pastoral activities. The plateau lies some 4,000 metres above sea level and occupies a full 20 per cent of China’s land mass. Radiating out from the plateau are the major rivers of China, South East Asia and the Asian sub-continent. The Yangzi, Yellow, Mekong, Red, Ganges and the Brahmaputra all find their sources here on this desolate plateau. Beyond it there is a series of smaller descending plateaus and basins that eventually give way to the major plains of the east, such as the Yangzi Delta, the North China Plain and the Northeast (Manchuria) Plain. The huge oceans to the east, the plateau to the west and the surrounding mountain ranges have protected China throughout its history. This, combined with the continuation of some form of the Chinese state over two millennia, contributed to an insular attitude to alternative modes of thought and an ethnocentrism that the dominant Han Chinese felt was justified by the heritage to which they were the unique heirs. This insularity is reflected by the name of China itself, Zhongguo, which literally means the middle or ‘central’ kingdom. Yet even here there have been variations. China has witnessed periods of extensive dealings with foreigners, such as in the Han (205 bc–ad 220) and the Tang (ad 618–907) dynasties. These were periods of extensive trading when foreign products were well received in China and when Chinese goods reached far-flung corners of the globe. This trade was even accompanied by the influx of foreign systems of thought. Most noticeable was the increasing influence of Buddhism, which arrived from India beginning in the late Han period. The later Qing period (ad 1644–1911), despite some attempts to keep foreigners out, and the Republican period (1911–49), were both influenced by foreign trade and the influx of new ideas. The Taiping Rebellion (1850–64), with its strange mix of half-baked Christianity, icono- clasm and traditional notions of peasant rebellion, mounted a major challenge to Confucian orthodoxy (Spence, 1996). The May Fourth Movement (1915–19), in part a response to the decision to cede the German concession of Shandong to Japan following the First World War, also witnessed a major attack on the Confucian tradition and revealed an intellectual fascination with a whole host of foreign ideas ranging from liberalism to Marxism to anarchism (Chow, 1960). Indeed, during the reform period from the late 1970s, the CCP has tried to make use of the more cosmopolitan trading of China’s coastal regions as a key element in its economic programmes. Policy has

Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–44527–8 Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–44527–8 4 Governance and Politics of China favoured a development strategy that relies heavily on coastal trade and investment by revitalizing historic links with the overseas Chinese communities in South East Asia and beyond. Given that China has such an expansive and varied landmass, it will come as no surprise that there is enormous climatic variation, much more so in the winters than the summers. While most of the country lies in the temperate zone, the north-east freezes, with temperatures dropping as low as minus 25–30 degrees Celsius, and even the capital of Beijing can still get the occasional winter day of minus 10–15 degrees, although the average temperature in January hovers just a few degrees below zero. By contrast, Kunming in the south-west province of Yunnan is known as the city of eternal spring, Guangzhou (in Guangdong Province) enjoys winters at around 15 degrees and the island of Hainan has a balmy tropical climate. This north–south climatic divide led the CCP to decree that south of the Yangzi River public buildings would not be heated in winter. I have never been so cold in my life as during the winter of 1976–77 when studying at Nanjing University just south of the Yangzi River. We used to look forward to occasional trips across the Yangzi by ferry to sit in the local post office north of the river that was allowed to provide heating. Rising affluence has changed this, with those who now can afford heating able to pur- chase it as they please, as long as supplies are available. The forces of nature have not been tamed as fully as in the more advanced countries, and this has resulted in different problems. Rainfall is variable and each summer one is treated to the news that while certain areas have been subjected to flooding (Jiangxi, Zhejiang, Hunan, Jiangsu), other areas are suffering from severe drought (Hebei, Henan, Shanxi); people refer to ‘north – drought, south – floods’. South China depends on the vagaries of the monsoon for its rainfall whereas most of the north and west of China do not receive its effects. The severity and diversity of these problems may be illustrated by the fact that in 1981 millions of people in north-central China faced quite severe food shortages because of extensive drought; in the western province of Sichuan, 1.5 million people lost their homes because of floods. The water shortages in the north have been exaggerated by the industrial development and urbanization of recent years and the water table of the North China Plain has been dropping precipitously. This has led to the ambitious government programme to divert water from the abundant rivers of the south to the north. This will provide some relief but not enough, and China needs to adopt policies that will price water more realistically and will promote water conservation. These climatic and topographic variations have caused a rather varied environment for agricultural production. It is only in the areas around the Yangzi River and the south that the flooded paddy fields

Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–44527–8 Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–44527–8 Diversity within Unity 5 are commonplace. In fact, most of China is dependent on dry-field cropping of wheat and millet. The staple for most in the north is noo- dles and steamed bread rather than the rice that many associate with being Chinese. This dependence on staple grains has meant that tradi- tionally the overwhelming majority of China’s population has settled along the fertile plains and basins that provide suitable arable land. By contrast, the grasslands of Inner Mongolia and Ningxia, the far north-west and Tibet are home to livestock with vast stretches of land for grazing. The periphery in the north-east and south-west is home to China’s principal remaining forest cover. This forest cover has been declining rapidly, now covering only 18 per cent of the landmass (in the US it is 30 per cent), and perhaps as much as 90 per cent of the remaining coverage is threatened. The current coverage is considered insufficient for economic needs and everyday use. While the government often blames local practices, such as swidden (slash and burn) agriculture in the south-west, for the decline in the remaining forests and the subsequent soil erosion and flooding, it is clear that the major culprit in recent times has been the government itself through its massive forestry industry. Although the authorities have moved aggres- sively to cut down on illegal logging, the practice continues but on a much smaller scale. One unexpected consequence of the crackdown has been the intensification of logging in neighbouring countries in order to meet Chinese demand. With the decline of forest cover and the expansion of arable land and urbanization, there has been a decline in China’s great biodiversity and wildlife. Animals such as elephants, tigers and the golden monkey are to be found only in small parts of remote Yunnan, while the giant panda can be found only in declining numbers in a few Sichuan reserves. These more remote areas are home to most of China’s 55 recognized national minorities (there were 400 to 500 applications from such minorities to be recognized, Blum, 2000, p. 74). While these minorities comprise less than 10 per cent of China’s total population (still around 105 million), with the remaining Han Chinese they occupy over 60 per cent of the total landmass. This includes the very sensitive autonomous regions of Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Guangxi Zhuang that border Russia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar and Vietnam. Yunnan, home to 25 minorities, borders on Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam. Over time, China has had difficult relations with virtually all of these countries. These peripheral areas have always been important to Chinese security concerns and have provided a buffer zone to protect the ‘Han-core’ from possible invaders. Beijing’s concern about these areas is increased by the fact that they possess vital natural resources and are the last areas into which China’s growing population can expand (Grunfeld, 1985).

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This concern with security from external threat explains in part why Beijing is so concerned with consolidating its rule over the border areas and has adopted various policies to encourage more Han to move into them so that they will form the majority population group in many such areas. However, regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang have also been the site of considerable domestic opposition to CCP rule and tensions have increased because of the settlement policies. Both have experienced sporadic resistance to Beijing’s rule and both are viewed with suspicion by the centre. In Tibet, many still pledge their allegiance to the exiled Dalai Lama, who fled to India in 1959 after the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) crushed the Tibetan revolt. In March 2008, on the 49th anniversary of the failed 1959 uprising against CCP rule, a major riot broke out in Tibet with much of the violence directed against Han people. While the CCP blamed the unrest on the exiled supporters of the Dalai Lama, it seemed to be sparked by the economic inequality that has developed under reforms between local Tibetans and Han and other outsiders. Similar tensions exist in Xinjiang, and Beijing fears that people might forge links with radical Islamic groups that have been more active since the break-up of the Soviet Union. July 2009 again witnessed ethnic unrest in Xinjiang, and again Beijing blamed the situation on groups in exile. In 2013 and 2014, sporadic attacks occurred both within the province and outside, including in Beijing, which the authorities blamed on ‘separatists’ (see Box 1.1). Until the CCP develops policies that allow greater religious freedom and permit the spoils of economic growth to be distributed more equitably to local communities, the threat of unrest will persist. The CCP has adopted a paternalistic, not to say patronizing, attitude towards these communities. Before the 2008 demonstrations in Tibet, at the annual National People’s Congress (NPC) meeting, the party secretary of Tibet stated that ‘the Communist Party is like the parent to the Tibetan people, and it is always considerate about what the children need’. He also noted that the central party committee is the ‘real Buddha for Tibetans’ (Reuters, 2 March 2007).

Box 1.1 Beijing’s Xinjiang Problem On taking power in 1949, the CCP adapted the Stalinist notion of national or ethnic minorities and created an institutional infrastructure to deal with them that included the State Nationalities Affairs Commission with sub-national branches and a university and college system. The adapta- tion separated the idea of nation and ethnicity and simply falling under Beijing’s jurisdiction did not mean that one was counted as being Chinese, or more correctly as being Han Chinese. The idea that the ‘minorities’ had

