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June 2020

Life after the Caliphate: Human Security Challenges in and

Authors: Benedetta Berti, Elizabeth Tsurkov

Introduction: Beyond ‘Mission Accomplished’

The international community’s attention can be fickle. The combination of competing priorities, limited financial and political capital, and multiple parallel protracted political crises, conflicts and humanitarian emergencies mean that maintaining focus and long-term commitment is often a challenge. This is especially the case when a ‘day after narrative’ begins to develop, at times irrespective of the reality of the ground.

The monograph looks at ISIS ‘liberated areas’ in Iraq and Syria, making the case that the international community should by no means become tempted to succumb to triumphalism nor lose focus or commitment to supporting the process of reconstruction and reconciliation in the ‘day after the Caliphate’. Simply put: the social, economic, security and, above all, political challenges ahead for the people, communities and societies living in the ‘post-Caliphate’ areas are tremendous and the chances of success still unknown. The military gains that led to weaken the Islamic State and undo its territorial advance can only be maintained and consolidated if the stabilization process focuses both on repairing the damage done by ISIS as well as on addressing the political context that led to the rise of the group in the first place.

Indeed, while necessary, a and ‘service-delivery oriented’ approach to reconstruction would not be sufficient to creating the conditions for sustainable stability. This research highlights the importance of focusing on law and order, personal security and access to justice as key issues to begin tackling both the past legacy of marginalization and lack of accountability as well as the recent collective trauma generated by living under the Caliphate. Without a broad, political and human security-centered approach to stabilization, chances of sustainable local and regional stability are slim.

The study first briefly lays out the history of ISIS’ territorial ascent and decline, offering a geographical and political snapshots of the ‘liberated areas’ (chapter 2) and, building on this framework, it summarizes the main challenges of the ‘day after’ from a human security perspective, focusing on economic, health, food and environmental security as well as on the challenges related to the delivery of Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. June 2020 2 Life after the Caliphate: Human Security Challenges in Syria and Iraq

effective governance (chapter 3). The monograph then zooms in on some of the main protection of civilians’ challenges, focusing on: restoring law and order, managing armed factions, providing personal and community security and addressing the threat still posed by ISIS. Finally, the study concludes by laying out what a sustainable security agenda for the ‘day after’ could look like.

Chapter 1: The ‘day after the Caliphate’

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISIS’ first leader, announced the establishment of the organization in its current form in March 2013, unifying the Syrian and Iraqi branches of al-Qaeda: the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), which he headed,1 and Jabhat al-Nusra, headed by Abu al-Jolani.

al-Jolani, a Syrian who fought in the ranks of al-Qaeda in Iraq and lSI, was dispatched by al-Baghdadi to Syria in August 2011 to establish the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda, known as Jabhat al-Nusra.2 After al-Jolani rejected al-Baghdadi’s merger announcement, Jabhat al-Nusra’s ranks split, with foreigners mostly joining ISIS and severely weakening al-Jolani’s group in the process.3

Map - How the area under IS control has shrunk. Source: Conflict Monitor by IHS Markit

1 In late 2006, ISI succeed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda in Iraq (Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn; The Organization of the Base of the Jihad in “Mesopotamia”/in the Land of the Two Rivers), which had been active in the country since 2003 (initially as Zarqawi’s Jaamat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (the Group of the Unity/Monotheism and Jihad) and then, after 2004, as al-Qaeda in Iraq. 2 Rania Abouzeid, “The Jihad Next Door,” Politico Magazine, June 23, 2014. https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/06/al-qaeda-iraq-syria-108214_full.html 3 Author interview with former ISIS member who operated in city, northern Aleppo, June 2019; Rania Abouzeid, No Turning Back: Life, Loss, and Hope in Wartime Syria. W. W. Norton & Company: New York, New York. 2018. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. June 2020 3 Life after the Caliphate: Human Security Challenges in Syria and Iraq

After the schism, Jabhat al-Nusra prioritized capturing additional areas from the regime, while ISIS chose instead to focus on gaining dominance and later absolute control over areas captured by the from the Assad regime.4 This policy caused tensions with Syrian opposition factions, which exploded in open conflict in January 2014.5 As a result, ISIS was forced to withdraw out of , and the western , choosing to concentrate its forces and cement its hold over eastern Aleppo, , southern Hassakeh, northern Deir Ezzor and the strategic borders crossings of Tel Abyad and Jarablus into .6

In June 2014, ISIS launched an attack from Syrian territory, linking up with the highly active ISIS cells in Iraq that effectively controlled Fallujah and parts of Ramadi. Over the next two months, ISIS captured a third of Iraqi territory, fighting alongside Sunni Iraqi insurgent factions.7 Following this advance, the leader of ISIS announced the establishment of the Caliphate, changing the name of the organization simply to: “Islamic State.”8

Both the Iraqi Army and, to a lesser extent, Kurdish forces fled amid ISIS advances, allowing the group to capture massive hauls of weaponry and cash from ’s banks. This withdrawal also allowed ISIS to advance virtually unopposed, in the process carrying out a genocide against the Yazidi community in their ancestral lands in Sinjar. The large-scale atrocities of the minority community prompted the to intervene by carrying out airstrikes against ISIS to halt their advance.9

ISIS then turned around and utilized its large stock of new materiel, including advanced U.S. weaponry that they had obtained from raiding the Iraqi military’s caches, such as hummers and tanks, to drive out Syrian rebel factions and Jabhat al- Nusra from Deir Ezzor, gaining nearly total control over the governorate.10 At the

4 Rania Abouzeid, No Turning Back. 5 Charles Lister, “Syria’s New Rebel Front,” Brookings Institute, January 8, 2014. https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/syrias-new-rebel-front/ 6 Shiv Malik, Alice Ross, Mona Mahmood and Ewen MacAskill, “Isis 'ran sophisticated immigration operation' on Turkey-Syria border,” , January 10, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/10/isis-immigration-operation-turkey-syria- border-passenger-manifests-tel-abyad-islamic-state; Islamic State and the crisis in Iraq and Syria in maps, BBC News, March 28, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east- 27838034 7 Erica Gaston and Andras Derzsi-Horvath, “Iraq After ISIL: Sub-State Actors, Local Forces and the Micro-Politics of Control,” Global Public Policy Institute, March 2018. https://www.gppi.net/media/Gaston_Derzsi-Horvath_Iraq_After_ISIL.pdf, p. 17. 8 Mark Tran and Matthew Weaver, “Isis announces Islamic caliphate in area straddling Iraq and Syria,” The Guardian, June 30, 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/30/isis-announces-islamic-caliphate-iraq-syria 9 Cathy Otten, With Ash on Their Faces: Yezidi Women and the Islamic State, OR Books: New York, New York. 2017; Martin Chulov, Fazel Hawramy and Spencer Ackermanm “Iraq army capitulates to Isis militants in four cities,” The Guardian, June 11, 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/11/mosul-isis-gunmen-middle-east-states 10 “We were able to drive Daesh back all the way to Shaddadi, but after Mosul, we were no match to them with all the hummers and weapons,” said a former FSA rebel. Author interview in , August 2019. See also, “'Islamic State' expels rivals from Syria city,” Al- Jazeera English, July 14, 2014. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/07/state- expels-rivals-from-syria-city-2014714134248239815.html Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. June 2020 4 Life after the Caliphate: Human Security Challenges in Syria and Iraq

height of its power in late 2014, the organization controlled about a third of both Iraq and Syria.11

Soon after, however, ISIS’ fortunes began to change. In Iraq, ISIS’ incursions prompted the mobilization of mostly Shia youth to join the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF, al-Hashd al-Shaabi), following a religious edict (fatwā) from Iraq’s supreme Shia cleric, Ayatollah Ali Sistani. The PMF are a combination of nationalist Iraqi militias and more established and better funded militias financed and trained by .12 The PMF includes about 120,000 registered fighters distributed across over 50 different militias.13 This force, along with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the Kurdish Peshmerga militias, all took part in driving ISIS back from areas that fell under its control.

