SMA Reach-Back

SMA CENTCOM Reach Back Cell Final Quick Look Responses

SMA Reach-back

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 1 Contents Executive Summaries ...... 4 Question (QL1): What are the factors that could potentially cause behavior changes in Pakistan and how can the US and coalition countries influence those factors? ...... 4 Question (QL2): What are the strategic and operational implications of the Turkish Army’s recent intervention in northern Syria for the coalition campaign plan to defeat ISIL? What is the impact of this intervention on the viability of coalition vetted indigenous ground forces, Syrian Defense Forces and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (formerly ANF)? ...... 8 Question (QL3): What does primary source opinion research tell us about population support for ISIL in ISIL-held Iraq and globally outside the Combined Joint Operation Area (CJOA) (Syria and Iraq)? ...... 10 Question (QL4): To what extent do populations maintain positive views of ISIL or ISIL's ideology, particularly in European, N. African, and Arabian Peninsula countries most associated with foreign fighter flows into Syria and Iraq? What are the general perceptions associated with ISIL endorsed themes, ...... 14 Question (QL5): What are the predominant and secondary means by which both large (macro-globally outside the CJOA, such as European, North African and Arabian Peninsula) and more targeted (micro- such as ISIL-held Iraq) audiences receive ISIL propaganda? ...... 17 Complete Inputs ...... 19 Question (QL1): What are the factors that could potentially cause behavior changes in Pakistan and how can the US and coalition countries influence those factors? ...... 19 Question (QL2): What are the strategic and operational implications of the Turkish Army’s recent intervention in northern Syria for the coalition campaign plan to defeat ISIL? What is the impact of this intervention on the viability of coalition vetted indigenous ground forces, Syrian Defense Forces and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (formerly ANF)? ...... 39 Question (QL3): What does primary source opinion research data tell us about popular support for ISIL in ISIL-held Iraq and globally outside of the Combined Joint Operation Area (CJOA) (Syria and Iraq)? ...... 56 Question (QL4): To what extent do populations maintain positive views of ISIL or ISIL's ideology, particularly in European, N. African, and Arabian Peninsula countries most associated with foreign fighter flows into Syria and Iraq? What are the general perceptions associated with ISIL endorsed themes, ...... 86 Question (QL5): What are the predominant and secondary means by which both large (macro-globally outside the CJOA, such as European, North African and Arabian Peninsula) and more targeted (micro- such as ISIL-held Iraq) audiences receive ISIL propaganda? ...... 117 Author Biographies ...... 139

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 2 Dr. Hassan Abbas ...... 139 Major Shane Aguero ...... 140 Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois ...... 140 Mr. Adam Azoff ...... 141 Dr. Mia Bloom ...... 141 Prof. Hamit Bozarslan ...... 141 Dr. Soner Cagaptay ...... 142 Ms. Sarah Canna ...... 142 Mr. Bernard Carreau ...... 143 Mr. Mark Caudill ...... 143 Dr. Kim Cragin ...... 143 Dr. Munqith Dagher ...... 144 Dr. Cori E. Dauber ...... 145 Prof. Ruben Enikolopov ...... 147 Mr. Alexis Everington ...... 147 Prof. Christine Fair ...... 148 Dr. Sarah Feuer ...... 148 Dr. Rengin Bahar Firat ...... 149 Mr. Zana K. Gulmohamad ...... 149 Mr. Max Hoffman ...... 150 Dr. Noureddine Jebnoun ...... 150 Dr. Neil Johnson ...... 150 Dr. Karl Kaltenthaler ...... 151 Dr. Ramazan Kilinc ...... 151 Dr. Randolph Kluver ...... 152 Dr. Gina Ligon ...... 152 Dr. Thomas F. Lynch III ...... 153 Dr. Clark McCauley ...... 153 Dr. Ian McCulloh ...... 154 Mr. Paul Melly ...... 154 Dr. Chris Meserole ...... 154 Ms. Vera Mironova ...... 155 Dr. Sophia Moskalenko ...... 155 Dr. Assem Nasr ...... 155

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 3 Dr. Denise Natali ...... 156 Dr. Shuja Nawaz ...... 157 Dr. Jacob Olidort ...... 157 Mr. Raffaello Pantucci ...... 158 Mr. Marc Pierini ...... 158 Mara Revkin, JD ...... 159 Mr. Mark Robinson ...... 159 Prof. Yezid Sayigh ...... 160 Prof. Mark Tessler ...... 160 Ms. Steffany A. Trofino ...... 162 Dr. Shalini Venturelli ...... 163 Mr. Gary Warner ...... 163

Executive Summaries

Question (QL1): What are the factors that could potentially cause behavior changes in Pakistan and how can the US and coalition countries influence those factors?

Executive Summary Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois, NSI

The experts who contributed to this Quick Look agree on an essential point: Pakistan’s beliefs regarding the threat posed by India are so well-entrenched that they not only serve as the foundation for Pakistan’s foreign policy and security behavior, but represent a substantial barrier to changing it behavior. Christine Fair a Pakistan scholar from Georgetown University is specific as to the target of any influence efforts – difficult as they may be: “the object of influence is not “Pakistan;” rather the Pakistan army” and so security behavior change if possible requires change in the Army’s cost-benefit calculus.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 4 self-identity as an “oppositional state, created to counter India.”1 The nature of behavior change is relative and can occur in (at least) two directions: one aligning with the observer’s interests (for the sake of brevity referred to here as “positive change”), and one in conflict with those interests (“negative change”). Encouraging positive change in Pakistani security behavior was seen by each of the experts as an extremely difficult challenge, and one that would likely require dramatic change in Pakistan’s current internal and external security conditions. The experts also generally agreed that negative change in Pakistani behavior is easily generated with no need for dramatic changes in circumstance.

Negative Change: Easy to Do According to long-time Pakistan scholar and Atlantic Council Distinguished Fellow Shuja Nawaz, Pakistan’s current state is to “to view its regional interests and strategies at a variance from the views of the US and its coalition partners.” Moreover, Pakistan’s willingness to cooperate with US/Western regional objectives can deteriorate rapidly if the Pakistani security establishment believes those states have dismissed as invalid, or take actions that exacerbate their concerns. Specifically, actions that reinforce the perceived threat from India (e.g., Indian military build-up, interest in Afghanistan) or Pakistan’s inferior position relative to India (e.g., US strengthening military and economic ties with India; Indian economic growth) stimulate negative change. Importantly, because the starting point is already “negative” relative to US interests, these changes can take the form of incremental deterioration in relations, rather than obvious and dramatic shifts in behavior. Examples may include increased emphasis on components of Pakistan’s existing nuclear weapons program, amplified use of proxy forces already in Afghanistan, or improved economic relations with Russia.

Levers Encouraging Positive Change: A difficult Challenge While the experts agreed that Pakistan’s deep-rooted, security-related anxieties inhibit changes in behavior toward greater alignment with coalition objectives, they clearly diverge on what, if anything might be done to encourage positive change. Two schools of thought emerged: what we might (cheekily) refer to as a been there perspective; and a longer-term, cumulative influence view.

1 These generate what Christine Fair (Georgetown) sees as three enduring security goals: resisting Indian regional hegemony, developing “strategic depth” sufficient to deny India another base from which to threaten Pakistan; and gaining Indian-administered Kashmir.

2 Lynch cites the promoting Pakistan as an ally in the War on Terror, delivery of preferential military equipment and operational arrangements, and global debt relief among other efforts. 3 See additional options as outlined in the material submitted by Dr.’s Fair and Lynch below.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 5 Pakistan” and be the first step in inducing positive behavior change. Lynch believes these costs can be raised while at the same time US engagement continues with Pakistan – in a transactional way with Pakistan’s military-intelligence leadership and in a more open way through civilian engagement and connective projects with the people of Pakistan. However, Christine Fair points to US domestic challenges that mitigate against the success of even these efforts given what she argues is a lack of political will “in key parts of the US government which continue to nurse the fantasy that Pakistan may be more cooperative with the right mix of allurements.”

Cumulative Influence School of Thought Other contributors however believe are not ready to abandon the possibility of incentivizing positive change in Pakistan’s foreign policy and security behavior. They argue that there are still actions that the US and coalition countries could take to reduce Pakistani security concerns and encourage positive change. Admittedly, the suggested measures are not as direct as those suggested by a been there, done that approach and assume a significantly broader time horizon:

• Do not by-pass civilian authority. Equalize the balance of US exchanges with Pakistani military and civilian leaders rather than depending largely on military-to-military contact. Governing authority and legitimacy remain divided in Pakistan, and while dealing directly with the military may be expedient, analysis shows that by-passing civilian leadership and continuing to the treat the military as a political actor inhibits development of civilian governing legitimacy, strengthens the relative political weight of the military, and will in the longer term foster internal instability in Pakistan and stymie development of the civil security, political and economic institutions necessary for building a stronger, less threatened state.4 In this case the short-term quiet that the military can enforce, is off-set by increased instability down the road. • Reduce the threat. A direct means of reducing the threat perceptions that drive Pakistani actions unfavorable to coalition interests is to actually alter the threat environment. One option suggested for doing this is to use US and ally influence in India to encourage that country to redirect some of the forces aimed at Pakistan. A second option is to develop a long-term Pakistan strategy (“not see it as a spin-off or subset of our Afghanistan or India strategies”) was seen as a way to signal the importance to the US of an enduring the US-Pakistan relationship. • Remember that allies got game. Invite allies to use their own influence in Pakistan rather than taking the lead on pushing for change in Pakistan’s behavior. According to Shuja Nawaz, “…the Pakistanis listen on some issues more to the British and the Germans and Turks. The NATO office in Islamabad populated by the Turks has been one of the best-kept secrets in Pakistan!” Enlist Pakistan’s diplomatic assistance. Finally, Raffaello Pantucci of the Royal United Services Institute (UK) suggests enlisting Pakistan to serve as an important conduit in the dispute that could most rapidly ignite region-wide warfare: that between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Pakistan has sectarian-based ties with Saudi Arabia as well as significant commercial ties with Iran. Although as MAJ Shane Aguero points out increased Saudi-Iranian hostilities could put Pakistan in an awkward position, Pantucci believes that the US and allies could leverage these relations to open an additional line of communications between the rivals. Importantly, doing so would also important signal US recognition of Pakistan’s critical role in the region, which would enhance “Pakistani sense of prestige which may in turn produce benefits on broader US and allied concerns in the country.”

4 See Astorino-Courtois, Allison, Belinda Bragg, Danette Brickman, George Popp, Alex Stephenson and Richard Williams. PAKStaM: Drivers and Buffers of Instability in Pakistan, Strategic Multi-Layer Analysis for USSOCCENT, 2013. Full report available from Allison Astorino-Courtois at [email protected], or the SMA office.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 6

Contributors: Shuja Nawaz (Atlantic Council South Asia Center), Hassan Abbas (National Defense University), Thomas Lynch (Institute of National Strategic Studies - National Defense University), MAJ Shane Aguero (US Army), Shalini Venturelli (American University), Raffaello Pantucci (Royal United Services Institute - UK), Christine Fair (Georgetown University)

Editor: Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI)

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 7 Question (QL2): What are the strategic and operational implications of the Turkish Army’s recent intervention in northern Syria for the coalition campaign plan to defeat ISIL? What is the impact of this intervention on the viability of coalition vetted indigenous ground forces, Syrian Defense Forces and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (formerly ANF)?

Executive Summary – Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois, NSI There is general consensus among the expert contributors that the strategic and operational implications of the Turkish incursion are minimal: each sees the incursion as consistent with previous Turkish policy and long-standing interests. Turkey’s activities should be viewed through the lens of its core strategic interest in removing the threat of Kurdish separatism, which at present has been exacerbated by renewed Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) insurgency inside Turkey, its influence in northern Iraq, and the expansion of Kurdish territories in Syria more generally. As one commented, “Turkey will prioritize itself. This means preventing the strengthening of Kurds at all costs (including indirect support to those fighting them). It also means patrolling borders, harsh treatment of those who try to get through and/or corrupt practices such as involvement in smuggling.” One implication of note however is the increased risk of escalation between Turkey and Russia and Turkey and the US-backed Peoples Protection Units (YPG) that the incursion poses.

Establishing a Turkish zone of influence in northern Syria accommodates multiple Turkish interests simultaneously: from the point of view of the leadership, it should increase domestic support for President Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP); it should allow Turkey to gain control of costly and potentially disruptive refugee flows into Turkey and reduce the threat of ISIL or PKK activities in Turkey; it prohibits establishment of a unified Kurdish territory in northern Syria; and, it secures Turkey’s seat at the table in any Syrian settlement. In addition, a Turkish-controlled zone could establish a staging area from which Syrian Opposition forces could check PYD expansionism, secure the Aleppo corridor and clear ISIL from Turkey’s borders.

In terms of the impact of the intervention on the viability of coalition-vetted ground forces, Ramazan Kilinc (University of Nebraska Omaha) believes that while Turkey’s activities in Syria will not necessarily undercut Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, they will strengthen coalition vetted indigenous groups with the exception of the YPG.

Alexis Everington (MSI) argues that in order for the campaign against ISIL to succeed in Syria two conditions must be met: 1) that opposition forces in Syria believe that the effort to defeat ISIL goes hand-in-hand with defeat of the Assad regime; and 2) that there are moderate, “victorious” local Sunni opposition fighters that mainstream society can support. If not, the general population is likely to support more extreme alternatives (like Jabhat Fatah al-Sham) simply for lack of viable Sunni alternatives.5 Hamit Bozarslan (EHESS) suggests that unfortunately the ship may have sailed on this condition. He argues that the Free Syrian Army of today, that Turkey backs, has little resemblance to the Free Syrian Army of 2011: many of its components hate the US, are close to radical jihadis and most importantly, in his view are a very weak fighting force. He explains that they succeeded recently in Jarablus because ISIL did not fight (organizing a suicide-attack and destroying four Turkish tanks, simply showed that ISIL could retaliate).

5 It is for this reason that Everington believes providing “international support to Kurdish fighting forces will only push local Sunni Syrians more into the arms of extremist groups. Supporting Kurdish armed groups to the detriment of support to local Sunni ones is one of the most significant errors of the conflict in the past year.”

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 8

Finally, Bernard Carreau (NDU) argues that “the U.S. should welcome the Turkish incursion into northern Syria and could do so most effectively by reducing its support of the SDF and YPG.” Doing so he believes could make Turkey “the most valuable U.S. ally in Syria and Iraq.” Additionally, the experts suggest that it is important to remember that the Turkish leadership has seen and will continue to see the fight against ISIL through the lens of its impact on Kurdish separatism and terrorism inside Turkey including Kurdish consolidation of power along the Syrian border. The impact on Opposition forces depends on the degree to which they see that the Turkish moves, as well as the campaign against ISIL address their objective of toppling the Assad regime.

Contributors: Denise Natali (National Defense U.). Sonar Cagaptay (Washington Institute), with additional comments from Alexis Everington (Madison-Springfield, Inc.), Bernard Carreau (NDU), and Hamit Bozarslan (Ecole des hautes estudes en sciences sociales), MAJ Shane Aguero, DIA, Max Hoffman (Center for American Progress), Yezid Sayigh (Carnegie Middle East Center), Zana Gulmohamad (University of Sheffield, UK), Ramazan Kilinc (University of Nebraska Omaha)

Editor: Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI)

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 9 Question (QL3): What does primary source opinion research tell us about population support for ISIL in ISIL-held Iraq and globally outside the Combined Joint Operation Area (CJOA) (Syria and Iraq)?

Opinion polls conducted by independent outfits in 2015 and 2016 derive the same result: the vast majority of Muslims in the region—both inside and outside of the CJOA—do not support ISIL.6 In fact, ISIL enjoys very low support as a percent of the population across all countries covered by the surveys included in this compilation. Syria showed the highest level of support (20%) while most Muslim-majority countries fall in the single digits (Mauro, 2015). These low numbers recede further when “support” is defined as providing active or material support rather than sympathy for the cause (Burson-Marsteller, 2016).

Among those who do support ISIL, the reported reason has less to do with religion or ideology than with social, economic, and governance grievances. 7 However, experts interviewed identified two populations of concern: young men across the Arab world who they believe are showing growing complaisance toward ISIL and the radicalized population in Northern Africa. According to Mark Tessler, survey data suggests that North Africans who support ISIL are more severe in their adherence to ISIL’s extremist ideology and espousal of violence support for ISIL is very low. In the five countries surveyed by the Arab Barometer in spring 2016, it is less than 2% in Jordan, less than 3% in Jordan and Morocco, and slightly higher, in the 8-9% range in Algeria and the Palestinian territories. This is the case both for overall populations and for poorly educated younger men, the primary target of ISIL messaging. (see also, Marcellino et al).

It should be noted however, that being widely seen unfavorably does not mean that ISIL is therefore considered the sole enemy. For example, an IIACS poll conducted in Mosul in December 2015 indicated that 46% of the population believed that coalition airstrikes were the biggest threat to the security of their families compared to 38% who said that ISIL was the greatest threat to their family. The poll suggests that US government is just as unwelcome in CJOA as ISIL.

Support for ISIL Outside of CJOA Evaluating military-aged males (MAMs), the primary audience for ISIL messaging, Mark Tessler and Maj Shane Aguero found that, even among its core demographic, support for ISIL’s goals, its use of violence, and its perceived compatibility with Islam is still low across the countries surveyed8 with possible exception of those in Northern Africa (Burson-Marsteller, 2016; Marcellino et al). For example, Tessler finds that nearly twice as many poorly educated younger male Tunisian respondents (14.9%) believe that ISIL’s tactics are compatible with Islam compared to the general population (8.6%), which already had one of the higher overall levels of popular support for ISIL. However, it is important to note that approval for ISIL’s ideology is not the same thing as willingness to provide active or material support. But this belief could help explain why a large number of Tunisians have left the country to fight with ISIL in Syria and Iraq.

6 For example, see polls from the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS, 2015); the Pew Research Center, 2015; ORB International Syria poll, 2015; ORB International Iraq poll, 2015; Brookings, 2015; Mauro, 2015; Withnall, 2015. 7 See Burson-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey 2016; Afrobarometer, 2015-2016; ACRPS, 2015. 8 Countries surveyed: Syria, Nigeria, Tunisia, Senegal, Malaysia, and 15 others (Benmelech & Klor, 2016) and an additional Tunisia survey (Arab Barometer, ND).

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 10 A different kind of concern about MAMs is emerging in countries like Egypt where there is only a 2% approval rating of ISIL, but where 22% of youth interviewed are not concerned about the rise of ISIL. While this does not indicate support, it suggests that tolerance for ISIL in the burgeoning youth population in MENA could be significantly higher than the general population (Aguero). Additionally, a 2014 study of Twitter feeds in Egypt showed that while overall levels of support for ISIL in Egypt remain low, ISIL’s appeal has increased in Upper Egypt and the Sinai region and that those who support ISIL do so intensely (Cragin).

Drivers of sympathy or support for ISIL outside of CJOA support the conclusion that individuals support ISIL not because of religion or ideology but for a number of other reasons including cultural isolation, poverty, presence of Western forces in Iraq and Syria, and lack of education and economic opportunity (Aguero, Firat). However, radicalization (active support versus sympathy) is a highly individualized process and often involves some kind of psychological, emotional, spiritual, or social catalyst (Aguero).

Support for ISIL in CJOA Primary source research provided conflicting conclusions regarding the population’s support for ISIL in Syria and Iraq. It seems to suggest that Syrians and Iraqis, as a whole, are opposed to ISIL but that Sunnis in ISIL-held territory do not see a better alternative and are increasingly complaisant about ISIL’s governance.

Countrywide surveys in Iraq and Syria find that the population is largely opposed to ISIL (Everington, Firat). By one account, 93 percent of respondents from Iraq reported that they hold a negative view of ISIL. Only about 2 percent of the Iraqi respondents reported a positive view of ISIL (Firat). Meanwhile 76 percent of Syria respondents reported that ISIL had a negative influence on matters in Syria (Firat).

However, when you look at ISIL-controlled territories—particularly the Iraqi cities of Mosul and Raqqah where polling has been conducted—surveys find growing tolerance for ISIL (Dagher). This is due to a number of reasons:

• Populations under ISIL control have no viable alternative to turn to and hold a strong aversion to the Iraqi state (Dagher). • Residents are opposed to non-Sunni Arab forces retaking their cities including the Iraqi army, Coalition forces, and Kurdish forces—not to mention Syrian, Iranian, or Russian forces (Dagher, Firat). • Anti-Shia and anti-Western sentiment is increasingly influencing public opinion in ISIL- controlled regions (Abbas). • In areas where ISIL has infrastructure and is able to provide essential services (like Raqqah), covert resistance is significantly lower than in areas like Deir Ezzor (Revkin). • In Syria, local support for ISIL is higher in areas where ISIL has made efforts to promote Syrian recruits within its leadership structure (Revkin).

This does not mean the residents of ISIL-controlled territory want ISIL to govern indefinitely, but they do not want to return to the pre-ISIL status quo. Similar to areas outside of CJOA, support for ISIL in Syria and Iraq is largely driven by social, economic, and governmental grievances, not by religion or ideology (Dagher, Firat).

Public Opinion in the Face of the Battle for Mosul

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 11 As the Coalition prepares for the Battle for Mosul, three newly submitted updates agree on one thing: the government that replaces ISIL in Mosul and other liberated areas must be as good or better than what ISIL provided. Let us start with an analysis of why so many Sunni Iraqis welcomed ISIL in the first place: 9 they provided security and justice (Enikolopov, Mironova, & Hussein). What is interesting is that these are two of the elements that seem to be aiding the group’s decline in ISIL- held territory, according to a series of interview conducted by Zana Gulmohamad with Arab Sunni and Shia tribal leaders. In Mosul and other areas where ISIL is being challenged, ISIL seems to be giving security and combatant roles to foreign fighters, which is increasing tensions with local populations. Furthermore, ISIL is increasingly harsh to defectors and those who express dissent, yet there is evidence that revolt movement and local counter-ISIL networks are strengthening in Mosul and other areas (Gulmohamad). Mirroring these findings, a study conducted by the Global Media Research Lab at Texas A&M found that ISIL’s support within the Arabic Twittersphere continues to erode and its ability to control the narrative appear significantly weakened (Hinck, Naguib, and Kluver). Discourse is changing from the efficacy of the Caliphate to setbacks in Iraq and Syria. What these three studies suggest is that support for ISIL is declining among Sunni populations in ISIL-held Iraq. But the authors cautioned that the government that replaces ISIL must do at least as well as ISIL in providing justice, security, economic stability, and essential services while providing reasonably dealing with competing sectarian and political agendas.

Contributors: Hassan Abbas (NDU), Shane Aguero (US Army), Kim Cragin (NDU), Munqith Dagher (IACSS), Ruben Enikolopov (Barcelona Institute of Political Economy and Governance), Alexis Everington (MSI), Rengin Bahar Firat (GSU), Zana Gulmohamad (University of Sheffield), Robert Hinck (TAMU), Mohammed Hussein (Iraq Oil Report), Amaney Jamal (Arab Barometer), Karl Kaltenthaler (University of Akron and Case Western Reserve University), Randolph Kluver (TAMU), Clark McCauley (Bryn Mawr College), Ian McCulloh (JHU/APL), Vera Mironova, (Harvard Kennedy School), Sophia Moskalenko (Bryn Mawr College), Jala Naguib (TAMU), Mara Revkin (Yale), Michael Robbins (Arab Barometer), Mark Tessler (Arab Barometer), Steffany Trofino (US Army)

Editor: Sarah Canna (NSI)

Works Cited

ACRPS. 2015. “The 2015 Arab Opinion Index: Results in Brief.” Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. Afrobarometer Round 6, 2015-2016. Data retrieved from: http://www.afrobarometer.org/data Arab Barometer. (not dated). Retrieved from: http://www.arabbarometer.org/ ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller. (2016). Inside the Hearts and Minds of Arab Youth: 8th Annual ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey [survey]. Retrieved from http://www.arabyouthsurvey.com/en/about Benmelech, Efraim, and Esteban F Klor. 2016. “What Explains the Flow of Foreign Fighters to ISIS?” NBER Working Paper 22190. Brookings Institution. (January 2015). American Public Attitudes Toward ISIS and Syria. Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/isis_report.pdf Galka, M. (December 1, 2015). Support for ISIS in the Muslim World—Perceptions vs Reality. Retrieved from http://metrocosm.com/support-isis-muslim-world-perceptions-vs-reality

9 Based on interviews with 200 Sunni Muslims in Qara Tapah and Jalawla—two sub-districts in the north Diyala governorate, which partially fell under ISIL control in 2014 (Enikolopov, Mironova, & Hussein).

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 12 IIACSS. (2015). Poll in Mosul. Mauro, R. (June 28, 2015). ISIS Has Up To 42 Million Supporters in the Arab World. [article] Retrieved from http://www.clarionproject.org/analysis/isis-has-least-42-million-supporters-arab- world# ORB International – Iraq Public Opinion. http://www.orb-international.com/perch/iraqdata.pdf ORB International – Syria Public Opinion. http://www.orb- international.com/perch/resources/syriadata.pdf Pew Global Attitudes Spring 2014. Data downloaded from http://www.pewglobal.org/category/datasets Pew Research Center. 2015. “In nations with significant Muslim populations, much disdainment for ISIS.” Pew Research Center. Rasmussen, N. (February 11, 2015). Hearing before the House Committee on Homeland Security “Countering Violent Islamist Extremism: The Urgent Threat of Foreign Fighters and Homegrown Terror” [testimony]. Washington D.C: US House of Representatives. Vindino, L. and Hughes, S. (December 2015). ISIS in America, From Retweets to Raqqa. Washington D.C.: George Washington University. William M. Marcellino, Kim Cragin, Joshua Mendelsohn, Andrew Michael Cady, Madeline Magnuson, and Kathleen Reedy, “Measuring the Popular Resonance of Daesh’s Propaganda,” Strategic Forum, forthcoming. Withnall, A. (December 8, 2015). One chart that shows what people in the Muslim world really think about Isis. [article]. Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/donald-trump-muslims-isis-one-chart- shows-what-people-really-think-about-a6765241.html

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 13 Question (QL4): To what extent do populations maintain positive views of ISIL or ISIL's ideology, particularly in European, N. African, and Arabian Peninsula countries most associated with foreign fighter flows into Syria and Iraq? What are the general perceptions associated with ISIL endorsed themes, to include: 1) desire for re-establishing the Caliphate; 2) imposition of Shariah law; 3) belief that the Ummah/Islam is under attack from the West; 4) low tolerance for non-Sunni Muslim ethno-religious groups; and 5) negative disposition towards gender equality?

Executive Summary There is ample evidence that by and large Muslim populations in the MENA region and Europe do not view ISIL favorably (see QL 3). However, there are many similarities and a few significant differences among these populations regarding the credibility and salience of many of the messaging themes that ISIL espouses. Arabian Peninsula In Syria and Iraq, one of the largest groups of foreign fighters come from Saudi Arabia, raising questions about the overall level of support for ISIL among the general population. Generally, Sunnis in the Arabian Peninsula support Salafist and Islamist political agendas but reject ISIL’s claims to political and religious legitimacy (Lynch; Aguero). According to Tom Lynch, Distinguished Research Fellow at National Defense University, political Islam, which seeks to introduce conservative Islamic practices into the political sphere, is far more popular than the implementation of ultra-conservative Salafism as espoused by ISIL.

Most Sunni Muslims in the Arabian Peninsula do not believe a caliphate is necessary to implement conservative Muslim political and social thought (Aguero). However, they share some of the same grievances about government that gave rise to ISIL in Iraq and Syria. Noureddine Jebnoun, professor of contemporary Arab studies at Georgetown University, argues that the Arab Spring showed that populations in the Arab world are rejecting what they see as a dysfunctional system of governance across the region. There is a demand for greater participatory governance, social justice, and better economic opportunities. At the same time, however, they are supportive of the implementation of Sharia law, including low tolerance for gender equality and non-believers (Jebnoun; Aguero). But it is important to keep in mind, particular in Muslim-majority countries, that Sharia is considered to be a way of life, not merely a legal code (Aguero). According to a 2014 Pew poll,10 making Sharia the law of the land has 74 percent support in the MENA region.

Populations in the Arabian Peninsula strongly oppose westernization and modernization, seeing it as an attack on Sunni Muslim unity and heritage. Lynch argues that these populations can be animated towards short-term support for violent causes when they perceive non-Sunnis or non- Muslims to be attacking fellow Sunni Muslims. This helps explain why groups like ISIL can gain meaningful, short-term support in moments of perceived danger for Sunni Muslims. For example, 83% of Saudis consider Western cultural invasion to be a very important or important problem

10 Lugo, L. (April 30, 2013). The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society. [survey]. Washington, D.C.: Pew Research. Retrieved from http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion- politics-society-overview/

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 14 (Moaddel, 2013; Aguero). Furthermore, 84% of Saudis also ascribe to the belief that the Ummah and/or Islam is under attack by the West.

In the past, Salafists from the Arabian Peninsula have provided material and financial support to Salafist jihadi groups opposing Bashar al Assad in Syria, according to Lynch. This anti-Assad support has also aided the rise of ISIL both directly and indirectly. Most Salafist support for ISIL has withered but some support still finds its way to ISIL.

Mia Bloom, an expert on the nexus between women and terror, noted that ISIL is careful to shape its messaging in ways that resonate best with various female population groups. English messaging focuses on giving women in the West a frontline role in the combat, such as the Al-Khansaa Brigade. Meanwhile, Arabic messaging offers women more socially acceptable roles as wives and mothers. This is particularly the case in messaging to women in Tunisia where women are seeking romance and adventure (at a time when marriages are delayed due to poor economic conditions). In Saudi Arabia, the messaging is more about empowering women by showing women in ISIL-controlled territories (in full niqab) driving cars.

Dr. Lynch concludes that the bottom line is that the depth and durability of conservative Islam in the Arabian Peninsula means that even if ISIL is degraded or defeated, the preconditions for another Salafi jihadist group to rise in its place will remain present for the foreseeable future. Europe Muslim populations in Europe overwhelmingly reject ISL’s ideology and violent tactics (see Quick Look 3). However, a small percentage of Muslims—particularly youths—actively or passively support ISIL’s ideology and political objectives according to Marc Pierini, a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe and former career EU diplomat.

What we know about support for ISIL in Europe is that most supporters are relatively young (between 18-30 years of age), have experienced an identity crisis, are disconnected from their communities, and are marginalized within their own European societies, which have failed to integrate their cultural preferences into the European social fabric, Jebnoun repots. In Britain, sympathizers tend to be highly educated while sympathizers in France and Belgium are often school dropouts, delinquents, have family problems, and face social exclusion and isolation, according to Pierini. What is also common among supporters of ISIL in Europe is that many of them have a superficial understanding of Islam, and are perceived by ISIL recruiters to be easy to co-opt and indoctrinate according to both Jebnoun and Pierini.

Many Muslim families in Europe still hold traditional values even decades after living in Western Europe—according to Pierini and Mark Caudill of the USMC Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning—including negative disposition towards gender equality and belief that Muslims are under attack from the West. What is clear, though, is that there is a generational divide where youth have a greater sense of frustration with their place in society compared to their parents. This is due, in part, to record high youth unemployment in Europe.

Among disaffected youth in Europe, the Caliphate has appeal, according to Pierini and Raffaello Pantucci of RUSI. The Caliphate provides disaffected youth with a purpose, a sense of belonging, and an outlet for their frustrations, outlined Pierini. Recruitment of young Europeans by jihadist movements abroad is not new (e.g., Afghanistan), but the scale is unprecedented due in large part to ISIL’s massive and modern propaganda campaign layered upon economic and social frustrations of Europe’s Muslim youth.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 15

The appeal has waned in some degree as ISIL loses territory, Pantucci wrote. Its visible loss has led to a gradual loss of appeal and is one of the reasons for the reduction of foreign fighters from Europe.

What is dangerous is that ISIL is intentionally seeking to exacerbate tensions between mainstream and Muslim communities in Europe, Jebnoun and Pierini agree. They do this through recruitment of European youths as foreign fighters, facilitate attacks that exacerbate anti-Muslim sentiment, and actively nurture sectarian divides between these two communities. This inculcates a growing sense of uncertainty and powerlessness in the face of repeated ISIL-supported attacks and is shifting a segment of society towards extreme right/xenophobic political parties and movements. The migration/refugee crisis out of Syria exacerbates these tensions, Pierini argues. Africa Like most of the Muslim world, support for ISIL in Northern Africa is quite low (Feuer). In 2014, an International Republican Institute poll found that only one percent of respondents believe that Tunisians should be joining Daesh. However, aspects of ISIL’s ideology finds broader support in Tunisia, especially when expressed in generic terms, including the incorporation of Sharia law, a nostalgic approval of the idea of a Caliphate—even though there is little support for the erosion of the nation state, and a belief that Islam is under attack from the West.

Similarly, there is very little support for ISIL in the Sahel, but other Islamist extremist groups do operate in the area, according to Paul Melly, a Sahel expert at Chatham House. In general, popular support for extremists groups in the region is strongly driven by local conditions and politics rather than ideology. Another characteristic of extremist groups in the Sahel is their more extensive ties and crossover between extremist groups and criminal organizations. The largest transnational group in Mali is al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), but it is largely considered a foreign organization that does not match well with the local population’s Sufism. Other groups operating in the area, who draw support based on ethnic or familial ties, is Haut conseil pour l'unité de l'Azawad (HCUA) and Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO). Aside from familial or ethnic ties, other reasons that individuals join these groups include poor economic opportunities, anti-state ideas, and the breakdown of traditional society.

Contributors: Hassan Abbas (NDU), Shane Aguero, (US Army), Mia Bloom (GSU), Mark Caudill (USMC Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning), Alexis Everington (MSI), Sarah Feuer (Washington Institute for Near East Policy), Noureddine Jebnoun (Georgetown University), Tom Lynch (NDU), Paul Melly (Chatham House), Raffaello Pantucci (RUSI), Marc Pierini (Carnegie Europe)

Editor: Sarah Canna (NSI)

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 16 Question (QL5): What are the predominant and secondary means by which both large (macro-globally outside the CJOA, such as European, North African and Arabian Peninsula) and more targeted (micro- such as ISIL-held Iraq) audiences receive ISIL propaganda?

Executive Summary – Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois, NSI

The contributors to this Quick Look demonstrate clearly the breadth and diversity of the ISIL media and communication juggernaut identifying a wide variety of targeted audiences, media forms and distribution mediums for both local and global audiences. These are summarized in the graphic on page 3 below.

Smartphones are game-changers; the predominant distribution medium globally and locally There was general acknowledgement among the experts that wide-spread, public access to smartphones has been both a game-changer for both the distribution and production of propaganda materials. Smart devices with web access were also cited by many as the predominant medium by which both global and local audiences receive ISIL propaganda and the catalyst for the fading of former distinctions between means used to communicate with “macro” versus “micro” audiences. Even ISIL messages primarily intended for local audiences (e.g., weekly newsletters) do not stay local; they are digitized and may be found on the internet and thus are available globally.

Chris Meserole a fellow at the Brookings Institution argues that ISIL communicators have benefitted from two particular capabilities that smart devices put in the hands of users: 1) easy access to impactful video and other visual content has enabled ISIL to transmit highly emotive and pertinent content in near real-time; and 2) users’ ability to produce and distribute their own quality images has altered the processes of recruitment and identity formation by making them more interactive: group members who formerly would have been information consumers only, now can readily add their voices to the group narrative by serving as information producers as well.11

Cyber platforms are critical but consider Twitter and YouTube as starting points Although Twitter, and YouTube are still the most commonly used platforms, and especially Twitter can be used for specifically-targeted, micro audiences, Gina Ligon who leads a research team at the University of Nebraska Omaha cautions that ISIL’s cyber footprint extends well beyond these “conventional” platforms which should be considered “mere starting points for its multi-faceted, complex cyber profile.” (See the Ligon et al below for ranks of the top cyber domains ISIL used between August 2015 and August 2016.) Assem Nasr (Indiana-Purdue University) questions the effectiveness of cyber platforms in delivering propaganda in Syria and Iraq however. Based on fieldwork in Lebanon, Nasr finds that people have significant reservations about the credibility of any media messaging, and even about the personal security risks of using social media themselves. He argues that the communication challenges in the Arab world push people to tend to rely on networks of family, friends, neighbors, “trusted acquaintances in high places (army officers, deputies... etc.)” and word-of-mouth communication for information about local issues. These social networks are

11 It is important to note that although there is clearly increased local agency regarding production of ISIL communications, the teams from the University of Nebraska (Ligon et al), UNC-Chapel Hill (Dauber and Robinson) as well as Adam Azoff (Tesla Government) and Jacob Olidort (Washington Institute) find substantial evidence of centralized ISIL strategic control of message content. However, once content is approved, a good argument can be made that dissemination of ISIL messages and even video production is localized and decentralized. The result is a complex and “robust cyber presence.”

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 17 extremely important communication channels that may be augmented but are not superseded by social media platforms such as Twitter.

Static or moving images – key to evoking emotion -- characterize all forms of ISIL propaganda The most distinctive characteristic of ISIL propaganda is its high quality visual content which are easier to distribute than large texts. It is also easier to evoke emotion with an image than with text. Arguably, the most prolific and widely-distributed propaganda are ISIL’s colorful print and digital magazines (e.g., Dabiq, Rumiyah in English, Constantinople in Turkish Fatihin in Malay, etc.) It is well known that ISIL videos are extremely pervasive and an important form of ISIL messaging. However, multiple experts noted that the sophistication and production value of today’s videos are a far cry from the 2014-era recordings of beheadings that horrified the world.

Not everything is digitized: solely local propaganda forms and mediums Audiences both in and outside ISIL controlled areas and those outside the region receive ISIL propaganda products. However, there are some mediums and forms of propaganda which can only be delivered in areas in which ISIL maintains strict control of information and in which it can operate more overtly. For example, Zana Gulmohamad (Sheffield U., UK) and other experts note that ISIL has printed ISIL education materials and changed school curricula in its areas, it holds competitions and events to recruit young people, and polices strict adherence to shar’ia law (hisba). It is in this context that Alexis Everington (Madison-Springfield) argues, one of the most impactful forms of ISIL messaging remains its visible actions (of course, the perceived actions of Iraqi government forces, Assad forces, etc. and the US/West are likely equally, if indirectly, impactful). Second in importance are “media engagement centers such as screens depicting ISIL videos as well as mobile media trucks.” Outside ISIL controlled areas, NDU Professor of International Security Studies Hassan Abbas, cites “the word of mouth” including “gossip in traditional tea/food places” as still the primary means by which local audiences receive ISIL propaganda, and many experts agree that the content is “largely influenced by religious leadership.”

What happens next? Finally, Adam Azoff of Tesla Government offers a caution regarding what happens when ISIL-trained, foreign media operators are pushed out of all ISIL-held areas: as these fighters relocate we should be prepared for the possibility that they would “continue their ‘cyber jihad’ abroad and develop underground media cells to continue messaging their propaganda. Though it will be more difficult to send out as large a volume of high-quality releases, it is not likely that ISIL will return to the amateurish and locally-focused media operations of 2011.”

Contributors: Gina Scott Ligon, Doug Derrick, Sam Church and Michael Logan (University of Nebraska Omaha), Jacob Olidort (The Washington Institute), Hassan Abbas (National Defense University), Alexis Everington (Madison-Springfield, Inc.), Cori E. Dauber and Mark D. Robinson (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), Neil Johnson (University of Miami), Chris Meserole (Brookings Institution), David B. Des Roches (NDU), Adam Azoff (Tesla Government), Zana Gulmohamad (Sheffield University, UK) Gary Warner (University of Alabama at Birmingham), Assem Nasr ( Indiana U. Purdue U., Fort Wayne)

Editor: Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI)

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 18 Complete Inputs

Question (QL1): What are the factors that could potentially cause behavior changes in Pakistan and how can the US and coalition countries influence those factors?

Executive Summary Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois, NSI

The essential components of Pakistan’s security beliefs are first that India is an existential threat to the state; and second that Pakistan is at a tremendous military and economic disadvantage to its stronger neighbor. Tom Lynch of the National Defense University adds a third: Pakistan’s national self-identity as an “oppositional state, created to counter India.”12 The nature of behavior change is relative and can occur in (at least) two directions: one aligning with the observer’s interests (for the sake of brevity referred to here as “positive change”), and one in conflict with those interests (“negative change”). Encouraging positive change in Pakistani security behavior was seen by each of the experts as an extremely difficult challenge, and one that would likely require dramatic change in Pakistan’s current internal and external security conditions. The experts also generally agreed that negative change in Pakistani behavior is easily generated with no need for dramatic changes in circumstance.

12 These generate what Christine Fair (Georgetown) sees as three enduring security goals: resisting Indian regional hegemony, developing “strategic depth” sufficient to deny India another base from which to threaten Pakistan; and gaining Indian-administered Kashmir.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 19 Levers Encouraging Positive Change: A difficult Challenge While the experts agreed that Pakistan’s deep-rooted, security-related anxieties inhibit changes in behavior toward greater alignment with coalition objectives, they clearly diverge on what, if anything might be done to encourage positive change. Two schools of thought emerged: what we might (cheekily) refer to as a been there perspective; and a longer-term, cumulative influence view.

“Been there” School of Thought Tom Lynch (NDU) argues that the security perceptions of Pakistan’s critical military-intelligence leaders have been robustly resistant to both pol-mil and economic incentives for change13 as well as to more punitive measures (e.g., sanctions, embargos, international isolation) taken to influence Pakistan’s security choices over the course of six decades. Neither approach fundamentally altered security perceptions. Worse yet, punitive efforts not only failed to elicit positive change in Pakistan’s security framework but ended up reducing US influence by motivating Pakistan to strengthen relations with China, North Korea and Iran. As a consequence of past failure of both carrot and stick approaches, both Lynch and Christine Fair (Georgetown) argue that motivating change in Pakistani security behavior requires “a coercive campaign” to up the costs to Pakistan of its proxy militant strategy (e.g., in Afghanistan by striking proxy group leaders; targeted cross-border operations)14. Moreover, Lynch feels that positive behavior change ultimately requires a new leadership. Raising the costs would set “the conditions for the rise of a fundamentally new national leadership in Pakistan” and be the first step in inducing positive behavior change. Lynch believes these costs can be raised while at the same time US engagement continues with Pakistan – in a transactional way with Pakistan’s military-intelligence leadership and in a more open way through civilian engagement and connective projects with the people of Pakistan. However, Christine Fair points to US domestic challenges that mitigate against the success of even these efforts given what she argues is a lack of political will “in key parts of the US government which continue to nurse the fantasy that Pakistan may be more cooperative with the right mix of allurements.”