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a common language, culture and lived within the same geographical space led to the establishment of autonomous regions (the equivalent of a province) and autonomous counties, cities, etc. The fiction is that they enjoy a certain level of autonomy from Beijing. In addition to the dominant Han Chinese, 55 national minorities were recognized by the central state. The break-up of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of Yugoslavia created a problem for China with the fear that its ‘national minorities’ might seek independence. As a result, the English term ‘ethnic minority’ was preferred and some began to change the Chinese usage (Bulag, 2000). As noted in the text, the two autonomous regions that have presented the greatest challenge are Tibet and Xinjiang. Both enjoy a distinct culture and history with an external point of reference. Frictions will not go away and opposition in Xinjiang has turned violent, with the latest incident in September 2014 resulting in the deaths of some 50 people. The fear in Beijing is that domestic opposition will link up with radical Islamic groups in the Central Asian region and beyond. The CCP has found it difficult to respond, resorting to a mixture of repression, suppression of traditional culture, blaming ‘outside entities’ for stirring up trouble and hoping that greater investment will ‘develop’ the problem away. After a May 2014 attack in Urumqi, over 300 people were arrested and the authorities claimed that 23 extremist groups had been broken up. The repression has not been limited to groups that have carried out violent attacks and pro- posed independence but has also included moderate critics such as the aca- demic Ilham Tohti. In September 2014, he was handed a life sentence for his criticism of Beijing’s policies towards Xinjiang. He has argued consist- ently against ‘separatism’ and tried to present a more moderate critique of Beijing’s policies. Instead, the leadership clings to the belief that the ‘ethnic minorities’ are in some way inferior to the Han Chinese and that investment in education and higher living standards will ameliorate the problem. For example, in May 2014, it was announced that free secondary-school education would be granted to those living in southern Xinjiang and one member of each household would be guaranteed employment (The Guardian, 30 May 2014). Bilingual education will also be promoted. Beijing has also moved to undermine cultural practices. In July 2014, the government banned staff from fasting during Ramadan and beards and veils have been discouraged. Limits have been imposed on Uighur traditional weddings and funerals as well as stricter reviews of who may go on the hajj pilgrimage. Control has included a long-term policy of in- migration of Han Chinese so that they make up around 40 per cent of the population. In a more recent move, officials in southern Xinjiang began to offer cash and other incentives to promote intermarriages between the communities. Qimao (Cherchen) County officials offered a payment of 10,000 yuan per year for five years to newly weds if one was Han and the other a member of an ethnic minority. The households would also receive priority for housing and employment, better support for their children’s education and healthcare. The local county head said that such marriages

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produced ‘positive energy’ through which Xinjiang could realize Xi Jinping’s calls for a ‘China Dream’. Xi had called for more Uighurs to be moved to Han-dominated parts of China. He called on the party to ensure that ‘correct views about the motherland and the nation’ be established among China’s ethnic groups so that all would recognize the ‘great motherland’ (New York Times, 2 September 2014). Such approaches are unlikely to resolve the problem and, while repression may work over the short term, it and the suppression of Uighur culture and identity will create the ground for unrest and resentment over the long term.

However, the Tibetans (6.3 million) and the Uighurs (10.1 million), the main ethnic groups in Xinjiang, are not united groups internally. With respect to Tibet, the CCP has had some success in trying to cir- cumvent the authority of the Dalai Lama by developing local Buddhist leaders more sympathetic to Beijing. The Panchen Lama, the second most important religious leader, did not flee to India and was used by Beijing to mediate with Buddhist groups domestically. However, the former Panchen’s death in 1989 and the debacle of finding a successor, combined with the heavy hand of repression from the late 1980s, seem to have undermined Beijing’s attempts to build Tibetan loyalty. A further blow to Beijing came in December 1999 when the young religious leader, whom the CCP was grooming to mediate on its behalf with the Tibetan community, fled to join the Dalai Lama in India. The tension between Han and non-Han peoples is a legitimate topic for discussion in China; indeed it was legitimated by Mao in 1956 when he referred to it as one of the Ten Great Relationships that marked the post-1949 political landscape. However, in some cases it is the tensions between different minorities with their own unique cultural and historical origins that are more important. In the border areas of Yunnan, some villagers never met any Han Chinese. In fact, many minorities in Yunnan (constituting 33.4 per cent of the provincial population in 2012), such as the Bai (3.4 per cent), Miao (2.6 per cent) and Hani (3.6 per cent), are more likely to complain about the way the Yi (10.6 per cent) dominate the ethnic minorities’ administrative networks in the province. This, they feel, enables the Yi to dis- pense a disproportionate amount of largesse to their own group. Many of the ethnic groups living in the Yunnan border region are closely related to groups in Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam, and indeed the border is quite porous and seems to have become more so since the reforms began. Cross-border trade and work is common. While the main roads have border posts and each village has a border office, there is little attempt to stop this casual movement. In the village of Mengla

Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–44527–8 Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–44527–8 Diversity within Unity 9 one can see the hills of Myanmar across the fields and for many the border is secondary to economic activity. I met a former local head of the village driving a four-wheel drive Toyota jeep with Thai number plates, indicating the extent of his business travels. When asked about whether he needed to affix Yunnan plates to the car, he replied that as he had been head of the border patrols and knew the local police he could drive wherever he needed to go in Yunnan with the Thai plates and, besides, much of his work was across the border. His optimism was not entirely justified as at least once he was stopped by the police on his way to the provincial capital of Kunming. Many of the minorities, despite their special status, are for all intents and purposes assimilated. This is the case with China’s two largest minorities in 2010, the Zhuang (16.9 million) and the Manchu (10.4 million) and to a lesser extent with the Muslim Hui (10.6 million). The Zhuang live primarily in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region that borders on Vietnam. Despite their distinctive Dai language, a language common to a number of other groups in the south-west, they have effectively adopted a Han lifestyle. It was the Manchus who established the Qing dynasty (ad 1644–1911) and were the last imperial rulers before the Republic was established in 1911. Many have suggested that their survival as imperial rulers derived from the Sinification of their practices. While a Manchu language survives, it is used by very few. The Hui are an interesting group, with the largest concentration in the north-west (the Ningxia-Hui Autonomous Region) but they also live in many cities such as Xi’an (Shaanxi), Kunming (Yunnan) and even in Beijing. They speak the national language (Mandarin, or guoyu) and are indistinguishable from their Han neighbours except for their cuisine and worship in mosques. Last but not least, we should note that the broad classification of Han Chinese conceals great diversity within the group itself. Even the national language is a fairly recent construct and many of the Han Chinese actually speak other languages. These are more commonly referred to as dialects because the written script is the same. In reality, they can be as different as English and German. The national language is derived from the language spoken around Beijing. As a part of its drive to bring unity and to increase literacy, the CCP both simplified the written characters and promoted the use of the national language in schools and through radio and television. As a result, those who have enjoyed basic schooling can speak some of the national language. Whenever I am in non-Han villages one of the easiest ways to communicate is to seek out school-age children and to ask them to act as interpreters for their parents and grandparents, many of whom may speak only a few words of the national language at best. In one village, a couple of hours’ bike ride from the tourist destination of Yangshuo, I chatted with one of the village elders through his grandson who served as interpreter. He was

Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–44527–8 Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–44527–8 10 Governance and Politics of China particularly interested in trying foreign cigarettes. My colleague offered him one that he finished in one puff and dismissively discarded: not a patch on his home-grown tobacco, a whiff of which would seriously damage your health. He seemed blasé in the presence of foreigners, unu- sual at the time. I asked him if many foreigners came to the village. He thought for a second, drew on his cigarette and replied in a matter-of- fact tone, ‘Oh yes, one came here about 40 years ago’. The home language, even for many Han, is quite distinct, with about 30 per cent (some 350 million) speaking something other than the national language at home. In Guangdong the language is Cantonese (Yue), while various dialects of Minnan are spoken throughout Fujian; Gan is spoken in Jiangxi and Wu in Shanghai. Before communications improved it is said that travelling up the Yangzi Valley one would have to change languages at each county town. This may be apocryphal but it indicates how fragmented local Chinese society was until the 20th century. An important part of the nation-building process for the CCP has therefore been to build a common language. In this it has been fairly successful with, at least, the written script which is understood by all those who are literate. The official figures for 2012 claim that only 4.96 per cent of the population is illiterate (persons over 15 years of age), with Beijing leading the way in terms of illiteracy at 1.46 per cent and Tibet bringing up the rear at 34.81 per cent. Nationally, the illiteracy rate among men is 2.67 per cent and among women 7.32 per cent. For those who cannot read there has been a continual bom- bardment of officially approved news through radio and television, although now, with other outlets, official news can often be ignored. In the Cultural Revolution, there were even communal loudspeakers that dictated the pace of one’s life from when one woke up until one went to sleep. I remember lying in bed one morning trying to work out what was different and why I felt so relaxed before I realized that someone had cut the wires on the campus speakers. It was bliss to lie in bed and not listen to the blare of early morning wake-up routines and homage to the ‘Great Leader’, Mao Zedong. So long as the leadership speaks with one voice this system has been remarkably successful in providing acceptance for the official narrative. In 1991 I was visiting relatives in Shashi, a town of some 3 million inhabitants, a few hours up the Yangzi from Wuhan. They were considered free-thinking liberals in Shashi and I was surprised when we talked of the 1989 student-led demonstrations in Beijing and they referred to them as chaos and a counter-revolutionary uprising rather than using the milder phrases used by liberals in Beijing. When I asked them how they knew this, they replied that it was true because they had read about it in the People’s Daily, the official media organ of the CCP, and seen it on Central Television. In the same way, the

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CCP was successful in getting most of its citizens to believe that the NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia in May 1999 had been a deliberate act of provocation by the USA. The use of the media to build up patriotic sentiment at the time of the Olympics in the summer of 2008 is another example of how effective the media can be. However, the rise of the new media provides China’s citizens with alternative information sources and presents the old propaganda system with a new challenge (see Box 1.2). Blogs and instant messaging have become commonplace, with many not carrying approved information or analysis. Nationalists have used the new media to push the leadership to undertake sterner policy positions towards Japan and the US than it may have done otherwise. In response, the CCP has employed an army of people to monitor the Internet and also to write pro-party messages and to attempt to guide discussion. This lat- ter group has been ridiculed as the ‘50-cent party’ for the payment they receive for each pro-government posting. Under Xi Jinping, there has been a more concerted crackdown on Internet opinion leaders.