The Kurdish Peshmerga militias cleared ISIS from northern Ninewa Plains including the area of Sinjar, parts of Hamdaniya district, and Tel Kayf and also exclusively Arab areas in Rabia and Zummar.14 The PMF played an important role in the battles for Baiji (2014-2015), Tikrit (March-April 2015), Fallujah (May-June 2016), Tel Afar (August- September 2017), and Hawija (September-October 2017); as well as leading the battles in western Ninewa (April-June 2017).15 The Iraqi Army and Federal Police also played a major role in multiple operations, including the liberation of Ramadi (2015- 2016), Tikrit, Mosul (2017), and the battle for Hawija.16

11 Lathy Gilsinan, “The Many Ways to Map the Islamic 'State',” The Atlantic, August 27, 2014. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/the-many-ways-to-map-the- islamic-state/379196/ 12 Michael Knights, “Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New ,” CTC Sentinel vol 12, issue 7, August 2019. https://ctc.usma.edu/irans-expanding-militia-army-iraq- new-special-groups/ 13 Erica Gaston and Andras Derzsi-Horvath, “Iraq After ISIL: Sub-State Actors, Local Forces and the Micro-Politics of Control,”, p. 6, 8. Several thousands of fighters also operate in local non-Shia groups, but the groups are too weak to be able to operate on their own and usually played a marginal role in the recapture of territory from ISIS. Ibid., p. 6-7. 14 András Derzsi-Horváth, “Iraq After ISIL: Zummar,” Global Public Policy Institute, August 16, 2017. https://www.gppi.net/2017/08/16/iraq-after-isil-zummar; András Derzsi-Horváth, “Iraq After ISIL: Rabi’a,” Global Public Policy Institute, August 4, 2017. https://www.gppi.net/2017/08/04/iraq-after-isil-rabia; “Battle for Sinjar: Peshmerga Fighters Retake Town Held by ISIS,” NBC News, November 13, 2015. https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/battle-sinjar-kurdish-iraqis-enter-key-town- held-isis-n462686; Erica Gaston, “Iraq after ISIL: Qaraqosh, Hamdaniya District,” Global Public Policy Institute, August 5, 2017. https://www.gppi.net/2017/08/05/iraq-after-isil-qaraqosh- hamdaniya-district Derek Henry Flood, “The Hawija Offensive: A Liberation Exposes Faultlines,” CTC Sentinel vol. 10, issue 9, October 2017. https://ctc.usma.edu/the-hawija-offensive-a-liberation-exposes- faultlines/; Frauke Maas and Erica Gaston, “Iraq After ISIL: City,” Global Public Policy Institute, August 21, 2017. https://www.gppi.net/2017/08/21/iraq-after-isil-tal-afar-city; “Iran sends troops to help retake key Iraqi oil refinery from Isis,” AP, May 23, 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/23/iran-sends-troops-retake-iraqi-oil- refinery-isis; Erica Gaston and Frauke Maas, “Iraq after ISIL: Tikrit and Surrounding Areas,” Global Public Policy Institute, August 29, 2017. https://www.gppi.net/2017/08/29/iraq-after-isil- tikrit-and-surrounding-areas 15 Erica Gaston and Andras Derzsi-Horvath, “Iraq After ISIL: Sub-State Actors, Local Forces and the Micro-Politics of Control.” 16 Ahmed Rasheed, Saif Hameed, “Iraqi troops storm into center of Islamic State-held Ramadi,” Reuters, December 22, 2015. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis- iraq-ramadi-idUSKBN0U50TL20151222; Erica Gaston and Frauke Maas, “Iraq after ISIL: Tikrit and Surrounding Areas,” Global Public Policy Institute, August 29, 2017. https://www.gppi.net/2017/08/29/iraq-after-isil-tikrit-and-surrounding-areas; Dan Lamothe, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Laris Karklis and Tim Meko, “Battle of Mosul: How Iraqi forces Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. June 2020 5 Life after the Caliphate: Human Security Challenges in Syria and Iraq

In Syria, multiple forces captured territory from ISIS. In September 2014, during the ISIS laid on the Kurdish town of Kobanî, the U.S. decided to intervene and prevent the capture of the border town by ISIS.17 Thus began a partnership between the U.S. and the YPG, the armed wing of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party, the PYD, which is the Syrian branch of the Kurdish PKK, operating in Turkey.18

In October 2015, due to U.S. encouragement, the YPG formed the (SDF), adding to its ranks Arab militias that agreed to fight under the guidance of YPG’s commanders.19 The U.S. then began to channel military assistance to the SDF and paying the salaries of its fighters.20 The U.S. also provided air cover and intelligence support to the SDF in their fight against ISIS and currently, several hundreds of U.S. troops are present in SDF-controlled areas.21 The SDF gradually grew to a strength of 60,000 armed men and women, a large share of them , and played a key role in capturing ISIS-held territory in Hassakeh, eastern Aleppo, Raqqa and Deir Ezzor.22

Syrian regime forces and their Iranian and Russian allies prioritized the campaign against Syrian opposition factions and turned some of their attention to striking ISIS from the air only in 2015, carrying out offensive ground operations against ISIS the following year.23 The , pro-regime Syrian militias, Iranian-backed militias such as the Lebanese and the Afghan Fatemiyoun, with the assistance of Russian air cover, were eventually able to capture the desert, southern Raqqa, western Deir Ezzor and sections of eastern Aleppo from ISIS. Iranian-backed militias continue to play a central role in eastern Aleppo and western Deir Ezzor, and particularly in the region surrounding the Albu Kamal border crossing.24 The Syrian

defeated the Islamic State,” Washington Post, July 10, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/world/battle-for-mosul/ 17 Rebecca Grant, “The Siege of Kobani,” Air Force Magazine, October 2018. http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2018/October%202018/The-Siege-of- Kobani.aspx 18 Heiko Wimmen and Muzehher Selcuk, “The Rise of Syria’s ,” Sada, February 5, 2013. https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/50852 19 “U.S. general told Syria's YPG: 'You have got to change your brand',” Reuters, July 21, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-usa-ypg/u-s-general-told-syrias-ypg-you- have-got-to-change-your-brand-idUSKBN1A62SS?il=0 20 “The PKK’s Fateful Choice in Northern Syria,” International Crisis Group, May 4, 2017. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/176-pkk- s-fateful-choice-northern-syria 21 Lara Seligman, “Pentagon Defends Murky Mission in Syria Oil Fields,” Foreign Policy, November7, 2019. 22 “Squaring the Circles in Syria’s North East,” International Crisis Group, July 31, 2019. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/204- squaring-circles-syrias-north-east; Nabih Bulos, “Whether the U.S. fails or succeeds in Syria, tough choices lie ahead,” Los Angeles Times, July 1, 2019. https://www.latimes.com/world/la- fg-syria-kurds-enclave-20190701-story.html 23 Cassandra Vinograd and Ammar Cheikh Omar, Syria, “ISIS Have Been 'Ignoring' Each Other on Battlefield, Data Suggests,” NBC News, December 11, 2014. https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/syria-isis-have-been-ignoring-each-other- battlefield-data-suggests-n264551; Leith AbouFadel, “Syrian Forces, Hezbollah mobilize for the largest desert offensive against ISIS,” al-Masdar, March 9, 2016. https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/syrian-forces-hezbollah-mobilize-largest-desert- offensive-isis/ 24 Yonat Friling, “Iran building new crossing on Syria border that would let it smuggle weapons, oil, experts say,” Fox News, May 23, 2019. https://www.foxnews.com/world/iran- border-crossing-syria-smuggle-weapons-oil-experts; “31-minute Long Video About Operation In Syria's Deir Ezzor,” South Front, December 11, 2017. https://maps.southfront.org/31-minute-long-video-about-liwa-fatemiyoun-operation-in- Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. June 2020 6 Life after the Caliphate: Human Security Challenges in Syria and Iraq

Army also captured the ISIS pockets in the Yarmouk Basin, along the border with and the Golan, as well as several neighborhoods in southern and south of Damascus.25

In August 2016, in a move largely intended to prevent the Kurdish YPG militia from linking territory under its control in Efrîn, northern Aleppo, to SDF-controlled in eastern Aleppo, Turkey and Turkish-backed factions stormed ISIS territory in northern Aleppo, capturing several towns, the largest among them being al-Bab.26

While Syria is a country still in the throes of a civil war, with over 40 percent of the country’s territory outside the control of the Syrian regime, in Iraq, too, the weakness of the central government allows non-state actors to continue to maintain influence and control in areas recaptured from ISIS. Following the September 2017 independence referendum in Iraqi , Iraqi government forces control the ‘disputed territories’ between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the central government. Some of the areas captured by the government were previously liberated by the Peshmerga from ISIS, including the Sinjar region, parts of Hamdaniyya region and Zummar and Rabia. Thus, the KRG lost most areas it had fought to liberate from ISIS. Those areas are now under the control of a mix of local militias and the Iraqi Army and police. Areas that were recaptured from ISIS by government forces and the PMF are also under mixed control.27

This legacy of militia participation in the liberation of territory from ISIS in both Syria and Iraq produced a complex distribution of control and influence in post-ISIS areas. For the most part, the armed elements that liberated a certain area from ISIS then continued to hold it or maintain dominance over it. Thus, non-state actors dominate large swathes of the former ISIS ‘Caliphate,’ creating a balkanized map of security and civilian control.