13 Lynch cites the promoting Pakistan as an ally in the War on Terror, delivery of preferential military equipment and operational arrangements, and global debt relief among other efforts. 14 See additional options as outlined in the material submitted by Dr.’s Fair and Lynch below. 15 See Astorino-Courtois, Allison, Belinda Bragg, Danette Brickman, George Popp, Alex Stephenson and Richard Williams. PAKStaM: Drivers and Buffers of Instability in Pakistan, Strategic Multi-Layer Analysis for USSOCCENT, 2013. Full report available from Allison Astorino-Courtois at [email protected], or the SMA office.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 20 • Reduce the threat. A direct means of reducing the threat perceptions that drive Pakistani actions unfavorable to coalition interests is to actually alter the threat environment. One option suggested for doing this is to use US and ally influence in India to encourage that country to redirect some of the forces aimed at Pakistan. A second option is to develop a long-term Pakistan strategy (“not see it as a spin-off or subset of our Afghanistan or India strategies”) was seen as a way to signal the importance to the US of an enduring the US-Pakistan relationship. • Remember that allies got game. Invite allies to use their own influence in Pakistan rather than taking the lead on pushing for change in Pakistan’s behavior. According to Shuja Nawaz, “…the Pakistanis listen on some issues more to the British and the Germans and Turks. The NATO office in Islamabad populated by the Turks has been one of the best-kept secrets in Pakistan!” Enlist Pakistan’s diplomatic assistance. Finally, Raffaello Pantucci of the Royal United Services Institute (UK) suggests enlisting Pakistan to serve as an important conduit in the dispute that could most rapidly ignite region-wide warfare: that between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Pakistan has sectarian-based ties with Saudi Arabia as well as significant commercial ties with Iran. Although as MAJ Shane Aguero points out increased Saudi-Iranian hostilities could put Pakistan in an awkward position, Pantucci believes that the US and allies could leverage these relations to open an additional line of communications between the rivals. Importantly, doing so would also important signal US recognition of Pakistan’s critical role in the region, which would enhance “Pakistani sense of prestige which may in turn produce benefits on broader US and allied concerns in the country.”

Editor: Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI)

SME Input

Factors that could Cause Behavior Changes in Pakistan Shuja Nawaz Distinguished Fellow, South Asia Center, Atlantic Council

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 21 Pakistan remains a society and polity in flux, with a dysfunctional government and sharp divisions between a weak and disorganized civilian administration and a “Pakistan continues to powerful, disciplined, and well organized military, led primarily by view its regional the Pakistan army and its chief. In the short run, tensions will arise in interests and strategies the transition from the current army chief General Raheel Sharif to his successor, especially given reports of tensions between the Prime at a variance from the Minister Nawaz Sharif and the military on the support for Jihadi views of the United groups operating against both Afghanistan and India. This uneasy States and its coalition relationship will likely persist into the spring and summer of 2017 partners…” once a new chief is appointed at the end of November and then takes his time to assert his position within the army in the first place and then relative to the civil administration.

In the longer run, the impending elections of 2018 will occupy the minds of the political parties, and increasing pressure from India and Afghanistan on Pakistan will continue to heighten the paranoia of the Pakistani authorities “The United States has about Indian designs to isolate Pakistan and encircle it. There failed to develop a are also persistent fears that the United States is decidedly tilting steady relationship with towards India as a potential economic and military partner in the region. Recall that Pakistani historian Ayesha Jalal once used Pakistan despite its the term “Paranoidistan” to describe this country.16 Both civil and potential leverage of military leadership circles often operate on the basis of direct economic and unverified information about Indian designs and US military assistance …” intentions. Pakistan fears that a growing Indian economy and military presence in the region will be used to coerce a smaller Pakistan into submission. The National Intelligence Council’s 2030 Scenario pointed to an ascendant Indian economy: “India will most likely continue to consolidate its power advantage relative to Pakistan. India's economy is already nearly eight times as large as Pakistan's; by 2030 that ratio could easily be more than 16-to- 1," according to the NIC report.17 Despite its efforts to rely on support from China, Pakistan fears a diminution of its status in the region and will continue to use proxies against neighbors in the first instance while continuing to develop short-range nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery mechanisms to stave off any military or insurgent operations against it from India or its allies.

The United States has failed to develop a steady relationship with Pakistan despite its potential leverage of direct economic and military assistance, including a large quantum of training for the best and brightest military officers from Pakistan, and assistance from US-dominated International Financial Institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank. Pakistan continues to view its regional interests and strategies at a variance from the views of the United States and its coalition partners, while ostensibly working with the coalition forces in return for coalition support funding (or its successor arrangement).

16 Shuja Nawaz “Feeding Pakistan’s Paranoia”, The New York Times, May 9, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/04/12/when-pakistan-says-no-to-the-cia/feeding- pakistans-paranoia and Ayesha Jalal “Global Profiling of Pakistan: Problems and Prospect”, http://www.induspk.org/107-the-nation/231-the-nation-article-2 17 “India to become superpower by 2030: US Intelligence”, News18.com http://www.news18.com/news/india/india-to-become-economic-superpower-by-2030-us-intelligence- 526055.html

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 22 The critical factors that will affect Pakistan’s view of India and the United States in the next few years are:

• The below par state of the economy in Pakistan. Increased pressures from the return of migrant workers from the Middle East, and demographic pressures internally, leading to a sharp increase in the youth bulge and a rapid urbanization will add to Pakistan’s difficulties at achieving stability at home. • Lack of institution building and formal decision making systems in managing the economy. For example, the government was unprepared for the roughly $7-4 billion “savings” windfall per annum that resulted from the drop in the price of imported energy in 2015 and beyond and frittered it away on inconsequential projects and pork barrel politics. A senior minister, who is a member of the prime minister’s inner circle, told me the savings had “gone down the hole.” • Both Pakistan and the United States will have to do more with less in the next decade or so. • A persistent dynastic and corrupt political system under which the major political parties are led by autocrats or run as family businesses. Opposing them, increasingly through extra-legal and subterranean operations are a growing number of extremist militant groups that use Islam as a rallying cry against the State and neighbors, including India and Afghanistan. • A powerful military establishment that has created and continues to foster a “culture of entitlement” for its senior ranks and actively protects its turf even against the constitutionally superior civilian government. • The Pakistan military remains organizationally stuck in a post-World War II mind set, with bloated administrative systems, relying on outmoded budgetary and management systems. It could achieve much-needed economies in its operations autonomously and with greater oversight and inquiry from the elected representatives in parliament. There is very little active oversight and accountability of military finances and management systems by the civilian rulers of Pakistan. • The Pakistani military, particularly the army and air force, have been transformed in recent years into a force that is focused on fighting militancy and insurgency. Younger officers routinely are sent from the military academy to the border region. They are all battle inoculated and tend to view unfavorably the corruption of their civilian masters as well as the wealth acquired by senior military officers through acquisition of real estate through the proliferation of the defence housing schemes that provide windfall profits with relatively small investments. • The multiple ethnic and sectarian wars within Pakistan will persist for some time to come and drain the ability of the state and the military to de-militarize and de-radicalize Pakistani society. Political parties are beholden to jihadi groups with whom they have electoral alliances. Others use militant wings of their parties to amass wealth through kidnappings, extortion, and coercion. • Persistent suspicions, particularly in the senior leadership of the army, that the United States aims to defang Pakistan’s nuclear capacity and will countenance or even support Indian moves against Pakistan as a regional surrogate for the United States in that regard. • Lack of a center of gravity in decision making inside Pakistan, with the civil and the military more often than not at loggerheads, and the United States largely depending on its mil-to-mil contacts to affect decisions inside Pakistan.

What can the United States do? The United States can work on multiple fronts to build Pakistani confidence in this relationship, while shifting the onus on to the Pakistanis to craft mechanisms for implementing, benchmarking, and

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 23 reviewing projects and cooperative operations in both the civil and military sectors. Creating Pakistani ownership of these operations is critical to instilling confidence and fostering trust. This approach also makes it easier for the United States to turn off the aid spigot if Pakistan fails to meet its own self-imposed targets without the US being seen as arbitrary or antagonistic.

Pakistan needs to understand and verify that the United States does not wish to take away its nuclear capabilities but wishes to help safeguard its assets. Moreover, The United States must work to help Pakistan understand that it will not assist any foreign attempt to undermine Pakistan’s sovereignty and independence. Finally, the United States must make it clear that it will bolster Pakistan’s defence but not support offensive capabilities.

A number of approaches could be explored by the United States: • Use US influence directly and through the IFIs to transform Pakistan’s management of the economy, especially its longer-term strategies to deal with growing demographic pressures and changing economic situations in the Middle East. A more efficient system of employing economic aid, monitoring and reviewing its use at the provincial level, and setting of attainable targets by the Pakistanis themselves would engender great confidence among donors and potential donors. This will require transforming the Economic Affairs Division into a “We should eschew the more professional and active body inside the short-term fix and over- Government of Pakistan. Pakistan tends to over reliance on the military promise and under deliver on economic aid. It needs to become more realistic in its planning and channel to solve problems the US could help it draft achievable plans and projects. as they arise. This The US could follow the Chinese model of insisting on a undermines the civilians in strong US presence at the federal and provincial Pakistan.” level to monitor progress of implementation. But this needs to be done in a quieter and low-key manner so the US is not seen as hegemonic. • Help Pakistan achieve a bigger bang for its military dollars. This could be done by providing Pakistan advice and assistance in adopting a practicable taxonomy for defence planning and management, revamping the budget system so it is driven by results rather than wish lists of the military. Helping Pakistan understand the need for longer-term defence planning and budgeting along the lines of the quadrennial review in the United States may be a start. The US could provide expertise in the theoretical construct of such reviews and budgetary mechanisms without requiring Pakistan to share details of its expenditures with the United States. Use of NATO partners, especially the British in this process would make it less US- dominated and more palatable to the Pakistani military. If we can help the Pakistan military remove the fat inside its own system, it might help them understand that our intentions are good and they can do much more with what they have rather than constantly demanding more resources from their government and the United States. • The United States could help improve Pakistan’s defences while exercising greater influence over its offensive capabilities in the neighborhood. Pakistan has a relatively immobile land army. Provision of three helicopter fleets (50 helos each) with troop-lifting capacity for the long eastern border and another fleet of 50 helos for use in monitoring the western border and attacking insurgents in the difficult terrain of the western marches would enhance Pakistan’s defences. Prohibitions on the movement of the western fleet to the eastern border could be imposed if the supply of helicopters were under a lease agreement rather than outright purchase. • Reducing Pakistan’s huge fear of India’s growing military might is a more difficult task. If Indian could be persuaded to shift one of its three strike corps facing Pakistan to the Chinese

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 24 border, the signaling effect on Pakistan would be enormous. So long as a third of the Indian military budget continues to be spent on troops arrayed toward Pakistan, it is hard to convince the Pakistanis that India does not wish to coerce Pakistan into submission.18 • The White House and Department of State need to work with the Pakistani government and the US Congress with the Pakistani parliament to help make government more open, inclusive, and pluralistic in running the country. In other words, make Pakistan truly the federation that its constitution has defined. A greater review and public scrutiny by parliament of economic and military maters would assist the growing media inside Pakistan play a more useful role in informing the public about key issues and answers. Engaging with and educating civil society and media in this direction would act as a multiplier for the US efforts to assist Pakistan. • The United States needs to have a clearer and longer-term Pakistan Strategy and not see it as a spin-off or subset of our Afghanistan or India strategies. Once the Pakistanis understand this to be the case, they will feel more respected and comfortable in taking us at our word. While it may be tempting to follow a “feel good” policy of isolating or containing Pakistan, those approaches confuse our friends within the country and weaken their position while achieving little by way of influence in what still remains a critically important country in a tough neighborhood. History has taught us that crises will continue to erupt in the arc of instability than extends from Turkey to Indonesia. Who knows when we may need to have Pakistan on our side again? • We should eschew the short-term fix and over-reliance on the military channel to solve problems as they arise. This undermines the civilians in Pakistan. Bypassing the Minister of Defence and even the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for example, in favor of the Chief of Army Staff only makes the latter stronger than his titular bosses. • Ask the Pakistanis to help identify for us ways we can work with them to improve nuclear safety and prevention of leakage of nuclear materials and weapons into the hands of unsavory groups and work with them to further strengthen safeguards. This approach is better than offering unsolicited advice. • Use the Chinese approach of closed-door pressure tactics rather than public harangues to convey demands for change of behavior or explanation for missed targets or broken promises. We have provided more aid without strings and more grant aid to Pakistan than China, yet the Chinese are perceived in the Pakistan government and the public as being a better fried of Pakistan than the United States. One reason is that they lower the boom quietly and privately, while we resort to public criticism that provokes perverse behavior from our counterparts inside Pakistan. • The United States need not always be the lead agency for change in Pakistan. Use of key NATO allies, especially the British, the Germans, and the Turks could help us achieve our goals. This bank-shot approach might sometimes be preferred, since the Pakistanis listen on some issues more to the British and the Germans and Turks. The NATO office in Islamabad populated by the Turks has been one of the best-kept secrets in Pakistan! A growing number of senior military officers in today’s Pakistan army have been trained in Germany and Britain. The Australians also could help Pakistan think through the institutional changes needed to assess the structure to support the work of the newly minted National Security Committee. (I

18 Bharat Karnad “Rethinking Indian Policies towards Pakistan” Security Wise, a blog by Bharat Karnad. May 2, 2012. https://bharatkarnad.com/2012/05/02/rethinking-indian-policies-towards-pakistan-2/, and Bharat Karnad “Rethinking Pakistan,” Asian Age, March 31, 2011. http://archive.asianage.com/columnists/rethinking-pakistan-898.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 25 provided the new National Security advisor with a journal article that listed the steps the Australians took to reframe their national assessment networks.)

Many of these ideas have been offered before in different fora, including the published works by me for the Atlantic Council over 2008-2014 and in my book Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its army, and the wars within (Oxford 2008) that I am now updating. Some of the budgetary ideas were also shared with General James Mattis in his project on the future of CENTCOM shortly before he left his post as commander CENTCOM.

Determinants of the Foreign Policy Behaviors of Pakistan Thomas F. Lynch III NDU, Institute of National Strategic Studies (INSS), Center for Strategic Research (CSR)

Pakistan’s foreign policy and security behaviors are the function of three major factors. In late 2016, these factors “Reconsidering a Pakistani remain firmly embedded in the narrative framework security framework firmly agreed to [be] safeguarded by Pakistan’s security and rooted in the need for defense leadership – principally its military and Inter- proxy jihad would require Services Intelligence (ISI) Agency, which answers to the a radical reformulation of military. Absent foundational changes in these three the intellectual basis for factors, there will be no change in Pakistani behavior. The U.S. and its Coalition partners in Afghanistan cannot directly Pakistan itself. This will change these factors. However, they can deny Pakistan require fundamentally new and its proxies dominant influence in Afghanistan while at the national leadership – same time reducing the risks of escalating proxy war in leadership of a character Afghanistan between Pakistan and India. not now present in Pakistan.” Three major factors drive Pakistan foreign policy and security behaviors. First, Pakistan’s security leadership views India as an enduring and existential threat. This belief is dogmatic, and resistant to countervailing evidence. It impels Pakistan to an anti- status quo foreign policy and a security approach that “blames India first” and seeks to agitate and provoke India into intemperate responses. Second, Pakistan security elites believe themselves to be at an enormous asymmetric military disadvantage with India, one that they must offset with a robust nuclear weapons arsenal and with use of militant proxy forces. They empower and encourage militant proxy groups imbued with the spirit of jihad, leveraging these proxy groups to keep India off balance with targeted insurgency operations in nearby locations like the disputed area of Jammu- Kashmir and the country of Afghanistan. They also inspire and resource these jihadist groups to acts of terror inside India and in locations where Indian interests appear to be advancing, especially Afghanistan. A strategy of “jihad beneath a nuclear umbrella” – or no peace, no war - allows Pakistan persistently to challenge the status quo while staying short of another dangerous, direct military clash with India. Third, Pakistan’s militant strategy is necessitated by its state-building logic – which is cherished and perpetuated by Pakistan’s military and intelligence elites, but shared across the civilian political spectrum. By definition, Pakistan is an oppositional state, created to counter India. As long as it remains so defined, it will cling to a proxy militant strategy in pursuit of its core national purpose.19

19 The themes in this paragraph are advanced in various forms and fashions in the following scholarly works: Thomas F. Lynch III, “War and Pakistan: Ongoing Conflict, Imminent Risks and the “One Big Thing,” in Thomas Mahnkhen, ed.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 26

U.S. and other western governments have attempted a full range of policy options in failed efforts to alter Pakistan’s security framework. Pakistan has been welcomed as a U.S. ally in the Global War on Terror and afforded preferential military equipment, training and operational arrangements in an effort to alter its security choices. The Pakistani framework did not change. Pakistan has been given preferential international loans, global debt relief and an enormous amount of direct economic aid, including a U.S. government $1.5 billion per year for 5 years deal known as the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill in an effort to encourage a change to Pakistan’s security narrative. Pakistan’s framework has not changed. The U.S. and its western partners have also sanctioned, embargoed and isolated Pakistan from the international community in reaction to its covert nuclear arms programs. When sanctioned, Pakistan turned to the support and comfort of states like China, North Korea and Iran – states that do not challenge Pakistan’s security framework at all. Its framework did not change; and, its leverage of jihadist proxies expanded and its nuclear weapons arsenal grew. Reconsidering a Pakistani security framework firmly rooted in the need for proxy jihad would require a radical reformulation of the intellectual basis for Pakistan itself. This will require fundamentally new national leadership – leadership of a character not now present in Pakistan.

Given these three dominant security factors and their complex interaction, Pakistan must be expected to pursue proxy-led jihad (with the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqanis, Gulbiddin Hekmatyar’s group and others) in Afghanistan against what it views to be U.S. and Coalition abetted Indian interests in there. U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan can frustrate Pakistan proxy aims to wrest control of Afghanistan from its leadership in Kabul. Our forces can continue to strike at proxy militant leadership in Afghanistan and in targeted cross-border operations. Each of these activities, over time, will raise the cost to Pakistan’s proxy militant strategy in Afghanistan; and, may eventually assist in the rise of new leadership voices in Pakistan questioning the strategy’s worth.

Simultaneously, U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan can work to build the stamina and resilience of Afghan national forces against proxy militant operations. It also can demonstrate that Afghan leadership will be durable and persistent without the requirement for direct Indian security assistance. This too can slowly erode the Pakistani security narrative of nefarious Indian influence in Afghanistan. Finally, the U.S. and its Coalition partners can maintain frank – and even blunt – open dialogue with Pakistan military and civilian leaders about the unfortunate and inevitably unsuccessful pursuit of its aims through a proxy war strategy in Afghanistan or across wider South Asia. Coupled with limited but important U.S. and western-states civilian engagement and connective projects with the people of Pakistan, a persistent and capable U.S. and Coalition partnership in Afghanistan can set the conditions for the rise of a fundamentally new national leadership in Pakistan. Only then can the factors that undergird Pakistan’s six-decade-old proxy militant strategy be redressed.20

Learning From History (Palo Alto, California: Stanford University Press, 2017- Forthcoming); Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army and the Wars Within (London: Oxford University Press, 2008); Aparna Pande, Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India (New York: Routledge, 2011); Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), Stephen P. Cohen, Shooting for a Century (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2013); T.V. Paul, The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); C. Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army Way of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); S. Paul Kapur, Jihad as Grand Strategy: Islamist Militancy, National Security and the Pakistan State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017); and Stephen Tankel, Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e- Tayyibah (London: Hurst Publishers, 2011).

20 These paragraph themes are developed more fully in Thomas F. Lynch III, The 80 Percent Solution: The Strategic Defeat of bin Laden’s al-Qaeda and Implications for South Asian Security, National Security Studies Program Policy Paper, New America Foundation, February 2012; Thomas F. Lynch III, “After ISIS: Fully Reappraising U.S. Policy in Afghanistan,” The

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 27

Comments on Behavior Change in Pakistan Raffaello Pantucci Director of International Security Studies, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)

It is very difficult to influence Pakistani behaviour, but considering the massive influx of Chinese investment of late and the degree to which Islamabad has expressed a view that CPEC offers all the answers to Pakistan’s problems, it is clear that Chinese investment is a point of influence on the country. Were Beijing to abruptly change tack, this could change Pakistani behaviour. Having said this, it is highly unlikely that China would change position abruptly, but it is clear that Chinese influence does have leverage over Pakistan. The US and allies are already engaging with Beijing in Afghanistan (and to some degree in Pakistan), focusing these “Hugging Beijing closer efforts to an even greater degree could start to help shift more within this particular entrenched Pakistani views (though this requires Beijing’s context may be a way continued support and willingness to see its problems as longer term to influence coincidental to US and allies ones, something that may become complicated by the broader US-China relationship) Hugging Pakistani behaviour.” . Beijing closer within this particular context may be a way longer term to influence Pakistani behaviour.

Use Pakistani connections in the Middle East (on both sides of the Sunni-Shia divide) to give the country a greater sense of importance as well as provide a different conduit into difficult relationships. Iran and Saudi Arabia have complicated and deep relationships with Pakistan, and maintain regular engagements. Playing up this role for Islamabad and suggesting Islamabad offers a useful conduit to better understand and engage with both sides in the Saudi-Iran clash will not only offer a new way to engage with this complicated clash (between Iran and Saudi), but also offer a way of enhancing Pakistani sense of prestige which may in turn produce benefits on broader US and allied concerns within the country.

Comments on Behavior Changes in Pakistan Hassan Abbas National Defense University

Pakistani military and intelligence stanchly believes in the conspiracy theory that the US plan to target Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal at some stage. Despite strong US-Pakistan cooperation in the realm of nuclear security measures, the concern lingers on. It is less intense then before (based on my interactions with leading Pakistani military and intelligence officers). Any event/statement/action that will in any way strengthen their view will change Pakistan’s behavior for the worse. Secondly, Pakistan is increasingly leaning towards China in regards to regional politics for quite a while but its power centers are more aligned with the US primarily due to the military aid component. Pakistanis

Washington Quarterly, 38:2, 119-144 (July 2015); and, Thomas F. Lynch III, “South Asia and Evolving Major U.S. Security Interests,” in Richard D. Hooker, Jr. ed., Strategic Assessment 2017 (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, January 2017- Forthcoming).

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 28 love US made military hardware and they often express that Chinese equipment is no match to that of the US. Any negative slide in the US-Pakistan military to military relationship can make Pakistan more insecure. Pakistani perception about increased Indian role in Afghanistan is yet another critical issue but in that case Pakistan has played all its cards (by continuing to equip and arm Afghan Taliban/Haqqani group). The rise of Northern Alliance players in Kabul in 2002 for Pakistan was the red line and they never reviewed their Pro-Afghan Taliban stance since then.

Potential Internal and External Factors of Pakistani Behavioral Change MAJ Shane Aguero US Army [email protected]

There are several factors that have the possibility of causing behavioral change within Pakistan. I have broken “If PM Sharif were to be then down into four internal (military coup, economic collapse, replaced by a PPP new national leadership, and a massively effective terrorist candidate, relations with attack) and four external factors (increased Saudi/Iranian the US would cool hostilities, Indian aggression, Russian rapprochement and significantly, as the party Chinese benefaction). In the short term, none of these are likely, has often opted to although the probability of an external factor occurring increases over time. Several of these have limited lead increase relations with time before occurring (military coup, massively effective China, Russia and Iran ... by terrorist attack, Indian aggression), and four of them have a PTI candidate …relations little chance of the US navigating a path towards increased with the US would most influence (massively effective terrorist attack, Indian likely become hostile … ” aggression, Russian rapprochement and Chinese benefaction). Internal factors Internal factors that have the potential to cause behavior change within Pakistan include military coup, economic collapse, new national leadership, and a massively effective terrorist attack. A military coup is a low probability, high impact event due to the low threat to the military posed by PM Nawaz Sharif, and the politically low key Chief of Army Staff Raheel Sharif. If this were to occur, it would most likely be orchestrated by the ISI and have the tacit approval of COAS Sharif since he would be the one to be placed into national leadership. If this were to occur there would be little warning, and would most likely cause little long term instability in the country, since the military is still seen as being the most effective and least corrupt organization in the country. The most negative effect for the United States would be the short-term interruption of US support and aid similar due to the situation in Egypt in 2013. Due to the long term interaction of the US and Pakistani militaries, there would be little difficulty in resuming working relationships between the two countries on issues of mutual benefit.

Economic collapse of Pakistan without a concomitant regional disaster, military conflict with India or China (regarding the Gilgit-Baltistan, Jammu and Kashmir) or a widespread economic downturn is highly unlikely, and the economic devastation would be foreseen well ahead of time by regional economic actors. If this were to occur, the US is well positioned to assist in providing humanitarian and economic relief on a large scale. Depending on the length of time aid is required, and how such aid is delivered (preferably through the Pakistani military with acknowledged US involvement, but

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 29 minimal US visibility) an event such as this with a large US relief package could assist in strengthening relations with both the government and the populace over the long term.

A political regime change (as opposed to a military coup) is a moderate probability, especially with the renewed allegations of corruption brought on by the release of the Panama Papers. Although there is a call for PM Sharif to resign by his opponents, there is little support for this in the populace since the other two political parties are also widely seen as being corrupt. If PM Sharif were to leave office, but replaced by someone in his party (PML-N), there would be little change with regard to the US relations with Pakistan.

If PM Sharif were to be replaced by a PPP candidate, relations with the US would cool significantly, as the party has often opted to increase relations with China, Russia and Iran instead of the West. This would be difficult to counteract post-election unless the US made a concerted effort to support the PPP aligned PM whenever appropriate, although due to many of the policies the PPP supports, this would be difficult. Economic assistance would be the only easily accepted tool, and that would be only grudgingly accepted and fail to provide long term influence.

If PM Sharif were to be replaced by a PTI candidate, most likely Imran Khan, relations with the US would most likely become hostile as many of the PTI policies would bring it in conflict with US policies. If that occurs, the US would be best served by approaching the new PM as a blank slate as they have no national leadership experience. By placing all aspects of US-Pakistan relations on the table, it would allow the US to build a new relationship with Pakistan minus many of the previous missteps and some of the mistrust. The most effective influence the US could achieve with a blank state approach to a PTI PM would be continued relations with the Pakistani military, increased economic trade and a willing partner in the CT fight throughout Central Asia. The US should be wary of PTI aggression over Kashmir and/or a military coup in the event of a PTI victory.

A massively effective terrorist attack has a distinct possibility of causing a behavior change within Pakistan. This terrorist attack would not be effective due to the number of casualties, but rather the target of the attack. If Pakistani terrorists were able to cause a significant number of foreign casualties similar to the Islamabad Marriott Hotel bombing in 2008, it would cause a significant domestic uproar as more foreign investments leave and tourism declines even further, weakening the economy. Alternately, an effective terrorist attack against a foreign target may possibly goad the victimized state to attempt a retributive military action, in an attack similar to the 2008 Mumbai attacks. However, another distinct possibility is that an effective terrorist attack occurs against a nuclear facility, which would cause the country to go into immediate lockdown and possibly cause India or other concerned states to attempt intervention. This response would lead to armed conflict between Pakistan, the terrorist groups and the foreign intervention forces. The long term US response to an incident such as this could be to push for nuclear disarmament, increased global CT efforts, and increased regional cooperation, all of which are unlikely.

External factors The external factors that have the potential to cause behavior change within Pakistan are an increase in Saudi/Iranian hostilities, Indian aggression, Russian rapprochement and Chinese benefaction. An increase in Saudi/Iranian hostilities would place Pakistan in a difficult position, as Pakistan is a very close ally with Saudi Arabia, and a very close economic partner with Iran and is seen in positive light by a majority of Pakistanis. If the Saudi/Iranian hostilities were to increase to the point where Pakistan was forced to choose between Saudi Arabia and Iran, it would most likely choose Saudi Arabia, although the level of that support would be highly variable and be weighed against the long

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 30 term issue of being sandwiched between a hostile Iran, the existential threat of India, an unstable Afghanistan, a vast “occupied area” in Jammu, Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, and a relatively unfriendly China beyond that. In the case where Pakistan must become a belligerent in the Saudi/Iranian conflict, the US should expect Pakistani support for Saudi Arabia. Pakistan would be far more willing to support Saudi Arabia as part of a broad international effort as opposed to working bi-laterally against Iranian interests.

Indian aggression against Pakistan, either as a response, or as pre-emptive Cold Start offensive, would be devastating for Pakistan. The Pakistani response would most likely include massive terrorist actions across India, nuclear weapons and a very long low level insurgent conflict regardless of the military outcome. The US can best use its’ influence to prevent this conflict from occurring, but if that fails, the potential for interminable conflict throughout the region leaves no positive options for US policy other than diplomatic channels and humanitarian assistance during the conflict and economic aid post-conflict.

Russian rapprochement with Pakistan is a new phenomenon due to the relatively close ties of Pakistan with the West and the support of the anti-Russian mujahedeen in the 1980’s. The freedom that having positive relations with Russia provides Pakistan cannot be overstated, however. Having Russia as a patron to counteract India, China and the US allows Pakistan to more fully engage in regional issues from an independent position as opposed to having to follow a more stringent foreign policy dictated by having only one patron. The convergence of Pakistan and Russia on issues closely parallels that of Pakistan and China, although without the territorial issues that China and Pakistan have. This has led to an increase in military equipment purchases from Russia and joint exercises, increasing Pakistani military capability further. This is seen as a direct counter to increased India- US ties and warmer India-China relations. The US influence in the Pakistani military will wane over the long term if this trend continues.

Chinese benefaction would cause a significant Pakistani behavior change as China is already Pakistan’s leading trading partner. If China determined that it was in China’s best interest to support Pakistan’s territorial claims, the regional stability would shift overnight as Pakistan would have finally achieved a lasting victory over India, which could embolden Pakistan or goad India into overt military action. China is careful to maintain the balance of power in Central Asia, but if China (and Russia) decide to punish India for their closer ties to the West, Pakistan would be a very valuable ally or cat’s paw.

The US would be hard pressed to respond in an effective manner to a Chinese benefaction and/or Russian rapprochement in a timely manner, although there would be sufficient lead time before any significant actions were able to be made. The most effective US strategy would be to attempt to limit Russian and Chinese influence in Pakistan on issues the US requires Pakistani support for, such as nuclear security, CT and CN. The good news is that these are issues where the US finds itself in agreement with all the concerned parties including China, Russia and Iran.

In conclusion, behavior changes in Pakistan could either be internal (military coup, economic collapse, new national leadership, and a massively effective terrorist attack) or external (increase in Saudi/Iranian hostilities, Indian aggression, Russian rapprochement and Chinese benefaction), and with limited US capacity to influence prior to the event. Of these four (military coup, economic collapse, new national leadership, increase in Saudi/Iranian hostilities) offer the US the opportunity for increased influence in Pakistan, and the other four (massively effective terrorist attack, Indian aggression, Russian rapprochement and Chinese benefaction) have a generally negative effect on US influence.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 31

Pakistan’s Asymmetric Advantage in Strategic Information & Influence Control is Progressing to New Thresholds Dr. Shalini Venturelli American University

In parallel investigations I am currently conducting on four conflict and instability zones covering the regions of MENA, South & Southwest Asia, Russia-Eastern Europe and the China-East Asia, I identified a set of underlying patterns in key drivers of low-to-high intensity conflict inflation that involve differential capability of strategic actors to potentiate multiple signaling pathways in order to modify, influence and control the perceptions and behaviors of adversaries, media organizations and population groups. • The research demonstrates that the Pakistani state is a far more capable strategic actor in critical areas of asymmetric information warfare and in disinformation and influence control than is its much larger regional adversary, India. • The Pakistan military is the epicenter of this capability which, directly and through its client networks of jihadi militias, civilian sanctuaries and indigenous media channels continues to excel in shaping the domestic perception environment within the country.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 32 • Crucially, however PAKMIL is increasingly proficient in projecting asymmetric control of the perceptual and behavioral response environment across the border in India, including among India’s diverse population groups and Indian civilian and military decision-makers. The mere threat of escalation by PAKMIL and its client networks has thus far restrained Indian decision-makers fearful of Indian public opinion opposed to their military’s involvement in spiraling and costly wars. Indian Decision-makers are also anxious to avoid provoking too far an adversary they believe to be manipulated by a powerful but irrational circle of military and ideological leaders who seem eager to obtain a disproportionate reaction from the Indian military. Among top ranks in the Indian Army and Ministry of Defence, a deep belief in the willingness of their PAKMIL counterparts to take hostilities to the nuclear brink is widely and deeply held. Moreover, scant media and public support in India for pushing Pakistan’s military leaders beyond current levels of low-intensity border skirmishes, continues to rein- in the scope of tactical and strategic options available to the Indian military. In contrast, the Pakistani public perception—other than among a professional minority—is daily controlled and channeled by the military’s direct and indirect, multi-tiered information campaigns to keep India at a strategic information disadvantage in vulnerable territories like Kashmir with majority Muslim composition, and among unstable Muslim-Hindu population groups in urban zones prone to sectarian unrest. The net result is that strategic information signaling by PAKMIL and its clients effectively shapes and dominates the perceptions of leaders, population groups, and media channels across both sides of the border. Despite possessing a far larger sector of media and military power, India’s civilian-military organizations and leaders are unable to compete with their rival’s capability in the influence domain. • Even as India’s military forces conduct operations in response to cross-border Jihadist network infiltration in Kashmir, intervene in that Himalayan state for security and population control, and plan and conduct strikes against terrorist camps in Pakistan-held territory, they are obliged to plead public support through painstaking discourses of rationalization and lengthy explanation. Although venturing into new practices of open public announcements of operations, India’s defense organizations are doing so without any assurances of the kind of enduring and stable support from their own media or populations comparable to that enjoyed by their rival military organizations within Pakistan. • Nor do Indian defense forces have any experience, capability or even intention to influence Pakistan’s domestic opinion environment. They have in essence ceded the region’s strategic and asymmetric information domain to PAKMIL. • Thus while the Indian armed forces are in process of shifting to a new military doctrine with new sets of assumptions regarding the use of pre-emptive operations to prevent and deter terrorist attacks launched from Pakistani territory, nevertheless the influential narrative on the latest outbreak of hostilities over Kashmir will be crafted for the entire region of actors by PAKMIL’s information operations. This includes narratives of absolutist threats to ‘destroy’ India which is vital to securing public legitimacy, unity and cohesion for PAKMIL from across multiple indigenous sectors, as well as signaling the US and regional neighbors of its determination to escalate if India does not back down and continue to grant implicit freedom of maneuver to PAKMIL’s proxy jihadist militias. • Most singular of all capabilities in the information domain, is PAKMIL’s current success in narrating border violations and hostilities by its historical enemy India suggesting the imperative of a greater war. These are powerful narratives intended to influence perceptions of reality in the Indian media and general public and thus serve as an effective deterrent and limitation on India’s armed forces.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 33 • Indian leaders and security organizations have not yet learned the art and science of asymmetric information warfare, and Pakistan’s dominance of this critical capability will continue to shape the evolution of the region’s security and (in)stability.

How can US influence these factors? The US currently is unable to match the asymmetric strategic information capabilities demonstrated by a number of strategic actors ranging from terror networks to peer competitor states such as Russia, Iran and China. This does not mean, however, that it does not have a role to play in helping to stabilize an increasingly volatile information and perceptual environment of conflict in South Asia. So long as PAKMIL control this space of operations, conditions will continue to escalate. The US can use its experience of information and influence operations over the past decade fighting the Taliban and stabilizing Afghanistan to support the Indian military’s development of capabilities for stabilizing this domain. Without this capability, the spiral of escalating tension and graduated hostility will generate an autonomous dynamic past the indeterminate tipping point from which neither side can voluntarily withdraw. • Our extensive research in the field in the region shows how the complex signaling system of asymmetric information dominance works, its control mechanisms, and vulnerabilities. This knowledge should be applied to rapidly advance US capabilities, to deploy them for upgrading the information capabilities of our partners in India, leading to stabilization of the cross- border information environment in both countries • Investing in this strategy will pay multiple order dividends in the long run, not only in South Asia and MENA but also in other regions subjected to instability by continuing asymmetric information domination by peer competitors such as Russia.

Comments on Behavior Changes in Pakistan Dr. C. Christine Fair Georgetown University

In this memo, I first address the policy problem confronting the United States and its partners. Second, I identify the Pakistan army as the center of gravity. Third, I address specific actions the United States and its partners can undertake to influence the army’s cost-benefit calculus of its preferred courses of action.

The Problem I argue here and elsewhere that the object of influence is not “Pakistan;” rather the Pakistan army.21 The Pakistan army controls all levers of power that influence Pakistan’s foreign and security policies as well as key domestic policies that inform the same. The civilians have very little role in setting these policies. The Pakistan Army has several enduring strategic goals: 1. Resist Indian hegemony in South Asia and beyond 2. Cultivate “strategic depth” in Afghanistan both to vitiate any Afghan ill-will towards Pakistan and to deny India any space from which it can destabilize Pakistan from Afghan territory

21 C. Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War (New York: Oxford University Press).

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 34 3. Secure that portion of Kashmir currently administered by India To secure these goals, Pakistan has two tools: 1. A menagerie of Islamist (as well as non-Islamist) militant groups acting as proxies 2. An ever-expanding nuclear arsenal which includes battlefield nuclear weapons Pakistan relies upon proxies because they are inexpensive, able to subvert even the best defenses in India and Afghanistan, offer plausible deniability of state involvement, and generally limit the involvement of Pakistani security forces in direct engagement. (Pakistan’s military and intelligence personnel of course train, equip, and otherwise enable the operations of these groups and collaborate in planning high-profile attacks. In some cases, retired personnel fulfill these roles and may even join a militant group.)

Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal confers three principle advantages: 1. It raises the cost of Indian punishment in response to Pakistan-backed terror 2. It ensures international involvement following a Pakistan-sponsored terror attack or incursion by Pakistani forces (e.g. Kargil War of 1999) to pressure India to not escalate 3. In conjunction with the veritable zoo of militant groups, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal coerces the international community to engage Pakistan by exploiting the twin fears of Pakistan’s collapse should “The only way to motivate aid be withdrawn and of terrorists acquiring nuclear change is by developing a materials, weapons or know-how. coercive campaign that diminishes the advantages Pakistan has successfully used terrorism under its nuclear of Pakistan’s use of umbrella with impunity because it works to achieve Pakistan’s agenda of highlighting the “conflict” between militants under its nuclear Pakistan and India and inevitably provokes calls for dialogue umbrella while also to resolve “outstanding differences.” At the same time, increasing the costs of Pakistan has incurred few costs that it believes to be doing so.” disproportionate to the benefits it derives from this course of action. Even the sustained blowback of erstwhile proxies since 2004 has not persuaded Pakistan to cease using “jihadis” as tools of foreign policy.

Motivating Change: The Army is The Center of Gravity Pakistan’s army is fighting a battle it cannot win conventionally and it is unwilling to revise the three core goals enumerated above. The only way to motivate change is by developing a coercive campaign that diminishes the advantages of Pakistan’s use of militants under its nuclear umbrella while also increasing the costs of doing so.

The United States has been reticent to undertake a serious revision of policy because of the belief that US assistance and presence in the country can position Washington to stave off state collapse and/or prevent further nuclear proliferation. Unfortunately, Pakistan has used American assistance to further develop the very assets—nuclear weapons and terrorists—that disquiet Americans the most. Americans have generally been unable to appreciate the resilience of the Pakistani state and the low likelihood of any such failure. The United States will not likely be able to undertake any meaningful coercive policy if it continues to believe that its resources and those of its allies and multilateral organizations are staving off an otherwise likely collapse of the state. The below recommendations assume that state collapse is very unlikely even though this fear is commonly articulated by US officials. This assumption is premised upon the author’s detailed studies of this country since 1993.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 35

If the United States seeks to change Pakistani behavior, it must change the cost-benefit calculus of the Pakistan army. To the extent possible, policies should aim to influence the army’s equities rather than the entire country.

It should be acknowledged that any significant deviation from the status quo is unlikely given the prevailing lack of political will in key parts of the US government which continues to nurse the fantasy that Pakistan may be more cooperative with the right mix of allurements.

Courses of Action Washington first must cease incentivizing Pakistan to continue producing “good jihadi assets” while fighting “terrorists of the Pakistani state.” Pakistan is engaging in simple asset banking. As long as Pakistan has terrorists to kill, the United States will pay exorbitant amounts to Pakistan to do so. The army knows that the United States would be less concerned about Pakistan were it not for these groups. Instead of continuing to incentivize the security establishment to groom more terrorists, the United States should incentive them to abandon Islamist terrorists as tools of foreign policy. How does Washington do this?

As a preliminary matter, it should cease providing CSF funds.22 Pakistan should not be paid to do what sovereign states are supposed to do. Washington should also cease supplying Pakistan with strategic weapon systems.

Instead, the United States should be willing to provide a narrow set of platforms which have proven utility in counterterror and counter-insurgency operations. None of these platforms should have significant value in fighting India. The United States should also offer Pakistan military training in these areas, as well other areas that fit squarely within the rubric of domestic security (i.e. natural disaster relief). The United States should remain willing to provide police training and counterinsurgency training to Pakistan’s security forces and other forms of assistance to Pakistan’s shambolic justice system should Pakistan permit the United States to so and should the United States be able to provide meaningful assistance to these organizations.

A key part of this change of incentive, Washington should state clearly that it will declare Pakistan to be a state sponsor of terror if specific actions are not immediately undertaken. Such a declaration will impose sweeping and devastating sanctions against Pakistan’s army in particular because it will curtain security assistance. To pre-empt such an outcome, the United States should provide a timeline of concrete steps that Pakistan must take against the various militant groups it now supports. The first such step is ceasing active support for these groups, constricting their space for operations and recruitment; ultimately, Washington should demand the elimination of the remnants.

Even if Pakistan were willing to do so, this will be long-term project akin to any disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program. Pakistan has trained tens of thousands of militants, if not more. However, there should be no economic support to Pakistan for these efforts as long as it continues to actively raise, nurture, support and deploy so-called jihadis for state goals.

Simultaneously, the Washington should expand effort to target specific individuals who provide material support to terrorist groups and individuals. This means international prosecution, designations under UNSC Resolution 1267, Department of Treasury designation and seizure of

22 The latest legislation no longer uses this term. I use it here because this term has widest recognizably.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 36 accounts, and visa denials. In some cases, it should also include JSCOC targeting or other means to eliminate high-value personnel. Washington should work with its allies to ensure that its partners follow suit as well as those countries that traditionally protect Pakistan (i.e. China). Should China not cooperate, it will literally be China’s problem. The United States should be less concerned about “lost access and influence” in Pakistan than about coercing Pakistan to abandon the most dangerous policies that it currently pursues with American subsidies.

The United States can, in some measure, curb Pakistan’s appetite for terrorist misadventures by depriving it of the principle benefit it derives: international attention to its pet cause, Kashmir. Recent administration statements that reiterate support for India and Pakistan to achieve “peaceful resolution of outstanding issues, including Kashmir” reward Pakistan for its malfeasance while treating India as an equal party to the crime. India is, in fact, a victim of Pakistani terrorism. This language gratuitously rewards Pakistan for its use of terrorism in Kashmir.

