ORSAM REVIEW OFORSAM REVIEW OF REGIONAL AFFAIRS REGIONAL AFFAIRS No.33, NOVEMBER 2015
No.33, NOVEMBER 2015
SAFE ZONE IN NORTHERN SYRIA AND TURKEY
Oytun ORHAN
Oytun Orhan has been working The longer the Syrian crisis lasts, the more complica- as a researcher at ORSAM since ted the problem becomes. There are now an interwo- 2009. Conducting research basically on Syria and Lebanon, ven cycle of several wars on different fronts and in Orhan has also carried out different geographies, between different actors and studies about Israeli-Palestinian within the framework of changing alliances. In such conflict, Iraq and Turkey’s Middle East policy. Having an environment, Syria’s neighboring countries, no- graduated from the department tably Turkey, make efforts to minimize the security of International Relations, Gazi risks originating from Syria. Every country has to University, Orhan completed his master’s degree at the department concentrate on the developments in their own bor- of International Relations, der region. What Turkey has intensely proposed la- Hacettepe University with thesis tely is the establishment of a safe zone on the border titled “Impact of Identity on Syria’s Regional Policies (1946- line between Azaz and Jarabulus which is under ISIS 2000)”. Orhan continues his PhD control. This study examines the reasons behind Tur- in International Relations at the key’s demand for a safe zone and how the conditions Institute of Social Sciences, Bolu Abant Izzet Baysal University. have gradually been matured to establish a safe zone. SAFE ZONE IN NORTHERN SYRIA AND TURKEY
he longer the Syrian ward the issue of safe zone crisis lasts, the more again under the name of complicated the prob- ‘de-terrorized zone’ after the Tlem becomes. There are now Kurdish militia YPG captured an interwoven cycle of sev- Tell Abyad in June 2015, ISIS eral wars on different fronts gained ground towards Azaz and in different geographies, and Syrian refugees started between different actors flooding into European coun- and within the framework tries. The arguments about of changing alliances. In the reason for and objective such an environment, Syria’s of the demand for a safe zone neighboring countries, no- differentiated as well as how it tably Turkey, make efforts to would be established depend- minimize the security risks ing on the changing charac- originating from Syria. Every teristics of the Syrian crisis. country has to concentrate The first question that on the developments in their comes to mind is what the own border region. What goal of establishing a safe Turkey has intensely proposed zone will be. It is possible to lately is the establishment of a categorize Turkey’s expecta- safe zone on the border line tions under two main titles: between Azaz and Jarabulus easing the increasing pressure which is under ISIS control. of Syrian refugees and en- Turkey has principal- suring border security with ly brought this issue to the the strengthening of Turkey’s agenda since a long time Syria policy in short, medium ago. The proposal was firstly and long term. suggested within the context of the increase in the Syrian A. The Pressure of Refugees refugee influx at the begin- - According to the unoffi- ning of 2012 and reception cial figures, approximately of Syrians across the border. 2.5 million Syrians take It was later considered as part refuge in Turkey as of No- of the efforts made in order vember 2015. The refugee to weaken the Assad regime. influx continues increas- Finally, Turkey brought for- ingly with Russia’s involve- 2 ORSAM REVIEW OF REGIONAL AFFAIRS No.33, NOVEMBER 2015
ment in Syria. Unlike Eu- measure to reduce Syrian rope, although Turkey has influx into Europe. a large Syrian population, - The humanitarian aid that it is seen that the social Turkey and several oth- reaction is at a relatively er countries in the world controllable level and that send to civilians in Syria there are few problems in reaches the region from the Syrians’ adaptation Turkey. The majority of process. However, the in- this aid is sent via Oncu- creasing number of Syrian pinar border gate on the In case of the refugees also imposes an narrow line between Azaz establishment of increasing burden in terms and Afrin which is under a safe zone, new of Turkey’s economy and the control of Syrian op- refugee influx will social life. There are also position. If ISIS or YPG be received there; political and security risks. captures the mentioned it will be ensured Turkey aims to establish line, there will be limit- a stable safe zone where ed or no possibility that that the Syrians the people escaping from Turkey sends humanitar- living in Turkey Syria can take shelter. In ian aid to Syrian inlands, will return to this case of the establishment especially to Aleppo. At- zone and Turkey’s of a safe zone, new refu- taching high importance burden will be gee influx will be received to the developments in relieved. there; it will be ensured Aleppo, Turkey demands that the Syrians living in for the establishment of a Turkey will return to this safe zone in order to pro- zone and Turkey’s burden tect and expand this line. will be relieved. Therefore, the potential problems B. Strengthening Turkey’s that Turkey may face will Syria Policy and Border be resolved across the bor- Security der. The issue of refugees Turkey’s Syria policy can has become the problem be divided into three main of not only Turkey but phases from the beginning also Europe with Syrians’ of the Syrian crisis until influx into the West. The the end of 2015. The first de-terrorized zone offers a phase started with the begin- 3 SAFE ZONE IN NORTHERN SYRIA AND TURKEY
