Sectarianism in Syria's Civil

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Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War Fabrice Balanche

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Fabrice Balanche. Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018. halshs-01702640

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HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR

Fabrice Balanche

A Geopolitical Study Featuring 70 Original Maps

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR FABRICE BALANCHE

a geopolitical study featuring 70 original maps by fabrice balanche & mary kalbach horan The opinions expressed in this book are those of the author and not necessarily those of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors.

All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

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DESIGN: 1000colors.org CONTENTS

Table of Maps vii Acknowledgments ix Introduction xi

II The Origins of Syria’s Sectarianism 6 | A Divisive Evolution 109

About the Author Inside Back Cover

TABLE OF MAPS

1. Geography of the Syrian Population 2004  xii 19. Potential Migration from Rebel and IS Areas, May 2017  27 2. Sectarian and Ethnic Distribution in Syria 2011  xiii 20. Syrian Army Progression in Damascus Area, 3. Arab Tribes in Syria  xiv March 2013‒May 2017  33 4. Geography of the Syrian Uprising, Fall 2011  4 21. The Syrian Army Surrounds East Ghouta  34 5. Sectarianism and Frontlines, May 2017  5 22. Syrian Army Damascus Strategy, May 2017  35 6. Military Situation and Sectarianism, April 2013  6 23. Latakia Sectarian Distribution 2011  37 7. Military Situation and Sectarianism, May 2017  7 24. From Alawite Stronghold to Statelet  39 8. Homs 2011: Sectarian Distribution  9 25. Jabal al-Druze and the Southern Front, March 2017  40 9. The 2011 Damascus Uprising  10 26. East Aleppo vs. West Aleppo, January 2016  45 10. Baniyas Sectarian Distribution 2011  11 27. Syrian Army Offensive East Aleppo, Fall 2016  46 11. Syrian Cities: Two Models  12 28. Struggle for the Manbij‒Azaz Corridor, Winter 2016  47 12. Military Situation, May 2017  18 29. Ethnic Divisions in Northern Syria  52 13. Syrian Population Growth 1940‒2010  19 30. PYD Expansion in Northern Syria, May 2017  53 14. Refugees by Sect, June 2017  20 31. Rojava Population and Future Administrative 15. Syrian Refugees and IDPs, May 2017  21 Organization 2016  54 16. Resident Syrian Population by Sect  22 32. Arabization of Village Names in Northern Syria  55 17. Population by Sect in the Regime Area  23 33. Change in Irrigated Land, Northeast Syria 2001‒2009  57 18. Population by Zone, 2013 and 2017  23 34. Syrian Kurds Break Encirclement, April 2017  59

 vii  35. Rojava as a Future Corridor to the Sea  60 53. Partition with Rebellion in Damascus  99 36. Syrian Rebel Groups by Ideology, March 2016  69 54. Potential Iranian Routes to the Mediterranean, August 2017  101 37. Syrian Rebel Powerbrokers by Number 55. Russia’s Strategy in Syria  102 and Ideology, March 2016  70 56. Russia’s Strategy in the Levant: 38. Syrian Rebel Powerbrokers by Front, March 2016  71 Energy and Turkish Siege  103 39. Military Situation in Southern Syria, May 2017  73 57. Sectarian Distribution in Levant and Potential Statelets  104 40. Military Developments in Northwest Syria, 58. The New Thirty Years War  105 March/April 2017  74 59. Sectarian Distribution in the Levant at End 41. Military Situation in Northern Syria, May 2017  75 of Ottoman Empire  111 42. Close Allies of Jabhat al-Nusra, June 2016  76 60. Centers and Peripheral Zones in the Levant at End of Ottoman Empire  112 43. Jabhat al-Nusra and Coalitions, Winter 2015‒Fall 2016  77 61. Old City of Damascus at End of Ottoman Empire  113 44. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham Territorial Organization in Idlib Area, August 2017  80 62. The Alawite State 1920‒1936  114 45. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham Strongholds in Idlib Area, 63. Administrative Divisions in Syria  120 August 2017  81 64. Baathist Planning 1963–1990: Development of the Periphery  122 46. Military Situation in Syria and Iraq, May 2017  83 65. Periphery Cleavage Since the 1990s  123 47. Energy Production in Syria  86 66. Syrian Population 2010 by Age and Gender  124 48. Arab Tribes and Military Situation in Northeast 67. Demographic Growth in Syria by District Syria, April 2016  88 1970‒1981  126 49. Syria’s Ethnic and Social Structure  97 68. Demographic Growth in Syria by District 50. Unity with Regime in Damascus  98 1994‒2004  127 51. Unity with Rebellion in Damascus  98 69. Illiteracy in Syria by Province 2004  128 52. Partition with Regime in Damascus  99 70. Internal Migration in Syria 1990 –2010  129

 viii  acknowledgments

y profound thanks to all those who helped and supported me in the realization of this study. First, the publications team at The Washing- ton Institute was instrumental in bringing this project to fruition: Editor MGeorge Lopez did a wonderful job organizing the text and finessing the prose while scrupulously checking that all information was properly referenced. Publica- tions director Mary Kalbach Horan spent an extraordinary amount of time redesigning and editing the maps, ensuring the coherence of names down to the smallest and most obscure Syrian village. Research assistants Marine Barjol, James Bowker, and Jackson Doer- ing helped me translate my original French drafts into readable English. Their fresh eyes forced me to clarify ideas for the many readers who have not spent their professional lives analyzing Syria in minute detail. Furthermore, this study is the result of immense teamwork among the Institute’s numerous scholars and experts. Martin Kramer, David Pollock, David Schenker, Andrew Tabler, Ehud Yaari, and Aaron Zelin read and reread various chapters with great attention to detail and endeavored to enrich them. Patrick Clawson coordinated this team, greatly stimulating and encouraging my research over the past two years. I am also grateful to executive director Robert Satloff for his hospitality and kindness. Syria is a difficult subject with violent polemics, so any scholar who tackles it depends on the support of the institution hosting him. I have always found this support at The Washington Institute. Finally, I would like to express my deep gratitude to all the Washington Institute administrators, researchers, assistants, interns, and donors who helped and supported me during my stay.

Fabrice Balanche January 2018

 ix 

INTRODUCTION

s Syria’s seemingly in- Examining these identities is therefore including the most salient military, to create a strong solidarity link. The terminable war drags on, crucial to answering the most fundamen- political, demographic, and economic sect becomes a political player when its nagging questions about tal questions about the ongoing upheaval. trends. It can also yield lessons about leaders decide to compete for authority A its initial causes and cur- The main objective of this study is state failure and other ills afflicting the at the state level, using sectarian soli- rent dynamics have yet to be fully an- to foster a fuller understanding of the wider Middle East. Focusing on sectari- darity to seize mulk (political power). swered, particularly in comparison to role that sectarianism has played in anism does not mean one should see it Indeed, medieval scholar Ibn Khaldun other regional crises. Why did Bashar Syria’s war, and to reassess the notion lurking behind every door in Syria, but defined any such collective as an asabiy- al-Assad’s regime not fall quickly like that the regime’s divisive efforts single- it does need to be granted a more promi- ya, a solidarity group created with the Hosni Mubarak’s did in Egypt? Why handedly transformed the secular and nent place in discussions about the war express goal of taking political power.2 has the Syrian army not fractured like democratic revolution of 2011 into the and Syria’s future. In the 1980s, Michel Seurat applied Muammar Qadhafi’s in Libya? And why brutal sectarian conflict of today. Since Khaldun’s theories to Syria in ways that has the fighting persisted for so long? 3 the beginning, sectarianism has been A SECTARIAN CIVIL WAR are deeply relevant to the current war. In many ways the Syrian conflict has a major factor in the conflict, perhaps Detailed analysis of such theories can be been taken out of the hands of Syrians even more so than geopolitical drivers The general concept of sectarianism found in Part II of this study, “Origins themselves, becoming a proxy war be- and other issues, but many analysts and has been abundantly explained by a of Syria’s Sectarianism,” but they inform tween regional and international forces participants have deliberately marginal- multitude of authors. I have relied in Part I as well, which focuses on more that often exploit the country’s divided ized it. When sectarianism is discussed, particular on Maxime Rodinson, who practical questions about how the war society for their own benefit. Yet this it is often framed in terms of the re- used his keen understanding of the first erupted, why it has persisted, and sectarian fragmentation was not created gime consolidating its power. Certain- interplay between cultural and socio- how it is reshaping the country’s terri- when the war began in 2011; it came ly, Assad has used all means necessary economic parameters to describe this tory and population. from an inherited Ottoman millet sys- to stay in power, including tactics that phenomenon in the Middle East.1 The In simplest terms, sectarianism is tem whose traits were accentuated by the exacerbate interfaith tensions, but nei- definition of sectarianism employed in both a cause and consequence of the “divide to reign” policies of Bashar’s late ther he nor his father created these di- this study is wide, denoting not only re- initial revolt—and its subsequent fail- father, Hafiz. The war has compelled Syr- visions—they only exploited the preex- ligious communities but also ethnic and ures. Chapter 1 goes immediately to ians to cling to their sectarian identities isting vulnerabilities of Syrian society. tribal groups. In that sense, “sect” de- the heart of the matter, assessing the more tightly, whether out of socioeco- Analyzing these vulnerabilities can scribes any social group whose members role of sectarianism in the early upris- nomic self-interest or simply to survive. shed light on the war’s current course, share a common identity and are able ing and the behavior of different com-

 xi  1. GEOGRAPHY OF THE SYRIAN POPULATION 2004 N al-Malikiyah Amuda Qamishli W E Kobane Ras al-Ain S Tal Abyad Afrin Azaz Manbij al-Bab HASAKA

ALEPPO

IDLIB RAQQA

LATAKIA al-Thawra Maarat al-Numan

Jableh HAMA DEIR AL-ZOUR Baniyas Salamiya Mayadin

TARTUS Sa ta HOMS al-Qusayr Palmyra Abu Kamal

Nabek Provincial border

2004 POPULATION DAMASCUS 4,500,000 AREA 2,000,000 Zabadani Jayrud 1,000,000 100,000 Golan Heights Damascus 10,000 Shahba Douma 1,000

SUWAYDA Kiswah TYPE OF LOCALITY DERAA Busra Urban DAMASCUS AREA Rural

0 100 km

SOURCE: 2004 CENSUS

xii   fabrice balanche 2. SECTARIAN AND ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION IN SYRIA 2011

N TURKEY W E

HASAKA ALEPPO RAQQA

IDLIB LATAKIA DEIR AL-ZOUR HAMA

TARTUSTartous HOMS Mediterranean Sea LEBANON IRAQ

DAMASCUS

QUNEITRA Golan Heights SUWAYDA

ISRAEL DERAA JORDAN 0 100 km

Sunni Christian Turkmen Province center

Alawi Shia Kurdish Province border

Druze Ismaili Bedouin International border

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   xiii 3. ARAB TRIBES IN SYRIA

N Tigris River TURKEY W E Kobane Qamishli Ras al-Ain Tay S Tal Abyad Adwan Afrin Manbij HASAKA Jabbour ALEPPO Fadan Walda al-Shadadi Shammar Mediterranean Sea RAQQA Lake Assad Sabkha IDLIB Quayar Afadla Baggara LATAKIA al-Washeb Haddadin DEIR AL-ZOUR HAMA Fadan Mawali Ougaidat Salamiya TARTUS HOMS Bani Khalid al-Shour Sbaa Palmyra Abu Kamal Euphrates River Fawaira

LEBANON Hassana Ruwala al-Swaileh al-Shaga DAMASCUS Ruwala IRAQ al-Abdullah Golan QUNEITRA al-Ghiati Heights al-Hassan SUWAYDA ISRAEL al-Masaid DERAA al-Sherfat JORDAN 0 100 km

Sedentary area Sbaa Tribe Province border Province center Nomadic area Tribal territory International border City

xiv   fabrice balanche munities as the civil war escalated. The persons (IDPs), meaning that more the Kurdish-controlled SDF zone, and Kurdish zone, while rebel groups held use of the term “civil war” may shock than half the current population of 23 the Sunni Arab rebel zone. Each of these sway over a patchwork zone that be- some readers, since it goes against the million has been transplanted in one zones has significant internal fissures as came almost entirely Sunni Arab. The conventional reading of the conflict as way or another.6 Syria’s sectarian distri- well. The latter is the most fragmented, 2015 Russian intervention moved the a fight between a dictatorial regime and bution has also been modified by ethnic with several hundred competing rebel lines somewhat, enabling regime forces the people. The Assad regime is certain- cleansing in different areas, whether un- groups and some areas still held by the to leave their minority strongholds and ly a brutal dictatorship that has slaugh- der the aegis of the regime, the rebels, Islamic State. The regime zone has some reconquer certain Sunni Arab territo- tered many innocent civilians, and this the Islamic State, or the Kurds. institutional coherence, but the various ries deemed hostile to Assad. The re- study does not aim to elide that harsh The most diverse and populous area is community and tribal militias belong- capture of Aleppo in late 2016 was a reality. At the same time, though, the the one controlled by the regime’s army. ing to the National Defense Forces have particularly important turning point, chapters that follow describe how (and Although many of this zone’s residents introduced fragmentation at the local and the regime has since been expand- why) a large portion of Syria’s popula- are Alawites—that is, followers of the level.9 The NDF still respect Assad’s au- ing its grip in other areas such as the tion supports Assad, whether out of Alawi branch of Shia Islam, the same thority, but they often engage in violent central and southern desert. In the Da- self-interest, fear, or some combination sect as the Assad family—the majority inter-militia rivalries for control of ter- mascus suburbs formerly held by the of factors. And on the other side, rebel are Sunnis, and many minorities have ritory and resources. The Kurdish-con- rebels, most inhabitants have stayed in groups have attacked civilian popula- fled there as well.7 At various points trolled zone is the most centralized, de- place once regime forces retake their tions that they consider allies of the during the war, Sunni IDPs from Idlib, spite the PYD’s official discourse about neighborhoods, even in Sunni strong- regime simply because of their sectar- Aleppo, and Homs have sought refuge in local democracy and federalism. Kurd- holds. The army’s destruction of Da- ian affiliation. Syria is therefore in the the coastal region, the stronghold of the ish militia forces are everywhere, and the raya and dramatic siege of East Ghouta midst of a civil war—one that is mostly Alawites. Displaced residents of Damas- Arab militias within the SDF are mainly likely frightened many locals into sub- sectarian, sometimes even in the purely cus city have fled to Jabal al-Druze or the treated as tokens or substitutes rather mission, and the brutal tactics used by religious sense of the word given the in- Druze/Christian suburb of Jaramana. than full partners. certain rebel groups no doubt drove volvement of the Islamic State, al-Qae- In contrast, rebel zones are almost This new geography will likely de- them into the regime’s arms as well. da affiliates, and foreign Shia militias.4 exclusively Sunni Arab. The few minor- termine the structure of postwar Syria. After years of war, most civilians seek UN officials themselves have described ities who lived in these areas have fled It also informs the structure of this security above all else, and the fractured the crisis as a civil war since as early as or been forced to convert to Sunnism. study—each of these three zones is opposition has been largely unable to 2012, so it is hardly inappropriate for In the northern border zone controlled covered by its own chapter. Between provide it given the prevalence of radi- others to do the same.5 by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic March 2013 and December 2016, the cal actors. Forces (SDF), an Arab-Kurdish blend main fronts were stabilized along sec- In short, the regime’s counterinsurgency efforts have been quite ef- SYRIA’S DIVISION ALONG remains, but “Kurdification” efforts tarian lines, recalling Lebanon’s civil continue—belying the pluralistic dis- war in 1975–1990. In the west, the fective, at least in territorial terms.10 ETHNORELIGIOUS LINES course of the Democratic Union Party regime managed to secure a strip of Assad does not seek to win hearts and Civil wars provoke intense population (PYD), the dominant Syrian Kurdish territory stretching from Latakia to Su- minds, but rather to break the opposi- movements, and Syria is no exception. faction that shares close ties with Tur- wayda, with key strategic points in the tion’s neck, just as his father did forty More than 6 million residents have key’s Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).8 hands of religious minorities, enabling years ago when crushing a Muslim fled the country as refugees, and just as Syria is thus divided into three main Assad to keep the local Sunni majority Brotherhood revolt.11 And while politi- many have become internally displaced areas: the multisectarian regime zone, under control. The SDF controlled the cal and territorial cleavages cannot be

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   xv dismissed when examining the nature city dwellers lived in relative luxury, the of data on ethnoreligious identity in of this fight, sectarianism is the key countryside suffered, and deep sectar- these areas, and population data from to understanding its roots and near- ian fissures were reactivated by econom- various Syrian censuses conducted since term prospects. ic frustration. Most analysts did not see 1960. The ethnic and religious data has this growing unrest and spoke of sectari- been generated by cross-referencing AN INEVITABLE CONFLICT anism as a rapidly disappearing vestige three types of sources: a hand-drawn of local medievalism. ethnographic map of Syria created by Ever since I began my research in Syria The same error of analysis persisted French Mandate authorities, topo- in 1990, the country’s sectarian divisions at the beginning of the civil war, based graphical maps from the 1960s (i.e., have been glaringly evident. Back then, on the flawed notion that Alawites before the government Arabized many the Alawite community was the back- could reject Assad and embrace the placenames), and author surveys con- bone of Hafiz al-Assad’s classic patronage “popular revolution” without sectarian ducted in numerous Syrian communi- system: in exchange for political support, implications. Only a few analysts took ties. An individual GIS has also been they were given material benefits that the sectarian parameter into consider- built for each major city, broken down only increased their sectarian solidarity. ation, such as Fouad Ajami.14 More re- by neighborhood. The regime knew very well how to agitate cently, Nikolaos Van Dam denounced Taken together, this research shows the Islamist threat in order to strengthen the Western diplomatic tendency to that the ethnic and religious identity Alawite loyalty. Yet this privileged rela- downplay sectarian issues and dismiss of Syrian villages remained virtually tionship increasingly frustrated portions the fears of religious minorities who unchanged between the French Man- of the majority Sunni population, espe- faced a revolt largely overtaken by radi- date and 2010. The sectarian compo- cially those who suffered deteriorating cal Islamists.15 The chapters that follow sition of urban neighborhoods is also living conditions. Civil war seemed inevi- emphasize the role of sectarianism not well known because little population table in the long term. to encourage a future partition of Syria mixing occurred in the cities—for the When Bashar succeeded his father in based on these divisions, but simply to most part, the only residents living 2000, the system continued to run on describe the reality of a protracted civil in mixed neighborhoods are wealthy inertia for years, much like Yugoslavia war. Concerned members of the inter- people. These trends, coupled with a after the death of Marshal Tito.12 Even- national community cannot hope to GIS database that has been repeatedly tually, however—after a decade of rapid stop the violence unless they open their refined over the years, allow for the population growth, socioeconomic de- eyes to its core causes. production of highly accurate ethno- terioration outside the cities, and lapsed graphic maps, which in turn make it structural reforms—Syria’s disaster fi- A NOTE ABOUT feasible to assess sectarian distribution even amid wartime upheaval. nally struck. The long-brewing revolt METHODOLOGY in the rural areas and urban peripheries Therefore, unless otherwise indicated, had been masked for years by ultimate- Since first visiting the country in 1990, all demographic statistics and projec- ly superficial progress such as the open- I have built a geographic information tions offered in this study are derived ing of private banks and the huge in- system (GIS) that incorporates around from this database and the author’s crease in automobile ownership.13 While 6,000 Syrian localities, decades worth related work. xvi   fabrice balanche fikraforum/view/from-qamishli-to-qa- notes mishlo-a-trip-to-rojavas-new-capital. 9. In 2012, Iran helped Assad create the 1. See his book Islam, Politique et Croy- paramilitary NDF, which the regular ances (Paris: Fayard, 1993). army then tasked with protecting regime 2. Ibn Khaldun, Les Prolégomènes (Paris: strongholds at the local level. This stra- Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, tegy has proven to be a mixed blessing 1863). for Assad, as discussed in later chapters. 3. See Michel Seurat, L’Etat de Barbarie 10. Fabrice Balanche, “Insurgency and (Paris: Seuil, 2012). counterinsurgency in Syria” (in French), 4. Fabrice Balanche, “Communautarisme Geostrategic Maritime Review 2 en Syrie: lorsque le mythe devient réa- (Spring–Summer 2014), http://www.jos- lité” [Communitarianism in Syria: when hualandis.com/blog/insurgency-and- counterinsurgency-in-syria-by-fabrice- the myth becomes reality], Confluences balanche. Méditerranée 89 (Spring 2014), https:// www.cairn.info/revue-confluences-me- 11. Martin van Creveld, The Changing diterranee-2014-2-page-29.htm. Face of War: Combat from the Marne to Iraq (New York: Presidio, 2008). 5. Asked if the situation could be described as a civil war, UN undersecretary- 12. Fabrice Balanche, La region Alaouite et general for peacekeeping operations le pouvoir Syrien [The Alawite area and Herve Ladsous replied, “Yes, I think we Syrian power] (Paris: Karthala, 2006). can say that.” See “Syria Conflict Now 13. Fabrice Balanche, “The new lion of a Civil War, UN Peacekeeping Chief Damascus will not make an economic Says,” Reuters, June 12, 2012, http:// tiger with Syria” (in Spanish), Revista www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis- Culturas no. 8: Ten years of Bashar al- un-idUSBRE85B11V20120612. Assad (Sevilla, September-October 6. For more on these figures, see the 2010), http://revistaculturas.org/el-nue- “Demographics Overwhelmed by vo-leon-de-damasco-no-transformara- War” section of chapter 1. siria-en-un-tigre-economico. 7. Souhail Belhadj, La Syrie de Bashar al- 14. See his book The Syrian Rebellion Asad (Paris: Belin Litterature et Revues, (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 2013). 2012), particularly the section beginning on page 229. 8. See Fabrice Balanche, “From Qamishli to Qamishlo: A Trip to Rojava’s New 15. Nikolaos van Dam, Destroying a Na- Capital,” Fikra Forum, April 13, 2017, tion: The Civil War in Syria (London: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ I. B. Tauris, 2017).

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   xvii part i the role of sectarianism in the syrian confliCt

1. SECTARIAN LINES ARE DRAWN AND REDRAWN

hen the revolt ern agricultural region known as the the fighting. In this manner, the conflict his forces, with sectarian neighborhood began in 2011, it was Houran and the Druze of the adjacent has greatly disrupted the country’s pop- boundaries often defining the frontlines. driven by many dif- mountainous area (for more on these ulation distribution. More than half the Of course, a host of crucial nonsectarian W ferent factors, re- and other ancestral divides, see Part II). people have left their homes—sectarian factors complicates this picture (e.g., the sulting in numerous interpretations to To be sure, the geography of the revolt’s fiefdoms have become safe havens for class-based, urban/rural divide that char- explain what was happening. Looking first months is very important to under- those caught in mixed areas affected by acterized many wartime developments in at the uprising from a geographical per- standing the reasons for the ongoing war, violence, and ethnic cleansing has been Aleppo), so they are examined as well. spective, for example, one could see a and the first part of this chapter exam- carried out in some locales. Accordingly, clear fissure between the center and the ines these territorial fissures in detail. As the third part of this chapter seeks to TERRITORIES OF periphery. The initial protests in Deraa will be seen, however, sectarian factors establish a new geography of the Syrian THE REVOLT province were motivated by sociopoliti- quickly gained ascendancy over territo- population by charting this ongoing de- cal frustration accumulated against the rial, economic, and political factors. The mographic upheaval. In 1979, scholar Elisabeth Picard noted regime for decades. A drought had un- second part of the chapter therefore fo- In April 2013, Syria’s battle map large- that while Syria was experiencing sec- dermined local agriculture since 2005, cuses on the behavior of Syria’s six main ly aligns with the map of its sectarian tarian violence as a result of an upris- and the state’s lack of interest in this sects—Sunni Arabs, Alawites, Druze, distribution. As described in the Intro- ing by Sunni Islamists (i.e., the Muslim peripheral area ripened the conditions Christians, Ismailis, and Kurds—during duction, Sunni rebel and jihadist forces Brotherhood), its situation was not for revolt. the uprising. control much of the eastern and central comparable to that of Lebanon, which Yet this explanation, while valid and These sects do not have the same co- countryside, which by this point is al- was in the throes of a full-blown sectar- analytically useful, does not tell the hesion they did in the nineteenth cen- most entirely populated by Sunni Arabs. ian civil war.1 As she noted, Syrians did whole story. Even as their neighbors in tury, but their ties are strong enough to Kurdish forces control most of the Kurd- not seem to express their sectarianism Sunni Arab Deraa rose up, residents of influence the behavior of large commu- ish-majority northern border zone. And with the same vigor as the Lebanese at neighboring Jabal al-Druze did not join nities and give some of them access to the regime controls the Alawite coast, Ja- the time, and Hafiz al-Assad was able to the protest movement, despite their resources denied to others. At a time of bal al-Druze, and similar territories where crush the unrest before it escalated into equally degraded economic situation. war, Syria’s sectarian identities have been minorities passively or actively support a nationwide movement. This lack of revolutionary solidarity was awakened more powerfully than ever, Assad. Damascus and the other major Today, however, the question of due largely to the ancestral sectarian di- with noncombatants forced to choose a cities (Aleppo, Homs, Hama, and Lata- Syrian sectarianism must be reconsid- vide between the Sunnis of the south- camp as they seek a safe place to ride out kia) are either wholly or partially held by ered—analysis of the revolt’s geography

 3  QAMISHLI Turkey KURDISH POPULATION KURDISH POPULATION 4. KURDISH POPULATION ALEPPO GEOGRAPHY OF THE SYRIAN UPRISING RAQQA HASAKA Fall 2011 IDLIB ARAB TRIBES Jabal al-Turkmen LATAKIA Jabal al-Akrad Periphery of TYPE OF TERRITORY Alawite territory DEIR AL-ZOUR HAMA Hostile Abandoned periphery BANIAS RASTAN Support HOULE Idle Tal Kalakh PALMYRA Sunni enclaves in Alawite territory in Alawite Sunni enclaves TARTUS HOMS

AL-QUSAYR Free Syrian Army base Iraq ZABADANI Foreign support to ghting Mediterranean DAMASCUS

Fighting

Abandoned Lebanon urban periphery City

Primary road

Secondary road Abandoned SUWAYDA periphery Desert Israel DERAA Jordan

4   fabrice balanche suggests that the country has major (perhaps irreconcilable) sectarian fissures, despite official denials by the regime and 5. SECTARIANISM AND FRONTLINES, May 2017 opposition alike. The demonstrations that swept Latakia, Baniyas, and Homs in 2011 occurred only in the Sunni TURKEY districts of those cities. In the suburbs

PYD of Damascus, most Druze, Christian, PYD Ismaili, and Alawite districts did not HASAKA PYD join the protest movement, but outly- Mediterranean Sea ALEPPO SYRIAN ing Sunni towns did. The demonstra- ARMY RAQQA tions in Jdeidat Artouz, a Druze/Chris- IDLIB REBELS IRAQ tian area, and Bab Touma, the capital’s LATAKIA DEIR AL-ZOUR main Christian quarter, were largely IS HAMA undertaken by Sunni residents. In response, the older Druze and Christian TARTUSTartous inhabitants mobilized against what they HOMS considered aggression by newer inhabit- SYRIAN ants who practiced a different religion. ARMY Meanwhile, the Sunni inhabitants of IS Douma, Deraa, and other rebellious districts around Damascus rose to defend LEBANON DAMASCUS their territory against regime aggression. QUNEITRA For them, the state could no longer be Golan Heights considered an extension of the Syrian REBELS SUWAYDA people, if it ever had been during the ISRAEL DERAA JORDAN 0 100 km Baath/Assad era; instead, they saw it as JORDANIE a hostage of the Alawite minority, and therefore a foreign element. Sunni Christian Turkmen Province center

Alawite Shia Kurdish Province border The Alawite Fallback

Druze Ismaili Bedouin International border Syria’s Alawites occupy a more or less continuous territory between the Medi- Frontline terranean Sea and the Orontes River, including the Jabal al-Ansariyya range and surrounding plains. Additional Alawite settlements are scattered east of the Oron-

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   5 tes, created in the nineteenth century when the large landowners of Homs and Hama reconquered farmland on the edge 6. MILITARY SITUATION AND SECTARIANISM, April 2013 of the steppe using Alawite sharecroppers.

Prior to the creation of modern Syria, N Tigris River TURKEY Euphrates River Qamishli local Alawites were ostracized by Sunni W E and Ottoman authorities, who did not Kobane Ras al-Ain S Tal Abyad Azaz consider them true Muslims. Alawi- Afrin Manbij tes were forbidden from even entering al-Bab HASAKA cities—a harsh edict in light of the fact that minority Christians were permitted IDLIB ALEPPO Lake Assad RAQQA Jisr al-Shughour to live there. It was only with the French Ariha Maarat al-Numan Mandate (1920–1945) that Alawites LATAKIA DEIR AL-ZOUR began to settle in the cities. And when HAMA Alawite military officers such as Hafiz al- Salamiya Assad asserted themselves at the outset TARTUS Palmyra of the Baath era in the 1960s, their co- Mediterranean Sea HOMS Abu Kamal religionists took numerous positions of authority in these cities. Today, Latakia is a majority Alawite city, as are Baniyas, Jableh, and Tartus. LEBANON DAMASCUS Yet some key locales in the western Ala- QUNEITRA IRAQ wite heartland are dominated by other Golan sects. In Talkalakh, the majority of the Heights ISRAEL DERAA population remains Sunni, while in SUWAYDA

Homs, Alawites comprise only a quarter 0 100 km JORDAN of the population. They are practically absent from Hama, Jisr al-Shughour, and Maarat al-Numan, whose Sunni residents INHABITED AREAS OF CONTROL MINORITIES are openly hostile toward the minority. Syrian Army Shia minorities Main road Province border

Such Sunni animosity has grown over PYD (Kurdish) Christian Secondary road International border the past few decades because of the pref- Rebels Kurdish Desert Province center erential treatment Alawites receive from Disputed Turkmen City the state. This favoritism is a crucial part of the regime’s security system,2 an arrangement whose contours and inherent vulnerabilities have been put into

6   fabrice balanche sharp relief during the current war. Ala- wite military officers are the heart of this 7. MILITARY SITUATION AND SECTARIANISM, May 2017 system, which is based on direct loyalty N TURKEY Tigris River to the Assad family. Over the years, the Qamishli W E growing density of Alawite cadres in the Kobane Ras al-Ain regime ensured that every Alawite family S Azaz Tal Abyad Manbij Afrin had a potentially exploitable link within al-Bab HASAKA the state, assuming they demonstrated al- ALEPPO Lake Assad al-Shadadi legiance to Assad. Although individuals IDLIB RAQQA Jisr al-Shughour Tabqa from other sects could (and did) access

Maarat al-Numan similar privileges, the elder Assad’s strat- LATAKIA egy was to make the Alawite community DEIR AL-ZOUR a loyal monolith while keeping Syria’s HAMA Salamiya Sunni majority divided.3 And like the Mayadin TARTUS Rastan Shaer HOMS gas eld Capetian dynasty in France, he sought to Euphrates River Mediterranean Sea al-Qusayr designate his son as his successor in ad- Palmyra Abu Kamal vance to avoid any dispute after his death. LEBANON Interestingly, Bashar al-Assad paid Zabadani less attention to the Alawite community IRAQ DAMASCUS Douma upon his ascension—he married a Sunni and neglected to visit Qardaha, his an- QUNEITRA cestral home and stronghold, preferring Golan Heights to spend summer weekends in Palmyra ISRAEL DERAA SUWAYDA and Latakia with members of the Sunni 0 100 km JORDAN bourgeoisie. Yet the war has forced him to reconsider the value of having a faithful community at his back. It has also INHABITED AREAS UNINHABITED AREAS OF CONTROL OF CONTROL MINORITIES convinced him that, as an Alawite, he will

Syrian Army Syrian Army Shia minorities Province border Main road never be able to obtain the Sunni major-

SDF (Kurdish) SDF (Kurdish) Christian International border Secondary road ity’s acceptance without the use of force. The sectarianism that structures Syr- Other rebels Other rebels Kurdish Province center Desert ia’s society and regime is thus a double- Islamic State Islamic State Turkmen Locality edged sword, especially now that the smokescreen of Baath idealism has long dissipated and the social pact has been broken in rural areas by the welfare state’s

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   7 failure. Leading up to the war, econom- tion that the state had become hostage from Idlib province were forced to seek and the bourgeoisie. Each city also has ic difficulties increased for the general to the Alawites, the sect was clearly the refuge in Latakia because Islamists were a central souk where all faiths can mix, population as the state withdrew from first beneficiary of regime largesse.5 threatening their isolated hamlets in though individual communities main- many areas, but Alawites in western Syr- From the Alawite perspective, how- the middle of the Sunni countryside. tain their own (sometimes conflicting) ia tended to retain their privileges thanks ever, this largesse is a matter of exis- In light of these precedents, it came commercial interests as well. to their better integration in the power tential necessity, not (or not merely) as little surprise when the Assad re- The second model is that of the encir- networks that dominated the security material luxury. Well before the current gime sent arms to Alawite villagers cled or garrisoned city, such as Damascus branch. They had more opportunities to conflict, Alawites regarded their home around Jisr al-Shughour in June 2011 and Hama. In these cases, Alawites and join the public sector, obtain real estate, enclave in western Syria as a safe haven after cracking down on protests in that other urban minorities did not have a suf- secure agricultural loans, and take advan- in the event of mass uprisings, civil war, Sunni-majority town. Such actions re- ficient demographic reservoir to counter- tage of exemptions (e.g., for digging ille- or other displacements. In 1939, Ala- inforced the sectarian divides and ter- balance the influx of rural Sunnis, so the gal water wells on al-Ghab plain). wites from the Ottoman province of ritorial discontinuity between Alawites regime felt compelled to install more of Such favoritism exasperated Sunnis, Alexandretta immigrated to the Aleppo and Sunnis—a phenomenon that can its clients there, often in the form of large and many of those who rose up in 2011 area after the former was ceded to Tur- be seen not only on the national level, military garrisons and their families. simply sought to rebalance the scales key. In subsequent decades, Alawites but within individual cities.6 Some cities are a mix of the two ar- rather than overturn the entire system. who resided elsewhere in Syria often chetypes: until recently, for instance, In Baniyas, for instance, one of the used their wealth or favorable positions Divided and Encircled Cities Aleppo was both divided and encircled, demonstrators’ main demands was for to make real estate investments in the Sectarian distribution within Syria’s with sharply defined Arab and Kurdish the regime to create 3,000 jobs at the lo- coastal region, partly out of attachment major cities tends to follow one of two districts as well as loyalist populations cal oil refinery in order to curb massive to their homeland but mainly as an in- models. The first is the divided city that were deliberately settled in strategi- unemployment among Sunni youths. vestment in their safety. Their region model, exemplified by Latakia, Bani- cally vital neighborhoods. The resulting And in Latakia, prominent Sunnis sum- became the main terminus of internal yas, Homs, and other urban areas where urban agglomerations looked more like moned to the governor’s office after riots emigration after the Baath took power two main communities share most of groups of rival territories than cities, expressed their bitterness that all posi- in 1963, and the positive migration the territory. Typically, one of these so their dramatic fragmentation during tions of authority in the local adminis- balance continued in the 1994 and communities is composed of original and after 2011 was hardly surprising. tration were occupied by Alawites.4 The 2004 censuses. Some of this movement residents, while the second community Damascus is the typical model of the repression of protests by Alawite militias involved Alawite retirees returning comprises rural denizens who settled in encircled city. Hafiz al-Assad endeavored (shabbiha) and intelligence services only to their birthplace, but many of their or near the city later. In the cities men- to build good relations with the capital’s increased Sunni rejection of the ruling descendants moved west as well when tioned above, the mix is Sunni/Alawite, bourgeoisie in order to bolster the regime, community. The May 15–19, 2011, they were unable to integrate into Da- but in other locales such as Aleppo and his son extended this policy. On the crackdown on Talkalakh was particu- mascus, Aleppo, and other cities with and Raqqa, one finds an Arab/Kurdish security front, the elder Assad surrounded larly provocative—several thousand of large Sunni populations. During the mix as well. In both types, potentially the capital with Alawite military camps the town’s Sunni residents were forced Muslim Brotherhood insurgency of tense urban cleavages are tempered by that could seal it off from the rest of to take refuge in Lebanon, which Sunnis 1979–1982, Alawites were systemati- the presence of Christian districts and Syria in case of an uprising. In contrast, interpreted as a deliberate act of ethnic cally targeted in such cities, and large mixed middle-class neighborhoods that Homs has long been internally divided cleansing meant to benefit Alawites. By numbers fled toward the coast. Addi- are more amenable to coexistence, per- into neighborhoods with strong sectarian that point, even if one rejected the no- tionally, thousands of Alawite villagers haps because they are linked to the state identities, and the bloody confrontations

8   fabrice balanche seen during the initial phase of the uprising unfolded right on the boundaries

To Aleppo between the Alawite and Sunni districts 8. (for more on the sectarian situations in HOMS 2011: Damascus and Homs, see chapter 2). Sectarian Distribution Fragmentation Prevented To Salamiya an Even Wider Revolt Sunni The severe insecurity brought on by the Alawite war has only highlighted Syria’s preex- Christian Industrial area isting fragmentation, manifested on the Mixed area local level by loyalty to neighborhoods al-Waar and on the regional level by sharply de- Deir Baalba Cathedral al-Qousour Church fined sectarian refuges (e.g., Alawites al-Bayda fled to their coastal enclave; the Sunnis The Great Mosque al-Abbasiyah of the Houran and the Druze of Jabal Mosque al-Druze drew battle lines in the south). Orontes River 10 Homs in 1936 Indeed, the Syria built by the Assad re- 3 5 al-Muhajireen Street gime is not so much a nation-state as a 2 4 1 Zahra Fight territorial state, even a multi-territorial al-Arman 6 1 al-Ghouta state—a characterization that applies to To Tartus 8 7 the relatively quiet regime zone as well. 2 Governorate al-Fardos 9 To be sure, the central administra- 3 Khalid ibn al-Walid Mosque tion had authority over the whole coun- Nazha Karm al-Zeitoun 4 al-Hamidiyah try prior to the war, unlike in Lebanon, University Karm al-Loz Bab al-Amr 5 Karm al-Sham where certain territories traditionally Akermeh 6 Bab Drib operated outside state control. Yet the re- To Palmyra gime is in perpetual negotiation with lo- 7 Bab al-Sebaa cal societies, and this process bypasses the 8 al-Mahatta institutional channel of elected assem- 9 Station blies, since they are not representative.7

10 al-Khalidiya Instead, the president and his appointed

Industrial area provincial governors bargain with repre- Sources: Topographic maps 1942, Tourist map 1996, and sentatives of tribes, communities, or eco- 0 1000 m To Damascus personal inquiry nomic groups through a patron-client relationship. When the current uprising began, Assad replaced governors who

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   9 To Aleppo 9. THE 2011 DAMASCUS To Aleppo UPRISING Maaraba Tel Machaekh Barada River

Douma

Centers of power BARZAH Harasta NEW DAMASCUS Territory loyal to regime RUKN AL-DIN Qudsaya AL-QABUN Famous square To Beirut Jabal Qasioun Arbin Uprising

JOBAR Urban area in 2011 DUMMAR AL-MUHAJRIN Zamalka Shaqba Abu Old city Rumaneh al-Mazraa Abassyn Square Presidential al-Malikiyah al-Qassa Umayyad Kafr Batna Cultivated area Palace Square OLD CITY Jabal Mezzeh University Noncultivated area Douwayla EAST GHOUTA KAFR SOUSEH Locality To Beirut MEZZEH AL-SHAGHOUR Damascus border AL-MIDAN Mleiha Mezzeh military camp Jaramana Principal road Presidential airport QABOUN District YARMOUK Babila N Moadamiya

WEST GHOUTA W E Daraya

Set Zaynab To international airport al-Hajar al-Aswad 0 5 km Sahnaya To Deraa

10   fabrice balanche failed to reestablish dialogue with local notables. In Hama, for example, he sacked the governor in June 2011 and N To Latakia 10. installed a native of the province, at odds W E BANIYAS with the traditional policy of appointing

S SECTARIAN non-natives in order to avoid collusion. DISTRIBUTION The uprising apparently forced Assad to 2011 prioritize “territorial capital” in an attempt to restore order—that is, holding onto the territory of a restive province Sunni HOSPITAL To al-Qadmus by appointing a native with a large local 5 network was more urgent than preserv- Alawi ing the political status quo by appointing Mixed area another unpopular non-native. As will be discussed at greater length Mosque in chapter 2, however, whenever the revolt stalled in certain areas, it often had as CULTURAL CENTER Baniyas, 1936 much to do with old cross-sectarian dif- Street ferences boiling over as with Assad making strategic adjustments, at least during Fight POST OFFICE the war’s early years. For instance, after TOWN HALL the uprising began in Deraa, it spread Sources: Topographic map 1942, Tourist map 1996, rapidly throughout the Sunni Houran and personal inquiry

Mediterranean Sea Mediterranean region but then stopped short at the largely Druze/Christian province of Su- wayda. Within that province, the Jabal al-Druze region had previously stood against central authorities on several oc- casions: in 1925, the Great Syrian Re- To Marqab volt against French occupation began in these mountains under the direction of Druze leader Sultan al-Atrash; in 1967, local Druze rose against the Baath re- 0 400 m To Tartus gime, and their province nearly suffered the same destructive fate Hama would two decades later; and in 2001, Druze in the area began protesting the Assad

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   11 11. SYRIAN CITIES: TWO MODELS LATAKIA DAMASCUS A Divided City A Controlled City

NEIGHBORHOODS

Sunni

Kurdish

Alawite

Druze

Christian

Urban mixed

Political center

Military base

Communication axis

Market (central/secondary)

Suburban mixed

regime following a neighbor’s quarrel the war escalated. Meanwhile, extremist gain a foothold there and impeded rebel tion distrusted the countryside. When the with Sunni Bedouin, spurring severe elements among the Sunni rebels ostra- efforts to capture northern Syria’s main opposition called for Aleppo to arise on suppressive measures from Damascus. cized the few Druze who tried to join metropolis. The provincial capital was not June 30, 2011, asking all of the province’s Despite this rebellious background, them, kidnapped Druze villagers, as- affected by the rebellion until July 2012, inhabitants to converge on the city, it however, Jabal al-Druze saw only a few sassinated certain Druze notables, and in part because the Aleppo bourgeoisie— made a serious mistake: it underestimated small anti-regime demonstrations after engaged in full-scale military operations who had been punished by the regime the strength of the urban/rural cleavage. March 2011, and most residents did not against Jabal al-Druze in fall 2012 and for years after supporting the past Mus- Since the French Mandate, Aleppo’s iden- join the Sunni opposition movement August 2014. lim Brotherhood revolt—put a damper tity had been built not only in opposition sweeping in from Deraa. In fact, some Similarly, Aleppo’s fragmentation de- on local demonstrations. The delay also to Damascus, but also against the coun- of them formed a pro-Assad militia as layed the protest movement’s efforts to highlighted how much the urban popula- tryside and outlying towns.

12   fabrice balanche Aleppo’s large and well-defined Kurd- al death toll rose from a dozen per day8 further headway is at least partly rooted es under Syria’s infitah (openness) policy ish districts also help explain why much to more than a hundred.9 The army soon in nonmilitary factors. A closer look at have been more likely to support opposi- of the city remained passive—indeed, withdrew from most Kurdish territories the loyalties, internal cohesion, and of- tion movements, at least compared with this ethnic factor likely prevented a gen- and the hostile Sunni Arab countryside, ten-competing interests of Syria’s various the larger establishment firms they com- eral revolt in most of the northern prov- concentrating its efforts on large cities. communities is therefore warranted. pete against. In the 1970s and 1980s, inces. The few protest movements that And while outside actors such as Iran, such businessmen formed the social base erupted in Kurdish-majority cities such Hezbollah, and Russia would eventually Divided Sunni Arabs of the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood. Yet as Qamishli and Ras al-Ain were mainly play a massive role in how the rest of the Syria’s Sunnis do not constitute a single, years of economic liberalization have intended to obtain advantages for their war played out, Syria’s longstanding sec- unified community. In total they repre- considerably enriched them, pushing community alone, such as the natural- tarian fissures are greatly responsible for sent 80% of the population, but given some away from Islamist sentiment. ization of stateless Kurds known as be- the shape of its current battle lines, and the Arab/Kurdish ethnic divide, the For years, many wealthy Sunnis have doon. Many Kurds feared the specter of its uncertain prospects for future reunifi- Sunni Arab element is closer to 65%.12 feared their working-class coreligionists severe regime repression if they joined cation or stability. Sunni Arab communities are themselves on the peripheries of the cities, where the main revolt—an understandable divided between practicing believers, the strictly conservative Salafi strain of concern given their bitter memories of MINORITY SOLIDARITY, atheists, secularists, followers of Sufism, Sunni Islam tends to dominate. The feel- a previous regime crackdown on Kurds SUNNI FISSURES quietists, and radicals who wish to im- ing of religious belonging is generally in Hasaka province. In 2004, Assad re- pose sharia law and strict (mis)interpre- stronger among the working classes and sponded to local Kurdish riots by de- As of 2010, Syria’s population was rough- tations of Islam. They are further split others who feel left out of the regime’s ploying elite Republican Guard forces ly 65% Sunni Arab, 15% Kurdish, 10% by regional and tribal/clan loyalties. wealth redistribution, civil service ap- to the area, resulting in multiple deaths Alawite, 5% Christian, 3% Druze, 1% In political terms, while the Sunni pointments, and military promotions, and a mass Kurdish exodus to northern Ismaili, and 1% Twelver Shia.10 Given Arab bourgeoisie maintains close ties which often favor Alawites. These sectar- Iraq. He also bought the help of local this huge demographic advantage, one with the clergy, financing pious founda- ian feelings are more apparent in areas Arab tribal leaders in this endeavor. The might argue that the Sunni Arabs should tions and charitable associations, it does where Sunnis and Alawites live in close violence did not inspire wider Syrian have won the war quickly. Yet the Assad not represent a unified alternative to the proximity. For example, the spring 2011 sympathy for the Kurds, likely due to regime is still in power and on the offen- Assad regime, whether because of inter- demonstrations in Deraa—an almost en- an Arab nationalist perspective that cast sive, and while it holds only half of the nal divisions, regional rivalries, or a de- tirely Sunni province—were not overtly the Hasaka uprising as irredentism. The country as of this writing, this territory sire to stay out of politics altogether. For sectarian,13 but working-class Sunnis in Assad regime was no doubt eager to take remains the most populous zone (10 mil- example, the historical rivalry between the mixed city of Baniyas hit the streets advantage of such sentiment, posing as a lion inhabitants out of 16 million as of the business classes of Aleppo and Da- with clearly defined sectarian demands.14 guarantor of national unity in the face of 201511). Obviously, Russian military as- mascus—long fostered by Assad and his To be sure, a great many Sunnis likely a “foreign Kurdish conspiracy.” sistance and the influx of 40,000–50,000 father before him—keeps these influen- feel strong resentment toward a regime In short, Syria’s sectarian divisions foreign Shia militiamen were major ele- tial Sunni Arabs apart, with Aleppines they view as Alawite and therefore ille- helped fracture or neutralize the protest ments in the regime’s turnaround. Yet accusing Damascenes of exploiting their gitimate—the question is, how many of movement in various parts of the coun- the Sunni Arab rebels received substan- proximity to the halls of power in order them are willing to risk their interests or try. By spring 2012, the opposition had tial outside help as well, including air to unfairly monopolize markets. lives to act on these grievances? When become militarized in the face of unfal- support, heavy weapons, and legions of Meanwhile, the entrepreneurs who the current uprising broke out, the bru- tering regime repression, and the nation- foreign fighters, so their failure to make started small- and medium-size business- tal repression of the 1982 Muslim Broth-

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   13 erhood revolt was still a source of fear as no Alawite brigades in the Free Syrian As early as fall 2011, for example, Sun- the Druze in Suwayda province and Mt. much as anger. Moreover, the “Alawite” Army (FSA) or the Islamist militias— ni insurgents in Homs began daily bomb- Hermon remained passive. The situation regime is not entirely Alawite—many Alawite conscripts who deserted the ing of the city’s Alawi neighborhoods, was so calm that Syrian army troops re- Sunni officials are represented within army have instead taken refuge abroad to with the aim of expelling Alawites from sponsible for repressing Sunni unrest in the state apparatus, and powerful Sunni escape the fighting. While some Alawites a city where many regarded them as in- Deraa often took breaks in Druze villag- economic elites likewise had little rea- no doubt hate the dictatorial regime as truders.18 Some observers speculated that es.19 A few demonstrations did break out son to revolt given the benefits they much as other groups do, they also wor- the regime deliberately let the situation in Suwayda in spring 2011, organized received from Assad’s liberalization poli- ry that their loved ones would become in Homs deteriorate so that sectarian- by local lawyers, but their demands cen- cies (apart from a handful of notables victims of rebel retaliation if Assad falls. ism would fracture the local revolution- tered on respect for human rights and who ran afoul of the Assad family’s per- They are convinced that they have every- ary movement. And in areas where the the release of certain Druze prisoners, sonal interests). And for many ordinary thing to lose from regime change, fearing regime resorted to direct, violent repres- the latter of which was achieved. Local Sunni civilians, the growth of radical they might suffer the same fate as Saddam sion, pacifist demonstrators were quickly Druze officials and sheikhs refused to Islam within the rebellion spurred them Hussein’s cadres in Iraq. As such, defend- overtaken by militarized opposition as participate in the wider revolt, though to either support the regime or take a ing their economic and political interests people picked up weapons to defend they also refrained from making state- careful wait-and-see approach. Given has become secondary to what they per- themselves. These armed elements then ments supporting the regime. these sentiments, the Sunni bourgeoi- ceive as an existential struggle against an organized by sect; as in many other con- The Druze relationship with the re- sie quickly distanced themselves from Islamist, anti-Alawite rebellion. flicts worldwide, violence created stark gime has a complicated history. They an opposition movement they deemed These fears are not the fruit of regime dilemmas in which people had to make were excluded from power after the 1966 dangerous for the business climate—a manipulation or propaganda, at least tough choices with group consequences. coup, when many Druze military officers fear that was confirmed in summer 2012 not entirely—they are rooted in the Ala- This is hardly surprising in an environ- and other figures who had denounced when Sunni rebels plundered Aleppo’s wite community’s long history of perse- ment where both the regime and the op- the Baath Party’s communist drift were industrial zone.15 cution. After years of being isolated in position instrumentalized the country’s forced into exile, mainly in Iraq.20 Since the mountains or exploited by large es- latent sectarianism. While one can debate then, the regime has built numerous The Alawite Monolith tate holders on the surrounding plains,16 which side was more responsible for this military camps in Suwayda province, Not all of the Alawite community is the Alawites took their revenge with the atmosphere of incitement, the result is largely staffed by soldiers from the Ala- behind Assad. Some Alawite notables arrival of the Baath regime. They gained that Syria was caught in a spiral of sectar- wite coast. Officially, their function was joined the opposition, such as Aref access to the highest military and civilian violence. The behavior of other mi- to monitor the Golan Heights, but in re- Dalila, an academic and political ac- ian roles, and the community as a whole norities further illustrates this problem. ality they were intended to monitor the tivist who was arrested in 2001 and benefited from Baath-driven develop- Druze population. imprisoned for years on charges of se- ment policies that favored the west- The Druze: From Wait-and-See During the 1970s and 1980s, the dition. And Syria’s main Marxist oppo- ern Alawite region. Even so, they have to Self-Defense Jabal al-Druze region was deprived sition faction, the Party of Communist always lived in fear of Sunni uprisings During the first year of the uprising, the of public investment, which caused a Action, recruited heavily among Ala- given the Alawite displacements that oc- Druze remained largely neutral. Despite strong exodus toward Damascus and wite youths as early as the 1980s. curred during the 1979 Muslim Broth- having front-row seats to the revolt and abroad.21 Yet remittances from diaspora Yet unlike in the past, Alawite opposi- erhood revolt,17 and the same scenario repression in neighboring Deraa prov- Druze and investments by those who tion figures have not joined armed rebel took place on a national level when the ince, and despite their previously dis- moved to the capital helped bring Jabal factions during the current war. There are current conflict was first unfolding. cussed history of rebelliousness, most of al-Druze out of its isolation.