It is also historically ill-informed and dangerously misguided. Despite Pakistan’s vocal assertions that it has legitimate claims to Kashmir, the facts bely Pakistan’s narrative. First, the Indian Independence Act of 1947 did not allocate Kashmir to Pakistan; rather allowed the princely state to select the dominion of its choice. Second, Pakistan started the first war of Kashmir by dispatching militants who enjoyed various levels of state support in an effort to seize Kashmir by force, despite having signed a standstill agreement which bound it to not undertake a military invasion. As a consequence of Pakistan’s invasion, the Maharaja of Kashmir Hari Singh signed an instrument of accession to India in exchange for military assistance. Thus, all of Kashmir, including that portion currently administered by Pakistan and that portion “ceded” to China in 1963, are lawful parts of India. When the United States acknowledges Kashmir as a disputed area, it either demonstrates an enormous historical ignorance of the issues or evidences an effort to placate Pakistan at the costs of facts, law and history. Worse yet, it rewards Pakistan for its continued use of terrorism in Kashmir and elsewhere in India.

Consistent with historical facts, the United States should refuse to interject any mention of Kashmir in its various statements with and about Pakistan. Equally, it should abjure making any statements encouraging India to engage with Pakistan on the subject. Pakistan craves such language because it legitimizes Pakistan’s contention that it is seeking peace from India, which obstructs its efforts. While it would be preferable if the United States adopted strong language placing the onus on the conflict firmly upon Pakistan, a middle ground may simply be omitting such language altogether. The Pakistanis are very sensitive to such omissions and will understand the intent that such an omission conveys. Such signaling would also advance U.S. interests in discouraging Pakistani terrorism in some measure by depriving Pakistan of this much sought-after benefit.

When Pakistan-based terrorist organizations attack India, the United States should abandon its usual practice of encouraging India publicly to observe restraint and offering the usual bromidic calls for the both sides to continue dialogue. Such language imposes a false equivalence on India, the victim, and Pakistan, the victimizer. Most importantly, such language rewards Pakistan for using terrorism, and one of the reasons why Pakistan does so is to continue focusing international attention upon the area and incentivizing the international community to continue identifying Kashmir as “the most dangerous place on earth.” Instead, the United States should consider encouraging Pakistan publicly to take action against the militant groups in question and to cooperate with Indian and international law enforcement agencies to bring the terrorists to justice. This is a far cry from what the United States should do to punish Pakistan for continuing to use Islamist terrorism as a tool of foreign policy, but it may be something that the current or next administration would consider.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 37 Finally, the United States inter-agency should have a serious conversation about its official position on the Kashmir “dispute.” I would encourage the inter-agency to officially adopt support for converting the Line of Control into the international boundary. After all, such a conversion requires India to forego its claims on Pakistan-administered Kashmir while allowing Pakistan to retain that which it currently controls without legal sanction.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 38 Question (QL2): What are the strategic and operational implications of the Turkish Army’s recent intervention in northern Syria for the coalition campaign plan to defeat ISIL? What is the impact of this intervention on the viability of coalition vetted indigenous ground forces, Syrian Defense Forces and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (formerly ANF)?

Alexis Everington (MSI) argues that in order for the campaign against ISIL to succeed in Syria two conditions must be met: 1) that opposition forces in Syria believe that the effort to defeat ISIL goes hand-in-hand with defeat of the Assad regime; and 2) that there are moderate, “victorious” local Sunni opposition fighters that mainstream society can support. If not, the general population is likely to support more extreme alternatives (like Jabhat Fatah al-Sham) simply for lack of viable Sunni alternatives.23 Hamit Bozarslan (EHESS) suggests that unfortunately the ship may have sailed on this condition. He argues that the Free Syrian Army of today, that Turkey backs, has little resemblance to the Free Syrian Army of 2011: many of its components hate the US, are close to radical jihadis and most importantly, in his view are a very weak fighting force. He explains that they succeeded recently

23 It is for this reason that Everington believes providing “international support to Kurdish fighting forces will only push local Sunni Syrians more into the arms of extremist groups. Supporting Kurdish armed groups to the detriment of support to local Sunni ones is one of the most significant errors of the conflict in the past year.”

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 39 in Jarablus because ISIL did not fight (organizing a suicide-attack and destroying four Turkish tanks, simply showed that ISIL could retaliate).

Editor: Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI)

SME Input

Turkey's Kurdish Redline in Syria and the Fight Against ISIL Denise Natali Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University Published: War on the Rocks, September 14, 2016 http://warontherocks.com/2016/09/turkeys-kurdish-red-line-in-syria-and-the-fight-against-isil/

Turkey’s military intervention in northern Syria (Operation Euphrates Shield) has raised both hopes and concerns about defeating the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). While some regard it as a positive turning point in the anti-ISIL fight, particularly after Turkish and Free Syrian Army (FSA) forces quickly expelled ISIL from the strategically important border town of Jarablus, others see the incursion as a further “Ankara’s intervention setback. Turkish attacks on the U.S.-backed Kurdish People’s in Syria is neither Protection Forces (YPG) — the military wing of the Democratic surprising nor game- Union Party (PYD), an affiliate of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) and the most effective anti-ISIL force in Syria — may changing.” leave Washington trapped between allies fighting each other in Syria. Underlying these scenarios are assumptions that Ankara has fundamentally changed its strategy, that Syrian Kurds are vital to defeating ISIL, and that a portending U.S. “betrayal of the Kurds” will undermine their will to fight and thus the effectiveness of the campaign.

Neither of these predictions is fully accurate. Turkey’s incursion in Syria represents continuity of policy rather than dramatic change. While becoming more engaged against ISIL over the past year, Turkey still prioritizes the PKK and its affiliates as a strategic threat just like it did at the war’s

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 40 outset. Nor does Turkey-YPG fighting create a new dilemma for the United States. The U.S. strategy of defeating ISIL “by, with, and through” local partners has meant balancing competing interests and differentiating between tactical and strategic allies. CENTCOM commander Gen. Votel made this distinction clear by affirming continued U.S. backing for the YPG while requesting its forces depart the territories west of the Euphrates. This upholds Ankara’s redline and keeps the Kurdish communities of northern Syria from linking up a geographically contiguous zone of territory along Turkey’s border. Vice President Biden did the same by warning Kurds that they “cannot, will not and under no circumstances will get American support” if they do not keep their commitment to withdrawing to the other side of the Euphrates. These dynamics are unlikely to undermine the YPG’s will to fight — they benefit greatly from U.S. support — but they could forge regional alliances committed to keeping Syria’s borders intact while further embroiling Turkey in Syria’s cross-border quagmires.

Turning Point or More of the Same? Ankara’s intervention in Syria is neither surprising nor game-changing. Operation Euphrates Shield is not the first time Turkey has entered neighboring states to pursue terrorist threats — particularly the PKK kind — and it is unlikely to be the last. The incursion not only reveals Turkey’s increasing vulnerability and willingness to engage against ISIL, but a deeply rooted threat perception of Kurdish separatism that dates to the early state period. This perception has been reinforced by the breakdown of the Iraqi and Syrian states, renewed PKK insurgency in Turkey, growing PKK influence in northern Iraq, 186 percent increase in Kurdish-controlled territories in Syria since the anti-ISIL campaign commenced, and the failed Turkish coup. Any attempt to effectively counter ISIL with Turkey cannot be separated from its strategic priority of countering PKK threats, even if the United States insists otherwise.

The difference now is that Turkey no longer has allies in strong states to help control the PKK, and has to rely on sub-state actors to do so. During the Iran-Iraq War, for instance, Ankara negotiated an agreement with Baghdad that allowed it to search and seize PKK terrorists across Iraqi borders. When Ankara and Damascus were on the verge of war in 1998, they negotiated the Adana Agreement, which led to PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan’s ouster from Syria after years of refuge, as well as other anti-terrorism measures. Turkey’s efforts to check the PKK continued after the post-Gulf War breakdown of the Iraqi state. Instead of Baghdad, however, Ankara turned to Iraqi Kurds, and particularly Mas’ud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which assumed de-facto control of northern Iraq. This alliance helped create a Kurdish buffer zone that has permitted intelligence- sharing and border security, airstrikes against PKK bases in the Qandil Mountains, military incursions, and the creation of Turkish military bases in Iraqi Kurdish territories. Yet, it has not uprooted the PKK from northern Iraq. Barzani and other Kurdish officials may oppose the PKK presence, but after nearly 20 years, they have been unable and perhaps unwilling to expel PKK forces militarily. Turkish penetration in the Kurdistan Region has also instigated and embroiled Ankara in Kurdish power struggles between the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the latter of which gained support from Iran, and the PKK.

Similar dynamics are unfolding in the hyper-fragmented Syrian state. The zone of influence that Ankara seeks to create near Jarablus is similar to earlier plans for a buffer zone that overlaps with territories that PYD Kurds had claimed. This zone would not be controlled by the Syrian government, which has residual forces in some parts of Hasaskah, but by a patchwork of local militias and non- state actors such as the FSA and Sultan Murad forces — mainly Sunni Arab and Turcoman groups. Under Turkish influence, this zone could establish a space for the Syrian opposition to check

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 41 PYD expansionism as well as to secure the Aleppo corridor, clear ISIL from its borders, and control refugees.

Indeed, Turkey is likely to revive regional strategic alliances to further secure its borders and check PKK and ISIL terrorism. Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim has indicated the need for stability in Syria and Iraq for successful counter-terrorism efforts, to include normalizing relations with Syria. In his visits to Moscow and Tehran after the failed Turkish coup, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan indicated his readiness to enhance cooperation and desire to restore regional peace. In fact, Turkey’s engagement against ISIL has involved greater regional cooperation, to include support for the recent but tenuous ceasefire brokered by the United States and Russia which would permit the United Nations to establish aid corridors into Aleppo via the Turkish border.

Still, Turkey’s effort to re-establish regional alliances, although important, will not necessarily stabilize Syria, control the PKK or YPG, or help defeat ISIL and other jihadists anytime soon. Ankara ultimately depends on fractious local proxies to hold territories and ward off ISIL, radical jihadists, and PKK groups. Syrian Kurds worried about losing territories and influence, in turn, have reacted by creating another militia to resist Turkish forces. Numerous battles in Syria are also playing out on different fronts that have distinct problem sets. Alongside the PKK/YPG issue and ISIL, the general threat is Jabhat al-Nusrah, renamed Jabhat l-Sham (JFS), as well as separating moderates from extremists and the mixing of different extremist groups. The hyper-localized nature of the Syrian war also means that tactical gains or losses in Jarablus do not diminish the ISIL threat in other localities or for neighboring states. If the political order after the fall of key towns and cities such as Raqqah and Aleppo is unacceptable to Turkey, Gulf States, Iran, and Russia, then ISIL, radical jihadism, and PKK operations will continue.

These complex dynamics challenge the notion that Turkish-YPG conflicts place the United States on a “treacherous fault line” that will undermine the anti-ISIL campaign. From the outset, U.S. support to Syrian Kurds has remained tactical and situated around the parameters of its strategic partnership with Turkey and Syrian state sovereignty. Instead of directly or solely backing the PYD, the United States has channeled support to Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), comprised largely but not exclusively of PYD Kurds. After complaints from Turkey that U.S. special operations troops were wearing uniform patches bearing the YPG insignia, U.S. military commanders ordered the patches to be immediately removed. Further, at no point has the United States officially recognized the Syrian Kurdish cantons or self-declared Kurdish federal autonomous zone, or permitted the PYD to attend the Geneva negotiations apart from the Syrian National Council (SNC), backed by Turkey and Arab Gulf states.

While Kurds and some western pundits can turn to history and charge the United States with betrayal, the current circumstances in Syria are nothing of the sort. On the contrary, PYD/YPG forces have been the biggest beneficiaries of the anti-ISIL campaign and have much to gain from an ongoing U.S. alliance. Some YPG fighters may continue to over-reach territorially, however, other Syrian Kurds, including some PYD members (I have spoken to) know full well of the transactional nature of their partnership with the U.S. and the limitations of their role in the anti-ISIL campaign. Many Syrian Kurds recognize that they cannot realistically connect all of their cantons given Turkish opposition and Sunni Arab populations in the area, and realize the need to reconcile with Ankara to keep borders open. This is why, instead of snubbing U.S. support or pushing west of the Euphrates en masse, YPG forces vacated areas around Jarablus, even if they insisted that they have the right to remain “as Syrians.”

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 42 Implications for U.S. Policy

Turkey’s intervention in Syria has reinforced Ankara’s red lines, clarified the conditions of U.S. support to Turkey and Syrian Kurds, and revealed opportunities and challenges to regional cooperation in Syria. It underlines a shared commitment to Syrian territorial integrity by all groups, including Kurds, even if internal boundaries and the status of the Assad regime remain disputed. As the United States moves forward with its anti-ISIL campaign in Syria, it should more carefully calibrate the following issues:

Don’t Mirror Image. Washington should more carefully consider Turkey’s threat perceptions and those of local Sunni Arab groups. Insisting that the PKK and PYD are distinct — even though everyone knows they are not — and telling Turkey to prioritize ISIL will not change Turkey’s strategic calculus or red lines in Syria. It is also a mistake to think that Turkey and the PYD will “put away their differences” to focus on ISIL — particularly as the PKK insurgency continues, the Kurdish problem in Turkey remains unresolved, and opportunities to assert influence exist in the weak Iraqi and Syrian states.

Clarify Conditions of Support. Encourage Local and Regional Pacts. Washington should continue to openly clarify the parameters of support to Syrian Kurds and other partners, including Turkey, and avoid sending mixed signals, such as high profile visits to PYD leaders in Syria, which are largely symbolic but can deepen local and regional resentments. While continuing to support Syrian Kurds, the United States should not enable them to the point where they do not think that they have to negotiate with local and regional partners. These measures should focus on lessening fears of Kurdish empowerment and preventing backlash against Kurds by Turkey and Sunni Arab populations who regard the YPG as encroaching on their territories and as the United States as seeking to divide Syria.

Recognize the limitations of Syrian Kurdish influence. While the YPG has been the most effective anti- ISIL force in Syria, its effectiveness is confined to Kurdish territories where ISIL no longer has a presence. As the campaign seeks to expel ISIL from strategic Sunni Arab strongholds such as Raqqah, the YPG role will be limited. Given reactions by Arab groups to Kurdish territorial gains, direct engagement by the YPG in such an effort could be counterproductive.

These dynamics have implications for countering ISIL and eventually stabilizing Syria. As long as Iraq and Syria remain weak and fractured and Turkey’s Kurdish issue remains unresolved, Ankara will continue to prioritize the PKK as a strategic threat, even as it engages against ISIL. Telling Turkey that it should do otherwise or underestimating the effects of Kurdish territorial expansion on local and regional actors will only fuel these threat perceptions. The United States should pay more careful attention to these regional security priorities and how they are impacted by the second and third order consequences of the anti-ISIL campaign.

Turkish Bridgehead in Northern Syria Soner Cagaptay The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

Turkish incursion into Jarablus could not have taken place without Turkish-Russian normalization. After Turkey downed a Russian plane in November 2015, Russia had declared northern Syria a no-

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 43 go zone for Turkish military. Russian reaction to Turkey after November seems to have intimidated Turkish President Erdogan.

Russia is Turkey's historic nemesis and in the aftermath of the “Erdogan has been plane incident, the Russians terrorized the Turks in the running on a strong-man, intelligence, cyber and military realms. Russia also started to right-wing, nationalist provide weapons to the Democratic Union Party (PYD)’s Afrin platform to boost his own enclave in Syria. It was not a question of if, but when Russian and AKP’s popularity. This weapons would end up in the hands of the Kurdistan Worker’s is why he will not stand Party (PKK).

down against the PKK Erdogan wants to become an executive-style president and he until he defeats the needs to change the Turkish constitution to that end. To do this he organization militarily.” needs to win a referendum or new elections for his AKP. In two recent elections, the AKP has maxed out at 49.5 % popular support. Erdogan has been running on a strong-man, right-wing, nationalist platform to boost his own and AKP’s popularity. This is why he will not stand down against the PKK until he defeats the organization militarily. This makes Turkey by extension hostile towards the PYD until Erdogan achieves his presidential agenda. Erdogan has realized that if Russia is providing weapons to the PKK, he can never defeat that organization, and that is why he decided to normalize relations with Putin, sending him a letter of apology before the July 15 failed coup in Turkey.

Never wanting to completely alienate Turkey and push Turkey fully to NATO’s fold, Putin used the post-coup dark mood in Ankara to accelerate normalization with Turkey. Ankara seems to have gotten not only the green light from Moscow to go into Syria, but also Putin’s (and potentially Iran’s) blessing for the Assad regime to bomb the PYD near Hasakah. It is to be expected that Erdogan will want to cultivate better ties with Russia moving forward.

The Turkish incursion also shows that Ankara is reshuffling its priorities in Syria. For nearly five years, Turkey has been nearly obsessed with the goal of ousting Assad. Now, Ankara seems to have seen the writing on the fall. Anticipating the survival of the Assad regime, and even a potential U.S.- Russia settlement on Syria, Turkey has decided to prioritize two other objectives in Syria, namely pushing ISIL away from its border and blocking Kurdish People’s Protection Forces (YPG) advances, simultaneously. The incursion into Jarablus allows Turkey to do both at the same time. At least for the time being, the Turkish bridgehead not only blocks the PYD efforts to create their own bridge between Afrin and Kobane, but also increases Turkey’s value to the US as a partner in fighting ISIL.

Turkey seems to be pivoting towards the Jordanian model in Syria in terms of managing the refugee issue. For five years, Turkey had an open door policy regarding the Syrians whereas Jordan, after allowing some refugees in, decided to manage the flows on the Syrian side of its border in an informal zone. By creating an informal safe haven on the Syrian side of its border, Turkey is replicating the Jordanian model, which means that Ankara will house future refugee flows in this area, as well as potentially moving some refugees from inside Turkey to this informal zone. Needless to say, this policy would find strong support in Europe when fully implemented.

Finally, establishing a bridgehead in northern Syria allows Turkey to be invited to any future and formal talks on Syria. And if these talks fail, Turkey can try to turn this bridgehead into a staging ground for anti-Assad rebels, boosting its support for US-vetted groups, and others in this area. Whichever way the Syrian war works out, Turkey seems to have gained a permanent bridgehead in northern Syria in the short to mid-term.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 44

Turkey’s incursion into northern Syria Max Hoffman Center for American Progress

Turkey’s direct intervention into the Jarabulus-Azaz gap increases the military pressure on ISIL, reduces the likelihood of Kurdish unification along the border, and gives rise to several crucial longer-term questions, particularly regarding the desired relationship between the SDF and the Assad regime, and Turkey and the regime. Most of all, the incursion heightens the risk of escalation between Turkey and Russia/the regime, and Turkey and the SDF/YPG. Coalition efforts to clear ISIL from Dabiq and Al-Bab should be conducted with an eye towards reducing the risk of Turkish- Russian and Turkish-Kurdish escalation, either of which could significantly complicate the overall effort to eradicate ISIL and stabilize Syria.

Immediate effects of the incursion

In the near-term, the Turkish incursion has a number of important effects. First, the offensive further insulates Turkey’s border from ISIL infiltration, adding defense-in-depth to a section of the border which had proven particularly porous and where the new border wall had not been completed. This should increase the difficulty of moving people and supplies between Turkey and ISIL territory. Despite a recent ISIL counterattack north of Dabiq and subsequent rocket attack on Kilis, the Turkish- controlled buffer zone along the border should also end cross-border shelling and rocket attacks from ISIL territory. The attacks, which had previously hit Kilis and Karkamis, have been politically volatile within Turkey.

Second, the direct Turkish military intervention and Turkey’s support for Arab and Turkmen rebel groups between Azaz and Jarabulus has reduced the odds that “it is likely that Turkey has Kurdish forces associated with the PYD will establish territorial done enough to prevent continuity between Afrin and the eastern cantons of Kobane and Jazira. Turkey’s stated aim is to drive ISIL from Al-Bab, but the Kurdish territorial capture of Al-Bab would also give Ankara effective control of the continuity simply by corridor and major roads linking Manbij and Tall Rifat, the nearest demonstrating their points of Kurdish control. The Turkish offensive should therefore willingness to directly also be seen as a wedge meant to prevent Kurdish control across intervene … It will take the length of the border. It is far from clear if Turkey and the array time for the YPG/PYD to of rebels they support (of decidedly mixed capabilities and come to terms with this intentions) will be able to take and hold Al-Bab, short of a major infusion of Turkish ground forces. But it is likely that Turkey has reality, but they have done enough to prevent Kurdish territorial continuity simply by proven to be pragmatic demonstrating their willingness to directly intervene militarily to actors over the past four prevent it. (That is the likely explanation for Turkey’s initial air and years …“ artillery strikes on YPG forces north of Manbij.) It will take time for the YPG/PYD to come to terms with this reality, but they have proven to be pragmatic actors over the past four years, avoiding fights with powerful adversaries, and will be under U.S. pressure to avoid clashes with the Turks. That does not lessen the potential for local clashes or miscalculation leading to conflict between the YPG and Turkish forces or, more likely,

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 45 Arab and Turkmen rebels backed by Turkey and the YPG or its affiliated local military councils (e.g. Manbij Military Council).

The Turkish offensive puts further military pressure on ISIL. Dabiq has special ideological and theological importance for many ISIL fighters. Al-Bab is a major logistical hub and, reportedly, where ISIL manages much of their foreign recruitment and external operations. This means ISIL is likely to fight to defend the towns; opening up this new front against Dabiq and Al-Bab may force the diversion of ISIL fighters and resources from other fronts. This may, in turn, lead to opportunities for gains against ISIL in Ain Issa or in Deir Ezzour, in addition to offering a chance to further degrade ISIL militarily and strike a damaging propaganda blow.

Turkey’s push toward Manbij and Al-Bab also raises tensions with the SDF, particularly the YPG and the Manbij Military Council. While the U.S. has managed to secure an uneasy truce north of Manbij, Turkey continues “Despite these efforts and to view the SDF as a fig-leaf for the YPG and, they argue, the the relative calm since the PKK. While some of the Turkish-backed rebels have said they first week of Euphrates have no quarrel with the Kurdish forces, other groups regard the Shield, the prospect of SDF as separatists and/or apostates and have said they will wider conflict between “take back” Manbij. Turkey continues to reinforce this anti-YPG sentiment, seeing it as a useful counterweight to prevent the Kurds and the Turkish- long- term Syrian Kurdish autonomy. Given the heavy losses SDF aligned forces remains took in the Manbij offensive; it is unlikely they will hand the city very real, as is the risk of over to Turkish-backed groups. The best the U.S. can hope for conflict between the here is uneasy détente, which would be aided by consistent Syrian Arab Coalition pressure on the YPG to withdraw east of the Euphrates— fighting alongside the YPG leaving the town to elements of the SDF more acceptable to and the Turkish-backed Turkey—and the continued presence of U.S. special rebels.“ operators north of Manbij along the Sajur River to deter clashes.

Despite these efforts and the relative calm since the first week of Euphrates Shield, the prospect of wider conflict between the Kurds and the Turkish-aligned forces remains very real, as is the risk of conflict between the Syrian Arab Coalition fighting alongside the YPG and the Turkish-backed rebels. Turkey has deployed rebel units from Idlib as part of Euphrates Shield, and the SDF-backed militias from Jarabulus and Manbij view them as something approaching “If they feel particularly occupiers. Regarding the YPG and the Turks and their proxies, threatened, Turkey might powerful factions on both sides view the standoff in the context of a wider ethno-nationalist struggle (which includes the PKK launch military operations insurgency within Turkey). A widening of the Turkish-Kurdish against the YPG in Tel conflict would be very damaging to the counter-ISIL effort; it could Abyad, an area they also lead to fighting and attacks along the length of the Turkish consider to be outside border with the Kurdish cantons and a further escalation of PKK “traditional” Kurdish attacks within Turkey. For these reasons, it is unlikely that Turkey purview. Ankara might will launch a direct offensive on U.S.-backed SDF/YPG forces, even also view such a move as if it cannot be ruled out. (President Erdogan has repeatedly said Turkey will not allow the establishment of a “terror corridor” in a useful forcing northern Syria, referring to the YPG.) But Turkey might carry out mechanism to force the punitive strikes should they see continuing Kurdish efforts to push U.S. to abandon its west from Manbij, or in response to any attacks along the border or support of the YPG.“ within Turkey. If they feel particularly threatened, Turkey might

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 46 launch military operations against the YPG in Tel Abyad, an area they consider to be outside “traditional” Kurdish purview. Ankara might also view such a move as a useful forcing mechanism to force the U.S. to abandon its support of the YPG. Turkey is also likely to pursue its goal of weakening the YPG/PYD by other means, and there are suspicions surrounding the recent assassinations of a YPG commander and several members of the SDF-affiliated military councils. Finally, on the Kurdish side, the forces operating from Afrin canton remain a wild card. The U.S. seems to have minimal leverage on this branch of the YPG, while Russia has offered arms and other support to the Afrin Kurds. Clashes in Tall Rifat and Marea have already created a climate of hostility between the YPG and the non-Kurdish rebels, and the U.S. should use its ties to the other cantons to urge the Afrin Kurds to exercise restraint.

Finally, the Turkish-backed offensive may lead to two other developments. First, it may provide a focal point for the disparate rebel groups operating in northern Aleppo province and, potentially, allow for some partial military consolidation. Second, the Turkish buffer zone may allow for the return of some Syrian refugees to Syrian border areas (and has done so already, in Jarabulus), with attendant humanitarian needs within Syria.

Second-order questions arising from the incursion

Turkish officials have consistently said Al-Bab is the primary target of the incursion. If that is true, the offensive raises a number of important second-order strategic and operational questions. The effort to take Al-Bab and the aftermath of its potential capture could recast relations between several major belligerents in the Syrian war beyond the immediate Al-Bab front. The coalition should consider the desired end-state while shaping operations to liberate Al-Bab from ISIL.

It is unclear if the patchwork coalition of rebel groups Turkey is supporting will be able to take and hold Al-Bab without direct Turkish military support in the form of tanks, armored vehicles, and special forces soldiers, along with air support and indirect artillery fire support. Turkey seems to have secured Russia’s acquiescence to the offensive thus far, likely as part of the two countries’ recent rapprochement. Russia’s position—or perhaps Russian pressure—appears to have led the Assad regime to tolerate the open deployment of Turkish forces onto Syrian territory. (In any case, the regime has little ability to resist the Turkish incursion and also views ISIL as a threat.) The exact terms of Turkey’s deal with Russia and the regime are not clear; nor is it clear if there is an explicit “deal” or merely passive acquiescence, though Turkish Prime Minister Yildirim has hinted at a deconfliction arrangement with Russia. But it is unlikely that Russia and Assad will continue to tolerate direct Turkish military operations or a Turkish-backed rebel offensive should they become a direct threat to the regime (and Russia’s interest of regime survival). Indeed, it was a similar rebel offensive in Latakia and Idlib—supported by Turkey and Saudi Arabia—in 2015 that provoked Russia’s direct military intervention.

The capture of Al-Bab, then, should also be considered in this light – whoever takes the city will then be in close contact with regime forces around Aleppo, effectively opening another front in the multi- sided battle for the crucial city. Russia and the Assad regime have both shown themselves willing to go to great lengths (including regularly bombing civilians, hospitals, schools, and markets) to win the fight for Aleppo. The coalition should therefore expect Russia and the regime to react if they conclude that the Al-Bab offensive will threaten their efforts to secure Aleppo. Indeed, the imminent threat of a push on Al-Bab may be contributing to the recent escalation of Russian/regime efforts to clear the rebels from Aleppo (to preempt any second front).

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 47 If it is the Turkish-backed rebels (with or without direct Turkish military support) who take al-Bab, they will be extremely tempted to attack regime forces around Aleppo, whom they have long viewed as their primary enemy. Even if Ankara reaches a policy decision to avoid a direct confrontation with regime forces, Turkey may not be able to control the rebel groups they are supporting. How will the coalition respond if the regime or the Russians strike those forces, which include U.S.-backed groups? What if the regime or the Russians hit Turkish forces embedded with the rebels? Would Turkey seek NATO intervention (with the attendant negative consequences of NATO’s likely rejection of such a request)? What would this mean for the involvement of U.S. special operators accompanying these forces? And how would Washington respond to U.S. casualties in that circumstance? And, of course, how will these developments shape any eventual political negotiations or settlement?

Similar questions arise if it is the SDF that takes Al-Bab. What will their relationship be with the regime? How will the coalition respond if the regime or the Russians attack SDF forces? What would this mean for the involvement of U.S. special operators accompanying these forces? Additionally, if the U.S. supports an SDF offensive against Al-Bab, it will increase the likelihood of future conflict between the SDF and Turkey and the rebels they support; in this context, Turkey and the non-Kurdish rebels would see the SDF as part of the blockade of Aleppo, as well as fear the establishment of Kurdish territorial continuity along the full-length of the border.

It is unclear how the Turkish incursion will affect the timeline of any offensive to liberate Raqqah. The Turkish and rebel push on Dabiq and Al-Bab is likely to tie down ISIL forces, potentially preventing the group from shifting fighters and resources to counter offensives in other sectors, including around Raqqah. If the SDF are considered capable of pushing further towards Raqqah, simultaneous offensives might meet weaker ISIL responses in both areas. On the other hand, given the importance of having non-Kurdish elements of the SDF at the head of any offensive on Raqqah, these groups may be stretched thin, given the simultaneous need for their presence in Manbij. As a corollary, because the SDF feels threatened by Turkey, they may be reluctant to redeploy forces away from the Turkish front towards Raqqah.

There is also the issue of where ISIL fighters may go and how they may react to any potential capture of Dabiq and Al-Bab. In the past, fleeing ISIL fighters have offered open targets for coalition airstrikes, but the group now uses human shields to deter such strikes. This is likely to happen again in the wake of any successful offensive on Al-Bab. ISIL is also likely to turn increasingly to asymmetrical tactics as it loses ground, including trying to melt into the civilian population fleeing combat and resorting to hit-and-run tactics and assassinations. Ensuring restraint on the part of the Turkish-backed forces and the SDF will be important to securing any lasting calm in liberated areas.

Risks

The most obvious risk is that the Turkish offensive becomes bogged down, and Turkish forces incur increasing casualties from ISIL attacks. This is among the most likely outcomes, as the rebel groups Turkey is backing have shown limited military capabilities in the past, and much of the success thus far has been due to direct Turkish military (particularly armored) support. With their credibility on the line, Turkish forces will face pressure to expand their deployment – this mission creep is a serious risk. There is also the accompanying risk that the Turkish-backed rebel coalition splinters, especially if the push on Dabiq and Al-Bab drags on for an extended period. Many of the groups included in “Euphrates Shield” share little beyond a reliance on Turkey for military support, and they may withdraw or even turn on each other if they grow frustrated (or, conversely, in the wake of a rapid victory over ISIL, which would remove a common enemy and shift focus to the local political end- state).

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 48 The second—and more consequential—risk is of a widening of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, either as a result of unplanned escalation or due to conscious policy decisions by either party. Such an outcome could further destabilize NATO-ally Turkey, where there are already 400,000 people displaced from renewed fighting with the PKK. The worst-case scenario is that Turkey, confident after the initial success of Euphrates Shield and the lack of a response from Russia and the regime, sees an opportunity to further impose its will in Syria. This could manifest in a “Euphrates Sword” operation aimed at Manbij and/or Tel Abyad, meant to weaken the YPG/PYD and force the U.S. into picking a side and, Ankara would hope, abandoning the Kurds. Such an escalation would be devastating to the coalition efforts against ISIL and could possibly inaugurate fighting along the length of the Turkish border with the Kurdish cantons, including in sensitive Hatay province, as well as potentially increasing PKK terrorist attacks within Turkey.

Priorities

Both of the risks outlined above would damage the anti-ISIL effort and put U.S. special operators in danger. Therefore, the U.S. should continue to try and balance between its two partners on the ground (Turkey and its rebel alliance; and the SDF). Tactical efforts against ISIL should be subordinated, when necessary, to the broader strategic need to prevent Turkish-Kurdish and Arab-Kurdish escalation. Essentially, the U.S. must convince Turkey that its intervention has already achieved its goal of preventing PYD control of the length of the border in the hopes of preventing further escalation.

The YPG and their allies have bravely fought ISIL and have a legitimate right to self-defense; the U.S. should fully support the SDF in securing their current territory. But U.S. interests would not be served by a contiguous Kurdish territory along the full-length of Turkey’s border; the ethnic makeup of the region would likely lead to clashes, and Turkey would view such a development as an existential security threat. Therefore, the U.S. should try to channel further SDF military efforts south, into Raqqah, using air support and the carrot of further military support as leverage. Further SDF expansion to the west, from Manbij, should be discouraged through political pressure and the threat of withholding the support outlined above. The YPG is likely to continue pressing for an offensive west towards Al-Bab, both due to their basic goal of unifying the cantons and as a tactic to secure other concessions from the U.S. – this should be resisted. The U.S. should ratchet up pressure on the PYD/YPG to incorporate non-Kurdish and non-PYD groups into the military coalition and the administration of the cantons, as well as allow non-Kurdish residents to return to their homes. This will reduce the risk of Arab-Kurdish conflict and may make it easier for Turkey to, eventually, accept some level of Kurdish autonomy as part of a larger bargain in Syria. The military effort against ISIL is a useful mechanism to advance these efforts at inclusion and cooperation.

The U.S. should continue supporting Turkish operations toward Al-Bab and against ISIL by providing intelligence, surveillance, and air support. But the U.S. should consistently reinforce to Turkey that any operations toward Manbij or against SDF would be highly damaging to the overall coalition effort and should be avoided. At the same time, the U.S. should reiterate that it supports inclusive local administration along the entire length of the Syrian-Turkish border and opposes Kurdish separatism. It should, however, make clear that Kurds must be given assurances regarding their status in a post- war Syria, as part of any eventual political settlement. All this may help reassure Ankara that the U.S. will not ignore Turkish interests. Of course, at some point in a putative settlement process, the U.S. would have to confront the politically difficult question of federation or some other form of Kurdish autonomy, vigorously opposed not only by the Turks but by many of the U.S.-backed rebels as well;

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 49 given the sharply differing views of its two sets of Syria-based allies, Washington may want to postpone consideration of that question for as long as possible.

Regional Implications of the Turkish Incursion into Syria MAJ Shane Aguero US Army [email protected]

The strategic and operational implications of the Turkish incursion into Syria cannot be simply seen as a Turkish – Coalition issue, but has to be understood in the context of the wider problem set. Therefore, the following paper will address the current situation from the point of view of each of the actors affected (Syrian regime, Coalition vetted indigenous ground forces, the US and its coalition partners, Iran, the Kurds (collectively), Iraq, Russia, ISIL, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, and Turkey), followed by a possible US/Coalition reaction to enhance the US/Coalition’s influence/advantage vis a vis that actor.

The Turkish incursion was primarily driven by an attempt to gain leverage as a stakeholder in the eventual post-conflict Syria. The Kurdish insurgency in Turkey is a perennial issue, and by attempting to limit Syrian Kurdish gains along their southern border, Turkey hopes to stymie any potential pan-Kurdish movement arising in post-ISIL Syria and Iraq if there arises a partitioning of Syria and/or a redrawing of Iraqi Kurdistan borders. The operational goal of building a buffer area outside of Turkey which will ostensibly draw ISIL/Kurdish attention away from Turkey proper is an understandable assumption, especially when viewed as a military action designed to draw attention away from the recent coup and the exceptional response by President Erdogan. The strategic goal of gaining credibility as a stakeholder in a post-ISIL Syria will most likely be successful, as there is little probability of Turkey returning to pre-incursion borders prior to an internationally recognized peace settlement.

The US and Coalition members response should continue to be “The strategic goal of muted and to act as close, but ultimately uninvolved mediators in gaining credibility as a Turkish/Syrian Kurdish affairs. The reason is to ensure that stakeholder in a post-ISIL outside groups do not reinforce the idea that Syrian Kurds are a Syria will most likely be separate state. A separate Syrian Kurdish autonomous region or successful, as there is little proto-state would only serve to further fragment the region. probability of Turkey returning to pre-incursion The Coalition had been expecting a Turkish action of this type for several years, and the timing was the only unknown. Operationally, borders prior to an the opening of a true “northern” front against ISIL is a welcome internationally recognized addition to the battlefield geometry which places a higher caliber peace settlement.“ threat against ISIL than the YPG forces they were accustomed to fighting. Strategically, the difficulty will be in limiting Turkish gains

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 50 to make them as temporary as possible. A worst case scenario would be a deep Turkish incursion into Syria, and then Turkey retaining that land post-conflict as a permanent, if non-official addition to Turkey. The Coalition must attempt to ensure that this scenario does not occur, as it will be seen as a Turkish action against Arabs, Kurds, and Iran (Persians). That will lead to possible regional ethnic issues as Arabs, Kurds and Persians find a common enemy in Turks.

Coalition vetted indigenous ground forces should be kept as far from the Turkish offensive as possible, since battlefield command, control and coordination will become problematic with additional actors involved. Operationally, with Turkey being a credible threat to the northern ISIL- controlled area, Coalition vetted ground forces can be better utilized for small scale offensive actions thereby forcing ISIL to conduct wide area and rear area defense within ISIL-controlled southern areas, dispersing ISIL forces and allowing for large scale anti-ISIL offensive actions to be conducted by combined arms forces such as Turkey in the north, Syrian government forces (including Russian and Iranian elements) in the west, and the YPG (considered to be light motorized forces supported by Coalition enablers) to the north-east. Strategically, the Turkish offensive could be a major issue if the Coalition vetted ground forces are able to be coopted by Turkey for use post-conflict, or if the Coalition vetted ground forces are drawn from areas that fall within the Turkish occupied territories post-conflict.

The US and Coalition should again strive to ensure that the Turkish controlled areas are a temporary condition in order to ensure a post-conflict peace instead of a temporary ceasefire prior to a regional conflict occurring along more ethnic lines.

Russia most likely has no issues with the Turkish intervention, either operationally, or strategically. Operationally, the inclusion of another capable offensive element against ISIL is welcome, as the shorter the conflict can be made, the better off Russia will be with regard to blood and treasure, not to mention domestic and international prestige. Strategically, although Russia and Turkey have had a long history of discord, there is an opportunity for Russia and Turkey to find common ground. This common ground may be used to widen the gap between Turkey and NATO. The threat of Turkey leaning East presents a strategic choice to either support Turkey or some faction of Kurds, and regardless of which way the US and Europe decide, Russia has the ability to support the other side either overtly (Turkey) or covertly (a Kurdish faction).

Due to this, the US and the Coalition must find a way to publicly support Turkey, while at the same time limiting any permanent anti-Kurdish initiatives. This is essential in that the Kurds are the fourth largest stateless nation with 32 million people. It will take a concerted effort across the region to ensure a popular pan-Kurdish movement does not materialize if Iraqi Kurdistan increases in size and a partitioned Syria becomes a reality with an autonomous Kurdish region. If the US and the Coalition were to support the Kurds in Syria and Iraq, Turkey would move incrementally towards Russia, whereas if the Syrian Kurds are slighted, Russia would be in a position to surreptitiously aid the PKK and Syrian Kurds due to increasing Russian influence in Iran, Iraq and Syria.

Syria has the most to gain operationally, and the most to lose strategically due to the Turkish incursion. Operationally, the inclusion of Turkey into the conflict increases the threat against ISIL, and should posit a faster resolution to the conflict as ISIL controlled territory is eroded until Raqqah is liberated, and delivering a death knell to the idea of the ISIL caliphate in the near- to mid-term. Strategically, however, the Turkish incursion into Syria shows the mid-term inability of Syria to maintain control of the entirety of their territory, and the relative strength of Turkey. This show of force, whether or not Turkey withdraws to pre-conflict borders will almost assuredly lead to an arms race between Syria (supported by Russia and Iran) and Turkey. Turkey will be emboldened by this

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 51 intervention and the support of the US/NATO, and may feel the need to maintain this buffer zone in Syria which will lead to a difficult position for the US/NATO/Coalition as they will be tacitly supporting an action which is difficult to defend under international law.

The Coalition must not allow the Turkish incursion zone to become permanent and incur the wrath of the Syrian populace if there is a Syrian regime change. Due to the influence of both Russia and Iran, it would be difficult to imagine a pro-Western regime, but if the new regime is nationalist, or even Arabic, it would be a bitter pill to accept a Turkish owned disputed area in Syria.

ISIL views the Turkish incursion as an operational defeat as they were quickly displaced from their forward positions, and did so quickly without defending. This can viewed as pragmatism, fear or advance warning. Regardless of the reason, the fact remains that the Turkish incursion was remarkably successful in gaining a large amount of territory relatively quickly. Strategically, the question of advance warning becomes much more pressing. If there was collusion between some element in Turkey and ISIL, that will make the campaign against ISIL more difficult if partnered operations with Turkish forces become a reality. If there is no collusion between these forces, then it makes ISIL much more desperate as they are increasingly pressured on all fronts, and their defeat becomes much more inevitable as they will not have the ability to defend against a concerted offensive against the forces arrayed against them. Their most likely strategic goal is simply to prolong the conflict until fatigue sets in for the Coalition forces, and then attempt to fracture the Coalition and other opposing forces while moving their upper echelons of leadership and as many forces as they save to another theater of operation in order to maintain the viability of the ISIL brand. Alternately, it is possible that ISIL could attempt to simply return to being the resilient insurgent network that they evolved from, returning to a phase I/phase II insurgency.

Iraq, due to the support given by Iran can view the Turkish incursion as operationally welcome, but strategically problematic. This is due to the Iranian view that Iraq, Syria and Lebanon are within their sphere of influence. If the Turkish incursion becomes permanent, it will be seen as direct attack on Iranian influence in the region, possibly causing an outbreak of violence as Iran seeks to use proxies to dissuade Turkey from retaining that area. The Iraqi government may have a different view but, due to the increasing Iranian influence, the minority view may be quickly vilified into acquiescence using the recent ISIL/Sunni collusion.

Iran most likely views the Turkish incursion as a setback, since Turkey is another element on the battlefield that they cannot control and is hostile to Iran. The biggest issue is that operationally, the Turkish incursion points to the fact that Iranian support to the Syrian regime was not sufficient to stop ISIL. This is a narrative defeat for Iran, since the narrative they were attempting to spin was that they were able to support the Assad regime and save Syria. With the their inability to defeat the anti-Assad forces, the expansion of ISIL into Iraq, Coalition operations into Syria, Russian aid to Syria and finally the Turkish incursion, it will be difficult to spin the Syrian campaign into a victorious narrative.

The US and the Coalition should once again attempt to ensure that the Turkish incursion is only temporary, and build a narrative showing that it was global assistance that was necessary for the dissolution of ISIL in both Syria and Iraq, and that all who participated in the campaign were necessary. This will prevent a loss of face for Iran, Turkey, Iraq, the Kurds and Russia, which is necessary for a peaceful post-ISIL Syria.