Chapter 2: A Human Security Snapshot

On December 9, 2017, then Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi declared victory over ISIS and announced that the Iraqi government had regained control over the roughly one-third of the country that had previously been part of the short-lived “Caliphate project”.28 A year later, in December 2018, US President

syrias-deir-ezzor/; Liz Sly, “Hezbollah, and the U.S. help Syria retake ,” Washington Post, March 2, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/syrian-army- retakes-the-ancient-city-of-palmyra-from-the-islamic-state/2017/03/02/fe770c78-ff63-11e6- 9b78-824ccab94435_story.html; Mohammad Hassan, “Regime Forces are Advancing in Raqqa’s Countryside… Toward Deir Ezzor,” al-Modon, August 5, 2017. https://bit.ly/2kyuIVi (Arabic). 25 “Syrian army moves into Yarmouk after IS evacuation deal,” Middle East Eye, May 21, 2018. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/syrian-army-moves-yarmouk-after-evacuation-deal; Kareem Shaheen, “Syrian government forces seal victory in southern territories,” The Guardian, July 31, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/31/syrian- government-forces-seal-victory-in-southern-territories 26 Göktuğ Sönmez, “Turkey’s Shield Operation: al-Bab and Beyond,” Terrorism Monitor Volume: 15 Issue: 4, February 4, 2017. https://jamestown.org/program/turkeys- euphrates-shield-operation-al-bab-beyond/ 27 Erica Gaston and Andras Derzsi-Horvath, “Iraq After ISIL: Sub-State Actors, Local Forces and the Micro-Politics of Control.” 28 Margaret Coker and Falih Hassan, “Iraq Prime Minister Declares Victory Over ISIS,” New York Times, December 9, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/09/world/middleeast/iraq- isis-haider-al-abadi.html Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. June 2020 7 Life after the Caliphate: Human Security Challenges in Syria and Iraq

praised the “historic victories against ISIS”. He added, in March 2019, that ISIS in Syria had also been vanquished and that “The caliphate is gone as of tonight”.29

As the previous chapter illustrates the ISIS territorial Caliphate project has been heavily disrupted in both Syria and Iraq over the past two years. Still it is important to reflect on how these military gains can be translated into both a durable defeat for ISIS and sustainable stability for the areas and people previously under the group’s control. Meeting these key objectives for both local and regional stability and security requires tackling the long-term challenges of the ‘day after’ from a human security perspective, addressing both the tangible and intangible legacies of conflict.

The first, very tangible, legacy of conflict is of course the physical destruction of the civilian infrastructure left behind in both Iraq and Syria after the conclusion of the main military operations against ISIS. According to the World Bank’s Iraq Damage and Needs Assessment, the damage incurred in Iraq by the seven directly affected governorates (Anbar, Babel, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninawa, Salah Al-Deen, and Baghdad) amounts to US$ 45.7 billion, with a staggering US $16 billion worth of damages to the housing sector; an additional US $7 billion and US $4.3 billion to the power and oil and gas infrastructure, respectively; and further damages in excess of US $2 billion in the health and education sectors, just to mention a few especially affected sectors. Accordingly, an estimated US $88 billion will be required to rebuild and repair the damage inflicted by ISIS and the military campaigns against it.30 Iraq’s economy has also been deeply affected. The World Bank calculates cumulative real conflict-related losses to non-oil GDP at US $107 billion, corresponding to 72 percent of 2013 GDP and 142 percent of 2013 non-oil GDP.31 In the most affected seven governorates, unemployment rose from 12.6 percent in 2014 to 17.7 percent in 2017, with the overall poverty rate increasing from 17 percent in 2012 to 22.8 percent in 2017.32

The situation in Syria is even more dire, as the damage and destruction directly related to ISIS is compounded to the broader legacy of conflict and violence. The years of civil war have led to profound devastation and destruction of virtually all aspects of the country’s civilian infrastructure, resulting in estimated cumulative Gross Domestic Product (GDP) loss of US $226 billion between 2011 and 2016 alone, representing approximately four times Syria’s pre-crisis GDP with high levels of unemployment and poverty.33 In this sense, the ‘day after’ challenges linked to rebuilding areas previously under ISIS control cannot be disentangled from the broader context of prolonged instability and regime violence.

29 “Trump Says IS Territory in Syria Nearly Eliminated,” , March 20, 2019. https://www.voanews.com/usa/trump-says-territory-syria-nearly-eliminated “Trump’s Numerous Declarations of Victory Over IS,” Voice of America, March 20, 2019. https://www.voanews.com/usa/us-politics/trumps-numerous-declarations-victory-over 30 Lorenso Andreoli da Silva, Ricardo Chiapin Pechansky, Rodrigo Heck, “Post-Conflict Reconstruction in the Middle East and North Africa: The Cases of Iraq, Libya and Syria,” Islamic Development Bank, 2018. https://www.ufrgs.br/ufrgsmun/2018/web/files/isdb.pdf; World Bank, “Iraq Reconstruction and Investment. Damage and Need Assessment Report,” January 2018. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/600181520000498420/pdf/123631-REVISED- Iraq-Reconstruction-and-Investment-Part-2-Damage-and-Needs-Assessment-of-Affected- Governorates.pdf 31 World Bank, “Iraq Reconstruction and Investment. Damage and Need Assessment Report.” 32 World Bank, “Iraq Reconstruction and Investment. Damage and Need Assessment Report.” 33 OCHA, “2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview,” March 2019. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2019_Syr_HNO_Full.pdf Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. June 2020 8 Life after the Caliphate: Human Security Challenges in Syria and Iraq

The destruction of the city of Mosul, Iraq's second-largest city with its almost 1.5 million pre-war residents, and especially its western neighborhoods, has been extensive. The United Nations estimates that roughly ten million tons of rubble and 130,000 destroyed homes were left behind after ISIS left and guns fell silent, along with a large number of landmines and other unexploded ordnance.34 This situation left over 300,000 displaced residents of Mosul unable to return, as of July 2019.35 Former ISIS strongholds in Syria, including Raqqa, face a similar situation, affected also by the destruction of the housing and transportation infrastructure, and exposed to a legacy of improvised explosive devices and other unexploded ordnance left behind.36 And while Mosul’s and Raqqa’s fates are especially tragic, they are hardly exceptional: the damage to Iraq’s and Syria’s housing sector and civilian infrastructure more broadly is a key obstacle to the return of any level of normalcy in post-Caliphate areas.

Alongside damaged urban centers, the end of the Caliphate also revealed the full extent of the environmental devastation left behind. ISIS’ governance experiment resulted in direct harm to the environment, including contamination of waterways and soil, with a series of environmentally tragic oil spills resulting from ISIS’ makeshifts refineries and military operations aimed at taking controls of pipelines.37 According to UN estimates, in Iraq, over 2,371,350 hectares of "high-use land” became unusable due to landmines, with an additional 10,569 hectares contaminated pollution, and with a further estimated 387,750 hectares of forest lost.38 Needless to say, these losses, along with the disruption of crop-cycles and irrigation facilities, has also had an impact on both food security and livelihood opportunities.

The delivery of basic public services suffered significantly in ‘liberated’ areas. When it comes to health provision, the combination of destroyed medical facilities and equipment and dwindling of staff are significantly straining the system. Meanwhile, poor housing and water and sanitation conditions have only heightened the need to access healthcare facilities; as have the number of people left injured or disabled by the conflict. As post-ISIS areas face the COVID-19 pandemic, the weakened state of the health infrastructure, overcrowding in residential areas and camps will increase the vulnerability of the local populations. Just as importantly, while post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms are prevalent, access to mental care is not. For example, a 2019 health survey in Mosul concluded that “Communicable and noncommunicable diseases were reported for both children and adults, with a high prevalence of emotional and behavioral problems, particularly in west Mosul. Care-

34 Ben Taub, “Iraq’s Post-ISIS Campaigns of Revenge,” The New Yorker, December 17, 2018. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/12/24/iraqs-post-isis-campaign-of-revenge; “ Hidden bombs and eight million tonnes of rubble keep the people of Mosul from returning home,” Danish Demising Group, February 19, 2019. https://danishdemininggroup.dk/news/hidden-bombs-and-eight-million-tonnes-of-rubble- keep-the-people-of-mosul-from-returning-home 35 “Mosul: Over 300,000 still unable to go back home two years since end of war,” Norwegian Refugee Council, July 4, 2019. https://www.nrc.no/news/2019/july/mosul-over-300000-still- unable-to-go-back-home-two-years-since-end-of-war/ 36 “Syria: Landmines Kill, Injure Hundreds in Raqqa More International Support Needed for Clearance,” , February 2018. https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/12/syria-landmines-kill-injure-hundreds-raqqa 37 “Cleaning up after ISIS: how Iraq’s new chemicals team is trying to undo years of conflict pollution,” UN Environment, December 5, 2018. https://www.unenvironment.org/news-and-stories/story/cleaning-after-isis-how-iraqs-new- chemicals-team-trying-undo-years-conflict 38 World Bank, “Iraq Reconstruction and Investment. Damage and Need Assessment Report.” Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. June 2020 9 Life after the Caliphate: Human Security Challenges in Syria and Iraq

seeking was low, treatment compliance for noncommunicable diseases was poor, and treatment options for patients were limited.”39

The situation is similar in Syria’s north-east, formerly ISIS’ stronghold, and home to roughly 1.8 million people in need out of roughly 3 million inhabitants, including approximately 710,000 internally displaced persons (IDP).40 With half of the health facilities damaged or destroyed and with a heavily damaged sanitation infrastructure, Syrian areas previously held by ISIS – like Hassakeh, Raqqa, Deir Ezzor – have seen substantial degradation in public health, with reported cases of “Measles, acute bloody diarrhea and typhoid fever”.41 Other available health indicators paint an equally troubling picture. For example, according to 2019 UN assessments, vaccinations in children under 1 living in the Raqqa and Deir Ezzor governorates were estimated between 10-20 percent.42