ning of the civil uprisings in pressure and isolation. In the March 2011 and lasted until second phase, Turkey start- the negotiation between the ed utilizing increasingly the Turkish Minister of Foreign political, diplomatic and Affairs of that time, Ahmet economic sanctions and el- Davutoglu and the Syrian ements of pressure on Syria. President Bashar al-Assad in Turkey also began to provide Damascus in August 2011. the political and military op- Turkey thought that Syrian position of Syria all kinds of government could resolve the support. During the last phase crisis through political means of Turkey’s Syria policy, the and Turkey could persuade characteristics of the protract- al-Assad with its influence on ed civil war has changed, so the regime during that time. Turkey tried to adapt itself to The terms agreed in the ne- the new situation. At the be- gotiation between Davutoglu ginning, Syrian Civil War was and al-Assad were not put roughly identified as the con- into practice and the Syrian flict between the Assad regime government continued to ap- and the opposition. However, proach the crisis with military in time, it turned out to be means, which caused Turkey a complicated civil war with to abandon its approach to multi-actors, changing alli- persuade Syria and resort to ances, strengthening ethni- 4 ORSAM REVIEW OF REGIONAL AFFAIRS No.33, NOVEMBER 2015
cal and sectarian character, the regime and the mentioned leading to a de facto division, new threats. From this per- including foreign fighters on spective, Turkey’s demand for both sides and finally involv- a safe zone can be expected to ing major and regional powers serve the purposes below: in the war directly. Whereas - The control of the regime only Assad regime was consid- has decreased in northern ered to be a threat in Turkey Syria since the mid-2012 at the first phase, threat per- and now it has the con- ception changed throughout trol of only some limited the process. Turkey tries to areas. This power vacuum adapt its Syria policy and the has been filled by ISIS If ISIS or YPG tools of foreign policy that it that Turkey considers as a captures the line utilizes to the new situation terrorist organization and between Azaz at the third phase that we by YPG, the extension of and Afrin, there witness today. The rise of two PKK. By November 2015, will be limited actors in Syrian civil war is of ISIS, YPG or the regime great importance for Turkey control almost 90% of the or no possibility in this sense. One of them is Turkey-Syria border. On- that Turkey sends PYD/YPG, the Syrian exten- ly the remaining 10% is humanitarian aid sion of PKK and the latter is under the control of the to Syrian inlands, the Islamic State of Iraq and opposition which is also especially to Syria (ISIS), the derivative of supported by Turkey. Tur- Aleppo. al-Qaeda. These two actors key’s high level politicians that Turkey considers as ter- have indicated that Turkey rorist organizations cannot does not want to face these have a political status on the three actors on its borders. Turkey-Syria border or in the The establishment of a safe vicinity of the border; they zone will also lead the al- declared their own de facto lies like Free Syrian Army autonomous regions/states. to control some 100 km While Turkey’s demand for a border shared with ISIS. safe zone was initially seen as Therefore, at least ISIS- the fight against the Assad re- based security risks will gime, this new situation shows decrease. that it is a fight both against - YPG indicates that its ul- 5 SAFE ZONE IN NORTHERN SYRIA AND TURKEY
timate goal is to form an is important for Turkey integrated Kurdish region to force the Assad regime on the line starting from towards political solution. the Iraqi border and reach- That is why Turkey attach- ing Afrin. This means that es great importance to the Turkey will face a state-like maintenance of geograph- entity under PKK’s con- ical connection with the trol nearly along its entire opposition and Aleppo border with Syria. This de- which Turkey sees as a close velopment will weaken its region of interest. The con- hand within the context of nection has already been the fight against PKK, Tur- established on the line be- key’s vital problem, beyond tween Azaz and Afrin and the security risks which on Idlib. However, what is will result from the border. critical for Turkey are the Nevertheless, the establish- developments in Aleppo. ment of a safe zone will This connection is estab- eliminate the possibility lished in the narrow zone that YPG may pass to the between Azaz and Afrin. west of Jarabulus. The geographic connec- - The military success that tion between Turkey and the opposition will have the opposition, Turkey 6 ORSAM REVIEW OF REGIONAL AFFAIRS No.33, NOVEMBER 2015