Jabhat Fatah al-Sham views the Turkish incursion as an operational boon that will make their conflict against ISIL and the Syrian regime easier as both ISIL and Syria will have an existential threat to

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 52 worry about. This makes the strategic victory over ISIL and Syria more probable, but the strategic context of the Turkish incursion depends upon the length of the occupation. If the occupation is temporary, that will allow Jabhat Fatah al-Sham to gather strength in the security vacuum of a post- conflict Syria. If the incursion results in a permanent Turkish presence in the country, then Jabhat Fatah al-Sham has to determine if they will continue to accept surreptitious Turkish assistance in exchange for becoming a loose proxy of Turkey, or if they will return to their ideological roots and conduct offensive actions against apostate and Western backed governments.

The US and Coalition governments should continue to urge all state actors to refrain from using forces that are unaccountable under international law as proxies in this conflict, since doing so will inevitably lead to further conflict as heavily armed, and trained proxy forces will be unwilling to cede power to another party that may or may not have been an enemy during the previous conflict. The desire to create proxy forces that are easily controllable is strong, but ultimately misplaced unless placed under effective command and control by the supporting nation. Barring that, these groups will be free to cause conflict until they are disbanded or destroyed.

In conclusion, the Turkish incursion into Syria affects multiple actors including the Syrian regime, Coalition vetted indigenous ground forces, the US and its coalition partners, Iran, the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds, Iraq, Russia, ISIL, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, and Turkey. Each of these actors has an operational and strategic view of the Turkish intervention. Those that view the Turkish action as operationally beneficial are Turkey, the US, the Coalition, Russia, Iraq, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, the Syrian regime, and Coalition vetted indigenous ground forces. The forces operationally hindered by the Turkish incursion are the Syrian Kurds, Iran and ISIL. Strategically, Turkey and Russia have a positive view of the Turkish operations, whereas the Syrian regime, Iran, Iraq, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, ISIL, the US and the Coalition, the Syrian Kurds and the Coalition vetted indigenous ground forces all will be negatively affected by the Turkish actions.

Comments on Turkish Incursion

Yezid Sayigh Carnegie Middle East Center

With regard to the implications of the Turkish intervention in Syria is primarily a maneuver by Erdogan to display an appearance of being in charge (of the army and foreign policy) in the wake of the attempted coup, but in reality what seems to be an offensive posture is a defensive one that seeks to mask the big challenges the Turkish president faces at home. These include: 1) his continuing confrontation with the PKK (which he resumed as an extension of his domestic political agenda), 2) his need to consolidate control over his own party as well as the general public and the civil service (it's true that he has fired 80,000 civil servants and is going after opposition or independent media, academics, activists, which consolidates his personal grip, but Turkey is a diverse, complex, modern country and these measures will also inflict a high social, political, and economic cost too), and 3) his need to worry about the army (it's true he's defeated the coup, but the army will not regain its full cohesion and effectiveness for years, during which he's implicated it in a nasty domestic war with the country's Kurdish population, and he can't be absolutely sure that it is now wholly neutralized politically.)

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 53 So in my assessment, controlling a narrow strip of land inside Syria by Turkish units is more about show and PR, as are statements about being ready to work with the US to regain Raqqa. The Turkish army can't reach Raqqa without going either thru Syrian Kurdish areas (if going directly south from the border), which would be very problematic and disruptive for US military planning, or through or adjacent to Assad regime forces (if hooking via Aleppo East and then south of the Tabqa dam to Raqqa). The Turkish Defence Minister Isik has publicly said Turkey will "support" but not be part of the Euphrates Force.

The takeaway is that no single ground force operating in Syria today can take Raqqa on its own, no matter how much air support it gets: not the Assad regime, the Kurds/SDF, nor any combination of the "moderate" opposition (or non-moderate opposition for that matter). But I don’t see a coalition of any two of these forces working together, either.

Comments relative to Turkish Incursion

Zana K. Gulmohamad University of Sheffield, UK

There are two major militarized powers in Iraqi Kurdistan: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which is the largest Kurdish party in Iraq and allied with Turkey (particularly the AKP). The KDP is not opposing Turkey’s intervention in Syria. The KRG’s President Masoud Barzani and the KDP leader said in an interview with France 24 on September 10 2016, “We cannot condone an attack on the Kurds by any country. But at the same time we don’t agree that a number of Kurds should take up arms to fulfil their demands… This group which is the Democratic Union Party [PYD], has monopolized the situation in Syria… This party has pushed out other parties [other Syrian Kurdish parties allied with the KDP] and become part of the PKK… They should not have done that, they angered the Turks.”24 There are old rivalries between the PKK and the KDP. Rivalries have also now developed between the KDP and PYD and its armed wing the YPG. The KDP closed the borders between the PYD controlled Syrian Kurdish side and Iraqi Kurdistan. They have been opening it for short periods selectively allowing things through (mainly humanitarian) after indirect pressure from the PUK elite and US recommendation.

The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) is the second largest ruling party in Iraqi Kurdistan. It is fragmented in nature and allied with the PYD and its military wing the YPG. The PUK have provided logistic support to this group since its inception.25 The PUK were the first actors to mediate and coordinate between the PYD, YPG and the US.26 The majority of the PUK leaders do not agree with the Turkish intervention and they view it as a threat to their allies. Thus, there are two contradicting foreign policies towards Syrian Kurdistan “Rojava”. One is support for the PYD by the PUK, the other is opposing it by the KDP. This is despite the fact that the KDP leadership have in the last years tried to unify the Kurdish Syrian forces in a summit in Erbil that included: the PYD, and Kurdish Syrian forces backed and equipped by the KDP which are now based in Iraqi Kurdistan. These efforts failed. Nevertheless, the KDP has superiority in governmental bodies as it controls most vital bodies. The

24 France 24 Arabic. (2016). Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MXBcLlrExMQ 25 Author’s interviews with the PUK’s senior security and intelligence officials. (2015 & 2016). 26 Author’s interviews with the PUK’s senior security and intelligence officials. (2015 & 2016).

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 54 KRG is dominated by the KDP, which competes with the PYD and is allied with Turkey. Therefore, there is no formal opposition towards Turkish intervention in Syria from the KRG.

Comments relative to Turkish Incursion

Ramazan Kilinc University of Nebraska Omaha

The July 15 coup attempt facilitated the AKP’s transformation toward a more hegemonic, nationalist and populist Islamism that was already underway. In the days after the coup, the AKP increased its control over the system further. Holding Fethullah Gülen and the soldiers affiliated with his religious movement solely responsible for the coup from the very first moments of the coup attempt, the AKP fired tens of thousands of public employees for being affiliated with the movement, redesigned Turkish bureaucracy, and increased control over media and civil society. Despite its support for the elected government and stance against the coup, the Kurdish HDP “The psychology of was excluded by the AKP in the post-coup period. While President Turkey being in a war and Prime Minister met with all political party leaders and sought contributes to the their support in the post-coup period, the leader of the HDP was not government’s invited to many of the official meetings. Populism mostly in the form of anti-Westernism also rose as the AKP officials pointed to the U.S. hegemony in the as being behind the coup. In short, the coup attempt completed the country and being a process of Turkish Islamism’s evolution to its new version. dissident becomes increasingly difficult ... The intervention in Syria contributed to this process by strengthening the AKP’s domestic hegemony, increasing nationalist Turkey’s involvement in discourse, and revamping its anti-Westernism. Its stance against Syria will not undermine the Kurdish fighters in Syria boosts anti-Westernism and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham nationalistic zeal in the country. The psychology of Turkey being in although it helps a war contributes to the government’s hegemony in the country and coalition vetted being a dissident becomes increasingly difficult. Given this tendency, I think Turkey’s involvement in Syria will not undermine indigenous groups Jabhat Fatah al-Sham although it helps coalition vetted indigenous except the Kurdish YPG groups except the Kurdish YPG elements. It definitely helps the elements.” removal of ISIL from bordering areas with Turkey –which is a key legitimizing element for the AKP’s domestic considerations.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 55 Question (QL3): What does primary source opinion research data tell us about popular support for ISIL in ISIL-held Iraq and globally outside of the Combined Joint Operation Area (CJOA) (Syria and Iraq)?

Prioritized List of Study Topics Organized by Study Approach Hassan Abbas National Defense University [email protected]

QL3: What does primary source opinion research data tell us about popular support for ISIL in ISIL- held Iraq and globally outside of the Combined Joint Operation Area (CJOA) (Syria and Iraq)?

ANSWER: My frequent travels to Iraq convince me that ISIL support is inextricably linked to tribal alliances and networks run by former Bathist operators. Anti-Shia factor is increasingly influencing public opinion in ISIL controlled regions but still cannot be deemed to be a dominating factor. Parallel to the negative consequences of Hashd al-Shabi operations in certain areas, a counterbalancing factor at play is that Shia majority towns are hosting displaced Sunnis earning them some goodwill.

Popular Support for ISIL Major Shane Aguero US Army [email protected]

Primary source opinion data informs us ISIL does not have the support of the majority of the population in any country (Galka, 2015; Mauro, 2015; Withnall, 2015). The most support for ISIL as seen via a compilation of opinion polling conducted by Pew Research Center, Washington Institute, ORB International, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, ACRPS and Zogby is concentrated in Syria, with 21% of those polled expressing a favorable opinion of ISIL (Galka, 2015; Mauro, 2015). The next most supportive areas are Nigeria (14%), Tunisia (13%), Senegal and Malaysia (both 11%). In 15 other polled nations the level of support was under 10% (Galka, 2015).

These results can be very misleading however when these numbers are more fully dissected. For example, in Egypt, only 2% of the population has a favorable view of ISIS when viewed as a composite, however, when Arab youth (Burson-Marsteller, 2016) is polled (defined as age 18 to 24), 22% are not concerned about the rise of ISIS. While this does not indicate support, 13% agreed with the following statement: “If Daesh did not use so much violence, I could see myself supporting it” (Burson-Marsteller, 2016, pg 8). Again, while this does not indicate support, it does indicated that ideological agreement with ISIS is much higher in the youth population of MENA than in the general population.

The primary driver of support for ISIS in the youth population appears to be a lack of economic opportunity, although there are multiple other reasons presented as possibilities such as the superiority of Islam or the presence of Western troops in the reason. (Burson-Marsteller, 2016, pg. 10) This indicates that there is a massive distinction between ideological support for ISIS and active, material support for ISIS. In interviews with multiple subjects arrested or convicted for material support of ISIS, radicalization is a personal decision that includes ideological support coupled with some psychological, emotional, spiritual or social event that catalyzes the ideology into action

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 56 (Vindino, Hughes, 2015; Rasmussen, 2015). The primary driver of these catalytic actions appears to be cultural isolation for the majority of European foreign fighters (Galka, 2016).

In conclusion, the level of global and regional support for ISIS is relatively low. The level of material support and active support for ISIL is exceptionally low by percentage. The primary drivers of ideological support for ISIS appears to be economic, while the primary driver of active, material support for ISIS appears to be cultural isolation. Even with a very small support base of under 10% of the population, the total number of people expressing ideological support for ISIS is in the tens of millions globally (Mauro, 2015).

References Withnall, A. (December 8, 2015). One chart that shows what people in the Muslim world really think about Isis. [article]. Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/donald-trump-muslims-isis-one-chart- shows-what-people-really-think-about-a6765241.html Mauro, R. (June 28, 2015). ISIS Has Up To 42 Million Supporters in the Arab World. [article] Retrieved from http://www.clarionproject.org/analysis/isis-has-least-42-million-supporters-arab- world# Galka, M. (December 1, 2015). Support for ISIS in the Muslim World – Perceptions vs Reality. [article] Retrieved from http://metrocosm.com/support-isis-muslim-world-perceptions-vs-reality/ ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller. (2016). Inside the Hearts and Minds of Arab Youth: 8th Annual ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey [survey]. Retrieved from http://www.arabyouthsurvey.com/en/about Rasmussen, N. (February 11, 2015). Hearing before the House Committee on Homeland Security “Countering Violent Islamist Extremism: The Urgent Threat of Foreign Fighters and Homegrown Terror” [testimony]. Washington D.C: US House of Representatives. Vindino, L. and Hughes, S. (December 2015). ISIS in America, From Retweets to Raqqa. Washington D.C.: George Washington University. Galka, M. (April 26, 2016). What motivates foreign ISIS fighters? New research has an answer. [article]. Retrieved from http://metrocosm.com/foreign-isis-fighters/

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 57 Response to Quick Look 3 Kim Cragin National Defense University [email protected]

Quick Look #3. What does the primary source opinion research tell us about popular support for ISIL globally outside the Combined Joint Operation Area?

An academic article, recently accepted by the Journal of Strategic Studies, addresses this question by measuring the appeal of Daesh’s propaganda over time for local populations within Egypt, using Twitter data in 2014.27 Findings demonstrate that: (1) Daesh has a social media “fingerprint,” distinct from other Salafi groups; (2) while Daesh’s messages generally do not resonate with Egyptians, its appeal has increased in Upper Egypt and the Sinai regions; and (3) this method can be applied more broadly to measure the appeal of Daesh over time.

Methods Our basic approach is grounded in social science and rhetorical theory that treats language and worldview as inextricably linked: real world language-use informs the social and political world, and our social and political realities influence our language. More than just communication, word choice also provides insight into how a person understands the world.

By definition, VEOs promote a worldview that is far from the typical and their word choices are distinct. With a large enough sample, it is possible to use statistical measures to identify a linguistic model or “fingerprint” for VEOs: what words are statistically more likely to be used, and exactly how much more likely. Because the model is not simply a list of words, but rather a weighted list of improbability, it has greater precision.

Our linguistic model for Daesh was developed through keyness testing, using a log-likelihood approach. Keyness testing identifies keywords by comparing how often they appear in a target collection of texts, relative to how often we would expect them to appear in a random sample of more typical texts. The resulting linguistic model is similar to a fingerprint analysis. Our initial keyness tests yielded 97 distinct words for “Daesh talk.”

Further empirical tests, however, found that these 97 keywords alone did not provide fine enough resolution to detect small (<5%) degrees of resonance within sub-regions of Egypt. To add greater resolution, we calculated collocates for Daesh. Collocates are statistically conspicuous because of their (co)location near each other: e.g. prosodic associations, such as "habitual" with negative words ("offender,” etc.). This approach yielded 51 two-word collocates and nine three-word collocates for Daesh. By adding these collocates to the results of our keyness testing, we were able to detect much smaller variations of resonance amongst Egypt’s Twitter-users.

Results The table below reports the findings from our analysis. It illustrates the extent to which Daesh’s worldview resonated with residents of the four sub-regions of Egypt – the Sinai Peninsula, Cairo/Nile Delta, Alexandria/Coast and Upper Egypt – in 2014. For each region, readers will find four stacked bar graphs that go from left to right, which correspond to the four quarters of the calendar year. Each

27 William M. Marcellino, Kim Cragin, Joshua Mendelsohn, Andrew Michael Cady, Madeline Magnuson, and Kathleen Reedy, "Measuring the Popular Resonance of Daesh’s Propaganda", Strategic Forum, forthcoming.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 58 bar graph measures the proportion of Twitter users, in the defined region and time-period, whose Tweets echo the worldview articulated by Daesh. (The axis is truncated at 40%). For easier reading, the bar graphs are color coded in a “stoplight style:” red reports the percentage with high resonance, orange indicates medium resonance and so on with green indicating the non-resonant Twitter users. The gray shaded segments highlight changes from one quarter to the next within each region.

Resonance of Daesh’s Worldview in Egypt during 2014

Our findings suggest that only 1-2% of Twitter users pass the threshold for high resonance with Daesh. Even lumping high and medium resonance, the total never exceeds – and tends to fall well short of – 5% of Twitter users within each region. Based on these results, it is easy to conclude that Daesh’s way of thinking is highly salient to a small sliver of the population in Egypt.

But the value of this approach is that it goes beyond identifying a snapshot of that small sliver of the Egyptian population with the highest resonance for Daesh’s worldview. It also measures shifts in degree of resonance over time. Results indicate that Daesh gained ground with Twitter users in all four sub-regions of Egypt during 2014. The strongest gains occurred in the Sinai and Upper Egypt regions. Among those Twitter-users with high resonance, our analysis reveals that support is intense: Twitter users in this category were 9.2 times more likely to be resonant with Daesh’s worldview than random chance.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 59 Response to Quick Look 3 Munqith Dagher Director, IACSS, Iraq [email protected]

Karl Kaltenthaler Professor, University of Akron and Case Western Reserve University [email protected]

What does primary source opinion research data tell us about popular support for ISIL in ISIL held Iraq (Mosul)?

Ramadi, a largely Sunni town in Iraq, has been cleared of most of the remnants of the ISIS forces that occupied it until late December 2015. While pockets of resistance remain, there is optimism in the U.S. media that the defeat of ISIS in Ramadi foretells the coming liberation of Mosul, the second biggest city in Iraq and a significant source of revenue and propaganda value for ISIS. The Iraqi government has announced that Mosul is the next significant city to be liberated. Mosul will be a much tougher fight for Iraqi forces and their allies than Ramadi was. It might be a very long while before Mosul is pried from the Islamic State.

Why is Mosul likely to be such a difficult challenge for the Iraqi army and its allies? The reasons boil down to local acquiesce to ISIS, Mosul’s Sunnis aversion to the Iraqi state re-establishing control in their city, and the allies the Iraqi army will have to depend on to re-take the city. It is not a simple equation of the Iraqi army’s troop strength versus ISIS’s troop numbers in Mosul. Certainly, ISIS is grossly outnumbered. That being said, the politics on the ground are in ISIS’s favor. Ramadi is a largely de-populated city that was always much smaller than Mosul. Mosul has a very large population and that population is not friendly to the Iraqi state.

One thing is that is very instructive about how the forthcoming battle may play out, is to look back at how Mosul was conquered by ISIS in June of 2014. Iraq’s second biggest city, with around two million residents, was taken by a group of around 400 ISIS fighters with the help of some Sunni tribesmen. The much, much larger Iraqi army force simply fled as ISIS approached. The ISIS forces were welcomed by some residents within Mosul while most certainly did not resist ISIS. The key to understanding this is to view ISIS and the Iraqi army through the eyes of Mosul’s Sunni population. For them, the Iraqi army, was a Shia-dominated force, operating with the help and guidance of hated Iran, that had a record of abusing and humiliating Iraqi Sunnis. Mosul’s Sunnis were still angry about how demonstrating Sunnis had been treated during the Arab Spring demonstrations of 2011. Many Sunnis were shot, beaten, or disappeared by Iraqi Shia-dominated security forces. Thus, for Mosul’s Sunnis, ISIS may have seemed like a group of fanatics who were brutal and even savage, but they were Sunnis who opposed the Iraqi Shia-dominated state. Thus, Mosul residents acquiescing to ISIS taking over their city was more a vote of no confidence in the sectarian Shia-dominated Iraqi state than it was an embrace of the brutally intolerant Salafism of ISIS.

One might believe that since ISIS has controlled Mosul that its harsh rule has alienated the population and created a yearning for the return of the Iraqi state. While ISIS never had the full support of the population of Mosul, its popularity there has been growing, not waning. Public opinion polls have been carried out by IIACSS in Mosul in June 2014, June 2015, and December 2015. These polls give us a very useful view of how Mosul residents think about ISIS and its opponents. The results are not good news for the Iraqi government and the U.S.-led coalition against ISIS.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 60

When ISIS took over Mosul in June 2014, just 10% of the population thought that ISIS represented their interests. In June of 2015, 26% of Mosul residents believed ISIS represented their interests and by December of 2015, that proportion had risen to 40%. In June of 2015, 21% of Mosul residents interviewed said that things had gotten better than 18 months prior to the survey. In December of 2015, 55% of Mosul residents said that things had gotten better than 18 months prior to the survey. Thus, it seems that Mosul residents are getting used to ISIS and find its presence is more tolerable over time.

This does not mean that the people of Mosul want to be ruled by ISIS forever. In December of 2015, 40% of Mosul residents wanted ISIS to maintain control of the city, while 60% wanted ISIS to give up control of the city. This majority support for ISIS to leave does not mean that they want the Iraqi state, as it is now fashioned to simply re-establish the pre-ISIS status quo. This same survey shows that there is great distrust of the Iraqi state and its American allies. Eighty-two percent of Mosul residents have no confidence in the Iraqi parliament, 60% have no confidence in the Iraqi army, and 70% have no confidence in the Iraqi police. Seventy-two percent of Mosul residents do not believe that the Iraqi central government represents their interests.

The United States is also greatly distrusted in Mosul. A plurality of Mosul residents, 46%, said that U.S. and coalition airstrikes are the biggest threat to the security of their family, more than 38% who said ISIS was a threat to their family’s security. Another clear sign of the distrust of the United States is that 60% of Mosul residents said in December 2015 that ISIS was supported by the US government. That was up from 37% who believed that in June 2014.

What does all of this information mean? It means that the Iraqi army or U.S. forces would not be welcomed into Mosul with open arms. While ISIS is not overwhelming popular in Mosul, it is more popular than the current Iraqi regime. The Iraqi government will have to create a political solution to assuage Mosul residents’ fears. Mosul will not be successfully rid of ISIS, if it is accomplished by a Shia conquest of the city. U.S. forces coming in to expel ISIS would be just as unwelcome. Iraqi Sunni and Shia, national and local politicians must set about creating a national accommodation, whereby both sides can feel like they can live with each other in trust and not fear. This will be very hard to do, with Iran pushing for a maximalist position for Iraq’s Shias and hardline Sunnis, particularly Salafis from the Gulf States pushing for resistance to what is viewed as an Iranian puppet government. But, as Mosul goes, so does Sunni Iraq. If Mosul is to once again become part of Iraqi government controlled territory, its Sunnis must be convinced they have a secure and valued place in Iraq’s national politics.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 61 What ISIS Can Teach Policymakers

Ruben Enikolopov Barcelona Institute of Political Economy and Governance r [email protected]

Vera Mironova Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School [email protected]

Mohammed Hussein Iraq Oil Report

Military preparations to retake Mosul, the second biggest town in Iraq, are almost done, and no one in Baghdad or Washington has any doubt that these next maneuvers will eradicate ISIS’s Iraqi reign. But the question is, then what? Are the West and Iraq prepared to fill the power vacuum the fall of ISIS will leave behind? Unlike Syria, the Sunni Iraqis welcomed ISIS and considered them a liberating force. So how can coalition forces ensure post-ISIS civilians will not desperately need another “liberation” soon after this operation?

A good place to start might be to find out why Sunni Iraqis welcomed ISIS in the first place. In other words, what did ISIS do right? We decided to find out by asking the people who showed little resistance to ISIS expansion in 2014. Some interesting factors about ISIS’s effectiveness came to light by asking very basic questions to a random sample of 200 Sunni Muslims in Qara Tapah and Jalawla— two sub-districts in the northern Diyala governorate, which partially fell under ISIS control in 2014.

First, what did ISIS get right?

Governance Much Worse Worse No Change Better Much Better

Court 5.5 79.5 12 3 Security 5 63.5 25.5 6 Police Force 5 63.5 25.5 6 Public Goods 7.5 62.5 23.5 6.5

Security

Much Worse Worse No Change Better Much Better

Property Security 4.5 10 65.5 19 1

Personal Security 10 12.5 57 20.5

Crime prevention 8.5 5.5 70 13.5 2.5

Check Points 1 63 24.5 11.5

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 62 It is no secret that after US intervention, Sunni Muslims were unhappy with the Shia-dominated central government in Baghdad. Many thought the government incompetent, and some even considered it to be the root cause of the problems. So to win the hearts and minds of Iraqi Sunnis, the first thing ISIS fixed was justice system and security situation. Immediately after taking territory, ISIS established a hardline policing and court system, one where justice was swift, one where a person would quickly have their hand removed (via sword) for stealing. In this way, ISIS was able to instill order into a previously chaotic situation.

ISIS is also credited for reducing security-related bureaucracy. For example pre-ISIS Iraqi Army and Police checkpoints were considered excessive in number and were manned by disrespectful and rude personal. Locals had found it very annoying to spend at least 5-10 minutes under a hot Iraqi sun at each checkpoint between towns. “To travel from Qara Tapah to Diyala,” said Azada Rash, a local taxi driver, “took almost 2 hours when it was just 1 hour and 20 minutes before checkpoints were installed. And sometimes, people could not even use the road because of security concerns and criminal gangs.”

Though the Sunnis believe ISIS did a great deal to ensure internal security, they also believe ISIS is to blame for massive destruction of property and many civilian deaths because of the war. Despite a very high ranking on security achievements, only a quarter of people think personal and property security were better under ISIS (than under the former regime). However, almost the same percentage of people strongly disagreed. Compared to other terrorist groups and even legitimate governments around the world, ISIS has done fairly well with security policies in the area (at least better than the Baghdad government). However, that is not the case when it comes to other public concerns. Subsidies the Baghdad government had provided, such as pesticides, promptly halted with the takeover of ISIS, and other services, such as schools, and medicine for public hospitals, remained closed as they had been under the previous rule.

So what else did ISIS get wrong? Economy Much Worse Worse No Change Farming 42.5 38 19.5 Employment 22.5 61 15.5 1 Salary 24.5 63.5 11 1 Opportunity to build up a family 20 48 26.5 50.5

In general, the locals perceive the economy to be worse under ISIS. The biggest issue has been trade isolation. Farmers can’t sell their products—wheat, potatoes and sheep meat—which is a serious issue for the mostly agricultural region. If previously government was buying agricultural produce in the region to distribute it to people in need now this major buyer was off limits to farmers. Locals also weren’t able to buy imports, so some products like cooking gas are not even available while prices for other products more than tripled. Soon after ISIS took the territories, baby formula, which sold for $3.50 in government-controlled territories, climbed to $14, and to get it meant dealing with smugglers. The bad economy is even affecting the marriage rate. Because Iraqi culture requires a man to have a good job before he can propose to a woman, the bad economy has meant many young people can’t marry and start families. How much economic woe is because of ISIS policies and how much is because of outside sanctions is unclear, but crystal clear is the truth that ISIS has neither the means nor inclination to remedy it. Even in places where they were paying schoolteachers salary, it was not

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 63 an adequate compensation received only sporadically. So what lessons has the rise and impending fall of ISIS taught us?

The main take away point is that ISIS did a great job gaining public support by beefing up the justice system and dealing with security issues. They got very good scores on their own policies related to internal governance. The results of our survey made ISIS look pretty good among locals even though the survey was conducted after ISIS atrocities, and a retakeover of their territory by the Kurdish forces. This means actual attitudes toward ISIS could be even more positive than those reported in the survey. ISIS, however, was also the cause of the war and trade sanctions, both devastating blows to the economy and social aspects of those societies.

So what have we learned? That after the upcoming Mosul operation, the incoming government— whoever that may be— better do at least as well as ISIS did with security issues, crime, and justice. They also need to be prepared to right the sinking economic ship, some of which (sanctions) should automatically disappear post ISIS.

Response to Quick Look 3 Alexis Everington Madison Springfield Inc. [email protected]

3. What does primary source opinion research tell us about population support for ISIL in ISIL-held Iraq and globally outside the Combined Joint Operation Area (CJOA) (Syria and Iraq)?

1. The population is largely opposed to ISIL in both Syria and Iraq 2. However, the population is too afraid to do anything about it given the history of ISIL brutality and the lack of international intervention on this and other related events. 3. Consequently the majority will remain flexible and opportunistic. This is problematic in that they will not confront ISIL unless it is clearly in their benefit, but it is advantageous in that if real support is given there is potential to mobilize locals. 4. As time goes on, ISIL wins more opportunity to persuade locals that it was right all along. This is best done by adopting sectarian narratives. International support of Kurds and deals with Iran, for example, only serve to strengthen such arguments. The international community has to provide tangible and visible support to people in ISIL-controlled areas.

Quick Look at Social Media Presence as an Indicator of the Strength of the Islamic State Robert Hinck, Jala Naguib, and Randolph Kluver Texas A&M University [email protected]

Executive Summary

In support of USCENTCOM’s SMA Reach Back Support, a research team at Texas A&M conducted a follow-up study to its SMA report on Social Media & The Islamic State: The Legitimation of the Virtual Caliphate (March, 2016).

Our analysis aids CENTCOM’s questions regarding:

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 64

Q3: What does primary source opinion research data tell us about popular support for ISIL in ISIL- help Iraq and globally outside of the Combined Joint Operation Area (Syria and Iraq)?

Q4: What are the general perceptions associated with ISIL endorsed themes, to include 1) re- establishing the Caliphate; 2) imposition of Shariah law; 3) belief that the Ummah/Islam is under attack from the West; 4) low tolerance for non-Sunni Muslim ethno-religious groups; 5) negative disposition towards gender equality?

For this reach-back, the researchers conducted a network and content analysis of the Middle East Twittersphere to provide primary source opinion data gauging support for ISIL messaging. Two studies were conducted: the first examined use of known ISIL hashtags to determine whether ISIL generated content was driving conversation within the Arabic Twittersphere; the second examined the discourse around two widely tweeted hashtags—“Caliphate” and “Daash”—looking for criticism or support for ISIL’s claim of establishing a new Islamic State.

Summary of Findings • ISIL’s support within the Arabic Twittersphere continues to erode and its ability to control the narrative appears significantly weakened. • Discourse around ISIL has primarily shifted away from the efficacy of its Caliphate to updates regarding recent setbacks in Iraq and Syria. • Even among those who do not support ISIL, US and Russian policy in Syria is heavily criticized. Russian actions, in particular, are negatively framed as responsible for killing innocent Syrians. • Non-ISIL opinion leaders remain critical of US and Russian backed actions in the Middle East, with many believing that the US is biased towards Shiites.

Methodology Data was generated using Texas A&M’s Media Monitoring System programed to capture Twitter content from the Middle East. This system draws from a seed list of approximately 450 Arabic language twitter users, and captures tweets from across the region. Approximately 500,000- 1,000,000 tweets are captured per day, allowing us to discern trends and networks. Although it certainly does not capture all Twitter activity in the region, this quick look allows us to discern trends that are typically mirrored in the larger Arabic twittersphere. Our previous study showed us that Twitter quickly removes ISIL-sympathetic profiles, and thereby limits the number of followers that might exist. Therefore, we follow hashtags rather than follower-leader networks.

The research team conducted searches for known ISIL hashtags which was used for our previous study. Data was analyzed by conducting both a network analysis, identifying key nodes and networks of Twitter generated content, in addition to a content analysis of key themes emerging from user generated Tweets. Data was collected primarily collected from 10/10/16-10/17/16, along with some comparison to the number of Tweets from 30 and 90 days back from 10/17/16. Two data pulls were conducted: the first examined use of known ISIL hashtags to determine whether ISIL generated content was driving conversation within the Arabic Twittersphere; the second examined the discourse around two widely tweeted hashtags—“Caliphate” and “Daash”—looking for criticism or support for ISIL’s claim of establishing a new Islamic State. Caliphate was chosen because of its positive association with the idea of a new Islamic State, and is more likely to be used by those sympathetic to the organization; while Daash was chosen to represent an alternative description of ISIL’s organization, one that is more likely to be used by those who are unsympathetic.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 65 Quick Look Study 1: Examination of ISIL Hashtags

RQ1: To what extent are previously known ISIL hashtags driving conversation in the Arabic Twittersphere?

We conducted searches for known ISIL hashtags which suggests significantly fewer attempts by ISIL accounts to use them in organizing ISIL discourse in support of the Islamic State. Table 1 and Figure 1 depict the decline of hashtag use in comparison to the last seven days, 30 days, and 90 days. Network and content analysis of the top four hashtags, #IslamicState, #Daash, #Dabiq, and #Daeshis demonstrate that mainstream public intellectuals, academics, and journalists drive most of the conversation in these areas and are generally critical of ISIL focusing on recent events and ISIL setbacks in Syria and Iraq. Table 2 provides a closer look at suspect ISIL users that are caught up in our data set, identified by overly religious rhetoric, use of key terms such as “infidels,” or depiction of the ISIL flag. The table shows how many followers the suspect ISIL users have, number of tweets using known ISIL hashtags, and summary of content being tweeted. These numbers are just for our data set, not for the entire twitterverse.

The data suggests that ISIL accounts using the known hashtags create very little content, and are generally followed by no more than 200 users, which suggests that ISIL’s messaging capacity is limited and diminishing. The content Tweeted typically falls into two categories: criticism of other Tweets or reporting on casualties caused by ISIL. Analysis also showed ISIL users incorporating the Remaining/lingering), which might suggest ISIL setbacks, are reducing public) #ةيقاب hashtag support for ISIL. Finally, Figures 2, 3, and 4 provide a closer look into the networked component of suspected ISIL user generated content. In all three cases, network analysis shows ISIL generated content is pushed by ISIL sympathizers towards other non-sympathetic accounts, instead of to other ISIL sympathizers (or those that link to clear ISIL content). This suggests that ISIL messaging is not being picked up by others, providing more evidence doubting the effectiveness of ISIL attempts to influence public opinion.

Table 1. Frequency of Tweets from Known ISIL Hashtags (7 Days, 30 Days, 90 days) Number of Tweets/Retweets

Arabic Hashtag English Hashtag Last 7 Days Last 30 days Last 90 days (10/10/16- (beginning from (beginning from 10/17/16) 10/17/16) 10/17/16) IslamicState 524 1000 1000 #اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ_اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯿﺔ Daash 1000 1000 1000 #داﻋﺶ Dabiq 1000 1000 1000 #داﺑﻖ Daeshis 1000 1000 1000 #اﻟﺪواﻋﺶ RemainingExpanding 60 88 323 #ﺑﺎﻗﯿﺔ_وﺗﺘﻤﺪد Al-BayanRadio 9 22 248 #إذاﻋﺔ_اﻟﺒﯿﺎن StateOfCaliphate 20 37 220 #دوﻟﺔ_اﻟﺨﻼﻓﺔ StateAleppo 2 10 79 #وﻻﯾﺔ_ﺣﻠﺐ StateFurat 1 2 74 #وﻻﯾﺔ_اﻟﻔﺮات StateKhair 0 0 50 #وﻻﯾﺔ_اﻟﺨﯿﺮ StateSinai 2 0 44 #وﻻﯾﺔ_ﺳﯿﻨﺎء

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 66 StateNineveh 0 7 42 #وﻻﯾﺔ_ﻧﯿﻨﻮى DabiqMagazine 40 40 41 #ﻣﺠﻠﺔ_داﺑﻖ StateKirkuk 0 1 31 #وﻻﯾﺔ_ﻛﺮﻛﻮك Al-HayatCenter 0 0 28 #ﻣﺮﻛﺰ_اﻟﺤﯿﺎة StateDijlah 1 6 28 #وﻻﯾﺔ_دﺟﻠﺔ CaliphateNews 19 20 25 #أﺧﺒﺎر_اﻟﺨﻼﻓﺔ StateHoms 1 1 25 #وﻻﯾﺔ_ﺣﻤﺺ StateRaqqa 0 2 23 #وﻻﯾﺔ_اﻟﺮﻗﺔ StateBarqa 0 2 23 #وﻻﯾﺔ_ﺑﺮﻗﺔ StateAnbar 0 0 19 #وﻻﯾﺔ_اﻷﻧﺒﺎر StateHassakah 0 4 19 #وﻻﯾﺔ_اﻟﺒﺮﻛﺔ StateSouth 0 0 14 #وﻻﯾﺔ_اﻟﺠﻨﻮب StateDamascus 0 0 12 #وﻻﯾﺔ_دﻣﺸﻖ StateJezira 0 0 6 #وﻻﯾﺔ_اﻟﺠﺰﯾﺮة Al-HayatMediaCenter 0 0 4 #ﻣﺮﻛﺰ_اﻟﺤﯿﺎة_ﻟﻺﻋﻼم StateBaghdad 2 2 4 #وﻻﯾﺔ_ﺑﻐﺪاد StateDiyala 0 0 4 #وﻻﯾﺔ_دﯾﺎﻟﻰ StateSalahuddin 0 0 4 #وﻻﯾﺔ_ﺻﻼح_اﻟﺪﯾﻦ StateReports 0 0 3 #ﺗﻘﺎرﯾﺮ_اﻟﻮﻻﯾﺎت StateTripoli 1 1 3 #وﻻﯾﺔ_طﺮاﺑﻠﺲ StateKhorasan 0 0 1 #وﻻﯾﺔ_ﺧﺮاﺳﺎن StateNajd 1 1 1 #وﻻﯾﺔ_ﻧﺠﺪ WhenWillYouMigrate 0 1 1 #ﻣﺘﻰ_ﺗﻨﻔﺮ StateFallujah 0 0 0 #وﻻﯾﺔ_اﻟﻔﻠﻮﺟﺔ StateFezzan 0 0 0 #وﻻﯾﺔ_ﻓﺰان StateHijaz 0 0 0 #وﻻﯾﺔ_اﻟﺤﺠﺎز StateSanaa 0 0 0 #وﻻﯾﺔ_ﺻﻨﻌﺎء

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 67 Figure 1. Decline of ISIL Hashtag Use: 90 Days, 30 Days, 7 Days

StateSanaa StateHijaz StateFezzan StateFallujah WhenWillYouMigrate StateNajd StateKhorasan StateTripoli StateReports StateSalahuddin StateDiyala StateBaghdad Al-HayatMediaCenter StateJezira StateDamascus StateSouth StateHassakah StateAnbar StateBarqa StateRaqqa StateHoms CaliphateNews

ISIL Hashtags in English StateDijlah Al-HayatCenter StateKirkuk DabiqMagazine StateNineveh StateSinai StateKhair StateFurat StateAleppo StateOfCaliphate Al-BayanRadio RemainingExpanding 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 Frequency of Tweets/Re-Tweets

Number of Tweets/Retweets Last 90 days (beginning from 10/17/16) Number of Tweets/Retweets Last 30 days (beginning from 10/17/16) Number of Tweets/Retweets Last 7 Days (10/10/16-10/17/16)

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 68 Table 2. Suspected ISIL Accounts & Themes: Last 7 Days (10/10/16-10/17/16) Number Number of of Followers Arabic Tweets/ User Identity of Key English Hashtag from Content/Theme Hashtag Retweets Account Suspected Last 7 ISIL Days Account Unclear criticism Suspected ISIL 20 1 directed Account towards other StateOfCaliphate user #دوﻟﺔ_اﻟﺨﻼﻓﺔ Unclear criticism Suspected ISIL 2 103 directed Account towards other StateAleppo user #وﻻﯾﺔ_ﺣﻠﺐ Reporting on Suspected ISIL enemy 2 195 Account casualties in StateBaghdad Iraq and Syria #وﻻﯾﺔ_ﺑﻐﺪاد Reporting on Suspected ISIL enemy 1 Account/Sympathizer casualties in StateDijlah 15 Iraq #وﻻﯾﺔ_دﺟﻠﺔ Reporting enemy Suspected ISIL casualties in StateFurat 1 195 Account Syria and Iraq #وﻻﯾﺔ_اﻟﻔﺮات Suspected ISIL Reports enemy StateHoms 1 195 Account casualties #وﻻﯾﺔ_ﺣﻤﺺ

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 69

Figure 2. #StateCaliphate: Outward flow of ISIL Tweets

Figure 3. #StateAleppo: Outward flow of ISIL Tweets

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 70

Figure 4. #StateBaghdad: Outward flow of ISIL Tweets

Quick Look 2: Content Analysis of “#Caliphate” and “#Daash”

RQ1. How do Twitter users respond to ISIL discourse regarding the establishment of a new “caliphate”?

Twitter discourse surrounding the term “Caliphate” remained fractured, with ISIL accounts remaining on the periphery. Primary nodes of discourse continued to be public intellectuals, academics, and news organizations. Content analysis reflected a shift in discussion from our previous study. Instead of discussing the efficacy of the term “Caliphate,” discussion largely reflected updates on events taking place within the Middle East. Most prevalent were reports on events in Syria, including criticism of Russian and US intervention and the possibility for cooperation between Ankara and Iraq. Turkish-backed rebels taking back Dabiq, Syria from ISIL control prompted discussion suggesting the “Myth [that] the Caliphate will fall”. The most common theme among all users was support for Syrians and the large number of deaths in that country. Criticism was leveled towards the international community, and questioned whether anyone actually cared about those dying in Syria.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 71

Figure 1. Network Graph of “#Caliphate”

The graph above demonstrates that discourse surrounding the term “Caliphate” remains fractured with multiple major and sub-major nodes. Central nodes continue to be academics, mainstream public intellectuals, and news organizations. ISIL messaging is largely absent; attempts to penetrate the discussion remains marginal. The arrow points to one ISIL account ineffectively attempting to influence the discussion.

RQ2: What themes emerge from discussion of Daash?

Twitter discourse surrounding the term “Daash” reflects a more centralized discussion originating from a personal Twitter account from an Al Jazeera news reporter along with multiple peripheral discussions, primarily commenting on recent activities in Syria and Iraq. The content from the central node provides criticism towards US and Russian policy in Syria. Russian intervention is viewed negatively, labeling Russian air attacks in Syria as killing innocent Syrians. Largely absent from the discussion are ISIL twitter users suggesting ISIL is not driving the conversation.

Figure 2. Daash Network Graph

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 72

The word cloud below creates a visual representation of key words co-occurring with Daash. Taken together with content analysis of Tweets, the graph suggests that the central themes revolving around discussion of ISIL reflects public opinion supporting ground forces taking territory back from ISIL controlled regions while viewing ISIL actions as “terrorists”. Significant support is given to freeing territory formerly controlled by ISIL, as well as support for the Iraqi government’s attempt to retake Mosul.

Figure 3. Daash Co-occurrence Word Cloud

Conclusions: This quick look was not a broad look at public opinion in the region, but an examination of content and network ties in Twitter can provide a proxy into public opinion in the region. In our previous analysis of the social media strategies of the Islamic State, we concluded that the impact of ISIL sympathizers on public opinion was limited. This quick look back at the region shows that that limited capacity is falling even further, with significantly less traffic, fewer ISIL sympathizers, and almost no ability to generate themes (or memes) that gain widespread support.

Our analysis aids CENTCOM’s questions regarding:

Q3: What does primary source opinion research data tell us about popular support for ISIL in ISIL- help Iraq and globally outside of the Combined Joint Operation Area (Syria and Iraq)?

We find little support for ISIL in the Arabic Twittersphere generally. It isn’t possible to deduce from our data set findings exclusively from within ISIL-held Iraq (Twitter is banned within the region), but our analysis indicates little sympathy for, or association with ISIL. Instead, public sentiment remains strongly against the group, even when it is critical of US, Russian, or other Western policies.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 73 Q4: What are the general perceptions associated with ISIL endorsed themes, to include 1) re- establishing the Caliphate; 2) imposition of Shariah law; 3) belief that the Ummah/Islam is under attack from the West; 4) low tolerance for non-Sunni Muslim ethno-religious groups; 5) negative disposition towards gender equality?

Our findings indicate that although there is criticism of Western powers and Russia, that criticism does not significantly impact support for ISIL, including the establishment of a Caliphate or the imposition of Shariah law. There is significant criticism is of policies (including, but not limited to targeting practices), but we did not find evidence that there is a significant majority that believe that the ummah or Islam is under attack. This study did not look specifically at sub-questions 4 and 5, on tolerance for non-Sunni groups or gender equality.