Box 1.2 SARS and the Media The outbreak of SARS in 2002–03 reveals the problems that the CCP has in controlling the message but also how quickly the propaganda system can adapt to new challenges. While some thought that the experience might lead to a shift in official reporting, as it did when the major Sichuan earthquake struck in 2008, there is little evidence of a systemic shift. In January 2003, initial reporting of a new disease by Guangdong authorities ridiculed the idea that there was a problem; and a February press conference took the same view. Earlier, provincial health authorities in Guangzhou had informed doctors of a new disease but requested that the public not be informed. It was instant messaging that forced the provincial leadership to make some kind of public acknowledgement. According to Guangdong Mobile the message ‘There is a fatal flu in Guangzhou’ was sent over 120 million times in the space of three days. Officials responded that there was indeed a disease but that it was completely under control. It wasn’t. This was the regular pattern. Eventually, a retired army doctor, irate at the cover-up, tried to notify the Chinese press of the problem and, when unsuccessful, passed the information to foreign outlets. The international coverage made it impossible for the government to maintain the stance that there was only a small problem and that basically everything was under control. Belatedly on 20 April a press conference was held that appeared to signal a significant change in government attitude and openness. However, the traditional propaganda system soon moved into gear with a new campaign to mobilize people’s support for the struggle

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against SARS while introducing restrictions on reporting. This was more familiar ground and the media was filled with patriotic accounts of individuals struggling against heroic odds and making personal sacrifices to defeat SARS, including patriotic ditties such as ‘Angels in White Coats’. Traditional CCP language now took over and, sure enough, on 1 May, Hu Jintao declared that China was engaged in a ‘people’s war’ against SARS for which the ‘masses’ should be mobilized. Constraints on the media were soon put back in place and the limited openness about SARS did not spread to other areas. Publications were requested to stop reporting on sensitive issues and media outlets and academics were warned not to analyse how the government had dealt with the virus. Some of those who had reported honestly came in for criticism and official rebuke. Source: Saich, 2006.

The aforementioned linguistic affiliations and local ties have, if anything, strengthened with the reforms. Within the localities, these ties are reinforced by various local festivities and deities and even, for many, by the local cuisine. There is a clear cultural divide between the north of the country and the south. The southern parts were effectively integrated into China only in the later part of the Song dynasty (ad 960–1279) (Blum, 2000, p. 82). The north is the political capital and operates under a more bureaucratic culture while the south represents the more open, cosmopolitan trading culture. The rise of a nationalist discourse in the mid-1990s and anti-American tracts such as The China That Can Say No (Song et al., 1996) and Behind the Scene of Demonizing China (Li et al., 1996) also led to a rise in publications that stressed local identity and cultural essence. Books appeared on what it is to be Shanghainese or Sichuanese and even related local cooking to identity. The spicy food of Sichuan and the chilli tastes of Hunan cooking contrast markedly with the fish and steamed food of Guangdong or Shanghai, or the noodle soups of Shaanxi. Hunan even had Mao Zedong patronize the phrase that you could not be a revolutionary if you could not eat peppery food. It is also in the south that lineage and clan play an important role in rural life, much more than in the north. In many villages I have visited in the south, large lineage halls have been restored or built anew and clearly form the most important organizing point for political and socio-economic exchange. This re-emergence of more overt traditional power structures has made the implementation of party rule more difficult. In many villages the party group is ineffective and often, where it is effective, the party secretary and lineage head are one and the same (see Box 1.3). A number of officials involved with the programme to

Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–44527–8 Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–44527–8 Diversity within Unity 13 introduce direct elections into China’s villages complained that the elections are decided by the most important lineage and that there is little the party or the higher-level administrative authorities can do to alter this.

Box 1.3 Village Leadership and Clans Yantian Village lies just over the border from Shenzhen and has become a key part of the global production chain, having been home at its peak to over 400 foreign-invested enterprises and 150,000 migrant workers. Village life, economics and politics are dominated by the Deng clan. Their ancestral hall has pride of place in the village, listing all the Dengs in China over the last 1,000 years, with a special room for Deng Xiaoping, who they count as one of their own. A Deng has always been party secretary and, in 2014, six out of the seven village party committee members were surnamed Deng, as were four out of the five villagers’ committee members and six out of the seven members of the village economic shareholding cooperatives that oversee the wealth of the village and its distribution. Source: Saich and Hu, 2012.

These local identities are reinforced by religious practices and customs. While China is officially an atheist country, the CCP has had no choice but to tolerate religious practice so long as it is not seen as a challenge to state power. The CCP has adopted a series of secular official cel- ebrations that mark key dates of the revolution or communist tradition (such as 1 October – National Day; or 1 May – International Labour Day), but the most important festivals have to do with Chinese tradition (Chinese New Year – a week in January or February; or Qing Ming, grave sweeping – early April) and local customs. Local religious worship and traditional practices have blossomed since the reforms began but organized religion that stresses an allegiance beyond the CCP is viewed with suspicion and usually repressed. This is the case not only with Tibetan Buddhism, because of the presence of the Tibetan government- in-exile under the spiritual leadership of the Dalai Lama, but also with Christianity. Not surprisingly it is difficult to get a number of how many people practise these religions. Official statistics estimate around 100 million religious believers, but a 2007 survey led by Fenggang Yang of Purdue University suggested that only 15 per cent of the Chinese people were actually ‘atheists’. Even 17 per cent of the CCP or Youth League members identified themselves with a specific religion, with 65 per cent claiming to have engaged in religious practices during the previous year. Buddhism dominates with 185 million self-identified followers (and 12

Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–44527–8 Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–44527–8 14 Governance and Politics of China per cent of CCP members!), while a much lower 33 million identify as Christian, although a further 40 per cent said they either believe Jesus existed or they had participated in Christian activities. Most, however, followed traditional practices with 754 million engaging in ancestor worship. Fully 175 million adopted Daoist practices, while 23 million identified themselves as Muslim (Yang and Hu, 2012). As noted, Buddhism is widespread across three main branches: Tibetan Buddhism (with four major sects), Theravada Buddhism and a mixture of Chinese folk traditions and Buddhism. However, practi- tioners may also follow another religion, such as Daoism, thus making it difficult to assess the true numbers (Blum, 2000, p. 88). Figures are similarly imprecise concerning followers of Daoism and folk religion but are in the realm of 250 million (Donald and Benewick, 2005, p. 84). The CCP’s attitude towards local religion is also ambivalent. It denounces what it sees as ‘superstitious’ practices and in the Cultural Revolution it destroyed not only places of worship but also sought to stamp out practices such as ancestor worship and fortune telling. However, unless there is a perceived political threat, it now tolerates a wide range of locally based religious worship. In fact, there has been a debate about the value of belief within the CCP and in recent years a more positive view has been apparent. Some of these local practices can be quite striking. In Yunnan, I watched a video of the exorcism of spirits that had possessed the body of a young, female researcher from the Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences; I have also witnessed traditional ceremonies to welcome young men into manhood, overseen by local party officials. The young anthro- pologist in the video had been carrying out research in a remote mountain area and the village elder took pity on her when she was about to return to the city possessed by an evil spirit. Normally, he did not care about city folk and did not care whether they carried away evil spirits. But he felt that she was a good person and as a result he was personally willing to oversee the lengthy process to exorcise the evil spirits before allowing her departure. The local and national CCP has to make accommodation for these religious practices. Generally, worship of local deities and ancestors is tolerated but organized religion or beliefs that have external connections are monitored more closely. However, should a belief system develop an extensive following that crosses administrative jurisdictions, it may come in for harsher treatment. The Central Party School has set up a research group in recent years to study belief and moved towards the conclu- sion that it could play a positive role in providing social cohesion. The consensus view was that individuals could decide on their own spiritual beliefs but that it was the role of the state (read CCP) that would define the moral direction for society as a whole.

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The CCP refuses to recognize the authority of the Catholic Church and cracks down hard on those who profess allegiance, often arresting priests who accept the Vatican’s authority. Instead, practising Catholics are required to belong to the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association, an organization that follows the ranks and salary scales of the state administrative system. CCP suspicion of Christianity is compounded by the association of missionaries with imperialism before 1949. As a result, all missionary activity is banned in China, though it is not very difficult to find active missionaries in both the cities and the countryside. The number may exceed 10,000 and there is a large underground trade in Bibles. Some missionaries have been involved in rural development projects and the local authorities have tolerated their work as long as they do not become too public with their beliefs. Accommodation is seen best in those areas where overseas Chinese investment has been vital to local economic health and where these investors have allied with the local population to demand the restoration of local lineage houses or temples (see Box 1.4). Should traditional practices link up across localities and be perceived as a threat, the CCP will move swiftly to crack down. This was the case with a qigong-related sect (a type of exercise and breathing regime) called the Falun Gong (Skills of the Wheel of Law) that came to prominence after a large gathering of its followers surrounded party headquarters in Beijing in April 1999 following criticism of its organization. This woke up China’s senior leaders to the potential of such faith-based movements to inspire loyalty. This concern and the humiliation that senior leaders felt at being caught by surprise led to a draconian crackdown on the organization and a subsequent campaign to discredit it as a superstitious cult. Thousands of its members have been arrested and it has also led to the investigation of a number of similar organizations.

Box 1.4 A Tale of Two Religions – Buddhism and Christianity In Wuxi, overseas Chinese have donated money to erect an enormous gold leaf Buddha that overlooks the local lake. It is the dominant site in the locality. However, it was not constructed without controversy. The local propaganda bureau set the building of the Buddha as one of the three great tasks for completion in 1997, one of the other tasks being to strive to ensure the successful return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty. This caused an uproar when reported to the Propaganda Department in Beijing, which claimed that the erection of a Buddha representing a backward

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superstition could in no way be equated with the ‘glorious task’ of regain- ing sovereignty over Hong Kong. The Wuxi party authorities were forced to withdraw it from the glorious three tasks for 1997, yet the Buddha was finished the next year! Source: Field visit, 1999. In Wenzhou, there was a more complex outcome surrounding the demolition of the Sanjiang Church that was constructed after US$3.2 million had been raised and the local government had described it as a ‘model project’. Wenzhou is home to a large Christian community, with claims that 15 per cent of the 7 million inhabitants attend church. The church as constructed was around five times the original plan that was approved, and in 2013 and 2014, as local governments were instructed to crackdown on illegal structures, it became a focus of attention. Despite a reported compromise and attempts by local worshippers to protect the church it was bulldozed and demolished entirely. Perhaps out-of-plan party and government buildings will receive similar treatment! Source: Kate Tray, Christianity Today, 2 May 2014.