14   fabrice balanche In the 1990s, the Druze returned to ritory. Even after giving such pledges of and the Assad regime monitored the sionaries sought to convert the sur- the regime’s good graces, which con- support, they were still forced to con- area closely. Yet the 2011 uprising did rounding Sunni populations. Their tributed to their economic advance- vert to Sunnism in 2015 by the local not gain much traction there, at first efforts reached a few thousand people, ment. A member of the Atrash family al-Qaeda affiliate that dominates most because the Ismailis wanted to confine eventually spurring Sunni religious au- was appointed to head the powerful rebel territory. themselves to peaceful political opposi- thorities to ask for Assad’s intercession Ministry of Local Government, which tion, and later because they feared the against Shia proselytism in 2008.27 To led to a windfall of public investment The Ismailis: Revolutionary rise of Islamists among the rebels. The avoid angering these authorities, the for the Druze, including enhanced ser- Disillusionment many human-rights activists in the Is- president officially halted the Iran- vices and the creation of thousands of Syrian Ismailis are mainly concentrat- maili community have since become ian campaign. administrative jobs. Even so, Druze ed in the Salamiya area east of Hama, disillusioned with the revolution and Early in the current war, attacks were still much less prevalent in the where they organized anti-regime dem- retreated into sectarian solidarity.24 on Syrian Shia were part of the reason public sector than Alawites, and rela- onstrations in the first months of the why Lebanese Hezbollah intervened on tively few of them served in the army revolt. The regime responded in force, The Shia: First Victims Assad’s side even before their Iranian or intelligence services. but not as brutally as it did in Homs of the Jihadists patron asked them to. In autumn 2011, As the civil war escalated in 2011– or Hama, likely because it did not want As a sect that maintains a low profile due Sunni rebels raided Shia villages around 2012, Druze began to organize them- this small but strategically located mi- to their small numbers in Syria, Twelver al-Qusayr, stirring the deep clan links selves into defense groups in the sub- nority to join the Sunni opposition. Shia have always stood outside the halls that unite Shia on both sides of the urbs of Damascus and Jabal al-Druze Most Ismailis originated in al-Qad- of power, sharing few common inter- Syria-Lebanon border. Hezbollah could because their neighborhoods were mus, Masyaf, and other portions of the ests with those who practice the Alawite not resist the pressure to act, which being attacked by the FSA and other coastal mountains, but Alawites drove offshoot of their faith. Yet the situation emanated most strongly from its social rebel forces. The Druze/Christian town them west toward the plains during changed after Sunni jihadist groups be- base in Lebanon’s north Beqa Valley.28 of Jaramana suffered several bloody at- the nineteenth century. The center of gan attacking small Shia communities tacks in 2012.22 From then on, Druze the community then became Salamiya, between Raqqa and Deir al-Zour in The Christians: Fear of Sharing areas of southern Syria were armed and where the Ottomans used them to de- 2012. In one high-profile incident, the Iraq’s Fate clearly on the regime side. Lebanese fend the cultivated lands around Homs Shia population of Hatlah village on the Syrian Christians accounted for less than Druze leader Walid Jumblatt repeat- and Hama against Bedouins. The pop- Euphrates River was massacred by jihad- 5% of the population when the war be- edly asked his Syrian counterparts to ulation is poor but educated, largely ists on June 13, 2013.25 gan29 and were scattered throughout the support the Sunni opposition, but they thanks to missions financed by the Agha These communities resulted from country. Most of them lived in urban did not heed his call because they were Khan (their spiritual leader and chief of Iranian proselytism in Syria since the areas, with notable concentrations in convinced that the Assad regime was a well-endowed foundation). 1990s, when Tehran conferred its Aleppo, Homs, Damascus, Latakia, and their best protection. One exception Politically speaking, many Syrian Is- protection on all traces of Shia cul- Hasaka. This was the only way to sus- was the Druze community in Jabal al- mailis have been seduced by Marxist ture there. This included the Sayyeda tain their communities because the rural Summaq north of Idlib, which offered ideology over the years, and the Syrian Zainab shrine on the outskirts of Da- areas are dominated by a conservative vocal (if not material) support to the Communist Party–Political Bureau re- mascus and two important locations and often-unwelcoming strain of Sunni rebels.23 Yet this was simply a matter cruited heavily among them. In the in Raqqa: Uwais al-Qarni Mosque and Islam. The era of Christian missions also of self-preservation, as they are located 1970s and 1980s, Salamiya became a the Ammar ibn Yasir shrine.26 Using played a role in this distribution pattern, deep within opposition-controlled ter- fiefdom of the left-wing opposition, these locales as a base, Iranian mis- providing converted Syrians with access

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   15 to modern education and hence more from a former generation of left-wing torial fissures between Arabs and Kurds mixed territories.33 This intermixture remunerative urban jobs. opposition that is no longer relevant to in the process. After the previously de- decreased during the war, and despite Since the country gained indepen- Christians under sixty. In January 2012, scribed 2004 revolt, many Kurds lost reports of forced relocations and other dence from France in 1945, the Chris- the Catholic Archbishop of Aleppo, all confidence in their Arab country- actions against Arab civilians,34 Kurd- tian proportion of the population has Jean-Clement Jeanbart, told his follow- men, viewing them as complicit in the ish authorities have so far avoided full- shrunk to a third of its former percentage ers that “Assad must be given a chance,” regime’s repression. Rather than joining scale ethnic cleansing in their zones due to a fertility rate twice as low as that calling him “a loyal and sincere man.”31 forces with Sunni Arab rebel groups in of control. of Muslims and an emigration rate twice He also expressed fears that the rise of Is- 2011, they focused on their own goal of Around two million of Syria’s three as high. The aging community has thus lamism might lead to a new dhimma sys- forming an autonomous Kurdish terri- million Kurds live in a strip of terri- been growing weaker by the decade, a tem under which non-Muslims would tory in the north, even cooperating with tory along the Turkish border. Over the trend exacerbated by their proliferation become second-class citizens, a concern Assad when it suited their purposes. For course of decades, however, the extreme of denominations. Around 36% of Syr- likely shared by most of his brethren. its part, the regime seemed to realize the poverty that characterized much of this ian Christians are Orthodox Greeks, fol- They do not want to leave their country temporary benefits it could derive from rural zone spurred the other million to lowed by Orthodox Armenians (22%), permanently, but they have seen Iraqi this Kurdish quest for autonomy, par- move south, mainly to Aleppo and Da- Catholic Greeks (12%), and Catholic Christians transit Syria en route to the ticularly in terms of keeping the opposi- mascus. After one or two generations in Armenians (11%). The remainder are a West for years, so they take the possibil- tion fractured. This may explain why its an Arab milieu, many of these Kurdish mix of Orthodox and Catholic Syrians, ity of forced flight very seriously. response to Kurdish anti-regime dem- families became Arabized; in fact, the Maronites, Protestants, Assyro-Chal- Armenians were particularly trauma- onstrations in the towns of Qamishli, regime seemed to leave Kurdish terri- deans, and other subgroups.30 tized by the Sunni revolt, viewing the Amuda, and Afrin was not as harshly tories destitute for this very purpose, to Most Christians belong to the middle main rebel faction in the opening phases repressive as its crackdown on Homs encourage Arabization. This phenome- class, working as merchants, liberal proof the war, the FSA, as a proxy of Turkey. or Hama. At the same time, the regime non was more visible in Damascus than fessionals, or civil servants. They are not As early as March 2011, the Armenian maintained close contact with the Kurd- Aleppo, where Kurds still maintained well represented in the army or intelli- party Tashnag organized demonstrations istan Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey, their ethnic identity and close ties with gence services. Because of this, they tend in favor of the regime. They later set up a informally authorizing its return to Syria their home villages in the years leading to feel helpless today, with many be- militia to defend the Armenian districts in spring 2011,32 more than a decade af- up to the war. coming easy prey in a wartime environ- of Aleppo, even retaking the old Chris- ter ousting the group. This move indi- As early as 2012, the Kurds formed ment where abductions and organized tian quarter of Jdaide after it fell into rectly bolstered Syrian Kurdish factions militias to control their territories and crime are commonplace. Since 2011, rebel hands in August 2012. Since then, that were affiliated with the Turkish prevent Arab rebel forces from enter- Christians have left the country in even more Christians have sought to protect group (see chapter 3 for a fuller discus- ing. By autumn 2013, they had formed greater numbers than before, seeking their neighborhoods and villages by sion of the Assad-PKK connection). a government in Jazira “canton” under refuge in Lebanon, Armenia, Europe, joining the regime’s National Defense The number of Kurds in Syria is of- the aegis of the Democratic Union Party and North America. Forces militias. ten underestimated by analysts, who (PYD), which commanded the People’s Those who stayed behind have gener- tend to cap them at 10% of the popu- Defense Units (YPG) and had become ally supported the Assad regime. Some The Kurds: Quest for Autonomy lation. In fact, they are closer to 15%. the main political and military force of intellectuals participate in the opposi- The regime and the Kurds have been In 2010, “purely” Kurdish territories “Western Kurdistan.” Then as now, their tion, such as Michel Kilo and George using each other from the start of the were rather small (Afrin and Kobane), objective was to build their own zone Sabra, but most of these individuals hail uprising, sharpening the social and terri- with most Kurds living with Arabs in modeled on the Kurdistan Regional

16   fabrice balanche Government (KRG) in northern Iraq. To west, making their so-called “Rojava” re- more motivated to defend their land between Kurds and local Arabs. What- achieve this, they seem to hope that nei- gion a contiguous entity along the entire than conscripts from other regions. Yet ever the case, Arab tribes could decide ther Assad nor the rebels will win a de- border. As will be discussed further beit may prove problematic in the long to take further advantage of the situa- finitive victory, thus keeping the regime low and in chapter 3, military develop- term, since the national army cannot tion once IS forces are defeated, playing too weak to reassert itself in the north ments since 2015 and local demographic intervene and defend a given area if lo- the PYD and Assad against each other and the opposition too preoccupied to realities make that scenario increasingly cals do not support the regime. and forming a semi-autonomous buffer challenge their autonomy project. unlikely, though a narrow Assad-con- As for the Kurds and IS, their meth- zone of their own between Rojava and Open Kurdish hostility toward the trolled corridor was established between ods of territorial control have been regime territory. armed Arab opposition was evident these areas in March 2017. broadly similar, at least in organiza- Territorial fragmentation also oc- as early as autumn 2012, when Syr- tional terms: they tend to delegate local curred at the city level as the war pro- ian Kurdish Peshmerga forces fought Territorial Fragmentation management to civilians while keeping gressed. For example, many neighbor- FSA units in the vicinity of Afrin and Most maps of the war divide the coun- militia garrisons and broader military hoods of Damascus were recomposed near the Kurdish district of Ashrafiya try into four major areas of control: the oversight in the hands of central au- into sectarian bunkers. The new divid- in Aleppo. The situation deteriorated regime zone, the Kurdish zone, the IS thorities. This approach enabled the ing lines cut residents off from each further that December, with Salafist zone, and the “other rebels” zone. Yet PYD and IS to establish centralized other and encouraged the return of lo- groups led by Jabhat al-Nusra enter- this vision of Syria can be mislead- control over a united territory early on. cal economies, which only reinforced ing Syria from Turkey and attacking ing if extrapolated too far because the Even in the Afrin canton that remains the cleavages. the north-central Kurdish town of Ras fragmentation has been much more separate from the rest of Rojava, local Finally, several waves of dramatic al-Ain. From that point on, the PYD pronounced from the earliest stages authorities do not question the political population movement during the war moved closer to Assad in the hope of of the uprising. Sunni Arab rebel ter- control exercised by the PYD because have emerged from—and exacerbat- securing military support. In doing so, ritory has the most fissures; it consists the area has long been a stronghold for ed—Syria’s territorial fragmentation. the Kurds became strategic assets for of small, discrete areas controlled by lo- the party, and because the population Whenever one sect has established the regime, which has relied on their cal warlords. Even the regime zone is is 99% Kurdish. Yet Kurdish forces military control over a given area, it has presence along the northern frontier to no longer wholly run by a centralized cannot exercise that level of author- led to the departure of some of the lo- deprive Arab rebels of their bases and administration like it was in the past. ity in the various Arab-majority areas cal population, whether voluntarily or supply lines in Turkey. The state administration is locked in they passed through on the way to the through ethnic cleansing. For example, Meanwhile, the U.S. support the competition with local National De- IS “capital” of Raqqa in the Euphrates the Islamic State took the latter ap- Kurds have received against the Islamic fense Force militias that oversee key Valley. Thus, even as the PYD domi- proach, pushing out native Christians, State (IS) since summer 2014 has per- areas while the army is occupied on nates the Arab militias that have part- Shia, and other non-Sunni minorities mitted them to double their territory in other fronts. For example, the young nered with it to form the Syrian Demo- from whatever territories it conquered. Syria. They were able to link the cantons militiamen in Jabal al-Druze will only cratic Forces (SDF), the group has still The Kurds of Raqqa city, who account- of Kobane and Qamishli by seizing Tal perform their military service locally, been obliged to delegate power to local ed for about 20% of the population,35 Abyad. They also managed to take the defending threatened Druze zones such Arab chieftains when moving beyond virtually all migrated. Taken together, city of Hasaka in 2015 after local regime as the foot of Mt. Hermon. This system Kurdish-majority areas. It is unclear these profound upheavals and internal forces grew too weak from fighting IS. of decentralized protection has been whether this blurring of sectarian lines fissures could portend new political Their ideal goal is to merge their eastern quite effective during recent phases of is a temporary tactical gambit or an borders in the future Syria, and perhaps territory with the Afrin canton to the the war because local populations are indicator of longer-term cooperation even neighboring countries.

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   17 DEMOGRAPHICS OVER- 12. MILITARY SITUATION, May 2017

WHELMED BY WAR Tigris River TURKEY Qamishli 36 By March 2017, more than 465,000 Kobane Ras al-Ain people had been killed or gone miss- Azaz Tal Abyad Manbij ing during the war. And as mentioned Afrin HASAKA al-Bab in the Introduction, another 7 million al-Shadadi had fled the country as refugees as of IDLIB ALEPPO RAQQA 37 September 2017, while 6 million more Jisr al-Shughour Tabqa had become internally displaced persons Maarat al-Numan LATAKIA 38 (IDPs). According to UN projections, DEIR AL-ZOUR Syria’s resident population should have HAMA Salamiya Rastan been around 18.5 million by the middle Mayadin TARTUS Shaer of 2015, before the huge migration to gas eld HOMS Europe that summer. Yet the author’s Mediterranean Sea al-Qusayr Palmyra Abu Kamal calculations indicate that the resident Euphrates River population at that time was more like 16 LEBANON million—the UN underestimated the Zabadani IRAQ al-Dumayr number of refugees (4.2 million instead DAMASCUS N of the more accurate 5.3 million) and QUNEITRA W E did not take the wartime reduction of Golan 39 Heights fertility rates into account. The resident SUWAYDA S ISRAEL population was still around 16 million DERAA 0 100 km as of September 2017 due to continued JORDAN mass emigration over the previous two years. Put another way, more than half AREAS OF CONTROL of all Syrians have left their homes, ei- INHABITED UNINHABITED ther as refugees or IDPs. Tellingly, much Syrian Army Syrian Army Province border Main road of this population redistribution has SDF (Kurdish) SDF (Kurdish) International border Secondary road occurred along clear sectarian lines, on Other rebels Other rebels Province center Desert both the national and local level. Islamic State Islamic State Locality The Battle of Numbers Before examining this redistribution further and drawing conclusions from it, the question of problematic data sources needs to be clarified. For much

18   fabrice balanche of the war, the opposition and regime The opposition’s potential reasons for 13. SYRIAN POPULATION GROWTH 1940–2010 have engaged in a battle of numbers inflating Aleppo’s numbers are no mys- regarding civilian populations in their Population (in millions) tery: to obtain more aid and, later, a UN- areas of control, at times misleading the brokered ceasefire. Yet why did the UN, 20 international organizations entrusted which is supposed to publish reliable fig- with providing humanitarian assistance ures, validate the rebel numbers? French to these communities. journalist Georges Malbrunot found the The regime no longer publishes de- 15 most likely answer in December 2016, mographic statistics, but it does provide when he interviewed a UN official from such information to the UN Office for Geneva who admitted that such inflation the Coordination of Humanitarian Af- 10 “was necessary to help the insurgents.”43 fairs (OCHA), which moved its Syr- In other cases, the UN’s estimates ian headquarters to Damascus in 2015. were in line with reality but opposition Consequently, there are serious doubts 5 groups and international humanitarian about the number of IDPs reportedly organizations challenged its data, some- living in the regime zone. OCHA’s esti- times doubling or tripling the numbers. 0 mates for this population are often based 1940 1960 1981 2004 2010 During the battle for the Damascus sub- on data from the regime, which has am- urb of Daraya in 2016, the UN estimated ple cause to inflate the numbers in order that 4,000 people were under siege, but to receive more humanitarian help.40 Syrian population figures are ma- gees in Turkey, members of Medecins the local council announced more than For its part, the opposition—more nipulated in high places because they Sans Frontieres responsible for helping 8,000,44 and the NGO Save the Children precisely, the Syrian Interim Govern- are weapons of war. The most glaring residents in Aleppo indicated that only said 12,000.45 Most Western and Arab ment based in Gaziantep, Turkey—cre- example of this occurred in Aleppo. 200,000 civilians remained in the rebel media reports used the highest estimate, ated a special “Assistance Coordination When the army surrounded the city’s part of the city. It is difficult to believe but when the rebels negotiated their ex- Unit” (ACU) to provide demographic rebel-held eastern districts in August that this number could have increased filtration to Idlib that month, only 4,000 data at the provincial level, but only 2016, the opposition claimed that the to 250,000–300,000 by August 2016, people were in Daraya, including a thou- for “liberated areas.” Up until OCHA area contained around 300,000 civil- since the regime began bombarding East sand fighters. Such examples show why moved to Damascus, opposition data ians, while the UN put forth a similarly Aleppo in summer 2013 specifically in observers must be very cautious about served as a key source for UN agencies to high estimate of 250,000.41 These fig- order to make civilians flee and isolate relying solely on figures provided by determine humanitarian needs in Syria. ures were taken up by Western officials the rebels. Apart from occasional cease- sources involved in the conflict, includ- As with regime data, however, ACU sta- and media outlets who denounced the fires, this bombardment was continuous ing international organizations who may tistics were not always accurate, particu- humanitarian crisis in the rebel enclave. up until the rebel districts fell, causing be using compromised data. larly with regard to IDPs. The opposition After the army captured East Aleppo drastic deterioration in East Aleppo’s often inflated these numbers not only to four months later, however, there turned security situation and local economy. In Rapid Population Growth secure more aid, but also to demonstrate out to be only 100,000 civilians there.42 short, thousands of civilians were fleeing Interrupted that most of the population lived within Moreover, during the author’s June the area’s ever-tightening encirclement, In 1947, Syria’s population was 3.46 its areas of control. 2014 research mission on Syrian refu- not moving in. million.46 By the eve of the 2011 upris-

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   19 ing, it exceeded 20 million. This strong of the area’s nearly 1 million Kurdish placements have reduced the birthrate Huge Population Movements growth was encouraged by multiple residents were stripped of Syrian citizen- as well, and the deaths of so many men By analyzing and extrapolating from Syrian governments, who saw it as a ship and classified as foreigners. In 2011, on the battlefield ensure that these ef- the author’s previously described GIS strategic interest. Early on, population these bedoon were estimated to number fects will be felt far into the future. It statistics and other data, one can reach 47 expansion was a response to the Arab- around 300,000. Meanwhile, as part of is impossible to determine precisely how rough estimates of Syria’s current Israeli wars, which in the Baath regime’s a massive irrigation program in the Eu- the growth rate of individual commu- population distribution. The great- view had caused the dismemberment phrates basin, the regime pushed Arabs nities has been altered by the war; one est challenge is to locate the internally of historic Syria (the Bilad al-Sham) by into Kurdish regions in order to reduce can only extrapolate on the trends of displaced people. Around 6.3 million more populous neighbors. Syrian fami- the latter’s demographic weight and iso- previous decades. Two things are clear, IDPs remained in the country as of lies’ desire for children was matched by late them from Kurdish areas in south- however: (1) the country’s sectarian de- January 2017, comprising nearly 40% the state’s desire for a large population ern Turkey. mographics have been far more affected of all current residents. Some 80% of to resist external predations. Population growth decreased in by casualty, displacement, and emigra- these IDPs reside in regime-controlled This growth began to decline in the Syria’s Alawite and Druze regions as tion rates than declining birthrates; and areas. As noted previously, these num- mid-1990s, however. In previous years, well, mainly due to a fall in fertility (2) while some minorities have increased bers may be inflated given OCHA’s the annual growth rate exceeded 3%, es- rates among these religious minorities. their share of the population inside Syria reliance on questionable data sources. sentially doubling the population every By 2004, the rate was 2.1 children due to these factors, Sunni Arabs retain Whatever the case, IDPs have arrived two decades. Yet according to Syria’s Cen- per woman in the Alawite-dominated their wide majority. from both opposition-held territory tral Bureau of Statistics, it fell to 2.6% coastal region, 1.8 in Jabal al-Druze, between the last two censuses (1994 and and 1.8 for the widely dispersed Chris- 2004). Four provinces even fell below tians.48 These minority communities 2% during this period: Tartus, Latakia, no doubt felt threatened by the higher 14. REFUGEES BY SECT, June 2017 Suwayda, and Hasaka. fertility rates seen among the country’s

The case of Hasaka is quite surprising Sunni Arab majority, particularly in the Kurdish Christian because fertility rates in this poor Kurd- north and the Euphrates Valley (e.g., 9% 8% Turkmen ish-majority region remained very high. 5.5 children per woman in Raqqa and Shia minorities 2% 2% As described above, however, poverty and 6.2 in Deir al-Zour49). The Alawite- underdevelopment spurred many resi- dominated Assad regime has therefore dents to leave the province, in line with counted on its ability to divide the Sun- the Baath regime’s effort to push Kurds nis in order to offset this massive demo- southward toward cities where they were graphic disadvantage. more likely to become Arabized. Indeed, The civil war slowed population Syrian Kurds have been victims of Arab growth even further—abruptly and dras- nationalism since the country’s indepen- tically. The majority of Syrian men have Arab Sunni 79% dence. In 1962, the pre-Baath govern- been mobilized on one side or another, ment conducted a census in the northeast greatly affecting fertility rates among all that took ethnic and religious affiliation communities. Economic precariousness, into account. Afterward, around 120,000 unending violence, and population dis-

20   fabrice balanche and other regime areas that were ravaged by fighting. Some of them may have come from different provinces, while others probably just changed 15. SYRIAN REFUGEES AND IDPs, May 2017 neighborhoods within the same city because of urban violence. N In general, IDPs go where they have W E acquaintances or relatives and where

S they feel they will be safe. This creates 3,000,000 TURKEY different migration routes that greatly depend on religious and/or ethnic identity. Christians fled to Christian-majority areas such as Wadi al-Nasara; many Alawites in Damascus returned to their ancestral villages on the coast; the Druze of Jaramana fled to Suwayda. In contrast, Sunni Arab IDPs have not hesitated to 1,200,000 SYRIA 240,000 head for non-Sunni areas such as Jabal 6,300,000 al-Druze or Tartus. This influx of Sunni 1,010,000 refugees has altered the sectarian distri- IRAQ LEBANON bution of some minority strongholds, though it also shows that the war is not strictly sectarian, since IDPs base their 1,200,000 movements on multiple factors. Government gure UNHCR gure 660,000 By the end of 2015, more than 80%

120,000 of the Syrians who had fled abroad were Sunni Arab—hardly a surprise given the EGYPT JORDAN community’s majority status and the

0 200 km fact that most of the fighting had taken place inthe Sunni Arab-dominated areas Source : UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Response, May 2017 that spawned the rebellion. The Chris- tian population has been even more decimated by wartime emigration, in large part because members do not have their own sectarian refuge inside the country, unlike Alawites and Druze. Christians represent around 10% of all

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   21 16. RESIDENT SYRIAN POPULATION BY SECT

2011 Christian Christian JUNE 2017 5% 3% Kurdish Kurdish 16% 14% Alawite Alawite 10% 13%

Turkmen Shia 1% Turkmen 1% Ismaili 1% 1% Shia 1% Ismaili 1% Druze 3% Druze 4%

Arab Sunni Arab Sunni 65% 61%

Sunni Druze Shia Twelvers Turkmen Alawite Christian Ismaili Kurdish

Syrian refugees (600,000–700,000) but from Damascus and Aleppo have cho- Ismailis left the country at lower rates At its peak, IS held almost half of only 5% of the country’s prewar popu- sen to take refuge in the KRG rather than Sunnis because their territories Syria, but most of its territories were lation (1.2 million), meaning that half than closer destinations like Lebanon or have largely been spared by the war. Yet sparsely populated desert areas, and only of the community has emigrated since Turkey. In addition to ethnic affiliation, those who lived in areas conquered by two million people lived under its rule. 2011 alone. Armenians in particular the greater possibility of finding work the rebels or IS had to flee. Once the group lost Manbij, Jarabulus, have been affected. Out of the 150,000 there was a powerful attraction; even af- and al-Bab, this figure was reduced by who lived in Aleppo before the war, ter the KRG fell into economic crisis in Population Concentrated in half a million, and the number dropped Regime-Controlled Areas only a few tens of thousands are left. 2014, it remained a beacon of prosperity further amid subsequent defeats in 2017. Most went to Armenia, where they do compared to the Kurdish zone in north- As mentioned previously, the regime The areas held by other Sunni Arab not need a visa, or to the United States, east Syria (whose economy was a disas- controls only around half of Syrian ter- rebel factions (mainly in the northwest, France, or Canada. ter) and the Kurdish areas in southern ritory as of September 2017, but this the south, and the Ghouta district east of Kurds comprise around 10% of Syr- Turkey (where the central government zone contains around two-thirds of the Damascus) have lost the most inhabit- ian refugees as of fall 2015. Most of has made clear that Syrian Kurds are remaining population. Other factions ants because they are the least safe. Rus- them went to Iraqi Kurdistan, where not welcome). control large swaths of territory but sian and Syrian airstrikes have prevented they were well received. Even Kurds Finally, Alawites, Druze, Shia, and not nearly as many people. all semblance of normal life there, and

22   fabrice balanche 18. POPULATION BY ZONE

May 2017

17. POPULATION BY SECT IN THE REGIME AREA Syrian Army

SDF (Kurdish) June 2017 15 % 13 % Other rebels 5% 6% 7 % Islamic State

21% 65 %

2% 58% 2% March 2013 6%

Syrian Army

SDF (Kurdish) 18 % Rebels

7 % Disputed 41% Sunni Druze Shia Twelver Kurdish

Alawite Christian Ismaili

34 %

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   23 rivalries between various rebel groups that proves the rule. In all, the popula- eas. Notwithstanding the many com- no possibility of return because most of guarantee further insecurity. Paradoxi- tion of rebel-held territory is now more munity-specific motivations described them are related to rebel fighters and are cally, the area held by IS was safer for than 98% Sunni Arab. Many Turkmens at length throughout this chapter, there consequently on the regime’s blacklist. many Sunni Arabs because the group’s in these areas have stayed put and con- is no clear-cut pattern behind this pro- This same method of displacing and/ centralized authority helped maintain stitute the main minority there, but this cess—its mechanisms must be under- or banishing rebel-sympathetic popula- local security. In both the IS zone and is unsurprising given their intense anti- stood individually. The first driver of tions has been practiced in other locales other rebel areas, however, many minor- Assad sentiment and heavy involvement population displacement is of course the too, including militarily important ones. ities and secular Sunnis have fled when- in opposition militias.50 violence that has engulfed Syria since The most prominent examples are in the ever extremists have sought to impose At the national level, religious minori- 2011. Economic deterioration and a de- Homs area, where the army retook the their rigorous interpretations of Islamic ties constituted around 25% of the popu- sire to evade mandatory military service Bab al-Amr district in spring 2012 and law (though the departure of non-prac- lation as of fall 2015, compared to 20% are primary motivators as well. the town of al-Qusayr in May 2013, ex- ticing Sunnis has been offset somewhat before the war, while the Sunni Kurds pelling Sunni Arab civilians and armed by the arrival of thousands of foreign made up 15% and the Sunni Arabs 60%. Fighting, Repression, rebels alike. Those who fled al-Qusayr are Sunni jihadists). The current proportions should be the and Conscription now refugees in Lebanon, with little pos- As for the Kurdish zone, its popula- same because the violence has been con- As described previously, the regime has sibility of return, since they are all consid- tion has fallen to less than two million. centrated in Sunni Arab areas, spurring pursued a very basic and ruthless coun- ered opposition supporters. Similarly, the Economic difficulties and the PYD’s higher emigration rates from there. This terinsurgency strategy of violently sepa- regime’s winter 2013–2014 reconquest of monopoly on political life have led represents a radical transformation in the rating rebels from civilians in order to the Qalamoun border region forced most around half a million people to leave distribution of Syria’s population, to the better eliminate the opposition.51 This locals to seek refuge in Lebanon. during the war. benefit of non-Sunni minorities, whose is the main cause of displacement on Assad’s focus on expelling rather than Inside the regime-controlled zone in concentration in the regime zone makes Syria’s various fronts. The army has ap- wooing restive populations helps explain western Syria, Sunni Arabs remain the their long-term presence more viable. In plied the principle to all areas held by the extent of the exodus from Syria since majority population, in line with their addition, the war is not over—millions the rebellion, prioritizing major urban 2011—and suggests that the majority demographic dominance in the coun- more Syrians will likely flee the country districts such as East Aleppo and the of these refugees will not be permitted try as a whole. Yet religious minorities as new military campaigns unfold, and western suburbs of Damascus. to return. In all likelihood, only those now account for 42% of the population Sunni Arabs who support the opposition Beginning in late 2013, the army who can prove that they left for eco- there, a major increase. Most everywhere or IS will continue to make up the bulk massively bombarded rebel areas of nomic or safety reasons will be allowed Assad’s army goes, it receives support of these refugees. In the Euphrates Valley, Aleppo while gradually encircling them, back in. This is why tens of thousands from local Christian, Alawite, Druze, Sunni Arabs themselves are the most like- with the objective of spurring civilians of Syrian refugees in Lebanon rushed to Ismaili, and Shia communities. In con- ly drivers of these future refugee flows, to flee. When the regime finally retook their local embassy in June 2014 to cast trast, advances by Sunni Arab rebels and since some tribes will probably seek ret- the last of these Sunni Arab districts in absentee ballots in that month’s Syrian IS jihadists earlier in the war inevitably ribution against their co-religionists who December 2016, the population of East presidential election, so that they could triggered the departure of these same sided with IS. Aleppo had been reduced from more prove their loyalty in the hope of going populations. Only the Druze of Jabal Although these population move- than one million as of July 2012 to less home eventually. al-Summaq remained in rebel territory, ments exacerbate sectarian fragmenta- than 100,000. Like many before them, In addition to the millions of ordi- but they were forced to convert to Sunni tion in many parts of the country, they the last civilians to be evacuated went to nary civilians caught up in the fighting Islam, making them a fragile exception actually reinforce diversity in other ar- rebel-controlled Idlib—a journey with and forced to flee, tens of thousands of

24   fabrice balanche opposition activists have been repeat- have preexisting networks abroad. This Ethnic Cleansing in Rebel fled in spring 2013 when rebels seized edly displaced throughout the war. The includes physicians, engineers, techni- and IS Territories Raqqa. The small Christian community repression that began in March 2011 led cians, and university professors, many of In areas held by the rebels, ethnic ho- in Raqqa (around 1,000 people) like- some to seek refuge in opposition-held whom are resettling in Europe or the Per- mogeneity is de rigueur, and native wise fled once IS moved in and started territory. But as Islamist extremists took sian Gulf countries. The Syrian pound Christians, Druze, and Shia have been imposing its repressive policies. over much of the armed rebellion, these lost more than 90% of its value between forced to leave or convert. While some IS began to pressure the city’s Kurds secular/moderate activists had to flee 2011 and 2017, and wages have not districts initially sought to demonstrate as well, partly because they were con- abroad. Not all of them made it out— been adjusted sufficiently to compen- tolerance toward minorities (e.g., Jabal sidered to be allies of the PYD to the for example, lawyer and human-rights sate for the drop. The situation deterio- al-Summaq), such sentiment largely north, and more generally because of activist Razan Zaitouneh was kidnapped rated sharply during winter 2014–2015, evaporated once Jabhat al-Nusra gained the jihadist group’s tendency to define in Douma and likely murdered by the when inflation caused the exchange rate prominence in the rebellion and be- even fellow Sunnis as potential enemies Islamist group Jaish al-Islam in Decem- to rise from 300 pounds per U.S. dollar gan to take over these areas, in some if they are not Arab or do not follow 52 ber 2013. And early regime opponent to nearly 500.55 Syrian families had ad- cases massacring non-Sunni Arabs.57 At its warped interpretation of Sunni or- Raed Fares, an independent radio host ditional impetus to emigrate after Ger- times, the regime and opposition have thodoxy. IS cadres also played on Syria’s in Kafr Nabl, was arrested several times man chancellor Angela Merkel opened essentially held each other’s sectarian existing Arab/Kurdish fissures to im- by al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra for her country’s doors to refugees in sum- pockets hostage. For example, the Shia pose themselves on local populations, daring to broadcast songs against the mer 2015; many of these “economic” enclave of al-Fua and Kefraya northeast just as they did in Iraq. On the Turk- group’s wishes; his life was spared once refugees sold everything they had to pay of Idlib was long surrounded by rebels ish border, the group sought to awaken he pledged to respect Nusra’s brand of for their family’s passage to Germany. Yet who could easily seize it, but they were old territorial disputes and exploit the “Islamic order” and cease airing songs.53 this flow was largely halted after the Eu- restrained by the fact that Hezbollah widespread Arab view of Kurds as im- Many other young Syrians fled ropean Union reached agreements with had simultaneously encircled the reb- migrants from Turkey who have no real abroad after deserting the army or evad- Ankara to require visas from any Syrians el enclaves of Madaya and Zabadani property rights in Syria. The resultant ing conscription, regardless of their attempting to enter Turkey, the main north of Damascus. In April 2017, the tensions produced an all-out military religion. Numerous families have left refugee route to Europe. remaining population of Madaya and siege in Kobane, while Kurds in Tal the country one or two years before Some portions of north Syria, such as Zabadani was evacuated to Idlib prov- Abyad were expelled in spring 2013 by assigned conscription dates in order Jazira, have been hit especially hard by ince, while most civilians in al-Fua and IS-backed Arab tribes. When the PYD to spare their children from service in economic problems due to the blockade Kefraya were transferred to Aleppo, later retook the city, it did not expel the the war. The same phenomenon is oc- imposed by Turkey and the KRG.56 In though Hezbollah and National De- native Arab population, though it has curring in the Kurdish and rebel zones, response, many Syrian Kurds have taken fense Force units are still occupying the conducted such displacements in other where conscription systems have also refuge in Iraqi Kurdistan, where condi- Shia enclave.58 areas (see above and chapter 3). been established.54 tions are much more favorable. Despite In the territories controlled by IS, its own economic and political difficul- there were few non-Sunnis to begin Non-Kurds in Rojava Economic Deterioration ties, the KRG has generously welcomed with. Al-Thawra, a Euphrates town that Since winning a key victory against IS Syria’s eroding economic situation dur- its neighbors, who are glad to take the overlooks a major dam, had a majority forces in Kobane in January 2015, the ing the war has been pushing much of ample work opportunities created by a Christian and Alawite population due to PYD has continued to expand its ter- the middle and professional classes into higher standard of living and a bustling the influx of employees from the Min- ritory, to the detriment of both IS and exile, particularly those individuals who manual labor market. istry of Irrigation, but these minorities other rebels in the Azaz corridor to

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   25 population. Yet PYD leaders still hope returned; Sunni Arabs are generally for- the west. Advancing from the heavily CONCLUSION Kurdish territories of Afrin, Kobane, to merge Afrin and Kobane, despite the bidden from coming home unless they and Qamishli, the PYD began taking August 2016 Turkish intervention in have proven their loyalty to the regime Syria’s civil war is not driven exclu- mixed and non-Kurdish territories in a the area of Jarabulus, Azaz, al-Bab. Their by joining the army and fighting rebels. sively by sectarianism, but that ap- bid to establish contiguity between its aim is not just to unify Rojava, but also Similarly, Sunni Arab residents of al- pears to be the most essential factor eastern and western cantons. Its forces to “re-Kurdify” the area. Close attention Hussein village at the foot of the Crac today. After six years of war, all of the took Tal Abyad in spring 2015, spear- to local toponymy and maps published des Chevaliers have not returned either. country’s main confessional minori- headed the SDF operation to push IS under the French Mandate indicates They rose up against Assad in 2012, of- ties either support the Assad regime or out of Manbij in August 2016, and led that a significant portion of the popu- fering the medieval castle to rebel forces have ceased major hostilities against it, the siege of Raqqa in 2017. The PYD lation between these two cantons is of that were bombing nearby Christian and while the anti-Assad rebellion is almost has also taken non-Kurdish territories Kurdish origin. These Arabic-speaking Alawite villages. They left once the tide exclusively Sunni Arab. True sectarian such as al-Shadadi in order to cut off Kurds could choose to reconnect with of battle turned. After the regime recap- coexistence is limited, and ethnic ho- IS routes to Iraq and gain control over their roots if the PYD became the domi- tured the castle in spring 2014, local mogenization is under way in many local oil wells. nant political actor there. The area’s de- Christian and Alawite militias destroyed areas. The regime zone is heavily mixed Based on the 2004 census and the mography might also be significantly many of the village’s dwellings to pre- on the whole, and is home to a Sunni author’s projections, the PYD-con- altered if Arab refugees do not return to vent Sunnis from coming home. Yet ob- majority, but individual areas within it trolled Rojava zone would have held northern Syria in the same numbers as servers should be careful to distinguish are being increasingly segregated. And around 2.6 million inhabitants if the displaced Kurds. cases like this—where local minorities on the most basic neighborhood/vil- war had not broken out. Factoring in engaged in ethnic cleansing out of re- lage level, sectarian mixing is almost the movements of refugees and IDPs, Displacements in the Regime Zone venge or perceived self-preservation— entirely absent except in areas belong- Rojava’s actual population was around As described previously, the regime from cases in which central government ing to economic and political elites. 1.8 million in fall 2015, only half of zone has the most diverse sectarian mix forces have expelled rebel populations as Large cities remain mixed, but commu- them Kurds. In the eastern Jazira and in Syria, welcoming IDPs from all de- part of a deliberate military strategy (as nication between residents from differ- Kobane cantons, Kurds still hold a nominations. At the local level, howev- in East Aleppo). ent sects is low, and sectarian districts slight majority, but not in the western er, this mixing has its limits, and some Apart from displacements, the re- are often barricaded for fear of attacks Afrin canton.59 Depending on where cases of ethnic cleansing have occurred. gime has sought to keep a lid on Sunnis from other communities (apart from one draws its borders, Afrin canton Sunni Arabs still make up the zone’s within and abutting its area of control the heavily secured Damascus city cen- is either 30% or 40% Kurdish. Some majority population, but they have by ensuring that minorities dominate ter). Ultimately, the situation is in line areas on the fringes of Rojava’s can- been expelled from some areas and will strategic points throughout western with trends observed in Syria since the tons (e.g., Azaz and Jarabulus) are probably not be permitted to return af- Syria, including the Alawites in Maan, 1980s, when the Muslim Brotherhood even more heavily populated by Arabs ter the war. Ismailis in Salamiya, Christians in revolt brought latent sectarian fissures and Turkmens. The case of al-Qusayr is emblematic. Maharda, and Shia in Mazraa. Yet the back to the fore. Accordingly, the more the PYD ex- Between the Sunni rebel takeover in Sunni enclave stretching between Ras- The demographic weakening of re- pands its territory, the more it will have 2011 and the Shia Hezbollah takeover in tan and Houla—right in the middle of ligious minorities to the benefit of the to integrate non-Kurdish populations. spring 2013, around 90% of the town’s the regime zone—fell to the rebels at the Sunni Arab majority is one of the war’s This is the case in the Manbij area, where mixed population left. Since then, only beginning of the war and has remained primary causes—and the regime’s main Kurds represent less than a quarter of the the Christian and Shia residents have under their control ever since. obstacle in regaining control over more

26   fabrice balanche territory. Assad probably cannot stabilize Syria under his rule unless he fur- 19. POTENTIAL MIGRATION FROM REBEL AND IS AREAS, May 2017 ther rebalances the population’s size and Tigris River territorial distribution in favor of his mi- N TURKEY Qamishli nority constituents. Given the breadth W E of the country’s demographic disparity Kobane Ras al-Ain S Azaz Tal Abyad N (in terms of sheer numbers and fertility Manbij Afrin HASAKA rates), this would mean expelling mil- W E al-Bab lions more Sunni Arabs and prevent- S al-Shadadi IDLIB ALEPPO RAQQA ing their return once peace is restored. Jisr al-Shughour Euphrates Valley Such a scenario is hardly far-fetched: 1,200,000 Idlib-West Aleppo al-Tabqa the regime has already managed to drive LATAKIA1,200,000 DEIR AL-ZOUR out nearly 5.5 million of them, and the HAMA reconquest of Sunni Arab strongholds Rastan RastanSalamiya pocket 100,000 Mayadin such as Idlib, Deraa, Jarabulus, and the TARTUS Shaer gas eld Euphrates Valley would likely generate HOMS Mediterranean Sea al-Qusayr Palmyra Abu Kamal new mass migrations. Euphrates River Even if many Sunni refugees do man- LEBANON age to return, the regime has shown that Zabadani Damascus suburbs it can maintain support (grudging or 300,000 IRAQ DAMASCUS Douma not) among large communities of native QUNEITRA and displaced Sunnis in western Syria so

SouthGolan long as it keeps them divided and de- 400,000Heights SUWAYDA pendent on its largesse. Yet that would ISRAEL DERAA probably be a temporary fix at best, as JORDAN 0 100 km shown by the aftermath of past uprisings and crackdowns.

AREA CONTROLLED BY RESIDENT POPULATION Whatever the case, the international Province border Main road community can no longer do without Syrian Army 1,000,000 International border Secondary road a sectarian analysis of the Syrian revolt. SDF (Kurdish) 500,000 The initial uprising was only partly Province center Desert Other rebels 100,000 mixed, and militarization quickly led Locality Islamic State to the full exclusion of minorities (the Kurdish factor complicates but does not invalidate this point, as will be seen in chapter 3). Alawites, Christians, Druze, and other groups do not believe the op-

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   27 position’s promises that they would be regime. Syria is deep in the throes of the 5. Hanna Batatu, Syria’s Peasantry, the 2528 (Washington Institute for Near safe in a free and democratic Syria, nor Descendants of Its Lesser Rural No- East Policy, December 3, 2015), http:// same ethnoreligious fragmentation al- tables, and Their Politics (Princeton www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy- do they believe Western promises of ready experienced in Lebanon and Iraq. University Press, 1999). analysis/view/ethnic-cleansing-threatens-syrias-unity. international protection. In February Of course, Syria’s minorities want demo- 6. Fabrice Balanche, “La fragmenta- 2012, French foreign minister Alain Jup- cratic reforms just as much as their Sunni tion spatiale en Syrie: entre patrimo- 12. Syria’s Turkmen population (1%) is in- nialisme et communautarisme ram- cluded in these estimates. pe delivered the following declaration: Arab countrymen—but not at the cost pant” [Spatial fragmentation in Syria: 13. See Kelly McEvers, “Revisiting the Spark I call for the participation of Chris- of their marginalization or elimination. between patrimonialism and rampant That Kindled the Syrian Uprising,” NPR tians and all other communities in the Many of them fear that applying demo- communitarianism], Revue de l’Eco- Morning Edition, March 16, 2012, http:// nomie Méridionale, 2005, https://www. creation of a new and democratic Syr- cratic principles in the Syrian context www.npr.org/2012/03/16/148719850/ academia.edu/769788/La_fragmenta- revisiting-the-spark-that-kindled-the- ia where all citizens will have the same would eventually usher in a new dicta- tion_spatiale_en_Syrie_Spatial_frag- syrian-uprising. rights and duties. Who can believe mentation_in_Syria. torship by the Sunni majority, similar 14. See Fouad Ajami, The Syrian Rebellion that the rights of minorities are bet- to post-Saddam Iraq’s slide toward Shia 7. Fabrice Balanche, “Les municipalités (Hoover Institution, 2012), p. 196. See ter protected by bloody dictatorships dans la Syrie Baathiste” [Municipalities in majority rule and repression. To protect also Christopher Phillips, “Sectaria- than by democratic regimes? If ques- Baathist Syria: administrative deconcen- nism and Conflict in Syria,” Third World tions persist about the future, I wish themselves from this scenario, minori- tration and political control], Revue Quarterly 36, no. 2 (2015). Tiers Monde 193, January–March 2008, to tell the Christians of the Orient... ties with their own viable territory may 15. Suleiman Al Khalidi and Angus McDo- 60 https://www.cairn.info/revue-tiers- that France will not abandon them. choose partition in the end, much like monde-2008-1-page-169.htm. wall, “Hard Choices for Syrian Indus- the Kurds have sought to do. Extending trialists in Ruins of Aleppo,” Reuters, Yet today’s France is not the France of 8. In March 2012, the UN estimated that October 2, 2017, https://www.reuters. the war could even result in Syria’s mi- 9,000 people had been killed since Napoleon III, which sent boats to protect com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-eco- norities taking up arms against each oth- the beginning of the uprising. See nomy-insight/hard-choices-for-syrian- the Christians of Lebanon from massa- “En Syrie, l’ONU parle de 9000 morts industrialists-in-ruins-of-aleppo-idUS- er, on the model of Lebanon’s civil war. cres in the 1860s. Although the French en un an” [In Syria, the UN speaks of KCN1C71B8. 9,000 deaths in one year], Le Monde, and other Western governments have Whether the Assad regime stays or falls, 16. Jacques Weulersse, Le pays des March 27, 2012, http://www.lemonde. the country will not escape further ethnic Alaouites [The country of the Alawites] provided arms and air support to the fr/proche-orient/article/2012/03/27/ (Institut Français de Damas, 1940). opposition at various points in the war, cleansing and territorial fragmentation. syrie-bachar-al-assad-se-rend-a- they did not take robust action when the homs_1676516_3218.html. 17. Fabrice Balanche, La region Alaouite et le pouvoir Syrien [The Alawite area 9. By November 2012, the UN estimate had regime crossed their supposed redlines and Syrian power] (Paris: Karthala, Notes climbed to 40,000 deaths. See “Le bilan (e.g., after chemical weapons attacks 2006), p. 285. 1. See her article “Existe-t-il un problème des violences en Syrie dépasse les 40 18. French journalist Gilles Jacquier was against civilians in August 2013). The communautaire en Syrie?” [Is there 000 morts” [The toll of violence in Syria exceeds 40,000 dead], Le Monde, No- killed by one such strike on January Syrian people took note, viewing this in- a community problem in Syria?], Ma- vember 22, 2012, http://www.lemonde. 29, 2012. At the time, Paris accused ghreb-Machrek (1979). action as a sign of Western weakness and fr/proche-orient/article/2012/11/22/le- the Assad regime of organizing a setting aside any illusions they may have 2. Souhail Belhadj, La Syrie de Bashar al- bilan-des-violences-en-syrie-depasse- vendetta against international jour- had about Western protection. Asad [The Syria of Bashar al-Assad] (Pa- les-40-000-morts_1794102_3218.html. nalists in Homs, and much of the ris: Belin Litterature et Revues, 2013). French media tended to echo this line 10. For details on how the author arrived at In sum, the revolt’s sectarian aspects (apart from individual reporters such 3. Fabrice Balanche, La region Alaouite et the demographic statistics cited in the have too quickly been brushed under the as Georges Malbrunot, who questio- le pouvoir Syrien [The Alawite area and study, see the “Note on Methodology” ned the claim that Jacquier had been carpet in favor of viewing the conflict as Syrian power] (Paris: Karthala, 2006). at the end of the Introduction. hit by regime fire). In July 2012, the a classic political challenge by a revolu- 4. According to author interviews with 11. Fabrice Balanche, “Ethnic Cleansing rebels finally acknowledged that they tionary population against a dictatorial residents of Baniyas, April 2011. Threatens Syria’s Unity,” PolicyWatch had killed Jacquier in error, but the

28   fabrice balanche French media generally ignored the [Anna, a Syrian: “We have lost our ho- assad-selon-archeveque-catholique- 38. See “Annual mid-year population, revelation; only a few outlets such as meland and our dreams of freedom”], alep-jeanbart. United Nations estimates: 2006–2015,” Le Figaro reported it, e.g., see Mal- L’Orient le Jour, March 11, 2014, http:// in UN Department of Economic and So- 32. Aimad Hesso and Cyril Roussel, “Les brunot’s article “Jacquier : l’enquête www.lorientlejour.com/article/857609/ cial Affairs, Statistics Division, Demogra- alliances des Kurdes de Syrie: un jeu française pointe les rebelles syriens” anna-syrienne-nous-avons-perdu-notre- phic Yearbook 2015 (New York, 2014), de dupe?” [The alliances of the Syrian [Jacquier: the French investigation patrie-et-nos-reves-de-liberte.html. https://unstats.un.org/unsd/demogra- Kurds: a fool’s game?], Moyen-Orient 33 points to the Syrian rebels], Le Figaro, phic/products/dyb/dyb2015.htm. 25. “Syrian Observatory: Qaida-Linked (Jan–Mar 2017), http://www.areion24. July 17, 2012, http://premium.lefigaro. Militants Blow Up Shiite Hussainiyah,” news/produit/moyen-orient-33. 39. The UN’s demographic projections fr/international/2012/07/17/01003- Naharnet, June 16, 2013, http://www. tend to treat Syria as a uniform entity. 20120717ARTFIG00525-jacquier-l-en 33. Fabrice Balanche, Atlas du Proche- naharnet.com/stories/en/87102. To generate more accurate projec- quete-francaise-pointe-les-rebelles-sy- Orient Arabe [Atlas of the Arab Middle tions, one must take into account the riens.php. 26. See Myriam Ababsa, “Les mausolées East] (Paris: Presses de l’Université Pa- invisibles: Raqqa, ville de pèlerinage vast differences between the country’s 19. Mazen Ezzi, “A Static Revolution: The ris-Sorbonne, 2011), p. 36. chiite ou pôle étatique en Jazîra sy- various provinces, particularly when it Druze Community,” in Friederike Stol- 34. Amnesty International, “Syria: US rienne?” [The invisible mausoleums: the comes to sharply contrasting rural vs. leis, ed., Playing the Sectarian Card: Ally’s Razing of Villages Amounts city of Raqqa between Shia pilgrimage urban fertility rates. Identities and Affiliations of Local to War Crimes,” October 13, 2015, and Syrian statism], Annales de Géogra- 40. For instance, see OCHA’s “Humanita- Communities in Syria (Beirut: Frie- https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-re- phie 110, no. 622 (2001), pp. 647–664, rian Needs Overview 2017,” December drich Ebert Stiftung, 2015), pp. 39–70, leases/2015/10/syria-us-allys-razing-of- http://www.persee.fr/doc/geo_0003- 2016, https://docs.unocha.org/sites/ http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/ villages-amounts-to-war-crimes. beirut/12320.pdf. 4010_2001_num_110_622_1706. dms/Syria/2017_Syria_hno.pdf. 35. Estimate based on the author’s field See also Andrew J. Tabler, “Catalytic 41. OCHA, “Syria: ‘An estimated 200,000- 20. Nikolaos van Dam, The Struggle for Converters” New York Times Magazine, surveys. Power in Syria: Politics and Society Un- 300,000 people are at risk of besiege- April 29, 2007, http://www.washing- 36. Jack Moore, “Syria War Death Toll Hits ment,’ says UN Humanitarian Chief,” der Asad and the Ba’th Party (London: toninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/ I. B. Tauris, 1996). 321,000 With Further 145,000 Missing: July 21, 2016, https://www.unocha.org/ catalytic-converters. Monitor,” Newsweek, March 13, 2017, legacy/top-stories/all-stories/syria-esti- 21. Cyril Roussel, Les Druzes de Syrie: 27. Author interview with a French diplo- http://www.newsweek.com/sixth-anni- mated-200000-300000-people-are-risk- Territoire et mobilité [The Druze of mat in Damascus, 2008. versary-syrian-conflict-looms-war-moni- besiegement-says-un-humanitari. Syria: territory and mobility] (Beirut: tor-says-465000-killed-or-567181. Institut Français du Proche-Orient, 28. Martin Klasta, “Le Hezbollah en Syrie: 42. “En silence, les rebelles quittent Alep 2011), p. 263, http://www.ifporient.org/ la résistance redéfinie?” [Hezbollah in 37. According to the Office of the UN entre des soldats russes” [In silence, node/1024. Syria: resistance redefined?], Maghreb- High Commissioner for Refugees, 5.2 rebels leave Aleppo between Rus- Machrek 218 (April 2014), pp. 85–98, million Syrians were registered as refu- sian soldiers], Le Figaro, Decem- 22. Human Rights Watch, ‘He Didn’t Have https://www.cairn.info/revue-maghreb- gees in Middle Eastern countries as ber 22, 2016, http://www.lefigaro. to Die’: Indiscriminate Attacks by Op- machrek-2013-4-page-85.htm. of September 2017. Yet 6 million is a fr/international/2016/12/22/01003-2 position Groups in Syria (March 22, more realistic number—the UN figure 0161222ARTFIG00229-en-silence-les- 2015), p. 44, https://www.hrw.org/sites 29. Youssef Courbage, “Ce que la démo- underestimates the situation because rebelles-quittent-alep-entre-des-sol- /default/files/reports/syria0315_ForU- graphie nous dit du conflit Syrien” many refugees in the region decide dats-russes.php. pload.pdf. [What demography tells us about the Syrian conflict ], Slate, October 15, 2012, not to register for one reason or ano- 43. Ibid. 23. “Les druzes de Syrie pour la révolution, http://www.slate.fr/story/62969/syrie- ther (e.g., some fear being arrested mais pas pour la rebellion” [Syrian Dru- 44. “Syrian government steps up siege of guerre-demographie-minorites. and taken back to Syria, as has hap- ze are for the revolution, but not for the pened frequently in Lebanon; others rebel-held Damascus suburbs: state rebellion], L’Orient-Le Jour, September 30. Ibid. are wealthy and do not see the point media, rebels,” Reuters, February 6, 10, 2012, http://www.lorientlejour.com/ 31. “‘Il faut laisser une chance à Assad,’ of registering). Adding the nearly 1 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/ category/Moyen+Orient+et+Monde/ selon l’archevêque catholique d’Alep” million refugees in Europe pushes the us-mideast-crisis-syria-daraya/syrian- article/777148/Les_druzes_de_Syrie_ [“Assad must be given a chance,” overall count to around 7 million. See government-steps-up-siege-of-rebel- pour_la_revolution,_mais_pas_pour_ says Catholic archbishop of Aleppo], the UNHCR’s “Syria Regional Refugee held-damascus-suburbs-state-media- la_rebellion.html. France 24, January 14, 2012, http:// Response Inter-agency Information rebels-idUSKCN0VF0RT. 24. “Anna, Syrienne: ‘Nous avons perdu www.france24.com/fr/20120113-syrie- Sharing Portal,” http://data.unhcr.org/ 45. “12,000 people trapped in Syria refu- notre patrie et nos rêves de liberté’” il-faut-laisser-une-chance-president- syrianrefugees/regional.php. gee camp by bombs, shells and bul-

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   29 lets,” Guardian, May 13, 2016, https:// ment, December 10, 2015, http: 57. For example, see Aymenn Jawad Al- www.theguardian.com/global-deve- //www.joshualandis.com/blog/the-fac- Tamimi, “The Massacre of Druze Vil- lopment/2016/may/13/12000-people- tions-of-north-latakia. lagers in Qalb Lawza, Idlib Province,” trapped-in-syria-refugee-camp-by- 51. David Galula, Counterinsurgency War- Syria Comment, June 15, 2015, http:// bombs-shells-and-bullets. fare: Theory and Practice (New York: www.joshualandis.com/blog/the-massacre-of-druze-villagers-in-qalb-lawza- 46. Anne-Marie Bianquis and Mohamed Praeger, 2006). idlib-province. al-Dbiyat, “La population Syrienne: 52. Nabih Bulos, “Top Syrian Rebel Lea- un tournant démographique?” [The der Reported Killed in Airstrike,” 58. “Death toll from Aleppo bus convoy Syrian population: a demographic Los Angeles Times, December 25, bomb attack at least 126: Observa- turnover?], Méditerranée, 81, no. 1 2015, http://www.latimes.com/world/ tory,” Reuters, April 15, 2017, https:// (1995), pp. 81–90, http://www.persee.fr middleeast/la-fg-syria-rebel-death- www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast- /doc/medit_0025-8296_1995_num_81 20151225-story.html. crisis-syria/death-toll-from-aleppo-bus- _1_2878?q=population%20syrienne. convoy-bomb-attack-at-least-126-ob- 53. Laura Pitel, “Syria: Jabhat al-Nusra servatory-idUSKBN17H04Y. 47. “Damas promulgue un décret de seizes two prominent activists in raid naturalisation d’habitants Kurdes” on opposition radio station,” Inde- 59. According to the Kurdish adminis- [Damascus promulgates a decree of pendent, January 10, 2016, http:// tration, Afrin canton includes the naturalization of Kurdish inhabitants], www.independent.co.uk/news/world/ Afrin district, Azaz district, Jarabulus Agence France-Presse, April 7, 2011, middle-east/syria-jabhat-al-nusra-seize- district, northern al-Bab district, and http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/ two-prominent-activists-in-raid-on-op- northern Manbij district. Yet most of article/2011/04/07/damas-promulgue- position-radio-station-a6805186.html. this territory is under the control of un-decret-de-naturalisation-d-habi- Turkey-backed rebels, not the Kur- 54. According to author surveys conduc- tants-kurdes_1504426_3218.html. dish-led SDF. ted in Iraq and Syria (March 2017) and 48. Courbage, “Ce que la démographie nous in Lebanon (June 2015 and June 2017). 60. See his op-ed “Les chrétiens d’Orient et dit,” http://www.slate.fr/story/62969/ les printemps arabes” [The Christians of 55. Author interviews in Syria, June 2015. syrie-guerre-demographie-minorites. the East and the Arab spring], L’Orient 56. Ankara and Erbil each have their rea- le Jour, February 29, 2012, https://www. 49. Ibid. sons for blockading the Syrian Kurdish lorientlejour.com/article/747414/Les_ 50. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “The Fac- zone; these tensions are discussed at chretiens_d%27Orient_et_les_prin- tions of North Latakia,” Syria Com- length in chapter 3. temps_arabes.html.