Response to Quick Look 3 Zana Gulmohamad [email protected]

According to the author’s interviews conducted in August and September 2016 with Arab Sunni and Shia tribal leaders (most of them are Arab Sunni politicians, members in the Iraqi Council of Representatives (ICR) and leaders and commanders of Hashd al-Asha’ri - mobilized local Arab Sunni tribes). The interviewees included Hamid al-Sabawi (commander), Dr. Abboud al-Issawi (MP), Ghazi al-Kaoud (Chairman of the Committee of Tribes in the ICR, the leader of Abu Nimr tribe, and a leader of Anbar’s Hashd al-Asha’ri), Hamid al-Mutlaq (the Deputy Chair of the Committee of Defense and Security in the ICR), Ahmad Jabra (an MP, a member of the Committee of Tribes in the ICR, a leader of one of Hashd al-Asha’ri’s armed groups called The Lions of Nineveh) and many others.28

All agree that the support for IS in Sunni territories in Iraq has notably declined. There are local revolt movements and networks in Mosul and other areas before their liberation including Fallujah and al- Qayyarah. These secret networks and movements have contacts with the anti-IS coalition including the Iraqi governments and Hashd al-Asha’ri and provide them with critical intel about IS. These groups have targeted IS fighters and positions. For example, targeting checkpoints, assassinations and abductions of IS fighters. Moreover, they have carried out orchestrated defined actions such as raising the Iraqi flag, writing the letter M for “Muqawama” (meaning resistance) on the walls. The secret groups in Mosul are called Kataib al-Mosul, Harakat Ahrar al-Mosul, Free Officers Movements. Within these groups are sub-groups such those related to Kataib al-Mosul called Kataib al-Suqur and Kataib al-Nabi Yunis. The presence, activities and propaganda actions including cutting edge videos uploaded online to demoralize IS fighters and reduce their control of the areas. For example, Hamid al-Sabawi who participated in entering al-Qayyarah told the author that when the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) with local tribes entered al-Qayyarah there were several IS fighters killed by the locals. In Fallujah, Ramadi and other cities there were occasionally local revolts against IS by some local community members. According to the author’s interviews, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and other IS leaders increasingly grant the security and military (combatant) roles to foreign fighters. There is increasing distrust between the locals and IS fighters. Additionally, there are more and more fissures within the IS military and security structure as there are more defectors and withdrawal of military units. Consequently, IS reactions have become harsher to their fellow fighters by executing the commanders and fighters who withdraw from the battles. Although, there is discontent by the Arab

28 These interviews were conducted for part of the author’s project for a paper about the Mosul and Fallujah operations that will be published in October 2016.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 74 Sunni community towards the federal government, IS’s harsh policies have increasingly alienated local communities and widened the gaps between them. However, there are locals who cooperate with IS; mainly for benefits, but also because they have been forced, threatened or brainwashed.

According to the author’s interviews with most Iraqi Sunni tribal leaders and Sunni politicians, commanders in Hashd al-Asha’ri are not welcoming the Popular Mobilization Forces’ (PMF, Hashd al-Sha’abi, majority Shia militias) interventions in Arab Sunni areas, including Mosul. All the Sunni interviewees reject the PMF’s participation or are at least worried about their actions. However, most of the Arab Sunni interviewees believe that IS can be defeated and eradicated if the local Arab Sunnis are properly equipped and funded by the federal government. The popularity of IS has declined significantly in and outside IS held areas in Iraq because of: IS’s inability to sustain service provisions, their dramatically shrinking revenues, harsh polices, foreign fighters and leaders’ fissures with locals, forcing locals to fight, the exposé of IS’s false ideology to some of the locals, the success of the military offensive by the Iraqi Security Forces backed by the US-led coalition, the isolation and encirclement (siege) of many of the IS held areas, and the groups and tribes that facilitated IS’s domination from the beginning and throughout their rise and expansion have now turned against them for the aforementioned reasons. All Iraqi interviewees are worried about Iraq post-IS where the Federal Government, the KRG and the Arab Sunnis will all have their own competing agendas.

PUBLIC OPINION ON ISIL Dr. Rengin Bahar Firat Global Studies Institute Georgia State University [email protected], (404) 413-6641

What does primary source opinion research data tell us about popular support for ISIL in ISIL- held Iraq and globally outside of the Combined Joint Operation Area (CJOA) (Syria and Iraq)?

This short report presents some key findings published by major research outlets as well as new analysis I have conducted using existing publicly available data in an attempt to understand public opinion regarding ISIL in Iraq and Syria as well as around the world.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: 1. Majority of Iraqis and Syrians view ISIL negatively.

2. Iraqis and Syrians also view foreign military intervention in their countries unfavorably.

3. Majority of the citizens of Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) nations hold negative views about ISIL.

4. Religious extremism does not seem to be as big of a factor in influencing public support in MENA for ISIL nor reasons suggested by local populations as for why some people join ISIL.

5. Majority of Americans perceive ISIL as a major threat to the US.

6. The opinions about US military intervention in Iraq and Syria are more divided with almost half of the US respondents being opposed to sending military troops to the area.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 75 7. More than half of the citizens in a global survey of 59 countries are worried about a terrorist attack.

IN IRAQ AND SYRIA Key point 1: Majority of Iraqis and Syrians view ISIL negatively.

Key point 2: Iraqis and Syrians also view foreign military intervention in their countries unfavorably.

Background: Launched in 2011 by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS), the Arab Opinion Index (AOI) is one of the few academically led public surveys measuring Arab public opinion on current, relevant socio-political issues. Using a stratified, random sampling method with face-to-face interviews, they provide reliable results (confidence interval at 95% with margin of error 2-3 percent) from reasonably large, nationally representative samples. According to their reports from the latest AOI (2015), 93 percent of their respondents from Iraq reported that they hold a negative view of ISIL. Only about 2 percent of the Iraqi respondents reported a positive view of ISIL.

Results from another public opinion poll specifically targeting Iraq and Syria conducted by ORB International during the summer of 2015, an independent polling agency commissioned by the BBC, also reveal similar findings. While their sample was not representative in Iraq (did not cover the Kurdish or Shia southern regions), they claim that their Syrian sample is representative of the 14 governorates throughout Syria. Their findings show that 94 percent of their Iraqi respondents indicated that ISIL had a negative influence on the matters in Iraq and 76 percent of their Syrian respondents reported that Islamic State had a negative influence on matters in Syria. However, despite this negative evaluation of ISIL, majority of survey respondents also held unfavorable views of foreign fighters in their countries. 62 percent of Iraqis thought coalition against ISIL has a negative influence on matters in Iraq and 71 percent reported that “the presence of foreign fighters has made the problem in Iraq/Syria significantly worse,” while 79 percent of the Syrian respondents expressed that the presence of foreign fighters with the opposition or the regime made the problem worse.

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA (MENA) REGION Key point 3: Majority of the citizens of Middle Eastern and North African nations hold negative views about ISIL

Key Point 4: Religious extremism does not seem to be as big of a factor in neither influencing public support for ISIL nor reasons suggested by local populations as for why some people join ISIL.

Results from the AOI (2015) indicate that majority of Arab citizens hold a negative view of ISIL (ranging from 62 to 96 percent). My analyses from another nationally representative survey on global attitudes conducted by PEW Research Center (2014) also revealed similar findings (see Figure 1 of the Appendix). In many of the MENA countries like Egypt, Lebanon and Tunisia, more than 70 percent of the respondents indicated they were very or somewhat concerned with Islamic terrorism in their countries. More interestingly, however, AOI (2015) results indicate that religiosity does not seem to be driving factor for favorable views regarding ISIL. There seems to be an almost equal representation of religious and non-religious respondents with favorable opinions of ISIL. Similarly, my analyses of data from one of the most rigorous and systematic, nationally representative public data collection efforts in African countries, the Afrobarometer Round 6 (2015-2016) revealed that when asked about the main reasons why some people from their countries join ISIL, a greater

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 76 majority of people pointed to socio-economic reasons like poverty, unemployment or lack of education vs. religious beliefs or extremism (see Figure 2 of the Appendix).

IN THE US Key point 5: Majority of Americans perceive ISIL as a major threat to the US.

Key point 6: The opinions about US military intervention in Iraq and Syria is more divided with almost half of the respondents being opposed to sending military troops to the area.

My analysis of data based on Pew Research Center 2015 Political survey (a nationally representative survey of 1,500 adults living in the U.S.) showed that a large proportion of Americans are very or somewhat concerned about the rise of Islamic terrorism in the US (78 percent) and even a larger proportion is concerned about the rise of Islamic terrorism in the world. Similarly, 84 percent of the respondents considered ISIS to be a major threat to the well being of the US. However, despite these negative public attitudes about ISIL, the opinions about US military intervention in ISIL held Iraq and Syria are divided. While overall 64 percent of the sample supported US military campaign against ISIL, about a total of 61 percent indicated that the US military campaign is not going too well or not at all well and about 46 percent opposed to sending ground troops to fight ISIL.

AROUND THE WORLD Key point 7: More than half of the citizens in a global survey of 59 countries are worried about a terrorist attack.

There are fewer attempts to tap into public opinion about ISIL in non-MENA or non-US regions globally. One of the largest, academically driven global surveys of public opinion, the World Values Survey, for example includes a general question on worries about terrorism in general in their last Wave (2010-2014). Accordingly, my analyses of this variable indicate that there is a large concern about terrorism in especially Middle East, West and Central Asia, South East Asia, South America and Africa, while Europe, North America and Australia/New Zealand seem to be less worried about terrorism (see Figure 3 of the Appendix). However, it should be noted that this survey is relatively dated and unspecific, probably failing to capture growing concern with Islamic terrorism in some of these countries. Yet, what is disconcerting is that when looked at the aggregate numbers, more than half of the respondents in these 59 countries (about 63 percent) are worried about a terrorist attack.

POLICY AND RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS This report reveals that both in ISIL held Iraq and Syria and other regions of the world, the public by large have a negative opinion of ISIL. However, despite overwhelming negative views about ISIL and Islamic terrorism, public opinion in the US as well as ISIL held areas of Iraq and Syria challenges external military intervention in these regions. Furthermore, some of the findings highlight the importance of non-religious factors such as economics and education in ISIL support. These results suggest that potential non-military policies targeting educational or economic welfare might benefit local communities more than military involvement. Further research is needed to understand non- religious factors that might be promoting public support for ISIL. One potentially fruitful research venue is non-religious values and moral polarization in these dimensions. For example our current research funded by the DoD Minerva Initiative suggest that people draw sharp boundaries distinguishing their in and out groups by using value orientations like benevolence or hedonism, attributing the former or the in-group and the latter to the out-group. Explicating these value differences might contribute to our understanding how public opinion polarizes, diffuses or dissolves. At the moment, research on public opinion about ISIL is scarce, non-systematic and mostly focused on the MENA regions. A more clear knowledge requires systematic data collection from a

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 77 broader range of world regions (especially considering how wide spread globally ISIL recruitment network has been) with questions aimed at elucidating not only overall negative or positive views of ISIL but also detailed social psychological and community factors that might potentially challenge the propagation of ISIL ideology as well as help disseminate successful policies aiding local populations.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 78 APPENDICES

Figure 1. Global concern about Islamic terrorism

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 79

Figure 2. Reasons for joining ISIL or Al Qaida in the Maghreb indicated by the respondents

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 80

Figure 3. Worries about a terrorist attack around the world.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 81 REFERENCES & DATA SOURCES

The 2015 Arab Opinion Index: In Brief. http://english.dohainstitute.org/file/get/6ad332dc- b805-4941-8a30-4d28806377c4.pdf

ORB International – Iraq Public Opinion. http://www.orb- international.com/perch/resources/iraqdata.pdf

ORB International – Syria Public Opinion. http://www.orb- international.com/perch/resources/syriadata.pdf

The Afrobarometer Round 6, 2015-2016. Data retrieved from: http://www.afrobarometer.org/data

Pew Global Attitudes Spring 2014. Data downloaded from: http://www.pewglobal.org/category/datasets/

WORLD VALUES SURVEY Wave 6 2010-2014 OFFICIAL AGGREGATE v.20150418. World Values Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Aggregate File Producer: Asep/JDS, Madrid SPAIN.

Syria Barometer Survey: Opinions about the War in Syria and about Radical Action Clark McCauley & Sophia Moskalenko Bryn Mawr College [email protected] [email protected]

Executive Summary A telephone survey of Syrians was conducted by market research company GfK from European calling centers between May 6, 2016 and May 27, 2016. The survey was completed by 101 Syrian males between the ages of 18 and 71; although 87 percent of participants lived in an area controlled by Bashar al-Assad's forces, 52 percent were Sunni. Questions included opinions about life in Syria and in participants’ hometown since the beginning of the civil war; opinions about which political actor was responsible for the killing and suffering in Syria; opinions about justifiability of suicide bombing and support for ISIS; opinions about U.S. foreign policies; and attitude toward the idea of a “united states of Islam.”

Results indicated that most participants experienced significant hardships since the onset of the civil war in Syria. Surprisingly, most participants did not blame the Assad government, Russia or Iran for the war, and instead blamed the United States, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and Turkey. Suicide bombing and support for ISIS received almost zero endorsement. Most participants believed the United States is waging a war on Islam and that U.S. foreign policies are dictated by Jewish interests. Comparisons with a recent survey of U.S. Muslims as well as correlations among some of the items offer potentially useful implications for military and security officials. Notably, Sunni participants did not differ from other religious traditions in support for the Syrian government.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 82 Response to Quick Look 3 Ian McCulloh JHU/APL [email protected]

I will address the CENTCOM requirement regarding opinion research more broadly, addressing long term institutional problems. I do not think CENTCOM will succeed in the Gray Zone without addressing this challenge.

Primary source opinion research and related methods are a critical data source for understanding the human domain and the gray zone. Different data, sources, and methods are appropriate for different information requirements. For example, if the DoD wanted to know what kind of submarine the Russians were building, they wouldn’t ask people to mimic sonar sounds for an opinion poll. They would use MASINT. Likewise, if they want to understand population knowledge, attitude, beliefs, intention, and behavior (KABIB), they should not resort to expensive forms of intelligence collection. They should use the appropriate method and survey them in a scientific manner.

Proper opinion research is much more complicated than the typical military officer thinks. Most service members will have some experience with command climate surveys, end-of- course surveys, or other instruments. As such, their opinion of survey methods are based on a very informal, usually non-scientific process. These surveys are informal and rarely developed by scientists that are trained in the statistical design of survey instruments. There are technical and mathematical issues associated with instrument validity, respondent error, bias, and survey fraud. Proper opinion research will employ proven methods to address these issues. There are additional concerns with sampling hard to reach populations, conflict zones, volatile issues like support for the Islamic State, and collecting data when governments restrict the use of questionnaires. At CENTCOM’s level, multiple (vetted if possible) field vendors should be employed independently to triangulate findings and increase validity. When properly integrated with intelligence sources, a rich and complete understanding of the human domain and gray zone can be developed.

CENTCOM faces several challenges associated with the use of primary source opinion research data.

1) Opinion research is not fully integrated into strategic plans. In my experience, CENTCOM does not choose to conduct data-driven operations. They rely on intelligence that is focused/optimized for specific adversaries and potentially inaccurately identifies key individuals. They dismiss opinion research as invalid, because it is not valued within the mainstream intelligence community. The organizations within CENTCOM that contract opinion research have difficulty integrating their findings into strategic plans. This is due to a deep bias among intelligence professionals and planners and will require command emphasis to change.

2) CENTCOM (and regional Country Teams) no longer invests in intermediate to advanced analysis of opinion research data. For example, the survey data that CENTCOM collects can support latent cluster analysis (LCA) which is used to determine population clusters with similar KABIB characteristics, important for target audience identification, intervention, and assessment. CENTCOM has discontinued their use of cultural domain

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 83 analysis (CDA) to identify unsolicited issues and values that are essential for effective operations in the gray zone. The command lacks the analysts with strong quantitative skills to conduct this type of analysis. Perhaps this is due to the fact that when the command did have qualified analysts, from 2012-2014, the advanced analysis was not accepted by strategic planners; therefore this requirement was no longer understood nor resourced.

3) Operational and tactical forces do not know how to use relevant data and population information to inform actions on the ground. I call this “operational fusion.” For example, special operations teams that rotate through Tampa for pre-mission training (PMT) will often meet with officers whom they know at SOCCENT, SOCOM, and CENTCOM, but routinely fail to meet the social scientists that have been collecting population-centric data for years; (this data is also not requested and in many cases the users are unaware of its existence prior to pre-deployment train-ups). Despite years’ worth of after-action reports from special operations teams reporting the need to get population data for pre-mission planning, my recent trip to Fort Bragg last month reveals the operators are still unaware this resource exists. Of the few teams that get data, they need a properly trained scientist to explain to them how to use data to inform operational plans. Those scientists are never provided to the teams that need them.

4) Senior military leaders are rarely able to properly assess the qualifications of the social scientists on their staff. This was the principal failure of the human terrain system. A soldier is not a paratrooper, just because she went to Airborne School. A soldier is not a ranger, just because he went to ranger school. Soldiers are not special operators, just because they were administratively attached to an SFOB for a week on the FOB. Likewise, an academic is not an expert on the human domain or gray zone, because they have a Ph.D. We expect a jump master to have 30+ jumps, under varied conditions, and attend jump master school, before we would consider allowing them to lead a large jump. Qualified social scientists should have experience designing, overseeing, and analyzing data from multiple relevant projects. Their work should be published in venues that have been extensively reviewed by other experts. They should have innovated new methods to address complex problems. Senior military leaders need help in identifying true experts in opinion research that can mentor and develop the other social scientists working within the commands. Professionalizing this within the ORSA community might be a start.

5) DoD tends to employ solutions that sound good, but lack scientific rigor. For example, one CENTCOM program in 2014 was focused on Twitter use in Syria. When instability flared in Yemen, that program was redirected to Yemen against the recommendations of the social scientists within the command. The recently collected opinion research data showed there was 28% Twitter use in Syria, but less than 2% in Yemen. The program for Syria was an ineffective tool for the problem in Yemen. A similar tactic was recently employed, taking a successful MISO program from Afghanistan and trying to implement it in Syria. The program lacks any empirically supported target audience analysis.

Effective operations in the human domain and gray zone must use a program of scientific, primary source, opinion research to be effective! Ignoring these data and failing to integrate them into operations is negligent, especially given their successful use in Iraq (Strategic Programs Operations Center 2006-2015), Afghanistan (MISTF- A), and other operations in the CENTCOM AOR that can be discussed at higher classification.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 84 I’d like to shift the focus to a more pointed criticism. Senior leaders recognize they do not have a sufficient understanding of the human domain and gray zone to plan for and lead effective operations. This is not because the problems are difficult, or the research methods are illusive. It is a direct result of CENTCOM’s priorities and decision making. CENTCOM’s budget for opinion research exceeds $3M/year. SOCCENT’s budget exceeds $5M/year. SOCOM left approximately $12M unused in FY16. The annual appropriations for information operations and military information support operations (MISO) provide even more potential resources for assessment. I know these resources exist, because I was responsible for establishing those appropriations when I was in uniform a few years ago. The data from these programs are not sufficiently cataloged or utilized. They are not provided to operational forces preparing to deploy. They are not provided to academics supporting the Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA). This is not an issue with opinion research or the CENTCOM staff. It is a failure of DOD leadership to demand proper analytic rigor to inform their decision making process.

Response to Quick Look 3 Mark Tessler University of Michigan

Public opinion surveys conducted in 2014 and 2015 in Arab and other Muslim-majority counties found very low levels of support for the Islamic State (ACRPS, 2015; Pew Research Center, 2015). Surveys conducted in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Palestine and Jordan between February and June of this year as part of the fourth wave of the Arab Barometer (arabbarometer.org) also found extremely low levels of support among ordinary citizens. A summary of the Arab Barometer’s survey findings, as well as some preliminary analyses of demographic differences and factors that may influence attitudes toward ISIS, are reported in the attached paper, which was disseminated this summer through the WAPO Monkey Cage. Additional analyses, based on these and additional Arab Barometer surveys, will be forthcoming.

References ACRPS. 2015. “The 2015 Arab Opinion Index: Results in Brief.” Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies .

Pew Research Center. 2015. “In nations with significant Muslim populations, much disdain for ISIS.” Pew Research Center .

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 85 Question (QL4): To what extent do populations maintain positive views of ISIL or ISIL's ideology, particularly in European, N. African, and Arabian Peninsula countries most associated with foreign fighter flows into Syria and Iraq? What are the general perceptions associated with ISIL endorsed themes, to include: 1) desire for re-establishing the Caliphate; 2) imposition of Shariah law; 3) belief that the Ummah/Islam is under attack from the West; 4) low tolerance for non-Sunni Muslim ethno-religious groups; and 5) negative disposition towards gender equality?

Most Sunni Muslims in the Arabian Peninsula do not believe a caliphate is necessary to implement conservative Muslim political and social thought (Aguero). However, they share some of the same grievances about government that gave rise to ISIL in Iraq and Syria. Noureddine Jebnoun, professor of contemporary Arab studies at Georgetown University, argues that the Arab Spring showed that populations in the Arab world are rejecting what they see as a dysfunctional system of governance across the region. There is a demand for greater participatory governance, social justice, and better economic opportunities. At the same time, however, they are supportive of the implementation of Sharia law, including low tolerance for gender equality and non-believers (Jebnoun; Aguero). But it is important to keep in mind, particular in Muslim-majority countries, that Sharia is considered to be a way of life, not merely a legal code (Aguero). According to a 2014 Pew poll,29 making Sharia the law of the land has 74 percent support in the MENA region.

Populations in the Arabian Peninsula strongly oppose westernization and modernization, seeing it as an attack on Sunni Muslim unity and heritage. Lynch argues that these populations can be animated towards short-term support for violent causes when they perceive non- Sunnis or non-Muslims to be attacking fellow Sunni Muslims. This helps explain why groups like ISIL can gain meaningful, short-term support in moments of perceived danger for Sunni Muslims. For example, 83% of Saudis consider Western cultural invasion to be a very important or important problem (Moaddel, 2013; Aguero). Furthermore, 84% of Saudis also ascribe to the belief that the Ummah and/or Islam is under attack by the West.

29 Lugo, L. (April 30, 2013). The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society. [survey]. Washington, D.C.: Pew Research. Retrieved from http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the- worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-overview/

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 86

In the past, Salafists from the Arabian Peninsula have provided material and financial support to Salafist jihadi groups opposing Bashar al Assad in Syria, according to Lynch. This anti- Assad support has also aided the rise of ISIL both directly and indirectly. Most Salafist support for ISIL has withered but some support still finds its way to ISIL.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 87

Editor: Sarah Canna (NSI)

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 88 SME Input

Prioritized List of Study Topics Organized by Study Approach Hassan Abbas National Defense University [email protected]

To what extent do populations maintain positive views of ISIL or ISIL's ideology, particularly in European, N. African, and Arabian Peninsula countries most associated with foreign fighter flows into Syria and Iraq? What are the general perceptions associated with ISIL endorsed themes, to include: 1) desire for re-establishing the Caliphate; 2) imposition of Shariah law; 3) belief that the Ummah/Islam is under attack from the West; 4) low tolerance for non-Sunni Muslim ethno-religious groups; 5) negative disposition towards gender equality?

ANSWER: Anti-western views and assimilation challenges In the Arabian peninsula, in European states are playing a central role followed sectarian issues, class closely by the Caliphate utopia. In Arabian peninsula, divisions and a perceived sectarian issues, class divisions and a perceived threat from threat from western western secular ideals to Islamic worldview helps ISIL secular ideals to Islamic recruitment. Poor justice system has more to do with worldview helps ISIL ordinary peoples’ grievances against ruling classes than recruitment. other factors mentioned in the question. It is a common belief in countries such as Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan and Jordan that somehow US is involved in supporting ISIL. And this flawed narrative is gaining ground.

Views of ISIL Ideology Major Shane Aguero US Army [email protected]

The area that has the largest degree of support for ISIL and, by proxy, their ideology is Syria, where 21% of those polled expressed a favorable opinion of ISIL (Galka, 2015; Mauro, 2015). 2015; Mauro, 2015; Withnall, 2015). The next most supportive areas are Nigeria (14%), Tunisia (13%), Senegal and Malaysia (both 11%). In 15 other polled nations the level of support was under 10% (Galka, 2015). This level of support should not be seen as support for ISIL proper, and thus representative of the total strength of ISIL or their ideology, but rather as the total size of their possible resource pool not their actual level of material support. Even in a country with 9% ISIL ideological support (Pakistan), and a population 178 million Muslims, there has only been ~70 foreign fighters that have traveled to ISIS controlled territory to fight (Galka, 2016). An analogy might be to think how many people support a political ideology, vs how many people vote for that ideology, vs how many people volunteer to support that ideology vs how many people are actively employed by a political party espousing that ideology.

With regard to the specific questions being asked, various data sets will be utilized and there may be instances where certain questions have either no information, or only one survey was

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 89 available. Each of the questions below will be answered separately, followed by a conclusion that will attempt to determine the common elements of this support.

What is the desire for re-establishing the Caliphate? Almost negligible.

There is no desire for a Caliphate as popularly imagined as either a religious dictatorship or a Ummah-wide governmental/regulatory body. With regard to a religious dictatorship governed my Sharia, in historical Islam, prominent Muslim theologians-cum-political theorists relaxed some of the alleged principles of caliphate in favor of recognizing the sultan’s discretionary power, which amounted a de facto admission of the reality of secular politics (Moaddel, 2013, page 60). With regard to being bound to a Ummah-wide governmental/regulatory body, the majority of respondents defined themselves primarily as a citizen of a state instead of a Muslim. This is true in Egypt (52%), Iraq (57%), Lebanon (60%), Saudi Arabia (48%) and Turkey (44%). The two states where this is not true are Pakistan (70% defined themselves as Muslim) and Tunisia (59% defined themselves as Muslim) (Moaddel, 2013). Additionally, 51% of Egyptians, 69% of Iraqis, 80% of Lebanese, 9% of Pakistanis, 72% of Tunisians, and 76% of Turks strongly agree or agree that their country would be a better place if religion and politics are separated (Moaddel, 2013). This would lend credence to an argument that there is NOT a majority seeking the return of any form of a Caliphate.

This can be seen when there is some significant support for a Western political model in many of the countries surveyed. The percentage of citizens strongly agree or agree with the desirability of having a Western political model for their country varies from 26% of Pakistanis to 63% of Lebanese, with 33% of Egyptians, 45% of Iraqis, 47% of Tunisians, and 44% of Turks as well (Moaddel, 2013).

There is also very strong support for democracy where 91% of Egyptians, 86% of Iraqis, 88% of Lebanese, 88% of Pakistanis, 88% of Lebanese, 86% of Iraqis, 76% of Saudis, 91% of Tunisians, and 84% of Turks strongly agree or agree with democracy as an ideal form of government (Moaddel, 2013). Democracy, however, has a different meaning for different sections of the populations in these countries. Many of the people who favor the democratic political system at the same time believe in Islamic government, consider the implementation of only the Sharia as the characteristic of a good government, or prefer having the army rule. Thus, support for democracy often means support for an illiberal democracy (Moaddel, 2013, pg 73).

What is the desire for the imposition of Sharia law? There is a desire for increased Sharia.

Sharia is considered to be a way of life, not merely a legal code. The legalistic aspects of Sharia are generally only highlighted when examining the level of punishment for an offense, rather than the criminality of the offense itself. For example, alcohol consumption is a crime under Sharia, which carries with it a penalty of some number, generally 80, lashes. Alcohol consumption was also a crime in the United States from 1920 to 1933, and public intoxication is currently illegal in the United States. Additionally, adultery is illegal under Sharia and is also illegal in 21 of the United States and under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, but again, it is the degree of punishment that differentiates the two legal systems.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 90 It must be understood that Sharia is already in effect or has a high degree of influence in multiple countries such as Egypt, Mauritania, Sudan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, the Maldives, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and certain regions in Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, and the United Arab Emirates. Additionally, many states utilize Sharia for family law such as Algeria, Comoros, Djibouti, Gambia, Libya, Morocco, Somalia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Gaza Strip, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Oman, and Syria. Indeed, there are some states where Sharia family law is available as a legally binding recourse for Muslim minorities if both parties agree. The states offering this are Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, India, Israel, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and the United Kingdom.

With the previous information in mind, the question is more appropriate when rephrased as “What is the desire for a more strict interpretation of Sharia, or the inclusion of more Sharia into the legal code?”

The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society Pew Research Center survey finds that support for making Sharia the law of the land is often higher in countries where the constitution or basic laws already favor Islam over other religions (Lugo, 2013). Majorities in such countries say Sharia should be enshrined as official law, including at least nine-in-ten Muslims in Afghanistan (99%) and Iraq (91%). By comparison, in countries where Islam is not legally favored, roughly a third or fewer Muslims say Sharia should be the law of the land. Support is especially low in Kazakhstan (10%) and Azerbaijan (8%) (Lugo, 2013). Relatively few Turkish Muslims back enshrining sharia as official law (12%), most likely due to the strong history of secular government enacted by President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (Lugo, 2013).

Support for making Sharia the law of the land is highest in South Asia (median of 84%). Medians of at least six-in-ten Muslims in sub-Saharan Africa (64%), the Middle East-North Africa region (74%) and Southeast Asia (77%) also favor enshrining Sharia as official law. In Southern and Eastern Europe states (18%) and Central Asian states (12%), far fewer Muslims say Islamic law should be endorsed by their governments (Lugo, 2013). Overall, Muslims who want Sharia to be the law of the land in their country often, though not uniformly, are less likely to support equal rights for women and more likely to favor traditional gender roles (Lugo, 2013).

What is the belief that the Ummah/Islam is under attack from the West? A popular one.

The popularity of the idea that the Ummah and/or Islam is under attack by the West is a popular one. This can be observed by the fact that 85% of Egyptians, 79% of Iraqis, 70% of Lebanese, 95% of Pakistanis, 84% of Saudis, 84% of Tunisians, and 72% of Turkish strongly agree or agree that there are conspiracies against Muslims (Moaddel, 2013). Additionally, 85% of Egyptians, 80% of Iraqis, 64% of Lebanese, 30% of Pakistanis, 83% of Saudis, 54% of Tunisians, and 83% of Turkish consider Western cultural invasion to be a very important or important problem (Moaddel, 2013). Even though many Muslims enjoy Western pop culture, a clear majority of Muslims in most countries surveyed think that Western entertainment harms morality in their country. In four of the six regions at least half of those who say they enjoy this type of entertainment also say Western cultural imports undermine morality; specifically sub-Saharan Africa (65%), South Asia (59%), Southeast Asia (51%) and the Middle East-North Africa region (51%) (Lugo, 2013).

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 91 Is there a low tolerance for non-Sunni Muslim ethno-sectarian groups? Decreasing tolerance.

In 2013, only seven of the 38 countries where the question was asked, at least half of Muslims describe conflict between religious groups as a very big national problem, and in most cases worries about crime, unemployment, ethnic conflict and corruption far outweighed concerns about religious conflict (Lugo, 2013). The survey asked in particular about relations between Muslims and Christians. In nearly all countries, fewer than half of Muslims say that many or most members of either religious group are hostile toward the other group. In five countries, however, more than three-in-ten Muslims describe many or most Christians as antagonistic toward Muslims: Egypt (50%), Guinea Bissau (41%), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (37%), Chad (34%) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (31%). And in three countries similar percentages say many or most Muslims are hostile toward Christians: Guinea Bissau (49%), Chad (38%) and Egypt (35%) (Lugo, 2013). This information is somewhat analogous to the idea that there is a conspiracy against Muslims referenced in question number 3.

Three years after the previous information was gathered, Arab youth felt that there was much less tolerance than in 2013. In 2016 47% of Arab youth felt that Sunni-Shia relations had worsened over the past five years (ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller, 2016). The results were understandably higher in Yemen (88%), Jordan (84%), Libya (75%) and Iraq (62%) due to the eruption of massive violence along ethno-sectarian lines after the previous survey (ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller, 2016).

Is there a negative disposition towards gender equality? It is lessening.

Arab youth have a desire to see their personal freedoms increased. This averages 67% agreement across the MENA with the statement that, “Arab leaders should do more to improve the personal freedom and human rights of their people” (ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller, 2016). The rate of agreement in the GCC is 74%, in the Levant and Yemen 57% and 68% in North Africa (ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller, 2016). Across the MENA, 66% of male youth and 68% of female youth agreed with the statement that, “Arab leaders should do more to improve the personal freedom and human rights of women” (ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller, 2016).

With regard to specific rights such as female dress codes, the role of a wife, divorce, and inheritance rights, there is widespread difference of opinion. Generally, most Muslims support a woman’s right to choose to be veiled. This view is especially prevalent in Southern and Eastern Europe, Central Asia and Southeast Asia (Lugo, 2013). Sub-Saharan Africa is the one region surveyed where most Muslims do not think women should have the right to decide if they wear a veil (Lugo, 2013). A recent survey from the University of Michigan’s Institute for Social Research conducted in seven Muslim-majority countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey), finds that most people prefer that a woman completely cover her hair, but not necessarily her face. Only in Turkey and Lebanon do more than one-in-four think it is appropriate for a woman to not cover her head at all in public (Moaddel, 2013). In general, Muslim women voice greater support than Muslim men for a woman’s right to decide whether to wear a veil in public (Lugo, 2013).

With regard to the role of a wife, Muslims in most countries surveyed say that a wife should always obey her husband. In 20 of the 23 countries where the question was asked in 2013, at least half of Muslims believe a wife must obey her spouse. Muslims in South Asia and

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 92 Southeast Asia overwhelmingly hold this view. In all countries surveyed in these regions, roughly nine-in-ten or more say wives must obey their husbands. Similarly, in all countries surveyed in the Middle East and North Africa, about three-quarters or more say the same (Lugo, 2013). At least half of Muslims in 13 of the 22 countries surveyed say a wife should have the right to divorce (Lugo, 2013).

In 12 of the 23 countries surveyed in 2013 about inheritance rights, at least half of Muslims say that sons and daughters should have equal inheritance rights. Most Muslims in Central Asia and in Southern and Eastern Europe hold this view, including 88% in Turkey and 79% in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In these regions, Kyrgyzstan is the only country where fewer than half (46%) support equal inheritance rights (Lugo, 2013). In South Asia and Southeast Asia, opinion differs widely by country. More than half of Muslims in Indonesia (76%), Thailand (61%) and Pakistan (53%) support equal inheritance rights, but fewer than half do so in Bangladesh (46%), Malaysia (36%) and Afghanistan (30%) (Lugo, 2013). Across the Middle East and North Africa, fewer than half of Muslims say sons and daughters should receive the same inheritance shares. Palestinian Muslims (43%) are most supportive of equal inheritance rights in this region, while support is low among Muslims in Morocco and Tunisia (15% each) (Lugo, 2013).

Conclusions

The primary drivers of ideological support for ISIS appears to be economic, while the primary driver of active, material support for ISIS appears to be cultural isolation. There is almost negligible desire for re-establishing the Caliphate. There is a desire for an increased application of Sharia, and the belief that the Ummah/Islam is under attack from the West remains a popular one. There is decreasing tolerance for non-Sunni Muslim ethno-sectarian groups, especially in active conflict areas such as Iraq, Libya and Yemen. Finally, there is lessening opposition to gender equality as Arab youth comes of age.

References

Withnall, A. (December 8, 2015). One chart that shows what people in the Muslim world really think about Isis. [article]. Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/donald-trump-muslims-isis-- chart-shows-what-people-really-think-about-a6765241.html

Mauro, R. (June 28, 2015). ISIS Has Up To 42 Million Supporters in the Arab World. [article] Retrieved from http://www.clarionproject.org/analysis/isis-has-least-42-million- supporters-arab-world#

Galka, M. (December 1, 2015). Support for ISIS in the Muslim World – Perceptions vs Reality. [article] Retrieved from http://metrocosm.com/support-isis-muslim-world-perceptions- vs-reality/

ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller. (2016). Inside the Hearts and Minds of Arab Youth: 8th Annual ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey [survey]. Retrieved from http://www.arabyouthsurvey.com/en/about

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 93 Rasmussen, N. (February 11, 2015). Hearing before the House Committee on Homeland Security “Countering Violent Islamist Extremism: The Urgent Threat of Foreign Fighters and Homegrown Terror” [testimony]. Washington D.C: US House of Representatives.

Galka, M. (April 26, 2016). What motivates foreign ISIS fighters? New research has an answer. [article]. Retrieved from http://metrocosm.com/foreign-isis-fighters/

Lugo, L. (April 30, 2013). The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society. [survey]. Washington D.C.: Pew Research. Retrieved from http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society- overview/

Moaddel, M. (December 15, 2013). The Birthplace of the Arab Spring: Values and Perceptions of Tunisians and A Comparative Assessment of Egyptian, Iraqi, Lebanese, Pakistani, Saudi, Tunisian, and Turkish Publics. [survey]. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, University of Maryland. Retrieved from http://mevs.org/files/tmp/Tunisia_FinalReport.pdf

Moaddel, M. (June 2014). Is Iraq Falling Apart. [survey] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, University of Maryland. Retrieved from http://mevs.org/files/tmp/IsIraqFallingApart_June2014.pdf

Response to Quick Look Question 4 Mia Bloom Georgia State University [email protected]

Mia Bloom: So, Quick Look number 4. Okay, so, “To what extent do populations maintain positive views of ISIL or ideology, particularly in European, North African, and Arabian Peninsula countries most associated with foreign fighter flows into Syria and Iraq? What are the general perceptions associated with their endorsed themes: desire for re-establishing the Caliphate, imposition of Shariah law, belief that the Ummah/Islam is under attack, low tolerance for non-Sunni Muslim ethno-religious groups, and negative disposition towards gender equality?” I see. So, all of those are under section Quick Look 4.

Sarah Canna: Right, and I was thinking that you could take a look at this from either a gender perspective or from a regional perspective.

Mia Bloom: Okay, well, I’ve got 2 different projects with Minerva?? right now. One of them is looking at ISIS’s sort of telegram online dark web kind of stuff, which is why I sent that link about ISIS in Africa. In one of the conversations, it was interested in Africa. So, I think that was why I sent that.

Sarah Canna: Right.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 94 Mia Bloom: One of the things that we’re getting with regards to gender is very different messaging that it’s going out to the European women as it’s going out to the Arab women. So, some of the stuff that ISIS is financing explicitly in Arabic is a very different kind of picture than what is readily available on telegram for an English speaking audience. The English speaking audience, the women in particular, are getting the sense that being a foreign fighter involves fighting and that, when they go to Syria or Iraq, they’ll have a much more frontline role. In Arabic, it’s crystal clear that they’re never going to have that role. In Arabic, they make it clear that, for the most part, their role will be that of a wife, mother, “domestic goddess” to quote Rosanne (in other words, homemaker). They don’t emphasize the role of the Al-Khansaa Brigade in the Arabic materials. In fact, the only thing that I’ve seen that was clearly directed towards Arab speaking countries in the Arabian Peninsula was an ISIS woman, fully nikab, gloved hand and everything, driving, and this was sort of to say, “See. Here, you get to drive.” So, a lot of what has been directed in Arabic towards the Arabian Peninsula is about an individual level of empowerment, not as a fighter, but you can do far more with your life. I think that they’re trying to appeal to sort of the Saudi or Imarabi?? girls who are bored and want to feel more significant in what they’re doing. They’re saying, you know, that you may not even be able to leave the house, but what you’ll be able to do is more significant than what you’re going to be doing in the gulf, where you’re also not able to leave the house.

Sarah Canna: Can I ask a really basic question? So, are they doing their messaging, I presume to the Arabian Peninsula and Arabic, but to the European population, are they doing that mostly in Arabic?

Mia Bloom: No. To the European population, it’s overwhelmingly in French and in English. I mean, they’re online in 25 different languages that I’ve found iniciar??, Portuguese, iniciar?? Español. So, they’re doing it a lot of different ____ lately. They’re targeting each group in its own language and are very often using girls from that country as recruiters.

Sarah Canna: Is that because they’re targeting kind of second generation immigrants who maybe speak French better than Arabic or…?

Mia Bloom: Yeah, pretty much. I mean, they are targeting people who are Arabic, and we know that the women from Bradford or the women from Leon or Paris or wherever, they really speak hardly any Arabic. They may have the occasional Arabic word, ______, ____, you know, SWT. They won’t even say it in Arabic; they’ll say SWT. They barely speak, I mean if anything, the Punjabis and those originally from Pakistan, they speak sort of a heavily accented midlands English accent with the occasional Urdu/Arabic word peppered in, but they’re not fluent, and very few of them can read and write.

Sarah Canna: Mhmm.

Mia Bloom: So, the stuff that’s in Arabic is really directed towards Arabic speakers because they don’t expect that the, you know, midlands Muslim population speaks enough Arabic to be on the chat rooms in Arabic. Those would be in English.

Sarah Canna: What about northern Africa? Do you know what the messaging there is like to women in particular?

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 95 Mia Bloom: So, we only have some reports from Tunis of targeted recruitment of girls for this jihad al-nikah, which is this idea that the girls would travel to Syria in order to support the fighters, like comfort women kind of support, but that’s for the most part. Other than that first wave that left in 2012, most of the north African women are leaving with entire families. They’re going with fathers, husbands, and brothers. They’re going with family units. The ones that were targeted individually were targeted early on for this role as a comfort woman where there has been a bit of a backlash about this jihad al-nikah: whether it’s considered basically a form of prostitution.

Sarah Canna: Right, I was just wondering what the appeal would be to young women.

Mia Bloom: Well, they weren’t thinking that they would be passed around like a marijuana cigarette. They thought that they would go and find a mujahedeen?? husband, and keep in mind that the cost of marriage is very expensive in most of these north African countries, so marriage is delayed. If you’re going to stay in Tunis and you’re 18, you’re going to end up with a 45-year-old guy or you go to Syria and you’ll find a guy your age because they’ve built up this romanticized version of the mujahedeen?? in Syria. But this would have been in 2011/2012 before ISIS was as big as it is now. So, many of the girls went off, and it was different groups; it wasn’t just ISIS. We only have little bits and pieces of information about their experiences because there was a cleric in Tunisia when some of the girls came back with harrowing stories of having been passed around and then impregnated or some had gotten STIs. It wasn’t what they expected it to be. So, we don’t have a lot of information on individual girls that are going. The Tunisian government also hasn’t been great about sharing the data.

Sarah Canna: So, if I was going to really dumb this down and summarize it, I would say that in Saudi Arabia, women are responsive to messaging that emphasizes empowerment. Women in North Africa, originally, it was a way to find a spouse…

Mia Bloom: …well, it was adventure and romance.

Sarah Canna: Adventure and romance.

Mia Bloom: …and altruism. All of the underpinning elements for all of this is altruism. They’re appealing to women’s sense of wanting to do good, wanting to be important, significant, to make a difference. They fine tune the message a little bit because when telling a woman in Tunisia that she can drive, she’s like, “Mhmm,” but telling a woman in Saudi that she can drive, well, now it looks like the jihad is empowering women in a way that the regime doesn’t.