The impact of CCP policy

The CCP’s vision of a modern state and its policies have had a marked impact on the physical structure of towns and countryside as well as on people’s lives. The CCP came to power in 1949 with a vision of the future that was inspired by the Soviet Union. To be modern was to be urban, industrial and with production socialized. The CCP despised the private sphere, and policy during the early1950s sought to eradi- cate what remained of private industry in the urban areas. Yet, at the same time, there was a suspicion of the cities as carriers of indolence, corruption and other traits that ran counter to the perceived revolutionary heritage. The urbanization rate was only 17.9 per cent in 1978 and, although it has risen to 52.6 per cent in 2012, it is still relatively low in terms of the level of economic development. The effects of post-1949 CCP policy produced a uniform, drab urban environment. With the exception of a few cities, such as Beijing, Xi’an and Pingyao that have an imperial heritage, or Shanghai with its confluence of colonial styles, virtually all other cities adopted the dour, grey architecture of the Soviet era. Many city walls, even including much of Beijing, were ripped down to make way for the new, wider roads and work-unit apartment blocks. Those who favoured urban planning that would have afforded greater protection to China’s

Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–44527–8 Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–44527–8 Diversity within Unity 17 historical heritage were often drowned out by those who favoured the Soviet-style plan. During the anti-rightist campaign of the 1950s and the Cultural Revolution, defenders were denounced for their bourgeois and/or feudal thinking. Much of what remained of the old cities was torn down to accommodate the building boom of the 1990s. Some even calculated that more of old Beijing was lost to real estate devel- opers in the 1990s than in any other decade during the 20th century, which included the Cultural Revolution, the Japanese invasion and the civil war. The post-1949 desire to build up rapidly the industrial base also had a major impact on the urban landscape as the CCP sought to develop the heavy industrial sector. Smokestack factories became a familiar part of many cities, with little notion of zoning and protection of green areas. Scenes of the new urban industrial China were proudly dis- played on the propaganda posters of the time. Even depictions of rural China would include a smoking chimneystack or a hanging power line. In part, the industrialization of the First Five-Year Plan (1953–57) was built on the legacy of the past. The north-east became the industrial powerhouse with its legacy from the Japanese control of Manchuria that featured the chemical, steel and coal industries. This made the urban north-east one of the privileged areas of the Maoist period, a privilege that has steadily eroded since the reforms were introduced in 1978, so much so that in 2003 a ‘Revive the North-east’ programme was introduced (Chung et al., 2009). The second main area for heavy industrial development was Sichuan, especially Chongqing. This had two origins. First, the Guomindang (GMD; Kuomintang, the Nationalist Party with which the CCP fought two civil wars to gain power) that retreated to Chongqing after the Japanese invasion of 1937 moved significant industry to the south- west. This inheritance was built upon by the CCP with the post-1949 policy to industrialize the hinterland as well as to protect security concerns. Following the Sino-Soviet split (1960), Mao became increasingly concerned about the potential of war with the Soviets and even the possibility of nuclear conflict. This led to the policy to develop the industrial ‘third front’, that was based in Sichuan and further in the south-west, and that built on earlier investment in the north-west (Naughton, 1988, pp. 351–86). There was a massive redeployment of investment, almost 50 per cent, from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s to build an industrial base and nuclear facility that could resist a Soviet attack. By the 1990s it presented Sichuan and Chongqing with significant problems of outdated industry. In the countryside the CCP first abolished the old landlord system and, as a result of peasant expectations and the pre-1949 policy, carried out land reform by way of redistribution to the household.

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However, by the mid-1950s steps were taken towards collectivization in order for the state to extract the funds necessary to feed its industrialization programme. The division of China into 50,000 rural communes brought uniformity to political administration in the countryside that lasted until the early 1980s when the communes were dismantled and a return of household farming was promoted. The promotion of the communes brought a far greater uniformity to the visual impression of rural life than the varied topography would suggest. It also allowed the CCP to push nationwide policies while ignoring the law of comparative economic advantage. The most damaging of such policies was the promotion of ‘taking grain as the key link’ to accom- pany the industrial policy of ‘taking steel as the key link’. The former led many communes to turn over ill-suited land to grain production. Slopes were cleared of tree cover and grazing land was ploughed under to meet mandatory grain production targets. Not only did this depress local incomes, it also caused significant environmental damage (Shapiro, 2001). The other major policy that transformed the physical image of the countryside was the promotion of small-scale industry during the Great Leap Forward (GLF) (1958–60) as a concerted programme for rural industrialization. The most notorious result was the ‘backyard steel furnaces’ that produced a huge volume of useless steel that con- sumed scarce resources. Other experiments such as the creation of small electric power generators and chemical fertilizer plants provided the legacy for an equally dramatic transformation of the countryside in the 1980s and 1990s with the massive growth of township and village enterprises (TVEs). The Maoist lack of concern and the privileging of production over all other factors enhanced the degradation of the environment. This perspective was enthusiastically adopted by Mao Zedong, who saw nature as something to be conquered and tamed and who did not appreciate that there are natural limits that resource endowments place on growth. Not only did the development strategy favour rapid exploitation of natural resources to build up the heavy industrial base, but the associated policy of below-cost pricing for water, coal and other inputs contributed further to such exploitation. Walking by office buildings with lights burning during the weekends and past bathrooms with constantly running taps that could not be turned off even if one tried revealed the irrelevance of water or electricity prices to workplace and domestic budgets. The rapid economic growth and urbanization in the years after 1975 have come at the cost of enormous environmental damage – and natural resource constraints are a potential brake on China’s future development. The political economy of the reforms has in many ways been

Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–44527–8 Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–44527–8 Diversity within Unity 19 inimical to the development of an effective policy to control environmental pollution (for a critical analysis, see Economy, 2004). In 2010, an official report estimated the cost of environmental degradation was roughly US$230 billion, 3.5 per cent of GDP, a three-fold increase from 2004 (New York Times, 29 March 2013). The economic reforms introduced since 1978 have also had a significant impact on the physical look of both urban and rural China while binding the two closer together than during the Mao years. The reforms have released the tight grip of the party and state over local society and have allowed space for the return of local enterprise and even private entrepreneurship. Cities in contemporary China are certainly live- lier and less homogeneous than they were in Mao’s China. The drab Stalinesque town centres have been transformed in many cities with the rise of gleaming, glass-fronted skyscrapers housing luxury offices, shopping malls and the ubiquitous McDonald’s. These new symbols of modernization have been brought about by the bulldozing of much of the old architecture and housing that survived the Maoist blitz. While it is true that much of the housing was sub-standard, the redevelopment and loss of family homes to relocate to sterile new apartments far from the city centre have met with resistance and sit-ins. The historical heritage has often been bulldozed away in the name of a new concept of progress. Kunming was chosen to host the International Flower Exhibition in the late 1990s and this led to a frenzy of development and demolition. As a result, many of the charming old lanes around the Cuihu Lake area were demolished to make way for new buildings. When I asked a local official why they preferred demolition to restoration, he replied that the old lanes represented the past and backwardness and the foreigners who would come to the Exhibition would think of China as a poor country if they were to see them. As a result, communities were broken up and dispersed in the name of modernity. The new buildings represented the future and the modern. Unfortunately, to Western eyes, the building material of choice in south-west China is white tile, making most buildings look like inverted public lavatories covered with opaque deep-sea-blue glass. In hosting the World Expo in 2010, the Shanghai authorities organized neighbourhood training sessions on correct behaviour. They were particularly concerned about laundry, especially underwear, hanging out on the streets to dry and the habit of old men to roll up their undershirts in the hot weather to reveal their torsos. These were explained as things that would give a bad impression to foreigners and might be interpreted as ‘backward’ habits. China’s cities are now playgrounds for the world’s major and most adventurous architects. The vision of downtown Manhattan has replaced that of the Soviet Union for what a modern city should look

Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–44527–8 Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–44527–8 20 Governance and Politics of China like. The array and design of skyscrapers are impressive and lax con- trols over building codes has meant that designs that might require extensive review in the West can be developed and constructed in record time in China. It is not surprising that many foreigners have joked that the crane is the national bird of China. However, the rush to urbanize has also led to speculation, the construction of ‘ghost towns’ and citizens who have tried to resist forced removals, living on in their ‘nail houses’, while demolition goes on around them. The poster child for a ‘ghost city’ has been Ordos in Inner Mongolia. The city is in the coal-rich area of the province that contains almost one-sixth of the nation’s reserves. Within Ordos, Kangbashi New District was planned to house 1 million residents by 2010 but today it has a population of only 30,000 to 50,000. The urbanization drive pushed by the national government has led some local governments to boost GDP rates by building empty urban areas. This latent rush to urbanize has caused many forced relocations and every now and then pictures have been posted of individuals who have tried to hold out and hope for better compensation or housing or merely to preserve their traditional homes. This new architecture also reinforces the view of state power as being reified in the many new gleaming, marble-decked buildings constructed to house the local party, government and judicial authorities. In Wuxi, an affluent reform-minded city in Jiangsu several hours from Shanghai, I asked local officials about this phenomenon. I won- dered aloud whether they thought that such ostentatious signs of state power and public spending were appropriate in the modern world and whether local citizens felt disturbed to see so much spending on civic buildings. The local officials were dumbfounded and amused by my question. It had never occurred to them to think about this, and when they did, they replied that it was indeed appropriate as it was the party that had provided the correct guidance and policies for China’s take-off. They may be correct, and such graphic demonstrations of state power are a universal phenomenon. Interestingly, sitting on the hills overlooking the famous lake of Wuxi is not only the Gold Buddha, representing the return of belief, but also the enormous villa that belonged to one of China’s top capitalists, Rong Yiren, who also served as president of China, representing the return of the legitimacy of private capital in China. So there in one city, the architecture represents three facets of modern China that have to find a new modus vivendi – state power, popular religion and private capital. Even in poorer provinces such ostentatious buildings for party and state are common. This is changing. Slowly but surely, citizens and Netizens, those who are active online, have become more critical of lavish spending on government and party facilities. Certainly Xi Jinping has sought

Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–44527–8 Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–44527–8 Diversity within Unity 21 to control the construction of lavish government and party buildings. In 2012, it was announced that China’s largest government building, indeed one of the largest buildings in the world, in Shandong’s capital of Ji’nan had been completed at a cost of a cool $641 million, causing much outrage. The People’s Daily (13 May 2013), the CCP’s official mouthpiece, noted that ‘luxury buildings are built to satisfy the pomp- ous selfish desires of certain people, but have hurt the feelings of the common people’. The article criticized offices built in the fashion of the White House and local squares bigger than Tiananmen in the heart of Beijing. The new icons of urban modernity tower above a more varied urban environment that is a product of the reforms. I remember in 1976 the delight with which we greeted a street vendor in central Beijing who was selling homemade toys for a few cents. Now the streets teem with so many vendors that one is more likely to run away and seek refuge from the hawkers and traders. The gradual release first of rural markets and later of rural produce to be sold in the cities has led to a much more diverse urban street life. The markets, restaurants and discos are signs of the new entrepreneurship or official organizations moonlight- ing to make a bit of extra money. The restaurants and nightclubs are filled with the beneficiaries of reform: the private entrepreneurs, those involved in the new economy, the managerial elites and the politically well connected. Periodic curbs on government entertaining are met with horror by the owners of these establishments. When Xi Jinping took power he launched an austerity campaign on government spending. As a result, in 2012 money spent on meetings, international trips and vehicles fell by 53, 39 and 10 per cent respectively. In the first nine months of 2013, sales of Remy Martin fell 12 per cent. Cunning man- agers of five-star hotels scrambled to downgrade their ratings so that officials could still wine and dine there. The reforms have also changed what is for sale in stores. During the Cultural Revolution by and large one bought what one could get if one had the money and the correct ration coupons. Entering a department store was not a particularly energizing experience as choice was limited, quality was poor and service distinctly surly. Two phrases that you quickly became acquainted with were mei youle (don’t have it) and mai wanle (sold out). Now film and rock stars are used to promote new products and open stores. Competition has caused even state-run stores to become more entrepreneurial and to offer services with grudging smiles rather than scowls. Most of the luxury goods that were kept in special stores for senior officials and foreigners are now generally available for anyone who has the money. Chinese consumers are now major buyers of luxury products, representing 29 per cent of the global total. However, many of these purchases

Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–44527–8 Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–44527–8 22 Governance and Politics of China are made outside of China, making the Chinese the global leaders (The Economist, 25 January 2014). In 2013, there were 93.7 million foreign journeys from China, and Chinese tourists are now the biggest global spenders (US$129 billion in 2013, The Economist, 19 April 2014). Reform has even changed the content of official bookstores such as the Foreign Languages Bookstore on Beijing’s main shopping street. Its transformation has been a bellwether of the reforms. In the 1970s and 1980s its main stock was the collected works in foreign languages of China’s leaders, posters of revolutionary icons such as Stalin and Enver Hoxha, and English-language textbooks that carried revolutionary parables or stories of friendship between Chinese and foreign citizens. When I have visited in recent years, there was barely a collected work in sight and no revolutionary icon to be found. In their place were Harvard Business School textbooks and manuals on how to make money or manage financial transactions. The posters had been replaced by a wide choice of Western novels, cassettes and DVDs introducing the latest sounds and fashions. Learning English by revolutionary parable has been replaced by learning English through business management. The urban one-child per couple policy, now being relaxed, has affected shopping. Toy shops and department stores are now the icons of a happy family life, with parents lavishing relatively large sums to pamper the ‘new little emperors’ of modern China. As one old party wag commented, they are the hope for greater party accountability in the future. In his view they have been so spoilt and they so dominate household spending and priorities that there is no way that they will listen passively and unquestioningly to party directives when they grow older! They will be more likely to demand results to improve the quality of their lives and to provide greater accountability. Not all have money to spend in this new urban China. There have been beneficiaries but there have also been losers – workers in ineffi- cient state-owned enterprises, the aged with no family dependents and some migrants and farmers engaged exclusively in grain production. The increasing pressure of marketization and the need to cut costs and increase profits have led to a rapid increase in lay-offs from the old SOEs in the 1990s. While the worst effects for many were cushioned either through supplemental income from the state or the retention of low- cost housing and medical provisions, there is no doubt that for some it has been a hard transition. The favoured north-east and Sichuan of the Maoist period have become the rust-belts of the early 21st century. It is noticeable that provinces such as Liaoning and Jilin that used to be among the wealthiest during the Mao years have become relatively poorer in the reform period. By contrast, Guangdong, one of the poorest provinces under Mao, has become the wealthiest under reform.

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The impact of restructuring has fallen unduly heavily on women. In most SOEs, they were the first to be laid off and were the last to be rehired. In many state organizations, women are being persuaded to take early retirement – usually around age 45 and, on occasion, even earlier. The chances of finding new, legal employment are slim. The elderly and the single have also been vulnerable. With workplaces shedding their social welfare responsibilities and a new system only slowly coming into place, old age or divorce are much more threaten- ing than in the days of cradle-to-grave socialist care for the elite of the urban industrial working class. A rise in the divorce rate has been a by-product of reforms and there has been much hand-wringing in the Chinese press. While some see it as a breakdown of social mores, others have heralded it as a positive sign of modernization, pointing to the higher divorce rates in the ‘developed West’. The divorce rate rose from 0.44 per 1,000 marriages in 1985 to a high of 2.29 in 2012, with extra-marital affairs being the main cause of divorce. The north-east provinces and Chongqing have comparatively high divorce numbers and Sichuan (250,984 in 2012) has the highest, perhaps reflecting the economic distress of those areas. Tibet has the lowest rate (1,339 in 2012). The rates might seem low but, for a society coming out of the Mao years of enforced social con- formity and repression of sexual desire (unless you happened to be Mao himself), it is still seen as a disturbing increase. The early rise in divorce rates was related to people shaking off political marriages that they undertook during the Cultural Revolution. In those years, rather than feelings of love, correct class background and political stance were more important for finding urban marriage partners. This led to many loveless marriages in urban areas for the now 60-somethings, leading not only to rising divorce rates but also to increases in extra- marital affairs as well as the enormous popularity of books and films like The Bridges of Madison County. I have sat through many discussions with older urban residents about nostalgia for the old days. Forgetting the famine of the Great Leap Forward and the chaos and violence of the Cultural Revolution, they reminisce about the ‘golden days’ when life was secure, there was basic healthcare and the streets were safe. For many, reforms have meant bewildering choices, loss of security, rising crime and declining personal safety, and a younger generation who treat their elders with less respect. Many such people have been attracted by the ‘leftist’ mani- festos published by former Maoist party veterans. These criticize the ‘capitalism’ and ‘materialism’ and new inequalities of current policy and call for a return to stricter discipline, party control and central state planning. Others have been attracted to a variety of religious and popular movements such as the Falun Gong. This is just the tip of the

Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–44527–8 Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–44527–8 24 Governance and Politics of China iceberg as many seek to find something that brings meaning to their life in such a turbulent world. It is the migrants who have received popular and official blame for the increase in crime, dirt and disease in urban China. While such hyperbole is usually unjustified, migrants are a feature of the post- Mao reforms. There have been previous waves of migration post-1949 but, at the end of 2012, the migrant population was estimated at over 262.6 million. The decline in farming incomes and the pull of better- paid work in the cities have led many young men, and increasingly women, to abandon the harsh conditions of rural labour for higher wages in the cities. The construction boom starting in the mid-1990s was a major source of employment as was the expansion of township and village enterprises and the foreign-invested manufacturing enterprises that have mushroomed in the Special Economic Zones (SEZs). However, life in the cities, while perhaps not as harsh as that in the countryside, has not been easy. Migrants tend to live in sub-standard or shanty-housing or in dormitories provided by their employers. In the former, they often live together in native-place villages. A major problem for the migrants is that their place of registration is still considered to be in the countryside and thus they have been frus- trated with respect to receiving medical care or access to education, despite the policy reforms. One development has been the growth of ‘urban villages’ in major cities, which are low-cost, illegal settlements. Another has been the development of ‘ant tribes’, communities of university graduates who have not yet found decent jobs and live in small communities, often underground, where rent is cheap. As noted, the migrants have been important to the growth of not only the non-state sector but also to the development of new growth areas along the coast. The CCP has promoted a strategy of coastal growth while allowing a progressive running down of the old industrial areas. This began with the promotion of trade as a key component of the new policy and the licensing of the four SEZs in 1980 that provided a series of incentives for foreign enterprises and joint ventures. They were set up primarily to absorb overseas Chinese investment, thus turning Hong Kong millionaires into billionaires. The programme expanded from the four zones (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen) under Zhao Ziyang by the late 1980s to a coastal zone development strategy. Shenzhen, the first major zone over the border from Hong Kong, was just a small, sleepy village when I first passed through in 1976. On the train ride from the border with Hong Kong to Guangzhou one passed endless rice paddies, small clustered village hamlets and the occasional water buffalo pulling a plough or swish- ing their tails while bathing lazily in the river. A decade later, Shenzhen was Asia’s newest metropolis with an urban centre full of towering

Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–44527–8 Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–44527–8 Diversity within Unity 25 skyscrapers rising from the former paddies. It is now the most crowded city in China with around 14 million residents in 2012 (of whom only 30 per cent have permanent resident status). In 1979, the population was only 30,000. Interestingly, it is said to be home to 20 per cent of China’s PhDs (Shenzhen Daily, 13 June 2007). Very few rural areas have undergone such a dramatic transformation but official figures show a dramatic decline in the percentage of those living in extreme poverty from over 80 per cent when reforms began to just 12 per cent in 2010. It should be noted that there is the emergence of an urban poor, with 21.43 million in 2012 receiving the minimum living support. As these figures suggest, the reforms have been equally dramatic in their effect on rural China. The communes have been abandoned and farming returned to a household basis. As a result, the wide fields and expanses of land have been divided up into small parcels that are often guarded as crops ripen. The breakdown of communal farming has led to an increase in theft of crops in the countryside. Migration has also affected the demographics of many rural villages and many who have remained behind have pulled out of farming where there is a viable alternative. For the first time, in 2011 the number of those registered as living in the countryside fell below 50 per cent. Those still farming are increasingly reliant on non-farm sources of income such as remittances from migrants or wage labour in TVEs or household businesses. Even for those who remain in agricultural production there has been a shift away from the Maoist obsession with grain production to other products that fetch a higher price in the urban markets. Generally, with the low returns for grain production, most only keep fields to fulfill their quotas. For a country that has such a heavy pressure on the available land, it is disconcerting to see so much good agricultural land being abandoned either because families do not want to farm it or cannot because of migration or redeployment to more profitable non-agricultural work. The composition of those farming has also changed. In many villages, males have moved in search of off-farm employment as have many women of pre-marriage age. This has left farming in many areas to the elderly and married women. Because of the low status and income from these activities, there has been discussion as to whether we are witnessing the ‘feminization’ of not just agriculture but also poverty. Many villages seem to comprise only the elderly, children, the sick and married women, who have to deal with all the household and production affairs. Migration and other social changes have also led to the increase of sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS. For example, the incidence of syphilis has increased from 0.17 per 100,000 in 1989 to

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30.44 in 2012. Viral hepatitis and pulmonary tuberculosis remain, however, the most prevalent communicable diseases (102.48 and 70.62 per 100,000 respectively). The figures for HIV/AIDS are not especially high, with a prevalence of only 2.93 per 100,000, with the highest mortality rate at 0.8591; but the disease has spread from original at- risk populations (intravenous drug users and commercial sex workers) to the population at large. Migrant male workers who have contracted sexually transmitted diseases have brought them back to the village where there may be no adequate healthcare. The spread of HIV/AIDS has also been linked to poverty. Ethnic minorities represent 9 per cent of the population but 40 per cent of the absolute poor and 36 per cent of reported HIV/AIDS cases (information from Joan Kaufman). While HIV/AIDS is now spreading among the heterosexual community and from sexual activity with prostitutes, much of the spread has come from needle sharing by drug addicts and earlier from the poor who had to sell their blood to ‘blood snakes’ and to the government. The mortality profile is changing as lifestyles change and, increasingly, resembles that of urban, wealthier societies. In 2012, heart disease (11.8 per cent of deaths), malignant tumours (22.96 per cent) and cer- ebrovascular disease (20.61 per cent) were the main causes of death in the rural areas. With reforms rural China has become more varied than in the past, with greater freedom for households to decide on what to produce, where to sell it and how to deploy their labour force. However, reforms have not favoured all in the rural areas and the extension of household-based farming and markets to areas where they are inap- propriate has had adverse effects. For the absolute poor, many of whom live in remote mountainous areas, liberalization and the increased use of market forces have been of little benefit as they have little if anything to sell. In fact, with increased prices for agricultural inputs and the collapse of medical access, their living standards have almost certainly declined. In addition, with financial pressures increasing on local authorities, many have resorted to raising illegal fees and levies that fall on the poor disproportionately. The CCP’s vision of modernity has also intruded into rural life. Clearly, the CCP still sees the future as urban and industrial. Policy has always privileged these areas but other policies have also impacted on rural life. In particular, the CCP sees nomadic or other traditional farming practices as ‘backward’. As a result, CCP policy has tried to organize nomadic and shifting cultivators into more permanent habi- tats. More permanent settlements, of course, make it easier to control activities and to pursue unpopular policies such as family planning. In addition, policies have been pursued to bring urbanization to the countryside.

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The CCP has to rule over this increasingly diverse society while trying to guide China into further integration with the world economy. This is a daunting challenge. The CCP has also to provide an explana- tion to its people of where the country is heading and offer some kind of a moral compass. This is hard to do not only because of the diversity but also because ideological orthodoxy appears to run counter to the direction in which the economy and society are heading. It is hard for General Secretary Xi Jinping, or any other senior leader, to provide a genuine vision of China’s future as at best it would suggest a radi- cally transformed role for the CCP and at worst perhaps no role at all. If the future is an economy increasingly dominated by market forces and integrated with the world economy, is a CCP that still professes commitment to socialism and the state-owned sector, while harbouring suspicion of foreign motives, the most effective organization to manage this? However much practice may move away from Marxism, the ideology remains a crucial component of the CCP’s self-legitimation (Kelly, 1991, p. 23). To abandon adherence would be impossible. The gap between official rhetoric and social practice has widened significantly under the reforms and is perhaps even greater than in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. While China’s leaders claim ‘only socialism can save China’, students laugh that ‘only China can save socialism’. The leadership has adopted a number of linguistic phrases that seek to explain current reality while retaining allegiance to socialism. The latest is that China is a ‘socialist market economy’, while the phrase ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ has been used to cover a multitude of policies that are difficult to describe as being conventionally socialist. This leads the CCP to think up snappy phrases to encapsulate how they see the present and future. Hu Jintao’s ‘scientific outlook on development’ is probably not as catchy as Xi Jinping’s ‘China Dream’. While Chinese society has become less ideological and even more pluralistic, CCP ideology sets limits to how far reform can go. Party leadership has retained its commitment throughout to socialism, however much the definition of its content may have changed. The reforms have not been intended to introduce either democracy or a capitalist economic system but rather to find a way for socialism to survive (on this point see Huang, 2008), or perhaps more correctly for the CCP to stay in power. This explains the residual commitment to the SOE sector, the slow, grudging approval given to the private sector and the attempts to make foreign investment support the CCP’s policy objec- tives. Whether such an approach to development is still tenable is one of the major challenges the CCP faces in the 21st century. In a pres- cient observation, Kelly has remarked that one outcome of transition may be the ‘installation of a New Authoritarian regime that dispenses

Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–44527–8 Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–44527–8 28 Governance and Politics of China with Marxist state ownership and its attendant social welfare functions but retains the self-legitimating apparatus of Marxist ideology’ (Kelly, 1991, p. 34). Certainly, within society and even among party members there is little faith that traditional socialism can provide a guiding light for China. Socialism is very rarely raised these days in discussions with foreigners and when mentioned is usually met with an embar- rassed giggle by those sitting around the table. When bored listening to the development plans of local officials, I often ask them about the relevance of socialism to their plans. They usually pull up short and mutter something about social stability, party guidance and that the kind of socialism being pursued is one with Chinese characteristics. The appeal to the primacy of social stability and the appellation of Chinese characteristics seem to justify most things one wants to do. Whether such linguistic conundrums can suffice in the future is hard to say. It is clear that many party members and citizens have a highly instrumental view of the party. As long as it has sufficient patronage to deploy and continues to deliver the economic goods there is little incentive to seek alternatives or to rock the boat. This makes legitimacy highly conditional, and the party has struggled to provide deeper reasons for attachment, best seen in its promotion of nationalism. One significant legacy of Deng’s reforms is that the overwhelming majority of people do not have to worry about the CCP anymore and it does not interfere directly in their lives. This is an important advance from the Mao years and even from the 1980s when political campaigns in which all were supposed to participate were commonplace. Withdrawal could be interpreted as lack of support and punishment could be harsh. Now campaigns generally only affect the 86.7 million party members (as of July 2014) and even then many do not have to take them seriously. This is something Xi seems dedicated to changing and certainly the campaign against corruption has caught the attention of party members. Some citizens have not been willing to withdraw into a private realm of activity but have joined a variety of religious and spiritual organizations. A very small number have even joined underground political and labour organizations. Such individuals have clearly transgressed the limits of the permissible and such organizations are broken up and key individuals arrested as soon as they are discovered. Many more inhabit a grey zone of local religious organizations, clans, lineages, gangs or social organizations that operate at the margins of the politically acceptable. Providing governance over this diverse people and ter- ritory is an increasingly complex challenge.

