UNDERGROUND SPACE

Marienplatz Station in Munich. The city of Munich opened its first subway (U-Bahn) line in 1977 and since that time has expanded the underground - system, investing an average annual rate of DM200 million.

Costs and Benefits of Underground Railway Constructiont by Gunter Girnau*

ccording_to the results of a rep• massive financial support that has been The immediate benefits of this huge resentative survey, m recent given to promote local public transport investment program in terms of in• A years the image of local public in the past 15 years. Since 1967, when creased ridership and convenience to passenger transport in the Federal Re• federal funds first became available, a the individual passenger can easily be public of Germany has improved con• 30-year program of planning and in• seen. What is not so obvious is that the siderably. This is largely a result of the vestment in public transport has been public interest has been served in a under way nationwide. It is now "half• number of other ways. Reduced noise, tRevised and reprinted with permission from time" in the 30-year program. A de• improved air quality, fewer traffic ac• Advances in Tunnelling Technology and Sub• cidents, and a positive economic effect surface Use (Developpement des Travaux en tailed breakdown of the funds as ac• Souterrain), Volume 2, No.2, 1982. Oxford: tually invested and of the construction on the community can also be counted Pergamon Press. work already done is now available, and among the benefits of this program. "'Professor Dr.-Ing. Gunter Girnau is pres• equally important, the program has Indeed, a cost-benefit analysis of public ident of the International Tunnelling As• advanced to the stage where prelimi• transport that did not include these sociation (ITNAITES) and president of STUVA, nary conclusions can be drawn from benefits would be remiss. This brief Cologne, Federal Republic of Germany. what has been achieved. survey of Germany's revitalized public

Underground Space, Vol. 6, pp. 323-330, 1982 0362-0565/82/060323-08$03.00/0 Printed in the U.S.A. All rights reserved. Copyright © 1982 Pergamon Press Ltd. 323 transport system will consider both the DM13.4 billion (61%) went toward un• costs and the various benefits of this derground (U - Bahn), metropolitan AVERAGE CONSTRUCTION COST PE R KM huge undertaking. (light rail, or Stadtbahn) and tramway systems. This was followed by the DM7.3 DM in mil l West Germany's Investment billion (33%) spent selectively on the per km in Public Transport German Railways' rapid transit systems 50 (commuter railways, or S-Bahn). Most Between 1967 and 1980, federal, of the remaining DM1.3 billion was used 45 state, and local governments, German to extend or construct service stations Railways, and individual transport 40 and workshops, central bus stations, in• companies spent a total of DM22 bil• terchange stations, park-and- ride fa• 25 lion on extending the facilities of pub• cilities, or grade separating structures. lic passenger transport systems. Be• The funds invested during the first tween 1967 and 1975, in particular, there was a marked upturn in the level 14 years of the development program have genera ted a huge volume of con• of annual investment (Fig. 1). Since 1977, the annual yearly expenditure ' struction work. has been in the range of DM2 billion to DM2.3 billion. Facilities for The major sources of funds over the municipal railway systems years were the federal and state gov• The development program covers the ernments, which provided 52% and following projects: 20% respectively. (The chief basis for • All-out underground systems (U• financing today is the Municipal Fi• Bahn) are now in operation or are (23% in tunnel) (78% in tunnel) nance Transport Act- being extended in Berlin, Ham• Gemeinver• kehrsfinanzierungsgesetz. burg, Munich, and Nuremberg• Figure 2. Cost comparison between sub• The federal share is currently some cities, with the exception of Nur• way (U -Bahn) and light rail (Stadt• 60%.) The amount provided by emberg, having populations ex• local govern• ment- 24%- is bahn) systems. ceeding one million. much higher than is generally assumed. However, as own• ers of • Metropolitan systems (light rail , or Mulheim/Ruhr, and Stuttgart• local transport systems, local Stadtbahn) are being built in 17 cities whose populations vary widely governments bear the cost of the roll• cities: Bielefeld, Bochum, Bonn, between 200,000 and 900,000. ing stock, which amounts to DM600 Bremen, Cologne, Dortmund, million annually. Dusseldorf, Duisberg, Essen, • To finance extensions to their tram networks, 11 cities have received in• The major portion of funds was in• Frankfurt/Main , Gelsenkirchen, vestment assistance: Augsburg, vested in improving and extending Hanover, Herne, Ludwigshafen, Brunswick, Darmstadt, Freiburg, railway traffic; by far the largest amount, Karlsruhe, Kassel, Nuremberg, and