30   fabrice balanche 2. ASSAD’S SYRIA, THEN AND NOW

s of summer 2017, Does Assad have the means to match nomic interests, and other clientelist able to approach the central districts. the Assad regime’s efforts such ambitions? Answering this ques- networks, Assad has been able to keep The Midan quarter was temporarily oc- to retake territory had giv- tion requires more than assessing the local Sunni Arabs under control dur- cupied by the rebel Free Syrian Army in A en it control over roughly regime’s military capabilities—it also ing the war and return key territories to summer 2012, but Assad’s forces quickly half the country, stretching from Lata- means taking a closer look at the de- the regime’s bosom. Examining how he regained control. Although al-Midan is a kia in the northwest to Suwayda in the mography and loyalties of the various was able to do so—and how his late fa- Sunni neighborhood, it is largely popu- southwest and to portions of the Eu- local populations under consideration. ther established minority control before lated by middle- and upper-class families phrates River in the east. Damascus Currently, almost all of the territories him—is central to understanding how who seemingly did not feel any solidar- has been the centerpiece of this resur- that remain outside Assad’s control are he might go about trying to reconquer ity with the rebels. Anecdotal observa- gence: since their nadir in March 2013, either Sunni Arab or Kurdish. The terri- the rest of the country despite facing tions gathered by the author in April Assad’s forces have reestablished their tories that have remained faithful to the long demographical odds. Accordingly, 2011 and October 2013 hinted that grip on the suburbs, and the capital is regime are dominated by Alawites and this chapter focuses on Assad’s strategies this social cleveage was present in many no longer threatened by rebel pockets other religious minorities. Yet from these in the five main sectors of regime-held Syrian cities. In Latakia, for instance, a on the outskirts. Further south, Jabal minority zones, Assad’s forces have been Syria: Damascus, the Alawite coast, Ja- middle-class Sunni friend declared that al-Druze remains a stronghold for the able to reassert their hold over certain bal al-Druze, the central Homs-Hama he did not want to march in the streets army, while the Alawite coastal region areas with large communities of Sunni area, and Aleppo. with people from the city’s poorest Sunni to the west has been largely undis- Arabs, who still constitute the majority neighborhood, Ramel al-Filistini, where turbed by the rebellion since 2015. In population in the regime zone. This ap- DAMASCUS REMAINS the protests began. More important, the the north, Aleppo city was reconquered proach echoes the classic counterinsur- geography of the revolt has continually THE KEY in December 2016 after more than four gency strategy of relying on a loyalist shown that social divisions can be stron- years of fierce fighting. The regime also minority—in Syria’s case more than one The phrase “Whoever holds Damascus ger than sectarian solidarity among ur- retains control over small but impor- minority, each manning strategically holds Syria” has been attributed to Hafiz ban Sunnis.1 tant enclaves in the east such as Deir al- crucial places within the regime zone, al-Assad, and his son has adopted the Since March 2013, the army has re- Zour, Hasaka, and Qamishli, indicat- as described in chapter 1—while slowly same view. The regime’s elite troops have captured most of the lost territory near ing that it still intends to retake all of reasserting one’s sway over the rest of the defended the capital well throughout the Damascus, confining the rebels to en- Syria in the long term after eliminating population by force, fatigue, or entice- war, and while Sunni rebel forces seized claves that have been inexorably reduced. rebel strongholds in the west. ments. Through tribal allegiances, eco- the suburbs early on, they were never Holding the capital gives Assad some of

 31  the internal and external legitimacy he tal’s population of 600,000 included national airport. The regime’s apparent for a new shopping district with wide needs to cast himself as Syria’s leader. only 300 Alawites.3 By 2010, they com- willingness to allow Jaramana to expand streets. The regime’s error was to allow Damascus is a multiethnic city where prised more than 500,000 of the city’s corresponds with its strategy of separat- the growth of informal suburbs, which each of the country’s sectarian commu- five million inhabitants, which meant ing the Sunnis in the East and West Gh- created a labyrinth of narrow streets nities is represented, allowing the regime that a quarter of the country’s entire Ala- outa neighborhoods with a non-Sunni more conducive to demonstrations. to maintain contact with the various wite population resided in the greater bloc. This was useful in preventing In addition to the obstacles posed by networks that structure Syrian society. Damascus area.4 the rebels from encircling the city and the regime’s urban planning, the rebels Half a century of political, administra- The current distribution of commu- cutting it off from the airport. In the also failed to make inroads into down- tive, and infrastructural centralization nities around Damascus best illustrates northeast, public housing in Dahiyat town Damascus because much of the has made Damascus the main hub for all the regime’s system of control. Alawites al-Assad, Maarat Mahmoud, and Adra local Sunni population was, for social of these networks, and Assad fully under- and other religious minorities occupy is home to mostly non-Sunni industrial and economic reasons, not supportive. stands this dynamic.2 areas of critical importance. Senior republic-service employees who constitute As mentioned previously, many middle- gime officials live in Malki, around a loyalist bulwark for that part of the and upper-class residents there were Urban Planning to Control Assad’s private residence. Some lower- capital. In the southwest, the density of hostile to the rebels, who tended to hail Insurgency level civil servants live in Mezzeh 86, military camps and Druze/Christian lo- from lower-income neighborhoods.5 Since the 1970s, the army has exerted a large urban district that spans several calities helps protect the roads to Beirut, The old alliance between Hafiz al-Assad considerable territorial influence on the affluent neighborhoods, while others re- Quneitra, and Deraa. As for the Sunni and members of the capital business class capital and surrounding region. Large side in small Druze/Christian towns in localities of Moadamiya, Daraya, and was reinforced by Bashar’s economic lib- military camps occupy southern and the suburbs (Jdeidat Artouz, Jaramana, Babila, they are bordered to the south by eralization policies, so they seemingly western Damascus, including one that and Sahnaya). The Druze and Christian the Druze/Christian belt, a large popu- had little desire to revolt. Only al-Midan hosts the Republican Guard, an elite lifestyle is more compatible with that of lation of Alawite military and civil ser- district, a former Muslim Brotherhood corps of 30,000 mostly Alawite troops. the Alawites (who allow alcohol con- vants, and a ring road that was built not stronghold, rose up in summer 2012, Officially, the regime claims that this sumption, unveiled women, etc.) than only to ease traffic, but also as a line of but the army quickly retook it. large-scale military presence is necessary the conservative Sunni localities of the defense against rebellious suburbs. to protect the capital from Israel, since Ghouta district (e.g., Douma, Daraya, Other aspects of the city’s planning Turning the Tide in Damascus, the Golan Heights is less than fifty ki- Zamalka), which became rebel strong- fit this strategy as well. The Damascus 2012–2016 lometers away. Yet the real objective holds early on. municipality is surrounded by a wide When the national security headquar- was well understood by the strategy’s Before and during the war, the Ala- peripheral boulevard and flanked by ters in Damascus was bombed on July architect, Hafiz al-Assad: namely, to wite and Druze/Christian districts were wide avenues that create ruptures in the 18, 2012,6 killing several prominent re- better control an area that he regarded permitted to extend their boundaries urban space. Through this “anti-insur- gime figures, the rebels seemed close to as indispensable to holding all of Syria. close to the strategic points that connect gency urban planning,” the regime like- seizing the capital, and Western officials Upon his ascension to power, he rein- Damascus with the rest of the country, ly sought to optimize the movement of were predicting that the regime would forced his grip on the city by installing in the process cutting the Sunni areas armored vehicles, which would in turn collapse in a matter of days or weeks. By tens of thousands of Alawite soldiers and off from each other and the rest of the discourage large street demonstrations. 2016, however, the local military situa- officials there, along with their families. rebellion. This was the case in Jaramana, The old city of Damascus was a victim tion had been completely reversed—the Damascus thus became the first heavily the large Druze/Christian suburb that of this strategy in the late 1970s, as parts remaining rebels in the area were sur- Alawite city in Syria. In 1947, the capi- developed along the route to the inter- of the old souks were razed to make way rounded by army forces and allied Shia

32   fabrice balanche 20. SYRIAN ARMY PROGRESSION IN DAMASCUS AREA, March 2013–May 2017

vers Alep Kafr al-Awamid vers Ain al-Fija Palmyre

er Barada Riv Adra Dimas AL-TALL Maarat Mahmoud

Dahiyat al-Assad vers Masaken al-Dimas Beyrouth Barzah DOUMA Harasta Hawsh Mubaraka QUDSAYA Mayda Qura al-Assad al-Qabun Rukn al-Din Hawsh al-Shalaq Arbin Beit Siwa Zamalka Dummar al-Balad DAMASCUS Jobar Utaya al-Bahariya Saqba Yafour Jarba Douwayla al-Nashabya al-Abbadah Mezzeh al-Midan Marj al-Sultan Jaramana al-Mulayhah Qaysa

Yarmouk Babila Moadamiya Deir al-Asa r DARAYA Sayyida Zaynab QATANA Jdeidat Artouz Harran al-Hawamid Hatite al-Turkman Sahnaya

Artouz

al-Ghezlaniya

Khan al-Sheikh N

W E al-Kiswah vers Quneytra 0 10 km S vers la Jordanie

PROGRESSION Urban area Province center Main road

March 2013 Rebel held Industrial zone District center Secondary road

July 2016 Cease re Rural area Town Airport

May 2017 Military base Damascus municipality

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   33 To Aleppo AL-TALL 21. Maarat Mahmoud Adra Adra industrial area THE SYRIAN ARMY BRIGADE 39 SURROUNDS EAST GHOUTA

Barzah DOUMA PROGRESSION Harasta Hawsh Nasri Mayda al-Qabun March 2013

Hawsh al-Shalaq Nov 2014 Arbin June–July 2016 Bayt Siwa Rebel July 2016 DAMASCUS Jobar Utaya Nov 2016 –Jan 2017 al-Bahariya Zamalka Local agreement May 2017 Saqba Jarba Spring 2013–Summer 2014 Old City East Ghouta surrounded al-Nashabya Syrian Army old o ensive Hawsh al-Malban al-Abbadah Syrian Army ongoing o ensive Jaramana Marj al-Sultan military airport Urban area al-Mulayhah Marj al-Sultan al-Otaiba Dec 2015 Jan–Aug 2014 Qaysa Rural area Yarmouk May 2016 Babila Deir al-Asa r Industrial zone al-Shahba Military base

Sayyida Zaynab Haran al-Awamid Province center Hatite al-Turkman District center

Town Damascus Int'l Airport BRIGADE 158 Damascus municipality N

Highway al-Ghezlaniya W E

Principal road S

0 10 km Airport To Suwayda

34   fabrice balanche 22. SYRIAN ARMY DAMASCUS STRATEGY, May 2017

To Saidnaya To Homs Kafr al-Awamid To Palmyra Minority Ain al-Fija stronghold AL-TALL Military base B iver Maraat Mahmoud To Beirut arada R Dimas Adra Dahiyat al-Assad Syrian Army o ensive since Spring ‘16 Masaken al-Dimas DOUMA Qura al-Assad Barzah Hawsh al-Mubaraka Rebel held Harasta Mayda QUDSAYA al-Qabun Cease re Rukn al-Din Arbin Bayt Siwa Hawsh al-Shalaq Syrian Army Jobar progress, July '16 Dummar al-Balad DAMASCUS Zamalka al-Bahariya to May '17 Saqba Utaya Yafour Jarba Mezzeh al-Nashabya Strategic road 86 Douwayla al-Abbadah Road closed Jaramana Marj al-Sultan al-Mulayhah Qaysa Frontline Babila YARMOUK Urban area DARAYA Moadamiya Deir al-Asar Rural area Sayyida Zaynab QATANA Jdeidat Artouz Hatite al-Turkman Haran al-Hawamid Industrial zone Sahnaya Artouz Airport

Province center al-Ghezlaniya District center

Town Khan al-Sheikh al-Kiswah 0 10 km Damascus governorate

To Quneitra To Deraa To Suwayda militias, and they had lost hope of being and especially its airports as a strategic thousands of pilgrims annually before forces there early on. Whenever a rock- rescued by Western-backed fighters to gateway for transferring weapons to the war. Although the population of et falls or car bomb explodes anywhere the south, whose focus had shifted from the Lebanese militia. Their willingness the shrine’s neighborhood is predomi- near the district, the news reverberates the Assad regime to the Islamic State. to commit Shia forces to the capital is nantly Sunni, the local Shia minority throughout the Shia world, helping One of the main reasons for this re- also explained by the presence of the has been able to keep the district in the Iran and Hezbollah mobilize new fight- versal was robust support from Iran and Sayyeda Zainab shrine, a major Shia regime’s hands with major help from ers by playing on widespread fears that Hezbollah, who have treated Damascus holy place that attracted hundreds of Hezbollah, which deployed numerous the shrine will be eradicated (much

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   35 like the prominent Samara mosque in struction. Indeed, locals in Qudsaya Assad Now Sure of His Power difficult for the international commu- Iraq was destroyed by Sunni extremists asked the rebels to leave8 so that they in the Capital Area nity to push him out of power under the in 2006). could spare themselves further suffer- Today, services are functioning normally current circumstances. This would be Another major reason for the opposi- ing. Once the fighters were evacuated, in the Damascus city center, and if not true even if Moscow were willing to step tion’s setbacks in the capital was its in- some residents were granted amnesty for the sound of artillery shelling against aside and permit his ouster, since Assad ability to unite the two parts of the Gh- and integrated into a local police force. rebel holdouts from Mount Qasioun, does not need the Russian air force to outa and cut off the road to the airport. The army then air-dropped leaflets over the war would likely seem nonexistent to hold the capital. When the rebels first went on the of- other opposition-held areas instruct- most residents. The international airport fensive, Jaramana was strongly defended ing to them choose between the Daraya has been back in operation since 2015, THE ALAWITE by the army and local Druze members and Qudsaya formulas. One rebel who and the roads to Homs, Deraa, Su- STRONGHOLD of the National Defense Forces militias, departed Qudsaya described this stark wayda, and Beirut are relatively safe. In and the population stayed put amid choice: “Finally, they literally said to us, opposition-held East Ghouta, the army Syria’s coastal Alawite region has been rebel car bomb attacks and rocket as- ‘Either you get the hell out of this town is using intra-rebel divisions to gradu- staunchly loyal to Assad since the begin- saults. Once the tide turned, the army or we completely destroy the place’... ally gain ground, alternately bombing ning of the war, and for good reason. used Jaramana as a launching point to They literally said that. They’d destroy neighborhoods and providing humani- Although some Alawite intellectuals expand its grip on both sides of the air- the town and then we’d have to leave tarian aid in order to win over the lo- joined the opposition and sparked chal- port road and encircle the Sunni parts anyway, like in Daraya. So a group of cal population. The regime is also well lenges to the Assad family, the bottom of the Ghouta. us decided we’re better off leaving, we aware that the crossing points into the line remains the same: most Alawites The regime’s Ghouta siege has at didn’t want the town to be destroyed.”9 Ghouta are a significant source of reve- see the war as an existential fight against times been accompanied by food block- In all, the army was able to regain nue for whichever rebel faction controls a Sunni Islamist threat. ades and aerial bombardment intended about half of East Ghouta from April them, so it has sometimes favored one The Alawite region stretches from to scare surviving civilians into fleeing— to December 2016. These victories were faction to provoke clashes with others, the Turkish border south to the Leba- the same strategy applied in Aleppo. The facilitated by a fratricidal war between as in the spring 2016 conflict between nese border, and from the Mediter- campaign against Daraya was exemplary the rebel groups Jaish al-Islam, Failaq al- Failaq al-Rahman and Jaish al-Islam. ranean Sea east to the Orontes River, in this respect. In 2012, the southern Sham, and the Fustat Army (led by al- Going forward, the regime’s negotia- more or less corresponding to the for- suburb was home to around 80,000 Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra).10 The tions with Jaish al-Islam will likely in- mer Alawite state created by France in people, but by August 2016—when the first group had previously exercised qua- tensify as pressure on the group mounts. 1920. In 2011, the local population was rebels negotiated the evacuation of the si-hegemony over East Ghouta, but the The surrender of Douma, the de facto about two million, of which Alawites last fighters and civilians to Idlib—the death of founder Zahran Alloush in De- rebel capital in the Ghouta, would mark comprised 70%, Sunnis 20%, Chris- number had fallen to 4,000.7 One ob- cember 2015 weakened the militia, and the end of the enclave. tians 10%, and Ismailis 1%. The Sunnis jective of the regime’s brutal campaign his brother Mohammed failed to live up These and other developments in mainly reside in the cities and in three was to make an example out of Daraya to local and international expectations Damascus can only boost Assad’s confi- large rural enclaves: Jabal al-Akrad, Ja- in order to facilitate a modus vivendi upon succeeding him. Mohammed dence, even though much of the country bal Turkman, and south of Baniyas. The with localities where rebels were less was quickly marginalized at the Geneva remains out of his control and his army majority of Christians have settled in aggressive. Babila, Moadamiya, Qud- peace talks in January–March 2016, and is still struggling to preserve the gains the cities of Latakia, Tartus, and Safita. saya, al-Qabun, and Barzah all agreed the political and military opposition lost that Russian air power has made possi- Wadi al-Nasara, near the historic Crac to ceasefires in order to avoid total de- whatever unity it had once cultivated. ble in other areas. It would therefore be des Chevaliers, became the main rural

36   fabrice balanche home for Christians in Syria, particu- in May 2016 (causing 170 deaths in larly after many began to flee Homs Tartus and Jableh) and September 2016 23. LATAKIA SECTARIAN DISTRIBUTION 2011 during the war. At the Turkish border, (50 dead). Such attacks could eventually N To Kassab and Turkey Armenian villages cling to the slopes of spur reprisals against Sunni refugees. W E Jabal al-Akrad; one of them, Kasab, is To Mashqita The Latakia Corridor among the last vestiges of Western Ar- S Demsarkho menia, and it benefits much from the The jihadist threat has moved further support of the Armenian diaspora. As To Ibn Hani Datur away from Latakia since the recapture for the Ismailis, they are concentrated Besnada of Jabal al-Akrad in winter 2015–2016, Ramel in al-Qadmus and Masyaf and live on al-Shamali but the city and surrounding areas are good terms with the Alawites. Memo- not immune to sectarian conflict. In ries of the wars that ravaged the area in Hamam 2010, the city’s population of around 1920 have faded; the Ismaili population 400,000 was roughly 50% Alawite, Knenas is no longer large enough to threaten the Bustan Rihan 40% Sunni, and 10% Christian (most- 12 Alawites, and they have found common Mediterranean PORT ly Orthodox). Alawites occupy the AREA ground in their shared animosity toward al-Jumhuriyah Mashru northern and eastern suburbs, while al-Reji To Damascus Sunnis live downtown and in the south- Sunni Islamists. Governorate Port ern suburb of Ramel al-Filistini, the Since the war began, the Alawite re- Sheikh Dahir gion’s population distribution has been Zyraa University city’s poorest area. Christians inhabit Mashru al-Thani modified somewhat by the arrival of in- the “American district,” named after the To Damascus local Evangelical Presbyterian school es- ternally displaced persons from Aleppo, al-Sleibeh Tobacco Idlib, and Damascus. Many Alawite Railway INDUSTRIAL AREA tablished by Americans. station factory and Christian families have returned to In this historically Sunni city, old Ramel al-Filistini urban residents still view Alawites as their villages of origin, along with sig- MILITARY al-Tabiyat AREA nificant numbers of non-hostile Sunnis. Ramel al-Janubi foreigners. Up until the French Man- The UN Office for the Coordination of date, the city had no Alawite residents Humanitarian Affairs estimated that as Kornich al-Janubi apart from household servants. More of fall 2016, about 600,000 IDPs lived than two decades later, Alawites still 0 1 km on the coast.11 Indeed, Latakia, Tartus, constituted only 10% of the popula- and Safita are experiencing a construction, concentrated in the poor suburb Sunni Christian Cathedral Great Mosque Latakia, 1936 tion boom due to high demand from of Ramel al-Shemali. Beginning in the Alawi Unpopulated Church Mosque Street new homeowners. 1970s, however, Hafiz al-Assad’s “Ala- Mixed Yet the influx of Sunnis might de- witization” policy facilitated a dramatic stabilize the Alawite region over time demographic shift, and his sect became if it gives terrorist operatives cover to the majority in Latakia by the 1980s. infiltrate the area. The Islamic State The surrounding countryside is like- conducted a series of bombings there wise divided between Sunni and Ala-

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   37 wite villages. Traveling north toward Beginning in spring 2012, the op- some point the army will likely aim To be sure, Iran and its Shia proxies Turkey, one finds that Sunnis are the position seized control of Jabal al-Akrad to retake Jisr al-Shughour, a city from regard the Latakia corridor as less of a majority; according to the 2004 cen- and the area along the Turkish border which rebels have launched multiple at- strategic interest than Homs, Damascus, sus, they composed about 80,000 of up to Kasab village. In March 2014, tacks on the Alawite region in the hope and the Golan Heights, so it is unclear the area’s 140,000 residents. The sub- jihadist groups operating from Turkey of reaching the coast. how eager they would be to defend Tar- districts of Rabia and Qastal Maaf and Idlib province invaded Kasab and tus from any future rebel offensives. Yet are mostly Sunni Turkmen, as are the destroyed the Russian radar station atop A Possible Alawistan Moscow has a strong interest in main- coastal villages of Burj Islam and Salib Jabal Aqra. But they were unable to For the rebels, the (increasingly dim) taining a presence along the coast; the al-Turkman. When the war began, the progress further southward, so they left prospect of gaining access to the sea is Russian navy has a base in Tartus and Turkmens of Rabia and Qastal Maaf the village that June.14 Similarly, rebel both strategic and symbolic. In March plans to rebuild the former Soviet sub- sided with the rebels, while those in forces from Jabal al-Akrad briefly oc- 2014, for example, Jabhat al-Nusra marine base in Jableh twenty miles Burj Islam and Salib al-Turkman re- cupied al-Haffah in July 2012, but the advanced from Kasab to the Mediter- south of Latakia. mained neutral, likely because they local population did not join them for ranean in just a few days. Today, the As described previously, the Russian were surrounded by Alawite villages. fear of provoking regime retaliation. De- group and its allies would very much intervention and other developments Sunnis also dominate the area east of spite these failed offensives, the north- like to control a major port such as Lat- have greatly diminished the prospects Latakia, the northern part of Jabal al- western rebel zone continued to pose a akia or Tartus. of the regime losing power in Damas- Ansariyya (including al-Haffah and real threat to regime control in Latakia. Although opposition forces have cus, yet it remains a distant possibility its surrounding villages), and Jabal al- Accordingly, Assad created a new militia since been pushed further east, any fu- if geopolitical circumstances change. In Akrad. Although residents in the latter in 2015 called the “Shield of the Coast,” ture rebel offensives toward the coast that scenario, the regime could decide to area have been of Kurdish origin since whose mission is to protect the area us- would stand a better chance of success retreat to the coast and form an Alawite the Middle Ages, none of them speak ing young Alawites who refuse to fight in Latakia than in Tartus. First, the statelet. Beginning in the 1970s, Hafiz Kurdish anymore, and the area is con- outside their home province. The re- road to Latakia is more accessible. Sec- al-Assad built the area into a bunker sidered essentially Arab. gime no doubt felt the need to protect ond, Alawites constitute 80% of the where Alawites could take refuge if they According to UN figures13 and per- “Alawistan” from offensives like the one population in Tartus, compared to only lost power in the capital. This arrange- sonal communications with a municipal launched in July–August 2015, when 10% Sunnis and 10% Christians. The ment has proven particularly useful dur- official in Latakia, 200,000 IDPs had rebels from al-Ghab plain advanced population between Tartus and Homs ing the current war, since Alawite mili- fled to Latakia city as of October 2016 closer to Latakia and the underpopu- is predominantly Alawite as well, with tary personnel would not have agreed to (mostly Sunnis from Idlib and Aleppo), lated Alawite villages in northern Jabal a strong Christian minority; Sunnis are continue fighting in Deir al-Zour, Da- while another 170,000 went elsewhere al-Ansariyya. If the regime had failed to concentrated in the countryside around mascus, or Aleppo if their families were in the province. In general, Alawite IDPs stave off such threats, Alawite soldiers al-Hamidiyah and Talkalakh. Third, not safe back home on the coast. In the have fled to Alawite villages and Sunnis could have taken matters into their own Lebanon’s proximity would complicate event of regime collapse, the Alawites to Sunni areas. Yet Jabal al-Akrad and hands and renounced support for Assad. any jihadist push for Tartus, since Hez- could bunker in their stronghold and Rabia were swept up in the fighting for In winter 2016, however, the army bollah and the Syrian army are stiffly perhaps extend it eastward depending a number of years, so most of the local regained the advantage in the Latakia controlling that frontier to prevent any on their capacity to retain portions of Sunni women and children have fled to area thanks to intense Russian air bom- cross-border Sunni coordination—a al-Ghab plain and the Homs country- Turkey by now, while most of the men bardment, and the rebels were driven strategy exemplified by the May 2013 side. Jabal al-Akrad and Jabal Turkman joined rebel groups. out of the northeast coastal region. At battle for al-Qusayr. could serve as a further buffer, since they

38   fabrice balanche N 24. T URKEY Idlib W E FROM ALAWITE STRONGHOLD

S TO STATELET To Aleppo Kasab To Antakya Ariha Jisr al-Shughour TERRITORY INFRASTRUCTURE

Sunni Highway Russia

Burj Islam Salma Christian Principal road al-Ha ah Maarat al-Numan

Alawite Power station Jabal Latakia al-Zawiya Renery Qardaha URBAN MAJORITY al-Suqaylabiyah Jableh Port

Jabal Sunni al-Ansariyya al-Ghab plain Airport Baniyas Christian

Maharda Hama Mediterranean Sea Alawite OFFICIAL BORDERS

al-Rawda Ismaili International border Masyaf Sheikh Badr Rastan Mixed Province border al-Sawda Duraykish

Tartus Sata Wadi al-Nasara POPULATION POSSIBLE BORDERS

Tal Kalakh 200,000 to 500,000 Pessimistic scenario al-Hamidiyah Akkar plain Homs Iran 50,000 to 200,000 Optimistic scenario

Less than 50,000 Frontline (May 2017) al-Qusayr

Potential foreign aid L EBAN O N To Baalbek

0 20 km

Hezbollah To Damascus

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   39 25. JABAL AL-DRUZE AND THE SOUTHERN FRONT, March 2017

Mezzeh DAMASCUS Mt Hermon 2012–13: Car bombs, Ruwala Daraya rebel bombardment Qatana Jaramana Nov 2014 battle: Sayyida Zaynab Damascus Int’l Makhul JN and Druze militia Arneh Jdeidat Artouz Sahnaya Jun 2016: Rebels seize from IS al-Abdullah Hader Marj Ruhayyil Sep 2016: JN attacks Rebel route between Syria and Lebanon Apr 2016: IS attacks al-Ghiati

MADINAT AL-BAATH Khalkhalah Rebel smuggling route Quneitra from Jordan UNDOF Islamic State crossing Mar 2017: Syrian Sanamin Leja base army seizes from IS

Jun 2016: Syrian Dama army seizes from IS Tal Barakat Aug 2014: JN clashes with Sheikh Balous al-Hassan Izraa al-Shahba Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade JABAL AL-DRUZE

al-Muzairab al-Thaala SUWAYDA 21 June 2016: Israeli airstrike on IS antiaircraft battery Jun 2015: Mar 2017: Rebel Heavy JN attacks o ensive in Deraa DERAA

Nasib Apr 2015: Rebels seize Busra al-Sham from Syrian army Salkhad Mar 2015: Rebels seize from Syrian army

0 20 40 km

INHABITED UNINHABITED International border Province capital Notable event AREA OF CONTROL AREA OF CONTROL RELIGION Syrian Army Syrian Army Sunni Province border District center al-Hassan Arab tribe

Islamic State (IS) Islamic State (IS) Druze Golan DMZ Town Informal route Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and other rebels and other rebels Christian Border crossing Main road

Israel Shiite Military airport Secondary road

Commercial airport

40   fabrice balanche were practically emptied of their civilian Protecting the Capital’s men (mostly Druze with a few Chris- Jabal al-Druze was regularly attacked population during years of fierce fight- Southern Flank tians) who know the terrain and are by Sunni Arab forces. In August 2014, ing with the rebels. In 2010, Syria’s Druze numbered around more motivated to defend their home- rebels fought a serious battle against In theory, this “Alawistan” could ex- 700,000, or 3% of the national popula- towns than fight for the regime in far-off the Druze in al-Dana. One of the most tend over 12,000 square kilometers, tion. Most of them lived in Suwayda: Aleppo or Homs. In fact, keeping Druze active regime militias in that clash was including the provinces of Latakia and 90% of that province’s 375,000 inhab- conscripts inside Suwayda province led by Sheikh Balous, a former Druze Tartus, the districts of Masyaf and al- itants were Druze, 7% were Christian, rather than deploying them to other policeman who had been very success- Suqaylabiyah, and the western part of and 3% Sunni. Another 250,000 re- fronts was part of the tacit bargain that ful at recruiting local youths unwilling 20 Homs province. It would be reduced to sided in Damascus and its suburbs of Assad reached with the community’s to fight outside Jabal al-Druze. And 6,000 square kilometers if the regime Jaramana, Sahnaya, Ashrafiyat Sahnaya, spiritual leaders (known as the Sheikhs in June 2015, around the same time as lost the mixed Alawite/Sunni territories and Jdeidat Artouz. The remainder lived of Akel) in order to maintain control a major opposition offensive in north- north of Latakia, Homs, and al-Ghab in Mount Hermon (30,000) and the Ja- over them.18 western Syria, rebels from a group called plain. In the first case, the population bal al-Summaq region of Idlib province the Southern Front attempted to seize would be about 3 million; in the second, (25,000 people spread over fourteen Sunnis vs. Druze al-Thaala military base, the key to Su- 2.5 million (since many Alawite, Chris- villages).17 As early as 2011, tensions emerged be- wayda’s defense. They were pushed back tian, and Ismaili families from central With the exception of Jabal al-Sum- tween the Druze and certain rebel fac- by the army and local Druze militias—a Syria would likely flee there).15 maq, most of these Druze areas are tions. In Deraa, armed and unarmed huge turning point given that Druze co- Regime victories over the past year points of strategic support for the army. opposition factions began using anti- operation with Assad would have been have made the Alawistan scenario in- Jaramana played a key role in defend- Druze slogans, describing them as her- unimaginable in past years (e.g., in No- creasingly unlikely, and Assad is still ing Damascus city at the height of rebel etics. One slogan even called Assad “son vember 2000, the regime cracked down focused on retaking the entire country, campaigns there. The Druze villages of of the Druze,” a local pejorative. In a on a revolt in Suwayda, killing dozens of not building a sectarian statelet.16 Yet Mount Hermon have been a loyalist bas- climate of growing Islamist incitement, Druze and wounding hundreds more). the coastal bunker will remain a fallback tion on the capital’s southeastern flank, some Druze villagers were abducted and These rebel actions may seem baffling option as long as he has Russia’s support. allowing the army to maintain lines of then ransomed or murdered. These in- given the Druze posture at the start of communication with the Golan Heights cluded leading Druze dignitary Jamal the uprising. Like other parts of Syria, JABAL AL-DRUZE: CAUGHT and prevent isolated rebel pockets from Ezzeddine, who enjoyed good relations Jabal al-Druze was the scene of significant anti-regime protests in 2011, echo- IN THE MIDDLE linking up with larger opposition-held with the Deraa opposition; he and six- zones. And the Jabal al-Druze area has teen of his companions were abducted ing the region’s traditional air of defiance The mountainous Jabal al-Druze region given the regime an enduring land link by Jabhat al-Nusra in December 2012 (e.g., as described in chapter 1, many occupies a strategic position on the road to Jordan, as well as a launchpad for air- and killed a few months later. Similarly, inhabitants still brandish the proud to Damascus, so Assad has sought to craft crucial to the defense of Deraa and Druze residents in Jaramana fell victim memory of Sultan al-Atrash, the Druze keep its inhabitants in his fold despite a means of continually reminding reb- to assaults beginning in spring 2012. leader who revolted against the French their uncertain loyalties when the war els in the southwest that they are under That autumn, Jabhat al-Nusra led a in the 1920s). Yet various opposition began. The Sunni Arab opposition has threat of attack. rebel offensive in Jabal al-Druze.19 In bodies, including the Syrian National made his job much easier by repeat- Defending Jabal al-Druze requires response, the Druze set aside their neu- Coalition, failed to meet the Druze edly mishandling and attacking the little of the army; most of its protection trality and formed a local militia with community’s expectations, particularly local Druze. is entrusted to a local militia of 10,000 the regime’s help. From this point on, the demand for secularism. Rather than

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   41 calling for a “secular state” following The Secessionist Temptation under mysterious circumstances, and Ismaili, and Shia communities. This Assad’s ouster, the SNC instead adopted of Sheikh Balous his militia was dissolved. There is little diversity is linked to the area’s complex the idea of a “civil state,” which in Is- Despite being rejected by the rebels, doubt that the regime had him mur- history on the margin of Syria’s steppe, lamic discourse refers to governance by the Druze were initially hesitant to link dered for becoming too ambitious and where nineteenth-century agrarian col- sharia, not secular law. Such ideological their fate to Assad, since his fall would encouraging the Druze to secede. The onization attracted non-Sunnis from nuances exacerbated Druze mistrust of leave them defenseless. In mid-2015, at reasons for his move at al-Thaala are the coastal mountains and Shia from the Sunni Arab opposition, whom the a time when the army seemed about to unknown. He may have believed that Lebanon’s Beqa Valley to villages near regime had already portrayed as taking collapse, some Druze began to consider Assad’s army was on its way out of Ja- Homs. Christian communities in the inspiration from medieval fatwas calling the option of opening Jabal al-Druze up bal al-Druze given the successful rebel area date back to pre-Islamic Syria; they for genocide against the Druze. to Jordan and making it an autonomous offensives in Idlib province and around were able to preserve their identity be- Even so, some Druze still decided to region under international protection. Deraa (e.g., the key southern town of cause their land lay next to swamps and join the rebels at first. In August 2011, This idea was championed most Busra al-Sham had fallen that March). was deemed too poor to interest Mus- Druze officer Maj. Khaldun Zeined- prominently by Sheikh Balous, who had If so, he may have felt that the regime’s lim and Ottoman conquerors. dine deserted the army and created an established one of the first pro-regime supposedly imminent fall might pave The central region is dominated by anti-Assad armed group, the Sultan al- Druze militias in 2012. He made his the way for him to become the leader of Homs and Hama, rivals for centuries be- Atrash Brigade.21 Although the group mark in 2014 during the battle for al- a Druze safe zone. fore the creation of modern Syria.24 Hama, joined other rebel factions in Deraa and Dana, defending Druze territory from Whatever the case, Russia’s interven- a conservative Sunni city, dominated a vast participated in several offensives against rebels. Afterward, he asked Assad to pro- tion soon after his death completely countryside, and its residents mainly lived regime forces in the Jabal al-Druze area, vide him and other militias with heavy changed the balance of power on the on land rent until Syria’s 1963 agrarian re- it was unable to recruit many Druze weapons to defend Jabal al-Druze more ground, so the Druze are unlikely to form. In contrast, the cross-sectarian city and eventually drew the ire of Jabhat effectively. He also began to focus on gamble on further secessionist attempts of Homs invested more in industry and al-Nusra. In 2013, members of the al- political issues, calling for reforms to ad- anytime soon. It will therefore be diffi- commerce beginning in the nineteenth Qaeda affiliate arrested the Druze bri- dress the high cost of living, corruption, cult, if not impossible, to detach Jabal century, so it was able to continue pros- gade’s members and sentenced them to and Druze conscription. By June 2015, al-Druze from the regime. The Druze pering under Baath land reforms a century death; they were eventually released and his militia had increased to nearly 1,000 will not be won over unless they are cut later thanks to its diversified economic fled to Jordan. This incident showed the fighters,23 and he was reportedly receiv- off from Damascus, and even then they base. Yet the new masters of Syria sought Druze community in starkest terms that ing financial aid from abroad, especially would need very concrete assurances to upend the great landowning class of they were not welcome in the Sunni from Israeli Druze who were concerned that international forces will protect Hama, who had exploited their families Arab rebellion. For those Druze who about the fate of their Syrian coreligion- them from Sunni Arab jihadist groups for generations. Once these owners were had joined the fighting, the jihadists ists. Yet when Jabhat al-Nusra led the and spare them the fate of their co-reli- deprived of land rent, they were quickly did not consider their commitment to offensive to seize al-Thaala military air- gionists in Jabal al-Summaq. marginalized by the Baath regime. Hama’s be sincere enough; in some cases they port that month, his forces did not help Muslim Brotherhood revolt in 1982 and were threatened with death unless they defend the regime; instead, he called on CENTRAL SYRIA: the fierce repression that followed were a converted to Sunnism (e.g., the Druze the local population to seize army posi- A SECTARIAN MOSAIC prelude to the bloody conflict Syria is ex- of Jabal al-Summaq were forced to con- tions and government buildings. periencing today, with most combatants vert in 2015, then destroy their own This gambit failed—three months At the center of the regime zone lies a divided along urban/rural and minority/ mausoleums22). later, Sheikh Balous was assassinated mixed bag of Christian, Alawite, Sunni, Sunni lines.

42   fabrice balanche Why Did Hama Stay Calm While Moreover, Hama’s subsequent political neighborhoods tend to have more asser- a base for organizing aid to the insur- Homs Ignited? and economic marginalization deterred tive community identities. gents, and wounded rebels found relief 28 When the uprising began in 2011, some outsiders from moving there, which lim- In July 2011, clashes broke out in at Gulf-based Islamic NGOs there. Yet demonstrations took place in Hama, ited both the possibility of intercommu- Homs and caused several dozen deaths. the Gulf networks stopped operating in but local Sunni Arab leaders quickly put nal friction and the visibility of regime In most every case, these incidents took Tripoli after the Assad regime attacked them to an end. And unlike in cross- favoritism toward Alawites. place on the borders between Alawite rebel-held Homs in force and encircled sectarian Homs, no armed insurrection During the war, rebels have tried to and Sunni districts. The army soon de- the city in fall 2012. Meanwhile, the developed there. seize the city several times. As of this ployed to these hotspots, surrounding Lebanese army and Hezbollah eventu- Two factors explain this relative calm. writing, forces from Hayat Tahrir al- the northern Sunni neighborhoods that ally took control of the border and pro- First, the memory of the 1982 massacre Sham (the radical coalition headed by would become the rebellion’s stronghold hibited further aid transfers to the rebels is still very present in Hama. In response Jabhat al-Nusra) are only about ten ki- in Homs. This resembles what Michel after the May 2013 fall of al-Qusayr, a to that revolt, Assad’s father killed at lometers north of Hama, but they face Seurat wrote about Tripoli during the former opposition stronghold on the least 20,000 residents and completely a dense network of military bases built Lebanese civil war—clashes in that city northeastern frontier. razed the city center, so locals knew around the city’s perimeter in the 1980s did not take place within affluent neigh- what to expect from the regime if they and a western countryside full of Ala- borhoods, but rather between Sunni and Sectarian Slaughters took up arms again. Apparently, their wite, Christian, and Ismaili villages. But Alawite districts where community en- As the war gained momentum in 2011, fear of Assad’s retribution outweighed the regime’s greatest asset in Hama re- dogamy and identity were strong.26 central Syria was racked by intercom- their anger toward his repression. mains the population’s relative passivity Initially, Homs rebels enjoyed strong munal confrontations. In Homs, dem- Second, the sectarian homogeneity throughout the war—an advantage it external support, especially from Leba- onstrations against the regime stopped of Hama’s population and bureaucracy certainly has not enjoyed in Homs. non, their principal source of foreign at the edge of Alawite districts because seemed to defuse tensions. Although Like most of central Syria, Homs is weapons and fighters. The Bab al-Amr clashes tended to multiply rapidly there. Alawites have a strong presence in the home to a mosaic of sects. As of 2011, district, which rose up militarily against In the city’s suburbs, the Shia village of local civil service, many of the city’s its population was around 65% Sunni the regime, was known as a haven for Mazraa was regularly attacked on Fri- top municipal and regime posts are oc- Arab, 25% Alawite, 10% Christian, and smugglers operating between Syria and days by local Sunni opponents.29 And cupied by native Sunni Arabs, not mi- less than 1% Ismaili and Shia.25 Lebanon before the war. These smug- when rebels seized the central districts, nority outsiders. Hama also lacks a dis- As in the coastal cities, Alawites came glers often traveled through tunnels they fired mortars at the Alawite neigh- tinct Alawite neighborhood—the city is to Homs from the former French Man- that begin several kilometers out in the borhoods daily. Elsewhere, Christians largely unappealing to non-Sunnis, and date and settled in outlying districts to countryside, bringing goods and weap- and Shia fled the nearby town of al- those Alawites who do hold government the south and east. Christians have a ons into the city while avoiding police Qusayr in autumn 2011 after sectarian posts there often prefer to reside in their historic district in the city center from checks. French journalist Edith Bouvier threats were broadcast from the loud- towns and villages of origin when not which they have spread eastward, rein- used one such tunnel to escape Homs speakers of local mosques. performing their local duties. When the forced by their brethren in rural areas. in 2012, describing it as high and wide Amid this tense climate, sectarian regime destroyed downtown in 1982, it The city’s western half is wealthier than enough to ride a motorcycle through.27 slaughters began to occur. One noto- erected a five-star hotel on its ruins as its eastern half, which is largely occupied The large Sunni Arab community rious incident took place in Houla on a symbol of state power and modernity, by rural people from the margins of the of Tripoli was particularly supportive May 25, 2012, when 108 Sunni Arab but Hafiz al-Assad did not seek to trans- steppe. The western half is also more of a of the rebels next door. Saudi and Qa- civilians (including 49 children) were form the city’s conservative Sunni roots. religious mix, while the rest of the city’s tari networks used the Lebanese city as murdered by the regime’s shabbiha para-

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   43 military.30 A week earlier, a dozen Ala- secured Homs after the last of the city’s nis and other communities in central Shifting Demography wite state employees had been massacred rebel districts, al-Waar, was evacuated in Syria will be difficult. Further east, West Aleppo is considered the “legal” en route to Homs. In June of that year, March 2017, threats from other quar- Assad would also need to reestablish part of the city and has been popu- 80 people were killed in the Sunni vil- ters persist. Just north of the city, in- links with the Sunni tribes that have lated by urbanites for generations. It lage of Mazraa al-Qoubeyr; a month cursions continue from the rebel-held been supporting the Islamic State and includes the rich neighborhoods of al- later, another 100 Sunnis were massa- pocket between Rastan and Houla. conducting raids on Alawite and Is- Shahba and Mohafaza, the lower-class cred in Tremseh. More recently, a score Similarly, Hama remained under threat maili settlements. The regime may task Sunni district of Sulaymaniyah, and the of Alawite civilians were killed in Zahra from the Islamic State to the east until Defense Minister Fahd Jassem al-Freij middle-class public service district of al- in May 2016. Alongside these incidents, as recently as September 2017, when with leading this effort given his mem- Hamadaniyeh, where most of the Ala- thousands of individuals from every sect the group’s local stronghold was de- bership in the Haddadin tribe, which wites live. In contrast, Aleppo’s eastern have been kidnapped in the area during stroyed; the rebel coalition Hayat Tahrir is based in east Hama province and has half is largely considered the “illegal” the war and either ransomed or mur- al-Sham still looms to the north. always been loyal to the Assad family. city, with unplanned neighborhoods 31 dered. The Rastan-Houla situation may In 1982, the tribe participated in the that have spread widely due to rural ex- After years of violence, the front- prove to be particularly intractable. The bloody repression of Hama, and most odus (a process called “inrifyeh,” a term lines in Homs became well defined, and roughly 100,000 residents of this Sunni of its members have been fighting with used with disdain by old city dwellers). many minorities moved into more ho- Arab territory have eluded regime con- the regime during the current war as Rebels from the countryside found sup- mogeneous neighborhoods for protec- trol since 2011, and the area gave birth well. As in other parts of the country, port in East Aleppo, whose residents tion. Yet attacks on Alawite neighbor- to Liwa al-Farouk, a key brigade in the these and other tribal cleavages have have integrated poorly into the con- hoods continued. On October 1, 2014, Free Syrian Army commanded by the fragmented the opposition in central servative city and face a persistent ur- terrorists bombed a school in Akrama, famous rebel lieutenant Abdul Razzaq Syria, so Assad will likely use this to ban/rural divide. The working-class killing some forty people.32 And on Feb- Tlass. Local fighters are now under the his advantage as he attempts to prevent residents in these neighborhoods serve ruary 21, 2016, car bombs killed fifty- control of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which a rebel resurgence there. as labor for the vast industrial zone of seven in Zahra.33 These and other neigh- has been trying to break the siege and Sheikh Najar on the city’s northeastern borhoods were later blocked off with attack Homs and Hama. Previously, the ALEPPO’S DIVIDING LINES outskirts, run by the West Aleppo en- concrete barriers to prevent outsiders regime seemed content with containing trepreneurial class. from perpetrating further mass-casualty rebel advances in the area and negotiat- After the rebels seized parts of Aleppo In 2012, the population of Aleppo attacks (whether on foot or in vehicles). ing. Rastan and Houla facilitated “rec- in July 2012, the city was split into the was 2.5 million: 1 million in the west- Alawites and Christians felt especially onciliation” efforts in Homs because the opposition-held east and the regime- ern district, another million in the east, threatened, though Sunnis suffered re- army was able to transfer many of that controlled west. This demarcation was and around 500,000 in the northern prisals as well. city’s rebels to the pocket, first in April virtually unchanged until 2016, when Kurdish neighborhoods of Sheikh 2014 and later in September 2016. Yet Assad’s forces retook the city. Yet the Maqsoud and Ashrafiya. In October The Difficulty of Reconciliation the army may be targeting the pocket for boundary was not drawn along strictly 2016, intense Russian bombing in East In light of this brutal intercommunal a full-scale military campaign now that sectarian lines—Sunni Arabs were the Aleppo sharply reduced the population; violence, the return of mutual coexis- it has removed the IS presence in east majority on both sides of the city, so as described in chapter 1, only 100,000 tence in central Syria is by no means Homs and Hama province. territorial and socioeconomic criteria people remained there by year’s end. guaranteed even if Assad’s forces retake If the regime retakes Rastan-Houla, played important roles in how the up- Some of those who fled found refuge the entire region. Although the regime the restoration of trust between Sun- rising played out there. in West Aleppo, in some cases replac-

44   fabrice balanche ing middle- and upper-class residents who had left the city amid the fighting. 26. EAST ALEPPO vs. WEST ALEPPO, January 2016 For its part, Sheikh Maqsoud’s population decreased to only 50,000 inhab- al-Mallah Farms Central prison itants by 2014,34 with the majority of the Kurdish population taking refuge in their villages of origin in Afrin, Ko-

Kafr Hamra bane, or Hasaka. NORTH ALEPPO Kurdish Area To be sure, sectarianism is not ab- Bani Zaid WEST ALEPPO Sheikh Maqsoud sent from the conflict in Aleppo. The Regime Area Christian quarters remained uniformly al-Haydariya loyal to the regime. Sheikh Maqsoud

University Nor Kiugh Sakhur rose up against the state, but for reasons Railway station al-Azizieh Sheikh Najar different from those of Sunni Arab reb- Governorate al-Jaziran industrial area els; later, the Kurdish and Arab camps Administrative city MUNICIPALITY came into direct conflict when the for- NEW ALEPPO mer began cooperating with the army Bab al-Nayrab in certain campaigns (see chapter 3).

EAST ALEPPO And while Sunni Arabs were divided Military Academy Salah al-Din Rebel Area by clan rivalries based on blood ties or al-Hamadaniah al-Nayrab neighborhood solidarity, many of them

Police Academy Bus Station Military became more uniformly and openly Sheikh Said industrial area Ramouseh hostile toward Christians, Alawites, and Ismailis as the rebellion grew more

N radicalized. The Christian community was the first victim of such sentiment, W E and its population fell from 200,000 0 2 km S to 40,000 between 2011 and 2016.35 Rebels targeted the Christian neigh- Old city Railway Highway Citadel borhoods of al-Midan, al-Azizieh, and Legal city Airport Principal road Principal location Jdaideh, urging civilians to flee in order Illegal settlement Frontline Industrial area to seize their districts. Some neighborhoods resisted this encroachment—in summer 2012, for example, the Chris- tian militia in al-Midan halted the rebel advance in the district’s Armen- ian quarter.