A similar combination of destroyed infrastructure, missing material and lack of sufficient personnel characterizes the educational sector as well, limiting access to schooling and education to children and young people.43 According to the World Bank’s Iraq Damage and Needs Assessment only “38 percent of the total school infrastructure for which data were available in the 16 cities remain destroyed, while 18 percent (190 facilities) were completely damaged.”44 UN need assessments for Syria report an equally stressing situation, with one in three schools damaged or destroyed.45 In any case, landmines and unexploded ordnance, debris and rubble renders both the schooling environment as well as the public space more broadly not safe for children, depriving them not only of an access to education, but also to freedom of movement and play.46 What is more, lack of security on the street further hinders access to education, with a more prominent impact on girls (and women more in general).47

Ensuring personal security along with a measure of law and order represents a fundamental issue that necessitates tackling it in order to move towards stabilization. Yet, challenges amount. First, while major military campaigns have winded down, ISIS’ presence has not been completely eliminated and the group

39 Riyadh Lafta, Valeria Cetorelli, Gilbert Burnham, “Health and Health Seeking in Mosul During ISIS Control and Liberation: Results from a 40-Cluster Household Survey,” Society for Disaster Medicine and Public Health, Inc. DOI: 10.1017/dmp.2019.11. 40 OCHA, “Humanitarian Update Syrian Arab Republic - Issue 06,” November 14, 2019. https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/humanitarian-update-syrian-arab-republic- issue-06-14-november-2019 41 OCHA, “2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview.” 42 Ibid. 43 “Picking Up the Pieces: Rebuilding the lives of Mosul’s children after years of conflict and violence,” Save the Children, 2018. 44 World Bank, “Iraq Reconstruction and Investment. Damage and Need Assessment Report.” 45 OCHA, “2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview.” 46 “Education and Child Protection Needs Assessment in West Mosul,” War Child UK and Mercy Hands for Humanitarian Aid, January 28, 2018. https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/assess ments/west_mosul_needs_assessment.pdf; “Education needs assessment Siniyah district, Salaaldin – Iraq,” 2019. https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/iraq/assessment/education-needs- assessment-siniyah-district-salaaldin-%E2%80%93-iraq 47 “Child Protection Rapid Assessment Al Qayyarah Subdistrict,” COOPI, December 2018. https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/assess ments/cp_rapid_assessment_summary_-_coopi.pdf; “Human Security Survey Basra, Iraq — 2018 Gender Security Dynamics,” PAX, 2018. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/181015_HSS%20Basra%20Gender%2 0Dynamics.pdf Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. June 2020 10 Life after the Caliphate: Human Security Challenges in Syria and Iraq

retains the ability to spoil and destabilize the transition. Moreover, the fact that security provision and law enforcement is on numerous instances derogated from the Iraqi Armed Forces to local armed groups or to the non-local Shia al-Hashd al- Shaabi (Popular Mobilisation Forces) creates social, political and strategic challenges that will be described more in depth in chapter 3.

Even a cursory description of the legacy of destruction left behind in the aftermath of the ‘victory’ against ISIS highlights the precariousness of the situation and helps explain why, as of February 2020, of the six million people who were cumulatively displaced by the war against ISIS between 2014 and 2017, over 1.3 million have still not returned to their homes and remain displaced, mostly in the north-central region and in Kurdistan Region of Iraq.48 Those who have not returned are from areas experiencing particularly severe human security concerns, such as Mosul, Sinjar, Tuz Khurmatu and Baiji.49 In Syria, 2018 saw a relative large number of returns to Deir Ezzor (roughly 295,000) and Raqqa (approximately 136,000), but significant obstacles to return to formerly ISIS-held areas remain, while internal displacement within north-east Syria is estimated to affect around 710,000 people.50

Obstacles to return are many in both Iraq and Syria, from the physical destruction of homes and cities, to the lack of livelihood opportunities, to the absence of social services and security, to fear of reprisals or retaliations.51 Returns have also been blocked by lack of identity papers. For example, children born under ISIS generally lack identification documents, with as many as 45,000 IDP children missing any type of identification.52 There are also political obstacles. The IOM’s Returns Working Group Iraq describes Sunni IDP reportedly to have been stopped from returning due to “a will to change the ethno-religious demographics of the district, to suit the provincial Shiite majority”.53 At the same time, IDP continue to face substantial hardships, with 60 percent of IDP lacking sufficient income to meet their basic needs; and with significant obstacles in terms of access to education and health care.54

In addition to these tangible issues related to reconstruction of housing and infrastructure, livelihood generation and access to public goods, one of the most significant obstacles to a successful post-conflict transition has to do with repairing social cohesion and moving toward reconciliation. Challenges in inter-community

48 Ninewa, Dohuk, and Erbil remain the governorates with the highest number of IDP. IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix, March 30, 2020. http://iraqdtm.iom.int/; IRAQ DISPLACEMENT CRISIS 2014–2017, IOM, October 2018. http://www.iomiraq.net/reports/iom-iraq-releases-new- %E2%80%9Ciraq-displacement-crisis-2014-17%E2%80%9D-report; “Iraq: 2019 Humanitarian Response Plan - Jan to Dec 2019,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, February 2019. https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/iraq/document/iraq-2019- humanitarian-response-plan-january-december-2019 49 IOM Iraq, “Displacement Tracking Matrix: TDM Round112”, November 2019. http://iraqdtm.iom.int/Downloads/DTM%202019/October%202019/DTM_112_Report_Septe mber_October2019.pdf 50 OCHA, “Humanitarian Update Syrian Arab Republic - Issue 06”. 51 “Protracted Displacement Study: An In-Depth Analysis of the Main Districts of Displacement”, International Organization for Migration (IOM) Iraq, April 2019. 52 Jess Wanless, “Born under ISIS, the children struggling in Iraq”, International Rescue Committee, January 19, 2018. https://www.rescue.org/article/born-under-isis-children- struggling-iraq 53 “Returns Working Group (RWG) Annual Progress Report: January – December 2018”, IOM, May 2019. https://iraq.iom.int/publications/returns-working-group-rwg-annual-progress- report-january-december-2018 54 “Iraq: 2019 Humanitarian Response Plan - Jan to Dec 2019”, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. June 2020 11 Life after the Caliphate: Human Security Challenges in Syria and Iraq

and intra-community relations and in inter-sectarian dynamics are clearly not tied exclusively or even predominantly to ISIS and its legacy; they are arguably one of the most complex and long-standing socio-political issues in Iraq and Syria. Specifically, in both Syria and Iraq, the root causes for the emergence of ISIS remain largely unaddressed, namely, political marginalization in Iraq and extreme political repression in Syria of communities from which ISIS emerged. At the same time, dealing with the legacy of the Caliphate has generated a set of new of problems concerning transitional justice, accountability, reconciliation, as well as reintegration of former ISIS member and their families.

Chapter 3: Zooming in on Protection of Civilians and Security

In addition to the significant ‘day after’ challenges identified in chapter 2, one of the lesser understood yet most troubling aspects of the post-ISIS transition pertains to addressing the question of ensuring protection of civilians in the 'liberated areas’ – including by ensuring personal and community security, as well as access to justice. Some of the main obstacles in this sense have to do with the fact that communities that fell under ISIS control continue to be disempowered and subjected to the rule of forces often perceived as foreign and abusive.

Political Disempowerment and Abusive Militia Control

Non-state actors share or maintain full control over areas once occupied by ISIS in Iraq and Syria. In Iraq, the Iraqi army or federal police are present alongside the PMF (Hashd al-Shaabi). This raises serious questions when it comes to ensuring transparency, accountability and adherence to rule of law standards. The PMF has been implicated in grave human rights abuses such as house demolitions, field executions, systematic looting, preventing locals from returning to their homes due to political and demographic considerations, as well as repression of political opponents and protests.55

To address some of these issues the government has been taking steps to officially absorb the Hashd into the armed forces of Iraq; but in practice the central state still has a limited ability to monitor or control their conduct, and locals are largely unable to complain about abuses and have them redressed.56

55 Erica Gaston and Mario Schultz, “At the Tip of the Spear: Armed Groups’ Impact on Displacement and Return in Post-ISIL Iraq,” GPPI, February 18, 2019. https://www.gppi.net/2019/02/18/at-the-tip-of-the-spear; “After Liberation Came Destruction Iraqi Militias and the Aftermath of Amerli,” Human Rights Watch, March 18, 2015. https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/03/18/after-liberation-came-destruction/iraqi-militias-and- aftermath-amerli; “Iraq: Looting, Destruction by Forces Fighting ISIS,” Human Rights Watch, February 16, 2017. https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/02/16/iraq-looting-destruction-forces- fighting-isis; Renad Mansour and Faleh A. Jabar, “The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s Future,” Carnegie Middle East Center, April 2017, p. 9. https://carnegie- mec.org/2017/04/28/popular-mobilization-forces-and-iraq-s-future-pub-68810; Michael Knights, “Exposing and Sanctioning Human Rights Violations by Iraqi Militias,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 22, 2019. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy- analysis/view/exposing-and-sanctioning-human-rights-violations-by-iraqi-militias 56 Michael Knights, “Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups,” CTC Sentinel, August 2019, p. 1, 2. On the incorporation of the PMF into the Iraqi armed forces, see Renad Mansour and Faleh A. Jabar, “The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s Future,” p. 10; “A member of an official Iraqi security body confirmed that state institutions could not effectively monitor areas controlled by IRGC-backed militias near the Qa’im border zone”, see: Harith Hasan and Kheder Khaddour, “The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. June 2020 12 Life after the Caliphate: Human Security Challenges in Syria and Iraq