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Index

Abdullah Mansour, 221–2 Central Military Affairs Commission Abe Shinzo, 324, 328 (CMAC), 54, 71, 74, 95, 100 Afghanistan, 332 Central Organization Department, 96 Africa, 342–3 Central Party School, 14, 97–8 Agricultural Bank of China, 306 Charter 08, 60, 110, 144 Agricultural Development Bank, 271, 306 Chen Boda, 41, 107 Ai Qing, 201 Chen Duxiu, 105 Ai Weiwei, 144, 201 Chen Guangcheng, 144, 364 All-China Federation of Trade Unions, 205–6 Chen Liangyu, 69, 71, 139, 296 All-China Women’s Federation, 205–6 Chen Shui-bian, 360 Angola, 343 Chen Tonghai, 360 Anhui, 165, 231–2, 272 Chen Xiwen, 234 ‘ant tribes’, 24 Chen Xitong, 69, 354 Anti-Rightist Campaign, 17, 339–40 Chen Yun, 37, 45, 50, 90, 172, 354 APEC, 322 Chi Haotian, 150 Arab Spring, 63, 110 Chile, 329 ARF, 322 China Banking Regulatory Commission, ASEAN, 252, 319–20, 322 134, 239 Australia, 328 China Charity Federation, 207 Authoritarianism and neo-authoritarianism; China Democracy Party, 57, 110, 144 authoritarian xxv China Development Bank, 341 ‘China Dream’, 8, 27, 73, 76–7, 81, 105, Bai nationality, 8 191, 200–01, 292 Bale, Christian, 364 China Export and Import Bank, 341 bankruptcy, 258 China Family Planning Association, 207 base areas, see revolutionary base areas China Investment Corporation, 341 Beijing, 3, 4, 10, 179, 181, 240, 299, 341 China Railway Corporation, 135 ‘Beijing Consensus’, 253–5, 372 Chinese Academy of Governance, 97 Beijing Summer Olympics (2008), xix, Chinese Communist Party, 22–7, 85–115 61–3, 185 Central Committee, 90–3 Berlin Wall, 329 membership, 85, 100–04 Bhutan, 5 Party Congresses: 8th Congress, 119; 9th birth rate, see family planning Congress, 41; 10th Congress, 41; 12th Bismark, 283 Congress, 92; 13th Congress, 50, 51, Bo Yibo, 52 55, 93, 111; 14th Congress, 55–6; 15th Bo Xilai, 65–9, 70, 72, 77, 95, 98–9, 139, Congress, 56–7, 71, 95; 16th Congress, 354, 360 92, 95, 208; 17th Congress, 60–1, 71, Brazil, 249, 370 88–9; 18th Congress, xxii, 69, 87, Brezhnev doctrine, 41 89, 90, 92, 93, 95, 112–13, 137, BRICS, 317 208, 323 Buddhism, 3, 13–14, 15–16 Plenums: 3rd Plenum of 8th CC, 37; 3rd Budget Law (1994), 173 Plenum of 11th CC, 44–6, 110, 124; Burma, see Myanmar 5th Plenum of 11th CC, 49; 6th Plenum Bush, George W./ Bush administration, of the 12th CC, 50–1; 1st Plenum of the 331–3, 336 13th CC, 86–7; 4th Plenum of 13th CC, 53; 3rd Plenum of 14th CC, 556, 259; Cambodia, see Kampuchea 4th Plenum of 16th CC, 60; 6th Plenum car ownership, 349–50 of 16th CC, 59, 285; 3rd Plenum of the Carter, Jimmy, 370 17th CC, 241; 4th Plenum of 17th CC, Central Advisory Commission, 51 60; 3rd Plenum of the 18th CC, 72–3, Central Discipline Inspection Commission, 81–4, 96, 144, 166–7, 208, 233, 239, 98–9 241–2, 244, 257, 348; 4th Plenum of Central Leading Group for Comprehensively the 18th CC, 80–1, 143; Deepening Reforms, 74, 83–4, 96, see also Politburo; Standing Committee of 172, 245–6 the Politburo

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Chinese People’s Political Consultative Falun Gong, 15, 23, 57–8, 220 Conference, 125–6 family planning, 22, 277–82 Chinese politics, study of, xii-xiii, xxi-xxii see also China Family Planning Chongqing, 3, 17, 23, 65–8, 164, 167, 240 Association; State Family Planning corruption scandal, 361–2 Commission Christianity, 15–16 ‘fi fty-cent party’, 11, 367 civil society, xxii, xxiii foreign direct investment (FDI), 338–40 see also mass organizations; non- ‘Four Basic Principles’, 48, 111, 125, 199 governmental organizations ‘Four Bigs’, 145 Clinton, Hillary, 315, 320 ‘Four Modernizations’, 41–2, 149 Clinton, William, 330–1 Friends of Nature, 207 Cold War, 313 Fujian, 9 collectivization/communes, 18, 35–6, 38, 268 ‘Gang of Four’, 42–3, 49, 98, 101, 104, 105, ‘colour revolutions’, 108–10 148, 197, 222, 318 Comintern, 108 General Administration of Food and Drugs, community construction, 212–13 135–6 Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 85, General Administration of Press, Publishing, 108, 109, 110, 329 Radio, Film and Television, 136 Confucianism and neo-Confucianism, 74–5, General Audit Offi ce, 163 191, 203, 288, 291–2 Germany, 315 corporatism, 188–9 ghost towns, 20 corruption, xxiii, xxv, 28, 77–9, 117, 151, global fi nancial crisis (2008–9), xix, 61–2, 261, 296, 354–64 185 Criminal Code, 141–2 ‘Go Global’, 241–2 Criminal Procedure Law, 141–3 government organized non-governmental Cuba, 60 organizations (GONGOs), see Cultural Revolution, xx, 1, 14, 17, 21, 23, non-governmental organizations 29, 40–3, 49, 66–7, 75, 96, 98–9, 101, Gorbachev, Mikhail, 54–5 104, 106–7, 108, 124, 137, 140, 145, gradualism, 254–5 147, 157, 195, 197, 201, 226, 268, Great Leap Forward (GLF), 18, 23, 29, 286, 345, 363 37–9, 49, 119, 193, 225, 226, 268, 345 Czech Republic, 370 Green Earth Volunteers, 209 Czechoslavakia, 41 Green Han River, 210 Gu Junshan, 152 Dalai Lama, 6, 8, 13, 160, 221–2 Gu Kailai, 68 Democracy Wall Movement, 48–9 Guangdong, 4, 9, 11–12, 22, 162–3, 165, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 343 166, 167, 179, 189, 209, 230, 240 Democratic Progressive Party, 325 Guangzhou, 4 demonstrations, see social unrest Guangxi, 5, 214 Deng Xiaoping, 2, 38, 40–1, 43, 44–5, 48–9, Guizhou, 168, 170, 179 51, 54–5, 57, 71, 74, 86–8, 90, 92, 93, Gulf War (1991), 330 95, 97, 100, 104, 109–10, 111, 147, Guomindang (GMD), 17, 34, 225 149–50, 164, 165–6, 197–8, 199, 249, 254–5, 273, 314, 318, 330, 354, 370 Han Han, 201, 367 ‘Develop the West’, xxiv, 168–9, 302, 306 Han dynasty, 3 divorce, 23 Hani nationality, 5, 6, 8 Document Number Nine (April 2013), ‘harmonious society’, 59, 61, 284, 292, 300 79–80, 220 Harvard Kennedy School, 76 dossier (dang’an), 194 Hebei, 4, 243 Du Qinglin, 94 Heilongjiang, 165, 167, 272 Henan, 4 East China Sea, xix, 83, 108, 136, 147, 313, Highway Law, 131 325, 328 HIV/AIDS, 25–6, 207 see also village elections Hong Kong, xii, 155–6, 250, 352–3 elections, 211, 213–17 household registration (hukou), 82, 193–4, environment, xxiii, 19, 344–54 227, 231, 233–4, 285 European Union, xx, 321 household responsibility system, 268–9 extra-budgetary funds (EBFs), 173–4, Hoxha, Enver, 22 180–1, 183 Hu Chunhua, 71–2, 92, 96

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Hu Jintao, xxiv, 12, 27, 56, 58–64, 69, 71, Korea, North, see North Korea 76, 78, 81, 84, 87–9, 94, 95, 100, 104, Korea, South, see South Korea 112–13, 121, 137, 147, 151, 163, 164, Kunming, 5, 9, 19 166, 169, 208, 220, 228, 231, 233, Kyrgyzstan, 12, 100 244, 252–3, 261, 269, 284, 285, 287, 299, 300, 314, 316, 322–3, 337, 354, Lai Changxing, 355 325, 358, 363, 369 Land Contract Law, 241 Hu Qili, 53 Land Management Law, 241 Hu Yaobang, 2, 49, 50–2, 53, 88, 94, 109 land reform, 35, 225 Hua Guofeng, 43–5 land rights, 240–3 Hubei, 210 Laos, 5, 8, 319 Hui nationality, 9 Leading Group for Poverty Alleviation, 306 human rights, 333–4 Lee Teng-hui, 331 Human Rights in China (NGO), 334 Lei Feng, 148 Human Rights Watch, 334 legal system, 137–46 Hunan, 4, 165–6 ‘Legislation Law’, 129 Hundred Flowers’ Campaign, 39,49, 198 Li Jianguo, 162 Hungary, 39, 370 Li Keqiang, 64, 70–71, 73, 82, 83, 84, 106, 131, 162, 166, 233, 237, 244, 253, Ilham Tohti, 7 270, 287, 326, 345 illegal taxes, levies and fees, see taxes Li Lanqing, 162 India, 5, 6, 8, 249, 287, 321, 370 Li Lisan, 105 Indonesia, 173, 249, 287, 322, 370 Li Peng, 59, 71, 87–88, 118, 129–31 industrial policy, 257–67 Li Yuanchao, 70, 73, 99, 162 inequality, xxiv Liaoning, 167 information revolution, 364–8 Lin Biao, 40, 88, 149 see also internet; telecommunications Liu Junning, 202 Inner Mongolia, 5, 20 Liu Shaoqi, 38, 40–1, 49, 86, 98, 105, 106 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 315, Liu Xiaobo, 60 339, 320 Liu Yunshan, 94, 96, 161 internet, 364–8 Liu Zhijun, 60 see also information revolution; Lou Jiwei, 73 telecommunications Iraq, 313, 330, 332 Ma Ying-jeou, 325 Iran, 321, 330 Malaysia, 286 Manchuria; Manchus, 9 Japan, xix, xx, xxiv, 3, 11, 121, 260, 315, Mao Zedong, xiii, 1–2, 8, 10, 17, 18, 30–1, 318, 322, 323, 326–327, 328, 333, 32, 36–40, 65, 86–7, 93, 95, 104, 105, 334–5, 352 108, 116, 171, 195–197, 316–17, 347, Jia Qinglin, 162 348 Jiang Qing, 40, 43 Marx/Marxism, 75 Jiang Zemin, 53–4, 55, 56, 58, 59, 61, 69, mass organizations, 205–6 71, 76, 78. 79, 80, 81, 87–9, 92, 94, May Fourth Movement, 3 100, 102–3, 104, 112–13, 130–1, 147, Meng Jianzhu, 95 150–1, 162, 168–9, 253, 267, 302, Miao nationality, 8 305–6, 314, 316, 330–1, 354–5, 358 middle class, 370–1 Jiangsu, 4, 167, 266, 274 middle income trap, xxiv Jiangxi, 4, 169, 240 Middle East, 371 Jilin, 22, 167, 272 migration/migrants, 24–5, 229–35, 284–5, Jin-Cha-Ji, see revolutionary base areas 295 Jiusan Society, 205 minimum living support scheme, 284–5, Joint Venture Law, 338–9 304, 310–12 Ministry of Civil Affairs, 209 Kampuchea (Cambodia), 319, 322 Ministry of Commerce, 134 Kazakhstan, 5 Ministry of Environmental Protection, 346 Keating, Admiral, 147 Ministry of Finance, 240 Kerry, John, 315, 328, 336 Ministry of Justice, 141 Khrushchev, Nikita, 48, 130 Ministry of Labour and Social Security, Kim Jung-un, 326 230–1, 295, 298 Kissinger, Henry, 327 Ministry of Land and Resources, 269, 346