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   45 To Azaz, Afrin, N and Turkey (closed) Alternative road to West-Aleppo Muslimiyah 27. (open since summer 2016) W E SYRIAN ARMY Queiq River S OFFENSIVE Anadan EAST ALEPPO Handarat Fall 2016 Haritan

Handarat camp al-Mallah Farms Central Prison AREA CONTROLLED BY

Syrian Army To Bab al-Hawa, and Turkey SDF (Kurds)

Castello Road Rebels Kafr Hamra Bani Zaid

Sheikh Maqsoud

Hanano SYRIAN ARMY TERRITORIAL GAINS al-Haydariya al-Shahba University 22 Sept to 30 Oct 2016 al-Midan Sakhur Governor's Palace al-Jaziran al-Azizieh 23 Nov to 4 Dec 2016 Administrative City 5 Dec to 8 Dec 2016 Citadel al-Myassar To Damascus Bab al-Nayrab New Aleppo Bustan via Salamiya 9 Dec to 13 Dec 2016 al-Qasr Bab al-Maqam Aleppo Airport Highway Military Academy Salah al-Din Marjeh

al-Sukkari Hill 400 Principal road al-Hamadaniah Karm al-Dada al-Nayrab Police Academy Railway Artillery School Sheikh Said Ramouseh To Damascus Airport (closed) Urban area

Industrial zone

Rural area Khan Tuman Queiq River Principal road to West Aleppo (open since summer 2012)

0 2 km To Damascus via Salamiya

46   fabrice balanche N 28. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE MANBIJ−AZAZ CORRIDOR, Winter 2016

AREA CONTROL W E Syrian Army S KOBANE Islamic State

Feb 2016: Transfer of JARABULUS Other rebels rebels through Turkey TURKEY SDF

al-Shuyoukh Tahtani OFFENSIVE Bulbul To Gaziantep Raju Ghandoura Syrian army

Bab al-Salam Islamic State Sharran Euphrates River AZAZ Other rebels al-Raai Sarrin al-Shemali Maabatli SDF (Kurdish) AFRIN Souran MANBIJ Sheikh Hadid Dabiq MAIN ETHNIC GROUP Marea Arima Tal Rifaat Akhtarin Arab Sunni

Feb 2016: Syrian Army Abu Qilqil Kurdish Sunni Jandeiris Nubl closes Azaz road AL-BAB Turkmen Sunni al-Zahraa Tishrin Dam Ain Issa Arab Druze Tadef Dec 2015: SDF crosses Darat Izza Euphrates to Manbij Arab Shia To Antakya Haritan Mar 2016: Syrian Army Rasm al-Harmel International border begins to close Castello ring ALEPPO Khafsa Bab al-Hawa al-Dana Province border HAREM Khan al Asal al-Jarniya Atareb Deir Hafer Border crossing Kuweires Province center Qorqanya AL-SAFIRAH Armanaz District center al-Jaboul Lake Maskanah Town Taftanaz al-Fua Hader Benan Aleppo urban area Mar 2016: IS and rebels Lake Assad IDLIB try to cut Aleppo road Main road Thawra Dam Secondary road Saraqeb Military airport open ARIHA Tal Daman THAWRA Military airport closed Khanaser Abu Duhur 0 10 20 km Bridge open Ahsem To Hama Bridge destroyed

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   47 Retaking Aleppo reassuring the regime zone’s million- outside its main zone of control: Deraa, would any other tribe. Although most of Between summer 2012 and 2013, reb- plus inhabitants. Deir al-Zour, Hasaka, and Qamishli. the work done by these state employees els encircled West Aleppo; the army By October, the army had launched These cities offer a useful illustration of is menial, it guarantees a fixed income seemed trapped, with the airport be- its final offensive against East Aleppo, the complex balancing game Assad has that is out of reach for the impoverished coming its only means of communica- retaking the rest of it in less than two sought to play in dealing with sectarian lower classes that make up much of the 39 tion with the outside. By May 2013, months. Many observers were taken and social factors during the war. The rebellion. Sunnis held roughly the same however, regime forces opened a road aback by the campaign’s speed, but the regime seemed to decide early on that number of government posts as Alawites 40 through the steppe between Aleppo and timeline was not so surprising once it it must cling to certain provincial and when the war broke out, including top Homs, allowing for an influx of fuel and became clear that Russia and Turkey had district capitals in order to legitimize its officials such as Ali Mamlouk, the pow- giving hope to the inhabitants of the already discussed the framework under power, even when these cities became erful chief of the security services. Yet regime-held districts. From that date which local rebels could negotiate their wholly surrounded by enemies. From unlike the Alawites with Bashar al-Assad, until summer 2016, the army slowly en- surrender. Moscow also pushed Assad these strongholds, Assad likely hoped the Sunni Arabs have no senior political, circled the eastern districts. Meanwhile, and his Iranian ally to let the 6,000 re- to resume military offensives using the military, or tribal figure capable of uni- the air force launched continual strikes maining rebels leave the city with their “oil-spot strategy,” which entails circu- fying their different factions and coun- against East Aleppo to separate its civil- light weapons instead of eradicating lar expansion from a center. terbalancing Assad without crossing the ian residents from the rebels, causing them.37 The Kremlin seemed particular- In each city, the regime had the sup- line into outright rebellion or otherwise major casualties among both due to the ly keen on achieving this goal before the port of the many public-sector employees provoking retaliation. This limits their indiscriminate nature of the bombing. new American president came to office who form its enormous national bureau- power. For his part, Assad relies on these On August 7, 2016, rebels from Idlib in January 2017. cracy. Rebels besieged them and in some Sunni networks within the bureaucracy province briefly succeeded in breaking Despite the intercommunal hostil- cases seized neighborhoods, but the army to manipulate the population—they act through the siege lines and opening a ity witnessed in Aleppo during the war, and security services concentrated their as bridges to reconcile groups that sided corridor to East Aleppo via Ramouseh the city’s fate shows how some key de- strength to prevent internal rebellion. with the rebellion, coaxing them back district. Yet this did not compensate for velopments in the regime-held portions This dynamic was also evident in pro- to the regime’s side. This was the case the July 28 loss of Castello Road, the of Syria have been driven less by sectar- vincial capitals that fell fully to the op- with Sheikh Nawaf al-Bashir, a powerful main supply line for the city’s rebel dis- ian affiliation than by social divisions, position. When rebels seized Idlib, for Sunni tribal leader who left Istanbul for tricts. The Ramouseh passage remained whether between economic classes or example, most of the regime’s local bu- Damascus in January 2017. By rallying under attack by Russian planes, which along urban vs. rural lines. In other cit- reaucracy and constituents did not sup- to the regime, he showed that the Bag- largely prevented the rebels from using ies, however, these social divisions were port them; instead, minorities and state gara tribe had shifted its support from it. A few trucks full of produce entered usually trumped by sectarian concerns; employees were accused of collaboration the rebels to Assad. East Aleppo with much publicity on for example, poor Alawites in Latakia and fled to regime-held towns. Those who Yet regardless of the regime’s proven August 7, but this was essentially a one- did not join their impoverished Sunni stayed behind were often treated harshly; ability to exploit tribal, class, and po- time delivery that did little to change the “classmates” in demonstrations. many were killed by rebels for purport- litical fissures and coopt many of those daily reality for the rebel zone’s 100,000 edly serving as “intelligence agents.”38 who might oppose it, the fact remains 36 inhabitants. Meanwhile, the army CONTESTED CITIES From this perspective, the regime bu- that Sunni Arabs still form the large ma- opened a new road to supply West Alep- reaucracy in Syrian cities constitutes a jority of the Syrian population—and the po from the north, taking a stretch of At various points in the war, the regime multiethnic, cross-sectarian tribe of sorts, backbone of its current and past armed Castello Road in the process and greatly also held portions of four cities that lay one that seeks to defend its interests as rebellions. Accordingly, forcing an Ala-

48   fabrice balanche wite national construction onto wider phone interviews with Syrian busines- Arab Republic: Estimated people in intended for more “moderate” rebels men in Damascus, Latakia, and Aleppo; need & IDPs per governorate,” Ref- but nevertheless fell into the hands of parts of Syria while excluding other the answer was the same each time: world, October 31, 2016, http://www. radicals. See Gareth Porter, “How Ame- communities from power is not realis- most urban residents in the middle and refworld.org/publisher,OCHA,MAP,SYR rica Armed Terrorists in Syria,” Ameri- tic in the long term; it may not even be upper classes considered the revolu- ,584ff2524,0.html can Conservative, June 22, 2017, http:// tion dangerous because it came from www.theamericanconservative.com/ 12. Fabrice Balanche, La region Alaouite et viable in the multiethnic regime-held the informal settlements populated by articles/how-america-armed-terrorists- le pouvoir Syrien [The Alawite area and zone. The reason is simple: Alawites are poor people of rural origin. who were in-syria the Syrian power] (Paris: Karthala, 2006). motivated mainly by the prospect of a relatively small minority in western 20. Talal El Atrache, “Syrie: quel avenir seizing wealth from the city center. As 13. OCHA, “Syrian Arab Republic,” http:// pour les Druzes?” [Syria: which future Syria and nearly nonexistent in the rest one Sunni businesman in Latakia angri- www.refworld.org/publisher,OCHA,MA for the Druze?], Monde Arab, Septem- of the country. The Assad regime can- ly put it, the uprising threatened to take P,SYR,584ff2524,0.html ber 19, 2015, http://magazine.com. away the benefits gleaned from twenty not take the same path as Iraq, where the 14. “Syrie: le village arménien de Kassab, lb/index.php/fr/monde-arabe-?issue_ years of economic liberalization. Iranian-backed Shia majority has used victime ‘d’une épuration ethnique’” id=200 6. “Syria crisis: Three of Assad’s top chiefs [Syria: the Armenian village of Kasab, the reins of power to appropriate most 21. Noam Raydan and Adam Heffez, “Why killed in rebel bomb strike,” Guardian, an ethnic cleansing victim], France 24, Syria’s Druse Are Sticking with Assad of the country for themselves. July 18, 2012, https://www.theguardian. March 24, 2014, http://www.france24. for Now,” Jerusalem Post, April 9, com/world/2012/jul/18/syria-rebels-kill- com/fr/20140324-syrie-village-arme- 2014, http://www.washingtoninstitute. elite-damascus nien-kassab-epuration-ethnique-assad org/policy-analysis/view/why-syrias- Notes 7. “Syrian government steps up siege of 15. Fabrice Balanche, “Le réduit Alaouite: druse-are-sticking-with-assad-for-now rebel-held Damascus suburbs: state un refuge de la Syrie ‘utile’?” [The 22. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “Jabhat al- media, rebels,” Reuters, February 6, Alawite stronghold: refuge for the use- 1. Fabrice Balanche, “Géographie de Nusra and the Druze of Idlib Province,” 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/ ful Syria?], Carto 32 (November-De- la révolte Syrienne” [Geography of Syria Comment, January 24, 2015, us-mideast-crisis-syria-daraya/syrian- cember 2015). the Syrian revolt], Outre Terre 3, no. http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/jab- government-steps-up-siege-of-rebel- 29 (September 2011), https://www. 16. Nicholas Heras, The Potential for an hat-al-nusra-druze-idlib-province/ cairn.info/revue-outre-terre1-2011-3- held-damascus-suburbs-state-media- Assad Statelet in Syria, Policy Focus 23. Nour Samaha, “Syria’s Druze reject page-437.htm rebels-idUSKCN0VF0RT 132 (Washington Institute for Near East calls for anti-government uprising,” Al 8. Mustafa al-Haj, “Militants from Syria’s Policy, December 2013), http://www. 2. Fabrice Balanche, “Damas: une ville Jazeera, September 14, 2015, http:// Qudsaya prepare to leave for Idlib,” washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analy- sous le Baath” [Damascus under the www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/09/sy- Al-Monitor, October 14, 2016, https:// sis/view/the-potential-for-an-assad-sta- Baath], Moyen-Orient, April 2012, ria-druze-reject-calls-anti-government- www.al-monitor.com/pulse/origi- telet-in-syria https://www.academia.edu/1514404/ uprising-150913111703291.html Damas_sous_le_Baath_Damascus_un- nals/2016/10/syria-qudsaya-regime- 17. Cyril Roussel, Les Druzes de Syrie: Ter- 24. Mohamed al Dbiyat, Homs et Hama der_the_Baath settlement-opposition-evacuation.html ritoire et mobilité [The Druze of Syria: en Syrie centrale (Damascus: IFEAD, 9. Peter Kenyon and Alison Meuse, “In territory and mobility] (Beirut: Insti- 3. Ibrahim Nouss, “La population de la 1995), p. 370. République Syrienne: etude démogra- A Syrian Suburb Cleared of Rebels, a tut Français du Proche-Orient, 2011), phique” [The population of the Syrian Gradual Return to Everyday Life,” NPR http://www.ifporient.org/node/1024 25. Balanche, “Géographie de la révolte,” https://www.cairn.info/revue-outre- Republic: demographic study], docto- Weekend Edition, December 25, 2016, 18. Talal El Atrache, “The Druze in the terre1-2011-3-page-437.htm. These ral dissertation, The Sorbonne, 1951. http://www.npr.org/sections/paral- Syrian Conflict,” Syria Comment, Sep- figures are a personal estimate distilled 4. Fabrice Balanche, “L’habitat illégal lels/2016/12/25/505304239/in-a-syrian- tember 5, 2016, http://www.joshualan- from the 2004 census and subsequent dans l’agglomération de Damas et suburb-cleared-of-rebels-a-gradual-re- dis.com/blog/druze-syrian-conflict-ta- field surveys. In a 1995 article, Alain les carences de l’etat [Illegal housing turn-to-everyday-life lal-el-atrache/ Chouet wrote that Alawites constitu- in greater Damascus and the shortco- 10. Aron Lund, “Into the Tunnels: The Rise 19. It bears mentioning that this offensive ted 40% of the city’s population, but mings of the state], Revue de Géogra- and Fall of Syria’s Rebel Enclave in the was presumably conducted with arms this estimate seemed exaggerated phie de l’Est 49, no. 4 (2009), https:// Eastern Ghouta,” Century Foundation, supplied by the Jordan-based, Saudi- at the time. Moreover, natural growth rge.revues.org/1980 December 21, 2016, https://tcf.org/ supported “Military Operations Cen- patterns and emigration to Homs have content/report/into-the-tunnels 5. In April 2011 and following months, ter” via sources in the Balkans. These not been in favor of the Alawites since the author conducted numerous tele- 11. See the OCHA infographic “Syrian weapons may originally have been then. See Chouet’s article “L’espace

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   49 tribal Alaouite à l’épreuve du pouvoir,” 31. Babak Dehghanpisheh and Suzan ro.fr/international/2016/12/22/01003- Maghreb-Machrek 147 (1995), pp. 83– Haidamous, “In Syria, Kidnappings 20161222ARTFIG00229-en-silence 119, http://alain.chouet.free.fr/import/ on the Rise as Lawlessness Spreads,” -les-rebelles-quittent-alep-entre-des- Alaouite.pdf Washington Post, April 21, 2013, https:// soldats-russes.php www.washingtonpost.com/world/mid 26. See his essay, “Le quartier de Bâb 37. Ibid. Tebbâné à Tripoli: étude d’une assa- dle_east/in-syria-kidnappings-on- 38. Aron Lund, “Assad’s Broken Base: The biyya urbaine,” in Pierre Yves Pechoux the-rise-as-lawlessness-spreads Case of Idlib,” Century Foundation, (ed.), Mouvements communautaires et /2013/04/21/b0bb2f2e-a854-11e2- July 14, 2016, https://tcf.org/content/ Espaces urbains au Machreq (Beirut: 8302-3c7e0ea97057_story.html report/assads-broken-base-case-idlib. CERMOC, 1985), pp. 45–86. Seurat 32. “Double bombing kills at least 41 Lund described the rebels’ methods: noted how Tripoli’s Sunni quarter (Bab children at school in Syria,” Austra- “Having broken into the local intel- Tebbane) and Alawite quarter (Bal lian Broadcasting Corporation, Octo- ligence headquarters and released Mohsen) were the scene of intense ber 1, 2014, http://www.abc.net.au/ those prisoners who remained alive, clashes. In fact, the two neighborhoods news/2014-10-02/school-bombing-kil- [Jaish al-Fatah] also set about studying never really stopped fighting—they rels-41-children-in-syria/5784266 the documents captured there in order sumed their exchange of fire in 2005, 33. Yousuf Basil and Tim Hume, “In Syria, to weed out intelligence agents and and the Syria war has only exacerbated Dozens Killed as Bombers Strike in Homs the tension. informers. In May 2015, the group’s and Damascus, Regime Says,” CNN, ruling council issued a list of some 750 27. Damien Pearse, “Edith Bouvier’s es- February 22, 2016, http://www.cnn.com wanted Assad supporters.” cape from Homs,” Guardian, March 3, /2016/02/21/middleeast/syria-civil-war/ 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/ index.html 39. Fouad Ajami described these class fissures well: “There were divisions world/2012/mar/03/edith-bouvier-es- 34. According to a June 2014 author inter- cape-from-homs of class and geography that still ran view conducted in the border city of Ki- through the Sunni population, there 28. Interviews with French NGO members in lis, Turkey, with members of Médecins was the age-old separation between Tripoli, June 2014. Sans Frontières in charge of Aleppo. city and country, and the middle classes 29. According to a Homs resident inter- 35. Author interview with French scholar of Aleppo and Damascus bristled at viewed by the author in Damascus in Frederic Pichon, Paris, March 2016. the idea that they would be led by pro- November 2013. 36. Georges Malbrunot, “En silence, les vincials.” See his book The Syrian Re- bellion (Hoover Institution, 2012), p. 91. 30. “Houla: How a massacre unfolded,” rebelles quittent Alep entre des soldats BBC News, June 8, 2012, http:// russes” [In silence, rebels leave Aleppo 40. Souhail Belhadj, La Syrie de Bashar www.bbc.com/news/world-middle- between Russian soldiers], Le Figaro, al-Asad [The Syria of Bashar al-Assad] east-18233934 December 26, 2016, http://www.lefiga- (Paris: Belin Litterature et Revues, 2013).

50   fabrice balanche 3. SYRIAN KURDISTAN UNDER THE PYD

hatever the future ing, nearly a decade before the current 2016, the goal is to establish full terri- for al-Shadadi, an Arab-majority town may hold for the rest of civil war. Each of these trends will be torial contiguity between Rojava’s west- south of Hasaka, are less clear. Although Syria, the emergence of examined below, along with their im- ern canton (Afrin) and its two eastern taking it met an obvious short-term Wa partially autonomous plications for the ongoing hostilities in cantons (Jazira and Kobane). In other military goal (cutting off the main IS Kurdish region has already become various parts of northern Syria. cases, such as the thrust toward the route to Mosul, Iraq), the town is fifteen a reality. The boundaries of this “Ro- IS “capital” of Raqqa, the PYD seems times smaller than Raqqa and adjacent java” are still uncertain and could wind THE CURRENT SITUATION more concerned about countering cur- to significant oil wells, so the Kurds may up differing from the maximalist lines rent and potential threats to Rojava decide that holding onto it indefinitely IN ROJAVA claimed by the Democratic Union Par- than expanding its contours. is worth the potential sectarian strife. ty (PYD). Yet the leading Kurdish fac- In October 2015, the PYD’s military Whatever the PYD’s future plans, the In general, the Kurds may believe tion has continued its efforts to absorb branch, the YPG, partnered with a few SDF controlled about 25% of Syria as that they can offset their demographic more territory, gather all Syrian Kurds local Arab militias to create the Syrian of October 2017. These territories are disadvantage in certain Arab-majority under its banner, and make Rojava vi- Democratic Forces, and the SDF have home to around 2.5 million people, yet areas through ethnic cleansing, “re- able economically, indicating that the since helped to expand the territory the Kurdish portion of this population Kurdification” of Arabized Kurds, and country’s sectarian fragmentation may under Kurdish control. In the north- fell below 50% with the occupation of alliances with Arab tribes that want to be irreversible in the north. east, Kurdish-led forces have reclaimed large parts of the Arab Euphrates Valley. side with the strongest player. The PYD Looking back at the recent history of large swaths of ground from the Islamic In the Jazira and Kobane cantons of Ro- also hopes that some of the one million the Kurdish region, three trends stand State, including the provincial capitals java itself, Kurds still constitute a slim Kurds in Damascus and Aleppo will out: the Assad regime’s forced “Ara- of Hasaka and Raqqa. majority (55%), while the area around move to Rojava, but convincing them to bization” of some inhabitants (which The rationale for this expansion Jabal al-Akrad (aka Kurd Dagh) in Af- do so will require drastic improvements may now be reversed through a PYD seems to vary depending on where it oc- rin canton is almost 100% Kurdish. For in the north’s dire economic situation. “re-Kurdification” campaign); the im- curs. As described in previous chapters, demographic reasons, then, the Kurds position of heavy economic restrictions, the PYD has advanced out of its Kurd- likely have no desire to permanently DEFINING KURDISH which have rendered it dependent on ish-majority heartland to conquer areas integrate Arab-majority areas such as IDENTITY & TERRITORY regime-controlled parts of the country; where Kurds are either the minority or Raqqa city; rather, they launched their and the PYD’s rise to prominence out not present at all. In some cases, such offensive there because of the persis- As mentioned in chapter 1, the topon- of the ashes of the 2004 Kurdish upris- as the conquest of Manbij in summer tent IS threat to Rojava. But their plans ymy of maps from pre-independence

 51  N 29. ETHNIC DIVISIONS IN NORTHERN SYRIA Tigris River W E al-Malikiyah Euphrates River Qamishli S TURKEY Kobane Ras al-Ain Jarabulus Tal Abyad Tal Tamer Afrin al-Raai Azaz Manbij al-Bab HASAKA Harem al-Shadadi Mediterranean Sea ALEPPO Kasab IDLIB Lake Assad RAQQA IRAQ Jisr al-Shughour LATAKIA DEIR AL-ZOUR

0 100 km HAMA

Armenians Kurds Kurds and Arabs Province center Province border

Desert area Turkmens Arabs Locality International border (Arab population)

Assyrians

Syria shows that the extent of ethnic Kurdish territory at the time was vast. Today, the Kurdish people residing in Kurdish communities existed even in these locales have been Arabized to the zed village and city names in order to the coastal Alawite heartland—in the extent that they no longer consider them- eliminate non-Arab religious and ethnic around Azaz were left unaltered. Why thirteenth century, for example, Sultan selves Kurds, despite retaining Kurdish markers. This trend reached its peak the difference? In all likelihood, the Baybars settled Kurdish tribes in Ja- words in their Arabic dialect. Moreover, under the Baath regime from 1963 to Baath regime wanted to support one bal al-Akrad in order to better control Sunni Arab rebel groups were able to get 1970. The names of hundreds of Kurd- Aleppo minority over the other, accord- the Latakia-Aleppo axis.1 Many other a foothold in such areas during the cur- ish villages were changed without the ing to the old principle of “divide to Kurdish settlements were built around rent war—unlike in the Kurdish-majority population’s consent, with the new reign.” In Latakia province, however, all historic fortresses such as Salah al-Din, north—highlighting the complexity of name in some cases having no relation- Turkmen village names were Arabized in Marqab, and the Crac des Chevaliers; any effort to delineate “Kurdish territory.” ship to the original name. order to maintain the dominance of the in fact, Arabs called the latter fortress The application of this policy varied regime’s fellow Alawites.2 “Husn al-Akrad,” or “Castle of the Resisting Arabization by region. In Aleppo province, for in- In the northeast, Arabization ef- Kurds,” until 1950 (though they now Between 1945 and 1970, successive stance, numerous Kurdish village names forts were rather limited. The dispersal call it “Qalaat al-Husn”). Syrian regimes systematically Arabi- were changed, but the Turkmen villages of local housing and the multitude of

52   fabrice balanche N 30. PYD EXPANSION IN NORTHERN SYRIA, May 2017

W E Tigris River

S al-Malikiyah Euphrates River Qamishli TURKEY Kobane Ras al-Ain Jarabulus Tal Abyad Tal Tamer Afrin Azaz Manbij al-Bab HASAKA Harem al-Shadadi ALEPPO Mediterranean Sea Lake Assad RAQQA IDLIB Jisr al-Shughour IRAQ

LATAKIA

0 100 km HAMA DEIR AL-ZOUR

PYD EXPANSION OTHER ACTORS Inhabited | Uninhabited Inhabited | Uninhabited

Jan 2015 Syrian army Province center Province border

Jan 2016 Other rebels Locality International border

Jan 2017 Islamic State Oil eld Claimed Rojava border

May 2017 tegrated into capital society. Younger resi- the Arabized Kurds for whom Kurdish dents do not know how to speak Kurd- Mountains), including the small town is a second language? What about bilin- ish, and mixed marriages are numerous. hamlets in the area would have made of Afrin; the city of Kobane (aka Ain al- gual Kurdish/Arabic speakers who do In contrast, Kurds in Wadi Doumar— comprehensive renaming extremely dif- Arab) and surrounding countryside; and not claim Kurdish identity? What about who arrived in the 1980s as construction ficult, so the Baath settled for Arabizing the large Jazira region stretching from Ras the children of mixed marriages between workers to help build the city’s newest the names of key locales. This approach al-Ain to the Tigris River. Kurds and Arabs, a practice that has districts—tend to reside in exclusively also highlighted the regime’s lack of inter- contributed to the dilution of Kurdish Kurdish neighborhoods and remain at- est in the Kurdish countryside, which it Kurdish Identity in Damascus identity and speech? tached to their rural roots despite living largely abandoned over time. In addition, and Aleppo The situation in Damascus best il- in a more urban setting for years. the prevalence of Kurdish identity there Mapping the distribution of Syria’s Kurds lustrates these dilemmas. In the Rukn As for Aleppo, the Sheikh Maqsoud may have convinced Arab nationalists to raises thorny questions about people’s al-Din and Barzah districts, many in- district constitutes a Kurdish city with- retreat. Whatever the case, Kurds are now sense of belonging to an ethnic group. habitants are ethnically Kurdish but have in the city. Kurds made up 20–25% the majority population in three portions Which people are “truly” Kurds—only neglected ties with their ancestral villages of Aleppo’s population before the war, of northern Syria: the Kurd Dagh (Kurd those who speak Kurdish? What about for three generations and are now well in- mainly clustered in the northern parts

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   53 N 31. ROJAVA POPULATION AND FUTURE ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 2016

W E Tigris River Euphrates River Qamishlo Derik al-Malikiyah S Qamishli TURKEY Kobane Serekaniye Ain al-Arab Ras al-Ain 30% Gire Spi Efrin Jarabulus 55% Tal Abyad HESITSHE Afrin Manbij HASAKA Azaz 55% KOBANE CIZIRE al-Bab EFRIN (JAZIRA) Harem al-Shadadi Mediterranean Sea ALEPPO Lake Assad RAQQA IDLIB Jisr al-Shughour IRAQ

LATAKIA DEIR AL-ZOUR 0 100 km HAMA

2010 POPULATION BY CANTON ROJAVA ADMINISTRATION SYRIAN ADMINISTRATION

CIZIRE 1,300,000 Present Kurdish canton Canton border International border

EFRIN 900,000 Future Kurdish canton Canton center Province border

KOBANE 350,000 2010 Kurdish population Rojava capital Province center by canton Serekaniye Kurdish name Ras al-Ain Arabic name of the city. Since the 1970s, Aleppo has served as a natural outlet for the rural and car repair industries. Kurdish auto their entire lives without meeting people usually overcrowded with forty or more exodus from Kurd Dagh and the coun- shops gradually replaced those run by from Arab districts. They watch interna- children due to lack of investment from tryside around Kobane and Jarabulus. Armenians, while the Sheikh Maqsoud tional Kurdish television networks rath- the Ministry of Education.3 In response, Many Kurds preferred the city not only district has become a vast informal in- er than Syrian or other Arabic channels, Kurdish students often sidestep the dif- because of its numerous job opportu- dustrial zone where hundreds of small and they can content themselves with ficulties of learning Arabic, leave school nities, but also because it contained apartment workshops supply textile speaking Kurdish in their daily lives, early, and find jobs in garages or work- entire neighborhoods where they felt wholesalers. since Arabic is only a foreign language shops. The level of education in these free to speak their language without Wadi Doumar and Sheikh Maq- taught at school. Indeed, the govern- districts is lower than the national aver- discrimination. This was not the case in soud highlight the problem with calling ment has failed to implement special age, which has limited Kurdish access to smaller towns such as Manbij and al- Syria’s cities “mixed” or holding them curricula for students with a different the civil service and skilled jobs while Bab, where Kurdish minorities adopted up as models of sectarian coexistence. mother tongue, so all classes are taught transforming large areas into ghettos. a more discreet profile. Aleppo has even These districts are essentially Kurdish in Arabic. Partly as a result of this lan- Even so, a Kurdish intellectual middle developed a Kurdish entrepreneurial mini-cities nestled within larger Arab guage gap, many local teachers show lit- class developed in Damascus and Aleppo bourgeoisie rooted in the city’s textile cities. Kurdish residents could easily live tle effort in their classrooms, which are over the years, and its members were ea-

54   fabrice balanche N 32. ARABIZATION OF VILLAGE NAMES IN NORTHERN SYRIA W E Tigris River Euphrates River S Qamishli al-Malikiyah TURKEY Kobane Ras al-Ain Jarabulus al-Raai Tal Abyad Tal Tamer Afrin Azaz Manbij HASAKA Mediterranean Sea al-Bab Harem al-Shadadi ALEPPO Kasab Lake Assad IDLIB RAQQA IRAQ Jisr al-Shughour LATAKIA DEIR AL-ZOUR

0 100 km HAMA

ETHNICITY

Desert area Armenian Kurdish Province center Province border (Arab population)

Turkmen Arab Arabization of Locality International border village names 1958–1970 Assyrian Kurdish and Arab

ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE PKK cohorts launched cross-border at- The 2004 Hasaka uprising and sub- ON DAMASCUS ger to integrate into wider urban society. tacks into Turkey with the Assad regime’s sequent crackdown were perhaps the For many of them, the Syrian Commu- tacit approval. These operations helped final nails in the coffin of Kurdish inte- The Kurdish territories of northern Syria nist Party served as a vehicle for such in- spread the Baathist idea that Syrian gration into Syrian society, prefiguring suffer from chronic underdevelopment tegration. Unlike the Baath, the SCP did Kurds were of foreign origin, and that the country’s general fragmentation as linked to years of Arabization policies not promote Arab nationalism; in fact, their status as “guests” (even those with minorities retreated into religious and and geopolitical problems with Turkey Kurdish politician Khaled Bakdash was Syrian citizenship) precluded them from ethnic solidarities (see the PYD section and Iraq. A slow economic opening with the party’s president for decades.4 claiming any political space in the Syrian of this chapter for more on that upris- Ankara began in 2005, but it was not suf- At the national level, however, the nation. The regime eventually expelled ing). For many of the Damascus Kurds ficient to reverse the situation prior to the notion of Kurdish integration was chal- the PKK amid Turkish military threats, who felt compelled to flee the country war. Developments since then have ren- lenged by the presence of Abdullah Oca- but the perception of Kurds as outsid- during the current war, this meant tak- dered Kurdish trade via Iraq and Turkey lan, the Kurdistan Workers Party leader ers did not fade. And while the group’s ing refuge in Iraqi Kurdistan rather than complicated or impossible, but the PYD who fled to Syria from Turkey in 1979. departure allowed for the emergence of other neighboring countries, where they has nonetheless maintained economic re- He was granted refuge in Damascus un- other Kurdish political voices, the PKK’s believed they would be less welcome due lations with the regime zone and hopes to til 1998, during which time he and his influence persisted via the PYD. to their ethnicity. increase its export options in the future.

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   55 Hasaka Treated Like (which has become known as the Jazira however, these reforms were only par- completed, including those aimed at ad- an Internal Colony canton of Rojava) was completely isolat- tially applied. Large estates were expro- dressing urgent water problems. For decades, Syria’s borders with Turkey ed, despite occupying a long strip of the priated, but the land was not given to Water Scarcity and Iraq were real barriers to economic northeastern border. Damascus treated the peasantry. Instead, the state rented activity in the northern provinces. The it like an internal colony. Before the war, it to a relatively small number of indi- Agricultural practices in Hasaka re- custom houses in Qamishli and Ras al- Hasaka’s residents produced a third of viduals—usually regime cadres, includ- main very traditional, so the area has Ain were open only a few hours a day, Syria’s oil, most of its cotton, and half ing many of the same wealthy families suffered dramatically from water scar- 6 and the Turkish consulate in Aleppo of its cereals, which helped to ensure the that had previously owned it. Hafiz city since the beginning of the century. 5 was the closest means of obtaining a country’s food independence. In return, al-Assad did not want Kurdish peasants Overconsumption of water on the Turk- visa. Until 2008, Syrians had to apply however, the central government ex- to benefit from the land redistribution ish side of the border contributed to this for visas to travel to Turkey, and those ploited this wealth for its own purposes because that could have given them un- problem, and the Assad regime made no with Kurdish or Armenian names of- without reinvesting export profits back precedented political weight in the long serious attempts to resolve it. Unlike in ten faced delays in obtaining the nec- into the region. term. By renting the land out, the Baath the Euphrates Valley, where farmers re- essary documents. As a result of such Local educational efforts lapsed as regime kept the Kurds in a perpetual ceive cheap and abundant water due to obstacles, Syrian trade with Turkey was well. Technically, schooling was man- state of dependence while also main- major state irrigation projects, farms in meager in size and conducted mainly datory up to age fourteen in Syria, but taining leverage on the former landown- northern Hasaka are supplied by private through Bab al-Hawa west of Aleppo many children in Hasaka province left ing class. Assad was able to “clientelize” wells. In the years leading up to the war, rather than through Kurdish areas along well before then to help their parents these notables by implicitly threatening drought and the tripling of the price of the northern frontier. with agricultural work. Tens of thou- not to renew their leases. fuel (which farmers use for motorized Similarly, the Iraqi border was often sands of Hasaka residents were landless Hasaka was also left out of the so- water pumps) caused a significant reduc- closed because the two countries had peasants who rented their services to cioeconomic development seen in other tion in Hasaka’s cultivated areas.7 been enemies since the 1960s; the enmi- large farms, so they could not afford to rural areas of Syria after the agrarian re- In 2008, an extensive irrigation plan ty was so strong that Iraqis were one of send their children to school. By 2004, forms, particularly the coastal Alawite based on water from the Tigris River only two nationalities barred from hold- government census data indicated that region. The province was still lagging was announced, but the lack of political ing a Syrian passport (Israelis being the illiteracy had reached a record level of behind in public services before the war. will from Damascus and the outbreak other). Baghdad moved closer to Syria 30% in the province. Local Kurdish Half the population resided in localities of the war blocked its implementation. in the 1990s following the U.S. embar- children often had great difficulty fol- that did not have a municipality, so they In the future, water scarcity will be the go, and Syrian markets benefited from lowing a state-mandated curriculum had to go to the provincial capital for all main problem facing Rojava because increased trade. Yet the flow of goods taught in Arabic since that is not their of their administrative needs; more seri- agriculture is the population’s principal largely bypassed the northern Kurdish mother tongue. ously, this meant there was no mecha- source of income. Kurdish administra- provinces; most items bound for Aleppo Hasaka’s agricultural proletariat was nism through which to carry out local tors in Hasaka/Jazira have indicated went through the eastern border cross- (and in many ways remains) an anach- development. After the 2004 revolt and that establishing a Tigris pump station ing at Abu Kamal, while those bound ronism in Syria. During and after the crackdown, the regime launched a de- is probably a priority,8 but fulfilling that for Damascus went through al-Tanf in agrarian reforms of 1963–1970, large velopment plan for Hasaka, presumably pledge would require an agreement with the south. estates in most of the country were dis- believing it would limit future protests. Iraq and Turkey before tapping into the In light of these policies, the large mantled and redistributed to landless Yet this plan was never fully imple- transnational river. Bashar al-Assad ob- Kurdish-majority province of Hasaka peasants as freehold land. In Hasaka, mented; projects were launched but not tained such permission from Turkey in

56   fabrice balanche 2008, but the war has changed all of the relevant parameters. Another option for Rojava is to develop irrigation plans that draw on the Euphrates dam at al-Thaw- 33. CHANGE IN IRRIGATED LAND, NORTHEAST SYRIA, 2001–2009 ra, but that would create potentially serious issues with Arab farmers and tribes N Tigris River 25%–43.2% decrease living downstream. W E al-Malikiyah If Rojava chooses to cut ties with TURKEY Qamishli 0%–25% decrease S the Assad regime, the Kurdish region’s Ras al-Ain 0%–25% increase bounty of arable land could help it be- Tal Abyad Aleppo 25%–50% increase come economically independent, since HASAKA Balikh River the Hasaka/Jazira region remains Syria’s 50%–87.5% increase largest producer of wheat and cotton. Yet Uninhabited area these production levels are dependent

al-Thawra IRAQ River on water, so the Kurds would need to RAQQA reduce their consumption rates through Euphrates River Province border better irrigation techniques. Local peas- District border ants still tend to use traditional gravity Khabur River feed systems, which waste a lot of wa- Province center ter. For instance, if farmers using this Hama DEIR AL-ZOUR District center method want to get one cubic meter of water to their crops, they must draw sev- Mayadin Homs en times that amount from their source. With a sprinkler system, however, they

Abu Kamal would need to draw just two cubic me- ters.9 Prior to the war, few farmers used Source: Ministry of Agriculture, sprinklers in Hasaka province, and the 0 100 200 km Damascus regime bureaucracy dragged its feet on modernization efforts for years. Perhaps Rojava’s administrators will prove more efficient if given full autonomy to implement their own irrigation plans.

Oil Wealth The Hasaka/Jazira region also holds significant oil reserves that could be a major asset for Rojava. In 2010, the local

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   57 al-Malikiyah and al-Shadadi oil fields and the KRG has been erratic, so estab- Western Syria needs the cotton, wheat, owner of FlyDamas, the principal airline provided around one-third of Syria’s to- lishing a stable oil export route is hardly and oil produced in Hasaka/Jazira, while serving Qamishli. Despite being located tal output of 383,000 barrels per day.10 a given. the Kurds need to export their raw ma- deep within Rojava, Qamishli Airport is Since then, that figure has collapsed terials and import manufactured goods. still under the Syrian army’s control. The due to lack of maintenance and closed Still Firmly in Syria’s This development also makes Rojava PYD never tried to take it because it is pipelines, which made export impracti- Economic Space less dependent on the KRG for supplies; an indispensable means of communica- cable. Nevertheless, restoring that flow These transnational Kurdish tensions the northeastern passage to Peshkhabur, tion for Rojava. The two daily flights to could give the Kurds energy autonomy; could cause long-term problems for Iraq, is no longer the only international Damascus are full of essential cargo, as oil is already a major source of revenue Rojava because the KRG is its only trade route open to it. are two weekly flights to Beirut and one for the Rojava administration, which direct overland connection with the To be sure, Kurdish wartime trade weekly flight to Kuwait.12 The airport is sells it inside PYD territory and exports outside world. The Turkish border is relations with western Syria were ongo- also the easiest way for local civilians to small amounts of it to the regime zone closed, much of the Euphrates Valley is ing even before February’s Afrin linkup. travel abroad. The nearest international by truck. If Rojava can overcome the controlled by IS (though perhaps not Goods continued to circulate between airport is Erbil, a full day’s drive away in transportation hurdle, it could eventu- for much longer), and the reopened Rojava and regime territory, with taxes Iraq. Crossing the Tigris to Peshkhabur ally export most of its production. Manbij-Aleppo road can only be con- levied by the army, Assad-allied militias, is a painstaking process because civilians That hurdle is a tall one, however. Di- sidered a foreign connector so long as and even certain rebel/jihadist groups. cannot use the local barge, which is re- rect export via Turkey seems impossible Rojava remains in the Assad regime’s For example, trucks transporting Jazi- served for cargo trucks; customs formal- given Ankara’s hostility toward the PYD, good graces. When the Syrian army ra’s grain harvest to the regime zone ities take up ample time as well. More- which it considers an arm of the PKK. met up with the PYD/SDF south of had to pay a commission to IS forces over, prior to the Manbij-Aleppo linkup, Alternatively, if the original pipeline to Manbij in February 2017, Kurdish au- when passing through their territory.11 Qamishli Airport was the only way for the coastal terminal of Baniyas were re- thorities characterized it as a means of And whenever Afrin was supplied with Rojava civilians to move to and from opened, the Kurds could sell oil to the linking Afrin with the eastern cantons. fuel from refineries in the Rmelan re- the western regime zone. Thousands of Assad regime, though Damascus would The PYD would have preferred to con- gion east of Qamishli, Turkish-backed Kurdish students who attend universi- surely oppose paying full price for “its trol this link with its own troops rather rebels in between the two areas used to ties in Aleppo, Damascus, Homs, and own oil.” Rojava could also use the Iraqi than relying on the regime, but Turkish take as much as half the cargo in “tolls.” Latakia have therefore faced the prospect Kurdish pipeline to Turkey, though that operations in the preceding weeks had Since February 2017, however, Kurds of not being able to return home during would require reaching an agreement blocked its westward march. Even so, have been able to send fuel through the the war. Access to the capital is essential with Baghdad and/or the Kurdistan Re- the development gives Rojava a means reopened army corridor between Man- for medical reasons as well—Rojava hos- gional Government (KRG). The faction of preventing Ankara from boxing it in bij and Afrin via Aleppo. Assad’s forces pitals are poorly equipped, and most of currently in power there, the Kurdistan politically or economically. have kept their own tolls relatively low their medicines come from the regime Democratic Party (KDP), has very bad Going forward, the Manbij-Aleppo to incentivize the use of regime-con- zone.13 Public salaries and pensions from relations with the PYD due to decades- linkup will facilitate the circulation of trolled roads. Damascus have also arrived by plane. In long tensions with the PKK; the Iraqi goods between Afrin and the rest of Ro- Facilitating trade with Rojava helps short, Kurdish authorities do not yet and Turkish groups follow entirely dif- java. Fortunately for the PYD, Assad has Assad politically as well, keeping the have the means to replace the Syrian ferent ideologies and are led by strong a mutual interest in expanding econom- Kurds under his economic influence state in many sectors, so they will likely leaders who detest each other. Partly as ic relations with the Kurds, so he is un- while also benefiting key associates and do whatever is required to preserve the a result, trade between the Syrian Kurds likely to cut this flow off anytime soon. family members such as Rami Makhlouf, Qamishli and Manbij links.

58   fabrice balanche Ideology vs. Economic Pragmatism ful textile industry and was exported in Hasaka. While the state opened two siderable oil reserves; most other elec- The PYD takeover of Hasaka province for great profit, so farmers were forced spinning mills there, most of the coun- tricity came from the Baath, Tishrin, in 2012, followed by the breakdown of into strict regime-mandated production try’s cotton was processed in Aleppo and and Thawra dams on the Euphrates. By territorial continuity with the regime plans that excluded most other crops. the coastal region. The province had no enforcing such economic dependency, zone when rebels seized the Euphrates Public offices supplied them with seeds textile sector to speak of, and its agro- the regime hoped to avoid any secession- Valley, completely disorganized the lo- and bought their whole crop at prices food industry was limited to a few ar- ist attempts by the Kurds—in striking cal economy. As described previously, fixed by the state; they also received fer- tisanal dairies and flour mills for local contrast to the Alawite coastal region, Hasaka’s role had been limited to pro- tilizer from the huge chemical plant in needs. It had no refineries or plastics which Bashar’s father endowed with all ducing raw materials, including some Homs at low cost. industry either. The Rmelan thermal the infrastructure needed to establish an 80 percent of Syria’s cotton.14 This Meanwhile, the creation of local in- power plant covered only strategic needs independent sectarian bunker if the re- “white gold” fed the country’s power- dustrial enterprises was long forbidden related to extracting the province’s con- gime ever lost power in Damascus.

N 34. SYRIAN KURDS BREAK ENCIRCLEMENT, April 2017

W E Tigris River Euphrates River S Peshkhabur al-Malikiyah TURKEY Kobane Qamishli Jarabulus Ras al-Ain Bab al-Salam Tal Tamer Azaz Tal Abyad Katuniyeh Afrin Manbij Hasaka Sinjar Mountains Bab al-Hawa al-Bab al-Shadadi Aleppo Lake Assad Mediterranean Sea Raqqa Idlib al-Tabqa Jisr al-Shughour IRAQ Latakia Deir al-Zour

0 100 km Hama

AREAS OF CONTROL Inhabited | Uninhabited SDF Rojava commercial route Province center Province border

Syrian army Closure Locality International border

Sunni Arab rebels Border crossing Oil eld Civilian airport open

Islamic State New opening for Rojava

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   59 Since gaining control in Hasaka and 35. ROJAVA AS A FUTURE CORRIDOR TO THE SEA other areas, the PYD has been pushing for a self-sufficient economy to liberate itself from unequal relations with Da- mascus. It also rejects capitalism and Black Sea seeks to promote the philosophy of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, who has long Istanbul advocated Marxist-leaning policies. At the moment, however, these ideas can Yerevan Caspian Sea only be implemented on a small scale in Ankara Rojava, so Kurdish authorities likely feel compelled to continue opening up their

Tabriz territory, exporting their raw materials, Diyarbakir PKK and trading for manufactured products Gaziantep Qamishli (see the “PYD Path to Socialism” sec- Iskenderun Qandil Erbil ROJAVA Mosul Tehran tion below for more on this dilemma). te state awi ? Aleppo Sinjar Al The Kurdish communities in Rojava are Jisr al-Shughour Kirkuk Latakia KRG Hamadan very resilient and can accept spartan liv- UNSTABLE ARAB SUNNI AREA ing conditions, but many residents have Mediterranean Sea Syria state? ern been leaving the region throughout the est W Baghdad Damascus war. To stop this population hemorrhage, the PYD will need to develop the economy, which requires freer movement of goods internationally. In this context, opening a second Basra commercial route to Iraq would strongly reinforce Rojava’s autonomy, and much P N e rs more rapidly than the slow and uncer- ia n G W E u tain construction of a self-sufficient lf 0 400 km economy. A new land route to Kirkuk S Red Sea could break Hasaka’s dependence on the Peshkhabur border crossing, which Kurdish-majority areas Claimed Rojava PKK stronghold PKK headquaters KRG control O cial KRG (per Kurdish Institute of Paris) remains under full KDP control and presents a host of political and practical obstacles. A new route could pass south of the Yazidi Mountains, then through Sinjar and Tal Afar in western Iraq, and

60   fabrice balanche finally on to Kirkuk through the Tigris the wake of the September 2017 Iraqi cal Arab tribes whom it had armed over Following the death of Hafiz al-Assad Valley. All of these areas are now con- Kurdish independence referendum, the years specifically to keep the Kurds in 2000...relations between Syria and trolled by the Iraqi army and associated which spurred heavy backlash interna- in check. Officially, the crackdown the government of Turkish prime Shia militias.15 tionally, regionally, and domestically.16 killed 43, injured hundreds more, and minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan began to improve rapidly. Dozens of PKK To be sure, the feasibility of opening resulted in about 2,000 arrests, but the activists based in Syria were handed this route is not yet assured. As of this PYD HEGEMONY actual numbers were probably much over to Turkish authorities, while for- writing, the Islamic State is still pres- higher than these biased regime statis- mer PKK fighters returning to Syria ent south of Sinjar, while the KDP and The PYD dominates the Syrian Kurd- tics.17 Several hundred activists escaped, were given prison sentences ranging PKK are locked in a standoff over con- ish political scene and has become a mainly to Iraq Kurdistan, where they from one to ten years. Despite this trol of that city following violent clashes key military actor in the war, courted are still gathered in camps today (e.g., context of adversity, Syrian PKK mili- earlier in 2017. Moreover, KDP leader by both the United States and Russia. Sumel northeast of Dahuk). tants established the [PYD] in 2003, Masoud Barzani and Turkish president Its main goal is to unify the country’s After the revolt, the regime promised with two objectives: escaping state repression and maintaining the support Recep Tayyip Erdogan both oppose any Kurdish territories and then proclaim the Kurds it would ameloriate their eco- of the PKK’s thousands of members strategic axis that opens Rojava up to its autonomy within the framework of nomic and political situation, but little and sympathizers.21 the outside world and reinforces its geo- a future Syrian federation. Yet this goal, was actually done. Public investment political importance for Iran. Kirkuk is coupled with its apparent commitment remained very limited. The previously The 2011 national uprising reawak- partly under the sway of the Patriotic to implementing the PKK’s communist stateless bedoon were officially permit- ened Kurdish contestation of regime Union of Kurdistan (PUK), a KRG fac- ideology, is fraught with difficulties and ted to obtain Syrian nationality in control in the north. As protests esca- tion that is close with Tehran and Bagh- could put the PYD at odds with local 2011,18 but few Kurds seemed to receive lated, Assad did not want to multiply dad, unlike Barzani’s party. If the Syrian Arabs, policymakers in Washington, their citizenship papers after requesting the number of potential fronts he faced, Kurds establish a direct corridor to the and entrenched business interests. them.19 The only notable change was so he normalized relations with the city, they might forge a link with Iran regime tolerance toward the creation of PKK that spring in order to placate the in the process, perhaps through Sulay- The PYD’s Military Rise Kurdish political parties. Around a hun- PYD and its Syrian Kurdish constitu- maniyah further east of Kirkuk. Theo- In March 2004, the Kurdish population dred were formed, most of them serving ents. This also served to counter Turkey, retically, Rojava could then become in Qamishli rose up against the regime as extensions of individual clans. From which openly supported Syria’s Sunni an Iranian transit route between Iraq, to protest discrimination, economic the regime’s perspective, this political Arab opposition. The signing of a truce western Syria, and even the Mediter- misery, and underdevelopment in their fragmentation was useful in keeping the in 2011 between Tehran and the Iranian ranean coast, at least once U.S. forces region. The revolt spread to other Kurd- Kurds under control. branch of the PKK, the Party for a Free leave eastern Syria. Although this is not ish areas of Syria, including Afrin, Ja- After the PYD was formally estab- Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), also helped the shortest potential westward route rabulus, Kobane, and districts of Alep- lished, however, it took advantage of the the PYD, since the Assad regime quick- for Iran, it would have the advantage po and Damascus. In response, army regime’s new tolerance to expand its in- ly followed the cue of its Iranian patron of circumventing IS strongholds along forces closed Kurdish neighborhoods in fluence, especially in Afrin and Kobane. by treating the PKK and PYD favorably. the Syria-Iraq border, where the terror- the cities while police systematically ar- The party was an offshoot of the PKK,20 Meanwhile, the KDP’s influence on ists are likely to take refuge after being rested men over age fifteen. The regime which had lost its influence on Syrian the Syrian scene began to wane, due in expelled from Raqqa and Mosul. Of also sent Gen. Maher al-Assad’s Re- Kurds after Ocalan and his cadres were part to the Iraqi party’s ongoing ten- course, all of these scenarios will like- publican Guard to Hasaka province to expelled from Syria in 1998. According sions with the PKK and PYD. In 2011, ly become even more complicated in quell the revolt, in partnership with lo- to scholar Jordi Tejel: President Barzani created the Kurdistan

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   61 National Council (ENKS in its Kurdish turn to. The party’s contributions to de- composed of former FSA Kurds, PYD/ plication has been limited because the acronym), which was intended to bring fending Ras al-Ain against rebels com- YPG forces, and local Arabs. Kurdish leadership is more concerned together Syrian Kurdish parties while ing from Turkey in winter 2012–201324 Meanwhile, the battle for Kobane had with the unification of Rojava and the deliberately excluding the PYD. At were a particularly potent boost to its another crucial outcome for the PYD war against IS. Regardless, the new au- first this initiative seemed like a viable influence in Hasaka province. Afrin besides boosting its local reputation: it thorities are working to implement this counterweight to the PYD thanks to the canton is still under threat from non- made the group Washington’s main ally PKK-inspired ideology on the ground. KDP’s considerable financial resources Kurdish rebel groups and even Turkish against IS from 2015 onward, much to Abdullah Ocalan has written a series and reasonable working relations with troops,25 spurring many locals to back the dismay of Turkey and the decom- of books proposing a societal model for Baghdad. By 2012, however, Barzani the PYD out of necessity. posing FSA.27 U.S. arms, air support, the Kurdish people, and his “Ocalanism” was greatly distracted by conflicts with The PYD’s decision to field its own and other assistance have enabled PYD was directly inspired by American social internal rivals and the Iraqi central gov- Kurdish militia and launch offensives forces to extend their territorial control theorist Murray Bookchin, a radical left- ernment, which diverted attention and outside its area of control also contrib- in the east and strengthen their influence ist who wanted to break down capital- resources from Syria. uted to the FSA’s loss of prominence on the Kurdish population. Moreover, ism through “libertarian municipalism.” The PYD has taken advantage of within the wider Syrian rebellion. Early Arab brigades that wish to fight IS in Bookchin believed that capitalism’s fatal these factors to impose itself all the more in the war, the FSA had a significant the Euphrates region have been com- flaw lay in its conflict with nature—that during the war,22 despite the multiplica- number of Kurdish fighters, and its pelled to join the PYD-led SDF coali- is, by destroying the environment, capi- tion of other Kurdish parties in previ- clashes with the PYD put these fighters tion if they want to receive U.S. weap- talism will inevitably create a major cri- ous years, and despite the fact that rival in a very uncomfortable situation. The ons. Some Arab militias have taken the sis and consume itself. In his first book factions believe it professes a retrograde PYD depicted Kurdish FSA members alternative path of seeking Turkish rather on radical ecology,28 he recommended and authoritarian ideology.23 Officially, as traitors to Rojava’s cause, while the than American support, for instance by the decentralization of polluted metro- the PYD espouses Ocalan’s ideas about Sunni Arab opposition grew increas- backing Ankara’s September 2016 inter- politan centers and pesticide-ridden in- evolving from Marxism-Leninism to ingly wary of them, especially as radical vention in northern Syria. Yet this path dustrial farms so that people could live socialist self-management, but in prac- elements began to take over the rebel- is more limited than the SDF option on a smaller scale, produce their food lo- tice the party has tended more toward lion. By 2014, Jabhat al-Nusra was busy because “pro-Turkish” rebels are bound cally, use renewable energy, and manage “democratic centralism,” which effec- eliminating or absorbing secular rebel by Ankara’s agreements with Russia. In their own affairs. tively amounts to monopolizing power. groups, and Kurds were leaving the FSA the interest of protecting its client regime On the latter front, he recommended Its leaders advocate a federal Syria to jus- en masse, joining with Arab fighters to in Damascus, the Kremlin has restricted democratizing urban neighborhoods by tify Kurdish autonomy, but few Syrians form the militia Jaish al-Thuwar (Army how far these brigades can advance into empowering citizen assemblies. These outside Rojava have seriously proposed of Rebels). Members of this militia of- Syria, while the U.S.-backed forces have assemblies could then confederate at dif- that option. ten found themselves at odds with radi- advanced as far south as Deir al-Zour on ferent levels: city, region, and so forth. Perhaps most important, the PYD is cal Arab groups; in February 2016 they September 2017. They would send delegates to confederal the only Syrian Kurdish party with its played a major role in closing the Azaz councils to coordinate and administer own militia. Thus, whenever the rebel corridor by taking Minakh and Tal Ri- The PYD’s Path to Socialism policy. Power would be based among Free Syrian Army or jihadist groups like faat from their former rebel colleagues Officially, the PYD aims to promote the people, who would be directly repre- IS tried to take over Kurdish areas, the with indirect help from the Syrian army an original political and economic sys- sented at the top. In time, he theorized, local population sought protection from and Russian aviation.26 Jaish al-Thuwar tem in northern Syria based on self- confederal municipalities would become the PYD because they had no one else to eventually joined the SDF, which is sufficiency and local democracy. Its ap- a counterweight to the nation-state, and