The PMF is present throughout Iraq, not merely in areas previously controlled by ISIS, but their presence in post-ISIS areas is particularly sensitive due to its demographic composition. Areas occupied by ISIS were largely Sunni-majority and in Ninewa, home to some of Iraq’s largest minority communities. For example, in Baartela, once a Christian-majority town in the Ninewa Province, the 30th Brigade of the PMF, the force in charge of the region, is made up of members of the Shabak community who largely identify as Shia. Shia flags flutter on the main roads and next to their checkpoints. When sanctioning the commander of the 30th Brigade, the U.S. Treasury Department accused the force of “extortion, illegal arrests, and kidnappings. The 30th Brigade has frequently detained people without warrants, or with fraudulent warrants, and has charged arbitrary customs fees at its checkpoints.”57 During a visit in 2019, local Christians repeatedly expressed the view that the force is foreign. Its presence clearly exacerbated intra-communal tensions. For example, an incident when Shabak civilians told Christian women that they dress like prostitutes and should cover up, were perceived as threatening because the Shabak neighbors are seen to be backed by PMF.58

The PMF added non-Shia militias, which maintain a presence in their localities,59 but those are subsidiaries to the Shia PMF factions and do not have independent decision-making powers.60 Commenting on the Shia flags fluttering around her city, Sarah, a resident of Mosul, said “there is nothing we can do about this. We have no power. The local tribal [Sunni] Hashd are not the ones in charge.”61

The situation in Sinjar, the home of the Yazidi community in Iraq, is an outlier in terms of the number of militias present in the area, but illustrates problems elsewhere. Multiple armed forces compete for influence in the region including: the Iraqi army, Iraqi federal police, Shia units of the PMF, the Yazidi PMF “Lalish Brigade” under the guidance of Iranian-linked Kata’ib al-Imam Ali, Yazidi Peshmerga forces under the command of Qassem Shesho, and the PKK-affiliated YBŞ, YJÊ and Asayîşa Êzîdxanê.62 Zaradesht, a local activist, commented: “people don’t know who is the person carrying weapons. To which they belong.”63 Ibrahim, a local poet and student,

From a National to a Regional Frontier,” Carnegie Endowment, March 31, 2020. https://carnegie-mec.org/2020/03/31/transformation-of-iraqi-syrian-border-from-national- to-regional-frontier-pub-81396 57 “Treasury Sanctions Persons Associated with Serious Human Rights Abuse and Corrupt Actors in Iraq,” U.S. Department of Treasury, July 18, 2019. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm735; The charging of fees at certain checkpoints is commonplace. See: Joel Wing, “Expansion of the Hashd al-Shaabi’s Influence In Iraq, Interview With Clingendael’s Erwin van Veen,” Musings on Iraq, August 20, 2019. http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2019/08/expansion-of-hashd-al-shaabis-influence.html 58 Author fieldwork in Baartella, April 2019. 59 Inna Rudolf, “The Sunnis of Iraq’s “Shia” Paramilitary Powerhouse,” The Century Foundation, February 11, 2020 https://tcf.org/content/report/sunnis-iraqs-shia-paramilitary-powerhouse/ 60 Erica Gaston and Andras Derzsi-Horvath, “Iraq After ISIL: Sub-State Actors, Local Forces and the Micro-Politics of Control”; Zmkan Ali Saleem, Mac Skelton and Christine M. van den Toorn, “Security and Governance in the Disputed Territories Under a Fractured GOI: The Case of Northern Diyala,” LSE Middle East Center Blog, November 14, 2018. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2018/11/14/security-and-governance-in-the-disputed-territories- under-a-fractured-goi-the-case-of-northern-diyala/ 61 Author interview, Mosul, April 2019. 62 Michael Knights, Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups,” p. 4; Rania Abouzeid, “When the weapons fall silent: Reconciliation in Sinjar after ISIS,” European Council for Foreign Relations, October 2018. https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/when_the_weapons_fall_silent_reconciliation_in_ sinjar_after_isis; Mélisande Genat, The Song Remains the Same, June 24, 2019 https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1&v=q50j-6pmWj8 63 Author interview, Dohuk, April 2019. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. June 2020 13 Life after the Caliphate: Human Security Challenges in Syria and Iraq

expressed deep fear of the Shia Hashd present in his region: “They are just like ISIS, only Shia. It’s the same extremist mentality.”64

In tribal areas in Iraq, the weakness of the central state contributes to increasing reliance on tribal law and unofficial courts to settle disputes, some of them stemming from ISIS’ time in power. A central issue tackled by tribal sheiks is the return of IDP with perceived ties to ISIS, a process fraught with profiteering.65

In Syria, post-ISIS areas are also largely ruled by non-state actors. A large swath of territory stretching from former ISIS strongholds of Shaddadi in Deir Ezzor, to Manbij in the west and Baghouz in the south is now controlled by the SDF. Most SDF fighters and mid-level commanders are Arab, but they all have Kurdish ‘advisers’ who are often the real decision-makers. These advisers are in most cases long-term PKK cadres who have engaged in armed struggle, including attacks targeting civilians, against Turkey or political work on behalf of the PKK in Europe. These individuals retain significant decision-making power over questions of governance and strategy. While they often do consult with the population, and some decisions are initiated by local civilians; still civil society activists, tribal leaders and political and military leaders across Arab-majority areas under SDF control insisted that they are not allowed to govern themselves.66

This disempowerment breeds resentment and at times leads locals to withdraw their cooperation from the SDF.67 The tribal nature of the region’s population makes intelligence cooperation with the SDF even more complicated. “If I knew that my cousin is working with ISIS, would I report him to an administration that does not represent me, going against tribal traditions, or would I keep quiet, and maybe even help him?” asked a sheikh of a prominent tribe in Deir Ezzor.68 The SDF’s ability to guarantee law and order varies from one area to another under its control. While the Kurdish-majority areas have enjoyed one of the highest levels of security in all of Syria, in such places such as Raqqa and Deir Ezzor, locals reported that criminality is rampant. In Raqqa, locals reported that they will not go to the police in case of a crime because the perpetrator will be released soon after.69 In Deir Ezzor, few courts and police () forces operate and individuals solve issues of crime through tribal court (‘uraf), but at times kill perpetrators without turning to any court – civilian or tribal.70

Following the partial U.S. withdrawal from northeastern Syria in late 2019, the perception of the SDF as a lame duck, coupled with increasing attacks by cells belonging to ISIS and the Syrian regime, increased instability in Deir Ezzor. ISIS is now again able to operate in broad daylight east of Deir Ezzor city and assassinate

64 Author interview, Dohuk, February 2019. 65 Haley Bobesine, “Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq,” The Century Foundation, November 7, 2019. https://tcf.org/content/report/tribal-justice-fragile-iraq/ 66 Elizabeth Tsurkov and Esam al-Hassan, “Kurdish-Arab Power Struggle in Northeastern Syria”, Sada, July 24, 2019. https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/79542 67 “Squaring the Circles in Syria’s North East,” International Crisis Group, July 2019. 68 Author interview in Deir Ezzor countryside, July 2019. 69 Author interviews in Raqqa, July 2019. 70 Ahmed al-Atra, “The Judiciary in Areas Under SDF Control in Deir Ezzor: An Investigation,” Jisr TV, July 25, 2019. https://bit.ly/37VjduT (Arabic); In July 2019, without the authorization of any court, civilian of tribal, members of the Sheitat tribe executed a man in broad daylight after he confessed to killing their relative. “In a First Event of Its Kind Since SDF [Took] Control of Deir Ezzor: Execution of Punishment of Retaliation in Kind against a Young Man after He Confessed to Killing a Member of the Sheitat,” SOHR, July 23, 2019. http://www.syriahr.com/?p=328778 (Arabic) Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. June 2020 14 Life after the Caliphate: Human Security Challenges in Syria and Iraq

perceived and real collaborators with the SDF, creating an atmosphere of fear.71 ISIS has also been able to infiltrate local governance and military institutions of the SDF, further discouraging cooperation with local authorities against ISIS.72

In areas now under the control of Syrian rebel factions, lawlessness is rampant.73 Idlib and its environs, from which ISIS was expelled in 2014 by the rebels, is under on-and-off escalations and heavy bombings by the Syrian regime and the Russian air force. Under these conditions, law and order is hard to maintain. Hayat Tahrir al- Sham (HTS), the jihadist but increasingly flexible faction ruling the area, routinely carries out raids against ISIS cells and executes their members.74 Despite this, the former ISIS leader was able to hide in the region undetected for months, and ISIS attacks, particularly assassinations of HTS personnel, continue sporadically.75