Sarah Canna: Mhmm. That makes a lot of sense. No one’s going to do anything without feeling that they’re in the right, but it seems that in Northern Africa, it’s more of a transition to entire families going over.

Mia Bloom: Yeah, so that’s one of the reasons why, you know, the problem has been the focus on the female foreign fighters overwhelmingly the western ones, ones like Aqsa Mahmood or Hoda Muthana from Alabama, in other words, these women from western countries. The vast majority of foreign fighters as you know are actually from the more local countries, and the vast majority of the women are also local Syrian women or women that came over with their entire family units. So, we don’t have an accurate depiction because there has been this fetishizing of ‘why would a woman leave North America or northern Europe to go to Raqqah when you have all of these other benefits, and it’s built an assumption that it’s better for

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 96 women in the west. So, there are very different kinds of messaging to target different kinds of girls, and a lot of the times, they’ll use a local interlocker. In other words, they’ll use a French girl to recruit other French girls, they’ll use a Tunisian girl to recruit other Tunisian girls, they’ll use an Italian woman who actually lives in Saudi Arabia to recruit Italian girls. They’re being recruited in their own languages, and in order to do so, they have frames of reference that…you know if I was to say to you Jaffa cakes and piji?? chips, it would mean nothing, but if I was talking to a British girl, she would know exactly what I was talking about. So, all the frames of references, the things in order to build up rapport and foster trust…it almost requires some local knowledge.

Sarah Canna: So this actually bleeds into the next question, which is how these populations receive the messaging. It’s really interesting to see that a lot of people who are volunteering tell us how people receive messaging on social media and even via text, but we never have anyone talking to us about how person-to-person people get recruited, and I wonder how important that is in these populations.

Mia Bloom: Well, it’s very important, and you know, you can have people in the chat rooms, but until you get that individual recruiter who starts making the arrangements, it’s all just fantasy. You know, it’s all just blowing off steam and saying stuff online that you might not say regularly because online, you have this anonymity. You know, you can be posting under an assumed or false name. So, you really do need to have that recruiter who just comes in at some point in the conversation and starts making the arrangements because these things can’t happen without that point person.

Sarah Canna: Now, do you find it…

Mia Bloom: …so, at some point it will be offline. At some point, it will be like you’re in the chat room, and then someone will be like, “You know, let’s set up a private conversation where we’ll start making arrangements…what do the roots look like?” The other thing that they’ve disseminated in a variety of languages, including a sample in English, was a sort of step-by- step what to do, what to wear when you travel, how to tell people, how to accumulate the money. When I found this one thing, as I was reading it, they were making reference to…I think they said jumper, which is sweater in British language, and they used a particular book store. So, as soon as I realized it was in UK, I sent it to M5 and I said, “Okay, this is the step- by-step instruction manual that we found online,” and it was very much written by somebody that was British for a British audience. It included a what to do and what not to do, what kinds of behaviors to engage in.

Sarah Canna: Was the list specific to women or just anyone who was going over?

Mia Bloom: I think it was specific to any. It wasn’t specific for women; it was for anyone. In fact, it might have been the one that I found was specific to men because it also said ‘don’t be fooled by the girls who are just going to retweet you and be your fans,’ and you know, ‘don’t be lulled in by that.’ It was actually quite antagonistic towards the fangirls. So, I think it was for guys. But, you know, my first instinct was, because we found it (I think I found it in December), we have contacts. We have equally good relationships with security services in the US as we do with the UK, having had MOD funded projects when we were at Penn State. So, you know, I was like, “I know who to send it to.” I don’t know what they did with it, and they don’t write me back to tell me what. In the same way, I turned it over to the FBI, and I don’t know what Mark is doing with it, footedly say no??? or I sound out to somebody that

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 97 there were specific threats that an ISIS contact gave a journalist, and I was like “Okay, and here is the journalist’s phone number.” So I, personally, at that point, I would pick up and call and be like, “You know, I’d rather prevent something than predict it and be right.” I would like to prevent as many bad things from happening. I contacted Brandy Dinini in Boston because one of the threats was Boston. So, I was like, “Tell Carmen” (she’s the AG, Carmen Ortiz). We’ve worked with a bunch of these pilot programs and worked with different parts of the country. If I’m on telegram, and I see something, I do say something. I take a screen capture, and I send it. So, ___ has never been mentioned interestingly.

Sarah Canna: I have one last question before I let you go. So, going back to the recruitment thing. I just wanted to follow up with the one-on-one in-contact recruitment. Do they use formal recruiters to recruit females?

Mia Bloom: So, they use female recruiters to recruit the young girls. I think my explanation for it is that we’ve probably done an adequately good job of warning young teenage girls of talking to strange men on the Internet. So, their guard is down when it’s a British girl, and she’s talking with Aqsa Mahmood because she doesn’t see Aqsa Mahmood as a threat, whereas she may have seen some old dude as being sketchy.

With the older women…so, let me step back for a second. We’ve identified within the western women that are coming from Europe and the United States and Canada, there are two very different types of girls that they’re going after. They’re going after these young, high achieving girls, maybe girls from Muslim backgrounds who don’t know very much about Islam. So, these would be like the Benthal Green Academy girls; girls who are very young, and they’ll use women as…in the literature on online grooming for pedophiles, it’s called the deviant peer. In other words, the kid looks at this person as just some slightly cooler, older person and not someone who’s potentially a threat. It’s someone who’s not going to be creepy. They also go after some much older convert women. That’s more like a match.com, and they’re directly in touch with guys. It’s very romantic, and right away, it’s about finding a mujahedeen?? husband. So, you have the Sally Jones type; she’s the British ex-punk rocker, married, ____ or even Shenna Morine colony?? from Colorado.

So, there are different age groups. One is very young; partly, it’s because they think western Muslim women in the west, even though they’re Muslim, you’ve got to get them young before they’ve been spoiled. They’re looking, and they’ll be explicit about it, for virgins. They’re looking for girls who are bint, which is untouched and unsullied. They’re looking for unsullied girls, but they’re also looking for these western convert women for other reasons. Now, according to one in here, it was because you know, they know how to please a guy…really sketchy stuff. We’re more likely to see these older women, these convert women, directly in communication with men. You’re more likely to see the 15, 14, and 13-year-old girls not in communication with men but in communication with other girls. The British girls are talking to Aqsa Mahmood, the Scottish radiology student who disappeared, and the American girls might be talking to Hoda Muthana from Alabama. In other words, it’s because those friends will reference things that they can share. You know, with an American girl, they might be talking about music or the Kardashians, with the British girl, EastEnders. You know, those things don’t resonate in the same way. That’s why I was giving you the Jaffa cakes as an example; nobody here knows what a Jaffa cake is, but if you were a British girl, you totally know what a Jaffa cake is. So, everything is just slightly different (the music is different, the celebrities are different, the snack foods are different) so that they’re able to relate, and it’s the exact same process that we see with the pedophiles. They’re trying to create…they’re

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 98 fostering trust with the target, so that the target goes back to the Internet, is communicating almost exclusively with them, is keeping secrets from the parents so that the parents won’t know what’s going on, and it’s about creating a little mini world. For example, the girl that was interviewed by Rukmini Callimachi in Washington State. She was older and a convert, and she was directly in touch with a male recruiter who she thought she was really good friends with who was trying to set her up with a 40-year old something guy. As compared to we know Aqsa Mahmood’s involvement with the Benthal Green Academy girls and with the precursor, the first girl from that ____ that left. So, this is how we differentiate, at least it’s how I have differentiated. We may have some exceptions, ____ is really on the cusp because she was a convert, but she was 19, so she was directly in touch. But, we know that some Anna Erelle, who was a French journalist, pretended to be a convert named Melodie who was young, maybe 17 or 18, and she was directly in touch with an amir. So, you know, there may be some tiny exceptions along the fringes. When they’re 17 years old, they may be in touch. When they’re 13, 14, 12, 11…it’s a girl that they’re going to be in touch with because again, the 11-year-old is going to automatically have their guard up with an adult male.

Sarah Canna: It’s all about trust.

Mia Bloom: It’s about fostering trust and developing this rapport and secrecy and all of these other things.

Sarah Canna: Alright, well, Mia, I’m going to let you go, but thank you so much for this. I think that you’ve provided a really unique aspect that we’re not getting from anyone else.

Response to Quick Look Question 4 Mark A. Caudill USMC Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning [email protected]

Abstract: Muslims have not fully embraced the modern West’s progress-driven secular ethics and continue to subordinate reason to faith. Many are alienated from their own culture amid feelings of inferiority and anxiety vis-à-vis westerners. Some reject both the West and contemporary Muslim societies by embracing what they imagine were the guiding principles of Islam in its infancy.

• Muslims across the globe aspire to live in a single polity following established Islamic ideals. • Most oppose the harsher aspects of Islamic law but regard Shari’a as a moral consensus harmonizing divine writ with human capacities. • Many see the modern West as a symptom of the immorality they fear could consume the planet but for Islam. • Muslims do not hold tolerance and diversity to be unambiguously positive. • They are similarly ambivalent with respect to gender equality.

A Shared Worldview

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 99 This query assumes there is ideological separation between populations from countries associated with foreign fighter flows into Syria and Iraq and the foreign fighters themselves. In fact, in most cases, the populations and the foreign fighters that come from these populations share a common worldview. The difference is one of degree, not kind.

Despite their diversity, Muslim cultures—irrespective of locale—share a fundamental premise distinguishing them from western cultures: Ethics are the province of God, not man. The guiding values by which most Muslims strive to live their lives have not been secularized. Failure to appreciate how different the western worldview is from those of more traditional societies, including those where Islam predominates, prevents a clear understanding of what drives members of The guiding values by those societies. which most Muslims strive to live their lives have not Of Bees and Balances been secularized. The modern world westerners inhabit, physically and mentally, is the ethical inverse of the Old World. In tracing the West’s transformation, Harvard University Islamic Studies Professor Abdolkarim Soroush writes that “the values that preceded, caused, and sustained the development of the West were not the result of a conscious world-historical project,” among whose authors he includes Bacon, Luther, and Machiavelli. Nonetheless, these and other groundbreaking thinkers opened Pandora’s Box by asking whether (and subsequently how) the ethics that had guided the West for millennia could be harnessed to serve the cause of human happiness in this world vice solely assuring salvation in the next.30

By examining values through the lens of reason instead of faith, westerners began rationalizing behaviors that heretofore were considered sinful. Dutch physician Dr. Bernard Mandeville’s 1705 book The Fable of the Bees was instrumental in driving this process, according to Souroush:

“The gist of his thesis is that a society consists of two groups, not unlike a beehive. On one side stand the hardworking, righteous, noble, and productive members. On the other side lay the pompous, idle, and slothful nobility, the class of gluttony and deception. In his story, one day the idle nobility decides to become truly noble by emulating the good workers, and this causes the downfall of that society. No longer did art find enthusiasts or artists patrons. Mandeville concludes that there is an affinity between ‘private vices and public goods.’ The subtitle of his book reads: An Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue.”31

This, Souroush continues, gave rise to the idea of progress:

“It is thanks to selfish profit seekers that business is lively. Those who hunger for power and ostentation stoke the fire of politics and the seekers of vanity and fame keep the flame of the academy and library aglow. It is the efforts of those who have a love of the worldly pleasures that enrich and improve this world.”32

30 Souroush, A. (2000). Trans. by Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmad Sadri. Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam: Essential Writings of ‘Abdolkarim Souroush. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 40-41. 31 Ibid., p. 42. 32 Ibid.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 100 Utilitarianism was born. Private vices—greed, lust, pride, etc.—were transformed into public goods that fueled the progressive furnace, thereby producing greater happiness in this world for greater numbers of people. The next logical step was for the private vices to be viewed as private goods. Westerners, maintains Souroush, emerged

“from the shadows to embrace ambition openly, to haggle and to unabashedly strive for the worldly glory of high corporate and political office. Freed from internal constraints of traditional piety, the new humanity kept order (political and legal) through the natural play of checks and balances.”33

This is the ideological context within which the West has regarded the world for more than two centuries. The fact that it developed gradually over time has hindered a full appreciation for what a fundamental shift in outlook it represents. It also has made it difficult for westerners to comprehend the seemingly illogical resistance of some cultures, including those of the Muslim world, to embrace fully the idea of progress.

Resistance and Hypocrisy

Muslim resistance derives, in part, from history. While the West pursued the idea of progress, Islamic cultures continued to prize piety. Reason and logic, cast in Islam as useful tools for trying to discern God’s intent, are human properties and therefore limited and imperfect. God orders, man obeys; believers do not ask, let alone expect an answer to, the question “why.” Even where Muslim leaders and governments agree progress would benefit their societies, they are playing catch-up and lack the capacity to engineer changes that occurred organically over hundreds of years in the West.

For many Muslims, the West’s progressive enterprise is morally suspect. Each good it produces seems to come freighted with at least one evil: freedom of expression and pornography, high technology and nuclear weapons, material comfort for some at the cost of exploiting others. Small wonder the nation-state, a means of organizing societies that arguably is the paramount achievement of western culture, provokes less enthusiasm than cynicism in the Islamic world.

There is more than a little hypocrisy in the Muslims’ viewpoint. In truth, they have coexisted with the West long enough and absorbed sufficient aspects of its worldview to become hybrids: One foot in the pietistic past (the tenets of Islam remain a primary source of law) and the other in the progressive present (nearly all Muslims reside in nation-states). Their existential ambivalence manifests in a profound sense of alienation from their own culture amid feelings of inferiority and anxiety vis-à-vis westerners. Implicitly or explicitly, many define themselves by how much westernization they will tolerate. Others have gone further, rejecting both the West and contemporary Muslim societies by embracing what they imagine were the guiding principles of Islam in its infancy.

Back to the Future

Salafism, the conscious emulation of supposed early Islamic behaviors and mores, has captured the imagination of Muslims exasperated by their cultures’ inability to compete effectively in the progressive arena. Rather than maintain, like many of their co-religionists,

33 Ibid., p. 43.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 101 that the Islamic world’s clear deficiencies bespeak a noble refusal to sacrifice morality on the altar of progress, Salafis turn the argument on its head: The present can be used to reacquire the ethics of the past. While modern concepts like freedom of speech involve moral choices (how much pornography is acceptable?), contemporary artifacts are value-neutral: Social media and smart phones can be used to stanch or spread the faith.

The overwhelming majority of Muslims reject the Salafis’ enterprise, particularly in its most extreme (Islamic State, al-Qa’ida) forms. They are appalled by the violence and carnage committed in the name of a faith they regard as a counterweight to unfettered materialism, and see the extremists’ embrace of western technology as a dire threat: With the West and Islamic terrorists using advanced weapons and media against one another, moderates like themselves are caught in between. Even with the moderate A generational issue is at play. Older Muslims are aware that majority, the ideals the Salafis’ combining of high-tech with black-or-white championed by the revivalism has piqued the interest of many young people. Salafists have resonance. Some of the latter blame their societies’ shortcomings on the failure of their parents’ flaccid faith to stand up to what they have been taught is a hegemonic West bent on usurping God by annihilating Islam, the last bastion of traditional ethics. Youthful rebellion combines with utopianism and moral outrage in the cauldron of jihad.

But for Islam

That idle, disaffected, and frustrated young people are enthused by the idea of reconstituting the Caliphate and imposing a puritanical interpretation of Shari’a (meaning the way of Islam, but generally used as a synonym for Islamic law) is not surprising. The urge to set matters aright is a universal human impulse, one cynical and/or maniacal leaders have used to lure youth into committing to a variety of isms over the course of human history (tribalism, nationalism, Communism, etc.). What disappoints many in the West is the apparent inability, or perhaps disinclination, on the part of mature Muslims to curb the enthusiasm of their progeny.

The fact is that, for even the moderate majority, the ideals championed by the Salafists have resonance. Do most Muslims endorse the IS caliphate? No, but many hold out hope that— someday—Muslims across the globe might live in a single polity that follows established Islamic ideals. Do they seek the imposition of Shari’a? No, not in the sense of imposing brutal hadd penalties (stonings, amputations, beheadings).34 But yes in the form of an inchoate, elusive moral consensus that somehow would harmonize divine writ with human capacities, producing justice and moderation in all things.

That Islam is under assault is not in dispute for most Muslims. The question is by whom and to what degree. The modern West is seen by many as a symptom of the immorality they fear could consume the planet but for Islam. For them, western secularization is the handmaiden of a cosmic evil bent on ensuring the victory of godlessness. Others, including the Salafis,

34 Contrary to Islamic State and other extremists’ oft-repeated use of beheadings and other gruesome punishments, mainstream Muslims hold that the extremely high evidentiary standards required to impose the hadd penalties—four credible eyewitnesses to the act of penetration in cases of adultery or fornication, for example—should ensure they rarely, if ever, are imposed.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 102 detect greater collusion between the West and satanic forces rendering western culture a legitimate target for any and all means required to hasten Islam’s ultimate triumph. Ironically, such reasoning epitomizes Machiavelli’s ends-justify-the-means argument.

Faith Trumps Reason

As concepts, tolerance and diversity derive from secular ethics. Both are reasonable, logical ideals for westerners (and others) who see the world in live-and-let-live terms. For Muslims anchored to the traditional worldview, however, tolerance and diversity are not unambiguously positive. Many continue to utilize the five-part Islamic categorization of moral obligation, distinguishing between activities on the basis of whether they are forbidden, objectionable, permissible, commendable, or obligatory. Moderates refer to various ahādīth—narrations of the Prophet Muhammad’s words and deeds 35 —to cast tolerance of non-Muslims as permissible, commendable, or even obligatory. Salafis cite others in arguing that such forbearance is either objectionable or forbidden.36

And what of gender equality? Few Muslims, even in the West, are completely comfortable with the idea of male-female equivalence. Most regard the sexes as fundamentally different physically and therefore equipped for different tasks in this world. Many also believe men and women possess unique minds, distinct ways of looking at and solving problems, and therefore see value in recognizing and utilizing these differences.

Polls consistently show that Muslim women want greater opportunity to use their talents and education outside the home. The same surveys indicate that women as well as men continue to view the latter’s primary role as bearing children and taking care of their families. This apparent contradiction reflects the aforementioned one-foot-in-the-past-one-in-the-present dichotomy of Islamic societies. It also may be seen a tacit acknowledgment that although Islam imposes greater gender differentiation than some in a given society may regard as just, most are willing to subordinate their reason to faith. If any one thing can be said to distinguish Muslim cultures from our own, that is it.37

35 Thousands of ahādīth (singular = hadith) on a wide range of subjects were related by the Prophet’s relatives and companions following his death in 632 CE. Islamic scholars and jurists developed methods for determining the authenticity of these narrations, including by examining the reliability of their transmitters through the ages. Although there is consensus on the validity of some ahādīth, many are contested to this day. 36 Kadri, S. (2012). Heaven on Earth: A Journey Through Shari’a Law from the Deserts of Ancient Arabia to the Streets of the Modern Muslim World. New York: Straus and Giroux, p. 85. 37 Poll Finds Muslim Women Admire Western Values, But Don't Want to Imitate Them. (2009, October 31). Retrieved from http://www.voanews.com/a/a-13-2006-06-06-voa48/322871.html; Crabtree, S. (2012, April 2). Two-Thirds of Young Arab Women Remain Out of Workforce. Retrieved from http://www.gallup.com/poll/153659/two-thirds-young-arab-women-remain-workforce.aspx; Most Muslims Want Democracy, Personal Freedoms, and Islam in Political Life. (2012, July 10). Retrieved from http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/07/10/most-muslims-want-democracy-personal-freedoms-and-islam-in- political-life/.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 103 Response to Quick Look 4 Alexis Everington Madison Springfield Inc. [email protected]

It is important to acknowledge the evolution of the relationship between VEOs, potential recruits and the wider public both inside and outside areas controlled by ISIL. For example, during the early days of JN and even ISIL, the wider public view among many within Muslim – and not just Sunni – community was that these VEO groups appeared to be a religious (but not extremist) platforms against the oppressive tyranny of the Assad regime. As such, although it seems hard to believe it now, many of those who joined ISIL in 2013 were religious but more motivated by a humanitarian desire to help those in need.

Another category, and one that has grown stronger over time - is the opportunist. Here, recruits are primarily – but again not solely - driven by the need to win tangible or non- tangible rewards. One obvious example includes financial incentives and booty for those lacking means to get wealth. A second is power and status for those who lacked it. These two account for the strongest opportunistic motivators and apply to a range of recruits. For example, ISIL approached certain individuals belonging to more downtrodden tribes in Deir Ezzor and ‘empowered’ these to gain greater local control. The benefit of this type of recruit is that he or she can be persuaded to leave ISIL if other opportunities present themselves. Herein lies a challenge – how to ensure that tribes supportive of ISIL will not face revenge attacks if they leave, and how to ensure that individuals who leave ISIL will not face heavy punishment, including marginalization from society. Other salient rewards that have motivated recruits include: Redemption and forgiveness (often for former criminals seeking a second chance to ‘make it right’), access to Paradise (for those convinced by VEO religious narratives), Camaraderie and heroism (for those who identified with the energy of the Arab Spring but felt the need for a more radically religious approach) and sex (for those attracted by the idea of the availability of women or Jihad husbands)

The next category is the ideologue. This recruit acts primarily out of a desire to inspire and spread a ‘correct’ version of Islam. It is noteworthy that the ideologue may restrict his objective to countering western and ‘Zionist’ governments, seeing these as aggressive entities that threaten the existence of Islam. However, the more radical ideologue will expand his or her definition of the enemy to include other Arab and Muslims governments and nations, accusing these of straying from the right version of Islam. These types of ideologue are revolutionaries imbued with a sense of moral and religious righteousness echoed in some of the Wahhabi teaching (such as the legitimacy of labeling other Muslims takfiris). Other drivers include: a desire for revenge, an eagerness for justice as they perceive it, sectarianism,

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 104 the sense that Islam today is corrupt and that a return to the purity of early Islam is the only solution, etc.

Given the different categories, the demographic background of an individual attracted to a VEO also shows great variety. For example, it is true that those in poorer communities (particularly those that exist surrounded by visibly wealthier communities) are more susceptible to feel indignation and frustration at their life situation. Likewise, they may lack a religious or mainstream education that inculcates a sense of critical thinking. Both of these aspects will make them more susceptible to some of the narratives implied by the abovementioned observations (access to wealth, access to justice, divine calling, Paradise etc.). However, it is also clear that recruits include unemployed youth that have received a good education, and even men who are married and have children.

Perhaps rather than trying to establish the ratio of ‘types’ of recruit, it would be better to focus on programming that will more likely lead to a change in behavior. Here, the opportunist stands out as more ‘low-hanging fruit’ than the ideologue. The former displays a much greater elasticity of affiliation, and I believe that co-opting these will help starve VEOs of the ‘oxygen’ they need.

Response to Quick Look 4 Sarah Feuer Washington Institute for Near East Policy [email protected]

In Tunisia and Morocco, the two countries responsible for the largest outflow of foreign fighters to Syria, Iraq, and more recently Libya, the populations' views of ISIL's activities tend to be very negative. In Tunisia, for example, an internal poll conducted by the International Republican Institute in 2014 found that only 1% of respondents believed Tunisians should be joining Daesh. However, aspects of ISIL's ideology find support among these populations, especially when framed in general terms. If asked whether Islamic law (sharia) should form the basis of legislation, majorities would respond in the affirmative to the extent sharia is understood as a set of principles intended to establish justice. (When sharia is framed as a set of specific punishments for acts such as theft, support for "the imposition of sharia" among populations of northwest Africa tends to drop, though support remains high in countries to the east, such as Egypt.) Likewise, the Caliphate retains significance in the collective memory as a period of flourishing in the Muslim world, even if there is little expressed desire to eliminate nation-states and re-establish an empire. The notion that Islam/the Muslim world is under attack from the West resonates strongly throughout the region, due in part to lingering resentment over the colonial past and in part to governments' promotion of such conspiracies. In my travels to the region, I have found little intolerance for non-Sunni communities, although in Salafi communities (which number around 17,000 in Tunisia and 10,000 in Morocco), anti-Shiite sentiment is stronger. These societies are generally conservative in their views of gender relations, even if small but effective women's rights movements have successfully lobbied for laws increasing gender equality in the political realm.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 105

Response to Quick Look 4 Noureddine Jebnoun Georgetown University

It is very difficult to assess with accuracy the level of support and sympathy for ISIL’s views and ideology among European and Middle Eastern populations. In fact, any serious study that aims to measure the patterns of ISIL’s “popularity” among target populations should be based on reliable and quantifiable data. However, what we often glean from the abundant open sources regarding the involvement of European citizens in terrorist activities in their countries or across Europe is that most perpetrators are relatively young (between 18 to 30 years of age), have experienced a crisis of identity, are disconnected from their communities, and are marginalized within their own European societies, which have failed to integrate their cultural references into the European social fabric. Seemingly, ISIL can comfort them and provide them with a sense of purpose and community to remedy their meaningless lives. Such measures mitigate their disillusionment, boosts their self-esteem, and empowers them to redress their perceived “moral bankruptcy.” Whether converts to Islam or descendants of second or third generation immigrants, these militants hold a very superficial understanding of Islam and are therefore seen by ISIL as religious novices who are very easy to co-opt and indoctrinate. By recruiting youths from Europe’s Muslim communities, ISIL aims to exacerbate anti-Muslim sentiment in European societies through further exclusion and stigmatization. More importantly, ISIL’s European network, beyond its operational value, has been actively nurturing sectarian divides between European communities and their religious minorities.

In contrast, the attitude of individuals in the Arab world who either expressed support for ISIL by joining the movement or by failing to oppose it when it occupied their towns in Iraq, Syria or Libya, should be understood as a response to the dysfunctional systems od governance across the region. ISIL is not only a criminal organization using a theological discourse that revolves around an “authentic representation of Islam” to achieve its strategic goals across the region, it is also seen as an alternative to miscarried governance and to the failure to create local societies based on participatory governance, citizen rights, equal opportunities, social justice, respect of human rights, adequate education, job opportunities, and decent standards of living. Instead, the post-colonial Arab state epitomized authoritarianism, corruption, police brutality, denial of citizenship, cultural alienation, and systematic violation of its citizens’ rights as a mode of governing. ISIL built its “legitimacy” as a “state in waiting,” in the terms of Yezid Sayigh, seeking to appropriate the monopoly representation of political Islam. ISIL’s legitimacy is also a result of the Arab state’s failure to deliver a legitimate system of governance to its citizens that involves feasible socioeconomic development and equitable treatment based on citizenship rather than on ethnic and sectarian background. Furthermore, there is evidence that foreign military interventionism in the Arab world, including the U.S. led-war in Iraq, deeply destabilized the region and was a major driver in the rise of ISIL. The Israeli aggressions against Palestinians and other Arabs as well as the occupation of Arab territories aggravated these trends.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 106 Response to Quick Look 4 Dr. Thomas F. Lynch III38 NDU, Institute of National Strategic Studies (INSS), Center for Strategic Research (CSR)

This response addresses Arabian Peninsula countries.

The people in Gulf Arab States (Arabian Peninsula) maintain negative views about the desirability of a Caliphate. A vast majority are opposed to the use of violence or terror to attain political objectives. In the main, they do favor adherence to Shariah law and hold negative beliefs toward gender equality. They fear westernization and modernization as an attack on Sunni Muslim unity and heritage and can be animated to short-term support for violent causes when they perceive non-Sunnis or non-Muslims to be attacking fellow Sunni Muslims. These trends help explain why Salafi jihadist groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) can gain meaningful short-term support in moments of perceived danger for Sunni Muslims. The trends establish the reasons that ultra-conservative Salafi beliefs remain viable across the Arabian Peninsula and the more prominent Islamist agendas sustain broad popular support in many Gulf Arab States.

The governments and people of the Gulf Arab States express low support for the methods and techniques of the Salafi jihadist ideology of ISIL. They express uniform dismay at the extreme violence and gore practiced by ISIL in Syria, Iraq and across the wider Middle East. They are wary of the self-declared Caliphate by Iraqi Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, uncertain about its legitimacy and its prospects for survival. The Saudi Grand Mufti, Sheikh Abdul Aziz al-Sheikh and other Sunni Arab Gulf clerics branded ISIL as “enemy number 1 of Islam,” in mid-2014 shortly after al-Baghdadi declared the Islamic State Caliphate.39 Public opinion polls in late 2014 found that ISIL had a mere 5% support in Saudi Arabia, with similarly low numbers assumed present in the other Gulf Arab States.40

However, many people in the Gulf Arab states believe in the tenets of Salafism, the ultra- conservative Sunni Muslim ideology that, although non-violent in the main, shares a number of religious beliefs with the extremely violent ideology of Salafi jihadism practiced by ISIL (and by al Qaeda). Modern Salafism is based on an austere reinterpretation of Islam, calling for Sunni Muslims to return to the original teachings outlined in the Koran and the practices of the Prophet Mohammed as understood by the earliest generations of Islam. From the Salafist perspective, non-Islamic thought – including Westernism, modernism and Shiísm - has contaminated the message of "true" Islam for centuries, and this excess must be

38 See short author biography on page 26. 39 “’ISIS is enemy No. 1 of Islam,’ says Saudi Grand Mufti,” Al Arabiya (English), August 19, 2014, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/08/19/Saudi-mufti-ISIS-is-enemy-No-1- of-Islam-.html. 40 See David Pollock, ISIS Has Almost No Popular Support in Egypt, Saudi Arabia or Lebanon (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute, October 14, 2014), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/isis-has-almost-no-popular-support-in- egypt-saudi-arabia-or-lebanon.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 107 jettisoned for a proper Islamic way of life. Salafists’ desire uniform implementation of restrictive Shariah law and eschew gender equality. Salafists have low tolerance for non- believers and what they decry as insufficiently conservative or “impure” fellow Sunni Muslims. Most Salafists revere past Muslim Caliphates. However, most are unconvinced that a wider Caliphate is necessary. Many believe that properly configured national governments can protect Salafist interests from the encroachment of modernity and Muslim “non- believers.” Most Salafists are organized around popular local imams, preachers and social groups. In recent times, Salafists have formed political parties to safeguard their interests. Salafist political parties exist in Kuwait and Bahrain (and in Egypt). Salafists in other Gulf Arab States gain and maintain political influence through community and religious groups with reach into the powerful ruling families and state bureaucracies of the region’s autocratic governments. Salafists from the Gulf Arab States have provided material and financial support to Salafi jihadists militant groups opposing Bashar al Assad in Syria. From 2011- 2014, this support was broad and somewhat indiscriminate – an emotional reaction to the brutal crackdown against Syrian Sunni communities that began during 2011 by the Assad government in its fight against the Arab Spring uprisings. This intemperate support for Sunni Muslim communities under government assault in Syria aided the rise of ISIL in direct and indirect ways. Since late 2014 and the declarations by prominent Sunni Muslim clerics and Gulf Arab governments against ISIL, most Salafist support for ISIL has withered. Nonetheless, analysts agree that some Salafist financial support still finds its way to ISIL from unreformed Gulf State donors or from ISIL predation of donations to other Sunni militia groups fighting in Syria.

Islamism is a far more popular modern Sunni Islam ideology. Islamism seeks to introduce conservative Islam into the political sphere. Islamists are known for forming political parties, participating in elections, and pushing for constitutional reform. The most notable Islamist political party is the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt. Islamists target governments, universities, and any other institutions into which they can integrate the major features of Islam: Shariah law, solidarity of the Sunni Muslim Ummah, and adherence to largely segregated gender roles. Islamists are not inclined toward widespread violence, and do not look for a new Caliphate. Like Salafists, many Gulf Arab State Islamists provided material and financial support to Salafi jihadist militias in Syria from 2011-2014 as an emergency response to the fierce “assault on fellow Sunni Muslims” by Bashar al Assad’s Alawite government. Islamists across the Gulf also heeded the Sunni clerical backlash against ISIL of late 2014, although some material support from Islamist charities in the Gulf has been documented as still going Sunni militias in Syria and even to ISIL.

Although Gulf Arab State populations have a very negative view of ISIL and its ideology of Salafi jihadism, a majority of Gulf Sunni Arabs do align with two schools of Sunni religious thought with common, fundamentalist but non-violent themes: ultra-conservative Salafism, and conservative Islamism. Neither school believes in re-establishing the Caliphate. Both oppose violence absent an extraordinary threat to the community of the Sunni faith (Ummah). However, both view conservative Sunni Islam, the imposition of Shariah law, and firm limits on the encroachment of western mores and modernism as desirable in political

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 108 life. The depth and durability of these popular views to the questions that Gulf Sunni Arabs face in the conduct of everyday life make it certain that even should ISIL meet its demise, the preconditions for another Salafi jihadist group to rise in its place will remain present for the foreseeable future.41

Popular Support for Extremist Groups in the Sahel Paul Melly Chatham House [email protected]

Introduction

A range of militant or extremist groups are active in the Sahel, most signficantly in north-east Nigeria and in Mali, but with tentacles extending into other countries. The extent to which they have genuine local roots varies – as does the extent of popular support they enjoy.

Brief mention will also be made of other armed groups active in the region but focussed on secular goals and without an ideological jihadist agenda, or else focussed primarily on criminal activity.

The picture is clouded by a degree of overlap in membership between jihadist and non- jihadist groups and the extent to which many individuals may move between groups or remain involved with two or more factions simultaneously. This applies both to ordinary fighters and possibly also some leading figures, who may participate in a peace process while in fact still dabbling in jihadist violence or criminality.

Jihadist factions

Al-Qaeda au Maghreb Islamique (AQMI – or AQIM) developed as an outgrowth of the 1990s conflict in northern Algeria between a secular state and Islamist radicals. Faced with a peace amnesty backed up by tough government military action, some Algerian militants moved south into the Sahara and over the border into Mali – where the state and security forces were much weaker and poorly equipped to stop them.

The leaders of AQMI and many of the fighters were Algerian, but they began to develop connections with local Arab or Tuareg tribes in the Malian Sahara – in some cases taking wives from local Arab or Tuareg families. Thanks to the money they were earning from hostage taking and drug trafficking, they also had the financial resources to lubricate these

41 For greater detail on these conclusions and their implications see Thomas F. Lynch III, The Islamic State as Icarus: A Critical Assessment of an Untenable Threat, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (WWICS), October 2015; Thomas F. Lynch III, The U.S. Military and Countering ISIS, Middle East Institute – Policy Memo, October 1, 2015; and, Thomas F. Lynch III, Sources of Terrorism and Rational Counters, TRENDS Working Paper – 01/15, January 2015.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 109 local ties; it is reported that in some cases they provided medical or other essential services that the state had failed to provide in this region – which is remote from most of Mali; but full details have not emerged and this presence did not amount to overall territorial control or the total displacement of the state.

A constellation of jihadist groups occupied northern Mali in 2012-13.

Of these, AQMI was predominant in the Timbuktu region, and probably attracted most publicity, because of its hostage taking and its attacks on libraries and tombs in Timbuktu. It did manage to recruit some local sympathisers – such as Ahmed Al-Faqi Al-Mahdi, recently convicted at the ICC for damage to historic saints tombs in the city. The group may also have recruited some local guides and drivers in Mali; it had the money to pay local recruits much more than they could earn from alternative legitimate pursuits.

However, AQMI continued, overall, to be viewed as a largely foreign organisation and it appears to have attracted little popular support in Timbuktu – where the tolerant Sufi interpretation of Islam, influenced by mysticism and with great reverence for numerous saints, is strikingly different from the fundamentalist austere purist Wahabi beliefs of jihadist AQMI.

However, the period 2011/12 did see the emergence of one major jihadist faction that is essentially Malian in nature – Ansar Dine (or Eddine). This armed group was founded by Iyad Ag Ghaly, a Malian from the noble Ifoghas strand of Tuareg, from Kidal region in north-east Mali. The group has drawn many of its recruits from among Malian Tuareg, particularly Ifoghas, from this region.

(It should not be confused with the domestic non-violent religious movement in Bamako of the same name, which had in fact been founded earlier.)

Iyad Ag Ghaly was already prominent in Kidal region, in business, as a former leader in the separatist azawad rebellion and later as a mediator in disputes between the Malian government and re-emergent local separatists before a new crisis developed in late 2011. But he formed Ansar Dine around the end of that year, after being rejected in a bid to become the leader of the secular separatist Mouvement National de Libéation de l’Azawad (MNLA). He recruited among kinsmen and other fellow Ifoghas.

After the French-African military intervention of 2013, Ag Ghaly went underground, but even today he remains an influential figure who may even have had some influence over the negotiation of the Algiers Accord, last year’s peace deal between the government and separatists. There have been unsubstantiated reports that Ag Ghaly may benefit from the protection of the Algerian authorities; his whereabouts are variously reported as in the Tinzaouten area – twin communities of the same name either side of the border between north-east Mali and southern Algeria – or southern Libya.

Ag Ghaly certainly appears to benefit from a degree of connection or tolerance among senior figures in parts of the separatist alliance (the Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad, CMA) particularly the Haut Conseil de l’Unité de l’Azawad (HCUA). The latter is essentially drawn from the Ifoghas.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 110 There is a substantial degree of overlap and two way traffic between the separatists, particularly the HCUA, and the jihadists. The HCUA is nominally signed up to the peace deal, but Cheick Ag Aoussa, the HCUA chief of military staff – killed when his car was blown up as he returned from an arms control meeting with the UN peacekeepers in Kidal on 8 October 2016 – is believed to have maintained close contacts with Ag Ghaly. Malian sources also claim Ag Aoussa was a leading commander of the January 2012 Aguelhok massacre, when a Malian army garrison that had surrendered were murdered in cold blood by separatists and/or jihadists.

Many fighters move back and forth between public allegiance to the HCUA – in the hope of benefitting from the material incentives offered under the peace and disarmament process – and continued involvement in jihadist violence. In recent weeks, jihadists have been relatively brazen and open about their continued activity, which suggests they still benefit from degree of at least tacit acquiescence in north-east Mali, particularly the Kidal and Tin Essako areas; many of those engaged in this violence appear to be Tuareg from this region.

Conditions are rather different elsewhere in northern Mali -- in Timbuktu, Gao, Ménaka, Tessalit or Taoudenni – where the social/ethnic composition of the population is mostly non- Ifoghas and where there appears to be relatively little support for Ansar Dine.

However, it would be quite wrong to view jihadism in Mali as a purely Ifoghas phenomenon. There are commanders and fighters drawn from other strands of the population too.

In the Gao region, the most prominent jihadist faction during 2012-13 was the Mouvement pour l’Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO). This was sometimes described as the “black Al-Qaeda” – which was something of a caricature but did reflect the fact that MUJAO seemed to recruit more local people, particularly of darker skinned sub-Saharan ethnicities from the Niger river valley. This may in part have been the result of a long tradition of adherence to Wahabi religious traditions in some villages near Gao.

The French-African military intervention of 2013 ended MUJAO’s control of the area. But jihadist fighters remain active. Subsequently, the Algerian jihadist Mokhtar Belmokhtar – who had gradually broken away from mainstream AQMI – formed a new group drawn from his fighters and the residue of MUJAO; this faction, Al-Mourabitoun, is widely suspected of involvement in some of the recent spectacular urban jihadist attacks in Bamako, Ouagadougou or Grand Bassam. If true, its ability to stage these may have been helped by a capacity to recruit black recruits who are less noticed in the big West African cities. But there is little evidence of generalised popular support for Al-Mourabitoun, either in these cities or in the Gao region of Mali.

The picture is complicated by the persistence of drug smuggling, which is highly lucrative. The big urban attacks clearly are motivated by jihadist terrorist ideology.

Even so, among the wider population in Gao, there is widespread resentment of the armed groups, whether jihadist, criminal or separatist. Recently, there were street demonstrations by local protesters angered by the possibility that, under a plan to decentralise more power to regional councils, the government might seek to draw armed groups into the peace process by giving heir senior figures many of the seats in new nominated transitional councils. Many Gao residents are angered by this possibility.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 111 Meanwhile, some recent attacks in the rural Sahel – for example, near Téra in western Niger in March 2016 – have been seen by local observers as less motivated by ideology than by a desire to capture weapons from the security forces. (Thanks to the international security operation in the Sahara, it has become much harder to smuggle weapons into Mali from southern Libya).

However, ethnic motivations and generalised anti-state ideas also come into play.

The authors of a 6 October attack on the troops protecting the Tazalit refugee camp in western Niger, executed the 22 members of the Nigérien security forces they had captured, even though there was no military reason to do so. The killings may have been motivated by ideology or by ethnic factors (e.g.: Tuareg antipathy towards southern Nigérien soldiers), but this has yet to be clarified.

There is a long history of jihadist raids into western Niger, even as far as Niamey, to attack security force posts, refugee camps, or kidnap westerners. Evidence appears to suggest that these are often carried out by militants operating from neighbouring eastern Mali, and a significant proportion of these are local, sometimes also involved in narcotics trafficking, for which Gao has been a hub.

Although identified jihadists have often been local Arabs or Tuareg, there are some indications they may also have recruited fighters from other ethnic backgrounds. They appear to benefit not so much from generalised popular support as from the acquiescence of some local Gao region individuals who may turn a blind eye or alternatively be employed as drivers or look-outs

So in this region the jihadist operators do appear more local than in Timbuktu region.

Elsewhere in Mali, there is some evidence that jihadist groups have attracted some recruits from the Sahraoui population (in Western Sahara or Sahraoui refugee camps in Algeria). This may reflect the fact that many young Sahraouis in refugee camps in Algeria are unemployed and disillusioned, rather than widespread popular support for an ideological agenda; but this remains to be clarified.

However, further south, in central Mali, there is a clear overlap between local grievances and popular support and the emergence of jihadist ideas as a motivator for violence. Much of Mopti region has become highly insecure, with numerous attacks over the past two years.

Many have been claimed by the Front de Libération du Macina (FLM), a local group inspired by the jihadist preacher Amadou Koufa. Many local youths, particularly from the Peul ethnic group, have become involved.

However, the violence also reflects pressures on land and a breakdown of the traditional arrangements for resolving disputes between Peul pastoralists and settled farming populations; there also appear to be other grievances at play, over the governance by some local elected officials, the poor quality of some local services or heavy-handed security crackdowns and human rights abuses by the Malian army. Criminality may also be a factor.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 112 The violence in central Mali is essentially local; there was a recent attack on Nampala, where the FLM was joined by fighters who had come from northern jihadist groups, but that is not typical; most attacks appear to be staged by disenchanted local youths, motivated by a mixture of local grievance and a touch of ideology; in numerical terms, these groups may have recruited at least several hundred fighters, but it’s not clear whether or not these youths have much support have beyond their own numbers, or how far their wider communities support them.

There have been local mediation efforts in central Mali by community leaders, leading Peuls and others, who have persuaded significant numbers of fighters to promise to lay down their arms. But it remains unclear how far this process has actually been implemented; certainly some attacks have continued into mid-late 2016.