62   fabrice balanche capitalism would naturally disappear. ter assisted by two vice prime ministers, In addition, Rojava’s communes are to existing owner-farmers, who would Municipalities would expropriate major most of whom are non-Kurdish (e.g., supposed to organize economic life by no doubt prefer to continue working in- economic resources and “municipalize” Sunni Arab or Christian). Although promoting cooperatives. In the country- dividually. Moreover, market gardening the economy, which the community the PYD is an avowedly Kurdish party side, farmers are organized in groups of requires much greater personal invest- would take possession of. pursuing a clear sectarian policy, Ro- fifteen and asked to work together and ment than cereal farming, which is in- Bookchin never succeeded in popu- java’s prime ministers are careful to exchange surplus production with other compatible with the collectivist spirit the larizing his ideas among other radical respect diversity. cooperatives, including in the cities. This PYD has sought to inculcate. leftists, anarchists, or ecologists. Yet Oc- The three cantons are supposed to practice is in line with the goal of de- Meanwhile, industry is almost absent alan became his ideological disciple in be governed by an elected assembly that signing communes to be self-sufficient, from all of the cantons, mainly because 2004 after reading several of his works controls Rojava’s executive bureau, but with the eventual aim of eliminating the Assad regime preferred to keep things in prison. The PKK leader had been elections have not yet taken place (as of traders and money while establishing a that way for “security reasons.” As de- seeking a new ideology for the Kurd- this writing, TEV-DEM has scheduled bartering system. scribed previously, only two cotton mills ish people after renouncing Marxism- them for January 2018). Any such elec- Yet skepticism is warranted about the were built in the Hasaka/Jazira area; no Leninism. At the 2005 PKK congress, tions would be contrary to Bookchin’s principles behind these measures and other large-scale industrial facilities ex- Bookchin’s “libertarian municipalism” model of creating municipalities that their application on the ground. Until ist. To fill this gap and meet local needs, became the group’s official ideology. elect delegates to confederal councils. In recently, wartime disruptions had pushed PYD authorities would like investors to Today, the PYD seeks to implement Rojava, such municipalities are known Rojava’s population to organize a subsis- develop agro-food and manufacturing Ocalan’s municipalist principles in Syr- as communes (komun in Kurdish), tence economy, and the Kurdish zone’s industries. Yet attracting foreign inves- ia. Although the party does not officially each containing roughly 150 houses isolation created practical reasons to fa- tors into such an anti-capitalist system plan to build a Kurdish state there, it and around a thousand inhabitants. An vor self-sufficiency. Yet now that overland would be difficult. Entrepreneurship is does seek to create a democratic and elected communal council manages re- links are reopening, this policy can only encouraged in Rojava, but only within ecologically responsible society within lations between individual villages and be justified on the ideological level. the framework of cooperatives. Similar- the framework of a federal system. the established authorities; the latter of- In the agricultural sector, the new au- ly, engineers and technicians are needed In 2013, the PYD began to admin- ficials still run local public services such thorities in Jazira canton want to reduce to work for the “revolution,” but indi- ister territories under its control by es- as water and electricity, since the admin- their share of cereal and cotton produc- viduals with the necessary training tend tablishing the Movement for a Demo- istrative framework of the prewar mu- tion to make room for activities that to leave Rojava because salaries are too cratic Society (TEV-DEM), a coalition nicipalities has not disappeared. Ideally, would make local communities better low there. Moreover, many young men of civil associations and political fac- new municipalities would arise naturally able to feed themselves, such as market fear conscription and prefer to take ref- tions such as the Syriac Union Party from the communes, but in reality the gardening and arboriculture. To effect uge in Iraq. The middle classes in partic- (SUP), the Syrian Kurdish Democratic new and old structures exist in paral- this change, large estates and public lands ular are experiencing this demographic Peace Party (PADKS), and the Kurd- lel. The communes deliver certificates need to be entrusted to the population hemorrhage, since liberal professionals istan Liberal Union Party (PYLK). to the population for bread and fuel at and organized in cooperatives. Yet the and entrepreneurs are largely excluded In November 2013, TEV-DEM an- low prices; they also supervise the local people seem unlikely to embrace such a from the economic system currently be- nounced the creation of its own au- community and participate in its politi- system. The TEV-DEM program might ing set up. tonomous administration for Rojava cal education. This corresponds roughly seduce the landless peasants of Jazira, to The application of Ocalan’s theories and its three cantons. At the head of with the village “committees” of Com- whom the PYD plans to distribute for- is still modest in Rojava’s economic each canton is a Kurdish prime minis- munist China. mer public domains, but it is unpalatable sphere, as the PYD is aware that it risks

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   63 alienating a large part of the population, of changing Rojava society, and to fur- training Arab forces only to see them fall far cry from “half.” Realistically, only especially those who only rallied to the ther normalize relations with Damascus apart, though discrepancies in its state- some of the new recruits were Arabs, so group for fear of IS. The reopening of instead. The Kurdish cantons would ments about the SDF’s Arab contingent their true proportion is probably one- land communications with the Assad then be reinstated in the Syrian eco- are puzzling. On August 31, 2017, Army third of the SDF. regime zone has encouraged a return to nomic space, and impediments to pri- general Stephen Townsend, commander In August 2016, the launch of a the lucrative exportation of cereals and vate initiative would be lifted. Whichev- of the Combined Joint Task Force–Op- new Turkish-supported rebel opera- cotton. Moreover, manufactured goods er approach the party chooses, the local eration Inherent Resolve, estimated the tion known as Euphrates Shield created from the regime zone will likely flood population—Kurdish and non-Kurd- SDF’s total manpower at around 50,000 dissension inside the SDF, with several Rojava markets before any local produc- ish—will be more inclined to accept the fighters and noted that half of them are Arab tribes in northwestern Syria leav- tion could develop. Accordingly, local pursuit of some form of autonomy if Arab.29 On December 8, 2016, however, ing the PYD-led coalition to join the authorities may resort to protectionism their living conditions improve. Air Force spokesman Col. John Dorrian campaign. Among other objectives, to defend the cantons economically, per- stated that only 13,000 of the SDF’s Turkey sought to peel ethnic Turkmens haps by imposing tariffs and cutting off The PYD and Arab Loyalty 45,000 fighters were Arab.30 Other esti- away from the SDF, and it had the mon- the western Syrian market. Many inhabitants of PYD territory are mates of the Arab contingent are much ey and arms to do so. Going forward, If the PYD’s cooperative economic not Kurdish, so the group will need to lower, but even if Dorrian’s figures were the extent to which it can draw more Ar- system fails due to these pressures, the address any signs of internal sectarian accurate, they represented a surprisingly abs from the SDF depends on whether party would have two choices: coerce revolt if it hopes to maintain its con- large increase since the SDF’s creation in it unduly favors Turkmen fighters over locals into accepting Ocalan’s theories trol over Rojava. This likely means al- October 2015, when Arabs constituted Arabs, and on how deeply it decides to or declare a “pause” in implementation lowing self-government for local Arabs only 5,000 out of 30,000 total fighters.31 intervene in Syria. Euphrates Shield of- due to wartime circumstances, much and refraining from any attempts at Dorrian and Townsend’s figures also ficially ended in March 2017 when the like Vladimir Lenin did with the Soviet forced Kurdification. At present, the seem at odds for reasons other than tim- battle for al-Bab came to a close, but Union’s New Economic Policy in 1920. PYD’s governing policy appears flex- ing. It is difficult to believe that 25,000 Ankara still hopes to push the SDF east In the first scenario, the “communaliza- ible enough to accommodate such an Arab fighters are currently in the SDF of the Euphrates River. Another Turk- tion” of Rojava’s economy would entail approach, but once the Islamic State is because that would mean the number ish campaign has been underway since the expropriation of property belonging defeated—that is, when the common of Kurdish fighters has decreased from October, officially against Arab jihadists to certain social groups, namely, constit- enemy disappears—building strong 32,000 to 25,000 since December 2016. in Idlib province, but in reality against uencies deemed opponents of the PYD. relations with Arabs inside Rojava will Attributing that drop to losses from the PYD’s Afrin stronghold.32 Selective This property would then be redistrib- pose a greater challenge. the Raqqa battle is not tenable—more Turkish support to some Arab factions uted to the party’s own base with the ob- In their southward progress toward likely, the U.S. military does not want could revive a tribal war for local power jective of strengthening its influence and and past Raqqa, the SDF have received to specify the actual number of Arab and delay the final victory against IS. eliminating the Assad regime’s. Such additional backing from anti-IS Arab fighters because they are still a minor- For the PYD, then, the big question efforts would also indicate a separatist clans. These forces have joined up with ity. Whatever the case, if the SDF gained is how to retain the loyalty of its Arab mindset, despite the federal model the the PYD-led coalition not out of any in- 5,000 new fighters between December allies in the long term. The group has PYD has been outwardly promoting. herent affinity, but because the SDF is the 2016 and August 2017 (from 45,000 partly addressed this issue by permitting In the second scenario, a “pause” in lone repository for American weapons. to 50,000), and if all of them are Arab, Arab self-governance in parts of Ro- economic collectivization would likely For its part, the U.S. military has then the current Arab contingent should java and coopting local leaders in Arab spur the PYD to renounce its intention sought to avoid repeating the mistake of be 18,000 at most, or around 36%—a councils while keeping military power

64   fabrice balanche for itself. Arab intertribal divisions and stroyed Kurdish villages around the while neglecting Kurdish communities. players can have unforeseen repercus- the SDF’s monopoly on U.S. support city and expelled Kurdish civilians from Such tensions are no doubt complicat- sions. While arms and money might have also kept many clans from turning the district. Such acts drew retribution ing the PYD’s bid for hegemony in the hold together a coalition against IS, against the PYD. In Afrin, the group ap- when the PYD retook the city in 2015, area today. establishing stability afterward will be pears to be receiving Russian support,33 despite reassurances to the contrary by Economic dynamics could widen a great challenge. Building better rela- giving local Arabs further incentive to the group’s leader, Salih Muslim. In a Arab/Kurdish fissures as well. At present, tions between Kurds and Arabs will not partner with it. Yet the opposition regu- 2013 interview, Muslim had stated that Rojava is suffering under an economic be easy, but it is the only way to forestall larly accuses the PYD of engaging in eth- his militias would fight jihadist groups embargo maintained by Turkey and the future sectarian clashes in the north. nic cleansing against Arab and Turkmen but would not force out local Arabs, KRG. The restrictions have pushed many populations in Rojava, and the group’s whether transplants or natives: middle-class Kurds to emigrate, allowing A DIFFICULT FUTURE FOR leaders have only partially dispelled these the PYD to gain strength by pursuing There are three types of Arabs among KURDISH AUTONOMY concerns. The Kurds have clearly sought us: there are those with whom we have control over a working-class economy to strengthen their demographic weight always lived and fought alongside. rooted in handicrafts and agriculture. Many questions remain about the fu- in Rojava. In October 2015, Amnesty We defend the brotherhood among For those Kurds who remain in Rojava, ture of Rojava, and most of the answers International denounced the PYD for these people. There are those who do accepting material sacrifices is an accept- will depend on how the region’s au- preventing some displaced Arab villagers not belong, Arabs who came from able cost for living in a region ruled by thorities handle local sectarian fissures. outside, other countries or the area, from returning to their homes near Tal their PYD kinsmen. Yet the Arab popu- The territory is stretched into a thin the jihadists who have burned our Abyad and Tal Tamer.34 In response, the lation does not share this sentiment, so 800-kilometer-long strip, bordered to home and decapitated Kurds. Finally, party claimed that it had to secure the there are the Arabs who were moved they would more willingly turn against the north by a hostile Turkey and to the area first, since the proximity of IS forces to Kurdistan by force by Hafiz al- the party if other political or economic south by Arab populations who thus far made it impossible for civilians to return Assad...to Arabize the area. They are alternatives arise. Critics of Kurdish refuse to recognize a reversal of power in safely. By March 2017, the Arab village victims...and we advocate a peaceful rule emerged in Manbij38 after the SDF the Kurds’ favor. The Kurdish popula- of Tal Fweida near Tal Tamer was still solution for these populations. Those seized it from IS in summer 2016, most tion is not a majority in the Euphrates empty.35 This community had support- who can return to their hometowns likely because Turkey restricted humani- Valley, where the SDF is fighting IS, ed IS during its February 2015 offen- should do so and the others can live tarian access to the area.39 In contrast, so Rojava authorities are unlikely to in peace with the Kurds.36 sive against Assyrian villages along the such access was encouraged after Tur- annex that area post-Raqqa. Yet they Khabur River; when IS later withdrew, Muslim was referring to the “Arab key defeated IS in Jarabulus on August would certainly prefer that the Arab the Arab population followed. The same belt” created in the 1960s when the re- 2016. Ankara no doubt wants to show tribes who do assume control there are process apparently occurred around Tal gime moved Arab populations from the residents of PYD-held Manbij and Tal willing to maintain good relations with Abyad when the SDF liberated it from Raqqa area closer to the Turkish border. Abyad that they can have a better quality Rojava. In addition to snuffing out the IS in June 2015. That move involved around 25,000 of life under non-Kurdish leadership.40 IS threat, this is likely a major reason Kurds have indisputably practiced people at most—a relatively small num- The July 2017 assassination of Manbij why the SDF have been deployed into ethnic cleansing in cases where local ber given Rojava’s current population of councilman Sheikh Shlash Ghaniemi41 the Euphrates Valley—to cultivate and Arabs helped Islamist fighters displace around 2 million.37 Yet the Baath regime shows the extent to which the area is be- empower Arab allies. Kurds and seize their properties. In inflamed sectarian tensions dispropor- ing violently contested. Inside Rojava, the PYD successfully spring 2013, after PYD forces briefly tionately over the course of decades by In short, the local environment is imposed itself by force and through fear captured Tal Abyad, IS fighters de- showing favoritism toward local Arabs complex, and any actions by outside of IS. Now that the latter threat is wan-

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   65 ing, however, the group will need to set only as a vehicle for establishing Rojava’s Assad regime ultimately prevails over the form], in André Raymond, ed., La Syrie d’Aujourd’hui (Paris: National Center up a viable government while mulling autonomy, while both the Sunni Arab Sunni Arab rebellion and reestablishes for Scientific Research, 1980), http:// the major risks inherent in commit- opposition and the Assad regime reject control over more of Syria, the Kurds books.openedition.org/iremam/744. ting the population to a socialist proj- it completely. In truth, PYD leaders would be forced to withdraw into their 7. Fabrice Balanche, “Le programme ect comparable to the Chinese Cultural are focused on maximizing the state of sectarian strongholds of Afrin, Kobane, de modernisation de l’irrigation en Revolution of the 1960s. One can only grace they have earned through fight- and Qamishli, where they might enjoy Syrie” [The modernization of irrigation systems in the Syrian northeast], Médi- be skeptical about the sustainability ing IS. They are rushing to consolidate some autonomy but would have to use terranée 119 (2012), https://mediterra- of such an economic system, even if their power and to Kurdify Rojava, as regime-controlled roads to communi- nee.revues.org/6499. the population is willing to accept the seen in the expulsion of any hostile Arab cate between cantons. 8. According to author discussions with constraints of following the path traced populations that supported IS (whether Abdullilah Arabo, vice president of the Movement for a Democratic Society by Ocalan. directly or tacitly) and the implementa- (TEV-DEM), and Mohamad Dirok, vice On the geopolitical level, the PYD tion of Kurdish educational curricula. Notes president of economic policy for Jazira seems caught on a narrowing path be- Those Arabs who want their children to 1. Jacques Weulersse, Le pays des canton, Qamishli, March 2017. tween the United States and Russia. receive an Arabic education now have to Alaouites [The country of the Alawites] 9. According to a January 2011 survey (Institut Français de Damas, 1940). conducted by the author under the American support against IS allows the leave Rojava (private Christian schools 2. Fabrice Balanche, “Clientélisme, com- auspices of the Plan for the Moder- Kurdish group to strengthen its ter- are allowed to teach in Arabic, but only munautarisme et fragmentation territo- nization of Irrigation in Syria, a joint ritorial grip, placate local Arabs, and to Christians42; this policy is the PYD’s riale en Syrie” [Clientelism, communi- venture between the Syrian Ministry of Agriculture and the French Develop- muzzle the various Kurdish opposition way of preserving its image as a protec- tarianism, and territorial fragmentation in Syria], A Contrario (March 2009), ment Agency. elements backed by the Iraqi KDP. Yet tor of Christians). https://www.cairn.info/revue-a-contra- 10. “Syria: International Energy Data and it is uncertain whether Washington will The future of Rojava depends on rio-2009-1-page-122.htm. Analysis,” U.S. Energy Information continue supporting the PYD once the the PYD’s ability to manuever between 3. These judgments are based on the au- Administration, June 24, 2015, https:// www.eia.gov/beta/international/analy- Islamic State is eliminated, especially in Washington and Moscow, obtain- thor’s personal observations and interviews conducted in Syria between 1990 sis.cfm?iso=SYR. light of Syrian Kurdish links with the ing benefits from both parties while and 2011. 11. Author interview with a Syrian busi- PKK, a U.S.-designated terrorist group avoiding military moves that alienate 4. Interestingly, the SCP has been divi- nessman in Beirut, March 2016. that has been at war with NATO ally either one. Yet the group’s margin for ded between two camps since 1986: a 12. Author interview with travel agency that Turkey since the 1970s. Russia will like- error is increasingly slim. The August Kurdish faction that supports the offi- books flights to Qamishli, March 2017. cial party leadership (which Bakdash’s ly agitate the Turkish threat against Ro- 2016 Turkish intervention in Jarabulus 13. Author interviews with doctors and widow assumed after his death in pharmacists in Qamishli and Hasaka, java if the Kurds fail to get along with showed how quickly Russia could lose 1995), and a Christian faction that has March 2017. Arab factions inside or outside their patience with the Kurds. And the inter- opposed some of the leadership’s poli- 14. “Statistical Abstract 2009,” Central Bu- territory. At the same time, Moscow vention that Ankara launched in north- cies (e.g., Bakdash’s decision to reject perestroika near the end of the Soviet reau of Statistics, Damascus, 2010. appears eager to keep the PYD in play ern Idlib in October 2017 is unfolding era). The sectarian nature of the split is 15. Dexter Filkins, “Iran Extends Its Reach in quite evident and reflects other mino- (albeit in weakened form) because the near the borders of Afrin—another ex- Syria,” New Yorker, June 9, 2017, http:// rity trends in Syria. group is a useful lever against the Assad ample of Russian-Turkish coordination www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/ regime and Ankara. unfavorable to the PYD. Turkey’s hos- 5. “Statistical Abstract 2009,” Central Bu- iran-extends-its-reach-in-syria. reau of Statistics, Damascus, 2010. As for the PYD’s oft-proposed fed- tility will make it difficult for Syrian 16. Michael Knights and Bilal Wahab, 6. Francoise Metral, “Le monde rural Sy- “Resetting U.S. Relations with the eral project for Syria, it is merely a chi- Kurds to achieve levels of development rien à l’ère des réformes (1958–1978)” Kurdistan Region,” PolicyWatch 2886 mera—the Kurds seem interested in it comparable to the KRG in Iraq. If the [The Syrian rural world in the age of re- (Washington Institute for Near East

66   fabrice balanche Policy, November 2, 2017), http://www. www.al-monitor.com/pulse/securi- What You Need to Know,” IRIN, Octo- 40. Haid Haid, “Post-ISIS Governance in washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analy- ty/01/11/kurds-caught-in-the-crossfire- ber 9, 2017, https://www.irinnews.org/ Jarablus: A Turkish-led Strategy,” Cha- sis/view/resetting-u.s.-relations-with- of-battles-for-northwestern-syria.html. analysis/2017/10/09/turkey-intervenes- tham House, September 2017, https:// the-kurdistan-region. 25. Fehim Tastekin, “Turkey’s real target on syria-what-you-need-know. www.chathamhouse.org/publication/ post-isis-governance-jarablus-turkish- 17. Jordi Tejel, “Les paradoxes du prin- way to Idlib: Kurds,” Al-Monitor, July 33. Fehim Tastekin, “Is Turkey rattled led-strategy. temps Kurde en Syrie” [The paradoxes 2, 2017, http://www.al-monitor.com/ by Russian-Kurdish deal?” Al-Mo- of the Kurdish spring in Syria], Politique pulse/originals/2017/06/turkey-syria- nitor, March 24, 2017, http://www.al- 41. “Arab tribal leader killed in bomb blast Etrangere (Summer 2014), https://www. kurds-real-target-on-way-to-idlib.html. monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/03/ in Syria’s Manbij,” ARA News, July 22, cairn.info/revue-politique-etrangere- 26. See Fabrice Balanche, “Kurdish Forces turkey-syria-russian-troops-arrive-afrin. 2017, http://aranews.net/2017/07/arab- 2014-2-page-51.htm?1=1&DocId=9441 Bolster Assad in Aleppo,” Policy Alert html. See also Barbara Slavin, “Syrian tribal-leader-killed-bomb-blast-syrias- 4&hits=10+8+5+. (Washington Institute for Near East Po- Kurdish leader: Moscow wants to work manbij. 18. “Syria’s Assad grants nationality to Ha- licy, July 29, 2016), http://www.washing- with us,” Al-Monitor, October 8, 2015, 42. Author interview with Christian authori- saka Kurds,” BBC News, April 7, 2011, toninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/ http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ori- ties in Qamishli, March 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/world- kurdish-forces-bolster-assad-in-aleppo. ginals/2015/10/kurdish-leader-pyd-russia-support-syria.html. middle-east-12995174. 27. “Erdogan spokesman slams U.S. mili- 19. Author interviews with bedoon in Hasa- tary for backing Syrian Kurdish militia,” 34. “‘We Had Nowhere to Go’: Forced Dis- ka province, March 2017. Reuters, January 12, 2017, http://www. placement and Demolitions in Northern Syria,” Amnesty International, October 20. Kyle W. Orton, “The Error of Arming reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis- syria-turkey-usa-idUSKBN14W0MZ. 13, 2015, http://www.amnesty.org/en/ the Syrian Kurds,” New York Times, documents/mde24/2503/2015/en. June 6, 2017, https://www.nytimes. 28. Murray Bookchin (writing under the com/2017/06/06/opinion/syria-kurds- pseudonym Lewis Herber), Our Synthe- 35. Based on the author’s observations isis-raqqa.html. tic Environment (New York: Knopf, 1962). during a visit to the area. 21. Jordi Tejel, “Syria’s Kurds: Troubled 29. U.S. Department of Defense, press 36. “Kurds Seek Autonomy in a Federal Past, Uncertain Future,” Carnegie briefing by Lt. Gen. Townsend via te- Syria: Top Official,” Agence France- Endowment for International Peace, leconference from Baghdad, August Presse, December 2, 2013, http://www. October 16, 2012, http://carnegieen- 31, 2017, https://www.defense.gov/ mei.edu/content/kurds-seek-autono- dowment.org/2012/10/16/syria-s- News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Ar- my-federal-syria-top-official. kurds-troubled-past-uncertain-future/ ticle/1297228/department-of-defense- 37. Jordi Tejel Gorgas, “Les Kurdes de e2nt. press-briefing-by-general-townsend- Syrie, de la ‘dissimulation’ à la ‘visi- 22. Cyril Roussel, “Les Kurdes de Syrie et via-teleconference-fro. bilité’?” [The Kurds of Syria, from le projet du Rojava: rêve éphémère ou 30. U.S. Department of Defense, press “concealment” to “visibility”?], Revue espoir durable?” [The Kurds of Syria briefing by Col. Dorrian via teleconfe- des mondes Musulmans et de la Mé- and the Rojava project: an ephemeral rence from Baghdad, December 8, diterranée 115-116 (December 2006), dream or a lasting hope?], Maghreb- 2016, https://www.defense.gov/News/ https://remmm.revues.org/3022. Machrek 4, no. 222 (2014), http://www. Transcripts/Transcript-View/Ar- 38. According to a June 2017 author inter- cairn.info/revue-maghreb-machrek- ticle/1025099/department-of-defense- view with a Manbij resident who had 2014-4-p-75.htm. press-briefing-by-col-dorrian-via-tele- been staying at a refugee camp in Le- 23. “‘PYD Political Thought Resembles conference-from-bag. banon since 2016. That of Baath Party’: Kurdish Politi- 31. “Kurdes et Arabes créent les Forces 39. “Manbij Civilian Council calls for inter- cian,” ARA News, May 14, 2014, http:// Démocratiques de Syrie” [Kurds and national aid for IDPs, warns of huma- aranews.net/2014/05/pyd-political- Arabs create Syrian Democratic Forces], nitarian disaster northern Syria,” ARA thought-resembles-that-of-baath-par- L’Orient le Jour, Oct.r 12, 2015, https:// News, May 20, 2017, http://aranews. ty-kurdish-leader. www.lorientlejour.com/article/949062/ net/2017/05/manbij-civilian-council- kurdes-et-arabes-creent-les-forces-de- 24. Mohammad Ballout, “Kurds Caught calls-for-international-aid-for-idps- mocratiques-de-syrie.html. in Crossfire in Northwest Syria Battle,” warns-of-humanitarian-disaster-nor- Al-Monitor, November 14, 2012, http:// 32. Aron Lund, “Turkey Intervenes in Syria: thern-syria.

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   67 4. rADICALIZATION OF THE SUNNI ARAB REBELLION

early all of the from the country’s Sunni Arab majority time period is being discussed.) Indeed, greatly reduced since summer 2012, groups involved in the but attracting many Turkmens as well, prior to 2013, IS and JN were the same when the rebels held some 80% of the revolt against Bashar al- along with a multiethnic rainbow of for- organization, and members of IS par- country and seemed close to winning Assad are Sunni Arab, eign Sunnis. (Syrian Kurds are a special ticipated in rebel coalitions with more the war, while regime-controlled terri- N 2 and that descriptor is important because category, since they are more focused moderate factions. The subsequent war tory was highly fragmented. The situa- it defines their primary motivation for on safeguarding their Kurdish rather between IS and other Sunni groups was tion is drastically different today—rebel taking up arms: namely, defending the than Sunni identity and never fully em- one of a series of fratricidal clashes that areas are now separated from each other, Sunni community by ousting a non- braced the goal of toppling the regime, have come to characterize the rebellion while the regime controls a largely con- Sunni regime. They are of course driven seeking partial autonomy inside Assad- in general.3 Of course IS does possess a tiguous swath of territory in the western by a host of social, economic, and po- ruled Syria instead.) The Islamic State number of unique traits, so this chapter and central regions. litical grievances as well, but these same is the largest and most well structured discusses the group in a separate section Since 2011, various attempts to orga- grievances exist in all other Syrian sects of these groups. Some analysts may and refers to the other factions collec- nize the Sunni rebellion have failed. The without pushing them into open, sus- deem it iconoclastic to discuss IS in the tively as “the Sunni rebellion” for conve- Free Syrian Army (FSA), an early um- tained revolt. Many Christians, Alawi- same chapter as the “Sunni rebellion,” nience’s sake, rather than specifying “the brella group, lost most of its fighters to tes, Druze, Ismailis, and Shia are dissat- but the organization does its recruiting non-IS Sunni Arab rebellion.” ephemeral, ineffective coalitions formed isfied with the regime, but they have not in the same ethnoreligious category as Sunni rebels control disparate ter- with funding from Turkey, Qatar, and risen up against it en masse. In contrast, many radical jihadist rebel groups and ritories that lack geographical continu- Saudi Arabia.4 In January 2015 these same large swaths of Syria’s Sunni Arab major- espouses ideologies similar to those of ity. Some are small pockets of resistance countries helped create Jaish al-Fatah (the ity rebelled in 2011, and tens of thou- Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), the al-Qaeda af- within areas controlled by the Syrian Army of Conquest), a more efficient JN- sands of foreign fighters have infiltrated filiate that has come to dominate much army, such as Rastan-Houla, Mazraat led coalition that conquered the cities of Syria in the name of defending Sunni of the rebellion on the ground.1 (Note: Beit Jinn (close to the Golan Heights), Idlib province in a few short weeks and Islam, toppling the Alawite regime, and JN changed its name to Jabhat Fatah al- and East Ghouta, but the largest rebel seriously threatened Latakia, Aleppo, and fighting its Shia allies, thereby reinforc- Sham in 2016 and has since rebranded zones have not been fully surrounded Hama. Yet the Russian intervention later ing the insurrection’s sectarian character itself as part of a coalition called Hayat because they lie on or near the borders that year put an end to the group’s expan- in a communal and religious sense. Tahrir al-Sham. But for simplicity’s with Turkey and Jordan, two countries sion, and JN has since eliminated or alien- The Sunni rebels are divided into sake, this chapter refers to the group that have supported the revolt. This ated many other Sunni groups in its quest myriad fighting groups, drawing mainly as JN throughout, regardless of which agglomeration of territories has been for hegemony over the rebellion.

 68  NUMBERS, IDEOLOGIES, & REGIONAL FRONTS

As the number of Sunni opposition 36. SYRIAN REBEL GROUPS BY IDEOLOGY, March 2016 groups continues to grow and the coalitions that house them change in POWERBROKER GROUPS 90,000 ghters composition and name, predicting the rebellion’s dynamics has become more and more difficult. Religious homoge- 20% IDEOLOGY neity has not been enough to give the 25% rebels the military cohesion and unified Transnational Sala -jihadist political identity they so sorely need. Syrian Sala -jihadist A closer look at the numerical, ideo- Political Islamist logical, and geographical scope of this Secularist 31% fragmentation can help observers bet- 24% ter understand the rebellion and assess whether it still has a chance to prevail, or at least survive. ALL REBEL GROUPS ALL REBEL GROUPS A March 2016 report by Jennifer Ca- Minimum estimate: 100,000 ghters Maximum estimate: 150,000 ghters farella and Genevieve Casagrande at the Institute for the Study of the War (ISW) categorized twenty-three of Syria’s hun- 20% 19% dreds of rebel groups as the main “pow- 30% erbrokers” and “potential powerbrokers” in the armed opposition.5 Not much 45% has changed since that assessment, de- 20% spite the fall of Aleppo and other high- 28% profile military developments, so the 22% ISW’s figures greatly inform the follow- 16% ing discussion. At the time, these two powerbroker categories encompassed around 90,000 fighters in total. The re- BASED ON AUTHOR RESEARCH AND DATA FROM JENNIFER CAFARELLA AND GENEVIEVE CASAGRANDE, SYRIAN ARMED OPPOSITION POWERBROKERS, MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 29, MARCH 2016, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR. port described a third category of groups with a few hundred fighters each. While most of the twenty-six factions in this category do not profess any ideology, several of them are linked to al-Qaeda:

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   69 namely Jund al-Aqsa, Harakat al-Fajr al- Sham al-Islamiyah, Imarat al-Qawqaz fi al-Sham, and a brigade called “al-Nusra 37. SYRIAN REBEL POWERBROKERS BY NUMBER AND IDEOLOGY, March 2016 Front al-Kavkaq.”

The report also outlined a fourth cat- TURKEY Tigris River egory composed of hundreds of smaller NORTHEAST ALEPPO groups with a few dozen fighters each. ? These factions correspond to local clans, and their main objective is to protect % NORTHWEST SYRIA 4 their given neighborhood or village; they 47,000 are incapable of launching offensives. 33% 35% Estimating the total number of fighters in the third and fourth categories 28% is difficult. The best approximation is between 10,000 and 60,000. In total, Mediterranean Sea then, the Sunni rebellion could have ? HOULE-RASTAN anywhere from 100,000 to 150,000 fighters. Euphrates River The ISW usefully classified all of LEBANON 5% % these groups into four ideological cat- 24 DAMASCUS AREA egories: transnational Salafi-jihadists 20,000 IRAQ 71% (i.e., al-Qaeda-linked fighters), national Salafi-jihadists, political Islamists, and 4% secularists. The difference between na- 4% 4% SOUTH tional jihadists and political Islamists is ISRAEL 23,000 % more or less akin to the difference be- 87 JORDAN 0 100 km tween Salafists and the Muslim Brother- hood—in simplified terms, the former INHABITED AREAS UNINHABITED AREAS TYPOLOGY OF REBEL FACTION seek strict application of Islamic law, OF CONTROL OF CONTROL while the latter tend to favor a state with Transnational Sala jihadist Syrian Army Syrian Army Province border an Islamic civil constitution but protec- Syrian Sala jihadist PYD (Kurdish) PYD (Kurdish) International border tions for religious freedom. As for the Political Islamist Other rebels Other rebels ? No data “secularists,” the term is applied very Secularist Islamic State Islamic State loosely because most of the fighters in this category are conservative Muslims who do not actually want a secular government. Among the 90,000 “powerbro-

70   fabrice balanche ker” rebels, ISF classified some 20% as transnational jihadists, 31% as national 38. SYRIAN REBEL POWERBROKERS BY FRONT, March 2016 jihadists, 24% as political Islamists, and 25% as “secularists.” When the thou- TURKEY NORTHEAST ALEPPO Tigris River sands of rebels in the non-powerbroker Ahrar al-Sham NORTHWEST SYRIA Jabhat al-Shamya categories were added, the “secularists” Hizb al-Islam Fawj al-Awl Nour al-Din al-Zenki became the largest grouping, but they al-Turkistani Jaysh al-Mujahideen Firqat al-Sultan Murad HASAKA Jabhat al-Nusra Nour al-Din al-Zenki Firqa 13 are also the most fragmented and there- Ahrar al-Sham Firqat al-Sultan Murad Jaysh al-Naser fore the least effective. Jabhat al-Shamya Jaysh al-Naser ALEPPO Faylaq al-Sham Firqa 13 The Sunni rebellion’s external sup- RAQQA porters have failed to establish a single, IDLIB unified operational headquarters from LATAKIA DEIR AL-ZOUR which rebel coalitions can coordinate HOULE-RASTAN large-scale offensives. Western govern- Mediterranean Sea HAMA Jabhat al-Nusra Ahrar al-Sham ments, Saudi Arabia, and the Qatar-Tur- TARTUS Harakat Tahrir Homs HOMS key alliance each have their individual Euphrates River clients: the West mainly finances “secu- DAMASCUS AREA larists” while Riyadh, Doha, and Ankara Jabhat al-Nusra Faylaq al-Rahman LEBANON Jaysh al-Islam Aliwya Ahmed Abdou fund political Islamists and Salafists. The Ahrar al-Sham Jabhat al-Asl wal-Tanmya operations rooms established in Jordan Ajnad al-Sham IRAQ DAMASCUS and Turkey do bring these external part- QUNEITRA ners together in support of secularist and SOUTH political Islamist factions, but the assis- Golan Heights Jabhat al-Nusra Jaysh al-Awl Ahrar al-Sham Thalalaf Suquor al-Janoub tance coming from these centers is less SUWAYDA Jaysh al-Islam Usoud al-Harb ISRAEL DERAA important than the direct aid given by Ajnad al-Sham Faylaq al-Awl Seif al-Sham 0 100 km Arab Gulf countries, which has helped JORDAN marginalize the secularists. The division among donors has com- INHABITED AREAS UNINHABITED AREAS TYPOLOGY OF REBEL FACTION OF CONTROL OF CONTROL bined with internal ideological differences to cause multiple confrontations Fatah al -Sham Transnational Sala jihadist Syrian Army Syrian Army Province border between rebel groups. In its various Ahrar al-Sham Syrian Sala jihadist PYD (Kurdish) PYD (Kurdish) International border manifestations throughout the war, al- Faylaq al-Sham Political Islamist Other rebels Other rebels Province center Qaeda affiliate JN has systematically Jaysh al-Naser Secularist Islamic State Islamic State Locality eliminated groups that opposed its hegemony in the northwest, especially those linked to the FSA. In spring 2016, JN played a role in the bloody war that Jaish

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   71 al-Islam and Failaq al-Rahman waged half of the group was killed or injured the FSA-aligned Syrian Revolutionaries The Southern Front. Established against each other in the suburbs of because the attack had been ill-pre- Front for JN during the latter’s takeover in February 2014 by the Amman Mili- Damascus, which allowed Assad’s army pared, without any collaboration with of Idlib province.10 tary Operations Center, this umbrella the other factions since the objective to retake half of East Ghouta over a six- The FSA regrouped into about fifty group comprised 23,000 fighters as of was simply to assert themselves. month period.6 Later that year, fighting factions in 2016, by which time its pres- March 2016, dominated by five “secu- between Jund al-Aqsa and Ahrar al- The FSA General Staff, made up of ence inside Syria had been greatly re- larist” groups.11 Yet a report issued by Sham—both former members of the defecting Syrian army generals, was duced. Its only significant contingents researcher Aron Lund12 a month af- Jaish al-Fatah coalition—was largely re- never able to coordinate the operations were located in Aleppo city (which of ter the coalition’s creation argued that sponsible for the failure of a rebel offen- of these groups, lacking the legitimacy course ended when the city fell that it existed only on paper, and that its sive against Hama.7 and resources to exert such wide au- December), further north in Aleppo five main groups were merely a weak thority. In the end, “Free Syrian Army” province around Azaz and Marea (under federation of village militias. What- Disappearance of the FSA became merely a label affixed to certain Turkish protection since August 2016), ever the case, the front’s efforts to take The attempt to transform numerous rebel groups by the Military Operations in the greater Damascus area, and in De- Damascus in 2014 and then Deraa in rebel groups into a genuine army, the Centers in Jordan and Turkey, which raa province under the umbrella of the June 2015 both failed. After September FSA, fell apart as early as 2013. Saudi sought to coordinate rebel activities and Southern Front (though some FSA fac- 2015, its military activity was limited to Arabia, Qatar, and other foreign donors foreign supply efforts.8 To receive the lations in the south entered into a tactical the rivalry with IS. prefer to finance groups directly accord- bel, groups must adhere to a charter of alliance with the Islamist coalition Jaish ing to their ideology, and Syria’s clan “good behavior” and respect for secular al-Islam). Damascus area. As of October structure has fostered competition to and democratic values. In reality, most 2017, an estimated 10,000 rebel fight- obtain this external financing. FSA groups are Islamist—only Firqa 13 Regional Fronts ers remained in the Damascus area, In September 2012, a Swiss journalist (Division 13), formed early in the war In the absence of a single command, down from around 20,000 in March in Geneva provided the author with an by army defectors, objectively meets the rebel factions meet in regional coali- 2016. Hailing from Jaish al-Islam, edifying example of this disunity from secular-democratic criteria.9 This con- tions; once they accomplish a given Failaq al-Sham, and JN, most of them Jabal al-Akrad: fusion has often extended to media re- military objective, they usually separate remain encircled by regime forces in ports about the FSA’s importance. Many and renegotiate their participation in a East Ghouta. One by one they have lost A Saudi delegation arrived with suit- cases full of dollars to finance rebel Syrians who stayed in rebel territory or new operation. The coherence of these towns in the western suburbs (e.g., Da- groups. A faction had just taken pos- fled the country as refugees have told coalitions mainly depends on the sus- raya, Moadamiya, Qudsaya, Wadi Bara- session of an observation post of the reporters that the FSA is present every- tainability of external financing and the da). They had hoped to take the capital, Syrian army, proving that it was ef- where, but this impression was based on dominant group’s ability to maintain but all their offensives after summer ficient, and consequently that Saudi the mistaken notion that all rebels who unity. The most sustainable and effec- 2012 failed, and they lost hope of reach- money was well used. The Saudis are not from JN or IS are members of tive coalition so far has been Jaish al- ing this goal or even being rescued from had filmed the fight to report to do- the FSA. The situation has been further Fatah, which JN created in the north- the south. Some factions in Daraya and nors, like humanitarian associations. complicated by reports of FSA fighters west in February 2015. It continues to Qudsaya therefore made deals to be ex- A competing faction also wanted to prove its ability to benefit from the defecting to JN; in 2014, for instance, grow thanks to its military successes and filtrated to rebel-controlled Idlib prov- financial windfall, but the attack on Rami Abdulrahman, head of the Syr- its coercive power over other groups. JN ince—an arrangement the regime was the military post on the Nabi Younes ian Observatory for Human Rights, has been trying to reproduce this for- willing to countenance because it could (near Slonfeh) resulted in a disaster: noted that “dozens of fighters” had left mula on other fronts as well. more easily reestablish its authority over

72   fabrice balanche N DAMASCUS Mezzeh military airport 19 Dec 2015: Airstrike kills 39. Mount Hermon Hezbollah ocial Samir Kuntar W E LEBANON Daraya Jaramana MILITARY SITUATION Qatana IN SOUTHERN SYRIA, S Nov 2014: Battle between Jabhat Damascus International Airport al-Nusra and Druze militia Sayyida Zaynab May 2017 Fall 2016: Syrian Army seizes Sahnaya Arneh Nabatieh Khan al-Sheikh Shebaa al-Kiswah AREA CONTROLLED BY 28 Jan 2015: Hezbollah al-Khyam Mazraat Beit Jinn attacks Israeli convoy Khan al-Sheikh Marj Ruhayyil military airport Syrian Army Hader Majdal Shams Islamic State (IS)

UNDOF Other rebels Mar 2017: Syrian Army Buqata CONTROL (including Jabhat al-Nusra) seizes IS positions

Israel MADINAT AL-BAATH Khalkhalah RELIGION Quneitra military airport

UNDOF crossing Sunni Sanamin Mar 2017: Rebels seize Mazraat Amal IS positions in Lajat area ISRAEL GOLAN Druze HEIGHTS 18 Jan 2015: Israeli airstrike kills Hezbollah and IRGCInkhil gures Christian

Qazrin Shiite Safed

International border

Nawa Province border Izraa Shahba 1974 Golan cease re lines Sea of Galilee Sheikh Maskin and DMZ

Border crossing Jamlah Dael Province center al-Shajara SUWAYDA al-Muzairab al-Thaala 21 Jun 2016: Israeli airstrike District center on IS antiaircraft battery military airport Spring 2017: Rebels launch Town an oensive on Deraa Event JORDAN DERAA Main road Irbid al-Qurayya 2 Mar 2016: Jordanian raid Secondary road kills seven IS militants Busra al-Sham Airport Salkhad Advances by IS aliate 0 20 40 km Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade (LSY)

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   73 N Rajo Bab al-Salam TURKEY 40. W E Mar 22: Russian troops MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS support PYD in Afrin IN NORTHWEST SYRIA, S AZAZ March/April 2017

AFRIN Marea Tal Rifaat

AREA CONTROLLED BY

Jandeiris Syrian army Other rebels Nubl AL-BAB Islamic State PYD (Kurdish) Tadef TURKEY Bab al-Hawa Hama frontline 3/27/17 Kuweires ALEPPO HAREM Mar 16: U.S. strike OFFENSIVE LAUNCHED BY reportedly hits mosque Mar 29: Syrian army seizes Deir Hafer from IS Syrian army Qorqanya al-Jinah AL-SAFIRAH Deir Hafer Other rebels

March 21–27: U.S. airstrikes kill al-Qaeda ocials MAIN ETHNIC GROUP PREWAR al-Fua Darkoush Kefraya Kasab Arab Sunni Arab Alawite IDLIB Apr 12: Scheduled evacu- (closed) ation of al-Fua and Kefraya Kurdish Sunni Christian JISR al-SHUGHOUR Mar 31: Ongoing rebel Saraqeb o ensive toward Kinsabba ARIHA Turkmen Sunni Arab Shiites

Arab Druze

Kinsabba

MAARAT AL-NUMAN International border AL-HAFFAH Province border

Border crossing

LATAKIA QARDAHA Province center Khan Sheikhoun Apr 4: Chemical attack on Khan Sheikhoun District center Suruj JABLEH Town AL-SUQAYLABIYAH Souran Main road

MAHARDA Secondary road BANIYAS Mar 27: Syrian army Military airport open blocks rebel o ensive HAMA Notable event 0 10 20 km MASYAF Urban area

" " 74   fabrice balanche residents of these suburbs if it offered Beit Sahem in southern Damascus. The The Northwest. The focus of the 60,000 as of this writing thanks to trans- local rebels a chance to survive. The re- Qalamoun-area towns of al-Dumayr rebellion is now in the northwest, where fers of rebels from the Damascus area, mainder are concentrated in East Gh- and Jayrud reached a truce with the nearly 47,000 “powerbroker” fighters Zabadani, Arsal, and al-Waar (a neigh- outa because the army has retaken most army, so neither can be considered a were active as of March 2016.13 The borhood of Homs). Jihadist and Islamist other pockets, aside from Yarmouk and rebel stronghold anymore. number has likely increased to around factions represent three-fourths of these

41. MILITARY SITUATION IN NORTHERN SYRIA, May 2017 N AREA CONTROLLED BY W E KOBANE Syrian Army S Islamic State TURKEY JARABULUS Other rebels al-Shuyukh Tahtani Bulbul Kurdish forces Raju Bab al-Salam Ghandoura Euphrates River MAIN ETHNIC GROUP Sharran AZAZ al-Raai Sarrin al-Shemali Arab Sunni Maabatli Souran Kurdish Sunni AFRIN Dabiq MANBIJ Sheikh Hadid Marea Turkmen Sunni

Qabasin Arima Arab Druze Tal Rifaat Abu Qilqil Jandeiris Um al-Qura Arab Shiite Nubl al-Zahra AL-BAB Tishrin Dam Ain Issa International border Tadef Darat Izza Bab al-Hawa Province border Haritan Rasm al-Harmel al-Dana Khafsa Border crossing ALEPPO HAREM Khan al-Asal Province center Atareb Kuweires Deir Hafer al-Jarniya District center Qorqanya AL-SAFIRAH Armanaz Town Lake al-Jaboul al-Fua Taftanaz Maskanah Aleppo urban area Hader Benan Main road Lake Assad IDLIB Secondary road Saraqeb Military airport open ARIHA THAWRA Tal Daman Thawra Dam Military airport closed Khanaser 0 10 20 km Abu Duhur Bridge open Ehsem Bridge destroyed

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   75 personnel. JN and its allies have essen- A few thousand Turkish soldiers sup- tially built an Islamic emirate in the ported these rebels, who were regrouped Idlib area by gradually eliminating or into the “Euphrates Shield” coalition. integrating other groups. Since the 2015 Turkey announced the official termina- 42. Russian intervention, however, even tion of Operation Euphrates Shield in CLOSE ALLIES OF rebels on this front have been forced March 2017, though it has reportedly JABHAT AL-NUSRA, Suqur al-Sham to withdraw at times. Their territorial launched a new campaign since then (see June 2016 Liwa al-Haqq losses have not been large, but they have chapter 3). been strategic—key regime areas in Lat- akia, Hama, and Aleppo are no longer Houla-Rastan Pocket. A few Liwa al-Haqq thousand rebels are surrounded in this (Homs) Jaish threatened. AHRAR AL-SHAM al-Sunna In the Aleppo area, JN and its al- enclave between Homs and Hama. The Fajr al-Khilafa lies gradually took over most rebel op- leading group appears to be Harakat erations in 2016, and the local Fatah Tahrir Homs, a faction headquartered Halab coalition was seemingly margin- in Rastan and classified as political Is- alized. Led by JN forces, Jaish al-Fatah lamist.14 It competes with Jaish al-Sham Jabhat Ansar al-Din advanced toward Hama and Latakia in in Talbisah and with a local coalition in order to divert the army from Aleppo Houla. Yet the situation is calmer in this city. This gambit ultimately failed in a region than in East Ghouta. The rebels military sense once Aleppo fell, but it occasionally launched northward offen- Jund al-Aqsa JABHAT AL-NUSRA Jamaat did help JN reaffirm its hardline stance sives to assist with the battle for Hama Ahadun Ahad against the Assad regime and attract and link up with Idlib province, but to no avail. In the long term, the latter ef- other rebels disappointed by the lack of Caucasus support from outside allies. fort is their only chance of avoiding the Emirate fate of their brethren in Ghouta, espe- in al-Sham Junud al-Sham Northeast Aleppo. The 5,000 rebel cially if the regime takes direct action fighters present in the Azaz-Marea pock- against this enclave. Fajr al-Sham et as of March 2016 were reinforced by Islamic Movement thousands of pro-Turkish fighters from East Turkestan Islamic AL-QAEDA’S EVOLUTION Jamaat Ansar Movement Idlib province once Operation Euphra- AND TAKEOVER al-Islam tes Shield began that August, including Kataib Ansar al-Sham the Turkmen brigade Firqat Sultan Mu- During winter 2013–2014, JN and oth- rad. The main objective of their offen- er rebel groups pushed the Islamic State sives was to create a safe zone between out of western Aleppo province, even as Azaz, al-Bab, and Jarabulus and thus pre- IS drove them out of eastern Aleppo and vent the Kurds of Rojava from unifying the Euphrates Valley. This war against IS their cantons along the northern border. was wrongly hailed as a second revolu-

76   fabrice balanche tion by many analysts,15 who spoke of a burst of “democratic forces” against the jihadists.16 In fact, it was only an inter- 43. nal conflict between rival jihadists: JN JABHAT AL-NUSRA and its local allies wanted to eliminate AND COALITIONS, IS before it could do the same to them. Winter 2015–Fall 2016 By getting rid of their main competitor JAISH AL-NASER in the northwest, they could focus on (Victory Army) unifying the area’s other rebel groups by force. Those who refused were either ex-

ANSAR AL-SHARIA pelled (e.g., Division 13) or eliminated (e.g., al-Hamza Front). As JN’s hegemony became inevitable, the group took control of the Jaish al- Fatah coalition.17 In spring 2015, Jaish al-Fatah’s advances in Idlib, Jisr al- Shughour, and Ariha shook the Assad JAISH AL-FATAH FATAH HALEB regime. The jihadist contribution was JABHAT AL-NUSRA (Army of Conquest) (Aleppo Conquest) fundamental to these victories; suicide bombers from JN’s fellow al-Qaeda affiliate Jund al-Aqsa played a major role in opening access to Idlib city. Since that successful offensive, the six subgroups of Jaish al-Fatah have shared

JAISH AL-FATAH IDLIB control of the province’s towns. Idlib (Idlib Army of Conquest) city was divided into sectors, but JN and its closest affiliates appear to have

SYRIAN DEMOCRATIC FORCES full control there. In a May 27, 2015, (YPG and Revolutionary Army) interview with Al Jazeera, JN leader Abu Muhammad al-Julani declared his intention to create an Islamic emirate in northwestern Syria,18 confirming analysis by expert Thomas Jocelyn one year prior.19 In pursuit of that goal, the group has used brutal methods similar to those of IS—the only difference is that ex- ecutions in Idlib are not advertised as

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   77 openly as they were in the IS capital of Fertile Ground for Salafism public mea culpa for broadcasting music ideology and terrorist methods that Raqqa. Most non-Sunnis have fled the JN’s strength lies in the geographic di- on his station, and none of the local rebel JN inherited from its parent group did area, though as described in previous versity of its recruitment, unlike the groups protested the crackdown for fear not change at all afterward, despite the 23 chapters, some were forced to convert. moderate groups and their highly lo- of retribution from JN. Nevertheless, name change. Moreover, the Zawahiri Unfortunately, even conversion did not calized recruitment. This approach has the radio station continues to operate, lieutenants who helped Julani’s group prevent the massacre of twenty Druze in helped JN largely avoid the clan quar- and locals still use the Syrian revolution- build a stronghold in northern Syria 24 Qalb Lawzah in June 2015. JN fighters rels that often undermine the rebellion ary flag during demonstrations. were not expelled from JN. Zawahiri’s also regularly arrest local civil society ac- (except in Deir al-Zour, where it had to remarks on the matter likewise in- 20 The Fake Break with al-Qaeda tivists, many of whom disappear. compete with IS for recruits from dif- cluded substantial qualifications. “You Militarily speaking, JN and its af- ferent tribes). Another strong point for On July 28, 2016, JN leader Julani and can sacrifice organizational ties without filiates are able to intervene pretty much the group is its ideological power, which al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri hesitation if this endangers your unity,” anywhere in Idlib province without helps it maintain legitimacy in many simultaneously declared that the two he stated, reenacting the familiar farce much opposition from whatever groups parts of the northwest despite its fre- groups were no longer tied by an oath of of taqiyya (dissimulation) that terrorist may be officially controlling a given vil- quent brutality against locals. The Salaf- allegiance.25 But this was merely a tactical organizations often use to keep up the 21 lage or city. Most maps illustrating ist strain of Islamist thought that JN es- maneuver to counter the July 15 U.S.- flow of external support while continu- the distribution of rebel factions tend pouses has been spreading throughout Russian agreement to fight JN in Syria, ing their brutal operations.26 to confine JN to two specific areas in the countryside of Idlib and Aleppo for which had greatly irked the Gulf states The timing of the supposed breakup Idlib—the strongholds of Harem and several decades via battalions of young and Turkey. These countries supported was also telling. It was announced on the Jabal al-Zawiya22—but the organiza- imams trained in Saudi Arabia. This JN after its 2012 emergence in Syria, but eve of a JN-led Jaish al-Fatah offensive tion is actually present throughout brand of Salafism is more relatable to in 2015 they began urging the group to against Aleppo. With logistical and finan- the northwest. the underdeveloped rural populations break allegiance with al-Qaeda because cial support from Turkey, Qatar, and Sau- JN has espoused a consistent and in northern Syria than the Muslim the relationship was creating friction di Arabia, the group’s forces temporarily clear political ideology for Syria. Terri- Brotherhood’s ideology, which is more with Washington and complicating their broke the siege there, allowing a newly tories under JN control generally respect suited to the urban middle class. efforts to supply the rebellion. rebranded JN to present itself as liberator the judgments issued by its courts and There are some exceptions. Kafr Julani’s announcement a year later of the city’s eastern districts rather than seem to respect the integrity and courage Nabl is often cited as an example of lo- seemed to fulfill that request, but a a proxy of foreign jihadists. To be sure, of its fighters—hardly the case for other cal democracy and secularism, widely closer look at his speech and JN’s sub- the reopened Ramouseh corridor was rebel groups. Thus far, JN has tolerated highlighted by journalists visiting the sequent behavior points to a different impassable because of nonstop regime the work of foreign NGOs and the UN’s north, while the “little Moscow” of Ja- conclusion. For one thing, he never ex- and Russian bombardment, and a Syrian Office for the Coordination of Humani- bal al-Zawiya has always been a leftist plicitly stated that JN would break off army counteroffensive that September tarian Affairs, but only because it needs stronghold. Yet these exceptions are not ties with al-Qaeda. After praising the soon closed the breach, leaving JN with these social services to help establish its reproducible at the provincial level, and transnational group in the first part of considerable losses expended for a near- political power. Humanitarian assistance Kafr Nabl’s free space is steadily being his speech, he announced the creation zero military outcome. Yet the group is currently channeled through the Bab reduced. In January 2016, for example, of a new group, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, did achieve a key political objective by al-Hawa border crossing, which Ahrar JN nearly assassinated Raed Fares, a fa- and stated that he had no “affiliation advancing into East Aleppo: the Obama al-Sham held until a July 2017 offensive mous civil society activist and head of with an external organization,” imply- administration was no longer willing to gave JN control over the border area. Kafr Nabl radio. He was forced to give a ing al-Qaeda. Yet the radical Salafist bolster Russia’s local fight against JN,

78   fabrice balanche even indirectly, because this would have The officers of both organizations were Syria and sought refuge in the Nagorno- was already crisscrossed by barbed wire, meant helping Assad win a major battle. former fellow soldiers of Osama bin Karabakh region.30 Ten Druze villages are “no man’s land” zones, and minefields In the end, however, various geopoliti- Laden, including Julani and Adel Radi scattered in the Jabal al-Summaq area; even before 2011. The situation became cal developments since the fall of Aleppo Saqr al-Wahhabi al-Harbi for JN, and as mentioned previously, JN forced resi- worse after 2015, when developments indicate that JN’s 2016 rebranding was Mohammed Bahaiya (aka Abu Khalid dents there to convert to Sunnism. The in the war greatly increased the refugee ultimately unsuccessful. The rapproche- al-Suri) and Hashem al-Sheikh (aka Abu Shia towns of al-Fua and Kefraya have flow and spurred Ankara to clamp down ment between Turkey and Russia isolated Jaber) for Ahrar al-Sham.28 Yet Ahrar’s been surrounded by rebels since Idlib’s on Bab al-Hawa. Today, no crossings are the group on the international and na- internal fissures have set the stage for fall; residents proclaimed their support permitted except in very select humani- tional scene, and the arrival of the Trump more clashes and defections, and this is for the revolt early on, but JN cast doubt tarian cases—a sharp contrast with pre- administration seemed to usher in a more precisely what Assad and his allies want: on their sincerity upon moving into the vious years, when Syrians could move in aggressive policy against it. At the Astana infighting between weakened rebels that province and kept them under threat as and out of Turkey whenever they needed peace conference in January 2017, oth- facilitates a regime takeover in Idlib. leverage against Hezbollah. Most civilians refuge from the fighting. er rebel factions were specifically asked were later transferred outside the besieged Downfall of Moderate by the summit’s sponsors (Russia, Iran, THE IDLIB STRONGHOLD cities in two waves (December 2016 and and Turkey) to distance themselves from April 2017) thanks to an agreement with Factions in Idlib Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, which had been After Raqqa, Idlib became the second the rebels31 (see chapter 1). By early 2016, more than sixty rebel excluded from both the event and the provincial capital lost to the rebellion, Before the war, 70 percent of Idlib’s groups were fighting in Idlib province associated ceasefire.27 The delegations falling to Jaish al-Fatah in spring 2015 population lived in the countryside, a and the western Aleppo area, fielding a were warned that they too would be con- along with the province’s two other ma- fertile agricultural area that produces total of some 60,000–90,000 combat- sidered terrorist groups if they refused to jor cities, Jisr al-Shughour and Ariha. grains, olives, and winter vegetables, with ants.32 JN was not the largest of these comply, and struck with the same vigor. Damascus had already lost control of individual irrigation allowing for addi- factions: its 10,000 fighters were only For its part, Ahrar al-Sham refused the surrounding countryside in winter tional crops in summer. For those who half that of Ahrar al-Sham at that time. to participate in the conference, but this 2011–2012. remained there, agriculture has provided Yet many other militias allied with JN may have been less a gesture of solidar- According to the UN High Com- a means to survive the turmoil. Yet the out of fear, ideological sympathy, respect ity than a function of being surrounded missioner for Refugees, Idlib province area had very little industrial activity pre- for the group’s battlefield achievements, by JN in Idlib province and therefore had 2,080,000 inhabitants as of Octo- war, and Idlib was long known as an ad- or other factors. In contrast, most of the at the group’s mercy. The situation ex- ber 2017, including 984,000 IDPs.29 In ministrative city, so the province depend- secular and “moderate” Islamist groups acerbated Ahrar al-Sham’s internal ten- sectarian terms, the fairly homogeneous ed heavily on Aleppo for manufactured were small, locally recruited units with sions, since radical elements within the population is around 95 percent Sunni products. Today, everything comes from a few hundred fighters or less each, so coalition had been pushing to merge Arab. To the north of Jisr al-Shughour, Turkey, and supplies are severely limited they had only marginal influence de- with JN while other elements had sided a Turkmen population lives close to because humanitarian convoys can only spite accounting for as many as a third with the group’s pro-Turkish leadership, the Turkish border. Many Christians access the province through one crossing, of all rebel forces in the area. The most which favored participating in Astana fled during the countryside fighting of Bab al-Hawa. For decades, the Assad re- important “moderate” unit was Division and avoiding public links with al-Qae- 2011–2012, while others left Idlib city gime practiced especially strict control of 13, a member of the Fatah Halab coali- da. The West does not regard Ahrar al- in March 2015 as rebels took control. this part of the border due to the linger- tion. Supported by the United States Sham as a terrorist group, even though For example, the entire population of ing Syrian claim on Turkey’s Hatay prov- and Turkey, the group claimed to field it has nearly the same ideology as JN. the Armenian village of Yacoubiyah left ince. As a result, the Bab al-Hawa area 2,000 fighters who had battled the Syri-

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   79 N Bab al-Salam TURKEY 44. W E HAYAT TAHRIR AL-SHAM

S TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION AZAZ Turkish-backed rebels IN IDLIB AREA, August 2017 AFRIN SDF SDF

HTS LOCAL STRATEGY Jihad against Western countries Nubl AL-BAB Turkish border

Border crossing Darat Izza TURKEY Bab al-Hawa Haritan HAREM Anadan Supply line al-Dana ALEPPO Syrian Army Target Salqin Kafr Nihal

Sarmada AL-SAFIRAH Atareb HTS INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY

Darkoush IDLIB Taftanaz

Strong in uence of Islamic Party of Turkestan Ayman al-Zawahiri Khirbet al-Joz IPT children’s training camp

JISR al-SHUGHOUR Saraqeb Yamadi ARIHA TERRITORIAL CONTROL Abu Duhur Khanaser Town fully controlled Kansafra MAARAT AL-NUMAN Town partially controlled al-Ziyarah Sinjar Syrian Army HTS base LATAKIA Kafr Nabl Idlib rebel area Fundraising in Arab Syrian Army Gulf countries Tal Khanzir International border Qalaat al-Madiq Frontline Khan Sheikhoun Sarouja Sectarian line

AL-SUQAYLABIYAH Souran Main road MAHARDAH BANIYAS Syrian Army Province center Mobilizing cause: destruction of Israel District center Islamic State HAMA Town 0 10 20 km

" "

80   fabrice balanche N Rajo Bab al-Salam TURKEY 45.