In former ISIS-held areas in northern Aleppo and the region surrounding Tel Abyad, which are under the control of Turkey and Turkish-backed factions unified under the ‘National Army,’ law and order also remains a significant concern.76 Both ISIS and YPG cells are able to operate in the area and carry out occasional attacks.77 Notably, in October 2019, the Spokesman of ISIS, Abu Hassan al-Muhajir, and a Syrian operative in the ISIS‘ were killed in Jarablus, a town under the control of the Turkish-backed factions.78 The factions controlling those areas often fight among each other and have been at times involved in criminal activities such as theft, kidnappings for ransom and smuggling,79 causing a deep sense of

71 Dareen Khalifa and Elizabeth Tsurkov, “Has Turkey’s Incursion into Syria Opened the Door for an Islamic State Comeback?,” War on the Rocks, February 21, 2020. https://warontherocks.com/2020/02/has-turkeys-incursion-into-syria-opened-the-door-for- an-islamic-state-comeback/ 72 Patrick Haenni and Arthur Quesnay, “Surviving the aftermath of Islamic State : the Syrian Kurdish movement’s resilience strategy,” Middle East Directions, March 2020. https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/66224 73 Elizabeth Tsurkov, “The Breaking of Syria’s Rebellion,” Forum for Regional Thinking, July 2018. https://www.regthink.org/en/articles/the-breaking-of-syrias-rebellion 74 Walid Abu al-Khayr, “Hayat Tahrir al-Sham Persecutes ISIS Members in Idlib,” Diyaruna, May 1, 2019. https://diyaruna.com/ar/articles/cnmi_di/features/2019/05/01/feature-02 (Arabic); “HTS executes ISIS members in Idlib city,” Orient Net, March 2, 2019. https://www.orient-news.net/en/news_show/163326/0/HTS-executes-ISIS-members-in-Idlib- city 75 Kareem Faheem and Sarah Dadouch, “Baghdadi hid among rivals and enemies in rebel- held Syrian province,” Washington Post, October 28, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/baghdadi-hid-among-rivals-and- enemies-in-rebel-held-syrian-province/2019/10/28/fcbf20c0-f982-11e9-9e02- 1d45cb3dfa8f_story.html “ISIS resurfaces in Syria’s Idlib province amid defeat in eastern ,” al-Masdar News, March 27, 2019. https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/isis-resurfaces-in-syrias-idlib-province-amid-defeat- in-eastern-euphrates-region/ 76 Elizabeth Tsurkov, “Who Are Turkey’s Proxy Fighters in Syria?” New York Review of Books, November 27, 2019. https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2019/11/27/who-are-turkeys-proxy- fighters-in-syria/ 77 Alexander McKeever, “Wrath of the Olives: Tracking the Afrin Insurgency Through Social Media,” Bellingcat, March 1, 2019. https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2019/03/01/wrath-of-the-olives-tracking-the-afrin- insurgency-through-social-media/; “Syria: Turkey Reveals an Operation Against ISIS in al- Bab,” Turk Press, August 3, 2019. https://www.turkpress.co/node/63500 (Arabic) 78 Zachary Cohen, “Trump says likely successor to ISIS leader Baghdadi killed by US forces,” CNN, October 29, 2019 https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/29/politics/trump-al-muhajir- dead/index.html; Phone interview with Syrian journalist, October 2019. 79 “Syria: At Least 13 Kidnappings Recorded Recently in Afrin,” for Truth and Justice, July 2019. https://stj-sy.org/en/syria-at-least-13-kidnappings-recorded-recently-in-afrin/; Haid Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. June 2020 15 Life after the Caliphate: Human Security Challenges in Syria and Iraq

frustration among the local populace.80 Members of factions threaten locals who have lodged complaints against them and perpetrators largely go unpunished.81

In areas recaptured by the regime from ISIS, Syrian and foreign Shia militias operate alongside the Syrian Army. In western Deir Ezzor and the Homs desert, foreign Shia militias are particularly dominant, and supersede the regime in their authority.82 Iran has opened Shia religious seminaries in the area, but successful conversion of Sunnis to is rare.83 However, the perception among people from Deir Ezzor is that “the Iranians have a project against our faith,” said Mohammed, a journalist from Deir Ezzor.84 These forces engage in looting and other forms of criminality. Arrests are common, landing the detainees in torture dungeons.85 Locals do not dare to complain.86 Most of the population of the region has been displaced by the regime and has been prevented from returning. The few who were allowed and even compelled to return are government employees, perceived as more loyal.87

Thus, in all areas once controlled by ISIS or in which it maintained a presence, locals continue to be politically disempowered and vulnerable when it comes to personal security.

Justice and Accountability

Ensuring transitional justice for the victims of ISIS and accountability for those who had perpetrated crimes as member of the group is important to begin healing societal wounds. The process should be conducted according to strict rule of law and due process criteria and in parallel to a broader reconciliation process. This is an especially complex challenge. Even determining what constitutes active membership in ISIS is not at all self-evident, with the risk of stigmatization of parts of the population based on the principles of collective guilt or guilt by association. This is an especially serious problem given that inordinate number of children and young adult ISIS recruited and actively relied on for a variety of roles, including active combat.

Haid, “Turkey’s Gradual Efforts to Professionalize Syrian Allies,” Sada, November 2, 2018. https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/77637 80 “They liberated Efrin from the PKK & PYD & turned it into a world of dishonor, hashish smokers, shit eaters, robbery gangs & shabbiha... Let them return the Kurds [PYD], who are more honorable that these miscreants.” An Arab resident in , displaced from Douma, June 2018. Additional author interviews with locals in al-Bab, Marea, Jarablus, Azaz, al-Rai and Efrin, 2017-2019. 81 Phone interview with a military police member stationed in northern Aleppo, October 2019; Phone interview with Firqa al-Mutasim fighter, an SNA faction, October 2019; phone interview with former member of a the 20th Division, a Turkish-backed faction, October 2019. 82 Ziad Awad, “Iran in Deir ez-Zor : strategy, expansion, and opportunities,” Middle East Directions, May 2019. https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/64687 83 Author interview with activist and researcher from Deir Ezzor, Urfa, August 2019; Author interview with Israeli intelligence analyst, August 2019. 84 Author interview with journalist from Deir Ezzor in Istanbul, August 2019. 85 “Systematic Looting in Deir Ezzor Goverorate,” Justice for Life Foundation, April 23, 2019. https://bit.ly/33bey5g (Arabic); “Deir Ezzor... Arrests, Extortion of Civilians and Oil Smuggling,” Justice for Life Foundation, April 30, 2019. https://bit.ly/2WF9eop (Arabic) 86 Interview with journalist from regime-held areas in Deir Ezzor, April and August 2019. 87 Interview with journalist from regime-held areas in Deir Ezzor, April and August 2019; “No Hope for Return Soon,” Justice for Life Foundation, March 28, 2018. https://bit.ly/2NfhhVW (Arabic). Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. June 2020 16 Life after the Caliphate: Human Security Challenges in Syria and Iraq

In turn, this creates a context that is fertile for abuses and human rights violations, can encourage summary justice and reprisals, whilst also risking to heighten existing sectarian tensions.88

Both Iraq and the various forces ruling Syria are forced to contend with the issue of detained ISIS fighters, some of them minors. According to the SDF, in October 2019, it held approximately 10,000 fighters in its prisons, 1,000 of them from countries other than Syria and Iraq, most of them regional countries such as , and Morocco. The Assad regime, HTS and the Turkish-backed factions have not released numbers regarding the number of ISIS detainees in their prisons. Each of these forces adopts a different policy with regards to the local detainees. The SDF adopts the most lenient policy, handing out lenient sentences and at times releasing ISIS members who are deemed not to have blood on their hands within months.89 This lenient policy is unpopular among some residents of SDF areas. On a trip to Raqqa in July 2019, dozens of locals complained about this policy without being asked. No one expressed support for it. On the other hand, tribal leaders in Deir Ezzor demanded the release of members of their tribes with links to ISIS. The SDF does not hand down death sentences.