Response to Quick Look 4 Raffaello Pantucci Director, International Security Studies Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) T: +44 (0) 20 7747 4979 | E: [email protected]

Q4: European populations remain interested in the Caliphate, but its visible recession on the battlefield means ISIL holds a lot less attraction than before. The establishment of the Caliphate was a visible radicalizer amongst a niche of European Muslim populations, and helped strengthen the flow of fighters heading to Syria and Iraq. Its visible loss has led to a gradual loss of appeal and is one of the reasons for the reduction of travellers to a trickle. The larger concepts remain of interest, but they no longer so clearly have a home in ISIL.

Perceptions of ISIL in Selected EU Countries Marc Pierini Visiting Scholar, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Carnegie Europe, Brussels), former EU Ambassador Turkey, Tunisia/Libya, Syria, Morocco [email protected]

Abstract • Among the European Union countries providing most ISIL fighters, there is a significant difference in social-economic background of ISIL sympathizers: British sympathizers seem to be mostly highly-educated people providing for ISIL’s policy planning and communications needs; sympathizers from France and Belgium are mostly found in young adults (mostly male, but not exclusively) with a background of school dropouts, petty delinquency, social exclusion, family problems, and vulnerability to propaganda. • A generational gap is observed in France and Belgium: most young people (18-30 age- bracket) hail from hard-working families, most often of Maghreb origin (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia), with no previous records of radicalization and a desire for

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 113 inclusion in the society and social promotion for the next generation. This “pull factor” doesn’t play for younger, frustrated generations. • In France and Belgium, the level of religious education/knowledge among ISIL sympathizers is generally very low and mostly recent. There is generally no knowledge of the Arabic language, other than superficial. More sophisticated motivations such as establishing a Caliphate, imposing Sharia law or the Sunni-Shia divide seem to largely escape this group of sympathizers/recruits. • The attractiveness of ISIL as a war organization seems to be focused on recent recruits among young people looking for a “place in the society” or for a personal project (some have even declared that they saw the jihad in Syria as “an adventure”), in the context of a society perceived as rejecting young Muslims. • In domestic political terms, the main consequence in Western Europe is not just a Muslim/non-Muslim divide in the society but also a rise in xenophobic/racist ideologies and political movements.

Background

Some of ISIL-promoted themes, such as the belief that Muslims are under attack from the West or a negative disposition against gender equality might resonate with a large proportion of the Muslim population in Western Europe. This is linked to the traditional way of life that many Muslim families maintain, even after decades of living in Western Europe (e.g. role of mothers traditionally limited to running the home, without working outside and with limited exposure to social life). In these Muslim families, the general political perception of Western policies vis-à-vis the Muslim world has been negatively influenced for decades by a) the Israel-Palestine conflict and b) by Western interventions in Arab and Muslim countries (French colonization of the Maghreb, intervention in Egypt in the 50s, Algerian independence war, or more recently the 2011 intervention in Libya).

But, until recently, these negative perceptions did not translate in more than general frustration. The fact that these frustrations morphed into political/terrorist activities (for the younger generation) is a more recent phenomenon and illustrates a profound generational gap between those young adults who are currently the ISIL’s sympathizers (or operatives) and their parents. It is striking to witness how distraught parents appear to be when confronted with news that their sons (and sometimes daughters) have left for Syria or have committed terrorist acts in European countries.

Recruitment of young Europeans by jihadist movements abroad is not a new phenomenon per se (e.g. Afghanistan) but the scale is unprecedented, probably due to a massive and modern propaganda and also to accumulated economic and social frustrations of young Muslims in France and Belgium.

It is worth underscoring the demographic and employment aspect of the situation of young Muslim in Western Europe. Previous generations of migrants from MENA were actually filling a gap in the job market which led to a somewhat better societal integration. That pull factor has disappeared as youth unemployment levels hit record highs in Europe and the situation of the most marginalized only got worse. The sense of economic security and opportunity enjoyed by previous generations was leading to integration, while the frustrations of younger generations lead to the opposite phenomenon and to sensitivity to radical propaganda.

Perceptions of ISIL’s Ideology by Young Muslims in France and Belgium

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 114

Apart from a limited group of older propagandists and recruiters, it appears that the level of religious education among young ISIL sympathizers is generally very low (some media even mentioned that 70% of French jihadists were “atheists”, an assertion hard to document). Themes such as re-establishing the Caliphate or imposing Sharia law, and even more remotely intolerance against Shia Muslims, seem to be perceived in a very general manner, and they are certainly not themes backed by any real degree of understanding of the Quran and the other fundamentals of Islam. The vast majority of ISIL sympathizers in France and Belgium seem to be receptive to its ideology mostly for reasons pertaining to their personal place in the society: belonging to the working class, being often confined to less affluent neighborhoods, being tempted by “easy money activities” (petty thefts, soft drugs dealing), they end up associating with marginal groups in the society, with little or no future than repeated arrests, judicial processes and short terms in jail (where radicalization occurs).

In such a context, belonging to (and eventually fighting for) a “single nation for all Muslims” (the Caliphate) may suddenly appear as a “life project” worth cutting off with family and friends and, ultimately for a fraction of this group, worth launching oneself in either jihad in Syria, violent attacks at home, or both in succession.

An important element of ISIL’s propaganda in France and Belgium lies in the messages specifically addressed in 2014 to French sympathizers. On 22 September 2014, a jihadist known by the name of

Abu Mohammed al-Adnani asked ISIL’s followers to target French citizens, civilian or military, by any means (stone, knife, car, push from high building, strangulate, poison). A similar message was broadcasted in French by a masked jihadist on 19 December 2014 (who also invited followers to imitate Mohammed Merah, the jihadist who killed French soldiers and Jewish teacher and pupils in the cities of Montauban and Toulouse in 2012). These messages echoed tragically on 14 July 2016 when a jihadist drove a truck into a crowd in Nice, killing 84 and wounding 331.

Perceptions of ISIL’s Ideology by the General Public

An important consideration in assessing the perceptions of ISIL’s ideology by the general public in France and Belgium is a) the total rejection of the ideology’s violent aspects, including by a portion of the Muslim citizens, b) a growing sense of being powerless in front of repeated attacks, especially in 2015 and 2016, c) a definite sense of frustration with the authorities in front of a perceived lack of efficiency, d) a growing shift of a segment of the public toward extreme right/xenophobic political parties or movements. In 2016, the coincidence of such attacks with the migration/refugee crisis has provoked amalgams and xenophobic reflexes in a large segment of the population and the political establishment.

ISIL-inspired attacks have been targeted with the objective not just to terrorize the population, but to attack its open society features and lifestyle (editorial meeting of a newspaper/pubs and restaurants/sport stadium/concert venue in Paris; random travelers in airport and metro in Brussels; crowd attending the National Day fireworks in Nice) and to divide the society according to ethnic/religious lines (military and police of Arab or Black origin/Jewish schoolchildren and teacher/Kosher supermarket in France; Jewish Museum in Brussels).

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 115

In other words, it is of paramount importance not to limit an assessment to the phenomenon of European citizens radicalizing due to ISIL’s ideology (certainly a most important part of any assessment), but to also consider the societal and political consequences on the wider society in a context where the lack of economic prospects, multiple armed conflicts in the vicinity of Europe, and a wave of migrants and refugees add to the terrorist wave to instill a high sense of insecurity among ordinary citizens and a high fear of the future. In such a context, xenophobic and racist ideologies flourish.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 116 Question (QL5): What are the predominant and secondary means by which both large (macro-globally outside the CJOA, such as European, North African and Arabian Peninsula) and more targeted (micro- such as ISIL-held Iraq) audiences receive ISIL propaganda?

Executive Summary – Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois, NSI

42 It is important to note that although there is clearly increased local agency regarding production of ISIL communications, the teams from the University of Nebraska (Ligon et al), UNC-Chapel Hill (Dauber and Robinson) as well as Adam Azoff (Tesla Government) and Jacob Olidort (Washington Institute) find substantial evidence of centralized ISIL strategic control of message content. However, once content is approved, a good argument can be made that dissemination of ISIL messages and even video production is localized and decentralized. The result is a complex and “robust cyber presence.”

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 117 have significant reservations about the credibility of any media messaging, and even about the personal security risks of using social media themselves. He argues that the communication challenges in the Arab world push people to tend to rely on networks of family, friends, neighbors, “trusted acquaintances in high places (army officers, deputies... etc.)” and word-of-mouth communication for information about local issues. These social networks are extremely important communication channels that may be augmented but are not superseded by social media platforms such as Twitter.

Not everything is digitized: solely local propaganda forms and mediums Audiences both in and outside ISIL controlled areas and those outside the region receive ISIL propaganda products. However, there are some mediums and forms of propaganda which can only be delivered in areas in which ISIL maintains strict control of information and in which it can operate more overtly. For example, Zana Gulmohamad (Sheffield U., UK) and other experts note that ISIL has printed ISIL education materials and changed school curricula in its areas, it holds competitions and events to recruit young people, and polices strict adherence to shar’ia law (hisba). It is in this context that Alexis Everington (Madison- Springfield) argues, one of the most impactful forms of ISIL messaging remains its visible actions (of course, the perceived actions of Iraqi government forces, Assad forces, etc. and the US/West are likely equally, if indirectly, impactful). Second in importance are “media engagement centers such as screens depicting ISIL videos as well as mobile media trucks.” Outside ISIL controlled areas, NDU Professor of International Security Studies Hassan Abbas, cites “the word of mouth” including “gossip in traditional tea/food places” as still the primary means by which local audiences receive ISIL propaganda, and many experts agree that the content is “largely influenced by religious leadership.”

What happens next? Finally, Adam Azoff of Tesla Government offers a caution regarding what happens when ISIL- trained, foreign media operators are pushed out of all ISIL-held areas: as these fighters relocate we should be prepared for the possibility that they would “continue their ‘cyber jihad’ abroad and develop underground media cells to continue messaging their propaganda. Though it will be more difficult to send out as large a volume of high-quality releases, it is not likely that ISIL will return to the amateurish and locally-focused media operations of 2011.”

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 118 Gulmohamad (Sheffield University, UK) Gary Warner (University of Alabama at Birmingham), Assem Nasr ( Indiana U. Purdue U., Fort Wayne)

Editor: Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI)

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 119

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 120 SME Input

Da’esh Cyber Domains from August 2015 – August 2016 Gina Scott Ligon, Ph.D., Doug Derrick, Ph.D., Sam Church, and Michael Logan, M.A. University of Nebraska Omaha Related Publication: Ideological Rationality: The Cyber Profile of Daesh (available on request and in press at Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict Journal)

Daesh is the most prolific violent extremist group on social media, but their cyber footprint is much more complex than researchers of solely mainstream services such as Twitter imply. Their cyber profile involves pushing content into open infrastructures to disseminate information, such as ideological messages, propaganda, and training instructions. To date, much of the research on Daesh communication has focused on what is publicly available through speeches and videos released by al Hayat Media and Daesh Twitter users (Ingram, 2014; Veilleuz-Lepage, 2014; Zelin, 2015). A notable exception is the important monograph from Saltman and Winter (2014), where the authors identified complex cyber capabilities such as 1) centralized propaganda, 2) global dissemination of threats, 3) custom app development, and 4) decentralized messaging. Given acknowledgement of Daesh’s prolific use of a variety of Internet Communication Technology (ICT), it follows that each aspect they use plays a role in sharing the story Daesh wishes to convey.

An organization’s online presence plays a significant role in communicating with a global audience (Ligon, Derrick, & Harms, 2015). In regards to Daesh and its messaging campaigns, popular platforms of more conventional ICT—like Twitter or Facebook—are mere starting points for its multi-faceted, complex cyber profile. Thus, the purpose of this effort is to better understand the nature of the cyber channels and domains most used in the messaging of Daesh, particularly as it manifests through social media connected transient web pages to an English-speaking audience. The organization’s end goal vis-à-vis their online marketing campaign is complex and is used to “attract potential recruits, raise money, promote the image of the organization, or just spread fear among its enemies” (Barrett, 2014: 53). While there is some evidence that a centralized authority approves messaging prior to it being disseminated via more conventional channels (e.g., Dabiq, Al-Hayat Media), the cyber footprint of Daesh is more complex. This overall strategic effort is reportedly overseen by a skilled media council (Lister, 2014). However, the deployment and dissemination of Daesh messages is arguably decentralized once content is generated, resulting in a robust cyber presence.

While the Daesh strategic and tactical cyber profiles are unquestionably unprecedented (Zelin, 2015), questions remain as to what we can glean about the organization from its messaging. The dataset used for assessing Daesh’s online presence was unique to this project and comprised of 4.5 million tweets and 16,000 attached transient webpage articles posted by Daesh followers, members, and sympathizers. The research methodology and subsequent data analysis provides insight into the messaging dynamics of Daesh. We conclude the study with a discussion of limitations of our method, implications of our findings, and recommendations for future research.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 121 Method We collected this data by developing a custom program that follows the method outlined in figure 1 (Derrick et al, 2016). First, our program utilized the Twitter API to follow and log tweets posted by the hacktivist group Anonymous. For the present effort we did not evaluate the “Tweets,” but used them as launching points to the open architectures where richer content is housed. During much of this collection, Anonymous posted Daesh members’ Twitter handles approximately one every two minutes since August 2014. As stated previously, the goal is to understand the strategic messaging from the deployment of messages by large grassroots followers. Thus, our program compressed a list of Daesh- affiliated accounts identified in the posted content. From that list, our system utilized the Twitter API to download a sample of the latest tweets from each Daesh- affiliated account. Figure 1. Method for Capturing Transient Webpages Tweets were sorted into various components (e.g., web addresses and links, hashtags, mentions) to be analyzed. Our software searched for links within tweets referencing anonymous posting services for open content-publishing transient webpages (e.g., JustPaste.it, dump.to). Next, our software automatically crawled to the referenced webpage and captured both PDF and HTML versions of the actual transient webpages. From these pages, the program identified any links to other transient webpages/open architectures in the online posting. The software continued to download and analyze the content until all possible transient links had been found and captured. To date, this process has produced over 4,500,000 tweets, 1,589,623 URLs, and 16,000 transient web pages.43

43 This is the Social Media for Influence and Radicalization (SMIR) Dataset (Church, 2016).

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 122 Results

Top 25 Channels Utilized by Daesh between August 30, 2015 - August 30, 2016 400,000 350,000 300,000 250,000 200,000 150,000 100,000 # of URLs of # 50,000 0 zad-… wp.me dump.to quran.to du3a.org qurani.tv almlf.com my.mail.ru mezani.net justpaste.it archive.org 7asnat.com pho2up.net up.top4top.… quran.ksu.e… twitter.com ghared.com wthker.com dailymotion… web.archive… drive.google… telegram.me sendvid.com youtube.com d3waapp.org

We ranked the top domains used by Daesh between August 2015 and September 2016. Results indicated that Twitter, identified as the “jumping off point” for much of the persuasive content we find on non-indexed, transient webpages, is the most oft used. However, a variety of other types of domains are also used by Daesh to disseminate messaging, as indicated in Tables 1 and 2.44

Table 1. Rank Order Daesh Communication Channels 2015-2016

Rank Domain f % 1 twitter.com 368,652 23.19% 3 youtube.com 213,092 13.41% 2 justpaste.it 105,802 6.66% 4 du3a.org 67,380 4.24% 5 archive.org 67,298 4.23% 6 zad-muslim.com 36,519 2.30% 7 sendvid.com 22,776 1.43% 8 drive.google.com 19,143 1.20% 11 up.top4top.net 18,965 1.19% 9 dump.to 13,394 0.84% 10 web.archive.org 12,904 0.81% 21 wp.me 14,280 0.90% 12 ghared.com 11,496 0.72% 13 qurani.tv 10,811 0.68% 14 quran.to 10,638 0.67% 15 telegram.me 8,726 0.55% 16 7asnat.com 8,624 0.54% 17 dailymotion.com 7,970 0.50% 18 almlf.com 7,958 0.50% 19 d3waapp.org 7,774 0.49% 20 wthker.com 7,067 0.44% 22 my.mail.ru 6,850 0.43% 23 quran.ksu.edu.sa 6,774 0.43%

44 A more detailed analysis of monthly usage could be conducted upon request.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 123 24 pho2up.net 6,000 0.38% 25 mezani.net 5,712 0.36% 1,066,605 67.10%

Number of total URLs in SMIR: 1,589,623

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 124 How ISIL’s Audiences Receive Propaganda Jacob Olidort, Ph.D. Soref Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

ISIL disseminates its propaganda to both large and more targeted audiences, tailoring content, language and even format to both the different audiences and its own priorities. The most widely known and broadest is its propaganda magazines, most famously the English- language Dabiq as well as the new magazine Rumiyah, and the less frequently published Russian-language Istok, French-language Dar al-Islam, Turkish language Constantinople, and Malay-language al-Fatihin. These magazines, along with videos in these and other languages (including Mandarin, German, Spanish and others), are the most widely distributed and commonly known of the group’s propaganda materials, which are released through social media and Telegram. Typically, these publications are aimed at audiences who communicate in those languages, and would often tailor the messaging to fit where those audiences may be. So, for example, they are targeting mainstream American Muslim leaders in the English- language Dabiq, citing sexual promiscuity and homosexuality as debauchery in the French- language Dar al-Islam, and the like.

Beside this macro level, the group has various targeted types of propaganda and outreach to its prospective support base. For example, media reporting has revealed that ISIL operatives engage via Twitter directly with estranged individuals in the West, checking in on them regularly and moving them “ISIL’s publishing house to gradually join ISIL’s cause. The group also uses and Maktabat al-Himma (“Zeal develops mobile apps to disseminate its propaganda, such Press”) … possibly as its Arabic alphabet and Islamic chants apps for children. affiliated with ISIL’s

Research and Fatwa- Within ISIL’s territory (and perhaps beyond, as these are also available online), the group releases a weekly Issuing Committee, has a newsletter reporting on its territorial progress, citing number of sub-divisions: casualties and costs incurred on both ISIL’s side and those research and scholarly of the counter-ISIL coalition, and featuring articles covering studies (for longer special interest topics (women who joined ISIL, obituaries manuals of religious of ideologies, etc.). This is also likely the area in which the guidance and aforementioned mobile phone apps are mostly used. commentaries),

Finally, ISIL has a prolific publication industry – likely both “Whispers in the ear of circulated within ISIL controlled territory and online, as the fighter” (pamphlets these have been digitized. While little information can be for its fighters), and its confirmed about ISIL’s publishing house Maktabat al- series of textbooks Himma (“Zeal Press”) based on open sources, my recent (released in October report – the first systematic review of the nearly 150 Arabic 2015).” language books and pamphlets produced through this vehicle since June 2014 45 – offers a number of observations about its operations and

45 Jacob Olidort, Inside the Caliphate’s Classroom: Textbooks, Guidance Literature and Indoctrination Methods of the Islamic State (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2016), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/inside-the-caliphates-classroom ; See also idem, “The Islamic State’s ‘Homo Jihadus,’” Lawfare, 18 September 2016, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy- analysis/view/the-islamic-states-homo-jihadus

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 125 organizational structure, as well as conjecture about location. The publishing house, possibly affiliated with ISIL’s Research and Fatwa-Issuing Committee, has a number of sub-divisions: research and scholarly studies (for longer manuals of religious guidance and commentaries), “Whispers in the ear of the fighter” (pamphlets for its fighters), and its series of textbooks (released in October 2015). Many of these publications bear the imprimatur of the publishing house and have introductory remarks from the editorial board, occasionally signed by the “head of the editorial board.” Given the deep concern for controlling ideas, it is reasonable to suspect that this chain of command may report to senior levels of ISIL leadership. If accurate, based on this assumption one can also suspect that the publishing house – if it does exist as a physical entity – is based in or around Raqqa (if ISIL leadership is based there), or, at the very least, maintains direct and regular lines of communication with ISIL leadership.

In terms of content (discussed in depth in the aforementioned report), these publications vary widely and appear regularly. Over the last few months, as the group continued to face challenges on the battlefield it published about one commentary on theology per month. Their commentaries are largely editions of works by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792), the “founding father” of Saudi Arabia’s religious tradition (Wahhabism), with the aim of validating ISIL’s claim that Saudi Arabia has betrayed its Islamic roots. In addition, the group has published manuals on prayer, fasting, charity, slavery; shorter pamphlets on aspects of the group’s jihadist priorities and its control of Islam (this includes topics such as men’s beard length, martyrdom, loyalty to ISIL rather than to national identity, and the woman’s head covering); and its textbooks. The latter include not only books on Salafi/Wahhabi principles of law and theology, but also textbooks on mathematics, geography, history, literature, computer programming and physical fitness – all of which interweave ISIL’s violence and religious intolerance into the kind of basic knowledge and skills they instill in children. Examples of this include a recent 80-page book of exercises to teach children how to write the letters of the Arabic alphabet, which include images of the ISIL flag and guns in between chapters. Another example is physical fitness – which includes not only chapters on exercises and stretches, but also those on how to identify, load, assemble and fire various weapons. All told the book publishing industry – which continues as the group loses territory (suggesting ISIL leadership’s continued investment in this area) – reflects the most coherent and systematic presentation of what it seeks to give over to what it calls “a new jihadi generation,” that the group hopes will outlive its current territorial pursuits.

Recommendation Once books are published it is of course difficult to stop their dissemination. However, the U.S. government can significantly disrupt these activities by going after the media (and the channels) rather than the message directly. This includes targeting the publishing house’s base of operations, interdicting where its payload is distributed and how it is received, and helping fill infrastructure and education gaps within ISIL controlled territory as the group withdraws from its strongholds. Pending U.S. government resources, there may even be opportunities for sowing anxiety into the ideological message of the group by engaging in a coordinated and consistent counter-propaganda campaign in which imitation ISIL propaganda could be disseminated – further causing distrust both internally within the ranks of ISIL leadership as well as between it and prospective recruits.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 126 Comments on How Audiences Receive ISIL propaganda Hassan Abbas Professor of International Security Studies and Chair of Regional and Analytical Studies College of International Security Affairs, National Defense University

In the directly controlled ISIL areas, ISIL’s propaganda machine influences all mediums of communication - social and electronic (where functioning) and especially through mosques. However, in the Sunni majority areas (not under ISIL control), ISIL propaganda happens primarily by word of mouth including gossip. To add, the international marketing of ISIL is largely being conducted via social media and ISIL magazine Dabiq. Within Iraq, however, my travels from Baghdad towards Samara (2015-2016) convinced me that local Sunnis had not even heard about Dabiq magazine. For them tribal and local networks are the source of all news - both political and ISIL related.

Comments on How Audiences Receive ISIL propaganda Alexis Everington Madison-Springfield, Inc.

It is important to note that propaganda does not cause extremism, it catalyzes already existing propensities. As such, it is the fuel added to the fire but not the fire itself. With this understanding the following brief observations can be made.

In-country audiences are most impacted by visible actions taken by ISIL (e.g. those in Raqqa see the executions that take place). In second place are media engagement centers such as screens depicting ISIL videos as well as mobile media trucks. In third place is religious messaging at mosques and other religious centers and events. Fourthly there are posters and leaflets that disseminate pro-ISIL messages. Finally, there are competitions and events held to recruit the youth.

Out-of-country audiences are largely reliant on face-to-face communication with an individual that introduces and/or grooms them, as well as supportive material (typically videos and chats online). In a few cases, individuals are also given reading material by the ‘groomer’. Finally, it should be noted that some communication contributes to the pro-ISIL effort, even indirectly. For example, the perception that the international community was doing nothing to help Sunnis oppressed by the Assad regime, drew concerned foreign fighters to their ranks. Likewise, media sensationalist coverage of ‘terrorism’ can convince those seeking notoriety that joining ISIL is one way to achieve it.

Comments on Video Propaganda Cori E. Dauber, Professor of Communication Mark D. Robinson, Director, Multimedia Labs University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

The primary means by which propaganda is distributed, both inside and outside the CJOA, is visual, though distribution networks, obviously, are different. Most powerfully, and of most particular interest are the moving images (video) that are employed. Last year ISIL began

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 127 representing its videos as being the products of a newly decentralized system, with multiple Wiliyats having their own production centers, but it should be noted that there is a centralized visual aesthetic. It is possible that there is centralized control and it is possible that this is an artifact of each of these centers having been started by members of a single original core team all of whom originally worked and were trained together, but either way there is a definite and identifiable “look” to these materials. Most obviously, line-up the opening graphics introducing each of the Wiliyats and [you will see that] there is no question this is the case.

There is a very conscious harnessing of technical, compositional “There is a very elements of video production for rhetorical, persuasive conscious harnessing of purposes. To a trained eye this is done so consistently, and in technical, such a sophisticated way, that there is no doubt it is being done with intent. Lighting, editing, camera angles, special effects, all compositional elements are being incorporated in very savvy ways. of video production for rhetorical, persuasive Direct appeals are being made to a universal, trans-national purposes. …ISIL videos youth culture. No matter what country they are from, young do not just mimic First people today watch, to an extent, the same movies, and play the Person Shooter games, same video games. ISIL videos do not just mimic First Person they copy specific Shooter games, they copy specific scenes with such accuracy that young people who play these games can immediately scenes...” identify the specific scene from the specific game. Lining up the scene from the [ISIL] video against the scene from the game there can be no doubt of the intent to pull from the game. By the same token, they use memes associated with Marvel Superhero comics and movies and now, in fact, have in at least “… in the visual realm a one case simply ripped a CGI image straight from one of these focus solely on ISIL films. (In the video made to celebrate last November’s Paris products is a mistake, attacks, the central image, repeated several times, is a digital that despite the fact image of the Eiffel Tower, bombed, collapsing into the Seine. They did not render this themselves, they ripped it from G.I. that ISIL was initially a Joe, Rise of the Cobra, which grossed more than $300 million generation ahead of worldwide.) other [terrorist] groups, several groups have On a general note, we have been warning for some time that been gaining ground in the visual realm a focus solely on ISIL products is a mistake, almost by the month.” that despite the fact that ISIL was initially a generation ahead of other [terrorist] groups, several have been gaining ground almost by the month. We believe there are several who have now caught up, if inconsistently so. This is extremely dangerous for the United States and our allies.46

Comments on How Audiences Receive ISIL propaganda Chris Meserole

46 See for example “The Wind of Rage,” from Harakat al Sham al Islamiyyah, http://jihadology.net/2016/09/10/new-video-message-from-%e1%b8%a5arakat-a%e1%b8%a5rar-al-sham- al-islamiyyah-the-wind-of-rage/ or “Story of the Life of Abu Basir al Hindi,” from Jabhat al Nusrah, http://jihadology.net/2016/03/25/new-video-message-from-jabhat-al-nu%E1%B9%A3rah-story-of-the-life- of-abu-basir-al-hindi/

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 128 Brookings Institution

I would define the smartphone as the primary means of global dissemination of propaganda, with the secondary means being content-specific apps such as Telegram (for operational or targeted information) or even Twitter (for general information, though less so now).

“…Without the video the I would also push back a bit against the question. We continue to view propaganda as something that is attack was pointless; and "received." However, I would argue ISIL is to AQ what without the smartphone, Snapchat is to CNN: they figured out that if the medium they could not easily make is the message, then the smartphone's "message" was as and disseminate the video. much about what you produced as what you consumed. The point of the attacks was I don't think it's a coincidence that AQ adopted a to participate in the "whitelabeling" strategy at the same time that propaganda even more smartphones gained global adoption. Their brand and operational structure were built in and optimized for a than it was to achieve global media environment that was push only, and thus political ends..” had to de-emphasize the brand once it was clear they could not adapt to new patterns of propaganda consumption. By contrast, ISIL had the advantage of spinning up its media operations at the same time that the smartphone reached global scale. As a result they were able to optimize their message and strategy for global participation. Note that many of the attackers this summer produced smartphone videos beforehand. Without the video the attack was pointless; and without the smartphone, they could not easily make and disseminate the video. The point of the attacks was to participate in the propaganda even more than it was to achieve political ends. Obviously there are many other factors that have contributed to ISIL's success. But among analysts I think the form factor of the propaganda itself has gone underappreciated.

Comments on How Audiences Receive ISIL propaganda Neil F. Johnson Professor, Physics Department, University of Miami, FL

Our analysis of online media shows that the social media platform VKontakte (VK.com < Caution-http://vk.com > )47 has been a predominant means by which propaganda in this region, and for this cause, has not only been shared, but most importantly also discussed and through which aggressive jihadi (and anti-U.S.) narratives develop. VKontakte online groups provide a much richer and more powerful environment for developing narratives and exchanging propaganda and operational details than other social media like Twitter, where individuals tend to be follow other individuals and the amount of text is limited. Members of these online VKontakte groups interchange ideas, propaganda, operational manuals, videos etc. and can do so even with a cellphone simply because VKontakte (like Facebook) has a mobile app, and so links to group updates can be shared through texts and Twitter through most phones. The groups can also pull in new members that way. The advantage pf these online groups for them is that, just as on Facebook, members of an online group can manipulate their footprint online, making themselves ‘invisible’ using the public/secret

47 VKontakte is a copy of Facebook which is very popular in the geographical region of interest. Like Facebook, it allows ‘communities/groups’ to be set up by an administrator, and then pull in members online.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 129 setting in the settings online, and also they can change “… online groups provide a their names, operate multiple languages, and also — if in danger of being shut down by moderators — they then much richer and more can jump to other groups with different ID’s, and they powerful environment for simply alert their members to this. So they remain developing narratives and essentially intact. exchanging propaganda and operational details than Over the 2015 period in which we studied them, we other social media like found approximately 200 of these online groups Twitter … involving just over 100,000 members that were actively discussing and propagating pro-ISIS propaganda, including videos, PDF files etc. They range in size from 10 to several thousands. In 2016, this number has started falling slowly, but we are unsure if this is because they are becoming smarter in avoiding detection or because some are migrating to other media. For example, we have learned that on Telegram, they have started forming ‘super-users’ which are a kind of ‘lite’ equivalent of these VKontakte groups — but with the more limited tools that Telegram offers compared to VKnotakte. We believe Telegram is fully encrypted meaning that it is more secretive for them — but in the end they want to attract new members so it is in their interests to keep a presence on a platform like VKontakte.

VKontakte is a dominant social media platform in the area of and has more than 350 million users worldwide — though a majority are in the area of interest in the question and so the dominant languages in these groups tends to be Russian and Arabic. Its headquarters are in Russia and it is a company, like Facebook. Interestingly, we found that members of these online VKontakte groups sometimes denote themselves as ‘fighters’ (in Russian or Arabic) and they seem to attract a lot of people around them online when they do so. From what they post, there is reason to believe that they are telling the truth when they say they are fighters on the ground.

So VKontakte is an ideal site for them — it is multilingual, but predominantly Russian which targets students etc. and hence potential recruits in that entire area, and has the flexibility to be a virtual meeting place for exchanging and discussing ideas and potential events, in a way that something more ‘lite’ like Twitter does not. Also given the penetration of the Internet and availability on smartphones, it is readily available. Our current research shows that, perhaps importantly, there are 2 broad classes of VKontakte groups — those that are stimulated primarily by news events and those that are (for want of a better word) spiritual. Some individuals online pass through many of these groups, as if they are looking for something, while others go in and sit more or less indefinitely in one (until it is shutdown which often happens, in which case they then jump to another). We are currently analyzing these individual user pathways in detail.

So in summary, whereas others have focused on Twitter, the important point we feel is that VKontakte (or something like it, akin to Facebook) provides a very flexible medium through which they can actually develop capability and intent, as opposed to simply reporting activity and exchanging short slogans and soundbites. ISIL Propaganda

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 130 David B. Des Roches48 Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA), National Defense University

ISIL’s reach and ability to attract recruits and inspire/direct action around the world is a disturbing development. It is not, however, unique. A “ISIL’s ability to leverage major trait of ISIL’s rise is its adroit use of new media – new technology has caught particularly internet based wide spread media sites and the rest of the world flat- various instant messaging / communications platforms – footed.” to attract, inspire and direct recruits to its cause.

ISIL is not the first ideological movement to globally inspire decentralized and undirected acts of violence. The anarchist movement of the late 1800s –early 1900s claimed this distinction, together with the credit for the assassination of several European rulers and an American president. What sets ISIL apart is the use of social media to develop and spread its propaganda. As with any effective propaganda method, the diffusion of propaganda varies depending upon the audience. This paper will examine several ISIL audiences and discuss the propaganda methods used to identify, inspire and direct them.

Key Characteristics of ISIL Propaganda ISIL’s ability to leverage new technology has caught the rest of the world flat-footed. ISIL has proven to be a nimble organization which has adapted to and applied technology long before the governments who oppose it. The following are the major characteristics of ISIL propaganda’s leveraging of new media.

1. Slick production values. ISIL publication and videos are produced using new, relatively cheap software which allows production values similar to large scale commercial magazines and network film production. One recent ISIL execution video feature multiple camera angles, smooth editing, professional sound, flawless lighting and a clearly edited sequencing which allowed for aesthetic stage management. Dabiq is laid out and has the same graphic style as a commercial magazine popular among young men such as Maxim.

2. Relatively impressive Islamic scholarship. While Western media makes much of the lack of knowledge of individual ISIL fighters and recruits, the written product produced by ISIL is of high caliber and generally cites the most highly regarded hadith verses.

3. Use of targeted languages. When ISIL wants to reach people in France, they get a native French speaker, often with a recognizable accent. Same thing for other languages. Al-Qaeda often used ponderous translations: ISIL literally speaks to its audience in their own language with their own accent.

4. Rapid response. By using digital production for both videos and magazines, ISIL is able to rapidly respond to events and capitalize on them. Al-Qaeda would generally

48 David Des Roches generally posts copies of both Dabiq and Inspire as they appear. His Twitter account is @dbdesroches

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 131 refer to events in taped messages released months or years after the event; ISIL will release videos or feature their “martyrs” in print within days or weeks.

5. Micro targeting. ISIL use of Twitter, Kik and other social media allows them to propagate messages and themes to discreet audiences – many of whom are self- identified – instantly and with tailored messages.

Socializing with the Enemy: Insights into how ISIL targets their propaganda, at home and abroad Adam Azoff Tesla Government Inc.

This paper attempts to qualitatively and quantitatively assess how the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) targets its propaganda toward local and foreign audiences (outside of the Combined Joint Operations Area [Iraq and Syria]; or CJOA). It builds on past studies examining ISIL’s propaganda, media strategy, and dissemination networks, as well as challenges facing counter-messaging efforts.49

By examining two weeks (9/13/16 to 9/27/16) worth of ISIL media output, this report provides insight on the types of media, central themes, and target audiences of the group’s propaganda. 50 Perhaps not surprisingly, this sample illustrates that ISIL is still capable of launching coordinated media campaigns and producing content that relates events on the ground. The group’s propaganda continues to be grounded in the realities of developments on the battlefield, the territories they control, and in international politics.51

49 See Aaron Zelin (2015) Picture Or It Didn’t Happen: A Snapshot of the Islamic State’s Official Media Output and Charlie Winter (2015) The Virtual ‘Caliphate’: Understanding Islamic State’s Propaganda Strategy for more comprehensive studies of ISIL propaganda output. 50 This paper does not contend to have collected all of ISIL’s media releases during this time span; however, by following an official account (“Abu-Muhammad”, @abo_m) over the course of two weeks, it was possible to collect a sizable sample. This account is one of ISIL’s official Twitter dissemination accounts, often taken down (sometimes within hours) and recreated at a slightly different handle (e.g., @abu_m_498 at the start of the study, @abo_m_544 by 9/27). The sample does not include non-visual posts, such as written statements, which are less common. It also does not include battlefield updates from the ISIL-affiliated A’maq News Agency, which is widely considered an unofficial distributor of propaganda related to developments on the ground. While in future studies it would be beneficial to follow multiple official ISIL accounts on Twitter, the sample presented below helps paint a picture of the breadth of content types, themes, and target audiences essential to its overall strategy. 51 See MEMRI JTTM report Understanding The ISIS Media Apparatus: Distribution Networks and Practices, February 19, 2016

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 132 Over the course of the two week time period, 105 official media releases were collected, produced primarily by ISIL’s “Waliyah” media offices. Like in past studies that examined ISIL’s social media output, the group’s offices in Iraq (41 media releases) and Syria (47 media releases) were able to publish many more posts than its affiliates combined (10 total outside of CJOA). The greater output from media offices in the CJOA, and the slightly higher rate in Syria, is understandable as the group enjoys more advanced content creation capabilities and likely a much higher flow of unedited footage and images sent to media offices from areas under its control.

In a way, all of ISIL’s propaganda is utopian. In products depicting military operations, everything seems to be moving in a positive direction. Even after an intentional, “tactical” retreat from an area, it is not uncommon to see posts of positive developments on another front. Much literature on the topic to date notes that ISIL’s media productions are more diverse than the violent videos that grabbed headlines in 2014. This sample reaffirms that much of the group’s output was not primarily military (48 releases). In fact, 51% of the collected posts depicted less violent governance, Da’wa (Islamic education/teachings), Hisba (religious policing), Martyrdom (parsing recently killed fighters), or other general posts about life in the “Caliphate.”

The types of content produced ranged from images to videos, newsletters, magazines, an audio file, and a children’s book. The breadth of products the group disseminates through its global network of online supporters indicates ISIL continues to operate a sophisticated media apparatus. Most frequently, the group issues pictures or picture stories and videos, which are easier to process and distribute than larger reports, newsletters, and books.52

Events occurring during this paper’s time frame helped shape the sentiment of the posts that were collected. Early on in the collection period, there could have been an unusually high volume of positive, non-violent releases due to the proximity of Eid celebrations, where the group’s various media offices clearly conducted a campaign depicting the “atmosphere” of areas under its control. As battles intensified in Shirqat there was an uptick of military-related releases highlighting attacks in the area. During this timeframe, there was also what appeared to be a continuation of the “caravan of martyrs” campaign—a series of pictures and captions praising recently killed ISIL fighters.

Primary vs. Secondary Means of Propaganda Distribution

52 See Charlie Winter, ISIS’ offline propaganda strategy, March 31, 2016

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 133 Audiences both inside and outside of ISIL’s areas of control receive ISIL media propaganda products, albeit through different distribution mechanisms. Within the CJOA, ISIL is able to conduct Hisba activities, broadcast local radio programs, provide Friday sermons, develop school curricula, and employ other measures to propagate their ideology to the populace under their control. ISIL's media products, which have been successful to some extent in radicalizing foreign recipients, are also put to use in the local context. While enacting limitations on access to outside information, including punishing even suspected users of social media, ISIL has set up viewing booths and distribution centers for populations under their control to view their media network’s products.

Outside of Iraq and Syria, where ISIL must operate covertly, the group’s predominant means of broadcasting its propaganda is online. Though ISIL has networks of supporters all over the world, these supporters must remain discreet, which limits in-person interaction. ISIL must thus rely on its online support base (known as “Knights of the Uploading”) to spread its message to the 1.4 billion Muslims in the world.

Conclusions Regardless of the language or target audience of a given media release, all official media is standardized and consistent to the central themes and quality of the group. ISIL does not concern itself like Al Qaeda, with the public opinion of the Muslim world at large, or, as William McCants of the Brookings Institution eloquently stated, “The Islamic State doesn’t give a damn about building broad support among the Muslim masses.” As ISIL is defeated militarily, its ability to produce a centralized message and high-quality product will be complicated. While much attention is given to the threat posed by ISIL fighters returning to countries outside of the CJOA, it is not clear what might become of ISIL’s media apparatus if the group loses control of the self-proclaimed Caliphate’s territories. Inevitably, as ISIL foreign fighters increasingly attempt to return to their areas of origin, there is the potential that ISIL members that took part in media operations will continue their “cyber jihad” abroad and develop underground media cells to continue messaging their propaganda. Though it will be more difficult to send out as large a volume of high-quality releases, it is not likely that ISIL will return to the amateurish and locally-focused media operations of 2011. ISIL's propaganda represents a stark increase in quality and quantity from other extremist groups. Even the group's own output has increased in volume and quality over time, despite setbacks on the battlefield. This threat should thus not be underestimated.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 134 Comments on ISIL propaganda Zana K. Gulmohamad PhD Candidate in the Politics Department at the University of Sheffield

There are various ways and methods that ISIL utilizes to spread their propaganda. Each method targets a segment of a society and/or person differently. The broad perceptions about the propaganda aims in Iraq are that spreading fear “…the personality, the and domination/power/authority, demoralizes the anti- background, environment, IS forces and distances the locals from the federal life condition, and ideology government in Baghdad as they show the Shias as (e.g. Salafi Jihadism) are all apostates or renegades “Rawafidh” and this increases factors that affect to what their recruit numbers. extent the propaganda is having an impact …” The extremely strict rules in ISIL held areas have deprived the communities of updated news and awareness of the developments. Therefore, the mainstream information and media is through ISIL’s media channels including Radio (Al- Bayan). Although ISIL banned satellite television receivers some people secretly have them.53 Internet is provided and possessed by ISIL and the locals are unable to access it. ISIL closed all cyber cafes.54 ISIL banned the Internet for several reasons; one of those is stopping the anti-IS locals from contacting anti-IS coalition forces. However, some locals use covert ways to access it and expose ISIL’s brutality.

Another means adopted to disseminate their propaganda and ideology is by changing the education system in IS held areas by printing new books and curriculums in schools and universities. In the universities they closed down many departments and faculties. Meanwhile, inside ISIL held areas, mosques and assembly areas that people are forced to attend are also a way to spread propaganda. Some mosques and Islamic schools are fertile grounds for recruiting more locals outside IS held areas in Iraq.

Their brainwashing and recruitment policy toward children (child solders) has been systematic. Besides printed leaflets, magazine and small books, using the internet has been one of the most active strategies of ISIL to lure teenagers.55 This has had a great effect on recruitment across the globe.

Those possessing a combination of the following factors have been targeted and have proved to be a fertile recruitment ground inside and outside IS held areas in Iraq: Former members of radical Sunni Islamic factions or militants, extremely conservative Muslims, those with no or very poor income, and those discontent with the Shia-led government in Baghdad. The aforementioned groups are more vulnerable and receptive to IS’s propaganda machine. The

53 Heavy. (2016). Retrieved from: http://heavy.com/news/2016/06/new-isis-islamic-state-daesh-news- pictures-videos-and-let-the-believers-be-cautious-regarding-the-prevention-of-the-satellite-dish-and-its- destruction-full-uncensored-youtube-video-mp4-download/ 54 Hawramy, F. (2016). Retrieved from:https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/09/life-under-isis- raqqa-mosul-giant-prison-syria-iraq 55 Gulmohamad, Z. (2014). “The Islamic State most effective wars are waged online”. The National. Retrieved from: http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/the-islamic-states-most-effective-wars-are-waged-online

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 135 author believes the personality, the background and environment, life condition, and ideology (e.g. Salafi Jihadism) are all factors that affect to what extent the propaganda is having an impact to be part of the ISIL or pledge allegiance (baiya).