W E HAYAT TAHRIR AL-SHAM STRONGHOLDS IN IDLIB AZAZ S AREA, August 2017

AFRIN Marea Tal Rifaat AREA CONTROLLED BY

Syrian army Jandeiris Kafr Nabl AL-BAB Islamic State Anadan Tadef TURKEY Bab al-Hawa Darat Izza Haritan HTS and allies HAREM Kuweires al-Dana ALEPPO Other rebels

Salqin Sarmada Kafr Ni’al PYD (Kurdish) Atareb AL-SAFIRAH Deir Hafer MAIN ETHNIC GROUP PREWAR

Darkoush Taftanaz Arab Sunni al-Fua Kasab Kurdish Sunni Khirbet al-Joz Kefraya Yamadi IDLIB Turkmen Sunni JISR al-SHUGHOUR Saraqeb ARIHA Arab Druze

Abu Duhur Khanaser Arab Alawite

Kinsabba Christian al-Ziyarah Kansafra MAARAT AL-NUMAN Arab Shiites AL-HAFFAH Senjar Kafr Nubul International border

Province border Tal Khanzir LATAKIA QARDAHA Qalaat al-Madiq Khan Sheikhoun Border crossing

Province center JABLEH Suruj District center AL-SUQAYLABIYAH Souran Town MAHARDAH BANIYAS Main road

Secondary road HAMA 0 10 20 km MASYAF Military airport open

Aleppo urban area " "

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   81 an army in Aleppo and Kurdish forces in Astana process and its aftermath to pres- Shortly after forming HTS, JN began has defected from HTS so far: Harakat the Azaz-Jarabulus area, where they had ent the rebels with a stark choice: assimi- to expel certain groups from its alliance Nour al-Din al-Zinki, which broke off been integrated into Turkey’s Euphrates lation or destruction. Those who choose and attack them, sometimes with ad- to become an independent force in late Shield effort. Moreover, after the Rus- the first option would be integrated into verse consequences. For instance, when July 2017. sian intervention, many small groups the Assad regime’s political system and it went after former ally Liwa al-Aqsa not affiliated with JN put aside their Is- have the opportunity to profit from the (formerly Jund al-Aqsa), various bri- HTS Nodes of Control lamist banners and other trappings and money and power it has accumulated gades merged with the Ahrar al-Sham The group’s fluid territorial presence joined coalitions with nationalist names during the war. Those who continue coalition in protest, replacing many of is not indicative of its predominant such as Jaish al-Nasr (the Army of Victo- to resist will be destroyed unceremoni- the fighters Ahrar had lost to HTS. The strength in Idlib—HTS relies more on ry) and al-Jabha al-Shamiya (the Levant ously, in a replica of the method Russia two coalitions have since clashed regu- the potency of its network than on the Front). They did so not only to receive used in Chechnya. larly, whether for control of the Bab al- accumulation of territory. In July 2017, U.S. military aid, but also to resist JN’s JN has likewise used the Astana pro- Hawa crossing or elsewhere it chased rival groups out of Idlib city hegemonic pressures. cess to its advantage. In November 2016, As of August 2017, HTS constituted and smaller towns such as Maarat al-Nu- The regime’s December 2016 vic- the group attacked the Idlib-based forces the largest rebel group in Idlib province man, Saraqeb, and Atareb, all of which tory in Aleppo was a fatal blow to the of factions that sent delegations to the and Syria as a whole.34 Of the 31,000 or are former FSA strongholds. When oc- already weakened moderate opposition, first Astana conference, accusing them so HTS combatants across the country, cupying such communities, HTS nota- at least in the sense that they could no of collaborating with Russia—a claim some two-thirds are situated in the Idlib bly practices discretion in order to avoid longer claim to represent a viable mili- that was not entirely unfounded given area.35 The group often attracts addi- antagonizing locals. In the southern and tary or political alternative to Assad. Moscow’s objective of dividing the re- tional recruits following military victo- eastern sections of the province, it has The outcome strengthened the army by bellion. And on January 28, 2017, soon ries. In particular, more Ahrar al-Sham not moved beyond the regime military freeing up large numbers of troops, ar- after the second Astana conference and brigades joined up after a high-profile bases it conquered during the war, such tillery, and Russian air capabilities, both the fall of East Aleppo, JN spearheaded Idlib campaign in July 2017, including as Abu Duhur. It also retains strong- to launch other offensives and to better a reorganization of the rebellion in Idlib, Usud al-Islam (Lions of Islam), based in holds near Aleppo (in the northwestern protect existing regime zones. It also led merging with numerous other groups the province’s southeast region, Usud suburbs), Hama (Khan Sheikhoun), to additional Russian-brokered peace (e.g., Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki, al-Maarat (Lions of Maarat), based in and Latakia (Jisr al-Shughour), from conferences in Astana, upping the dip- Jabhat Ansar al-Din, Liwa al-Haqq, Maarat al-Numan, and a group in the which it can probe opportunities for ex- lomatic pressure on any Idlib rebels who Jaish al-Sunna) to create Hayat Tahrir small northern town of al-Dana. Fur- pansion against the regime. Other areas opposed negotiating under the aegis of al-Sham (the Syrian Liberation Move- ther reinforcing HTS in Idlib have been not populated by Sunni Arabs are more Assad’s military patron in Moscow.33 At ment, or HTS). This move also shook fighters booted from enclaves retaken by difficult to control. the January and May 2017 summits, up Ahrar al-Sham. Although the organi- the army, such as Zabadani, the al-Waar In short, HTS does not seek territori- Russia and Iran reached ceasefires with zation itself did not join HTS, the ma- district of Homs, al-Qabun, Daraya, and al continuity but instead control of stra- Turkey and select rebel groups, but these jority of its fighters did, and its former others. Additionally, some 1,500 HTS tegic points from which it can launch agreements were clearly of the “tactical, leader, Hashem al-Sheikh, was tapped to fighters and their families may arrive raids, including against villages such as not strategic” variety, allowing the re- lead the new coalition (though JN lead- from the Arsal area of Lebanon, where Kafr Nabl, an anti-Islamist stronghold. gime to consolidate its territorial gains er Julani remained in charge of the HTS Hezbollah and Lebanese forces are con- Having elicited allegiance from local and further divide the rebels. Moscow in military branch, ensuring his continued ducting a campaign against Sunni jihad- factions throughout the Idlib area, it can particular has seemed bent on using the de facto control). ists. Meanwhile, only one notable group mobilize thousands of additional com-

82   fabrice balanche 46. MILITARY SITUATION IN SYRIA AND IRAQ, May 2017

N Tigris River Euphrates River W E TURKEY Kobane Qamishli S Tal Afar Afrin Manbij Hasaka Mosul Erbil Aleppo Raqqa Sinjar KDP Latakia Idlib al-Tabqa Sulaymaniyah SYRIA Deir al-Zour Kirkuk CYPRUS Hama PUK IRAN Tartus Homs Palmyra LEBANON

Ramadi Damascus Baghdad Golan Mediterranean Sea Heights Karbala IRAQ Najaf Amara

ISRAEL JORDAN SAUDI ARABIA Basra EGYPT

Persian Gulf KUWAIT 0 200 km

AREAS OF CONTROL IN SYRIA AREAS OF CONTROL IN IRAQ

Syrian army and militias Other rebels Iraqi army and militias Islamic State PKK-KDP Major city

SDF (Kurdish) Islamic State KRG (KDP and PUK) PKK Locality batants, as in the spring 2017 offensive of Latakia, a small Turkish protector- groups engage in trade with regime- THE ISLAMIC STATE against army forces in Hama. ate that includes the Yamadi border held areas, but essential humanitar- The main HTS stronghold encom- crossing. Controlling the border is ian aid comes almost exclusively from Despite its ideological proximity to JN passes the border area with Turkey fundamental to the group’s assertion of Turkey. Moreover, if other factions and other Islamist rebel groups, IS de- from Jisr al-Shughour to Bab al-Hawa. dominance over Idlib province, since lose access to weapons from Turkey, serves a separate section because of its A lone weak point can be found in the it gives HTS a monopoly over the they may cross over to the regime side organizational originality and relative Turkmen-inhabited countryside north transit of humanitarian aid. Various to avoid destruction. isolation. Unlike JN, IS was able to build

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   83 a unified territory in eastern Syria that communities outweighed the goals of American troops left Iraq at the end of own soil. Yet Baghdadi argued that there extended up to 90,000 square kilome- universal jihad and destruction of Israel. 2011, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was no longer any difference between ters at its height in May 2015, after the As al-Qaeda’s chief ideologist, Zawahiri began actively marginalizing Sunni Ar- Syria and Iraq; to prove his point, he capture of Palmyra. Combined with its encouraged these more universal goals abs, and this trend was reinforced by a declared that the groups were merging conquests in Iraq, the group reigned over and criticized Baghdadi’s approach, ar- Shia nation-building process. under a new title, the Islamic State of some 240,000 square kilometers, equiva- guing that it would lead to fitna taifiyya Iraq and al-Sham, invoking the ancient lent in size to the United Kingdom. (communal strife) with local Shia and IS Blossoms in name for the territory occupied by mod- This points to a fundamental strate- distract Sunni Arabs from their supreme the Euphrates Valley ern Syria (the group would later shorten gic difference in how IS and al-Qaeda objectives. Both men had made clear In summer 2011, fighters who would its name to just “the Islamic State,” re- have approached the acquisition of terri- that Shia were heretics who must be eventually form JN began infiltrating inforcing its desire to erase existing na- tory—and, by extension, how they pri- eradicated, but Zawahiri implied that eastern Syria, spurring Assad to deploy tional boundaries). Julani rejected the oritize sectarian issues. The jihadis who their turn would come later, once more army units to Deir al-Zour province. move, so he and his supporters retained formed IS generally believed in securing important goals were achieved.36 Some of these fighters were Syrians who the name JN and the oath of allegiance a large territory first and then building Nevertheless, when Baghdadi or- had gone to fight in Iraq after 2003 and to al-Qaeda. international terrorist networks. This dered the creation of a Syrian cell in were technically prohibited from return- It was not an easy divorce because strategy emerged after bin Laden’s death 2011 with al-Qaeda’s blessing, his group ing home. When JN was formally estab- the two groups were deeply mixed in and the dislocation of al-Qaeda’s net- had already established solid support lished in early 2012, it was widely re- the provinces of Idlib, Aleppo, Raqqa, work. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi advocated bases in Iraq’s Sunni provinces of Mo- garded as just one of many rebel groups and Deir al-Zour. Unlike JN, however, it a decade ago when he headed the IS sul and Anbar, both of which provided that were proliferating as the opposition IS did not have a significant presence predecessor group al-Qaeda in Iraq, and a steady stream of fighters and finan- became increasingly militarized. Even as in Damascus or Deraa province. And it was likewise embraced by his disciple cial resources. It had also set up its own late as November 2012, the mainstream in winter 2013–2014, JN teamed with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self-pro- tax system parallel to that of the Iraqi Syrian opposition protested when the Ahrar al-Sham’s coalition, the Islamic claimed IS “caliph” who broke off rela- state. Local Sunni Arab residents felt United States designated JN as a terror- Front, to try kicking IS out of Syria.39 As tions with bin Laden’s successor Zawa- marginalized by Baghdad and were still ist group,37 while French foreign min- mentioned previously, they succeeded in hiri. The strategy consists of taking root unhappy about the Shia community’s ister Laurent Fabius criticized the deci- chasing Baghdadi’s group out of Idlib in a given area by joining whatever fight rise to power in 2003. Kurdish pressure sion because JN was “doing a good job and western Aleppo, but IS eliminated the local Sunni population is waging, on Mosul, Kirkuk, and other disputed on the ground.”38 JN and other factions from Raqqa and rather than (or, in the case of IS, before) areas was a cause for concern as well. JN and proto-IS were a single out- Deir al-Zour, eventually taking over the undertaking spectacular terrorist attacks Although U.S. general David Petraeus fit until April 2013, when Julani, JN’s entire Euphrates Valley and establishing against international interests. Zarqawi had seemingly engineered the defeat of Syrian leader, had a falling out with Raqqa as its capital. supporters led by Baghdadi followed al-Qaeda in Iraq years earlier, this was a Baghdadi, who hailed from Iraq. Vari- With a third of their population il- that approach in proclaiming the first fragile victory that depended on main- ous factors spurred the clash, including literate, a birthrate of eight children per “Islamic State” in Iraq in 2006. Ameri- taining the balance of power between strategic divergence and inflated egos. woman, and over 50% of their work- can troops were certainly one of their the Shia-dominated central government The group’s Syrian members were appar- force tied to agriculture before the war, targets at the time, but their main en- and the northern Sunni Arab tribes who ently unhappy about being led by for- the provinces of Raqqa and Deir al-Zour emies were Iraqi Shia and Kurds, based had greatly facilitated the counterinsur- eign fighters and wanted to command suffer from low levels of development.40 on the view that conflicts between local gency. When the last main contingent of a movement that was fighting on their The Baath regime failed to dissolve the

84   fabrice balanche tribal system there, but it successfully courts was the group’s best means of se- Paradoxically, this area is Syria’s main fineries, reducing production to an un- manipulated local clans to its own ends ducing the people, particularly the lower oil-producing region, but much like the known extent. There are no wells burn- by exploiting their reliance on patron- classes, many of whom believed (at least Kurds in Hasaka province, residents of ing, so airstrikes have seemingly avoided age, including selectively distributed at first) that they could regain some of Raqqa and Deir al-Zour were immensely targeting the wells themselves, hitting farmland and new irrigation programs their dignity after years under a Baath frustrated by the regime’s practice of tak- adjacent facilities instead. Moreover, the that were highly coveted in this arid re- legal system that tended to victimize or ing local oil wealth without reinvesting refineries in IS territory are small and gion (though threats of course played a ignore them. According to anecdotal it in local development. During the war, easy to rebuild; they are not compara- role in their capitulation as well). From accounts from Syrian refugees, court petrol sales have played a major role in ble with Syria’s only official refineries in 1970 to 1990, the construction of al- justice in IS-held territory was faster at the Islamic State’s financial autonomy Baniyas and Homs, so IS or other ac- Thawra Dam on the Euphrates and first, rulings were executed immediately, in the northeast. To be sure, IS received tors could theoretically get them opera- the creation of a vast irrigation system and crime rates dropped noticeably,42 and redistributed significant funds from tional again if airstrikes are halted. Yet designed to develop eastern Syria ab- though any such improvements began private donors and, at times, foreign gov- the group’s main source of income was sorbed nearly 20% of the national bud- to fade away quickly as corruption set ernments, but the group did not want to not oil, but taxation on local trade and get.41 Yet this development push was in under IS rule.43 In any case, security become dependent on external resources, plundering of local resources, particu- designed as a political strategy rather is the primary demand of residents af- so it also taxed the movement of goods larly the property of expelled residents.48 than an end in itself—once the regime flicted by years of fighting, and many of and confiscated the property of displaced Such resources allowed IS to distribute had sufficiently bought the loyalty of them do not care who provides it. populations.45 By spring 2015, Euphra- bread and fuel to the people and pay local residents, it cut much of the fund- IS was also careful to provide food to tes Valley oil wells between Deir al-Zour high salaries to its fighters; as this eco- ing required to maintain and extend the the population. Upon taking over the and Abu Kamal were providing it with nomic largesse has dried up, so too has irrigation program, leading to rampant east, its first actions included emptying an estimated $1–2 million in revenue per the group’s popular support. water shortages and waste. This envi- the state’s grain silos, supplying bakeries, day.46 Crude and semi-refined oil from ronment of high population growth, and compelling them to provide bread these wells was traded illegally to neigh- Assad and IS: economic unrest, underdeveloped in- at modest prices; at one point bread cost boring countries and even Syrian govern- Mutual Avoidance frastructure, and archaic social patterns less in Raqqa than anywhere else in Syr- ment territory, but local consumption The Islamic State’s number one prior- was particularly favorable to IS, which ia. Water was given freely to farmers on generated the most revenue for IS. The ity in Syria was to absorb Sunni Arab quickly eliminated local regime forces irrigated land, unlike the prewar years group sold crude to small refineries that communities and rebel factions while and secular opponents in the area, then when drought, incomplete irrigation provided petrol to the roughly 2 million creating a caliphate, not to topple the imposed “authentic” Salafism on the reform, and discriminatory economic Syrians and 6 million Iraqis living in IS Assad regime. Therefore, the group largely Sunni Arab population. liberalization hit agricultural areas hard. territory, who then used the fuel for ve- initially refrained from fighting the In fact, the traditional way of life Over a two-decade period of instabil- hicles, irrigation pumps, and generators. Syrian army. The situation changed in practiced in much of Raqqa and Deir ality, villages in northeast Syria expanded Yet Syrian oil production has steadily July 2014, however, when the regime’s Zour before the war was not far removed with no accompanying increase in pub- collapsed during the war, falling from air force launched significant bombing from that preached by IS. The popula- lic services or employment, while water 380,000 barrels per day in 2011 to less runs against IS forces for the first time. tion already adhered to a particularly scarcity and price increases prompted than 50,000 in 2014, and to nearly That shift, coupled with the group’s strict form of Islamic law, respecting the thousands of peasant farmers to leave nothing outside Rojava by 2017.47 The elimination or conversion of all other tenets of sharia more than the regime’s their lands with no hope of finding work international coalition against IS has insurgent factions in the Euphrates Val- secular courts. Establishing Islamic in the boomtowns.44 bombed oil-well facilities and local re- ley, apparently spurred a series of IS at-

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   85 tacks against Assad’s military bases in Deir al-Zour and Raqqa. This included al-Thawra air base, where the group’s 47. ENERGY PRODUCTION IN SYRIA quick success and brutal tactics trau- matized the army—a day after state N Tigris River TURKEY television had announced that the base W E Euphrates River SUWAYDA OIL FIELD was impregnable, IS fighters conducted S suicide attacks to breach its heavy de- Khabur Suwayda fenses and executed 150 soldiers after Tishrin Hasaka the battle. Aleppo Previously, mutual avoidance be- Mediterranean Sea Thawra Raqqa SHADADI OIL FIELD tween the regime and IS had led opposi- Thawra Latakia Baath tion leaders to accuse Assad of creating RASAFA OIL FIELD the jihadist group to divide and discredit Maharda Deir al-Zour Banias Hama the uprising. As proof of their claims, OMAR OIL FIELD they cited the fact that the founders of Bassel al-Assad SHAER GAS FIELD IS had been released from Syrian prisons Homs Palmyra in 2011. The regime’s security services did in fact release known jihadists, and LEBANON they undoubtedly believed that doing so would divide the opposition and scare Damascus Tishrin IRAQ off its Western supporters by accelerat- Deir Ali ing the rebellion’s incipient radicaliza- Golan Heights tion. Yet most of these freed jihadists ISRAEL joined anti-Assad groups such as Ahrar JORDAN 0 100 km al-Sham, not IS, and the regime certainly did not manufacture the jihadist DATA FROM INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, DECEMBER 2016 movement or ship in the many foreign fighters that make up its ranks. Assad Oil eld Oil pipeline Hydroelectric power plant Prospective thermal power plant might have underestimated these op- Gas eld Gas pipeline Thermal power plant Oil terminal eratives’ capabilities, but that does not necessarily mean he should be held ac- countable for their subsequent actions.49 Put another way, was King Abdullah II of Jordan aware of what he was doing when he released Abu Musab al-Zarqawi during a general amnesty in 1999?

86   fabrice balanche In any case, the regime has had ample south, convincing the Yarmouk Martyrs power in the area as unacceptable given complex and all Christian churches. The strategic reasons to avoid attacking IS as Brigade to join it in spring 2014. It had their years of ruling over the Kurds. IS church in Raqqa was closed, and the much as other groups during the war. bases north of Jabal al-Druze as well, at has therefore subjected Kurds in the Eu- few remaining Christian families were First, IS forces are largely unable or un- least until rebels seized Hawsh Hammad phrates Valley and elsewhere to ethnic banned from practicing their faith. By willing to threaten the regime’s frontline and remaining IS positions in the Leja cleansing (e.g., in Tal Abyad in 2013). this point, most Christians have seem- between Latakia, Homs, Damascus, and area in March 2017. In addition, Palmy- It does not matter that these Kurds are ingly fled IS-held territory because their Jordan; most direct clashes between the ra has fallen into and out of the group’s Sunni Muslims—the group does not safety may come under threat at any two have been limited to Deir al-Zour hands over the past two years, usually consider their form of Islam sincere, time (e.g., Christian Assyrians in the and Hasaka. In some areas, the steppe depending on the army’s ability to divert and the secular ideology of the main Khabur Valley have been subjected to acts as a natural buffer between them. troops from other flashpoints. IS forces Kurdish powerbroker, the Democratic murderous raids and kidnappings50). Second, IS has served a powerful mo- captured the city in May 2015 to open Union Party (PYD), is tantamount to tivation for hesitant or even hostile mi- the way to Damascus. The Russian inter- apostasy for jihadis. Turning the Tribes Against IS nority communities to join the regime’s vention later that year and the entry of Similarly, IS regards Syrian Shia as As in Iraq, IS forces in Syria are made forces, which they regard as the lesser of Iranian-led Shia militia reinforcements heretics and aims to eliminate them. up of local fighters primarily recruited two evils. For example, when IS began prevented the group from expanding This goal fits with the general discontent from lower-class Sunni Arab youths threatening the Ismaili city of Salamiya past Palmyra and forced it to withdraw that Syria’s Sunni majority feels toward who dream of reversing the traditional east of Hama in spring 2014, the people in March 2016. IS then retook the city decades of regime-sponsored Alawite tribal power structure for their own petitioned Damascus for protection— that November when Assad’s forces were domination, especially given the af- benefit. Yet the group has sought to despite their longstanding enmity to- concentrating on Aleppo, but the re- finities between Shia and Alawi Islam. infiltrate traditional tribal structures ward the regime, their participation in gime pushed the group out again after As described in chapter 1, Iranian mis- rather than overturn them completely, anti-Assad riots since 2011, and their winning that battle. Today, IS seems to sionaries fostered conversions in parts for instance by asking chiefs to marry general refusal to enter military service. be preparing refuges for its operatives of the Euphrates Valley long before the their daughters to high-ranking IS of- Assad replied that he would not help throughout Syria so that it can con- war—some former Sunni communities ficers and send their sons to fight the them unless they convinced the more tinue to launch raids and terrorist at- became Shia, new Shia mosques sprung group’s battles. As a result, tribes in east- than 20,000 local youths who had been tacks if the remaining “caliphate” in the up in various towns, and a major Shia ern Syria have been driven in different dodging conscription to join the army east crumbles. shrine was constructed in Raqqa. Once directions by the Assad regime, outside or National Defense Forces militia. They the area became official IS territory, actors, and their own self-interest. Un- agreed, and Ismaili conscripts were soon Cleansing Kurds, Shia, however, the group massacred those Shia tangling this complex web as part of a trained and equipped to protect the city. and Christians who had not already fled, as seen in Hat- campaign to drive IS out of the Euphra- The same scenario has been repeated in As part of the group’s strategy of tak- lah village in June 2013. tes Valley will be difficult, potentially other locations threatened by jihadis. ing up local causes in order to enlist lo- IS has targeted Christians in the Eu- hindering any effort to pursue a coun- Even so, Assad has targeted IS when- cal support, IS forces in northeast Syria phrates region as well. Raqqa, al-Thawra, terinsurgency strategy based on Sunni ever it threatens the western regime zone. have sought to exploit a development and Deir al-Zour have long been home Arab tribes, as General Petraeus did in In winter 2014–2015, IS began infiltrat- that local Sunni Arabs regard as their to Christian communities, notably de- Iraq a decade ago.51 ing the Damascus and Qalamoun region greatest threat: the prospect of living scendants of survivors from the 1915 In June 2016, Kurdish and Arab and demanding allegiance from local under Kurdish control. Sunni Arabs Armenian genocide. In Deir al-Zour, fighters from the Syrian Democratic rebels. It also established networks in the tend to regard the wartime reversal of IS destroyed the Armenian memorial Forces began a long southward cam-

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   87 Tigris River al-Malikiyah 48. Amuda Qamishli Peshkhabur ARAB TRIBES AND MILITARY TURKEY To Dohuk SITUATION IN NORTHEAST SYRIA, Kobane Jarabulus Ras al-Ain Tay April 2016 al-Yarubiya Rmelan Tal Abyad U.S. military facilities To Mosul Adwan AREA CONTROLLED BY Manbij Balikh River Tal Tamer Jabbour al-Hawl Syrian Army Sinjar Mountain To Aleppo Tishrin Dam HASAKA Islamic State Fadan Khabur River To Mosul Main road Other rebels Secondary road To Aleppo Walda RAQQA PYD Afadla Shammar Military airport open Sabkha Thawra Dam MAIN ETHNIC GROUP Military airport closed al-Tabqa Quayar Arab Sunni Baggara Bridge open

Kurdish Sunni al-Washeb Bridge destroyed

Christian minority Fadan DEIR AL-ZOUR International border To Salamiya Sbaa Tribe name Province border Haddadin IRAQ Tribe territory Mayadin RAQQA Province center Jabal Abu Rujmayn POPULATION Mawali Sbaa Ougaidat Manbij District center

Euphrates River 20,000 Bani Khalid 100,000 al-Shour HOMS 300,000 To Homs Palmyra Abu Kamal Palmyra Russian N Fawaira military access To Baghdad Ruwala W E

To Damascus

88   fabrice balanche paign to take Raqqa, launching attacks with Saudi links took part, which ex- because they fear their enemies will take times spurred groups of tribesmen to against IS positions in the Balikh Valley. plains why Deir al-Zour province rapidly revenge if he loses power. This explains leave their traditional territory. In August Within a year, the SDF had surrounded shifted toward the opposition. Raqqa why the army has been able to control 2013, IS helped the Arab tribes of Tal the IS stronghold. Yet if the final push province remained loyal for longer be- a pocket in the middle of Kurdish terri- Abyad defeat local Kurdish forces, expel to break the group’s influence over the cause common tribes are more numerous tory south of Qamishli. Kurdish civilians from the district, de- area is to succeed, the players involved there and had benefited from decades of For its part, IS quickly integrated stroy their villages, and redistribute their will need a thorough understanding of Baath agrarian reform and development Sunni Arab tribes into its own system land to Arabs. Author interviews with the evolving role that Sunni Arab tribes projects. Yet these projects allowed the re- after establishing itself in eastern Syria.52 local observers confirmed the group’s have played there, first under the Assad gime to rent—not buy—the local tribes. Local sheikhs were asked to pledge al- objective in such cases: to play on Sunni regime and then under IS. Although the Raqqa region was loyal to legiance to the supposed “caliph”; those Arab fears of Kurdish irredentism. In Syria as in other countries, a tribe Assad until as late as 2013, more recent who complied were given oil wells, land, Going forward, even if all of the mi- (qabila) is an ancestral network com- agrarian policy failures and the influx of and other benefits, while those who re- nority sectarian forces and foreign pow- prising anywhere from a few thousand money from Gulf countries ultimately sisted were attacked (e.g., IS killed 700 ers involved in the war make IS their to tens of thousands of members, sub- pushed most Sunni Arab tribal leaders members of the Sheitat tribe in August main target, they will still need the lo- divided into clans (ashayra). Although toward the opposition. Some sheikhs 2014). Like the Baath regime before it, cal Sunni Arab population to reject clans generally compete for control of remained loyal and fled to Damascus, IS sought to create its own social base the group if they hope to fully defeat their tribe, they show solidarity in the however, where they enjoy protection be- out of the traditional tribal hierarchy, it. Existing factors will help in this re- face of outside danger. cause Assad hopes they will be useful if and not just through the intermarry- gard, such as local economic deteriora- During the Ottoman period, some his forces retake the Euphrates Valley. ing mentioned above. If an elder sheikh tion, the group’s heavy repression, and tribal federations (e.g., the Shammar) The regime also employed military was hesitant to cooperate, the group its gradual loss of legitimacy. Rallying were powerful enough to avoid paying means to coopt tribes. The army began promoted a younger son or a secondary the sheikhs will also require giving them imperial taxes, earning them the moni- recruiting heavily in the area during clan within his tribe. Indeed, the group money, political positions, and judicial ker “noble” tribes. Those who did pay the 1980s, and many residents came to mainly targeted adolescents, drawing immunity to replace what they received were regarded as “common” tribes in view military service as a social elevator. them into camps for ideological indoc- from IS. They may be turned more read- the Bedouin hierarchy. Many common That same decade, Hafiz al-Assad used trination and military training. Thou- ily given the group’s declining fortunes. tribesmen still harbor animosity against the Haddadin tribe to quash the Sunni sands of young men have been radical- The price controls in IS territory are no their “noble” counterparts after being Arab revolt in Hama. Today, the Hadda- ized and detribalized during the war, longer curbing inflation, especially as ag- dominated by them for centuries. din are helping his son fight rebel forces which will raise a serious rehabilitation ricultural production decreases—a func- While the noble tribes have retained and protect the Aleppo supply road east problem once IS has been defeated. tion of scarce fertilizers and pesticides, their transnational nature (which in- of Hama, while prominent sheikh Fahd The group also used conflicts between heavier taxation on farmers to compen- cludes strong patronage ties with Saudi Jassem al-Freij serves as Bashar’s defense tribes to impose its power. In Jarabulus, sate for decreasing oil revenue, and an Arabia), the common tribes are more minister. Similarly, the younger Assad it supported the Tay against the Jais, irrigation system beset by infrastructure rooted in the Syrian state and have largely did not hesitate to distribute weapons to forcing the latter to leave the city and damage and mismanagement. Farmers abandoned their nomadic lifestyle. These Arab tribes in Jazira when facing a Kurd- seek refuge in Turkey. It is unclear what in irrigated areas are subject to the same differences shaped their responses to the ish revolt in 2004. These tribes—the relationship the attackers had with the unpopular constraints they faced under 2011 uprising. When anti-regime pro- Jabbour, Adwan, Tay, and Ougaidat— main Tay tribal stronghold on Syria’s far Assad, but with less income. tests first broke out, Sunni Arab tribes are still fighting alongside him today northeast border, though the war has at Meanwhile, the myth of an IS-

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   89 imposed Islamic order that provides tribes in Hasaka province helped Kurd- tempts to unify it have failed, whether groups and communities, as happened justice to all of the faithful has faded. ish units capture al-Hawl and al-Shada- by military or civilian groups. As early in East Ghouta. In the south, Assad Recent interviews with refugees from di from IS in winter 2015. Despite the as 2012, local opposition committees has established a stalemate with the Deir al-Zour and Raqqa provinces in- sharp sectarian divisions in other parts tried to federate at the regional level and regional rebel coalition, the Southern dicate that IS courts are just as corrupt of the northeast, these tribes have al- thus establish a nationwide organiza- Front, which is disorganized, fractious, as Assad’s, with the group’s members ways had good relations with the Kurds; tion, but this effort collapsed complete- and likely unable to mobilize further and their families receiving preferential for example, they refused to help Assad ly. The Syrian Interim Government set large-scale offensives. He may ultimately treatment despite the occasional token repress the Kurdish uprising of 2004. up in Gaziantep, Turkey, in early 2014 decide to regain influence there by ne- execution of corrupt IS fighters. Con- Yet they are relying on Washington to likewise aimed to bring the local com- gotiation rather than conquest, even if scription and enlistment of adolescents moderate the PYD’s hegemonic tenden- mittees together and build an adminis- that means empowering a small local has provoked protests (e.g., in Manbij cies and ensure their own share of power tration for “liberated Syria,” but it failed warlord. Indeed, this template could in November 2015), spurring IS to in- once IS leaves. as well, despite financial support from probably be applied throughout much crease repression to keep the population The same process of integrating Arab Qatar. Powerful local authorities with of Syria—Assad and his allies seem to in check. tribes into the SDF has been taking their own discrete interests were the believe that they have already come out Given their growing desire for replace in northern Raqqa province, but main factor in blocking the construc- on top because they can now negotiate venge (intiqaam) and their traditional with many more obstacles. Some tribes tion of a civil administration capable of peace individually with many of the re- tendency to preserve tribal interests remained fiercely on the Islamic State’s unifying rebel territories, but resistance maining Sunni rebel groups. As for the above all else, many individual Sunni side and still refuse to integrate into the from individual rebel groups and desta- two factions that would never surrender, Arabs and even entire clans are ready SDF53 (e.g., the Afadla and Sabkha), bilizing actions by the Assad regime also JN and IS, the regime is capable of de- to help the SDF or Syrian army fight while those who have been expelled played a role. stroying them with continued outside IS. For example, 200 members of the from their lands by IS-backed tribes are Since the Russian intervention and help and seems bent on doing just that. Sheitat tribe joined the army in Deir not ready for quick reconciliation (e.g., the reconquest of Aleppo, a number of Western actors looking to continue al-Zour after the 2014 massacre. Tribal the Jais and Sheitat). The level of vio- isolated Sunni Arab areas where pro-reb- their intervention in Syria face similar collaboration also helped the regime re- lence has been so high since 2011 that el sentiment was strong have returned complications in wooing local actors take Palmyra in March 2016, and tribal traditional tribal measures for regulating to the regime’s fold, such as Daraya, to their side, whether they limit their defections around Deir al-Zour and it are no longer adequate—several clans Qudsaya, and Wadi Barada. In some of objectives to destroying IS or not. In Manbij multiplied as the army and SDF and tribes will be forced to flee to avoid these cases (like Qudsaya) they did so general, any such efforts will necessi- approached Raqqa. collective vengeance, such as the Tay in voluntarily—but only after witnessing tate some degree of involvement in lo- Thus far, the United States has been Jarabulus and the Sbaa in Sukhna (who the widespread destruction and depopu- cal ethnic, religious, and tribal conflicts. backing the SDF via the Kurdish faction originally helped IS capture Palmyra). lation of towns that fought to the bitter In the north, for example, the Kurds are that leads it, the PYD. Such assistance— end (like Daraya). Assad’s attempts to hardly ready to abandon their dream of uniting their three border cantons. Arab particularly the promise of air support FROM FRACTURE regain control will be even more diffi- and better weapons—is essential for en- cult in Sunni Arab regions where rebels and Turkmen populations in these areas TO FAILURE couraging tribes to join the anti-IS coali- hold larger swaths of territory, as in Idlib may therefore face a choice: accept their tion. Arab tribes from the Fadan federa- Today, the territory of the Sunni Arab province. To win over villages there, the new minority status or leave the north. tion have already joined PYD forces in rebellion is more divided than ever, regime will need to await (or actively Convincing any of these parties to con- Raqqa province, while several Shammar much like the rebellion itself. All at- sow) internal divisions between rebel tinue fighting IS post-Raqqa will require

90   fabrice balanche acknowledgment of their local concerns, refuse to support an offensive headed by Islamic Front] and Ahrar al-Sham have against-al-qaeda-jabhat-al-nusra-fsa/. had an excellent working relationship 10. Mariam Karouny, “Al Qaeda group and even that may not be enough. Kurd- Liwa Tahrir Deir al-Zour, instead back- with al-Qa`ida factions such as Jabhat seizes bastion of Western-backed ish forces have little desire to advance ing Quwat al-Sanadid (Sanadid Forces), al-Nusra, and regularly praise their rebels in Syria’s Idlib region,” Reuters, contributions on the battlefield.” See much farther outside of Rojava, and no a militia led by Shammar tribesman November 1, 2014, http://www.reuters. “The Non-State Militant Landscape in com/article/us-syria-crisis-nusra-idUS- “moderate” Sunni Arab rebel partners and close Kurdish ally Hamidi Daham Syria,” CTC Sentinel, August 27, 2013, KBN0IL2QT20141101. exist outside the SDF, which remains al-Hadi. Without PYD collaboration, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the- under the YPG’s grip. a U.S.-backed Sunni Arab force would non-state-militant-landscape-in-syria. 11. Cafarella and Casagrande, “Syrian Armed Opposition Powerbrokers,” 3. Charles Lister, The Syrian Jihad: Al- The long-running battle for Deir al- struggle to challenge IS. Past attempts http://www.understandingwar.org/re- Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Evo- Zour province is a good illustration of port/syrian-armed-opposition-power- along those lines have ended in bit- lution of an Insurgency (London: C. brokers-0. the Sunni Arab rebellion’s overall weak- ter failure, leading the United States Hurst, 2015). 12. Aron Lund, “Does the ‘Southern Front’ ness, whether one looks at its numbers, to abandon training programs for such 4. Aron Lund, “Syria’s Salafi Insurgents: Exist?” Carnegie Middle East Center, popular appeal, or military effectiveness. The Rise of the Syrian Islamic Front,” groups in order to concentrate its re- March 21, 2014, http://carnegie-mec. Swedish Institute of International U.S.-backed Arab rebel groups—name- org/diwan/55054 sources on the SDF. Affairs, March 2013, www.ui.se/globa- ly, Usud al-Sharqiya (Lions of the East), The PYD’s hesitance to bless an in- lassets/ui.se-eng/publications/ui-pu- 13. Cafarella and Casagrande, http://www. Jaish Maghaweer al-Thawra (Rebel Com- dependent Arab force in northeastern blications/syrias-salafi-insurgents-the- understandingwar.org/report/syrian-ar- rise-of-the-syrian-islamic-front-min.pdf. med-opposition-powerbrokers-0. mando Army), and Liwa Tahrir Deir Syria is partly rooted in its fears of a al-Zour (Deir al-Zour Liberation Bri- 5. Jennifer Cafarella and Genevieve 14. Ibid. future competitor emerging once the Is- Casagrande, “Syrian Armed Opposi- gade)—number 2,000 fighters at most,54 15. For example, see quotes from Tho- tion Powerbrokers,” Institute for the lamic State is defeated. The Kurds want mas Pierret in Helene Sallon, “En so they clearly cannot defeat thousands Study of War, March 2016, http://www. to remain the only U.S. partner in the Syrie, la ‘deuxième révolution‘ des understandingwar.org/report/syrian-ar- of the most seasoned IS soldiers even if insurgés” [In Syria, the ‘second revo- area, even if that means subordinat- med-opposition-powerbrokers-0. they were sufficiently motivated to do lution’ of the insurgents], Le Monde, ing local Arab tribes. Such reasoning so.55 Their June 2016 attempt to take 6. Aron Lund, “After Zahran: Rising Ten- January 2014, http://www.lemonde.fr/ helps explain the PYD’s deployment sion in the East Ghouta,” Carnegie proche-orient/article/2014/01/10/la- Abu Kamal by air failed miserably when against Raqqa, an almost wholly Arab Middle East Center, April 19, 2016, deuxieme-revolution-des-insurges-sy- local tribes, fearing IS, did not carry out http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/63376. riens_4345623_3218.html. city that could never be integrated into their expected revolt.56 Similarly, their 7. Saleem al-Omar, “Islamist Groups 16. Jean-Pierre Filiu, “La Syrie, ‘destina- Rojava. Now that Raqqa is liberated, spring 2017 ground advance from al- Ahrar al-Sham and Jund al-Aqsa Go tion de rêve’ pour djihadistes Français” the Kurds realize that they may become to War,” Atlantic Council, October [Syria, a ‘dream destination’ for French Tanf toward Abu Kamal was halted by a a dispensable U.S. ally, so their calcula- 13, 2016, http://www.atlanticcouncil. jihadists], Souria Houria, April, 8, 2014. flash Shia militia offensive. org/blogs/syriasource/islamist-groups- https://souriahouria.com/la-syrie-des- tions regarding Arab rebel groups could U.S. commanders have indicated a ahrar-al-sham-and-jund-al-aqsa-go-to- tination-de-reve-pour-djihadistes-fran- shift accordingly. war. cais-par-jean-pierre-filiu/. desire to transfer Arab rebels to al-Sha- dadi, where they could be integrated 8. Aron Lund, “The Free Syrian Army 17. “Syria: How a new rebel unity is ma- Doesn’t Exist,” Syria Comment, March king headway against the regime,” into the SDF ahead of launching an of- Notes 16, 2013, http://www.joshualandis. BBC News, May 1, 2015, http:// fensive in Deir al-Zour province from com/blog/the-free-syrian-army-doesnt- www.bbc.com/news/world-middle- the north. Yet some of these fighters 1. Aron Lund, “Who Are the Soldiers of the exist/. east-32540436. Islamic State?” Carnegie Middle East 9. Thanassis Cambanis, “The Syrian Revo- 18. See “[FULL] Interview Al Jazee- would likely defect to the regime instead Center, October 24, 2014, http://carne- 57 lution Against al Qaeda,” Foreign Poli- ra with Syaikh Abu Muhammad al of traveling to al-Shadadi. Besides, the gie-mec.org/diwan/57021?lang=en. cy, March 29, 2016, http://foreignpolicy. Jaulani (27 Mei 2015),” YouTube PYD commanders who control the SDF 2. According to Aron Lund, “The [Syrian com/2016/03/29/the-syrian-revolution- video, https://www.youtube.com/

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   91 watch?v=1EVaBgSAJ3o. 26. Charles Lister, “The Dawn of Mass Ji- tana-displace-geneva-in-the-syrian- 41. Myriam Ababsa, Raqqa, Territoires et 19. Thomas Joscelyn, “Leaked audio had: Success in Syria Fuels al-Qa’ida’s peace-process. Pratiques Sociales d’une Ville Syrienne features Al Nusrah Front emir dis- Evolution,” CTC Sentinel, September 34. Fabrice Balanche, “Preventing a Jiha- [Raqqa, territories and social practices cussing creation of an Islamic emi- 7, 2016, https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/ dist Factory in Idlib,” PolicyWatch 2856 of a Syrian city] (Beirut: Institut Français rate,” FDD’s Long War Journal, July the-dawn-of-mass-jihad-success-in-sy- (Washington Institute for Near East du Proche-Orient, 2009), http://books. 12, 2014, http://www.longwarjournal. ria-fuels-al-qaidas-evolution. Policy, August 31, 2017), http://www. openedition.org/ifpo/1260. org/archives/2014/07/leaked_audio_ 27. “Conférence d’Astana sur la Syrie: pas washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analy- 42. Author interviews with Syrian refugees of_al.php. de percée mais un ‘optimisme pru- sis/view/preventing-a-jihadist-factory- in Turkey, June 2014. dent’” [Astana conference on Syria: in-idlib. 20. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “The Mas- 43. Author interview with Deir al-Zour refu- no major progress, but cautious opti- sacre of Druze Villagers in Qalb Lawza, 35. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Tens of gees, Beirut, March 2016. Idlib Province,” Syria Comment, June mism], France 24, January 23, 2017, Thousands of Syrian Rebels Poised to 44. Fabrice Balanche, ”Le programme de 15, 2015, http://www.joshualandis.com/ http://www.france24.com/fr/20170123- Regroup,” The Cipher Brief, October modernisation de l’irrigation en Syrie” blog/the-massacre-of-druze-villagers- conference-astana-texte-commun-op- 12, 2017, https://www.thecipherbrief. [The modernization of irrigation sys- in-qalb-lawza-idlib-province/. timisme-rebelles-syrie-syriens-bachar- com/article/middle-east/tens-thou- tems in the Syrian northeast], Méditer- assad-russie. sands-syrian-rebels-poised-regroup. 21. Marie Kostrz, “Idleb sous la férule de ranée 119 (2012), https://mediterranee. 28. Thomas Joscelyn, “Jihadists in Syria Jabhat Al-Nusra” [Idlib under the rule 36. Gilles Kepel, Terreur et Martyr, Relever revues.org/6499. of Jabhat al-Nusra], Orient XXI, Fe- honor Mullah Omar, praise Taliban’s le Defi de la Civilization [Beyond terror bruary 15, 2016, http://orientxxi.info/ radical state,” FDD’s Long War Journal, and martyrdom: the challenge of civili- 45. “Caliphate in Decline: An Estimate magazine/idleb-sous-la-ferule-de-jab- August 4, 2015, http://www.longwar- zation] (Paris: Flammarion, 2009). of Islamic State’s Financial Fortunes,” hat-al-Nusra,1202. journal.org/archives/2015/08/syrian-ji- International Centre for the Study of hadists-honor-mullah-omar-praise-tali- 37. Michael Gordon and Anne Barnard, Radicalisation and Political Violence, 22. “Control of Terrain in Syria: Septem- bans-radical-state.php. “U.S. Places Militant Syrian Rebel February 17, 2017, http://icsr.info/ ber 14, 2015,” Institute for the Study Group on List of Terrorist Organiza- wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ICSR- of War, http://www.understandingwar. 29. “Whole of Syria Protection Needs Over- tions,” New York Times, December view (PNO), 2018: Idleb Governorate,” Report-Caliphate-in-Decline-An-Esti- org/map/control-terrain-syria-septem- 10, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/20 mate-of-Islamic-States-Financial-For- ber-14-2015. UNHCR, October 12, 2017, https://re- 12/12/11/world/middleeast/us-desi- liefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/ tunes.pdf. 23. Richard Spencer, “Al-Qaeda’s Syrian gnates-syrian-al-nusra-front-as-terro- whole-syria-protection-needs-over- rist-group.html. 46. “Isis Inc: How oil fuels the jihadi ter- branch seize citizen journalists,” Tele- view-pno-2018-idleb-governorate. rorists,” Financial Times, October 14, 38. “Pression militaire et succès diploma- graph, January 10, 2016, http://www. 2015, https://www.ft.com/content/b823 telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ 30. As discovered during the author’s April tique pour les rebelles Syriens” [Military 4932-719b-11e5-ad6d-f4ed76f0900a. middleeast/syria/12091812/Al-Qae- 2015 visit to Nagorno-Karabakh. pressure and diplomatic success for Sy- das-Syrian-branch-seize-citizen-journa- 31. “Syria, militants set to evacuate 4 rian rebels], Le Monde, December 13, 47. “Syrie: l’economie et le secteur petrolier lists.html. See also the February 2016 towns as part of deal: Sources,” Press 2012, http://www.lemonde.fr/proche- reduits a neant” [Syria: the economy and interview with Fares by “100eyes,” TV, April 12, 2017, http://www.presstv. orient/article/2012/12/13/syrie-pres- the oil sector are destroyed], Agence available at https://www.youtube.com/ com/Detail/2017/04/12/517709/Syria- sion-militaire-et-succes-diplomatique- France-Presse, May 30, 2017, http://www. watch?v=l0Co90T7uzs. Foua-Kefraya-Zabadani-Madaya. pour-les-rebelles_1805889_3218.html. lefigaro.fr/flash-eco/2017/05/30/97002- 20170530FILWWW00134-syrie-l-eco- 24. For example, see the Facebook 32. Cafarella and Casagrande, “Syrian Ar- 39. Georges Malbrunot, “Le nouveau vi- nomie-et-le-secteur-petrolier-reduits-a- group “Lovers of Rebels Kafr Nabl,” med Opposition Powerbrokers,” http:// sage de la rebellion Syrienne” [The new neant.php. https://www.facebook.com/groups/ www.understandingwar.org/report/ face of the Syrian rebellion], Le Figaro, 309240689152345. syrian-armed-opposition-powerbro- January 13, 2014, http://www.lefigaro. 48. “Financing of the Terrorist Organisa- tion Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant 25. Thomas Joscelyn, “Analysis: Al Nusrah kers-0. fr/international/2014/01/13/01003- (ISIL),” Financial Action Task Force, Front rebrands itself as Jabhat Fath Al 33. Fabrice Balanche, “Will Astana Dis- 20140113ARTFIG00585-le-nouveau- February 2015, http://www.fatf-gafi. Sham,” FDD’s Long War Journal, July place Geneva in the Syrian Peace Pro- visage-de-la-rebellion-syrienne.php. 28, 2016, http://www.defenddemocra- cess?” PolicyWatch 2754 (Washington 40. Fabrice Balanche, Atlas of the Near East: org/documents/documents/financing- cy.org/media-hit/thomas-joscelyn-ana- Institute for Near East Policy, January State Formation and the Arab-Israeli of-terrorist-organisation-isil.html. lysis-al-nusrah-front-rebrands-itself-as- 20, 2017), http://www.washingtonins- Conflict, 1918–2010 (Leiden: Brill, 2017). 49. Nikolaos van Dam, Destroying a Na- jabhat-fath-al-sham/. titute.org/policy-analysis/view/will-as- tion: The Civil War in Syria (London: I.

92   fabrice balanche B. Tauris, 2017), pp. 80–81. April 21, 2017, http://www.al-monitor. 50. “Islamic State frees 19 of 220 Abducted com/pulse/originals/2017/04/syria- Assyrian Christians,” BBC News, March south-armed-opposition-group-ad- 1, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/ vance-isis.html. world-middle-east-31685931. 55. Sam Heller, “A Deadly Delusion: Were 51. David Petraeus, “Learning Counterin- Syria’s Rebels Ever Going to Defeat surgency: Observations from Soldiering the Jihadists?” War on the Rocks, Au- in Iraq,” Military Review, January–Fe- gust 10, 2017, https://warontherocks. bruary 2006, http://www.au.af.mil/au/ com/2017/08/a-deadly-delusion-were- awc/awcgate/milreview/petraeus1.pdf. syrias-rebels-ever-going-to-defeat-the- jihadists. 52. Haian Dukhan and Sinan Hawat, “The Islamic State and the Arab Tribes in 56. Liz Sly, “Islamic State Routs Penta- Eastern Syria,” E-International Rela- gon-Backed Syrian Rebels in Fresh tions, December 31, 2014, http:// Setback for U.S. Strategy,” Washing- www.e-ir.info/2014/12/31/the-islamic- ton Post, June 29, 2016, https://www. state-and-the-arab-tribes-in-eastern- washingtonpost.com/world/middle_ syria. east/islamic-state-routs-pentagon- backed-syrian-rebels-in-fresh-setback- 53. Skype interview with a journalist from for-us-strategy/2016/06/29/41833a16- northern Syria, October 2, 2017. 3e0b-11e6-9e16-4cf01a41decb_story. 54. Shelly Kittleson, “Syrian rebel group html. just trying to get home,” Al-Monitor, 57. Ryan Browne, “Russia and Syrian Re- gime Seeking to Poach U.S.-Backed Fighters,” CNN, August 3, 2017, http:// edition.cnn.com/2017/08/03/politics/ russia-assad-poach-us-backed-fighters- at-tanf/index.html.