Wurzberg- cities having 1 ,000 mill . DM popula• tions ranging between 100,000 and 2.4 200,000. D PRIVATE PROJECTS 2.2 By the end of the construction period (:::::::::::::1 FEDERA L RAILWAY PROJECTS (1967-1980), some 180 km of new non• intersecting routes (tunnel, cutting, el• 2.0 MUNI CIPA L PROJEC TS evated) as well as 250 km of on-grade 1 .8 routes (special right-of-way) with a to• tal of 720 stops were put into operation 1 .6 in the municipal railway sector.

1.4 German Railways' rapid transit system (S -Bahn) 1.2 To open up the region by rapid transit (S-Bahn), 100 km of new track with 1.0 145 stops were laid and 490 km of ex• isting track with 164 stations were con• 0.8 verted to commuter railways and opened to traffic. Again as much con• 0.6 struction work is planned for the near future- an additional 125 km of 0.4 new track will be laid and 405 km of existing track is to be converted. 0.2 The Costs o U- UL _L a_ 1967 1 970 1971 The question of costs- and • Munic ipal and pr ivate projects not sep ar a ted. espe• cially of costs for subsurface construc• tion- is always difficult to Figure 1. Investment in local public passenger transport during the first 12 years answer. There are so many factors of the Federal Republic's 30-year planning and investment program. influencing costs that they may vary between 30 million

324 UNDERG ROU N D SPACE to 80 million DM per kilometer of un• derground railway tunnel (with all in• How the funds were invested stallations including stations). In the DM13.4 billion = 61% --? Underground 180 km non-intersect- same city, costs vary considerably from (U-Bahn) ing routes line to line and even from contract to contract. It is virtually meaningless, --? Metropolitan 250 km on-grade therefore, to talk about cost per kilo• (Light rail, or routes meter in a general sense, for the cost Stadtbahn) 720 stations and is never general. Having said that, however, some figures indicative of costs --? Tramway stops can be given. (Strassenbahn) The main factor influencing the cost DM7.3 billion 33% --? Commuter railways 100 km new track of railway construction is the relation between the length of a line in tunnel (S-Bahn) 145 new stations and and at grade. This relation is markedly stops different between the U-Bahn and the 490 km existing track S-Bahn. The results of the first eleven years of construction are: converted 164 existing stations U-Bahn: 78% of track length in tun• converted nel; overall costs 35 million to 40 DM1.3 billion 6% --? Workshops million DM/km --? Central bus stations (tunnel and at grade) S-Bahn: 23% of track length in tun• --? Interchange stations nel; --? Park-and-ride overall costs 20 million to 25 --? Grade separation million DM/km (tunnel and at grade) DM22 billion 100% The figures show that the U-Bahn is nearly twice as expensive as a light rail system on separated track (Stadtbahn). cost (See Fig. 2.) (OM per m track)

