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Sectarianism in Syria's Civil Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War Fabrice Balanche To cite this version: Fabrice Balanche. Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018. halshs-01702640 HAL Id: halshs-01702640 https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01702640 Submitted on 15 Feb 2018 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR Fabrice Balanche A Geopolitical Study Featuring 70 Original Maps SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR FABRICE BALANCHE A GEOPOLITICAL STUDY FEATURING 70 ORIGINAL MAPS BY FABRICE BALANCHE & MARY KALBACH HORAN The opinions expressed in this book are those of the author and not necessarily those of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2018 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 1111 19TH STREET NW, SUITE 500 WASHINGTON, DC 20036 www.washingtoninstitute.org DESIGN: 1000colors.org CONTENTS Table of Maps vii Acknowledgments ix Introduction xi I THE ROLE OF SectarianisM IN THE SYRIAN CONFLICT 1 | Sectarian Lines Are Drawn and Redrawn 3 2 | Assad’s Syria, Then and Now 31 3 | Syrian Kurdistan under the PYD 51 4 | Radicalization of the Sunni Arab Rebellion 68 5 | Four Postwar Scenarios 94 II THE ORIGINS OF SYRIA’S SectarianisM 6 | A Divisive Evolution 109 About the Author Inside Back Cover TABLE OF MAPS 1. Geography of the Syrian Population 2004 xii 19. Potential Migration from Rebel and IS Areas, May 2017 27 2. Sectarian and Ethnic Distribution in Syria 2011 xiii 20. Syrian Army Progression in Damascus Area, 3. Arab Tribes in Syria xiv March 2013‒May 2017 33 4. Geography of the Syrian Uprising, Fall 2011 4 21. The Syrian Army Surrounds East Ghouta 34 5. Sectarianism and Frontlines, May 2017 5 22. Syrian Army Damascus Strategy, May 2017 35 6. Military Situation and Sectarianism, April 2013 6 23. Latakia Sectarian Distribution 2011 37 7. Military Situation and Sectarianism, May 2017 7 24. From Alawite Stronghold to Statelet 39 8. Homs 2011: Sectarian Distribution 9 25. Jabal al-Druze and the Southern Front, March 2017 40 9. The 2011 Damascus Uprising 10 26. East Aleppo vs. West Aleppo, January 2016 45 10. Baniyas Sectarian Distribution 2011 11 27. Syrian Army Offensive East Aleppo, Fall 2016 46 11. Syrian Cities: Two Models 12 28. Struggle for the Manbij‒Azaz Corridor, Winter 2016 47 12. Military Situation, May 2017 18 29. Ethnic Divisions in Northern Syria 52 13. Syrian Population Growth 1940‒2010 19 30. PYD Expansion in Northern Syria, May 2017 53 14. Refugees by Sect, June 2017 20 31. Rojava Population and Future Administrative 15. Syrian Refugees and IDPs, May 2017 21 Organization 2016 54 16. Resident Syrian Population by Sect 22 32. Arabization of Village Names in Northern Syria 55 17. Population by Sect in the Regime Area 23 33. Change in Irrigated Land, Northeast Syria 2001‒2009 57 18. Population by Zone, 2013 and 2017 23 34. Syrian Kurds Break Encirclement, April 2017 59 vii 35. Rojava as a Future Corridor to the Sea 60 53. Partition with Rebellion in Damascus 99 36. Syrian Rebel Groups by Ideology, March 2016 69 54. Potential Iranian Routes to the Mediterranean, August 2017 101 37. Syrian Rebel Powerbrokers by Number 55. Russia’s Strategy in Syria 102 and Ideology, March 2016 70 56. Russia’s Strategy in the Levant: 38. Syrian Rebel Powerbrokers by Front, March 2016 71 Energy and Turkish Siege 103 39. Military Situation in Southern Syria, May 2017 73 57. Sectarian Distribution in Levant and Potential Statelets 104 40. Military Developments in Northwest Syria, 58. The New Thirty Years War 105 March/April 2017 74 59. Sectarian Distribution in the Levant at End 41. Military Situation in Northern Syria, May 2017 75 of Ottoman Empire 111 42. Close Allies of Jabhat al-Nusra, June 2016 76 60. Centers and Peripheral Zones in the Levant at End of Ottoman Empire 112 43. Jabhat al-Nusra and Coalitions, Winter 2015‒Fall 2016 77 61. Old City of Damascus at End of Ottoman Empire 113 44. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham Territorial Organization in Idlib Area, August 2017 80 62. The Alawite State 1920‒1936 114 45. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham Strongholds in Idlib Area, 63. Administrative Divisions in Syria 120 August 2017 81 64. Baathist Planning 1963–1990: Development of the Periphery 122 46. Military Situation in Syria and Iraq, May 2017 83 65. Periphery Cleavage Since the 1990s 123 47. Energy Production in Syria 86 66. Syrian Population 2010 by Age and Gender 124 48. Arab Tribes and Military Situation in Northeast 67. Demographic Growth in Syria by District Syria, April 2016 88 1970‒1981 126 49. Syria’s Ethnic and Social Structure 97 68. Demographic Growth in Syria by District 50. Unity with Regime in Damascus 98 1994‒2004 127 51. Unity with Rebellion in Damascus 98 69. Illiteracy in Syria by Province 2004 128 52. Partition with Regime in Damascus 99 70. Internal Migration in Syria 1990 –2010 129 viii ACKnoWLEDGments Y PRofoUND THANKS to all those who helped and supported me in the realization of this study. First, the publications team at The Washing- ton Institute was instrumental in bringing this project to fruition: Editor MGeorge Lopez did a wonderful job organizing the text and finessing the prose while scrupulously checking that all information was properly referenced. Publica- tions director Mary Kalbach Horan spent an extraordinary amount of time redesigning and editing the maps, ensuring the coherence of names down to the smallest and most obscure Syrian village. Research assistants Marine Barjol, James Bowker, and Jackson Doer- ing helped me translate my original French drafts into readable English. Their fresh eyes forced me to clarify ideas for the many readers who have not spent their professional lives analyzing Syria in minute detail. Furthermore, this study is the result of immense teamwork among the Institute’s numer- ous scholars and experts. Martin Kramer, David Pollock, David Schenker, Andrew Tabler, Ehud Yaari, and Aaron Zelin read and reread various chapters with great attention to detail and endeavored to enrich them. Patrick Clawson coordinated this team, greatly stimulating and encouraging my research over the past two years. I am also grateful to executive direc- tor Robert Satloff for his hospitality and kindness. Syria is a difficult subject with violent polemics, so any scholar who tackles it depends on the support of the institution hosting him. I have always found this support at The Washington Institute. Finally, I would like to express my deep gratitude to all the Washington Institute ad- ministrators, researchers, assistants, interns, and donors who helped and supported me during my stay. Fabrice Balanche January 2018 ix INTRODUCTION S SYRIA’S seemingly in- Examining these identities is therefore including the most salient military, to create a strong solidarity link. The terminable war drags on, crucial to answering the most fundamen- political, demographic, and economic sect becomes a political player when its nagging questions about tal questions about the ongoing upheaval. trends. It can also yield lessons about leaders decide to compete for authority A its initial causes and cur- The main objective of this study is state failure and other ills afflicting the at the state level, using sectarian soli- rent dynamics have yet to be fully an- to foster a fuller understanding of the wider Middle East. Focusing on sectari- darity to seize mulk (political power). swered, particularly in comparison to role that sectarianism has played in anism does not mean one should see it Indeed, medieval scholar Ibn Khaldun other regional crises. Why did Bashar Syria’s war, and to reassess the notion lurking behind every door in Syria, but defined any such collective as an asabiy- al-Assad’s regime not fall quickly like that the regime’s divisive efforts single- it does need to be granted a more promi- ya, a solidarity group created with the Hosni Mubarak’s did in Egypt? Why handedly transformed the secular and nent place in discussions about the war express goal of taking political power.2 has the Syrian army not fractured like democratic revolution of 2011 into the and Syria’s future. In the 1980s, Michel Seurat applied Muammar Qadhafi’s in Libya? And why brutal sectarian conflict of today. Since Khaldun’s theories to Syria in ways that has the fighting persisted for so long? 3 the beginning, sectarianism has been A SECTARIAN CIVIL WAR are deeply relevant to the current war. In many ways the Syrian conflict has a major factor in the conflict, perhaps Detailed analysis of such theories can be been taken out of the hands of Syrians even more so than geopolitical drivers The general concept of sectarianism found in Part II of this study, “Origins themselves, becoming a proxy war be- and other issues, but many analysts and has been abundantly explained by a of Syria’s Sectarianism,” but they inform tween regional and international forces participants have deliberately marginal- multitude of authors.
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