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   93 5. Four Postwar Scenarios

erritory and sectar- torted national construction methods ter that mobilizes all sects because unoffi- international consensus that emerges ian identity are not perma- inherited from the 1960s (in-depth cial quotas must be respected. Yet when a after the war and the decisions of the nent historical construc- analysis of which is laid out in Part II Westerner speaks with Lebanese citizens, foreign powers that have so extensively Ttions. In times of peace of this study). Yet by putting forward a they are more likely than not to dismiss intervened there. The international and prosperity, a process of sectarian starkly Sunni Arab identity for postwar sectarianism outright or call it a Western community is always cautious about dissolution usually takes place, but in Syria, the opposition has taken a path fabrication aimed at weakening Arabs. redrawing borders because dividing a wartime, the security provided by sectar- similar to the regime’s, generating a This contradiction is difficult to under- country is a bad example for others and ian communities takes precedence over wave of violent exclusions that could re- stand at first, but researchers can grasp the can exacerbate the conflicts it seeks to other relationships. sult in the country’s partition. Allowing problem and examine it objectively once remedy (or create new ones). Region- Decades ago, the Baath coup in Syria the Sunni Arab majority to govern may they realize two things: first, that political al powers are even more opposed to seemed to point toward a future marked seem just in abstract terms, but the fact ideology is usually just a smokescreen in touching Syria’s borders because doing by socially and territorially integrated is that the Kurds and other minorities the Middle East, and second, that sectari- so would benefit the Kurds first. Turkey nationalism. Instead, however, the new cannot accept such dominion today be- anism remains a major driver of regional and Iran are fiercely opposed to official rulers established a system of power cause most of the Sunni Arab rebellion politics and social organization. Thus, the Kurdish autonomy. Admittedly, An- that favored the revival of sectarianism. has been radicalized against them. dogma of the “Syrian Arab nation” has kara came to accept the idea of a semi- Baath leaders insisted that ethnic and Despite the glaring realities on the not withstood the current war, and the independent Kurdistan in Iraq. But religious differences were private, but ground in Syria, a great hypocrisy con- clues that reveal this Baathist deceit have the September 2017 statehood referen- this did not stop them from exploit- tinues to reign whenever Western ob- been clear for decades to those who really dum may have soured that tolerance, ing sectarianism to dominate society. servers discuss—or, rather, choose not know Syrian society. which was mostly based on Masoud Before Hafiz al-Assad became presi- to discuss—the role of sectarianism in Barzani’s willingness to partner with dent, he often condemned his Baath the Middle East. For example, Lebanon EXPLOSION OR Turkey on numerous ventures while re- comrades as “sectarian,” yet he himself has perhaps the most sectarian political jecting its bitter enemy, the Kurdistan REUNIFICATION? filled the army chain of command with system in the world and suffered fifteen Workers Party. This is certainly not the members of his Alawite clan in order to years of civil war because of it, not to As stated at the outset of this study, the case with Rojava and the Democratic seize power. mention many years of foreign occupa- fate of Syria is no longer Syria’s to de- Union Party in Syria, since Ankara re- The 2011 uprising was a long-brew- tion and domestic strife since then. The cide. Its reunification or partition will gards the PYD as an arm of the PKK. ing reaction to the failure of these dis- appointment of a senior official is a mat- largely depend on the regional and/or For its part, Iran believes that an inde-

 94  pendent Syrian Kurdistan could serve Kurds want to keep their autonomy fighting can cease, with one caveat— rural fissures, which partially overlap: as an unwelcome precedent for Iran- from Damascus. For their part, Sunni such arrangements would only apply in the cities, residents who have rural ian Kurds.1 Arab rebels do not want the regime to to peripheral regions and the northeast origins tend to be poor and in conflict Washington has good relations with resume control in their territories as because the regime will not accept any- with the original urban dwellers, who the dominant Kurdish factions in Iraq long as Assad is in power—they want thing less than full central authority in generally belong to the middle and up- and Syria, and past administrations to keep the country intact, but only on the populous western zone between Da- per classes. Yet these economic cleavages have already applied the ethnic-parti- the condition that they become the new mascus and Aleppo. are less lethal than the sectarian cleav- tion solution elsewhere (e.g., Yugoslavia powerbrokers. The Kurds have champi- It is difficult to predict Syria’s future ages. It is not social or class conflict that in 1994). Yet promoting a Kurdish state oned an alternative scenario by calling over the next ten years—the question of has motivated so many Syrians to join in Syria headed by the PYD/PKK does for a federal Syria, but federalism in a whether it will explode along sectarian militias, though poverty and the hope not seem like a viable U.S. option for non-homogeneous country seems far- lines or reunify itself depends strongly of social advancement are strong driv- a host of reasons, including the PKK’s fetched and has little support among on global and regional geopolitical pa- ers. Similarly, political conflicts between status as a U.S.-designated terrorist other sects. rameters. But the outcome also depends Arab nationalists, Baathists, commu- group, the Trump administration’s op- If the international community on the central government’s capac- nists, liberals, and so on are marginal. position to the Iraqi Kurdish statehood wishes to restore Syria’s territorial in- ity to build a new social and territorial Even in the politically stratified Kurdish vote, and the regional turmoil ushered tegrity, it will need to foster greater pact with the population. The war has community, opposition to the PYD is in by that referendum. decentralization. Transferring power to widened and multiplied the country’s not powerful enough to trigger interne- The Russians also support partition the municipalities based on sectarian cleavages, and years of heavy fighting cine war. when it serves their geopolitical inter- distribution could ease tensions some- and mass population displacement have In projecting how sectarian cleav- ests. In neighboring Georgia, Moscow what, and this solution might be more deeply inscribed these fractures onto ages might affect Syria’s mid-term fu- has backed the autonomous republics of acceptable to the regime and its exter- Syrian territory. Even if the country re- ture, it is useful to divide the country Abkhazia, Adjara, and South Ossetia in nal supporters than federalism. Tehran tains its territorial integrity and current into four territorial categories: minority order to weaken leaders whom it regards formally opposes federalism in Syria administrative divisions, the wartime zones (i.e., areas heavily populated by as too close to the West and NATO. because it could spur similar appeals in situation of decentralized governance Alawites, Christians, Ismailis, Druze, The same fate probably awaits Ukraine. Iran, where Persians make up a dwin- over sharply divided sectarian regions is Shia, or Kurds), the Sunni Arab tribal In Syria, however, Moscow’s objective dling 60% majority of the population2 likely here to stay. zones in the east, the Sunni Arab rural seems to be preserving the country’s and have a low fertility rate3 compared zones in the west (a category that in- territorial integrity as much as possible to ethnic minorities. Likewise, Turkey FOUR SCENARIOS cludes the small Turkmen minority for rather than partitioning it, since Damas- has no desire to fuel federalist demands convenience’s sake), and the large Sunni cus is a strong regional ally. among its sizable Kurdish population. The war has put a spotlight on Syria’s Arab majority cities (Damascus, Aleppo, Yet regardless of international and Yet all parties may need to resign them- two main cleavages: sectarian and eco- Homs, and Hama). Of course one could regional views on the subject, partition selves to at least some degree of unof- nomic. The first type—which includes create other categories, especially within already exists on the ground in Syria, so ficial federalism in Syria, since the army religious, ethnic, and tribal fissures—is the Kurdish community; Syria is a mo- the question has become whether any of lacks the means to reconquer the entire the most prominent, since Syrians are saic, and each of its communities is a the conflict’s actors is capable of reunify- country even with Iran and Russia’s sup- killing each other mainly on the basis mosaic within a mosaic. Yet the nature ing the country. Despite their coopera- port. Some territories should therefore of these identities. The second type cor- of this study calls for simplifying (some tion with the regime on various matters, be given informal autonomy so that the responds to class differences and urban/ might say caricaturing) the country’s

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   95 sectarian categories in order to develop alition dominated by al-Qaeda affiliate separate section is devoted to briefly as- more visibly divided between areas of comprehensible scenarios for its future. Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (under one name sessing the geopolitical consequences of direct and indirect administration. Before laying out these scenarios, it or another) is capable of taking Damas- these outcomes, particularly regarding Meanwhile, in the former rebel prov- is important to clarify their scope. This cus. Other scenarios are theoretically the stability of neighboring countries, ince of Idlib, around half the population study does not delve very far into the re- possible, such as the moderate rebels the solidity of the Iranian axis, and Rus- goes into exile abroad, unwilling to fight gional and international geopolitics that experiencing a revival and rising up to sia’s future role in the region. on or accept continued Baath/Alawite will be essential to Syria’s fate. Many challenge the radical Islamists. Yet this rule. After this last wave of emigration, other books and articles exist on those seems unlikely given the current reali- ethnic cleansing is limited. Yet the ma- scenario 1: syria remains subjects, and there is little need to syn- ties on the ground—if the regime is go- jority of Syrian refugees do not return united, the regime holds thesize them here. Moreover, geopoliti- ing to be defeated, the radicals will be home once the fighting stops, especially damascus cal conditions may still evolve before the the ones to do it. Similarly, there is little those who resided in opposition strong- war’s conclusion, which is the catalyst point in elaborating a scenario in which In this scenario, the regime does not holds such as Qusayr, Homs, or certain for the scenarios presented below. This foreign powers intervene to help secu- have adequate military resources to districts of Damascus and Aleppo. study does not venture to give a definite lar-democratic forces overthrow the re- reconquer all of Syria, so it negotiates Apart from potential safe zones on timeframe for peace in Syria, since it is gime, guarantee the country’s territorial agreements with local powerbrokers the borders, Syria remains territori- difficult to estimate how long the win- unity, and safeguard minority rights. outside its zone of control. The north ally united, allowing for rapid rebuild- ning side will need to wear the others This outcome would of course be ideal, remains under the PYD’s dominion, ing of infrastructure and the economy. down, and how long international ac- but one must remain realistic. and the Kurds agree to a strategic and The country’s stability remains fragile, tors will take to come to an agreement. The most useful aspect of this exercise economic alliance with Damascus in or- however, and only successful economic Given these parameters and the sec- is to define how Syria’s internal or exter- der to counter the Turkish threat. In the reconstruction and expanded sectarian tarian trends examined in the previous nal borders would look in each scenario, Euphrates Valley, newly liberated from power-sharing can preserve it in the long chapters, the war is most likely to result depending on the camp that winds up the Islamic State by the Syrian Demo- term. This in turn would require the rein one of four outcomes: occupying Damascus and essentially cratic Forces (SDF), the regime governs gime to open a wider political space for winning the conflict. A simplified visual Sunni Arabs and Kurds. As for Syria’s 1. The regime wins and Syria remains indirectly through local Sunni Arab no- rendering of the four sectarian territorial foreign relations, the country becomes a territorially united. tables. In western Syria, the regime con- categories described above is perhaps the tinues to impose direct rule, but with Russo-Iranian protectorate. 2. The rebels topple the regime and best way of illustrating each scenario; many new exceptions; for instance, it Syria remains territorially united. the first map shows how these four zones rewards Jabal al-Druze for its loyalty by scenario 2: syria remains are currently arrayed. 3. The regime stays in power but Syria giving it more autonomy, and extends united, the rebels take Each scenario also outlines the type is partitioned. similar privileges to former Sunni Arab damascus of governance that would prevail (cen- rebel zones that rallied to Assad during 4. The rebels topple the regime but tralism or federalism; direct or indirect the war. For its part, Turkey maintains After marching into Damascus, rebel Syria is partitioned. government), the demographic con- an area of influence in northern Syria, forces led by Jabhat Fatah al-Sham im- The scenarios in which the regime holds sequences (ethnic cleansing, refugee including the Turkmen areas, and an- pose a centralized political system with out do not assume that Bashar al-Assad flows), the prospects for stability, and other safe zone is created on the Jordani- a Sunni Arab, Islamist character. As they himself remains in power. And the rebel the main social, political, economic, and an border. The political system remains seize sectarian strongholds throughout victory scenarios assume that only a co- security problems that might arise. A formally centralized, but the country is western Syria, most of the Kurds and

96   fabrice balanche other minorities flee the country, along zone is formed at the Jordanian border, with numerous secular Arabs. Many with foreign ground troops support- of the millions of Sunni Arab refugees ing various opposition factions. Ethnic who fled Syria during the war decide cleansing leads to population exchanges to return home, believing they will be between the different zones, and some 49. SYRIA'S ETHNIC AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE permitted to seize the property of those wartime refugees return to Syria if their who leave postwar due to large-scale ethnoreligious status corresponds with Aleppo Qamishli Turkey ethnic and economic cleansing. that of the local authorities. Hasaka Raqqa The country’s reconstruction is facili- The new borders complicate the re- tated by Gulf investors eager to strength- construction effort and threaten to spark Latakia Deir al-Zour en a friendly regime that has managed new conflicts. In the northeast, clashes Hama to break the pro-Iranian axis. Russia is arise between Kurds and Arabs over ac- ousted from Syria along with Iran. And cess rights to water from the Euphrates. Tartus Homs Palmyra now that the country is homogeneous In the central steppes, Sunni Arab tribes in ethnoreligious terms, it has a better compete with the regime for control of

Iraq chance of becoming stable. Yet external key hydrocarbon reserves. Iran and Rus- Lebanon conflict is likely to arise with Lebanon, sia remain in Syria but are weakened by where a large portion of Syria’s minori- the challenge of propping up the regime ties seek refuge. Partly as a result of this, indefinitely amid economic impover- Damascus Lebanon’s own civil war resumes. ishment, potent competition from nu-

MEDITERRANEAN merous warlords,4 and the continually Suwayda looming threat of further secessions. Deraa scenario 3: syria is Israel Jordan partitioned, the regime holds damascus scenario 4: syria is Rural Sunni Arab City partitioned, the rebels This scenario is similar to the first one, take damascus Urban Sunni Arab Primary road but the regime is now weaker, and the Minorities Secondary road internal boundaries between the zones Although rebel forces seize Damascus,

Sunni Arab tribes Desert area of direct and indirect regime control they lack the means to oust minorities instead become external borders sepa- with well-defined, defensible sectarian rating discrete territories. Although the strongholds in other parts of the coun- southwest remains under the regime’s try. Accordingly, Kurdistan breaks away rule, Aleppo and Hama fall into rebel from Syria, along with an “Alawistan” hands, Syrian Kurdistan becomes inde- and possibly a “Druzistan,” the latter pendent, and the Euphrates Valley falls protected by Jordan. This leads to ex- under tribal council control and is cut tensive ethnic cleansing, with the rebels off from Damascus and Aleppo. A safe pushing minorities out of the Damascus

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   97 50. UNITY WITH REGIME IN DAMASCUS 51. UNITY WITH REBELLION IN DAMASCUS

SAFE ZONE Qamishli OIL Qamishli Aleppo Aleppo OIL Turkey Turkey Hasaka Hasaka Raqqa Raqqa SAFE ZONE EUPHRATES WATER

Latakia Latakia Deir al-Zour Deir al-Zour OIL Hama OIL Hama SHAER GAS FIELD EUPHRATES OIL SHAER GAS FIELD EUPHRATES OIL Tartus Homs Palmyra Tartus Homs

Palmyra

Iraq Iraq Lebanon Lebanon

Damascus Damascus

MEDITERRANEAN Suwayda

MEDITERRANEAN Suwayda Jordan SAFE ZONE Deraa Israel Deraa Israel Jordan

CLEAVAGES NEW ORGANIZATION GEOGRAPHY CLEAVAGES NEW ORGANIZATION GEOGRAPHY Rural Sunni Arab Internal border City Rural Sunni Arab Internal border City Urban Sunni Arab External border Primary road Urban Sunni Arab External border Primary road Minorities Con ict Secondary road Minorities Con ict Secondary road Sunni Arab tribes Ethnic cleansing Desert Sunni Arab tribes Ethnic cleansing Desert

Social cleansing

98   fabrice balanche

52. PARTITION WITH REGIME IN DAMASCUS 53. PARTITION WITH REBELLION IN DAMASCUS

Qamishli Qamishli Aleppo EUPHRATES WATER OIL EUPHRATES WATER OIL Turkey Turkey Hasaka Hasaka Raqqa Raqqa Aleppo SEA ACCESS SEA ACCESS Latakia ORONTES Deir al-Zour Latakia Deir al-Zour WATER Hama OIL Hama OIL ORONTES SHAER GAS FIELD SHAER GAS FIELD EUPHRATES OIL WATER EUPHRATES OIL

Tartus Palmyra Tartus Palmyra Homs SEA ACCESS Homs

Iraq Iraq Lebanon Lebanon

Damascus Damascus

Suwayda MEDITERRANEAN Suwayda MEDITERRANEAN SAFE ZONE Deraa Jordan Jordan Israel Israel Deraa

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   99 area and the breakaway statelets likely forward to the Syria crisis, however, common cause with the regime, quick- conflict could have raised doubts about expelling Sunni Arabs. Some wartime and Western countries no longer seem ly moved away from an opposition that Syria’s territorial unity—an apparent refugees return to Syria, while many to attach great importance to sectarian- was divided between Arab nationalists redline for the United States and other new emigres likely go into exile. ism, preferring to draw political paral- and Islamists, all of whom rejected countries. Yet after a civil war of this The political system in Sunni Arab lels between the war and the Europe- Kurdish autonomy. magnitude, Western observers should Syria is formally centralized, with direct an Revolutions of 1848 or the fall of As for the country’s majority Sunni be clear-eyed enough to realize that no governance in the west and indirect gov- communism in the Eastern Bloc. Such Arabs, they are hardly a monolith, but general reconciliation is possible. Mil- ernance for the Euphrates Valley, as local comparisons tend to leave out the fact that is due in no small part to the re- lions of Syrian refugees will be unable tribes demand to keep control of their that both of these historical anteced- gime’s decades-long effort to divide and to return home because of their sup- hydrocarbons. Competition likely arises ents had a communitarian dimension; disempower them. For half a century, port for the opposition, and if the re- between Aleppo and Damascus as well, when communism fell, for example, Damascus did everything it could to gime reconquers areas still under rebel echoing their longstanding rivalry dur- non-homogeneous countries such as create strife between the “noble” and control, a new forced exodus will occur. ing the Baath era. Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the “common” tribes in the Euphrates Val- Even if the regime’s central leadership As in scenario 3, the new borders Soviet Union were divided along eth- ley, between the Sunni bourgeoisie and expresses a sincere desire for amnesty complicate reconstruction. Although noreligious lines. It is therefore signifi- popular classes, between devout and (hardly likely), there is no guarantee the new Sunni Arab regime may still cant that Russia was the first country secular Sunnis, between Sufis and Salaf- this leniency would be respected by the benefit from Gulf financial assistance, it to highlight the sectarian aspects of the ists, and so on. Likewise, tribal rivalries sectarian militias and other actors who is now cut off from access to the sea due Syria war at a time when most West- have helped divide the rebels through- wield varying degrees of independent to the breakaway Alawite statelet on the ern European analysts were ignoring or out the war, making it impossible to authority at the local level. coast. And depending on its relations denying them. As early as 2011, Rus- unite the Free Syrian Army. Some Sun- The international players compet- with the Kurds and the Arab tribes, it sian media published ethnoreligious ni Arabs even joined regime militias, ing in Syria will therefore be compelled may also be deprived of wheat from maps of the conflict.5 This may help including civil servants who feared the to rely on factions for whom sectarian Jazira and hydrocarbons from the east. explain the relative success of Russian rebellion and city dwellers who sought concerns are a primary motivation. The These uncertainties could lead to new policy in Syria—Moscow immediately to protect their neighborhoods from Kurds want their own autonomous conflicts over borders and resources. understood the conflict’s most power- looters. Despite their greater numbers, area in the north. The Alawites and Finally, Russian and Iranian influ- ful dynamic. then, Syrian Sunnis remain far too frac- other religious minorities want to re- ence in Syria are weakened. Alawistan Since early in the revolt, many Syr- tured to represent a credible political tain their privileged place in the halls becomes a Russian-Iranian protectorate, ian religious minorities believed they alternative to the regime. of power and ensure they can remain while Moscow potentially shields Kurd- had no choice but to support the Assad The refusal to take this past and in their homeland. The various Sunni istan from Turkish threats. regime in order to prevent an increas- present sectarianism into consider- Arab tribes are more focused on mate- ingly radicalized Sunni Arab opposi- ation is one of the main reasons behind rial interests than politics—they seem the failure of Western policy in Syria to realize that taking power in Damas- THE WEST’S SECTARIAN tion from prevailing. The regime and Iran organized these minorities into and, consequently, the continuation cus is farfetched at this point, but they BLIND SPOT? self-defense groups within the frame- of the Assad regime. At first, Western still want more power at the local level, In the nineteenth century, France and work of the “People’s Army,” later re- governments may have had good rea- more land, more jobs, better access to Great Britain took a clearly sectar- named the National Defense Forces. son for this approach, since adopting water, hydrocarbon sharing, and so on. ian approach to the Middle East. Fast- Even the Kurds, who did not make an openly sectarian policy toward the If certain domestic or foreign actors aim

100   fabrice balanche 54. POTENTIAL IRANIAN ROUTES TO THE MEDITERRANEAN, August 2017

N Tigris River Euphrates River W E TURKEY PKK Kobane Qamishli S Manbij Tal Afar Mosul Afrin Hasaka Sinjar Erbil Idlib Aleppo Raqqa KDP Latakia al-Tabqa Sulaymaniyah SYRIA Deir al-Zour Kirkuk CYPRUS Hama PUK Sukhna IRAN Tartus Homs Palmyra Abu Kamal LEBANON

al-Tanf Damascus Ramadi Baghdad Golan Mediterranean Sea Heights Karbala IRAQ Najaf Amara

ISRAEL JORDAN SAUDI ARABIA Basra EGYPT

Persian Gulf KUWAIT 0 200 km

IRANIAN ROUTES AREAS OF CONTROL IN SYRIA AREAS OF CONTROL IN IRAQ

Potential Syrian army and militias Rebels Iraqi army and militias Islamic State PKK-KDP Major city

Existing SDF (Kurdish-led) Islamic State KRG (KDP and PUK) PKK Locality

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   101 55. RUSSIA’S STRATEGY IN SYRIA SUPPORT TO ASSAD Tigris River N TURKEY Euphrates River Protected city or area W E Qamishli Russian military base S Kobane Afrin Manbij HASAKA Control of desert

Mediterranean Rebel supply route closure ALEPPO IDLIB RAQQA CONDOMINIUM WITH IRAN

Hmeimim LATAKIA Air Base Boundary Iranian/Russian zones

Strong military cooperation w/ Iran Alawite HAMA region DEIR AL-ZOUR KURDISH STRATEGY New military base Recognition of Rojava TARTUS Palmyra Abu Kamal HOMS Afrin-Kobane junction

LEBANON Decon iction with Assad

IRAQ COUNTER-REBEL STRATEGY DAMASCUS Reconquest of Euphrates region QUNEITRA Sunni rebel safe zone Golan Heights Capital SUWAYDA GEOGRAPHY ISRAEL Province border Province center JORDAN 0 100 km DERAA International border Other locality to facilitate these demands, they should compels them to consider sectarian is- On August 2017, the “Desert Hawks” to use its influence over the army as le- understand that the tribes are not for sues when courting or confronting local militia—a force founded by Ayman Ja- verage with the regime at a time when sale, merely for rent. Moreover, in each armed groups. ber, a businessman close to Assad—was Iranian-backed militias are still ubiqui- of these cases, the empowered actors On the regime side, Russia has been disbanded and its fighters were inte- tous in western Syria. are armed forces rather than political pushing Assad to reorganize the na- grated into the Syrian marines and the The United States seems to have ad- groups, and the cohesion of these com- tional army by integrating the National army’s 5th Corps.6 Moscow has encour- opted a similar strategy in the east, at- batants is essentially based on sectarian Defense Forces militias. The regime has aged such moves,7 based on the belief tempting to transform the SDF into a solidarity. This fact may be engendering long presented the army as a model of that integrating pro-regime militias melting pot of Kurdish and Arab fight- a paradigm shift in how foreign gov- national unity, but in reality the elite will make the regular army a national ers. Washington hopes that this force ernments approach Syria, as realpolitik units are clearly dominated by Alawites. rallying point. The Kremlin also hopes will prove capable of taking the entire

102   fabrice balanche Euphrates Valley back from the Islamic 56. RUSSIA’S STRATEGY IN THE LEVANT: ENERGY AND TURKISH SIEGE State, stabilizing the area, preventing the Assad regime from returning there, Sebastopol RUSSIA KAZAKHSTAN and impeding Iran’s attempts to create Black Sea Abkhazia South Ossetia a land corridor to the Mediterranean— GEORGIA SOUTH STREAM Tbilisi all while maintaining a pro-American Istanbul TURKMENISTAN Batouni Baku posture. For this plan to work, however, ARMENIA Yerevan AZERBAIJAN U.S. officials would need to make sure Ankara NABUCCO Gyumri that the Kurdish forces in charge of

TURKEY Caspian Sea the SDF do not behave as an occupy- BTC PKK ing power, instead allowing Arab tribes to play the main role in liberating the Ceyhan valley. This may be a tall order given ROJAVA KRG Tehran Aleppo Mosul the numerous reports of inexperienced CYPRUS Hmeimim Palmyra Arab units playing second fiddle to Tartus Mediterranean Sea LEBANON SYRIA Kurdish forces in the battle for Raqqa.8 IRAN Baghdad In the end, the United States may need Damascus to establish a semi-permanent presence ISRAEL IRAQ on the ground in eastern Syria in order to bolster its local allies—a thorny pros- JORDAN Basra N EGYPT pect for many reasons, including Tur- key’s strong feelings on the Kurdish is- W E KUWAIT P e rs sue and Russia’s apparent unwillingness ia n S SAUDI ARABIA G u to treat the Euphrates River as a line 0 400 km lf Red Sea of deconfliction.9

POLICY RUSSIAN SIEGE AROUND TURKEY ENERGY STRATEGY CHOOSING BETWEEN Strategic alliance w/ Russia Strategic alliance w/ Russia Block transport from GCC FLAWED OPTIONS

Tactical alliance w/ Russia Russian base Hydrocarbon road All of the available scenarios for Syria’s near-term future present serious dif- Pro-USA Support to Kurds Potential hydrocarbon road ficulties and dangers, and the viabil- Potential Shia uprising ity of any given approach depends on the interests of the foreign power attempting to carry it out. If the main goal is to break the pro-Iranian axis and block Russian influence in the

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   103 Middle East, a rebel victory must be prioritized. Yet this runs the risk of partitioning Syria, making the country a base of radical Islam, and creat- 57. SECTARIAN DISTRIBUTION IN LEVANT AND POTENTIAL STATELETS ing millions more refugees. Can one Tigris River N Euphrates River realistically expect a group like Jabhat TURKEY W E Fatah al-Sham to evolve toward toler- Syrian Kurdistan Turkmenistan Iraqi Kurdistan ance and democracy? Alternatively, if S Erbil the goal is to stabilize the Middle East Mosul Sunni Idlib Idlib Aleppo Raqqa and prevent millions of Syrian, Leba- Sulaymaniyah Sunni Arab Tribes nese, and even Jordanian refugees from Latakia Kirkuk Deir al-Zour Sunni Arab overwhelming the European Union, Hama Palmyra then the existing regime in Damascus Tripoli Homs IRAN must be maintained, with or without Beirut SYRIA Assad at its head. Although this could Damascus produce a stalemate of sorts and allow LEBANON Baghdad some refugees to return home, it would Deraa Karbala probably require partitioning the ISRAEL Hillah IRAQ Sunni Deraa Amara country, and the geopolitical and mor- Najaf al consequences of backing a regime Amman Diwaniyah with such a brutal track record could be considerable. Basra The prospects seem equally fraught JORDAN EGYPT when considering what these scenarios SAUDI ARABIA might mean for the future governance Aqaba of Syria. Partitioning the country could KUWAIT solve some of its sectarian problems, 0 200 km but not all of them, and this approach would surely create new divisions be- SUNNI MAJORITY ETHNIC MINORITY RELIGIOUS MINORITY tween and within sects. The fragmenta- Sedentary Kurd Alawite Ismaili O cial borders tion would also present each sectarian Nomadic Turkmen Druze Christian De facto future internal borders zone with problems (and, likely, conflicts) related to sea access, narrowing Yezidi Shia Twelver Main city economic markets, sharing of river waters, and allocation of oil resources. Even worse, ethnic cleansing would likely be maximal in this scenario. Al-

104   fabrice balanche ternative scenarios do not project much better. Keeping Syria intact while establishing some form of federalism would still lead to partition sooner

Regional power or later given the country’s sectarian heterogeneity. Decentralization at the Local power provincial level would not be much dif- Client country ferent, since the regime’s administrative TURKEY Kurdistan boundaries generally align with Syria’s Regional confrontation sectarian boundaries. True protection Islamic State Civil War U.S. military base of minorities and progressive evolution toward democracy are only pos- SYRIA Russian military base Hezbollah IRAN sible within the framework of a system Arab-Israeli con ict Hydrocarbon resources that is decentralized to the lowest level, IRAQ the municipality. Yet one should not Suez Canal JORDAN Military con ict Baluchistan make the mistake of idealizing munici- Alarm Sinai Shia Revolt pal democracy as a goal given its keen Strategic position vulnerability to clientelism and ramp- Destabilization Hormuz ant corruption. EGYPT SAUDI ARABIA Russian in uence Ideally an intermediate scenario UAE Royal Succession OMAN between these extremes will materi- alize, but the opportunities for such solutions are dwindling. To seize the least unpalatable options before they

al-Qaeda disappear, the international commu- 58. nity must act quickly—and with eyes Houthi Rebellion fully open to the sectarian dynamics THE NEW YEMEN THIRTY YEARS WAR that will drive the rest of the war and its aftermath. Piracy

0 400 km Bab al-Mandab

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   105 the (de)legitimation of the Western in- Notes tervention in Syria], Orient XXI, May 11, 2015, http://orientxxi.info/magazine/ 1. Farzin Nadimi, “Iran’s Military Options la-carte-outil-de-de-legitimation-de-l- Against Kurdish Independence,” Policy- intervention-occidentale-en-syrie,0899. Watch 2861 (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 22, 2017), 6. Leith Fadel, “Pro-government ‘Desert http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ Hawks’ disbanded after three years of policy-analysis/view/irans-military-op- service,” al-Masdar, August 2, 2017, tions-against-kurdish-independence. https://www.almasdarnews.com/ article/pro-government-desert-hawks- 2. According to the CIA World Factbook, disbanded-three-years-service. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html. 7. Author interview with a Syrian official, 3. Youssef Courbarge and Emmanuel June 2017. Todd, Le rendez-vous des civilisations 8. See, e.g., John Davison, “Arab Fighters [The convergence of civilizations] (Pa- Struggle to Assert Role in Raqqa As- ris: Editions du Seuil, 2007). sault,” Reuters, August 16, 2017, https:// 4. Fritz Schaap, “Assad’s Control Erodes www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast- as Warlords Gain Upper Hand,” Spie- crisis-syria-raqqa-idUSKCN1AW1L4. gel Online, March 8, 2017, http://www. 9. Andrew J. Tabler, “Russia Crosses the spiegel.de/international/world/assad- Euphrates: Implications,” Policy Alert power-slips-in-syria-as-warlords-grow- (Washington Institute for Near East Po- more-powerful-a-1137475-2.html. licy, September 18, 2017), http://www. 5. Lucile Housseau, “La carte, outil de washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analy- (dé)légitimation de l’intervention occi- sis/view/russia-crosses-the-euphrates- dentale en Syrie” [The map, tool for implications.

106   fabrice balanche part ii the origins of syria’s sectarianism

6. A divisive EVOLUTION

n pre-civil-war Syria, in establishing its interior borders, well; newer generations have cut ties EFFECTS OF ARABIZATION community structures were ubiq- so analyzing the distribution of these with their ancestral villages in Jazira and uitous—members of any given communities throughout the state and Northern Syria’s Turkmen and Kurdish Kurgh Dagh, while local youths joined Icommunity were bound together within the regime that oversees them is communities are both Sunni, but they anti-Assad rebel groups after 2011 in- by endogamous marriage, preferential crucial. The administrative divisions, tend to assert their ethnic rather than stead of the Kurdish nationalist groups hiring, solidarity against outsiders in housing distribution, road networks, religious identity. This includes using that formed in the north. all matters, allegiance to local leaders, and other tangible state structures all their native tongues at home, a practice Yet ethnic identity is not necessar- and so forth. Each individual’s identity reflect the power relations between dif- reinforced in recent years by Turkish- ily the strongest community cement, therefore moved in two dimensions: ferent territorial actors. Consequently, and Kurdish-language satellite television and it often dissolves more easily than through state territory and commu- they give us information on the way programming. In contrast, some com- religious identity. For example, many nity territory. The first dimension was these actors operate, and more gener- munities were so thoroughly Arabized Kurds who moved from Rukn al-Din geographically limited by the state’s ally on the state’s system of territorial by successive regimes that their ancestral to informal Damascus neighborhoods borders. The second was geographically demarcation. Among other things, this memories are now limited to placenames such as Mashrou Doumar still use the noncontiguous and often consisted of a information confirms that sectarian- and family names. For example, Jabal al- Kurdish language and defend their network of smaller territories. Depend- ism is omnipresent in Syria, and that Akrad is geographically part of the Ala- Kurdish heritage. More broadly, until ing on the community to which they the economic development of different wite Mountains and lies in the heart of the war broke out, ethnicity did not belonged, some individuals also had a community territories has been closely the Assad regime’s coastal stronghold, represent a social code that sharply dis- transnational identity. Therefore, po- linked to both cross-sectarian relations but it was populated by Kurdish tribes tinguished Kurds from other Syrians. litical actors were influenced by com- and each sect’s relative weight on the brought there by Sultan Baibars when Yet as a response to discrimination suf- munity structures as well as state struc- scales of power. The current civil war he took the region back from the Cru- fered under Arab nationalism, Kurdish tures. As individuals, they depended on is part of a violent rebalancing of these saders in the thirteenth century. The identity is now quite strong. their community for personal support; scales, one that began long before the population has not spoken Kurdish The Syrian version of Arab nation- they also had to respect its structures 2011 uprising, so examining the vari- for centuries and does not sympathize alism sought to eliminate Kurdish and for the sake of political expediency. ous state policies and socioeconomic with the Kurdish nationalist movement. Turkmen identities for ideological The communitarian organization of developments that produced this seis- Kurds from the Rukn al-Din neighbor- and geopolitical reasons. Because both Syrian society has long played a role mic shift is instructive. hood of Damascus were Arabized as groups are situated along large stretches

 109  of the border with Turkey, they theo- ed Arabization. The majority of them ered Muslims, so they were usually iso- In 1932, Alawites and Druze were retically posed a threat to Syria’s terri- came from Turkey after the 1915 geno- lated in the mountains or used as ag- formally recognized as Muslims through torial integrity, unlike more dispersed, cide and settled in Aleppo, later spread- ricultural laborers and buffers against a fatwa issued by the Mufti of Jerusalem, less numerous non-Arab minorities ing to Damascus, Homs, Latakia, and a Bedouin attacks on the plains. Hajj Amin al-Husseini. His aim was to such as Armenians and Circassians. lone rural enclave around Kasab. Once During the nineteenth and twenti- unify Arabs against the Zionist threat in The Arabization policy launched in the in Syria, Armenians continued to use eth centuries, however, these heterodox Palestine and Franco-British coloniza- 1950s was subsequently intensified by their own language and practice strong sects were more or less recognized as tion, as well as stem the growing wave the Baath Party. Beginning in 1963, endogamy. During the nationalization Muslims for political reasons. Ismailis of Alawites converting to Christianity. the regime created a northern border and Arabization of the educational sys- were placed under Ottoman protection At the time, Jesuits were reportedly be- belt of Arab villages west of Qamishli tem in the 1970s, Hafiz al-Assad gave during the mid-nineteenth century to ginning to convert some Alawite villages to break up Kurdish territorial contigu- them permission to keep using their escape persecution from Alawites in of southern Jabal al-Ansariyya. Because ity. Authorities also prohibited the use language in their own schools, which the coastal mountains, giving them Alawites were not considered Muslims of the Turkish and Kurdish languages, would become semi-private. Such privi- the possibility of integrating into the prior to the fatwa, the missionaries were stripped numerous Kurds of their Syr- leges were the regime’s way of ensuring umma. The Alawite-Ismaili conflict was permitted to proselytize in their com- ian citizenship (the “bedoon” described Armenian support; indeed, this com- not a religious war, but a broader sectar- munities under an Ottoman “Capitula- in previous chapters), and economically munity has been one of the most loyal ian conflict motivated by demographic tion” treaty covering conversions outside abandoned many Kurdish and Turkmen to Bashar al-Assad during the uprising. pressures that had pushed the Alawites the umma. This led to an outcry among areas, spurring locals to move southward In Aleppo, the Armenian party Tashnag to take land from the outnumbered Is- Sunni and Arab nationalists, spurring to cities where the regime believed Ara- organized pro-Assad demonstrations as mailis. By 1919, Alawites had launched the Mufti’s fatwa. bization would occur faster. Decades of early as March 2011, and notable Ar- a revolt rooted in their disputes with Each of these historical cases shows such treatment eventually provoked a menians immediately declared their Ismailis. It was led by Sheikh Saleh al- how one Syrian community’s recognition Kurdish revolt in 2004, but that only support for the regime—a striking de- Ali, the first revolutionary of modern or mistrust of another depends more on resulted in a brutal crackdown followed velopment given their traditional quiet- Syria, who took advantage of the Otto- the political state of play than on religious by empty promises on development and ism on political matters. man Empire’s collapse to attack Ismaili dogma. And for individual members of other grievances. It was not until the lands around his tribal village of Sheikh these communities, exempting oneself 2011 uprising that the regime finally THE OTTOMAN LEGACY Badr. When the French army inter- from this sectarian wagon-circling is of- yielded somewhat, restoring citizenship vened to end the fighting, it caused ten impossible. In theory, communities to the bedoon and pragmatically accept- Under the Ottoman millet system, Jews a widespread revolt in the southern are composed of believers, practitioners, ing certain aspects of Kurdish national- and various Christian denominations Alawite Mountains.1 Decades later, in and non-believers, but the last group is ism (though as noted in chapter 3, many had autonomy, while most Muslims 2004, tensions between Alawites and largely silent in the Middle East. In Syria, bedoon have yet to receive their citizen- were considered part of a single umma Ismailis in al-Qadmus would provoke “atheists” are not recognized: everyone ship papers). (community). Theoretically, there was a similar confrontation, prompting lo- possesses a religion by birth, marriage, or Unlike the Kurds, who implicitly no difference between Sunnis and Shia cal Ismailis to ask for help from their conversion, and eschewing one altogeth- or directly challenged the regime’s at- in this system, but in practice some brethren in Masyaf and Salamiya. Au- er is not a practical option. This obliga- tempts to enforce Syrian national unity, groups were ostracized. Sects that were thorities eventually calmed their con- tion is both administrative and social— the much smaller Armenian communi- deemed heterodox, such as Alawites, stituents, but the conflict has remained declaring oneself an atheist typically leads ty acquiesced and, in the process, avoid- Druze, and Ismailis, were not consid- latent ever since. to marginalization or ostracism.

110   fabrice balanche N TURKEY W E

Aleppo

Kasab Raqqa

Latakia Jabal al-Ansariyya Hama Deir al-Zour

Mediterranean Sea Salamiya Homs Tripoli

Mount Beirut Lebanon LEBANON Saida Damascus 59. Jabal Amil SECTARIAN IRAQ DISTRIBUTION Haifa IN THE LEVANT

Mount Jabal al-Druze AT END OF Carmel OTTOMAN EMPIRE ISRAEL Irbid Ja a Amman SUNNI MAJORITY Jerusalem Sedentary Madaba Bethlehem Nomadic Karak RELIGIOUS MINORITIES JORDAN Alawite

Druze

SAUDI ARABIA Shia Maan Ismaili

EGYPT Christian Aqaba 0 100 km Contemporary border

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   111 60. Iskenderun Antakya CENTERS AND PERIPHERAL Aleppo ZONES IN THE LEVANT AT END OF OTTOMAN EMPIRE Latakia Hama ISMAELI Central city ALAWITE (Sunni and Christian)

ALAWITE Center (communities Homs integrated into power)

Tripoli Bedouin (repelled BEDOUIN periphery) MARONITE

Refuge mountain Beirut Damascus (forgotten periphery) DRUZE CIRCASSIAN

Frontline (dominated periphery) Saida SHIA

Jewish settlement DRUZE

MEDITERRANEAN SEA MARONITE Contemporary border DRUZE Haifa Coastline

Tel Aviv Jerusalem Ja a CIRCASSIAN

112   fabrice balanche 61. OLD CITY OF DAMASCUS AT END OF OTTOMAN EMPIRE

BAB TOUMA Citadel Souk Harir (silk market) Umayyad Mosque CHRISTIAN AREA

Souk Hamidyeh MUSLIM AREA Saint John of Damascus BAB SHARQI

Souk Midhat Bacha Patriarchate Greek-Catholic

Souk al-Souf (wool market) JEWISH AREA

Jewish 0 200 m School

Wall Mosque Church Synagogue

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   113 Sandjak of Iskenderun 62. THE ALAWITE STATE To Antakia 1920 1936 KASAB To Aleppo (detached from JISR AL-SHUGHOUR Turkey in 1942)

BASSIT and AKRAD MAIN RELIGION (detached from KANSABA Iskenderun in1924) Sunni AL-HAFFAH

MAARAT AL-NUMAN Christian MZERAA LATAKIA (state capital) QALAAT AL-MADIQ Ismaili

JABLEH Alawite State of Syria

BANIYAS AL-QADMUS International border HAMA AL-RAWDA MASYAF

Mediterranean Sea Mediterranean Province AL-SAWDA KHAWABI border

DRAYKISH Alawite state TARTUS SAFITA MASHTA AL-HELU

Non-Alawite ARWAD population (detached from TAL KALAKH Lebanon in 1921) HOMS Province/statelet capital QOUBAIYAT District center TRIPOLI

State of To Baalbek Locality To Damascus 0 20 km Great Lebanon

Road

114   fabrice balanche THE TRIBE: not limited to remote regions such as time reversion to tribalism can be seen cracy, and so forth. This community- THE BASIC UNIT Jazira; one can also find it in the coastal in other parts of Syria as well. based patronage system has endured for 3 OF SECTARIANISM Alawite Mountains and the southern centuries. Even in times of peace, those Jabal al-Druze region. Because Syrian PRIMARY LINKS ARE who denounce this system and turn Although ethnicity and religion are im- society is not nomadic, Alawite tribes away from their sect risk marginaliza- PARAMOUNT portant factors in Syrian sectarianism, are based on territorial ties rather than tion; if they do so during wartime, they clan and tribal affiliations are its most blood ties; references to a common an- When analyzing the connections be- risk their very survival. basic elements. The clan is actually cestor exist, but territory is the primary tween individuals, anthropologists of- a subset of the tribe, but for the sake defining element. In a traditional Ala- ten distinguish between primary links MINORITIES AND of simplicity, this chapter often treats wite village, the sheikh gives the tribe its (family, sect, tribe, etc.) and secondary NATIONALISM them as synonymous. Philippe Droz- name and serves as guarantor of village links (political affiliation, class, etc.). In Vincent provided a succinct description unity. Land is the means by which the Syria, primary links are strengthened by In the Muslim world, the idea of na- of the modern tribal phenomenon in community survives and is sustained, a system of patronage that forces citi- tion is often conceptualized in three the Middle East: while the extended family defends the zens to use sectarian networks to access different ways: as the community of land politically. resources. Economic difficulties often religious believers (umma), as Arab na- The word “tribe” is...more stable than As for the Kurds, the importance of prevent individuals from leaving their tionalism (al-watan al-Arabiya), and the reality it is supposed to describe. The “Bedouin” world has been de- tribalism decreased temporarily after families and communities—they need as the nationalism of individual states stroyed, through sedentarization, and 2004, when the regime allowed political primary solidarity networks to survive. (qawmiyya). Scholar Xavier de Planhol by the state powers. But the tribal parties to proliferate following the local The potential for “emancipation” from best defined these fundamental con- culture and its references to blood uprising and crackdown. At the time, one’s sect is stronger when an individ- structions in 1993, describing their and ancestors, a genealogical hierar- each major Kurdish tribe created its own ual is higher in the social hierarchy, but ambiguity in the Arab world and ex- chic, the use of power inside family party. Interestingly, the two most prom- lower-status members will nevertheless plaining why they had not supplanted groups persist...The tribes even found inent factions—the Kurdistan Demo- solicit such individuals for privileges, communitarianism (taifiyya).4 He con- in some states, such as Iraq in 1990, cratic Party of Syria (KDPS) and the essentially pulling them back into their cluded that one should have no illusions a new strength. Distinguishing dif- now-hegemonic Democratic Union Par- fuse social tribalism within a society sectarian identities. about the weak integrative capacity of that finds ways to survive in difficult ty (PYD)—lack a tribal affiliation and The regime’s core Alawite constitu- supra-community identities, includ- conditions (“ruralization” of city differ ideologically. The PYD adheres ency is the most glaring example of ing Arabism, and that further regional neighborhoods by rural migration, to a Marxist ideology while the KDP is these phenomena, since the Assad fami- fragmentation along sectarian lines import of the tribal ethos in solidar- liberal, producing a notable difference in ly relies primarily on Alawites to control should be expected. In 1984, Laurent ity networks), of political tribalism in recruitment: the PYD attracts working- the country. At the same time, it does and Annie Chabry had offered a similar power struggles between family net- class Kurds while the KDP attracts the not stop them from expanding their criticism of the Arabism on which con- works deployed around leaders. The urban middle class. Yet the political fu- patronage network to include non-Ala- temporary national constructions are “reinvented” or rediscovered tribalism ture of the Kurdish region is uncertain is therefore a symptom of the State wites that belong to the second or third based, arguing that it had attempted to (nation) weakening.2 because the war and associated quest for circle of power. In peacetime, a sect is “blur and erase” essential aspects of eth- autonomy are spurring some parts of the a social network to be mobilized when nic and minority identity in a manner Tribalism is more prevalent in Syria community to move back toward tribal one needs to find a job, get preferable that ultimately proved more divisive to than in most Middle East states. It is and ideological solidarity. A similar war- treatment in dealing with the bureau- Syrian society.5

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   115 In addition, the concept of umma with the Baath becoming the country’s anism and tribalism would cease to ex- than watan, emphasizing Syrian rather competes with the notion of the Arab only party until 1971. Assad eventually ist never materialized. The leaders who than Arab nationalism. The Syrian gov- homeland (watan). The term watan it- softened his rule by authorizing some believed in this utopia were swept away ernment outlawed the SSNP in 1955, self is ambiguous because it can signify “brother” parties to form, integrating by realists and opportunists like Hafiz and the party was not reauthorized un- both “country” and “the Arab world.” them into the wider National Progres- al-Assad. Although the Baath recruited til 2005. By then, the Baath and SSNP Within Syria’s Baath Party, the contest sive Front. Thanks to this allegiance, from all ethnicities and religions, Assad were no longer ideological antagonists, between Arab nationalists (who focused these parties gained parliamentary and ensured that his Alawite constituency re- since the Baath had become a de facto on defending the “Arab Nation”) and ministerial positions. Decades later, as mained ascendant. “regionalist” party over the years. regionalists (who sought to defend the the 2011 uprising unfolded, the regime Syria’s other political parties also tend The phenomenon of communities Syrian homeland) ended in the latter’s passed a new law authorizing the cre- to favor specific minorities, even if their forming political parties and alliances victory toward the end of 1960s. The ation of parties outside the National “universalist” names and rhetoric might for sectarian rather than ideological rea- Arab nationalists were mainly Sunni, Progressive Front. According to the indicate otherwise. The Syrian Social sons is hardly unique to Syria. In Leba- while the regionalists primarily consist- new constitution adopted after a Feb- Nationalist Party (SSNP) exemplifies non, for example, Maronite Christian ed of minorities (Alawites, Christians, ruary 2012 referendum, the Baath are this practice. Founded in Lebanon in leader Michel Aoun allied with the Shia Druze, and Ismailis). Hafiz al-Assad was no longer the country’s official ruling 1932, the party is now headquartered parties Hezbollah and Amal mainly to the first prominent Syrian figure to pro- party; the president can be elected from in the Christian district of Hasaka in ward off perceived threats from the Sun- mote and implement a political ideology a different faction. In practice, however, northeast Syria, where it has become nis—much like the Assad regime has based on building a unique Syrian iden- nothing has changed. a central part of the city’s Christian done in Syria. Meanwhile, leaders of tity, even if the official Baath Party line The revised constitution also stipu- community. Prior to the Assad era, the the Sunni-majority Gulf countries find remained focused on Arab nationalism. lates that any new party must be rep- SSNP served as an opposition party to it inconceivable and unacceptable that The failure of the pan-Arab project be- resented in all of Syria and eschew re- the Baath. Both factions were domi- non-Sunnis are ruling any Muslim na- came evident in 1961, when Syria uni- ligious or ethnic identity. Officially, the nated by non-Sunnis, but they pursued tions. In their view, all positions of high laterally dissolved its union with Egypt purpose of this provision is to prevent differing sectarian strategies. Minori- authority should be held by Sunnis. A after the population rejected being sub- the rise of sectarian or regional parties ties in the Baath Party tended to pro- similar mindset prevails in Iran, where sumed as an Egyptian colony. To be sure, that might call the country’s unity into mote Arab unity in order to defend all high offices must be held by Shia. Assad officially maintained the dogma of question. Yet the ulterior motive is to themselves against the Sunni political The ethnic factor has also played a Arab unity, speaking of the Syrian Baath exclude the Muslim Brotherhood; mem- Islam of the Muslim Brotherhood. In role in the formation of Syrian politi- Party as a regional subcommand of the bership in this openly Sunni Arab, pan- contrast, the SSNP initially promoted cal parties. Syrian Kurds, uncomfortable higher “Arab National” command. Yet Islamist organization is still punishable the creation of “Greater Syria,” an en- with the Arab nationalist character of the this was a fiction intended to unite the by death. tity that would have merged Lebanon, Baath, preferred to join the Syrian Com- Arab nationalists and regionalists while Regardless of the avowed Baath ef- Syria, Jordan, Palestine, and Cyprus in munist Party (SCP), which was permit- the regime consolidated power. fort to prevent sectarian politicking, the a manner that allowed minority groups ted to exist as a member of the National communitarianism that defines Syrian to outnumber Sunnis (though this quest Progressive Front. In 1991, amid the Syria’s Political Life Has Been society is naturally reflected in the rul- was abandoned by the 1950s). Another fall of the Soviet Union, the party im- Locked Since 1963 ing party’s composition and policies. SSNP defensive strategy was to break ploded in a dispute between pro-Soviets Following the 1963 coup, political com- The founding Baath project of building with transnational ideologies by using and Syrian nationalists, resulting in two petition was completely suppressed, a “Syrian Arab Nation” where sectari- the term qawmiyya in its name rather separate communist parties that both

116   fabrice balanche claimed the name SCP. While the split Alawites in the top positions most cru- der the French Mandate, during which tial tools of the Assad regime for de- was publicly characterized as a politi- cial to the regime’s grip on power. A Alawites were encouraged to enlist en cades. Devoid of democratic legitima- cal disagreement, in reality it resulted comprehensive analysis of the main masse. Adhering to the old adage that cy, and with the smokescreen of Arab from a sectarian cleavage—as described figures in the armed forces and inter- colonial powers prefer to use minority nationalism fading, Hafiz al-Assad in chapter 3, Kurds dominated one of nal security agencies between 1970 and troops, France chose to integrate Ala- (and, later, his son) turned to religion the new splinter parties and Christians 1997 shows that 61.3% of them were wites, Druze, Christians, Ismailis, and with greater frequency as a means of dominated the other. Since their 2004 Alawite, compared to 35.5% Sunni.6 By Circassians into its Army of the Levant influencing the population.12 The pre- revolt in Qamishli, Kurds have created 1992, seven out of the army’s nine di- rather than Sunni Arabs, whom the ponderant weight of religion in Syr- additional political parties that the re- visions were led by Alawites, compared French regarded as too receptive to na- ian society left the regime with little gime unofficially tolerates, each of them to two out of five in 1973. The major- tionalist sentiments. By 1945, Alawites choice—in January 1973, Assad’s at- representing a specific tribe rather than ity of these Alawite elites came from the represented a third of this transnational tempt to enact a constitution that did an ideology (apart from the PYD). hinterland of Jableh, the Assad clan’s army’s forces in Syria and Lebanon.7 not stipulate sharia as the source of law stronghold. Given their geographical Following the 1963 coup, the num- sparked riots.13 He was forced to rein- How the Alawites and familial proximity to the president, ber of officers from these minorities state the charter’s sharia roots, includ- Became a Client they constituted the center of the “rul- increased drastically, as the new leading an article mandating that the head Hafiz al-Assad’s early success permitted ing asabiyya,” one of the politicized soli- ers promoted members of their family, of state has to be Muslim. the ascension of his clan (the Kalbyeh) darity structures described in the intro- clan, or region in order to reinforce their Likewise, during the economic liber- within Alawite society, to the detriment duction to this study. Assad placed them power. Half of the 700 Sunni officers alization period that began in 1991, the of other historically dominant Alawite in key strategic positions such as director who were dismissed after the coup were wealth of the new bourgeoisie spread clans and tribes such as the Haddadin of the Mukhabarat and commander of replaced by Alawites.8 The abortive No- but poverty grew, leaving a society that and Khayatin. Yet ensuring Kalbyeh su- the paramilitary Defense Companies. vember 1965 putsch by Sunni officers,9 had hitherto been protected by social- premacy was not his primary objective; Although other seemingly crucial posts the elimination of Druze officers in ist measures (e.g., food subsidies, pub- it mostly resulted from granting his rela- were given to Sunnis (e.g., defense min- 1966–1968,10 and various removals of lic employment, rent control) with few tives key positions of power. Within the ister and chief of staff), they proved to Ismaili officers all reinforced the army’s mechanisms of support. The regime bureaucracy, army, and public sector, fac- be mere figureheads—the real decisions Alawite character. By the time of the soon found itself relying on religion tors such as familial ties, tribal proximity, were made by their Alawite deputies. 2011 uprising, Sunnis had become more more than ever to avoid social pressures. and even personal friendship with the The prominence of Alawites in the important in the rank and file due to the Every Friday, the president would go to president soon supplanted personal mer- armed forces and security services was Alawites’ relative demographic weak- a mosque to pray, and this event was it as a mechanism of social advancement. also evident at lower ranks, though exact ness.11 But the officer corps were still broadcast live on television. Addition- Assad also had other levers for achiev- statistics on this matter are unavailable. majority Alawite, which helped hold ally, leading representatives of each sect ing and maintaining power. He created Today, military camps around Damas- them together in the early years of the were invited to the presidential palace multiple alliances with other communi- cus, Homs, and Hama are populated war despite rampant Sunni desertions. during every religious celebration. ties by exploiting state institutions and exclusively with Alawite families, and The regime has also used religion to mobilizing traditional structures such as in the villages of the Jabal al-Ansariyya Using Alawite Sheikhs strengthen cohesion among Alawites, tribes and sects, giving him a broad base region, it is rare for a family not to have to Assert Authority usually by evoking the past persecution of support among the population. at least one member in the military. This Traditional social support structures, they suffered at the hands of Sunnis. Even so, Assad was careful to place is the result of a process that began un- particularly religion, have been essen- This goes hand in hand with the tac-

