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1 China's Foreign Aid and Investment Diplomacy in Southeast Asia

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1 China's Foreign Aid and Investment Diplomacy in Southeast Asia Notes 1 China’s Foreign Aid and Investment Diplomacy in Southeast Asia 1 . John F. Copper, China’s Foreign Aid: An Instrument of Peking’s Foreign Policy (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1976), pp. 27–28. 2 . Jay Taylor, China and Southeast Asia: Peking’s Relations with Revolutionary Movements (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 5. 3 . Bernard Fall, Street without Joy (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1961), p. 27, and Robert Shaplen, The Lost Revolution (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 69. 4 . Taylor, China and Southeast Asia , p. 5. 5 . J. J. Zasloff, “The Role of the Sanctuary in Insurgency, Communist China’s Support for the Vietminh, 1946–1954,” Rand Corporation Memorandum RM-4618TR, May 1967, p. 5. 6 . Taylor, China and Southeast Asia, p. 9 and 13. 7 . Copper, China’s Foreign Aid , p. 28. 8 . Chu Hao, “Enduring Ties: Sino-Vietnamese Relations Witness Their 60th Anniversary amid High Hopes,” Beijing Review , January 14, 2010, p. 14. 9 . Taylor, China and Southeast Asia , p. 7. Secretary of State Dean Acheson said at the time: “The choice confronting the U.S. is to support the legal governments of Indochina or to face the extension of Communism over the remainder of the continental area of Southeast Asia and possibly westward.” See Pentagon Papers (New York: Bantam Books, 1962), p. 36. 10 . Hao, “Enduring Ties,” p. 14. The author contends that the Geneva agreements could not have been reached had it not been for China’s aid. 11 . Taylor, China and Southeast Asia , p. 18. 12 . Copper, China’s Foreign Aid , p. 28. 13 . Taylor, China and Southeast Asia , p. 19. 14 . Copper, China’s Foreign Aid , p. 29; Taylor, China and Southeast Asia , p. 20. 15 . Ibid., p. 29. 16 . People’s Daily , February 1, 1961, cited in Copper, China’s Foreign Aid , p. 29. 17 . Copper, China’s Foreign Aid , pp. 29–30. 172 ● Notes 18 . Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), p. 159–60. The authors note that Chinese aid and support for the National Liberation Front at this time was “modest” as China did not see it as the most important national liberation movement in progress at the time and anyway thought it would ultimately succeed without China’s help. 19 . Richard M. Bueschel, Communist China’s Air Power (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 83. 20 . Allen S. Whiting, “How We Almost Went to War with China,” Look , April 29, 1969, p. 76, cited in Gurtov and Hwang, China under Threat , p. 161. 21 . Taylor, China and Southeast Asia , p. 48. 22 . Copper, China’s Foreign Aid , p. 30. 23 . People’s Daily , November 21, 1979, cited in Allen S. Whiting, “Forecasting Chinese Foreign Policy: IR Theory vs. the Fortune Cookie,” in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (eds.), Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 516–17. Also see Hao, “Enduring Ties,” p. 14. The author states that the Chinese troops killed of those that remained in Vietnam number in “the thousands.” 24. In 1965, US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara said he feared Chinese intervention if the United States hit really lucrative targets. During that year it was reported the US military did damage amounting to $70 million to North Vietnam, costing the United States $460 million to do it. See Phillip B. Davidson, Vietnam at War—the History: 1946–1975 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988), p. 389. 25 . Ibid., p. 517. 26 . See John Franklin Copper, “China’s Foreign Aid in 1976,” Current Scene , p. 20. 27 . Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War after the War (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986), p. 17. See the section on Cambodia for details on China’s $1 billion dollar aid donation. 28 . See Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin, 2011), p. 345. 29 . Francois Nivolon, “Vietnam on the Aid Trail,” December 9, 1977. The author cites the higher figure. This writer feels that was too high. See Copper, “China’s Foreign Aid in 1977,” p. 25. 30 . New York Times , June 26, 1977, cited in Copper, China’s Foreign Aid in 1978, Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, University of Maryland School of Law, Number 6–1979, p. 25. 31 . Copper, “China’s Foreign Aid in 1976,” p. 25. 32. Kissinger states that China terminated its aid in 1976 and ended deliveries the next year. See Kissinger, On China , p. 347. 33 . Alexander Vuving, “Tradition and Modern Sino-Vietnam Relations,” in Anthony Reid and Zheng Yangwen (eds.), Negotiating Asymmetry: China’s Place in Asia (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2009), p. 9. 