Another important factor influenc• 60,000 ing the cost of underground construc• tion is the tunneling method (which depends on the ground conditions). For 50,000 example, a tunnel in water-bearing soft NATM ground may cost two to three times 40,000 +---+----+--+----+=....-=+1-o---""""....._c----+'o"---_-+----fo'i---+---+---l I . more using the compressed-air shield shield dr --'""-<:L---- ', driven method than if the tunnel had been excavated using the cut-and-cover 30,000 -t-----,.!-+ --+---+----+---+---t---+---ll------t....o_-=\"""""";:l--+- ;if' ...... o..... approach. However, the experience in Germany has been that the technolog• 20,000t---r- ··-··_··- op e_n cu t--t--r-. o7.-··4PO ·- ··· -- -· · ------ical developments between 1966 and ..-o···· 1979, as well as the very strong com• 10,000 t---+---l--+---+---l--+---+---11--+---+--1---1 petition among contractors has mark• edly reduced the cost differential be• tween the cut-and -cover approach and 1966 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 the "underground" tunneling meth• ods. In Munich today, the costs for the Figure 3. The cost differential between the New Austrian Tunnelling Method, the New Austrian Tunnelling Method shield method, and the open cut has been markedly reduced. (NATM), the shield method, and the open cut are very close together (Fig. 3). There are instances in Munich and Federal Republic's entire transporta• period of approximately 30 years was other German cities where the NATM tion development program . While con• assumed for the implementation of the is already cheaper- especially when struction prices could be kept on the total development plan, an interim sur• the costs for environmental protection same level during the 1970's due to vey cannot have complete data: con• are taken into consideration. technological advances and competi• struction on individual projects is still (To be sure, the cost of underground tive bidding, these prices rose in 1980 under way, but more importantly, the construction is influenced by many fac• and 1981 by 20% to 40%- which total railway network is not complete. tors, e.g., tunnel length, cross section, means that we can now build less for The full effect of an underground or type of lining. To deal with these in the same amount of money. metropolitan railway in attracting pas• detail, however, would fall outside of The Benefits sengers is only really felt when a full the province of this paper.) route is in operation and, even more Finally, a factor not to be overlooked Besides being readily apparent, most so, when the full network has been when discussing cost is inflation. Since of the benefits of this investment activ• completed. 1980, inflation has had an effect on the ity are quantifiable. However, since a A statement of the results of invest-

May/june 1982 UNDERGROUND SPACE 325

ment in local public transport would be wanting, however, if it were con• fined to be the effects on traffic con• ditions, i.e., if the value of rapid transit systems were assessed in terms of pas• senger loads alone. Besides the in• creased ridership resulting from im• proved services, it is important to note that there are other results which are in the public interest, both economi• cally and socially. Transport improvements Regularity, punctuality, and speed are the basic criteria determining how attractive public transport is. Success is very apparent where route separation has permitted an unmix i ng of public and private traffic. Compared with former bus and tram serv ice, this has cut travel time (Table 1), reduced de• lays to zero in most cases (Table 2), and increased passenger loads (Table 3). To demonstrate in detail the succe3s of the investment policy in regard to in• creased ridership, data from the Mu • nich U-Bahn and the Hanover Stadt• An interchange station in Hanover, where the metropolitan light rail system (S• bahn are presented in Tables 4 and 5. Bahn) links up with the city's bus system. What is particularly important is that upgrading public transport makes it a genuine alternative for those who still • In Munich, the number of daily transportation, bus, tram, and under• travel by car. Again, the examples of car trips i n the urban area dropped ground railway are the safest of all. Munich and Hanover are representa• by 70,000 after underground and Pushing ahead with the construction of tive: rapid transit services began oper• separate lanes and routes- ation (reference period: 1970- resulting in a further unmixing of • Since the opening of Hanover's 1973). traffic-could do even more to metropolitan Line A, public trans• improve safety. These figures suggest that attractive port has accounted for 78% of all The pedestrian, in particular, is a public transport systems are appreci• trips into the city within the area beneficiary of these improvements in ated and used even by car drivers. of influence of the new line- the transportation system. The sub• even though 50% of the passengers Stepping up safety surface relocation of railway traffic has have a car at their disposal at all Compared with other modes of permitted the creation of extensive pe• times. destrian zones where pedestrian traffic can move unimpeded by vehicles. Be• low-grade stops provide greater safety Table 1. Reduction in travel time as a result of improvements in public not only for passengers, but for pe• transport in the Federal Republic of Germany. destrian traffic in general, whenever these facilities have walkways permit• Transport Mode Measure Taken Result ting pedestrians to cross streets under• Cuts in travel time of ground.