There has not been a recorded case of ISIS detainees released from HTS prisons, and on the other hand, HTS publicized executing ISIS prisoners. “After every attack by ISIS [in Idlib], HTS goes into the prison and executes a bunch of the ISIS detainees,” said Moaz, a journalist familiar with the region.90 In areas under Turkish control, ISIS prisoners are handed sentences in an apparently orderly manner and undergo ideological deradicalization classes.91 In regime areas, ISIS fighters captured in the battlefield are usually executed. The very few who are not, are at times released from prison after paying bribes and through connections (wāsta).92

In Iraq, ISIS fighters who are not killed in the battlefield are jailed and undergo trials that are reported to last minutes. Many are sentences to death.93 Torture is reportedly widespread in Iraqi prisons, and as Samuel Helfont notes: “There were an estimated 8,000 ISIS fighters in Mosul and far fewer in the surrounding cities. Yet, the wanted list of ISIS suspects has grown to some 100,000 people.”94

Unlike local ISIS detainees, foreign ISIS fighters in SDF prisons are not released. Most of their homelands refuse to accept them, whether from Iraq or Syria. Some countries have carried out negotiations with Iraq to accept their foreign fighters from Syria and put them on trial. Iraq appears to be willing to accept the fighters, but is demanding high sums of money for putting them on trial and is apparently not willing to commit to not handing down death sentences, as per the request of the European nations.95

88 Ben Taub, “Iraq’s Post-ISIS Campaigns of Revenge.” 89 “SDF Releases 300 Syrians Accused of Belonging to ISIS,” al-Modon, March 3, 2019. https://bit.ly/2JMMiOO (Arabic); “SDF Releases 100 Detainees Accused of Cooperation with ISIS,” Adar Press, October 24, 2018. https://bit.ly/326bh60 (Arabic) 90 Author phone interview with a Syrian journalist, August 2019. 91 “New Centre In Marea Aims To Reform Former ISIS Militants,” al-Shahed, November 28, 2017. https://alshahidwitness.com/centre-marea-reform-isis-militants/ 92 Interview with a journalist from western Deir Ezzor (regime-held areas), April 2019. 93 Ben Taub, “Iraq’s Post-ISIS Campaign of Revenge,” New Yorker, December 2018. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/12/24/iraqs-post-isis-campaign-of-revenge 94 Samuel Helfont, “Requiem for Mosul,” March 22, 2019. https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/03/requiem-for-mosul/ 95 Interview with UN official, New York, November 2019. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. June 2020 17 Life after the Caliphate: Human Security Challenges in Syria and Iraq

Social Cohesion

Social cohesion, namely, relations within and between communities, remain affected by the legacy of ISIS rule. Two issues in particular are a major concern, namely, prolonged displacement and the fate of families with perceived links to ISIS. In Iraq, despite the defeat of the Islamic State as a territorial entity in 2018, 1.4 million people continue to be displaced out of the total six million who fled their homes during ISIS’ rampage and subsequent campaign against it. Out of those displaced, two groups are particularly notable – minority communities from Ninewa and families with perceived links to ISIS. Members of the Yazidi and Assyrian communities, who survived ISIS’ genocide in 2014, have largely not returned to their homes due to desire to emigrate, fear of ISIS return, distrust of their Arab neighbors and militia rule in their areas of origin.96 While NGOs operating in the region have fostered peace-building and reconciliation efforts, the support for such efforts appears to be very low among minority communities.97

Another group that has largely been unable to return are families with perceived links to ISIS who live in displacement camps and whose freedom of movement is severely restricted by authorities through denial of access to legal documents. These families face abuse, denial of public goods including education, and suffer harassment and sexual assault.98 The internment of these families, their stigmatization and denial of education to their children is a particularly explosive mix. “Without action, these people could become a permanent underclass,” warned the International Crisis Group.99

Within their communities of origins, perceived association with ISIS can lead to “forced displacement, evictions, arrests, looting of their homes, house demolitions, threats, sexual abuse and harassment, and discrimination after returning to their places of origin.”100 Such reprisals, along with detentions and ill-treatment, have fallen on the broader Sunni population at large in areas where ISIS used to operate in Iraq.101 These policies only add to a legacy of abuse and discrimination against Sunni communities in those very same regions, fueling the sense of alienation and resentment that allowed a group like ISIS to gain popularity in the first place.

As opposed to Iraq, Syria is still in the midst of a civil war. Such an environment is not conducive to efforts to heal social rifts engendered and reified throughout the

96 Most Yazidis reside in camps in around Dohuk and Zakho, while most Assyrians fled to Ainkawa, adjacent to Erbil. Author interviews in Dohuk, Ninewa plain and Ainkawa, April and July 2019. 97 Interviews with activists working on peacebuilding and social cohesion in Ninewa. Ainkawa, Baartela, Dohuk and Mosul, February, April and July 2019. 98 “Iraq: The Condemned: Women and Children Isolated, Trapped and Exploited in Iraq,” Amnesty International, April 17, 2018. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde14/8196/2018/en/; Iraq: “ISIS Child Suspects Arbitrarily Arrested, Tortured. Children Should Be Rehabilitated, Reintegrated,” Amnesty International, March 6, 2019. https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/06/iraq-isis-child-suspects- arbitrarily-arrested-tortured; Elizabeth Tsurkov and Basma Alloush, “Among Displaced Iraqis, One Group Is Worse Off Than the Rest,” Foreign Policy, April 29, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/29/among-displaced-iraqis-one-group-is-worse-off-than- the-rest/ 99 “Averting an ISIS Resurgence in Iraq and Syria,” International Crisis Group, October 11, 2019. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/207- averting-isis-resurgence-iraq-and-syria 100 Ibid. 36. 101 “Iraq. Events of 2018,” Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/world- report/2019/country-chapters/iraq Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. June 2020 18 Life after the Caliphate: Human Security Challenges in Syria and Iraq

war by multiple actors. ISIS was only one actor brutalizing Syria’s citizenry, with most of the killing of civilians carried out by the Assad regime.102 The stabilization of Assad’s rule will ensure that foreign-funded efforts to promote social cohesion will be forced to operate in an environment not conducive to open dialogue and reconciliation.

In Syria, immediate families of former and current ISIS families often face stigmatization: the community shuns them, they struggle to find employment and generally feel unwelcome.103 The SDF continues to hold thousands of such families in displacement camps, the largest of which is al-Hawl.104 While some wish for the speedy return of their relatives to their communities, others fear their release.105

ISIS Persistence

With the gradual loss of territorial control in Iraq and Syria, ISIS has reverted to a strategy of ‘ink-spot’ insurgency, operating almost exclusively in rural areas, and hiding in terrain that is particularly difficult to traverse or permanently control, such as the Homs and al-Anbar deserts, and the Hamrin and Makhoul mountains in Iraq.106 In Iraq, the organization also exploits security gaps in the areas disputed between the KRG and the Baghdad government, particularly in Diyala and Kirkuk.107 The organization’s capability to stage complex attacks, such as prison breaks and takeovers of urban areas, has been severely disrupted due to ongoing counter- terrorism efforts in both countries, with the support of the U.S. air force and special forces in Iraq and in SDF-held areas.108

However, the organization still has thousands of fighters and millions of dollars at its disposal, funds that its commanders continue to regenerate through extortion,

102 “Who is Killing Civilians in Syria?” The Syria Campaign, March 2019 http://whoiskillingciviliansinsyria.org/ 103 Elizabeth Tsurkov and Dareen Khalifa, “An Unnerving Fate for the Families of Syria’s Northeast,” Carnegie Endowment, January 31, 2020. https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/80950 104 Elizabeth Tsurkov, “Uncertainty, violence, and the fear of fostering extremism in Syria's al- Hol camp,” The New Humanitarian, August 27, 2019. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2019/08/27/violence-fear-extremism-Syria-al- hol-camp 105 Author interviews in Raqqa, Deir Ezzor and residents of Manbij, April 2019 – January 2020. 106 Joel Wing, “Can The Islamic State Make A Comeback In Iraq Part 3? Interview With Horizon’s Alex Mello,” Musings on Iraq, August 19, 2019. http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2019/08/can-islamic-state-make-comeback-in-iraq.html; Derek Henry Flood, “From Caliphate to Caves: The Islamic State’s Asymmetric War in Northern Iraq,” CTC Sentinel, Vol 11, Issue 8, September 2018. https://ctc.usma.edu/caliphate-caves-islamic-states-asymmetric-war-northern-iraq/; “Averting an ISIS Resurgence in Iraq and Syria,” International Crisis Group, October 11, 2019. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/207- averting-isis-resurgence-iraq-and-syria; Gregory Waters, ““A Force They Haven’t Seen Before”: Insurgent ISIS in Central Syria,” Middle East Institute, April 15, 2020. https://www.mei.edu/publications/force-they-havent-seen-insurgent-isis-central-syria 107 Joel Wing, “Islamic State’s New Game Plan In Iraq,” Musings on Iraq, September 9, 2019. http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2019/09/islamic-states-new-game-plan-in-iraq.html; Lead Inspector General, “Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report To The United States Congress,” June 2019, p. 44. https://oig.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/2019- 08/LIG-OCO-OIR-Q3-Jun2019.pdf 108 Joel Wing, “Can The Islamic State Make A Comeback In Iraq Part 3? Interview With Horizon’s Alex Mello.” Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. June 2020 19 Life after the Caliphate: Human Security Challenges in Syria and Iraq

kidnappings for ransom and other illicit activity.109 In both Iraq and Syria, ISIS seeks to intimidate Sunni Arab collaborators, such as village elders (mukhtār) in Iraq and Arab SDF personnel in Deir Ezzor and Hassakeh.110 Rooting out ISIS requires the collaboration of locals with authorities, but continued discrimination, mistrust of authority and intimidation by ISIS hinder information-sharing.111

ISIS currently appears to largely rely on long-time fighters, who remain with the group either due to ideological conviction or lack of better options, as well as their younger male relatives.112 Internment of families with perceived links to ISIS, however, may create a new pool of recruits for the group, and particularly in the al- Hawl camp holding families who stayed with ISIS until its territorial defeat.113

Despite challenges to law and order, sluggish reconstruction, discriminatory policies toward entire communities in which ISIS was able to recruit heavily, ISIS is struggling to reassert itself in both Syria and Iraq due to a host of factors. In Iraq, sectarian tensions have decreased, with a growing sense of national unity in standing together against ISIS and the political elites perceived as corrupt or ineffective. In both countries, many are unhappy about their living conditions and those ruling over them, but fear instability even more. Meanwhile, ISIS is largely seen as a destabilizing and vicious actor by civilians who lived under its rule.114 ISIS left indelible trauma in the minds of their former subjects, forced to witness public executions and endure humiliation at the hands of foreign fighters.115 This provides a medium-term window of opportunity for those governing post-ISIS areas to address grievances that could be exploited by ISIS in the future.