and Aleppo will be secured and pave the way for the with the safe zone. change of power balances - ISIS or YPG control over in Aleppo in favor of the the zone between Afrin opposition. and Jarabulus on the bor- - A safe zone can set a good der will lead Turkey to example of the regions make its extension to Syria under the opposition con- and the Middle East in the trol, especially the south- long term from these two ern front providing that actors that it sees as terror- it becomes successful. The ist organizations. There- establishment of such a fore, it is important to zone may cause pressure secure the line in order to on Syrian regime and pave The geographic assure Turkey’s long term the way for efforts to find connection Syria and Middle East pol- political solutions in Syria. icy as well. between - One of the greatest diffi- Points to Take into Account Turkey and the culties that the opposition, and Put into Practice opposition, which fights the regime Concerning the Safe Zone Turkey and on the northern front, has The factors that should be Aleppo will be is that they have to fight taken into account in terms secured with the against ISIS at the same of establishing a safe zone in- safe zone. time. The fronts that ISIS clude the demographic struc- has opened on the eastern ture of the population in the country side weaken the mentioned geography, the ap- power of the opposition proach of the local people to- in its fight against the re- wards Turkey’s protection and gime. For example, ISIS a safe zone and the relations launched attacks while the between Syrian regime and opposition was planning the opposition. When consid- joint operations target- ered in this respect, it is possi- ing the regime positions ble to paint such a picture: in Aleppo, and therefore, the operation in Alep- There are totally 278 vil- po was postponed. A safe lages on the line between Azaz zone may also reduce ISIS’ and Jarabulus. The majority pressure on the opposition of the population in these vil- 7 SAFE ZONE IN NORTHERN SYRIA AND TURKEY
lages is Turkmen. Apart from Murad Brigade to advance by this, there are Arabs and lim- land. These groups are sup- ited number of Kurds. More ported by the local people. than 70% of the settlements Similarly, Turkey’s protect- are occupied by ISIS. The so- ing the region will strength- cial groups living here acted en the grounds of legitimacy in concert with the Syrian because the local community opposition to a large extent likes Turkey. Turkmens and against the Syrian regime since Arabs have close relationships the beginning. The villages by affinity with the people on and towns in the region were Turkey’s side of the border. even controlled by the armed The geography is of level land local opposition groups before differently from the Iraqi bor- ISIS entered the region. The der, which may facilitate mili- local population neither wants tary operations. It can be said the authority of ISIS nor that that there is a low risk when of YPG in their settlements. all these perspectives are taken It is aimed in the safe zone into consideration. plan to enable 14 different However, establishing a opposition groups, especial- safe zone can be said to in- ly Turkmen-created Sultan clude several risk elements.
8 ORSAM REVIEW OF REGIONAL AFFAIRS No.33, NOVEMBER 2015
Safe zone is planned to be ent opinions about this group. established between Azaz and Therefore, it is primarily Jarabulus, of around 100 km doubtful that there is a literal- wide and 40 km deep. Such a ly powerful opposition which narrow and small geography will advance on the ground. may not allow the zone to be Syrian opposition trusts the literally safe. ISIS control will air support of the USA and continue around the zone, Turkey to a large extent. It is which will easily and continu- believed that it was the US air ously make it open to ISIS at- operations, not YPG, that but tacks. It will become harder to were successful in Tell Abyad literally provide security in the and Kobanî. That is why they think that they will ad- A safe zone zone especially as long as ISIS can set a good continues to control Manbij, vance without facing a large- which is closely situated to scale resistance with the air example of the the zone and has an Arab- support. However, there are regions under questions whether this view is Turkmen population. Manbij the opposition right. Secondly, many oppo- is one of the places where ISIS control, especially sition groups will act togeth- has the greatest power and it is the southern er. Nevertheless, the alliance difficult to take the organiza- among the groups is fragile. front providing tion out of this town without That is to say, lack of the most that it becomes intense operation. powerful groups on the north- successful. The biggest problem in the ern front and fragility of the debates about safe zone is lack alliance among them reduc- of forces which will fight on es the possibility to succeed the ground and the fragility against ISIS in a great number of the alliance between them. of joint land operations. The Above all, al-Nusra Front is USA or Turkey may directly not part of this plan since it have to take the responsibility is a terrorist organization. In on the ground against ISIS in addition, Ahrar Ash-Sham is such a situation. This may be one of the powerful groups a limited operation in terms on the northern front but it is of geography and target when not certain whether it will take launched by special units rath- part in this movement. The er than a comprehensive oper- USA and Turkey have differ- ation. 9 SAFE ZONE IN NORTHERN SYRIA AND TURKEY