Separate right-of-way 2 to 15 minutes This separation of traffic accom• Bus/Tram or bus lane depending on length plished by constructing separate • of line. mainly underground - routes and lanes for public transport could not fail to Underground/ Bus line replaced by Average travel time be reflected in accident statistics. In Metropolitan Munich, for example, between 1970 and rail system cut by one-half (U-Bahn/Stadtbahn) 1977, the road accident rate fell by 37.6%, the injury rate by 22.1%, and the number of fatalities was reduced Table 2. Reduction in delays as a result of improvements in public transport. by 40.7% (Table 6).

Transport Mode Measure Taken Delays Before After Environmental impact Investment in improved under• Average Maximum Separate right-of- ground transport, resulting in in• Bus/Tram up to 10 of 2 way or bus lane creased passenger loads, has a direct minutes minutes effect on the environment. That un• Underground/ Average derground transport places less strain Tunnel or separate Virtually Metropolitan up to 10 on the environment is demonstrated in (U-Bahn/Stadtbahn) right-of-way none the following examples. minutes Over a three- year period, air poilu-

326 UNDERGROUND SPACE May/june 1982 tion from exhaust fumes was measured Table 3. Rise in passenger loads as result of the construction program. at 50 points in the urban area of Mun• ich. Comparing the data from 1970 and Transport Mode Measure Taken Rise in Passenger Load 1973, after the opening of the first rapid Separate right-of- Tram + 10% to 30% transit (Schne ll bahn) routes, it was way found that the carbon monoxide con• centration had dropped by 25%, the Normal: hydrocarbon concentration by 35%, and Underground/ + 15% to 60% Metropolitan Tunnel or separate nitric oxide by as much as 44%. Th is Extreme: reduction in pollution is largely attrib• (U-Bahn/ right-of-way + 109% (Frankfurt) uted to improved traffic flows, th e sh i ft Stadtbahn) of some segments of traffic to under• to 190% (Munich) ground and rapid transit systems, and Commuter Separate right-of- the use of park-and-ride systems (Fig. Railway System + 100% to 250% way 4). (S-Bahn) In addition, any investment t hat im• proves the routes and lanes for public transport or improves the vehicles Table 4. Rise in passenger loads as a result of subway expansion in Munich. themselves will lower noise levels. Re• Line Year Passenger Load Increase routing vehicles via an open cutting or 1972 trough, for example, yields a substan• 124,000 passengers/day tial noise reduction in the surrounding U-Bahn ("Before") + 190% built-up area (Fig. 5). Rerouting traffic U3/U6 1980 360,000 passengers/day t hrough tunnels eliminates noise pol• ("After") lution altogether. 1971 I n Hanover, the opening of metro• 160,000 passengers/day politan Lane A cut noise by more than ("Before") 10 dB(A) in the urban area along the S-Bahn + 244% 1980 route, meaning noise nuisance was 550,000 passengers/day ("After") halved. Bu t this also means that no spe• cific measures for protection against Approx. 200,000 passengers/day without U-Bahn U8 traffic noise were needed in this area. 1980 any reduction of passenger loads on (New) The costs, e.g., for noise protection other lines windows, which usually are between DM2,300 and DM5,,400 per meter of road (Table 7), were saved. Table 5. Increased ridership on Hanover's Stadtbahn.