Chapter 4: Conclusion: Supporting Sustainable Stability

This very brief account of the main ‘day after’ human security challenges ahead for the communities and areas that used to be part of the ISIS’ Caliphate project should caution against any premature triumphalism. Likewise, they should serve to support the case as to why the international community should continue to prioritize

109 Twenty-fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, United Nations, July 15, 2019. https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/2019/570; Lead Inspector General, “Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report To The United States Congress.” 110 Fazel Hawramy, “Covering their tracks, ISIS assassins target local mukhtars,” Rudaw English, June 4, 2019. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/04062019; “Averting an ISIS Resurgence in Iraq and Syria,” International Crisis Group. 111 Joel Wing, “Can The Islamic State Make A Comeback In Iraq Part 1? Interview With Washington Institute for Near East Policy’s Michael Knights,” Musings on Iraq, July 11, 2019. http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2019/07/can-islamic-state-make-comeback-in-iraq.html; “Squaring the Circles in Syria’s North East,” International Crisis Group. 112 Author interviews with activists from Deir Ezzor, Şanlıurfa, January 2020; Crisis Group remarked “Among ISIS’s Iraqi guerrillas, some may be committed ideologues, but all are wanted men, whatever their motives. They have few obvious alternatives to militancy, aside from the gallows.” See in: “Averting an ISIS Resurgence in Iraq and Syria,” International Crisis Group. 113 Lead Inspector General, “Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report To The United States Congress;” Elizabeth Tsurkov and Dareen Khalifa, “An Unnerving Fate for the Families of Syria’s Northeast,” Carnegie Endowment, January 31, 2020. https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/80950 114 Author interviews in Ninewa, Raqqa and Deir Ezzor, and with residents of al-Bab, Manbij and Tabqa, April-November 2019. 115 While the focus of this work and interviews with Iraqi and Syrian former subjects of the Islamic State focused on current living conditions and challenges, many chose to speak about the horrors to which they were subjected by ISIS. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. June 2020 20 Life after the Caliphate: Human Security Challenges in Syria and Iraq

supporting reconstruction and reconciliation in ‘liberated’ areas of Iraq and Syria. This point is worth repeating as, with both countries gradually receiving less international media coverage, it is already anticipated that the total amount of international assistance is estimated to diminish.116 At the same time, calling for sustained and long-term international support should not be constructed as advocating for adopting the same strategy in the two countries: external contexts are different and this should inform distinct country- and area-based approaches. Most importantly, in the case of Syria, the country is still in the midst of an internal conflict and support to ISIS-liberated areas needs to be balanced with the need not to reward the Syrian regime for its war-crimes nor to assist it in carrying out what essentially is a politicized and divisive reconstruction project.117

The monograph highlighted that the need for reconstruction is overwhelming, including – but not limited – to: rebuilding civilian infrastructure, repairing damages in the housing and transportation sectors, addressing environmental contamination, restoring basic access to services like health, education, water and sanitation (particularly crucial for being able to dampen the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic), and investing in economic and business recovery and livelihood generation. But past experiences underline that none of these interventions are likely to generate the desired effect in the long term if they do not also focus on creating the right institutional capacity, including at the local level, to manage and preserve the re- established civilian infrastructure.118 This means that the issue of governance is centrally linked to that of reconstruction and that institution-building and anti- corruption should be seen as integral to the possibility of success of the physical reconstruction, as well as key steps towards addressing lack of trust in local and national political institutions.119

Crucially, neither physical reconstruction, nor institution- and capacity-building should be approached as technocratic or technical exercises. In the deeply political and contested post-Caliphate environment, existing sectarian or community tensions can render the reconstruction process more complex and challenging. But even more importantly, the way resources are distributed and allocated can also contribute to worsening existing tensions and, in some cases, even lead to conflict. In other words: none of these programs, interventions and choices should be seen as ‘neutral’ or technical – they are essentially political questions that should be decided on the basis of solid understanding of local power dynamics and community relations.

116 Pesha Magid, “As displacement runs to years, northern Iraq camps need an overhaul,” The New Humanitarian, February 25, 2019. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2019/02/25/displacement-runs-years- northern-iraq-camps-need-overhaul 117 Pax for Peace, “No Return to Homs,” February 21, 2017. https://www.paxforpeace.nl/publications/all-publications/no-return-to-homs; Benedetta Berti,”Is Reconstruction Syria’s Next Battleground?” Sada, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 5, 2017.https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/72998 118 Hideki Matsunaga, “The Reconstruction of Iraq after 2003 Learning from Its Successes and Failures,” World Bank Group, 2019. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/756971558074801741/pdf/The-Reconstruction- of-Iraq-after-2003-Learning-from-Its-Successes-and-Failures.pdf 119 World Bank, “Iraq Reconstruction and Investment. Damage and Need Assessment Report’, January 2018. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/600181520000498420/pdf/123631-REVISED- Iraq-Reconstruction-and-Investment-Part-2-Damage-and-Needs-Assessment-of-Affected- Governorates.pdf Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. June 2020 21 Life after the Caliphate: Human Security Challenges in Syria and Iraq

Another key insight emerging from the short portray of the main challenges of the ‘day after the Caliphate’ is that repairing and rebuilding the shattered social and intra-community fabric of the liberated areas is both an essential and daunting task without which no sustainable stabilization is possible. A first necessary step towards normalization and reconciliation is to invest in the provision of security and law enforcement. It is well-known that ensuring personal and community security as well as a basis level of safety is essential for reconstruction and development to occur. In the deeply balkanized and contested post-ISIS security landscape in both Iraq and Syria, stabilization also requires finding a long-term solution to the current state of proliferation of largely unaccountable and politicized militias. Non-statutory groups’ provision of security can be arbitrary, unpredictable and unaccountable, and, in numerous cases, it contributes to enhancing pre-existing dynamics of political disempowerment and marginalization. Given that these very same trends played a key role in fueling ISIS’ rise, the importance of finding a national framework through which to address the issue cannot be underestimated. In this sense, both prolonged lack of security and lawlessness as well as sectarian-based and unaccountable law enforcement can lead to alienation, frustration and insecurity – trends that can eventually be utilized by ISIS or groups with a similar agenda to make a come-back. This would de facto squander the military gains obtained against the Islamic State and result in (yet again) ‘winning the war, and losing the peace’. This is why the role of non-statutory (and sectarian) groups as security providers and power-brokers in former ISIS-held areas can become so damaging to the entire post-Caliphate reconstruction project.

A second, closely related issue that needs to be addressed to begin repairing social cohesion and restoring a measure of trust in political institutions, has to do with ensuring justice for the victims of ISIS, as well as accountability for instances of abuse of power exercised in the aftermath of the demise of the Caliphate. Although a legislative framework is in place in Iraq to ensure accountability and compensation for the victims of ISIS, the implementation of these measures is complex, as well as insufficient, slow and often arbitrary.120 Supporting efforts to provide a measure of transitional justice, from documenting, investigating and prosecuting crimes to acknowledging and compensating victims can serve to begin the painful healing process required for the people and communities traumatized by ISIS. These measures can also help channeling resentment and contributing to avoid summary justice, revenge attacks or reprisals. Indeed, access to justice needs to avoid and address ongoing processes of stigmatization and guilt-by-association of ISIS family members or relatives, especially women and children. Unaddressed, these dynamics of collective punishment risk prolonging displacement, creating vulnerable de facto second-class citizens, fueling intra-community resentment and violence; they can also be exploited by remnants of ISIS to recruit and mobilize support.

More broadly, the reconstruction process should be used as an opportunity to truly deal with the past legacy of exclusion, marginalization and disempowerment that led to the rise of ISIS in the first place. It should be used to forge a new political path, to tackle pre-existing legacies of inter-community divisions and to work toward a concept of stability that is sustainable and inclusive. Needless to say, these processes will need to be carried out and owned by local and national actors in both Iraq and, hopefully in a not too distant future, Syria. The role of the international community should be a supporting one: it should invest in aiding these long-term processes and

120 “We Hope, but We Are Hopeless: Civilians Perceptions of the Compensation Process in Iraq,” Center for Civilians in Conflict, 2017. https://civiliansinconflict.org/wp- content/uploads/2018/12/CIVIC_COMPENSATION_FinalWebDec20.pdf Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. June 2020 22 Life after the Caliphate: Human Security Challenges in Syria and Iraq

avoid the temptation to divert attention or focus solely on short-term goals and technical or tactical solutions.

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