If such a zone is going to needs of people. That is why it be established, what should be should be planned before how done first is to prepare for the medical needs will be met, formation of civil administra- education and municipality tion and organization of the services will be provided, civil daily life following the estab- administration will be formed, lishment of the zone. A signifi- internal security will be en- cant number of people still live sured, preparations for food in this region. It is planned to and shelter will be made, eco- enable Syrians who lived in nomic life will be revived and this region to return at the first the needs for electricity and stage. Beyond this, new refu- water will be met. The success gee influx may be received in of the zone will be an example the region. Therefore, it can be of a successful model except foreseen that there will be an for the regime and ISIS at the intense population in the safe following stage. zone. At this point, unlike the regime and PYD, ISIS turns Conclusion out to be a successful example We can count the reasons of an alternative government which led Turkey to express model which provides security aloud its demand for a safe and systematic meeting of the zone within the last period 10 ORSAM REVIEW OF REGIONAL AFFAIRS No.33, NOVEMBER 2015
and which allowed for the aspects. Firstly, Turkey did emergence of favorable condi- not directly consider PYD tions to establish this zone as as a threat even though it follows: was skeptical about it due - PYD seized Tell Abyad to the continuation of where there is an intense solution process and con- Arab population as well as flict-free environment. In Turkmen and established addition, although Turkey a connection between the was troubled with PYD/ two regions under its de YPG’s approaches that undercut Turkey’s poli- facto control. This develop- The biggest cy of territorial integrity ment increased the possi- problem in the in Syria such as declaring bility of a PKK-controlled debates about cantons, expectations that region along the Syrian safe zone is the the solution process would border, thus also increasing lack of forces be successful was a factor Turkey’s concerns. that hinders Turkey from which will fight - ISIS launched terror at- taking steps against PYD/ on the ground tacks first in Suruç, then in YPG. The end of the solu- and the fragility Ankara. Also, Turkish se- tion process both led to of the alliance curity forces started intense the PYD/YPG presence among them. operations against ISIS to become a big threat in cells in Turkey and some- northern Syria and Turkey times the two engaged in to remove the factors that combat. This caused ISIS hindered her concerning to increase its threat in this actor. Turkey and to become an - Turkey and the USA signed urgent problem. an agreement in order to - PKK announced that it act together in fight against ended the solution pro- ISIS. It was concluded in cess at the beginning of this agreement that the July 2015 and the con- aircrafts of the USA and flicts started again between coalition forces would ben- Turkey and PKK, which efit from the opportuni- influenced Turkey’s view ty to use İncirlik Air Base of northern Syria in two and Turkey’s airspace and 11 SAFE ZONE IN NORTHERN SYRIA AND TURKEY
that Turkey and the USA fore, Turkey’s demands would act together in order and arguments about Syria to establish a de-terrorized started to taken into con- zone between Azaz and Ja- sideration more. Turkey’s rabulus. proposal that a safe zone - ISIS advanced towards should be established and Azaz and this brought in opened to build settle- the possibility that Tur- ments for Syrians as a solu- key’s connection to Alep- tion to refugee problem po would be cut. ISIS can be evaluated within this framework. increased its influence on Azaz, which triggered Tur- - Russia has been directly in- key to protect its Aleppo volved in Syrian Civil War connection. on the side of the Assad regime. This intervention - ISIS opened fronts on has increased the possibil- eastern countryside of ity that a regime zone can Aleppo against the oppo- be established with Russia’s sition when Syrian army permanent existence and was stuck in Aleppo and protection in Syria. This this indirectly reassured has pushed the USA to the regime. This situation take more responsibilities showed that it would be in order to balance Russia difficult for Turkey to reach in Syria. It can be evaluat- its expectations about ed within this context that Aleppo without eliminat- the USA brought its F-15 ing ISIS influence on the warplanes to Incirlik Air opposition. Base after Russia acquired - Syrian refugees flooded air superiority by bringing into Europe. This develop- its warplanes in Syria. The ment both caused the West USA has now air superi- to engage more in Syrian ority, which has weakened problem and Turkey to Russia’s deterrence which gain importance as a fun- poses an obstacle before damental partner in terms the establishment of safe of refugee problem. There- zone. 12 ORSAM REVIEW OF REGIONAL AFFAIRS No.33, NOVEMBER 2015
For all these reasons, both Arab armed units that have the issue of safe zone that been preparing for a long time Turkey has put forward for a will advance on the ground few years has become an emer- with intense air support with- gency and the regional devel- in the scope of efforts made in opments have helped to put order to eliminate ISIS from Turkey’s demand into action. this region. However, it cannot It is expected that military be acceptable for joint military operations will be launched operations of the USA and in order to end ISIS existence Turkey to fail to defeat the ter- between Azaz and Jarabulus rorist organization, ISIS. If air concerning the statements of support is insufficient at this Turkish and American author- point support on the ground ities, the mobility on Incirlik may also be brought to the Air Base and the measures tak- agenda. This will increase the en along the border. The first possibility to win as well as the option is that Turkmen and risks.
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