Line Year Passenger Load Increase

1975 Economic implications 70,000 passengers/day It is a fact that improvements in pub• ("Before") A +50% lic transport systems- especially by 1980 use of the underground- are 105,000 passengers/day synonymous with greater capital ("After") outlays. Higher maintenance costs of 1978 B 32,000 passengers/day sub-grade routes and stations, in (Only ("Before") particular, m ust be taken in to account. + 34% half in 1980 Also of crucial impor• tance are the 43,000 passengers/day costs of energy and ser• v i cing the operation) ("After") systems . Nor is t hi s a ll . Adapting vehicles to meet the specific needs of Table 6. Declining road accident rates in Munich. rapid transit services and costly safety engineering also entail h igher costs. Road Traffic Accidents For these reasons, it was long feared Number that these costs would be too great for Injured Fatalities local transport systems to bear, that they Year Absol. % Absol. % Absol. % would gradually fall deeply i nto debt, thereby placing an u nreasonable finan• 1970 45,946 100 12,118 100 246 100 cial burden on local governments. The 1971* 44,085 95.5 11,978 98.8 248 100.8 whole point of the initial investment 1972** 37,855 82.4 12,505 103.2 258 104.9 would then have been called into ques• 1973 31,902 69.4 11,016 90.9 204 82.9 tion. 1974 29,470 64.1 9,822 81.1 193 78.5 Thanks to the federal government's 1975 30,367 66.1 9,241 76.3 182 74.0 Post-Construction Cost Report (Fol• 1976 29,748 64.7 9,136 75.4 133 54.1 gekostenbericht) t his issue has been clarified. The report found that: 1977 28,676 62.4 9,439 77.9 146 59.3 • Opening of the first underground line, October 19, 1971. • The construction of under• **Start-up of the commuter railway system on May 28, 1972, at the same time as the ground, metropolitan, and rapid introduction of integrated operations. transit systems is not the primary

May/june 1982 UNDERGROUND SPACE 327 a. Decline in pollution, 1970-1973. b. Reasons for reduction in CO and CH pollutants.

smooth traffic flows 12 °/o metro pork and 7% ride as f exhaust- fume eo 1ng • • 4 o1c 1 eg•s 1at1on 0 3 II 11 %112%1

1-3% I rise in car 1970 1973 population

Figure 4. Reduction in air pollution from exhaust fumes according to a study conducted by the Bayerische Motorenwerke (BMW) in conjunction with the Bavarian State Environment Office, Munich.

cause of the deficits incurred by about equal to the investment in the local transport systems; underground system.

• Post-construction costs up to 1985, The overall economic impact even using purely commercial ac• With respect to the economy as a counting, were responsible for only whole, investment in public transport about 5% of the deficit. is important because it creates jobs in many sectors. Between 20,000 to 25,000 Post-construction costs are, there• construction workers are currently em• fore, far from reaching the level pre• ployed on underground, metropolitan dicted by the critics of public invest• railway, and rapid transit projects. Since ment in local transport. Moreover, the 0 10 20m this work force is concentrated in rel• purely commercial considerations un• -7. 5 -10 -15 atively few locations, the local impor• derlying the calculations in the Post• tance of these jobs is great. With capital Construction Cost Report ignore the spending totaling DM2 billion an• benefits for the economy as a whole• nually, approximately 40,000 workers even though local transport is pro• in West Germany are directly or indi• moted precisely because of the public rectly dependent on the construction benefit. of rapid transit systems. In sum, this analysis of the invest• A secondary effect on the economy ment in terms of its economic effects is that the construction firms working on local transport systems demon• on the rapid transit systems have been strates that the costs of running rapid able to apply the experience acquired transit systems (Schnellbahn) are not Figure 5. Noise reduction (in decibels) in handling domestic projects to open out of bounds, that they are indeed when traffic is rerouted through an open up foreign markets as well. affordable. cutting (top) or a trough. In Hanover, the opening of the met• The impact on urban development ropolitan Line A yielded a 50% rise in This catalog of results will be con• the passenger load, a major part of and private transportation influence cluded with what is perhaps the most which was genuinely new business. The each other, which is to say that big in • important consideration of all: con• increased ridership yielded a higher fare vestments in underground railroads will struction of rapid transit systems is an income which more than made up for reduce investments in roads. The city instrument of urban development and the higher operating costs (Table 8). of Munich, for example, opened its first renewal. That underground, metro• Admittedly, the Hanover system is not underground railway line in 1977 and politan railway, and rapid transit sys• representative of all rapid transit sys• since that time the underground sys• tems have a substantial impact on the tems in that it receives a perk- the tem has been enlarged at the rate of urban infrastructure and improve the City of Hanover foots the energy bill approximately DM200 million an• quality of life for our citizens is dem• and maintains the tunnel nually. In 1970 Munich invested DM160 onstrated by the following examples, installations• which other systems million in road construction. By 1975 of which many more could be cited: do not enjoy. Nevertheless, it the investment in road construction had • The function of city centers as remains a fact that in• vestment in dropped to approximately DMSS mil• market, trading, and communi• local public passenger transport does lion, and since that time the figure has cation centers is restored. not necessarily produce bigger deficits. ranged between DM60 to 70 million And there is another aspect that per year (Table 9). In other words, the • Below-grade routing of public should be observed. Plans for public reduction in road construction was transport permits more intensive