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Ministry of Railways, 135, 355, 365 poverty, 303–12 Ministry of Supervision, 163 private sector, xxiv, 265–7 Ministry of Transport, 135 Property Law (2006), 131–2 Modi, 147 protests, 52–3, 217–23, 371, Mongolia, 5 Pu Zhiqiang, 144 Mubarak, 109, 218 Putin, 338, 374 municipal bonds, 239–40 ‘Putting People First’, 61, 284, 292, 369 Myanmar (Burma), 5, 8–9 Qian Qichen, 331 ‘nail houses’, 20 Qiao Shi, 130 National Audit Ofﬁ ce, 166, 239, 296 Qing dynasty, 3, 9, 191 National Bureau of Corruption Prevention, Qinghai, 179 355 Qu Qiubai, 105 National Council for Social Security, 295–6, 298 Red Guards, 40–1, 197 National Development and Reform regional inequalities, 167–72 Commission (NDRC), 134–5, 167, 306, Rejuvenate the Central Region (Rise of 341 Central China), xxiv, 169–70 National Health and Family Planning Remy Martin, 21 Commission, 136 Renewable Energy Law, 352 National People’s Congress, xxii, 6, 56–7, Revive the Northeast, xxiv, 17, 169, 170 60, 72–3, 125–33 revolutionary base areas, 46; Jin-Cha-Ji, National Security Commission, 72, 74, 83, 130, 214–15; Shaan-Gan-Ning, 193 96, 100, 109 Rong Yiren, 20 Nationalities Affairs Commission, 6 rule of law, 80–6 NATO, 11 see also legal system Nepal, 5 rural healthcare, 298–303 New Citizens’ Movement, 80, 110, 144, rural policy, 267–75 209, 219–20 Russia, xxiii, 5, 249, 254, 317, 321, 338, Ningxia, 5, 9, 240 369, 374 Nixon, Richard, 327 see also Soviet Union Noda, 324 non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Saudi Arabia, 330 112–13, 207–11, 312 ‘scientiﬁ c outlook on development’, 27, 58, see also civil society 61, 76, 81, 87 North Korea, 60, 321, 325–326, 331, 333 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), Nu river, 209 11–12, 59, 83, 147, 300, 365 Shaanxi, 9, 165, 181–8 Obama, Barack, Obama administration, Shandong, 3, 21 314–15, 328, 343 Shanghai, 2, 3, 9, 162, 167–8, 179, 207, one-child policy, see family planning 213, 240, 266, 274, 283, 296–7, 299, 340 Pakistan, 5 Shanghai Free Trade Zone, 336 Panchen Lama. 8 Shantou SEZ, 24, 158 Paris Commune, 40–1 Shanxi, 4, 361 Parties, 204–5 Shenzhen SEZ, 13, 24, 25, 158, 166, 230 see also China Democracy Party; Jiusan ‘shock therapy’, 254–5 Society Shuanggui, 139, 143 Party School, see Central Party School Sichuan, 1, 5, 17, 22, 23, 165, 170 Peng Zhen, 129–30 Sichuan Earthquake (2008), 185 pension system, 292–8 Sina Weibo, 367 People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 6, 40–1, Singapore, 286 51, 146–53 Sino–Soviet split (1960), 17, 38 ‘permanent revolution’, 37 sixtieth anniversary of the PRC, xix, 61–2 Philippines, xix, 323, 328, 333 Social Insurance Law, 285, 295 Pinochet, 329 social organizations, 28, 56, 112, 134, 137, Politburo, 92, 93–6, 162–3 189, 204, 207–9, 351 Politburo Standing Committee, see Standing ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’, Committee of the Politburo 27–8, 105 population, xx, xxiv, 2–3, 280–2, 348 see Solidarity (Poland), 49, 142 also family planning Song dynasty, 18

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South Africa, 249, 342, 370 unions, see All-China Federation of Trade South China Sea, xix, 83, 108, 136, 147, Unions 153, 313, 319, 320, 321, 322–3, 325, UNITA, 329 328 United States of America, xx, 11, 147, 249, South Korea, xxiv, 121, 260, 286, 287 313, 318, 321, 322, 325–6, 327–8, 342, South–North Water Diversion Project, 347–8 353–4 Soviet Union, xii, 6, 7, 27, 31–2, 35, 40–1, urban residents’ committees (jumin 54, 146, 151–2, 154, 268 weiyuanhui), 212–13 see also Russia urban villages, 24 Special Economic Zones (SEZs), 24–5, 53, urbanization, xxiv, 20, 24, 224–43 158, 165–6, 167–8, 339 see also Shantou; Shenzhen; Xiamen; Vatican, 15 Zhuhai ‘vested interests’, 256 Stalin, Joseph, 39, 195 Vietnam, xix, 5, 8, 9, 172, 321, Standing Committee of the Politburo, 93–6 323–4, 360 see also Politburo village committees, 211–17 State Administration of Foreign Exchange, village elections, 211–17 336, 341 State Asset Supervision and Administration Wan Li, 130–2, 165 Commission, 134, 261, 262–3, 341 Wang Dongxing, 149 State Development and Planning Wang Hui, 202 Commission, 134 Wang Huning, 202 State Economic and Trade Commission, 134 Wang Lijun, 67 State Family Planning Commission, 136, Wang Qishan, 77, 98, 162, 354, 357 278–9 Wang Shan, 202 State Food and Drug Administration, 134–5 Wang Shiwei, 107, 193 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), xx, 292–8 Wang Xiaodong, 202 stimulus package, 62, 170–1 Wang Yang, 70. 71–72 stock market, xxiii Wang Yongchen, 209 Sudan, 321, 343 Washington Consensus, 255–7 Suharto, 109–110 Wen Hui, 200 Sun Chunlan, 96 Wen Jiabao, xxiv, 58–64, 66, 68, 73, 81, 84, Sun Zhengcai, 71–72, 92, 96 103, 121, 131, 176, 209–10, 228, 231, 233, 244, 246, 252–3, 269, 272, 284, Taiping Rebellion, 3 285, 287, 299, 300, 316, 343, 355, 369 Taiwan, xxiv, 32, 121, 147, 153, 252, 318, Wenzhou, 16, 135, 187, 365, 367 321, 325, 331, 334–5, 343, 370 workplace (danwei), 194–5 Tajikistan, 5 World Bank, 315, 317, 339 Tang Dynasty, 3 World Expo, Shanghai (2010), 19 taxes, 178–80 World Trade Organization (WTO), 29, 30, ‘Ten Great Relationships’, 8, 39 137, 228, 254, 313, 314, 316, 318, Thailand, 173, 249, 287, 360 320, 330, 334, 338, 340, 369 ‘Third Front’, 170 Wu Bangguo, 162 Three Gorges Dam, 347 Wuhan, 169 ‘Three Represents’, 58, 61, 76, 81, 87, 101, Wuxi, 15–16, 20 102–3 ‘Thucydides Trap’, 327 Xiamen SEZ, 24, 158 Tiananmen Square demonstration (1989), Xi’an, 9 52–3, 89–90,147, 329 Xi Jinping, xiii, xix, xxv, 8, 11, 20–1, 27, Tianjin, 3 28, 56, 56, 60–1, 62, 64, 65, 66–7, Tian Jiyun, 97 70–81, 88–9, 94, 95, 100, 103, 104, Tibet, 2, 5, 6, 8, 10, 23, 60, 61, 108, 154–5, 105, 113, 115, 117, 131, 140–1, 147, 160, 161, 179, 182, 195, 221–2, 315, 151–2, 162, 172, 200–01, 203, 220, 327, 334, see also Dalai Lama 233, 244, 245–6, 248, 256, 270, 287, township and village enterprises (TVEs), 25, 292, 310, 314, 315–16, 323, 326, 328, 180, 267, 273–5 329, 337–8, 354, 355, 357–8, 368, 367–8 Uighurs, 8 Xiao Gongqin, 202 see also Xinjiang Xiao Yang, 138 Ukraine, 317 Xinjiang, 5, 6–8, 108, 154–5, 160, 161, UN Commission on Human Rights, 334 221–2

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Xinjiang village, 231 Zeng Qinghong, 71, 131, 162 Xu Guangya, 152 Zhang Chunqiao, 42 Xu Zhiyang, 80, 219–20 Zhang Dejiang, 83, 127 Zhao Leji, 99, 162 Yan’an, 1–2, 107–9, 201 Zhao Ziyang, 2, 24, 49, 50–4, 55, 87, 88, Yang Jiechi, 320 93–4, 104, 106, 109, 111–12, 118, 164, Yang Jing, 94 165, 339, 373 Yangzi River, 4 Zhejiang, 4, 166, 167, 242, 243, 266 Yantian Village, 13, 189, 216–17, 242–3 Zhejiang village, 231–2 Yao Wenyuan, 42 Zhou Enlai, 41, 43, 45 Ye Jianying, 149, 222 Zhou Qiang, 132, 143 Yi nationality, 8 Zhou Xiaochuan, 73 Yu Dan, 203 Zhou Yongkang, 66–8, 72, 77, 95, 355–7 Yu Keping, 202 Zhu Rongji, 56, 57, 59, 88, 131, 137, 162, Yu Zhengsheng, 72, 162 246, 253, 258, 293–4, 305–6, 316, 318, Yuan Dynasty, 159 330–1, 354–5 Yugoslavia, 7, 11, 40 Zhuang nat ionality, 9 Yunnan, 4, 5, 8–9, 14, 167, 170, Zhuhai SEZ, 24, 158 188–9 Zoellick, Robert, 328, 332