34. Suisheng Zhao, “The Making of China’s Periphery Policy,” in Suisheng Zhao (ed.), Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2004), p. 220. Notes ● 173 35 . A wall poster was observed in Beijing at this time saying: “While people were begging in the streets in some parts of China, the dictator of our country distrib- uted Chinese money to his fellow dictators in Vietnam and Albania.” “Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation,” China Quarterly , January 1978, p. 187, cit- ing a French news agency report of December 1978. See also Copper, China’s Foreign Aid in 1978 , p. 1. 36 . Copper, China’s Foreign Aid , p. 24. 37 . Pobzeb Vang, Five Principles of Chinese Foreign Policies (Bloomington, IN: Author House, 2008), p. 216. The author cites the following sources: “The Truth about Vietnam-China Relations over the Last Thirty Years, Chinese Law and Government , Spring 1983, pp. 33–93; “Facts about Sino-Vietnamese Relations: Beijing Review , December 7, 1979, p. 23; China News Analysis , April 25, 1980; Washington Post , May 17, 1989, p. 31. Another writer also cites this figure; see Chanda, Brother Enemy , p. 260 and 325. China also stated that it spent $600 million on homes, jobs, and education for refugees from Vietnam. See “Cooperation between UN and China,” Beijing Review , October 21, 1985, p. 19. Also see Xinhua, May 26, 1980, cited in Copper, China’s Foreign Aid in 1979–80, p. 6. The figure of $20 billion in total aid to Vietnam was confirmed recently by a Chinese source; see Hao, “Enduring Ties,” p. 14. The author states that 20,000 experts and advisors were sent to Vietnam and “thousands” of Chinese soldiers perished on the battlefields in Vietnam. 38 . Xinhua, May 26, 1980 cited in FBIS , May 27, 1980, p. 13. 39 . Putting this in perspective, according to the Congressional Research Service, the United States spent $686 billion on the Vietnam War in 2008 dollars. See “Iraq War’s Price Tag Nears Vietnam’s,” CBS News, July 25, 2008 (online at cbsnews. com). Given this estimate it would appear that the amount China paid for the war cited here is not inflated. 40 . It is interesting to note that China reportedly promised Vietnam $2 billion to agree to China’s plans for Cambodia. See Michael Haas, Genocide by Proxy: Cambodian Pawn on a Superpower Chessboard (New York: Praeger,1991), p. 249. 41 . See Hao, “Enduring Ties,” p. 14. The author describes this agreement as the final chapter of border disputes in the area. 42 . See Bronson Percival, The Dragon Looks South: China and Southeast Asia in the New Century (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007), pp. 43–45. 43 . See Hao, “Enduring Ties,” p. 14. 44 . Percival, The Dragon Looks South , p. 45. 45 . “Vietnam-China Relationship Unceasingly Developed,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, online at www.mofa.gov.vn ) viewed December 27, 2008. 46 . David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia, Reshaping the Regional Order,” International Security, Winter 2004/05, p. 81, cited in Percival, The Dragon Looks South , p. 45. 47. “Vietnam to Borrow Nearly 200 Million U.S. Dollars from China: Report,” People’s Daily Online , October 30, 2005 (online at http://english.people.com.cn ). 48 . Thomas Lum, Wayne M. Morrison, and Bruce Vaughn, “China’s ‘Soft Power’ in Southeast Asia,” Congressional Research Service, January 4, 2008, p. 7. 174 ● Notes 49. Roger Mitton, “Beijing Refuses Aid to Hanoi after Rebuff over Taiwan,” Straits Times , December 22, 2006. 50 . Hao, “Enduring Ties,” p. 14. 51 . Ibid. 52 . Ian Storey, “China’s ‘Charm Offensive’ Loses Momentum in Southeast Asia (Part I),” China Brief , April 29, 2010. 53 . Dennis C. McCornac, “Vietnam’s Relations with China: A Delicate Balancing Act,” China Research Center, August 1, 2011 (online at chinacenter.net). 54 . Ibid. 55 . Pham Nuyen, “Adjusting Imports to Ease Reliance on China,” Vietnam Net Bridge, January 24, 2011, cited in James Bellacqua, “The China Factor in U.S.-Vietnam Relations,” China Strategic Issues Group, March 2012 (online at cna.org). 56 . Adam Forde, “Vietnam in 2011: Questions of Domestic Sovereignty,” Asian Survey , January/February 2012, p. 179. 57 . “Vietnam Outbound Investment Tops $10.8 Bln,” Business Times , January 2, 2012 (online at businesstimes.com.sg). 58 . “Interview: Chinese VP’s Visit to Vietnam to Boost Bilateral Ties: Ambassador,” Xinhua, December 20, 2011 (online at xinhuanet.com). The trade increase fig- ure was for the first 11 months compared to a similar period the previous year. 59 . “Vietnam, China Strengthen Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” TalkVietnam, December 13, 2011 (online at talkvietnam.com). 60 . “Territorial Rows No Obstacle to Chinese Internet Companies In Vietnam,” Forbes , January 14, 2013 (online at forbes.com). 61 . This seems to refute realist theory since Vietnam, as well as Mongolia, South Korea, and Taiwan that were all seriously threatened by China’s rise had drawn closer to China. See Steve Chan, Looking for Balance: China, the United States, and Power Balancing in East Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), p.
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