328 UNDERGROUND SPACE May/june 1982 -

use of the surface for higher-den• sity business and residential dis• tricts (Fig. 6).

• Locating rail traffic underground makes it possible, in many in• stances, to save historically valua• 1&.1 ble buildings and thus preserve the U) U) familiar townscape.

• Motor vehicle traffic can be bun• dled on fast arterial roads, thus creating areas that are largely free of traffic in which pedestrian zones can be built.

• Settlement along the right-of-way of rapid transit systems is pro• moted and urban sprawl is checked.

• Public amenities (museums, zoos, Figure 6. Routing public transport underground permits higher, more intensive libraries, parks) and recreation and use of the surface in the central business district (example: Kropcke in Hanover). sports facilities can be made more accessible and used by larger sec• Table 7. Costs of noise protection windows for three- to five-floor buildings tions of the population. In han• adjacent to highways. dling traffic peaks to and from Approximate costs of noise major events, public transport has Exceeding the acceptable noise proved to be particularly valuable. protection windows level (DM per meter of road length) Finally, one scarcely noticed factor is the large-scale renewal and moderni• + 5 dB 2,300 to 3,300 zation of utility supply lines and sew• 10 dB 2,900 to 4,200 erage systems that goes hand in hand + with the construction of below-grade + 15 dB 3,700 to 5,400 transportation facilities. For example, when the metropolitan railway was built in Cologne (involving the construction Table 8. A comparison of operating costs of Stadtbahn (light rail) and tram of II km of tunnel), 62 km of sewers systems. (The costs used in this 1976 study were those of Hanover's Line A.)

and piping as well as 233 km of cable Stadtbahn Tram were laid or relaid. Much the same is Expenses true of other cities. The new lines and (million DM) (million DM) 1 networks were designed to meet future Operators , inspectors, station 4,248 5,986 demands, thus obviating the need for staff regular repairs and extensions to the 2 old system. Propulsion energy 1,846 1,575 Maintenance (vehicles, buildings, 5,693 4,658 Costs Versus Benefits equipment) The assessment of costs versus ben• Capital cosP 6,846 5,578 efits is very popular today, but atten• 4 tion has to be drawn to the fact that Tunnel lease 200 -

there are a lot of problems in this field 5 Other 5,229 4,423 which are still unresolved. It is very difficult to assign a money value to Total cost 24,132 22,220 everything. Some of the most impor• tant benefits of underground railways Revenues 18,000-18,500 15,000-15,500 are hard to quantify. What, for ex• Total cost minus revenue 6,100- 5,600 7,200- 6,700 ample, is the economic equivalent of the growing prosperity of a city, of less 'The Stadtbahn requires 45 fewer operators. 2 polluted air, lower traffic noise levels, More powerful engines in Stadtbahn rolling stock. 3 and lower accident rates? Stadtbahn rolling stock is more expensive. •The City of Hanover maintains the tunnels. In spite of these difficulties in quan• 5 tification, in the mid 1970's the German E.g., costs for tickets, ticket machines, taxes; proportional overhead costs for Minister of Transportation developed administration, insurance, and social payments.