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   117 tic of stoking fear about the bloodshed For example, the Kinj family still led the fore made sure to appear alongside his Feeding on Alawite Poverty Alawites would experience if they lost Haddadin confederation, so the regime sheikh during various religious ceremo- It is important to remember that po- power. Memories of the 1979 massacre returned some of its lands in the Jableh nies. This individual had little influence litical power in Syria does not belong to of Alawite cadets at the Aleppo military plains17 and gave some of its members on the president, at least in policy terms; Alawites in general, only to certain Ala- school and the wave of Muslim Broth- preferential access to high-profile state rather, Assad used him and other sheikhs wites. Not all Alawites support the re- erhood attacks against Alawite figures jobs (e.g., one was placed in charge of to affirm his religious authority over the gime simply because the president hails around the same time help reinforce the the prominent Sham Hotel in Latakia). community. His son would later copy from their sect; opposition to Assad sect’s unity and its faithfulness to Assad. Even so, Assad apparently felt compelled this system of coopting the sheikhs; to- exists at both the clan and political As a popular Alawite saying goes, “If you to cultivate additional means of influ- day, most Alawite military officers be- level. The community certainly rallied support Assad, you support yourself.”14 ence within his sect, a quest that led him long to the circle of the initiated. behind the regime during the Broth- Another reason why the regime had to exploit Alawite sheikhs. In addition, the elder Assad became erhood revolt, but they did so mainly to invoke religion to mobilize Alawites Traditionally, sheiks have been sec- the honorary president of the “Council because they were a favorite target of is because it could not rely on the tribal ondary characters in the Alawite com- of the Alawite Sect” (Majlis al-Mili),18 insurgents, not so much out of Alawite leaders who served as the traditional po- munity; they subordinate themselves an informal body composed of eighteen solidarity. Indeed, this dynamic—mo- litical elites, namely the Kinj15 and Ab- to tribal leaders and generally stay away sheikhs from different tribes and tasked bilizing Alawites by playing on fears bas16 families. During his ascent to pow- from politics. At the same time, they with defining the direction of the Ala- of Sunni revenge if the ruling asabiyya er, Hafiz al-Assad was an Alawite military are recognized by the community for wite community. During the Brother- loses power—has come to define many leader from the rural bourgeoisie, not a their honesty, probity, and religious hood revolt of 1979–1982, he relied on of the Assad family’s efforts to maintain member of an important Alawite fam- knowledge. They also perform secular this council to unify Alawites against the sectarian solidarity over the years. ily. When he and others in the Alawite functions such as professor, judge, and perceived Sunni Arab threat.19 After this These fears did not always exist, military class sought membership in the farmer, resulting in a modest lifestyle period of disorder, the council became however, and they abated at the turn of National Progressive Front, they were that contributes to their “sheikh-ly” entirely subservient to Assad and limited the century as memories of the Broth- essentially rejecting Alawite feudal lords. aura—contrary to members of the rul- itself to a local role of providing consul- erhood revolt faded. The 2011 upris- These lords had established a political ing asabiyya, who live luxuriously thanks tation to families.20 In its place, Hafiz’s ing reactivated them, of course, but in alliance with Sunni and Christian oli- to rampant, open corruption. brother Jamil formed a separate asso- previous years the regime had to rely garchs from the cities, with whom they Sheikhs mostly serve as guardians of ciation that fostered Alawite religious on patronage relationships to maintain shared an interest in dominating the Alawite doctrine and transmitters of the practice by equipping mosques, build- solidarity among poorer Alawites who peasant class and preventing the social religion’s secrets, which puts them in ing and maintaining Alawite shrines, fi- held various grievances against the rul- ascension of the rural bourgeoisie. The charge of initiation. From Assad’s per- nancing Mecca pilgrimages for sheikhs, ing elite. elites were also mutually wary of agrar- spective, this was their most important and related activities. The Baath regime, like most other ian reforms that hit large Alawite, Sun- role, since membership in the ranks of In more recent years, Bashar al-Assad Arab regimes, tried to reduce poverty, al- ni, and Christian landowners in equal the initiated is an important distinc- has been less invested in supporting re- ternately presenting it as a consequence measure. In the 1990s, Assad’s ruling tion in the Alawite community, one ligious Alawites. He rarely visits his an- of the colonial period or the preceding asabiyya tried to regain the support of that confers authority and respect while cestral home of Qardaha, preferring to bourgeois-feudal regimes.21 Direct and former Alawite feudal lords who had lost generating solidarity among initiates. In spend his time developing relationships indirect rents helped it finance develop- many of their lands but still maintained return, initiates must obey their sheikh with businessmen—a practice criticized ment programs (including health and symbolic influence on the community. as a spiritual father of sorts. Assad thereby the sheikhs. education), regulate the prices of every-

118   fabrice balanche day goods and services, and drastically the agrarian reform era, monopoliz- tioning of institutions, nearly every as- from Jabal al-Druze, a Druze state cre- increase the size of the bureaucracy.22 ing the allocation of agricultural loans, pect of governance fell back to sectarian ated by the French.26 The Shia Beqa The economic prosperity that Syria ex- public sector hiring, road construction, membership. More than seventy-five Valley was removed from Damascus perienced between 1973 and the mid- irrigation, electrification, and so forth. years ago, scholar Jacques Weulersse province so it could be integrated into 1980s also facilitated the reduction of Each project was inaugurated with fan- noted that any individual hired as a Lebanon; the Lebanon-Syria border inherited economic inequalities and the fare and affixed with a placard thanking civil servant in the Middle East auto- separated a Christian-majority state and promotion of social mobility. the president for his generosity. matically became a representative of a Shia-majority region from a Sunni- Yet this mobility was fragile because Not all of the Alawite community his community within the government, majority territory, exceptions notwith- it depended on public monies distrib- developed a client relationship with the and his observation still holds true in standing. The creation of the Alawite uted by the state. When Saudi Arabia regime: some refused due to political Syria today.24 State in the 1920s also defined the stopped making large donations to opposition or because they had other Lebanon-Syria border by separating the Syria in the 1980s, it contributed to a means of material autonomy. For ex- Administrative Limits Create Sunnis of Akkar from local Alawites, crisis in the welfare state and impover- ample, many Alawite businessmen from Sectarian Borders again with some exceptions. The Nahr ished many public employees. There- Tartus spent years abroad and never A state’s use of administrative divisions al-Kabir River demarcated sectarian after, these employees had only two developed patronage links with Assad; demonstrates its true policies toward communities as well.27 solutions to improve their situation: rather, their economic interests place sectarianism. These policies can be used Upon achieving independence, the demand bribes or seek a second, more them closer to the city’s Sunni/Christian to reinforce traditional structures or de- states did not alter these divisions. The lucrative, job in the private sector. Not bourgeoisie. As a result, they tend to stroy them. Actors within the state are Alawite State became Latakia province. every position lent itself to procuring suffer the same bureaucratic problems as not neutral, and patronage operates at At the time, two non-Alawite districts bribes, however, and many Alawites others outside the ruling asabiyya—they its full potential because administrative (Tal Kalakh and Masyaf) were attached found it difficult to find second jobs in do not get special treatment simply be- promotions create a locus of power and to this province to dilute its Alawite their overpopulated mountain region cause they are Alawites. result in job creation, service delivery, identity, per the policy of the Sunni with limited agriculture. and other benefits. In 1945, the Syr- Arab government. Yet these districts Thus, the assistance that Hafiz al- THE STATE EXACERBATES ian state inherited administrative divi- were later detached from Latakia in Assad preferentially offered to such SECTARIANISM sions created by the Ottoman Empire, 1952. And in 1970, following Assad’s Alawites allowed him to cultivate an and France did not try to modify them coup, the regime further divided Lata- inner core of trusted servants and a In the Middle East, the state is not in- during the Mandate period. The French kia by creating Tartus province—this true praetorian guard—one whose de- dependent of communities but closely occupation was therefore only a digres- time to strengthen the Alawite region votion was rooted in their material de- linked to this form of societal and po- sion—its impact on the organization of by creating a second Alawite “capital.” pendence on him. This spurred histo- litical organization. In Syria, the gov- Syrian territory was minimal compared Officially, this administrative upgrade rian Raymond Hinnebusch to observe ernment officially sought to dissolve to Algeria, which experienced 130 years was justified with “objective” reasons that after the Baath revolution, Syrian individual communities in a broader of colonial politics.25 such as population distribution, ter- peasants went “from the service of the Syrian Arab identity, but such rhetoric When the French Mandate divided ritorial planning, remoteness from the large landowners to the intelligence ser- was at odds with the fact that sectari- the Levant, it demarcated the limits capital, and so forth. Yet there was an vices.”23 Thanks to its influence on the anism was omnipresent in the state’s of sectarian space. The province of Su- obvious contradiction at work because state, Assad’s asabiyya was able to take very structure for decades. From daily wayda, announced at the beginning of these rationales were not used to pro- advantage of land distribution during administration to the higher-level func- the independent Syrian state, stemmed mote other cities to provincial capi-

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   119 tals—one of many regime methods of keeping Sunni Arabs and Kurds marginalized. For example, the Manbij and al-Bab areas of Aleppo province could easily have been made into their own provinces at any point since the 1980s, but this would have meant devolv- 63. ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS IN SYRIA ing power from Aleppo city and creating new centers of Sunni power in an area already hostile to the regime. Similarly, the regime’s reticence to de- HASAKA velop Qamishli into a provincial capital clearly indicated its desire to avoid IDLIB 1970 RAQQA reinforcing Kurdish nationalism in 1960 ALEPPO the northeast. LATAKIA The Baath regime also came to prefer smaller administrative divisions be- HAMA cause state patronage worked best at DEIR AL ZOUR that level. Important members of so- TARTUS ciety could redistribute public monies 1970 through their personal networks more HOMS efficiently within these smaller frame- works than on the wider provincial level. The small divisions were also rep- RURAL DAMASCUS 1970 1960 province border resentative of existing local structures: DAMASCUS for example, the new subdistricts estab- Complete QUNEITRA New province lished in the coastal region correspond- 1964 Partial DERAA PRE 1960 POST 1960 ed to the territories of Alawite clans SUWAYDA and rural Christian communities28; Province center created 0 100 km District center created in Jabal al-Druze, they were based on longstanding boundaries established by Druze clans29; and in Jazira, they were based on tribal boundaries.30 This system is well adapted to rural territories but not cities, especially large metropo- lises with mixed sectarian and tribal populations.

120   fabrice balanche The Dual Strategic Role the current civil war, those fears appear cut off by insurrection—the official eco- years. Alawite, Christian, and Ismaili of Highway Networks to have been well founded: between nomic goal for this costly highway was populations in the province had already The construction of Syria’s road and 2012 and 2015, rebels took the Sunni just a pretext. The war has only rein- developed their own service centers in highway network has long obeyed a territories of Jabal al-Turkman and Jabal forced the importance of this strategic Masyaf, Tal Salhab, Maharda, and Sa- strategy of national construction. By al-Akrad, then used them as launching axis, which constitutes a vital artery for lamiya to avoid going to Hama. In ad- concentrating roads on the coast to the points to threaten Latakia, the Alawite the defense of Alawites in al-Ghab. dition to linking these areas, the regime detriment of the hinterland, the state re- stronghold that was expected to be a also wanted to further punish Hama for 32 Secondary Road Networks inforced its centralism. Accordingly, ad- refuge for the regime if Damascus fell. its 1982 uprising. In contrast, the road Privatized by Sects justing road plans to benefit a particular The Aleppo-Latakia highway gives this network in Homs province is central- sectarian interest is not easy; roads are territory strategic importance for Sun- Beyond major highways, Syria’s second- ized around the capital, transforming planned according to the interests of the nis in the interior; if Alawites were to ary road network reflects the country’s the area into an attractive cross-sectarian 36 state (which wants to control the entire secede, conditions would be suitable for social networks and their relationship metropolis spread over a wide area. country) and the economic bourgeoisie the formation of a “Latakia corridor” with the state. The construction of such (whose commercial imperatives often similar to the Danzig corridor in World roads is not a natural step in Syria’s in- ECONOMIC AND War II.33 From the beginning of the civ- frastructure development; instead, it re- transcend sectarian considerations). At DEMOGRAPHIC il war, this corridor was the subject of sults from tough negotiations between the same time, the large-scale drawing TRANSITION CREATES intense fighting34 as rebels tried to gain local populations and the state. Access of road networks and the priority given SOCIAL CRISIS to road construction projects is clearly access to the sea. to road networks is not a right but a influenced by sectarianism.31 While road construction was sus- benefit granted by the president in re- Since 1991, when Hafiz al-Assad en- The Aleppo-Latakia highway is il- pended between Latakia and Aleppo, the turn for political allegiance. In the Jabal acted Investment Law no. 10, Syria lustrative. Its construction was inter- minister of communication announced al-Alawiyya area, for instance, the mer- has been trying to transition from a 35 rupted in 1982 during the Brotherhood that a highway would be built between chedites towns were not accessible by Baath-imposed command economy to revolt and not restarted until 1995. Jableh and Hama, with a stop in Tal Sal- paved road until the community clearly a free-market system. This process has The minister of communication gave hab, a small Alawite town on al-Ghab submitted to the Assad clan’s patron- been slowed by the regime’s fear of a financial reasons to justify the delay, but plain. Once completed in 1993, the new age at the beginning of the 1990s. And popular uprising and its omnipresent, the move was widely understood as a highway had a steep grade that made it Khawabi, an isolated Sunni town in the entrenched bureaucracy. But the Assad means of punishing Aleppo’s bourgeoi- difficult for trucks to access. This prob- Tartus hinterland, did not receive access family also realized that some liber- sie for supporting the Brotherhood. The lem was compounded by the fact that to the road network until ten years after alization was needed to meet the de- city’s Sunni Arab business class stood to sections of the road between the coastal surrounding Alawite towns did. mands of entrepreneurs and integrate benefit from being linked to the coun- highways and the Aleppo-Damascus Hama province likewise illustrates the hundreds of thousands of young try’s principal port; Hafiz al-Assad also highway never materialized. In fact, the regime’s road-building calculus. The people entering the job market, espe- feared that the highway’s construction the highway’s true function was to con- local road network is clearly organized cially once the welfare state was no lon- would strengthen a sectarian axis be- nect coastal Alawites with their al-Ghab to connect small cities with the coun- ger able to provide secure employment tween Latakia (whose population was brethren, reinforce the region’s Alawite tryside directly, allowing them to bypass to the masses. half Sunni) and the northern Sunni ar- territorial unity, and give the regime a the provincial capital, an insular, strictly At the same time, Syria has been un- eas of Jabal al-Ansariyya, Jabal al-Akrad, route for sending the army to Hama if conservative Sunni Arab city that served dergoing a period of critical demograph- and Aleppo. Based on developments in the Damascus-Aleppo highway was ever as a Muslim Brotherhood stronghold for ic transition. After half a century of

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   121 natural growth in which the population doubled every twenty years, the birthrate finally slowed down after the turn of the millennium. Generations born 64. BAATHIST PLANNING 1963–1990: DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERIPHERY during the demographic peak were still entering a saturated job market while expecting greater purchasing power than Turkey ALEPPO EUPHRATES previous generations, but the number of VALLEY RAQQA positions created in the private sector HASAKA had yet to compensate for losses in agri- IDLIB culture and industry.37 LATAKIA After Bashar al-Assad came to pow- DEIR AL-ZOUR HAMA er, Syria was more open to foreign in- JABLEH GHAB VALLEY vestment, with Gulf companies invest- BANIAS ing heavily in real estate on the coast and in the capital. But this created TARTUS COAST few jobs and much frustration—unlike in other emerging markets, Assad’s HOMS approach increased the wage gap and Iraq spurred economic growth that benefited a minority without encouraging ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM MEDITERRANEAN SEA wider social development. GHAB Dam irrigation This new economic context challenged Lebanon State industry the geographical organization inherited DAMASCUS from the Baath period, which had favored Port and oil terminal the peripheries from which new political Raw materials route employees hailed.38 Bashar’s generation of Damascus-born elites was uninterested SUWAYDA URBAN HIERARCHY QUNEITRA in the peripheries and small cities where Capital the Baath Party had its social base—the Israel DERAA Jordan Province center state was no longer willing or able to finance the past politics of territorial plan- Principal road ning. Yet the regime seemed to forget that these were also the politics of security. For example, Assad abandoned the promised plan to develop northeast Syria after the 2004 Kurdish revolt, and this neglect

122   fabrice balanche helped create the conditions for Rojava’s potential breakaway a decade later.

65. PERIPHERY CLEAVAGE SINCE THE 1990s Differing Growth Rates In the 1950s, Syria began a period of

QAMISHLI demographic transition. High birthrates and decreasing mortality due to Turkey ALEPPO RAQQA HASAKA medical progress generated fast population growth. By the early 1980s, Syria had one of the top ten fertility rates in Latakia the world with more than eight chil- DEIR AL-ZOUR dren per woman. Syria’s age pyramid HAMA indicated a decreasing birthrate in the mid-1990s, but it increased again later on, probably due to the re-Islamization Tartus of society. The birthrate fell again after HOMS 2004, but life expectancy increased, so Iraq the population continued to grow. Yet these demographic trends were

Center uneven in Syria’s different communities. The fertility rate of religious mi- Lebanon Periphery norities declined sharply over the past MEDITERRANEAN SEA Uninhabited area thirty years, but the Sunni Arab rate Capital DAMASCUS remained high, as shown by the differ- Secondary city ing population growth in Alawite and

Regional center Druze provinces (Latakia, Tartus, Su- wayda) vs. Sunni Arab provinces (e.g., Secondary city SUWAYDA Raqqa, Deir al-Zour, Idlib). The decline Principal road DERAA among Alawites was due in large part to Israel Jordan Secondary road the regime’s decades-long effort to im- International airport prove educational opportunities for its

International port core constituency, reflecting the common correlation between higher levels of education and lower birthrates. After the 1963 coup, Alawites who held positions of responsibility in the bureaucracy routinely gave state jobs to

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   123 66. SYRIAN POPULATION 2010

AGE 80 + 75 – 79 70 – 74 65 – 69 60 – 64 55 – 59 50 – 54 45 – 49 40 – 44 35 – 39 30 – 34 25 – 29 20 – 24 15 – 19 10 – 14 5 – 9 0 – 4

1.4 1.2 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 (in millions) Source: U.S. Census Bureau International Data Base

their coreligionists from neighboring vil- As Alawite recruits swelled the rank 12.4% in Tartus,44 significantly lower Assad’s development policies were most lages. Yet chronically low levels of edu- and file of the state apparatus, low-level than the national average of 17.5%. effective, tells a different story from the cation on the Alawite coast eventually posts became scarce, and competition Furthermore, the gender gap in Alawite last census period (1994–2004), when forced the state to draw from a pool of for public employment became fierce. literacy rates disappeared entirely. As these policies were all but abandoned and recruits who held no more than a certifi- Political connections proved invaluable more and more women took up educa- the Alawite community had achieved its cate of basic high school education and to many job candidates, giving Alawites tional opportunities over the past two demographic transition. In the 1970s, the were only capable of performing the low- a clear advantage due to regime favorit- decades, many sought careers and put Alawite region’s growth rate was compa- est-level civil service and security jobs. To ism.40 By 2004, more than 80% of em- off getting married until they finished rable to the national average, but by the consolidate his control over the state and ployed Alawites worked in the military, their studies, usually after age twenty- 1990s it had noticeably declined, mirror- avoid schisms between his co-religionists state-led industry, or public sector.41 five. Thus, Alawite fertility rates steadily ing the pattern in other minority regions at the top and bottom of the bureau- The proliferation of primary and sec- declined—within two generations, the such as Suwayda, Shahba, Salkhad, and cracy, Hafiz al-Assad recognized that he ondary schools in the Alawite coastal average number of children per family Salamiya. In Sunni-majority districts would need a steady flow of faithful and region fostered such dominance.42 In dropped from eight to two.45 Birthrates such as Hama and Abu Kamal, demo- sufficiently skilled Alawites to fill every 1960, around 60% of Latakia residents in the Alawite provinces of Latakia and graphic growth exceeded 3% per year by stratum of the state apparatus. Accord- age fifteen and over were illiterate, cor- Tartus are now much lower than in the 2004, but the figure was less than 2% in ingly, he extended state education servic- responding with the national average at Sunni-dominated interior. coastal Alawite districts such as Tal Ka- es to what were traditionally isolated and the time.43 By 2004, however, illiteracy Charting Syrian demographic growth lakh and Masyaf. The coastal Alawite marginalized minority communities.39 had fallen to 10.7% in Latakia and in 1970–1981, the period in which region still enjoys a positive net migra-

124   fabrice balanche tion rate (for reasons elaborated below); When the State Disengaged Bashar’s succession in 2000 came at derlying problem of resource manage- its lower rate of demographic growth can The 2011 revolt began in the Houran, a time when third-generation beneficia- ment, which requires massive public in- be attributed to a lower Alawite birthrate an agricultural region between Da- ries of Syria’s agrarian reform were com- vestment in rehabilitating the irrigation than in Sunni-majority regions, where net mascus and the Jordanian border. At ing of age and discovering that the state’s network, treating waste water, building migration levels are negative. The aging the time, foreign journalists portrayed efforts were failing in many respects. By new retention dams, establishing restric- populations of mountainous districts in the Houran as a hotbed of perpetual this point, farms in the Houran and tive tariff policies in irrigated areas, and Latakia and Tartus have experienced the opposition toward the Assad regime, elsewhere had been subdivided and were so forth. For example, the situation in most significant reduction, with young but that was inaccurate. Up until the insufficient to feed a family, despite the al-Ghab plain, formerly a model of ag- 50 adults from Jabal al-Alawiyya flocking to 1990s, locals actually supported the re- transition from cereal to fruit growing ricultural development, had become coastal towns and Damascus to take ad- gime because they were still benefiting and market gardening. Overexploitation critical—the flow of the Orontes River vantage of greater employment opportu- from the agrarian reforms it launched of aquifers had led the Ministry of Agri- had dramatically decreased due to mas- nities beginning in the 1960s. For their in the 1960s. Previously, the Houran culture to ban new water wells and shut sive withdrawals upstream in Homs and part, the coastal districts have been able breadbasket had been dominated by down many illegal ones. These measures Hama. Those responsible for managing to keep their growth rate between 2 and large landowners and Damascus mer- were one of the primary reasons for lo- the area’s water ignored the proliferation 3% thanks to the dense concentration of chants who monopolized agricultural cal discontent because they deprived the of illegal wells because they knew that the labor force there. profits, but the reforms redistributed rural population of their main source of state irrigation systems could no longer The growth rate in Kurdish-majority a great deal of land to smaller farmers, income. Frustrations were exacerbated supply local needs. And just as in the provinces has been weak as well, but this agricultural banks, and other groups. whenever exceptions were made for Houran, officials were tolerant of abuses has much to do with their severe un- The state also created crop-buying or- farmers close to the regime. The decrease and illegal activities by Alawites who derdevelopment, which spurred many ganizations to further break farmers’ in farm income in turn affected urban were close to the regime. More illegal residents to migrate from areas such as dependence on large landowners who economies that were not diversified and wells were permitted to spring up in the Afrin, Kobane, Hasaka, and Qamishli often doubled as agricultural products hence unable to absorb the rural under- southern and western parts of al-Ghab, to Aleppo and Damascus. Impoverished traders. The livelihood of local farm- employment. Although this combina- where Alawites live, than in the north- and underdeveloped Sunni-majority ter- ers improved, and the regime provided tion of neglect and resentment affected ern and eastern sections, where Sunni ritories, such as the high plateaus of Qa- them with better public services to en- much of Syria’s countryside, it was felt Arabs are the majority. The fact that the lamoun, witnessed equally strong migra- sure their continued support. Multiple most acutely in the Houran because of director of al-Ghab’s irrigation system is tion to Damascus but still maintained villages grew into cities thanks to these the region’s proximity to the previously a member of the Assad family is prob- their high birthrates. Consequently, the public investments, most notably the generous leadership in Damascus. ably no coincidence.51 growth rate in the Sunni plains south of small border town of Deraa, which be- The water problem greatly affected In the northeast, the rural water situ- Damascus did not fall below 3%, and came a regional service center. The Ho- sectarian dynamics in other areas as ation came to resemble something out of the same goes for the vast Sunni crescent uran’s population increased rapidly due well.49 In 2005, the regime launched a John Steinbeck’s Grapes of Wrath. As de- stretching from the Iraqi border to the to high fertility rates, from 180,000 in plan to modernize irrigation techniques scribed in chapter 3, domestic overcon- foothills of Jabal al-Ansariyya via Deir 196046 to 900,000 in 2015.47 And lo- and reduce agricultural water consump- sumption in Syria and heavy withdraw- al-Zour, Raqqa, Idlib, and Aleppo. It is cal residents were appointed to many tion, but the program’s mechanisms als across the border in Turkey created a no coincidence that these “neglected but executive positions within the regime, were questionable because they tended structural deficit, and the problem was still growing” zones are where the cur- including Farouq al-Shara, who served to favor large landowners and eliminate exacerbated by several years of drought rent rebellion was most firmly rooted. as foreign minister and vice president.48 jobs. Moreover, it did not solve the un- that began in 2006. The Khabur River

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   125 would have gone dry if the regime had not supplied it with pumps that tap into groundwater. As a result, cultivated areas 67. DEMOGRAPHIC GROWTH IN SYRIA BY DISTRICT 1970–1981 in Hasaka province decreased by 25% between 1995 and 2008.52 The plan to modernize irrigation techniques fell far behind schedule there due to various bureaucratic obstacles.53 Thanks to a KURDISH

2008 agreement with Turkey, the regime KURDISH KURDISH Hasaka proposed a huge project to transfer wa- Aleppo ter from the Tigris River to the Khabur in order to prevent desertification in Idlib Raqqa Hasaka. The project would cost $2 bil- lion, however, and would need ten years Latakia 54 of work if Syria obtains international Deir al-Zour funding to carry it out. As for neigh- ALAWITE boring Jazira, the province’s agricultural ISMAILI Tartus Hama crisis in the decade before the war con- ALAWITE tributed to discontent elsewhere in the Homs country because several hundred thou- Palmyra sand locals left the region to resettle in slums in Aleppo and Damascus. The state’s disengagement from large swaths of the countryside also had wider consequences for the many rural towns Damascus that had become small cities due to years % AVG ANNUAL GROWTH 0–1 Dominant minority of exceptional population growth. By Golan KURD 1–2 Heights Province border 2011, many of these cities were openly 2–3 Suwayda District border rebelling because of neglect by the state, 3–4 Deraa Uninhabited area which had frozen administrative promo- DRUZE 4–5 tions and therefore the creation of public 0 100 km 5–6 Syrian Golan jobs. During the 1970s, the regime had encouraged the growth and health of Source: Population census 1970 and 1981, Central Bureau of Statistics, Damascus small rural towns, providing public jobs and facilities that contributed to local economic dynamism and gave residents ample avenues of employment.55 The

126   fabrice balanche number of districts (mantiqa) increased from forty to seventy between 1960 and 1994. Since then, however, no new prov- 68. DEMOGRAPHIC GROWTH IN SYRIA BY DISTRICT 1994–2004 inces (muhafaza) have been established, even as the population increased from 14 to 22 million people before the war.56 Likewise, the number of district centers KURDISH with more than 20,000 inhabitants (the

KURDISH official minimum for designation as a KURDISH Hasaka city in Syria) almost doubled,57 but the

Aleppo administrative status of these new rural Idlib cities was not formally changed. Public funds and facilities in Syria are distribut- Raqqa Latakia ed based on this categorization system, so these cities have been underfunded and Deir al-Zour underequipped for years, with fewer job ALAWITE Hama ISMAILI openings in the public sector. This lack Tartus ALAWITE of public support has not been offset by Palmyra private sector development, mainly be- Homs cause the modernization of Syria’s transport networks reduces the commercial attraction of these small communities compared to larger cities. Medium-size district capitals with more than 40,000 Damascus residents (e.g., Jisr al-Shughour, Maarat % AVG ANNUAL GROWTH al-Numan, Mayadin, Rastan) are experi- 0–1 KURD Dominant minority Golan encing similar declines in favor of major 1–2 Heights Province border cities for the same reasons. 2–3 Suwayda District border 3–4 Notwithstanding the war, Syrian ter- Deraa DRUZE 4–5 Uninhabited area ritory today echoes the period preceding

0 100 km 5–6 Syrian Golan the Baath era, as the ruling authorities focus their attention and largesse on the Source: Population census 1970 and 1981, Central Bureau of Statistics, Damascus large cities along the Damascus-Aleppo axis with extensions to the coast. Tartus and Latakia have become de facto parts of this regime heartland thanks to their port infrastructure. In the northeast, the

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   127 Raqqa, Deir al-Zour, Hasaka, and Qa- mishli regions remain intermediate hubs 69. ILLITERACY IN SYRIA BY PROVINCE 2004 that still bring local resources toward the N center despite their contested status dur- W E ing the war. The mutation of Syria’s territory has resulted in a socio-spatial crisis S KURDISH that the regime did not anticipate and KURDISH may yet be unaware of. KURDISH Hasaka

Aleppo Wealth Gap Leads to Urban Crisis Idlib As discussed in previous chapters, socio- Raqqa economic tension between the country’s center and peripheries was an impor- Latakia tant driver of the war, and this urban/ rural cleavage was experienced in min- Deir al-Zour ALAWITE Hama ISMAILI iature within Syria’s major cities. In Tartus Latakia, for example, the revolt began ALAWITE in the poorest neighborhood, Ramel al- Homs Filistini, but stalled closer to the central squares because the middle and upper classes did not sympathize with the pro- testors—a clear indicator of social gaps materializing as territorial boundaries.58 Damascus Damascus is the best example of this phenomenon. Beginning in March % ILLITERACY Golan >30 Minority-dominant 2011, the capital’s outlying areas suf- ALAWITE district Heights 20–30 Suwayda fered endemic revolts, and the army 15–20 Deraa Province border blockaded the town of Duma in the DRUZE 10–15 sprawling Ghouta suburb. The unrest 0 100 km <10 Desert area was very much a function of Ghouta’s sharp contrast with the rest of Da- Source: 1994 and 2004 population census, Central Bureau of Statistics, Damascus mascus on multiple levels: economics, class status, demography, urban planning, and so forth. By the time of the 2004 census, Ghouta was home to over 100,000 inhabitants, with a high population growth rate of 3.5%. Most

128   fabrice balanche 70. INTERNAL MIGRATION IN SYRIA, 1990 –2010

TURKEY

JAZIRA HASAKA

ALEPPO RAQQA

IDLIB LATAKIA

HAMA TARTUS DEIR AL-ZOUR

HOMS

LEBANON

IRAQ

DAMASCUS

Alawite region with low fertility rate QUNEITRA Golan Retired Alawite military and Heights civil servant migration DERAA SUWAYDA Weak Aleppo attraction area

Robust Damascus attraction area

Flow of migrants N JORDAN Daily civilian commute routes W E Provincial/international border S SAUDI ARABIA 0 100 km

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   129 of its buildings were one- or two-story new Damascus, which is loyal to the The regime’s “XI Plan” (2007–2011) chaic method of organizing society that edifices constructed quickly and ille- regime, and the Ghouta, which rose up made poverty reduction and job cre- is vulnerable to Western exploitation gally to meet the housing demand at a violently. ation its major objectives, but the plan and imperialist control, in line with the time of limited state resources. Indeed, As for the center of Damascus, it was was unfeasible. In 2007, Assad called theories of Edward Said and other in- the town has spread like an oil stain on largely insulated from the uprising. The tourism “the new oil of Syria” and de- tellectuals.64 Ironically, Assad uses the farmland now submerged in concrete. bourgeoisie presumably supported the clared that it would create two million same argument in many of his speeches, Government planners typically take a regime because they believed it would en- jobs by 2020.62 Clearly, the regime was claiming that Syria is the victim of a long time to decide on urban develop- sure them social stability and, by exten- either blind to the country’s realities or conspiracy by foreign actors who use ment in the Ghouta, by which time facts sion, prosperity. Pro-Assad protests were had run out of viable ideas to solve the sectarianism to achieve their ends— on the ground have usually changed. organized with the support of leading unemployment problem. The resultant an astounding bit of hypocrisy from a This leaves the population with little businessmen, who gave their employees social situation generated tremendous regime that relies on the loyalty of an choice but to build illegally and then days off to attend demonstrations and frustration among young people, which Alawite minority and does all it can negotiate access to urban services and financed the associated festivities, such helps explain the power of the protests to divide its Sunni citizens. More than retroactive legalization with public au- as a large July 2011 concert in Umayyad that erupted on the outskirts of major anything else, the war has revealed the thorities, all in return for money and Square with singer George Wassouf.60 cities. In the words of journalist Caro- deep cracks in the system of power that political allegiance.59 Officially, urban In their view, Assad has been trying to line Donati, “What will this generation Assad inherited from his father, and his growth near the capital was supposed facilitate Syria’s business environment— that cannot afford consumer goods in inability to reform it. to be limited to the northern wasteland he opened the door to Gulf investment the shop windows become? It is ready Thus far, the regime has survived beyond Jabal Qasioun in order to pre- (which was behind many real estate to radicalize.”63 This social crisis, she by ensuring that its security forces are serve the fertile lands of the Ghouta. projects in greater Damascus), removed concluded, “will be expressed in sectar- dominated by elite Alawite units,65 and But for various reasons—including lack exchange controls, and allowed private ian terms.” by cultivating support among minori- of knowledge about how urbanization banks. As a result, Syrian economic ties (despite Kurdish reluctance on that should be carried out, lack of access to growth was recovering strongly up until SUPRA-SECTARIAN front). It has also sought to fracture Sun- housing, and corruption—over 80% of the war. Yet this growth directly benefit- NATIONAL ni Arabs along territorial, tribal, ethnic, urban expansion occurred in the Gh- ted a wealthy, loyalist minority rather CONSTRUCTION and social lines, while simultaneously outa instead. The northern districts at- than the population as a whole. And HAS FAILED channeling their resentment into ideo- tracted the middle classes who work in while these wealthy individuals funded logical byways such as Baath national- the public sector, have a regular salary, charities that sought to reduce the social In social and economic terms, the Syr- ism, the struggle for occupied Palestine, and as such are eligible for housing as- cost of economic transition, their efforts ian revolt is comparable to what hap- and resistance to foreign “imperialism.” sistance. Today, these modern northern were insufficient given the magnitude pened in Tunisia and Egypt, but it is Bashar’s marriage to a Sunni and his in- neighborhoods are mostly populated of Syria’s social degradation. In 2007, also very different because of its sectar- tegration of the Sunni bourgeoisie into by officials who originally hailed from a UN Development Programme report ian character. Most researchers do not the ruling asabiyya were part and parcel other provinces. Indeed, the distribu- noted that poverty affected 33% of Syr- want to use a sectarian lens when exam- of this strategy. tion of public and private employment ians, with 12.3% considered extremely ining the conflict, preferring “neutral” Despite all these efforts to neutral- perfectly illustrates the split between poor. As Syrian economist Nabil Sukkar social explanations. Syrian opposition ize and coopt Sunni dissent, however, the capital’s northwestern and south- put it on the eve of the rebellion, “the leaders are uncomfortable with it as the fact remains that the majority of the eastern districts—that is, between the wealth gap widens in Syria.”61 well, regarding sectarianism as an ar- population considers the regime Alawite

130   fabrice balanche and therefore illegitimate. In addition regime, and no amount of mass wartime NOTES ging of Druze officers, which essentially led to the dismissal of the entire Druze to religious objections, they also oppose displacements will change that fact. community from power. Assad’s geopolitics, particularly his alli- Over the years, high population growth 1. Jacques Weulersse, Le pays des 11. Fabrice Balanche, “Go to Damascus, ance with Shia Iran. In their view, Syria accelerated the failure of its develop- Alaouites [The country of the Alawites] My Son: Alawi Demographic Shift under is more beholden to the Gulf oil monar- ment policy, which sought to placate the (Institut Français de Damas, 1940). Baath Party Rule,” in Michael Kerr and Craig Larkin, The Alawis of Syria: War, chies for its economic development than Sunni majority through agrarian reform 2. Philippe Droz-Vincent, Moyen-Orient: pouvoirs autoritaires, sociétés blo- Faith and Politics in the Levant (Oxford to Iran. They believe that continuing the and job creation but was incapable of quées [Middle East: authoritarian University Press, 2015), pp. 79–106. powers, locked societies] (Paris: Presse alliance with Tehran can only bring in- absorbing the massive number of unem- 12. Bertrand Badie explained that for Universitaire de France, 2004). ternational sanctions to Syria while an- ployed youths. Moreover, its favoritism many Muslims, only the power of Allah 3. Jacques Weulersse, Le pays des is legitimate, and he does not delegate gering potential patrons in Saudi Arabia. toward minorities had the unintended Alaouites [The country of the Alawites] this power to men. It is nevertheless ne- In the years leading up to the war, the effect of reducing their demographic (Institut Français de Damas, 1940). Also cessary that men submit to a temporal Sunni Arab community became more weight. Since the 1980s, Alawites have see his book Paysans de Syrie et du power in order to avoid anarchy. From Proche Orient [Peasants of Syria and the this perspective, “a bad or even unjust aware of its socioeconomic strength as undergone rapid demographic transi- Middle East] (Paris: Gallimard, 1946). order is better than anarchy,” provided the private sector grew and sectarian tion due to radical changes in their com- 4. Xavier de Planhol, Les Nations du Pro- it is at least compliant with sharia. See Badie’s book Les deux etats [The two charitable associations began provid- munity, with the regime’s largesse essen- phète [Nations of the Prophet] (Paris: Fayard, 1993), p. 24. states] (Paris: Fayard, 1987), p. 334. ing services that the welfare state could tially transforming them from a poor, 13. Martin Kramer, “Syria’s Alawis and not.66 When the regime proved inade- 5. Laurent Chabry and Annie Chabry, Poli- illiterate peasant class to an educated tique et minorités au Proche-Orient: les Shi’ism,” in Shi’ism, Resistance, and quate in the new suburban districts and corps of civil servants. Their fertility raisons d’une explosion [Politics and Revolution, ed. Martin Kramer (Boul- der, CO: Westview, 1987), p. 248. neglected rural areas, Sunni imams and rate has quickly declined in the process, minorities in the Middle East: the reasons for an explosion] (Paris: Maison- leaders of the bourgeoisie reconstituted while Sunni birthrates remain twice as 14. Michel Seurat, L’Etat de Barbarie (Paris: neuve et Larose, 1984), p. 358. Le Seuil, 1989), p. 94. their clientelist networks—a develop- high.67 Thus, even if political change 6. Hanna Batatu, Syria’s Peasantry, the 15. Under the French Mandate, the Kinj ment that will make them increasingly does not come to Syria in the short Descendants of Its Lesser Rural No- d’Ain Shqaq family from the plains of difficult to control and divide even if term via foreign intervention, economic tables, and Their Politics (Princeton Jableh was recognized as the repre- University Press, 1999), p. 219. Assad is able to survive the war. crisis, or insurrection, it will still arrive sentative of the Haddadin tribal confe- 7. Nikolaos van Dam, The Struggle for deration. Ibrahim al-Kinj was president Perhaps most important, Syria’s de- at some point due to the simple, stark Power in Syria: Politics and Society Un- of the territory known as the “Alawite mographic trends are firmly against the math of sectarian demography. der Asad and the Ba’th Party (London: State” in the 1930s. I. B. Tauris, 1996), p. 4. 16. The Abbas de Tlii family from nor- 8. Ibid., p. 32. thwest Akkar represented the Khayatin 9. Michel Seurat wrote about an ad- confederation under the French Man- ditional putsch attempt in 1973, date. spearheaded by a group of Nasserite 17. Eberhard Kienle, “Entre jama’a et and pro-Iraqi Baath officers, But even classe: le pouvoir politique en Syrie in this case, the overwhelming majority contemporaine” [Between “jama’a” of those involved were Sunni. See his and social class: political power in book L’Etat de Barbarie (Paris: Le Seuil, contemporary Syria], Revue du monde 2012), p. 136. musulman et de la Méditerranée 59, 10. An entire chapter of Nikolaos van no. 1 (1991), p. 219, http://www.per- Dam’s 1996 book The Struggle for see.fr/doc/remmm_0997-1327_1991_ Power in Syria is dedicated to this pur- num_59_1_2681.

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   131 18. Alain Chouet, “L’espace tribal Alaouite es] (Institut Français de Damas, 1940), (Washington Institute for Near East Po- Study,” PhD dissertation, University of à l’épreuve du pouvoir ,” Maghreb-Ma- p. 123. licy, September 23, 2016), http://www. Michigan, 1977. chrek 147 (1995), p. 96. washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analy- 25. Marc Côte, L’Algérie ou l’espace re- 43. According to the Syrian government’s sis/view/latakia-is-assads-achilles-heel. 19. For example, Michel Seurat offered an tourné [Algeria, or the returned area] 1960 census. account of the council’s August 1980 (Paris: Flammarion, 1989). 35. The merchedites are an Alawite sub- 44. According to the 2004 census. meeting in Qardaha, in which Assad group distinct from the rest of the com- 26. Fabrice Balanche, Atlas du Proche- exhorted the entire Alawite hierarchy munity because of their belief in the 45. Youssef Courbage and Emmanuel Orient Arabe [Atlas of the Arab Middle to stand together as a bloc to over- divine essence of Sleiman Merched, Todd, Le rendez-vous des civilisations East] (Paris: Presses de l’Université Pa- come the crisis, even if that meant cut- a prominent tribal leader during the [The rendezvous of civilizations] (Paris: ris-Sorbonne, 2011), pp. 32–33. ting off economic activity with the Sun- French Mandate whom they regard as Seuil, 2007), p. 56. ni bourgeoisie. See his book L’Etat de 27. Ibid., pp. 28–29. their prophet and God. 46. According to the 1960 census. Barbarie (Paris: Le Seuil, 1989), p. 88. 28. Ibid., p. 147. 36. Fabrice Balanche, “Transports et es- 47. Estimate based on Syria’s 2010 census. 20. Alain Chouet, “L’espace tribal Alaouite pace Syrien” [Transportation and the 29. Cyril Roussel, Les Druzes de Syrie: Ter- 48. Bashar al-Assad put Shara in charge à l’épreuve du pouvoir ,” Maghreb-Ma- Syrian space], Annales de Géographie ritoire et mobilité [The Druze of Syria: of the national dialogue committee chrek 147 (1995), p. 114. 630 (March–April 2003), pp. 146–166, territory and mobility] (Beirut: Insti- in 2011 to make sure the opposition https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/file/in- 21. The tactic of blaming the colonial tut Français du Proche-Orient, 2011), would accept the program of “re- dex/docid/61252/filename/Transports_ experience was also used in Algeria, http://www.ifporient.org/node/1024. forms” the regime was offering. The while blaming bourgeois-feudal prede- et_espace_syrien.pdf. 30. Myriam Ababsa, Raqqa: territoires et decision to appoint a politician from cessors was common in Egypt and Iraq. pratiques sociales d’une ville Syrienne 37. Samir Aita, “Labour Market Policies the Houran was no accident. Shara The phrase “bourgeois-feudal” may [Raqqa: territories and social practices and Institutions, with a Focus on In- was later put under surveillance due to seem contradictory, but it suitably des- of a Syrian city] (Beirut: Institut Français clusion, Equal Opportunity and the concerns that he would defect. cribes the historical alliance between Informal Economy: The Case of Syria,” du Proche-Orient, 2009). 49. Fabrice Balanche, “La pénurie d’eau en Syria’s commercial bourgeoisie and Etude pour l’Organisation Interna- Syrie: compromis géopolitiques et ten- great landowners. 31. Fabrice Balanche, “La prise en compte tionale du Travail, 2010, http://www. du facteur communautaire dans l’ana- sions internes” [Water scarcity in Syria: 22. Direct rent is the product of hydro- economistes-arabes.org/Cercle_des_ lyse de l’espace syrien” [Taking the geopolitical compromises and internal carbon exports. Indirect rent is aid economistes_arabes/Samir_Aita_files/ community factor into account in spatial tensions], Maghreb-Machrek, Sep- given by oil-rich Arab countries or Ilo-aita-summary.pdf. analysis], Géographie et Culture, May tember 2008. https://www.academia. remittances from immigrants in these 38. Alasdair Duncan Drysdale, “Center 2005, pp. 5–22, https://halshs.archives- edu/769789/La_p%C3%A9nurie_deau_ countries. Syria benefited from indirect and Periphery in Syria: A Political Geo- ouvertes.fr/file/index/docid/61242/ en_Syrie_Water_scarcity_in_Syria. rent between 1973 and 1987 as Arab graphy Study,” PhD dissertation, Uni- filename/La_prise_en_compte_du_fac- 50. Francois Metral, “Le monde rural Sy- countries with greater oil resources versity of Michigan, 1977. teur_communautaire_dans_l_analyse_ rien à l’ère des réformes (1958–1978)” paid subsidies to support Damascus spatiale_article.pdf. 39. Ibid., p. 199. [The Syrian rural world in the age of in its fight against Israel. See Blandine reform], in André Raymond, ed., La Destremau, “Pauvres et pauvreté en 32. Fabrice Balanche, “Il feudo degli Alaou- 40. Fabrice Balanche, La region Alaouite Syrie d’Aujourd’hui (Paris: National Afrique du Nord Moyen-Orient: essai ti” [The Alawite feud], LIMES, March et le pouvoir Syrien [The Alawite area Center for Scientific Research, 1980), de balisage d’une problématique de 2013, http://www.limesonline.com/car- and the Syrian power] (Paris: Karthala, pp. 297–328, http://books.openedition. recherche en sciences sociale” [The taceo/il-feudo-degli-alauiti?prv=true. 2006), p. 164. org/iremam/744. poor and poverty in North Africa and 33. Fabrice Balanche, “Syrie: la Montagne 41. Ibid., p. 165. See also Noujoud Al- the Middle East: an attempt to shed des Kurdes, prochaine zone martyre louche, “La péri-urbanisation de Lat- 51. As the author discovered during a re- light on a research problem in the so- de la révolte?” [Syria: Kurds Mountain, taquié” [The peri-urbanization of Lata- search trip to Hama in January 2011. cial sciences], Les Cahiers D’Urbama 13 site of the revolt’s next massacre?], kia], PhD dissertation, Josef Fourier 52. Statistic from the French Ministry of (1997), p. 25. Libération, June 12, 2012, http://www. University, 2009, p. 239. Agriculture, January 2011. 23. Raymond Hinnebusch, Peasant and liberation.fr/planete/2012/06/12/syrie- 42. A quarter of all secondary schools ope- 53. For example, most farmers in Hasaka Bureaucracy in Ba’thist Syria (Boulder, la-montagne-des-kurdes-prochaine- ned in Syria between 1963 and 1970 did not own the land they cultivated, CO: Westview, 1989), p. 325. zone-martyre-de-la-revolte_825808. were located in this region. See Alas- so they could not secure loans to pur- 24. Jacques Weulersse, Le pays des 34. Fabrice Balanche, “Latakia Is Assad’s dair Duncan Drysdale, “Center and Pe- chase irrigation equipment. The re- Alaouites [The country of the Alawit- Achilles Heel,” PolicyWatch 2489 riphery in Syria: A Political Geography gime half-heartedly sought to address

132   fabrice balanche this problem when the uprising broke com/pulse/business/2012/01/boom-to- out in 2011, with little success. crash.html. 54. Author interview with Syria’s director of 63. Caroline Donati, L’exception Syrienne: irrigation, Hasaka, January 2011. Entre modernisation et résistance [The 55. Fabrice Balanche, “Le Djebel Ansaryeh: Syrian exception: between moderniza- une montagne assistée” [Jabal al-An- tion and resistance] (Paris: La Decou- sariyya: an assisted mountain], Mon- verte, 2009), p. 269. tagnes Méditerranéennes 14 (2001), 64. In his 1978 book Orientalism, Said pp. 183–192, https://halshs.archives- denounced communitarianism as a ouvertes.fr/halshs-00009578. Western invention intended to weaken 56. This estimate is an extrapolation from Arabs. Syria’s 2004 census data; for more infor- 65. For example, the all-important 4th Ar- mation, see the notes on methodology mored Division is led by the president’s in other parts of this study. brother and wholly staffed by Alawites. 57. In the 1994 census, 67 towns had more The regime’s other armored units and than 20,000 residents; by 2004, the fi- its air force are Alawite as well. This gure was 125. arrangement helps offset the fact that most of the army’s rank and file are 58. Alain Reynaud, Société, espace et jus- Sunni, and that many Alawite youths tice: inégalités régionales et justice so- have been avoiding military service in cio-spatiale [Society, space and justice: recent years due to improvements in regional inequalities and socio-spatial their standard of living. justice] (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1981). 66. Thomas Pierret and Kjetil Selvik, “Limits of ‘Authoritarian Upgra- 59. Fabrice Balanche, “L’habitat illégal ding’ in Syria: Private Welfare, Isla- dans l’agglomération de Damas et les mic Charities, and the Rise of Zayd carences de l’etat” [Illegal settlements Movement,” International Journal of in the agglomeration of Damascus and Middle East Studies 41, no. 4 (Novem- the shortcomings of the state], Revue ber 2009), https://www.cambridge. de Géographique de l’Est 49, no. 4 org/core/journals/international-jour- (2009), http://rge.revues.org/1980. nal-of-middle-east-studies/article/ 60. Wassouf is a singer from Kafroun, a div-classtitlelimits-of-authoritarian-up- Christian village in the southern part grading-in-syria-private-welfare-isla- of Jabal al-Ansariyya. During the Da- mic-charities-and-the-rise-of-the-zayd- mascus show he called for national movementdiv/6126FC225642D3203- unity and performed a song suppor- CE980ACAA33C6C0 ting Assad. He has lived abroad since 67. Youssef Courbage and Emmanuel 1969, so his gesture was important for Todd, Le rendez-vous des civilisations the regime. See footage of the perfor- [The rendezvous of civilizations] (Paris: mance at https://www.youtube.com/ Seuil, 2007). watch?v=uG27BGQtzmY. 61. Roueida Mabardi, “Syria’s economic reforms see wealth gap widen,” Daily Star, April 28, 2010. 62. Jihad Yazigi, “Syrian Tourism Industry: From Boom to Bust,” Al-Monitor, Ja- nuary 24, 2012, http://www.al-monitor.

SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR   133 BOARD OF DIRECTORS BOARD OF ADVISORS

Chairman Gen. John R. Allen, USMC Martin J. Gross Birch Evans Bayh III Howard L. Berman President Eliot Cohen Shelly Kassen Henry A. Kissinger Chairman Emeritus Joseph Lieberman Howard P. Berkowitz Edward Luttwak Michael Mandelbaum Founding President, Chairman Emerita Robert C. McFarlane Barbi Weinberg Martin Peretz Senior Vice Presidents Richard Perle Bernard Leventhal Condoleezza Rice Peter Lowy James G. Roche James Schreiber George P. Shultz R. James Woolsey Vice Presidents Mortimer Zuckerman Benjamin Breslauer Walter P. Stern

Vice President Emeritus EXECUTIVE STAFF Charles Adler Executive Director Secretary Robert Satloff Richard Borow Managing Director Treasurer Michael Singh Susan Wagner Counselor Dennis Ross Board Members Jay Bernstein Director of Research Anthony Beyer Patrick Clawson Robert Fromer Director of Publications Michael Gelman Mary Kalbach Horan Roger Hertog, emeritus Barbara Kay Director of Communications Bruce Lane Jeff Rubin Moses Libitzky Daniel Mintz National Director of Development Lief Rosenblatt Dan Heckelman Zachary Schreiber Chief Financial Officer John Shapiro Laura Hannah Merryl Tisch Diane Troderman Operations Manager Gary Wexler Rebecca Erdman

In Memoriam Richard S. Abramson, president Fred S. Lafer, chairman emeritus Michael Stein, chairman emeritus

THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST THE WASHINGTON Fred Schwartz, board member about the author

abrice Balanche, an associate professor and in Beirut between 2003 and 2007, he carried out expert work research director at Université Lyon 2, as well as di- on the issue of water and the environment in the Middle East. rector of the Research Group on the Mediterranean His much-acclaimed maps of the Syria conflict created during and the Middle East (GREMMO), was a visiting fellow his Washington Institute tenure have been republished widely. Fat The Washington Institute from 2015 to 2017. His primary A prolific writer, he is the author of Atlas of the Arab Near fields of research are the political geography of the Arab East (2012, in French, English, and Arabic), and the book ver- world and the geopolitics of the Middle East, with particular sion of his thesis, The Alawite Region and Syrian Power (2006, focus on Lebanon and Syria, where he has spent 10 years in French). Balanche holds masters and doctoral degrees in since first engaging in fieldwork in 1990. geography from the Université de Tours, an accreditation to Dr. Balanche is frequently consulted as an expert on Middle supervise research from Université Lyon 2, and an undergrad- East development issues and the Syrian crisis. As head of the uate degree in history and geography from Université Besan- Institut Français du Proche-Orient (IFPO) Urban Observatory çon. He is currently a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution. THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY WWW.WASHINGTONINSTITUTE.ORG