May/june 1982 U N DERGRO UN D SPACE 329 a standardized cost-benefit analysis which had to be completed by all cities asking for financial support for their projects. The method used was a com• parison of the "with" and the "without" situation, i.e. , the expected effects of the i nvestment were compared with the situation as it would be without the in• vestment. The following effects were evaluated and quantified in relation to the three concerned groups: • for the passengers - costs for traveling time - fares for public transport -operating costs for private automobile • for the transit authority - annualized capital cost - operating cost - fare-box revenue

• for the general public - noise reduction costs - costs for the reduction of ex- haust fumes Frankenstrasse Station (open cut) in Nuremberg. - accident costs Because of the great expense, this cost• Table 9. Expenditures for the construction of roads, streets, and highways in benefit analysis was limited to projects Munich, Federal Republic of Germany. involving an investment of more than Expenditure for Total Investment Percentage of Total DM50 million. After a few years of ex• Road Construction in Transportation perience, however, this analysis proved Year Investment Spent on unsuitable and was withdrawn. A new (million OM) (million OM) Road Construction cost-benefit analysis is now being worked 1965 115.8 370.4 31.3 out, which tries to avoid the defects of 1966 126.4 360.0 35.1 the first one. But even an improved 1967 102.0 403.7 25.3 version can only be an aid to and not 1968 105.7 366.6 28.8 a replacement of political and technical judgment in the investment decision. 1969 117.0 398.8 29.3 1970 159.9 484.0 33.0 1971 156.3 531.5 29.4 Conclusion 1972 136.9 491.7 27.8

The examples cited in this paper show 1973 91.8 600.8 15.3 not only that improvement of local 1974 69.7 554.7 12.6 public passenger transport provides the 1975 54.6 554.9 9.8 individual passenger with a direct per• 1976 67.9 644.9 10.5 sonal benefit, but also that under• 1977 60.6 734.3 8.3 ground construction work in the field 1978 72.0 83 5.3 8.6 of public transport produces other positive effects that are in the public Verkehrswegeinvestitionen des OPNV, Heft Girnau, G., and Muller, K. W. 1980. Success interest, both socially and economi• 51. Bonn. of investment in local public transport in cally- benefits which make a big Federation of Public Transport Undertak• Germany, Transport policy and decision mak• con• tribution toward improving the ings (VOV), and Association of Municipal ing, pp. 253-265, Jan uary 1980. often• cited quality of life. Experience Corporations (Deutscher Stadtetag, DST). Meister, D., and Girnau, G. 1980. Statement in the Federal Republic of Germany 1978. Offentlicher Personennahvehrkehr: In• of the official delegation of the Federal indi• cates, on the one hand, that vesitionen- Bauleistungen- Erfolge 1967 Republic of West Germany at Round Ta• this re• quires a huge volume of capital bis ble Session I on Environmental Protec• spend• ing and, in some cases, very long 1976 (Local public passenger transport: tion. In Subsurface Space (Rockstore '80), investment and construction, results 1967 ed. M. Bergman, pp. 1061-1071. Ox• periods of construction. On the other to 1 976). An i nterim survey on the finan• ford: Pergamon Press. hand, this seems to be the only way cial assistance programme of the Munic• we have of saving our deteriorating ipal Passenger Transport Finance Act, p. Scheelhasse, K. 1979. Einsatzbereich von cities. 100 ff. Cologne. Stadtbahnsystemen, Vehrkehr und Technik: Federation. ot Pubhc Transport Undertak• October, 1979. ings (VOV). 1980. VOV-Statistik '80. Co• Society for Consumption, Market and Sales Bibliography longe: Verband Offentlicher Verkehrs• Research (GfK-Nurnberg). 1978. Bayerische Motorenwerke (BMW), and Ba• betriebe. Offentlicher Personennahverkehr im Urteil der varian State Environment Office. 1973. German Parliament. 1976. Report on post• Beviilkerung (Local passenger traffic as the Auto, motor, sport, no. 76/1973, Munich. construction costs of local public passenger public sees it), a representative survey. Bundesminister fur Verkehr. 1976. Anlei• transport (OPNV), publication VII/4556, Cologne. tung fur die Standardisierte Bewertung von January 12, 1976.

May/june 1982 330 UNDERGROUN D SPACE