Comments on ISIL propaganda Gary Warner, Director Center for Emerging Technology Investigations Forensics & Security The University of Alabama at Birmingham

Most of the recruiting tactics of ISIL these days focus on quickly moving the person of interest into a more secure communications environment. "First touches" are still often on Twitter, Facebook, or (as the attached report shows) Google Plus, which is steadily gaining in popularity. But as soon as someone is considered to be "determined" they are approached and helped to discover the more secure methods of communicating. Often these will be some of the hundreds of Telegram channels being used, but just as often it will be via the installation of a custom app. “These sites actually use quite good op-sec when For propaganda distribution, the main sites are "Isdarat" and they are set up.” "Amaq Agency", however these sites find themselves under constant attack. For this reason, "bookmark" sites are established throughout the community that allow one to quickly reacquire the "site-of-the- day" location of these sites of fresh news and inspirational documents and videos. As an example, by visiting a bookmark site, such as "alahzabblog (dot) wordpress (dot) com", we find the following are "today's" locations for distribution: Isdarat is currently at "frjsz5489 (dot) ga."56

The site is mostly current, with yesterday's Al Hayat video at the top left, and the featured "selected 10" with hotlinks to each video showing in the main frame. However, the "Rumiyah" issue being displayed in the left sidescroll is still issue #1, so they don't have a link to the newest issue #2 here. The site is protected via Reverse proxy routed through CloudFlare. Isdarat also maintains links to all of the Amaq Agency news announcements - twenty pages worth going back to mid-2014. There have been possibly more than 100, isdarat websites. The URLs for most of the high-bandwidth videos are actually posted as unpublished "Google Drive" videos, so once the Google Drive location is known, this can also be used for re-acquisition. Isdarat also has the "Translation section" where English language media from Al-Battar Media Foundation, Al-Furqan, Al-Hayat, and specialty pubs such as Dabiq may be found. (The most recent English video is yesterday's video from Media Gezira State). The Isdarat archive is currently about 39,800 pieces of media.

The multilingual headlines with their distinctive blue layout are commonly shared on Twitter, but each of these is actually the still title frame of a video. While they can all be found on the Isdarat page, they are also available through the Amaq app, available for Android, Windows, or jail-broken iPhone. Once the app is installed, it "auto-magically" finds the current data source location to stream video to your phone. It also provides a convenient way to tweet the news headlines directly from the app.

56 Amaq Agency news site is currently at "agnamaq (dot) ml" -- but this site isn't needed when you have the Amaq app installed on your phone or workstation.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 136

The daily news podcast of Al-Bayan radio is currently at "al-bayan-radio (dot) co (dot) uk". This also changes regularly, but can be easily reacquired through the use of bookmark sites. Many jihadi forums have banner ads that have the ability to refresh to connect to the current location as well. Lastly, ISIS often uses "dark web" or TOR or .onion pages. In order to know when the .onion page changes, they provide a "subscribe" feature which notifies by email of the new location. The current "dark web" propaganda site is: ou7zytv3h2yaosqq (dot) onion. The dot onion site changes whenever they feel compromised. It is usually slightly more current than the "isdarat" site. As with the Isdarat sites, such media is hosted externally. In the case of the .onion site, through a series of Cloud-flare reverse proxied sites. The current host being: ou7zytv3h2yaosq (dot) dabiqservehttpcom (dot) cf/32779. (Which is really in Belfast at IOMart Hosting through a reseller called ABPNI Computer Solutions.)

These sites actually use quite good op-sec when they are set up. The Bengali ISIL site, an example of a regional propaganda distribution website, (currently at attamkin dot co dot uk) was purchased via the Bullet Proof Hosting company "HostSailor". The last two al-Bayan radio station addresses were both on the same IP in Panama (though that was masked by CloudFlare). That box was purchased, likely with Bitcoin, from the site "offshoreracks dot com" which may be in Miami, Florida. The actual server is in Panama in an Offshoreracks data center.

Comments on ISIL propaganda Dr. Assem Nasr Department of Communication, Indiana University Purdue University Fort Wayne

In a recent study I am currently producing that tackles communication patterns in Arab (particularly Lebanese) “…I believe that societies, I have found that the media effects model is not propaganda is not necessarily what works given the cultural contexts. This effective… The molding of model suggests that media content (news, reports, individuals into violent portrayals, propaganda machines) shape the way people think. While this may hold some truth, in an ethnographic individuals is more likely study I conducted in Beirut a couple of years ago, to occur via more informants have suggested the following: intimate channels. The social media channels 1. Informants expressed mistrust towards news sources - that disperse propaganda traditional or social media platforms - as they construe them as mouthpieces for the parties (individuals, are more of a means of institutions, or political organizations) that own or reinforcement of dogma operate them. This is especially true as people are aware and ideology. “ of the political agendas, political economies, and (what the informants' believe to be) transparent alliances that shape these sources' rhetoric.

2. Informants revealed that they rely on personal connections, family, neighbors, friends, acquaintances in high places (army officers, deputies... etc.), and people whom they consider reliable. For example, while there might be an incident unfolding on the news, say, the Nusrah Front abducting Lebanese soldiers in the Bekaa, a neighbor whose uncle's client is a friend of a Customs officer on the border in a Bekaa region shares an insight to what's happening. As

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 137 such, news travels fast by word of mouth. With a common cultural element in the Arab world of societies having been oral cultures for centuries, this supports the importance of these complex social networks that at many times are augmented by social media such as Twitter, What'sApp and others. (On a side note, one's level of knowledge of "inside information" reveals one's capability of acquiring this privileged intel but also the person who has this knowledge uses this it to leverage their own social capital.)

3. Informants use social media with extreme caution. Unofficial censorship is a daily reality where people have to "watch what they say" about politics or any other aspect challenging the status quo. This is especially true as people fear being stopped at a random checkpoint (police, army, and militia) where their phones are checked for content and messages. Pro- Hariri content caught in a Hezbollah area, for example, puts the phone owner in deep trouble. Interestingly, aside from deleting messages, one way of overcoming such obstacles is through humor. With a backdrop of overwhelming social despair and disenfranchisement, informants (whom I think are representatives of many of the Lebanese public) have no means of dealing with daily life issues except to poke fun at the conditions and be cynical about the system. I have found that much of the communication about these conditions, incidents, and other important issues emerges with humor and innuendoes specific to a small social group to communicate if using social media. While this does not quite answer the question of the so- called Islamic State and the means by which they target their audiences, I can only suggest that probably (and I have no direct knowledge as my research scope has not tackled such groups), at least in the Arab world, this is a more direct personal type of communication: a small network of individuals who share certain realities such as poverty, lack of prospects, and systematic marginalization that allow for radical measures to be perceived as solutions.

Reflecting on their means of communication, and based on my findings (at least in Lebanon), I believe that propaganda is not effective. While it may be available to people, my understanding of the challenges to communication flows in the Arab world pushes communicators to exchange messages through alternative subtle means outlined in the findings above. The molding of individuals into violent individuals is more likely to occur via more intimate channels. The social media channels that disperse propaganda are more of a means of reinforcement of dogma and ideology.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 138

Author Biographies

Dr. Hassan Abbas

Hassan Abbas is Professor of International Security Studies and Chair of the Department of Regional and Analytical Studies at National Defense University's College of International Security Affairs (CISA). He is also currently a Senior Advisor at Asia Society. He remained a Senior Advisor at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (2009-2011), after having been a Research Fellow at the Center from 2005-2009. He was the Distinguished Quaid-i-Azam Chair Professor at Columbia University before joining CISA and has previously held fellowships at Harvard Law School and Asia Society in New York.

He regularly appears as an analyst on media including CNN, ABC, BBC, C-Span, Al Jazeera and GEO TV (Pakistan). His opinion pieces and research articles have been published in various leading international newspapers and academic publications. His latest book titled The Taliban Revival: Violence and Extremism on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier (Yale University Press, 2014) was profiled on The Daily Show with Jon Stewart in August 2014. Abbas’ earlier well acclaimed book Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army and America's War on Terror (M E Sharpe, 2004) remains on bestseller lists in Pakistan and India. He also runs WATANDOST, a blog on Pakistan and its neighbors' related affairs. His other publications include an Asia Society report titled Stabilizing Pakistan Through Police Reform (2012) and Pakistan 2020: A Vision for Building a Better Future (Asia Society, 2011).

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 139

Major Shane Aguero Major Shane Aguero is a counter-terrorism strategic intelligence officer with the DIA. He has previously been the Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE) officer in charge, and prior to that he was the US Army Central (US ARCENT) intelligence fusion desk chief for Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia. Major Aguero also has over five years of deployed combat experience in both Afghanistan and Iraq working at all levels from infantry squad to Combined Joint Task Force, with experience conducting joint, special and combined operations.

Major Aguero has a Master of Strategic Intelligence from the National Intelligence University, an MBA from Webster University and a Bachelor’s degree in International Relations from St. Edwards University.

Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois

Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois is Executive Vice President at NSI, Inc. She has also served as co-chair of a National Academy of Sciences study on Strategic Deterrence Military Capabilities in the 21st Century, and as a primary author on a study of the Defense and Protection of US Space Assets. Dr. Astorino-Courtois has served as technical lead on a variety of rapid turn-around, Joint Staff-directed Strategic Multi-layer Assessment (SMA) projects in support of US forces and Combatant Commands. These include assessments of key drivers of political, economic and social instability and areas of resilience in South Asia; development of a methodology for conducting provincial assessments for the ISAF Joint Command; production of a "rich contextual understanding" (RCU) to supplement intelligence reporting for the ISAF J2 and Commander; and projects for USSTRATCOM on deterrence assessment methods.

Previously, Dr. Astorino-Courtois was a Senior Analyst at SAIC (2004-2007) where she served as a STRATCOM liaison to U.S. and international academic and business communities. Prior to SAIC, Dr. Astorino-Courtois was a tenured Associate Professor of International Relations at Texas A&M University in College Station, TX (1994-2003) where her research focused on the cognitive aspects of foreign policy decision making. She has received a number of

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 140 academic grants and awards and has published articles in multiple peer-reviewed journals. She has also taught at Creighton University and as a visiting instructor at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Dr. Astorino-Courtois earned her Ph.D. in International Relations and MA in and Research Methods from New York University. Her BA is in political science from Boston College. Finally, Dr. Astorino-Courtois also has the distinction of having been awarded both a US Navy Meritorious Service Award and a US Army Commander's Award.

Mr. Adam Azoff

Adam Azoff is an international security specialist with over six years of academic and work experience in the Middle East. As a Team Lead at Tesla Government, Inc., Adam manages a USG platform that supports the informational requirements of USG personnel in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. Since 2014, he has responded to over 200 RFIs, providing tailored research focused on the Iraq problem-set. Adam has an M.A. in International Security and Diplomacy Studies from Tel Aviv University and B.A. in Socio-Cultural Anthropology from the University of Arizona.

Dr. Mia Bloom Mia Bloom is Professor of Communication at Georgia University. She conducts ethnographic field research in Europe, the Middle East and South Asia and speaks eight languages. She has authored several books and articles on terrorism and violent extremism including Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (2005), Living Together After Ethnic Killing [with Roy Licklider] (2007) and Bombshell: Women and Terror (2011). She is a former term member of the Council on Foreign Relations and has held research or teaching appointments at Princeton, Cornell, Harvard and McGill Universities.

Under the auspices of the Minerva Research Initiative (MRI) of Department of Defense, Bloom is currently conducting research with John G. Horgan on how children become involved in terrorist organizations. Bloom and Horgan’s findings will be published in a book for Cornell University Press entitled Small Arms: Children and Terror (2016). Bloom has a PhD in political science from Columbia University, a Masters in Arab Studies from the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a Bachelors from McGill University in Russian, Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies.

Prof. Hamit Bozarslan

Prof. Hamit Bozarslan has obtained his PhD degrees in history at the Ecole des hautes etudes en sciences socials in 1992 and in political sciences at the l'Institut d"etudes politiques de Paris in 1994. He is author of La question kurde. Etats et minorities au Moyen-Orient (1997),

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 141 Une histoire de la violence au Moyen-Orient: de la fin de l'Empire ottoman à al-Qaïda (2008), Conflit kurde (2009), Le luxe et la violence : domination et contestation chez Ibn Khaldûn (2014), Révolution et état de violence : Moyen-Orient 2011-2015 (2015).

Dr. Soner Cagaptay

Soner Cagaptay is the Beyer Family fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute. He has written extensively on U.S.-Turkish relations, Turkish domestic politics, and Turkish nationalism, publishing in scholarly journals and major international print media, including the Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, New York Times, Jane's Defense Weekly, Foreign Affairs, Atlantic, New Republic, and Newsweek Türkiye. He has been a regular columnist for Hürriyet Daily News, Turkey's oldest and most influential English-language paper, and a contributor to CNN's Global Public Square blog. He appears regularly on Fox News, CNN, NPR, Voice of America, BBC, and CNN-Turk.

A historian by training, Dr. Cagaptay wrote his doctoral dissertation at Yale University (2003) on Turkish nationalism. Dr. Cagaptay has taught courses at Yale, Princeton University, Georgetown University, and Smith College on the Middle East, Mediterranean, and Eastern Europe. His spring 2003 course on modern Turkish history was the first offered by Yale in three decades. From 2006-2007, he was Ertegun Professor at Princeton University's Department of Near Eastern Studies.

Dr. Cagaptay is the recipient of numerous honors, grants, and chairs, among them the Smith- Richardson, Mellon, Rice, and Leylan fellowships, as well as the Ertegun chair at Princeton. He has also served on contract as chair of the Turkey Advanced Area Studies Program at the State Department's Foreign Service Institute. In 2012 he was named an American Turkish Society Young Society Leader.

Ms. Sarah Canna, NSI Sarah applies her open source analytic skills to regions of vital concern to US Combatant Commands, particularly the Middle East and South Asia. To help military planners understand the complex socio-cultural dynamics at play in evolving conflict situations, she developed a Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) tool, which is designed to rapidly respond to emergent crises by pulsing NSI’s extensive subject matter expert (SME) network to provide deep, customized, multidisciplinary analysis for defense and industry clients. Prior to joining NSI, she completed her Master’s degree from Georgetown University in Technology and Security Studies. She holds a translation certificate in Spanish from American University and has been learning Dari for three years.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 142

Mr. Bernard Carreau Bernard Carreau is the Deputy Director of the Center for Complex Operations (CCO) at the National Defense University. He established and currently supervises a lessons learned program focusing on the operational and strategic effectiveness of the military and interagency teams in overseas contingency operations. He has led numerous collection and analysis teams to Afghanistan and Iraq. Mr. Carreau is the author or supervisor of recent reports related to the strategic effectiveness of special operations forces, stability operations, transitional public security, civilian stabilization capabilities, and socio-cultural intelligence analysis. He is currently completing a study on behalf of the Joint Staff/J7 on the question of whether the national security decision-making and strategic planning processes were effective in achieving U.S. national objectives in Syria. Mr. Carreau was an advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Washington and Baghdad on private sector development and an advisor to the Iraqi Minister of Trade. He has a Master’s degree from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).

Mr. Mark Caudill

Mark A. Caudill joined the USMC Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning in January 2015 as a Middle East Subject Matter Expert. He retired from the U.S. Department of State in 2014 following 10 years as a Foreign Service Officer. He served at the U.S. Consulate General in Istanbul (2005-07); the U.S. Embassy in Manila (2007-08 and 2009-10); the U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Team in Karbala, Iraq (2008-09); and the U.S. Embassy in Cairo (2010-14). Mark was an analyst at the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency during 1990-2004 and served at the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait (1992-93) and at the U.S. Consulate General in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (1999-2002). He speaks Arabic, Turkish, and Portuguese. He is the author of Twilight in the Kingdom: Understanding the Saudis, published by Praeger Security International in 2006. He holds a B.A. in Liberal Studies from the University of the State of New York (1987) and an M.A. in Islamic Studies from Middlesex University (2015).

Dr. Kim Cragin R. Kim Cragin is a senior research fellow at the National Defense University. She recently left a position as senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. Cragin focuses on terrorism-related issues. Cragin has conducted fieldwork in Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, Egypt, northwest China, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka, among others. Her RAND publications include Severing the Ties that Bind (2015), Disrupting Global Transit Hubs (2013) and Social Science for Counter-Terrorism (2010). Cragin also has published academic articles, including "Resisting Violent Extremism" in the reviewed journal Terrorism and Political Violence (2013), "al-Qa'ida Confronts Hamas" in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (2009), and "The Early History of al- Qa'ida" in the Historical Journal (2008). Her book entitled Women as Terrorists: Mothers, Recruiters, and Martyrs was released by Praeger in 2009. Cragin has a master’s degree from the Sanford Institute of Public Policy at Duke University. She completed her Ph.D. at Cambridge University in the United Kingdom.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 143

Dr. Munqith Dagher

Title: CEO and partner of COACH CEO and partner IIACSS.

2-Academic and Professional Qualification - 2008 Diploma in Marketing Research, University of Georgia ,USA - 2005 Certificate in SPSS preliminary and advance models, Bahrain, SPSS regional office - 1996 Ph.D. in Public Administration(human resources management), University of Baghdad, College of Administration and Economics. - 1989 M.S.C in Public Administration, University of Baghdad, Iraq. - 1980 B.Sc. in Administration, University of Basrah, Iraq.

3- Academic and Professional Appointment

- September 2003-Now CEO and founder of Independent Incoroporate of Administration and Civil Society Studies. - 2006 - Professor of Strategic Management in P.A., College of Adm. And Eco, Baghdad University - May2003-Sep.2003 Head of Polling Department – IRAQ Center of Research and Strategic Studies (ICRSS). - 2002-2003 Lecturer in Business Management Dep. College of Adm. And Eco. , Basrah University. - 1997 Lecturer in P.A., College of Adm. And Eco, Baghdad University. - 1997 Senior Lecturer in Administration Sciences, national defence college, AL-Bakir University for Post Graduate Studies, Baghdad, Iraq. 4- Publications

1. Munqith Daghir, The ground under ISIL’s feet, Voice of the People 2015 book, Gallup Int Association, May 2015. 2. Munqith Dagher, How Iraqi Sunni’s really feel about Islamic State, The Washington Post, 24th March 2015. 3. Michele Gelfand et.al ,The Cultural Contagion of Conflict, Philosophical Transaction Of The Royal Society B, 2012 ,367 PP.692-703.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 144 4. Mansoor Moaddel, julie de jong, and munqith dagher, beyond sectarianism in Iraq, Contexts, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 66-67. ISSN 1536-5042, electronic ISSN 1537-6052. © 2011 American Sociological Association

5. Munqith Dagher and others Article for the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, Theme Issue on Biology of Cultural Conflict, Edited by G. S. Berns and S. Atran..

6. Munqith M. Daghir & Qais Alzaidy, THE MEASURMENT OF STRSTEGIC THINKING TYPE FOR TOP MANAGERS IN IRAQI PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS-COGNITIVE APPROAC INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMMERCE AND MANAGEMENT(IJCM )H,. VOL.15(1) ,P34-46.

7. Munqeth M.Daghir & Adel H.Salah, UNDERSTANDING ORGANIZATION THEORY, AL-YEMEN, ALAHKAAFF UNIVERSITY, 1999.

8. Munqeth M.Daghir & Adel H.Salah, ORGANIZATION BEHAVIOR, AL YEMEN, AL AHKAAFF UNIVERSITY, 1999.

9. Munqeth M.Daghir & Adel H.Salah, Organizational Theory and Behavior, Baghdad, University of Baghdad Press, 2000.

10. L.Aspin (author), Munqeth M.Daghir (translator), Defense for New Era, Basrah, Arabian Gulf Studies Center, 1993.

11. Munqeth M.Daghir, Relation Between Administrative Corruption & Public Employee Characteristics and traits, Abu-Dhabi, Emirate Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2001.

12. More than 15 published articles and research in human resources,strategic management,organizational behavior,TQM and different public administration issues.

Dr. Cori E. Dauber Dr. Cori E. Dauber is Professor of Communication at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, where she is also a Research Fellow at the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS.) She is co-editor of Visual Propaganda and Extremism in the Online Environment, (US Army War College Press, 2014) and the author of You Tube War: Fighting in a World of Cameras in Every Cell Phone, Photoshop on Every Computer, (US Army War College Press, 2010.) She has been the Visiting Research Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College. Her research focus is the communication strategies of terrorist groups, with a particular focus on their use of visual imagery. Her work has been published in journals such as Military Review, Small Wars Journal, and Rhetoric and Public Affairs, and she has presented her research to the Canadian Forces College, the John Kennedy School for Special Warfare,

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 145 the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies of the National Defense University among others. Dr. Dauber holds a PhD and BS from Northwestern University, and an MA from Chapel Hill, all in Communication Studies.

Professor David Des Roches

David B. Des Roches is Associate Professor at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA) at National Defense University, where he specializes in countries of the Arabian Peninsula, Gulf Cooperation Council Regional Security, Border Security, Weapons Transfers, Missile Defense, Counterinsurgency, terrorism and emerging trends.

He joined NESA in 2011 after serving the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy in numerous positions, including as Director of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula, the DoD liaison to the Department of Homeland Security, the Senior Country Director for Pakistan, the NATO Operations Director, the Deputy Director for Peacekeeping, and the spokesman for the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Prior to that, he served in the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy as an International Law Enforcement Analyst and Special Assistant for Strategy.

He retired as a Colonel from a 30 year career in the active and reserve Army, serving on the Joint Staff, US Special Operations Command staff, and in conventional and special operations troop units deployed throughout the Middle East, Europe and in Afghanistan. He is a Ranger and a master parachutist with over 100 jumps. He also holds the parachutist badges of Canada, the United Kingdom and Germany. His final post was as the Deputy Commander of the US Army Center of Military History.

Professor Des Roches is the author of numerous articles on Gulf security, is the editor of The Arms Trade, Military Services and the Security Market in the Gulf: Trends and Implications (Berlin: Gerlach, 2016) , the theme editor of Oxford Journal of Gulf Studies Spring 2016 special issue on security (http://www.nesa-center.org/wp- content/uploads/2016/02/gulf_affairs_spring_2016_full_issue.pdf ), and the author of the chapter on the Gulf weapons market in the 2016 Gulf Yearbook, the definitive Arabic language resource on Gulf studies ( http://grc.net/data/contents/uploads/infopdf/Gulf- Year_3291.pdf) .

Professor Des Roches holds advanced degrees from the University of London School of Oriental and African Studies and Kings College London, which he attended as a British Marshall Scholar. He also holds an advanced degree from the U.S. Army War College, and a bachelor of science degree from the United States Military Academy, West Point.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 146 Professor Des Roches is a regular commentator on regional affairs on various Arabic language television networks including al-Hurra, RT Arabic, and al-Mayadeen, and on radio networks such as the Voice of America.

Prof. Ruben Enikolopov Barcelona Institute of Political Economy and Governance r [email protected]

Ruben Enikolopov is Assistant Professor at UPF, ICREA Research Professor at Barcelona Institute for Political Economy and Governance (IPEG), and Nordea Assistant Professor of Finance at the New Economic School in Moscow. He has been a consultant to the World Bank (2005-2010) and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (2007-2008).

Mr. Alexis Everington

Alexis Everington is the Director of Research for Madison Springfield, Inc. His qualifications include 15 years program management experience leading large scale, cross-functional, multi-national research & analytical programs in challenging environments including Iraq, Libya, Mexico, Syria and Yemen. Alexis advised both the Libyan opposition government during the Libyan revolution of 2011 and its immediate aftermath and most recently, the Syrian opposition military. He has also helped train several other foreign militaries and has taught at the NATO School. In addition, Alexis developed the Target Audience Analysis methodology that is currently employed across the US national security community and has been applied most recently in Afghanistan, Jordan, and Lebanon. His educational credentials include a Master of Arts from Oxford University in European and Middle Eastern Studies and his language skills include a fluency in Arabic, Spanish, French and Italian as well as a proficiency in Mandarin. Alexis is currently leading large-scale qualitative and quantitative primary research studies in Libya, Pakistan, Syria and Yemen.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 147 Prof. Christine Fair

C. Christine Fair is an Associate Professor in the Security Studies Program within Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. She previously served as a senior political scientist with the RAND Corporation, a political officer with the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan in Kabul, and a senior research associate at USIP’s Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention. Her research focuses on political and military affairs in South Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka). Her most recent book is Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War (Oxford University Press). Additionally, she has as authored, co-authored and co-edited several books, including Pakistan’s Enduring Challenges (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), Policing Insurgencies: Cops as Counterinsurgents (Oxford University Press, 2014); Political Islam and Governance in Bangladesh (Routledge, 2010); Treading on Hallowed Ground: Counterinsurgency Operations in Sacred Spaces (Oxford University Press, 2008); The Madrassah Challenge: Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan (USIP, 2008), and The Cuisines of the Axis of Evil and Other Irritating States (Globe Pequot, 2008), among others. Her current book project is Lashkar-e-Taiba: In its Own Words.

Dr. Fair is a frequent commentator in print (New York Times, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, The National Review among others) as well on television and radio programs (CBS, BBC, Al Jazeera, CNN, Voice of America, Fox, Reuters, BBC, NPR, among others).

She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Women in International Security, International Studies Association, American Political Science Association, and the American Institute of Pakistan Studies and serves on the editorial board numerous scholarly and policy-analytic journals.

She has a PhD from the University of Chicago, Department of South Asian Languages and Civilization and an MA from the Harris School of Public Policy, also at the University of Chicago. She speaks and reads Hindu, Urdu and Punjabi.

Dr. Sarah Feuer Dr. Sarah J. Feuer, an expert on politics and religion in North Africa, is a Soref Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Feuer, who completed her doctorate in politics at Brandeis University's Crown Center for Middle East Studies in 2014, wrote her dissertation on the politics of religious education in Morocco and Tunisia. A book based on that research is due out with Cambridge University Press next year. Previously, she earned her M.A. in Middle Eastern history from Tel Aviv University and a B.A. in history and French literature at the University of Pennsylvania. She has extensive experience in the region, including stints living in Israel, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. Her most recent

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 148 monograph for the Washington Institute, State Islam in the Battle Against Extremism: Emerging Trends in Morocco and Tunisia, examined the involvement of religious institutions in counter-extremism initiatives across North Africa.

Dr. Rengin Bahar Firat

Rengin B. Firat is an Assistant Professor at the Global Studies Institute, Sociology Department and the Neuroscience Institute at Georgia State University. A sociologist by training, her research focuses on the social psychological mechanisms underlying inter-group conflict and civic behavior, with a particular emphasis on group identities, ethnic cognition and moral values. She combines social scientific survey methodologies with neurological experimental techniques in her studies. Dr. Firat’s research has been published in avenues like Social Indicators Research, Social Science Research, Perspectives on Psychological Science and Advances in Group Processes and has received funding from the Social Science Research Council and the U.S. Department of Defense Minerva Initiative. Dr. Firat has previously held a post-doctoral Researcher position at the Evolution, Cognition and Culture Laboratory at University of Lyon in France. She has obtained her Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Iowa in 2013. She holds an M.A. in Sociology from University of Iowa and a B.A. in Sociology from Koç University in Istanbul, Turkey.

Mr. Zana K. Gulmohamad Zana Gulmohamad is a PhD Candidate in Politics at the University of Sheffield. Research title “Iraq’s foreign policy post-Saddam”. Research Fellow at the Center of Peace and Human Security at the American University of Kurdistan. Former senior security analyst for the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq for six years. Graduate Teaching Assistant for Introduction to Security Studies & Comparing Modern Polities in the Politics Department at the University of Sheffield, the UK. Pieces of Zana’s research have been published in various platforms such as the Jamestown Foundation, the National, Middle East Online, Open Democracy, Global Security Studies, and Your Middle East.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 149 Mr. Max Hoffman Max Hoffman is the Associate Director for the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on Turkey and the Kurdish regions. He has organized and undertaken many recent research trips to the region.

Dr. Noureddine Jebnoun Noureddine Jebnoun teaches at Georgetown University’s Center for Contemporary Arab Studies-Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. He has previously served as a professor of strategy and geopolitics at the National War College, the Command and Staff College, and the National Defense Institute (1998-2004) in Tunisia. He is co-editor and contributor to Modern Middle East Authoritarianism: Roots, Ramifications, and Crisis (London; New York: Routledge, 2013 & 2015), author of L’espace méditerranéen: les enjeux de la coopération et de la sécurité entre les rives nord et sud à l’aube du XXIème siècle [The Mediterranean Region: the Implications of Security and Cooperation between the Northern and Southern Shores at the Dawn of the Twenty First Century] (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2003) and author of the upcoming Tunisia’s National Intelligence: Why Do the ‘Rogue Elephants’ Lag Behind Reform? (Washington, D.C.: New Academia Publishing). His works have appeared in The Journal of North African Studies, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies’ Occasional Papers Series, Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding Occasional Papers, as well as in many book chapters among the most recent is “State and Religion in the Aftermath of the Arab Uprisings,” in Rainer Grote and Tilmann J. Röder (eds.), Constitutionalism, Human Rights, and Islam after the Arab Spring (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press 2016). He holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Paris I-Pantheon Sorbonne (1996).

Dr. Neil Johnson

Neil Johnson heads up a new inter-disciplinary research group in Complexity at University of Miami (Physics Dept.) looking at collective behavior and emergent properties in a wide range of real- world Complex Systems: from physical, biological and medical domains through to social and financial domains. The common feature which makes Complex Systems so hard to understand, and yet so fascinating to study, is that they all contain many interacting objects, with strong feedback from both inside and outside the system, and are typically far from equilibrium and exhibit extreme behaviors. Neil's research group is involved with interdisciplinary projects across multiple other departments and schools within the University of Miami, and other institutions both within U.S. and globally, e.g. Universidad de Los Andes in Bogota, Colombia.

Prior to coming to UM in 2007, Neil was Professor of Physics at Oxford University, having joined the faculty in 1992. He did his BA/MA at Cambridge University and his PhD at Harvard University as a Kennedy Scholar. He has published more than 200 research articles in international journals, and has published two books: "Financial Market Complexity" (Oxford

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 150 University Press, 2003) and "Simply Complexity: A Clear Guide to Complexity Theory" (Oneworld Publishing, 2009). He also wrote and presented the Royal Institution Lectures in 1999 on BBC television, comprising five 1-hour lectures on “Arrows of Time”.

He is joint Series Editor for the book series "Complex Systems and Inter- disciplinary Science" by World Scientific Press, and is the Physics Section Editor for the journal "Advances in Complex Systems". He is Associate Editor for "Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination", and is an Editorial Board member of "Journal of Computational Science". He previously served as an editor of "International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance". He co-founded and co-directed CABDyN (Complex Agent-Based Dynamical Systems) which is Oxford University's interdisciplinary research center in Complexity Science, until leaving for Miami. He also co-directed Oxford University's interdisciplinary research center in financial complexity (OCCF).

Dr. Karl Kaltenthaler Karl Kaltenthaler teaches and researches in the areas of comparative politics and international relations. His research focuses on public opinion, political psychology, terrorism (Al Qaeda and affiliates), and political economy. He has three books and several journal articles in these areas. His research has been published in International Studies Quarterly, Political Science Quarterly, Journal of Conflict and Terrorism, European Journal of Political Research, Journal of International Political Economy, European Union Politics, and others.

Ph.D. Washington University, St. Louis, 1995, Professor and Director of Research Projects, Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied Politics.

Fields: Comparative Politics, Political Behavior, Public Opinion, Terrorism, Al Qaeda and affiliates, International Relations, European Integration

Dr. Ramazan Kilinc Ramazan Kilinc is an Associate Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of Islamic Studies Program at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. He received his Ph.D. (2008) from Arizona State University and M.A. (2001) and B.A. (1999) from Bilkent University, Turkey. He previously taught in James Madison College at Michigan State University. His most recent articles appeared in Comparative Politics, Political Science Quarterly, Politics and Religion, and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. He has also written opinion pieces in outlets such as Washington Post and Open Democracy. He is currently working on a book manuscript tentatively entitled as Alien Citizens: State Policies toward Religious Minorities in Turkey and France. With Carolyn Warner, Christopher Hale and Adam Cohen, he is co-authoring a book, titled, Generating Generosity: Beliefs, Institutions and Public Goods Provision in Catholicism and Islam (Cambridge University Press, under contract).

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 151 Dr. Randolph Kluver Dr. Kluver conducts theoretically driven research on political communication (including rhetorical and new media approaches), and global and new media. His work explores the role of political culture on political communication, and the ways in which cultural expectations, values, and habits condition political messaging practices and reception in a variety of contexts. Recently, Dr. Kluver has been exploring the role of communication and geopolitics, and developing research agenda that articulates ‘media-centric’ views of geopolitics. Currently, he is co-PI of the Media Monitoring System Project, a real time international broadcast transcription and translation system, and is developing research protocols and agendas using this pioneering technology.

Dr. Kluver was the founder and Executive Director of the Singapore Internet Research Centre, and one of the principal investigators of the international “Internet and Elections” project, a groundbreaking international analysis of the use of the Internet in the elections. Dr. Kluver’s book Civic Discourse, Civil Society, and Chinese Communities won the Outstanding Book Award from the International and Intercultural Division of the National Communication Association in 2000. His essay “The Logic of New Media in International Relations” received the 2003 Walter Benjamin Award from the Media Ecology Association as the outstanding research article in media ecology.

Prior to coming to Texas A&M, Dr. Kluver taught at Oklahoma City University, Jiangxi Normal University, the National University of Singapore, and Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. He serves on the editorial boards of the Journal of Communication, the Journal of Computer-mediated Communication, the Asian Journal of Communication, New Media and Society, China Media Research, and the Western Journal of Communication.

Dr. Gina Ligon Dr. Gina Ligon is an Associate Professor of Management and Collaboration Science at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. She received her PhD in Industrial and Organizational Psychology with a Minor in Measurement and Statistics from the University of Oklahoma. She is a member of the National Consortium of Studies of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Since arriving at UNO, she has been awarded over $2,000,000 in security-related grants and contracts. She currently is the Principal Investigator on a grant from Department of Homeland Security (DHS) examining the leadership and performance of transnational Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs,) and is the originator of the Leadership of the Extreme and Dangerous for Innovative Results (LEADIR) database. Her research interests include violent ideological groups, expertise and leadership development, and collaboration management. Dr. Ligon has worked with DoD agencies on markers of violent ideological groups, leadership assessment, organizational innovation, and succession planning for scientific positions. Prior to joining UNO, she was a faculty member at Villanova University in the Department of Psychology. She also worked in St. Louis as a management consultant with the firm Psychological Associates.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 152 She has published over 50 peer-reviewed publications in the areas of leadership, innovation, and violent groups.

Tom Lynch Dr. Thomas F. Lynch III is a Distinguished Research Fellow for South Asia, the Near East and countering radical Islam in the Center for Strategic Research (CSR) at the Institute of National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University (NDU) in Washington, D.C. He researches, writes, lectures and organizes workshops and conferences for Department of Defense customers on the topics of Pakistan, Afghanistan, India & the Subcontinent, the Gulf Arab States, and the past & future trajectory of radical Islam. Dr. Lynch joined NDU in July 2010 after a 28 year career in the active duty U.S. Army, serving in a variety of command and staff positions as an armor/cavalry officer and as a senior level politico-military analyst. Dr. Lynch was a Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff & Deputy Director of the Chairman’s Advisory & Initiatives Group; Commander of the U.S. Army War Theater Support Group in Doha, Qatar; Director of the Advisory Group for the Commander, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM); and Military Special Assistant to the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan. He spent 42 of 44 months from 2004-07 on assignment in the Middle East and South Asia supporting OPERATIONS ENDURING & IRAQI FREEDOM.

Dr. Clark McCauley Clark McCauley (B.S. Biology, Providence College, 1965; Ph.D. Social Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, 1970) is a Professor of Psychology and co-director of the Solomon Asch Center for Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict at Bryn Mawr College. His research interests include the psychology of group identification, group dynamics and intergroup conflict, and the psychological foundations of ethnic conflict and genocide. He is founding editor of the journal Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward Terrorism and Genocide.

Other Research Interests • What does it mean to essentialize a group, our own or others, and how does essentializing enable killing by category? • What is the role of emotions (disgust, humiliation, anger) in intergroup conflict, and what is the relation between interpersonal emotions and intergroup emotions? • How can polling be used to track variation over time in support for terrorism? • What is the process of radicalization that leads individuals from support for terrorism to acts of terrorism?

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 153 Dr. Ian McCulloh Ian McCulloh is a senior scientist in the Asymmetric Operations Department of the John’s Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab. His current research is focused on strategic influence in online networks and data-driven influence operations and assessment. He is the author of “Social Network Analysis with Applications” (Wiley: 2013), “Networks Over Time” (Oxford: forthcoming) and has published 38 peer-reviewed papers, primarily in the area of social network analysis. He retired as a Lieutenant Colonel from the US Army after 20 years of service in special operations, counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) forensics and targeting, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) defense.

He founded the West Point Network Science Center and created the Army’s Advanced Network Analysis and Targeting (ANAT) program. In his most recent military assignments as a strategist, he led interdisciplinary PhD teams at Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) and Central Command (CENTCOM) to conduct social science research in 15 countries across the Middle East and Central Asia to included denied areas, which he used to inform data-driven strategy for countering extremism and irregular warfare, as well as empirically assess the effectiveness of military operations. He holds a Ph.D. and M.S from Carnegie Mellon University’s School of Computer Science, an M.S. in Industrial Engineering, and M.S. in Applied Statistics from the Florida State University, and a B.S. in Industrial Engineering from the University of Washington. He is married with four children and a granddaughter.

Mr. Paul Melly Expertise Francophone Africa - e.g. CAR, Guinea, Mali, Congo Brazzaville, Madagascar French and EU Africa policy Development policy, IMF/World Bank Africa strategy, grassroots development Development finance; project and trade financing

Dr. Chris Meserole

Chris Meserole researches modern religious conflict and is a pre-doctoral fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution. Chris graduated from Harvard with highest honors and has an M.Div. from Yale Divinity School, where he also completed Yale’s Middle Eastern Studies program. He has traveled extensively throughout the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, and contributed to the Huffington Post since its launch. Chris is currently completing a PhD in political science at the University of Maryland

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 154 Ms. Vera Mironova I am a Pre-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Belfer Center’s International Security Program and a PhD candidate in the Political Science Department at the University of Maryland. My research explores individual level behavior in conflict environments. I am interested in how violence affects individual attitudes and decision making. I conducted field work in active conflict zones (Yemen, Iraq, Ukraine, and Palestinian territories) and post-conflict regions: Balkans (Bosnia, Kosovo, and Croatia), Africa (DR Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi), Central Asia (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan), and Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan). others. Also, I am a contributor to the Political Violence @ a Glance blog.

Dr. Sophia Moskalenko Sophia Moskalenko is a Research Associate at the Solomon Asch Center for the Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict at Bryn Mawr College (Bryn Mawr, PA) and a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (NC-START).

Dr. Moskalenko received her Ph.D. in Social Psychology from the University of Pennsylvania in 2004. Her research interests include psychology of group identification, radicalization and activism, martyrdom and inter-group conflict. In collaboration with Clark McCauley she has authored Friction: How radicalization heats them and us, as well as a number of papers on political radicalization and terrorism.

Dr. Assem Nasr

Assem Nasr is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Communication at Indiana University Purdue University Fort Wayne where he teaches media studies and international communication. Nasr completed a Master of Fine Arts degree in film and electronic media at American University in Washington, DC and received his doctorate degree in international communication from The University of Texas at Austin. His research focuses on media, gender representations, and cultural identities in the Arab world. Dr. Nasr¹s work has been published in scholarly journals such as Global Media Journal, Arab Media & Society, and Communication, Culture, & Critique and presented in international academic conferences.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 155 Dr. Denise Natali

Distinguished Research Fellow, Center for Strategic Research

Dr. Denise Natali is a Distinguished Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) where she specializes on the Middle East, trans-border Kurdish issue, regional energy security, and post-conflict state-building. Dr. Natali joined INSS in January 2011 as the Minerva Chair, following more than two decades of researching and working in the Kurdish regions of Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Syria.

Dr. Natali is the author of numerous publications on Kurdish politics, economy and energy, including The Kurdish Quasi-State: Development and Dependency in Post-Gulf War Iraq (Syracuse University Press, 2010) and The Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey and Iran (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2005), which was the recipient of the Choice Award for Outstanding Academic Title (2006) (trans. to Turkish Kurtler ve Devlet: Iraq, Turkiye ve Iran’da Ulusal Kimligin Gelismesi (Istanbul: Avesta Press, 2009). Dr. Natali is currently writing a second edition of The Kurds and the State to include Syria.

Dr. Natali also specializes in post-conflict relief and reconstruction, having worked on the Gulf Relief Crisis Project for the American Red Cross International Division in Washington D.C., as director of cross-border operations for a non-governmental organization (INGO) in Peshawar Pakistan, and information officer for the U.S Agency for International Development’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance in northern Iraq in support of Operation Provide Comfort II. Dr. Natali returned to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq from 2005-2010, where she engaged in research, teaching and university start-ups, including positions as the Head of the International Politics Department at the University of Kurdistan-Hawler (UKH) and Associate Professor, Dean of Students, and Director of International Exchanges at the American University of Iraq-Sulaimaniya (AUI-S).

Dr. Natali received a Ph.D in political science at the University of Pennsylvania, a Master of International Affairs (MIA) at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs and a B.A. in government at Franklin&Marshall College. She also has studied at the L’Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales in Paris, the University of Tehran (Deh Khoda Language Program) and Tel Aviv University. Dr. Natali speaks French, Kurdish and conversational Farsi.

Dr. Natali provides frequent commentary on national and international media sources. She is an adjunct professor at Georgetown University’s Center for Security Studies, columnist for al-Monitor, member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Contacts: [email protected]/[email protected], 202-685-2249/202-361-7649

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 156 Dr. Shuja Nawaz

Shuja Nawaz, a native of Pakistan, is currently a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council's South Asia Center. Most recently, he was the Center's first director. He is a political and strategic analyst. Mr. Nawaz writes for leading newspapers and websites and speaks on current topics before civic groups, at think tanks, and on radio and television worldwide. He has worked with RAND, the United States Institute of Peace, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and other leading think tanks on projects dealing with Pakistan and the Middle East. He has also advised or briefed senior government and military officials and parliamentarians in the United States, Europe, and Pakistan.

Mr. Nawaz was educated at Gordon College, Rawalpindi, where he obtained a BA in Economics and English Literature and the Graduate School of Journalism of Columbia University in New York. He was a newscaster and news and current affairs producer for Pakistan Television from 1967 to 1972 and covered the western front of the 1971 war between Pakistan and India. He has worked for the New York Times, the World Health Organization, and has headed three separate divisions at the International Monetary Fund (IMF). He was also a director at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna from 1999 to 2001, while on leave from the IMF. Mr. Nawaz was the managing editor and then Editor of Finance & Development, the multilingual quarterly of the IMF and the World Bank. He served on the editorial advisory board of the World Bank Research Observer.

He is the author of Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within(Oxford University Press 2008). He is also the principal author of FATA: A Most Dangerous Place (CSIS, Washington DC January 2009), Pakistan in the Danger Zone: A Tenuous US-Pakistan Relationship (Atlantic Council 2010),Learning by Doing: The Pakistan Army's Experience with Counterinsurgency(Atlantic Council 2011), and India-Pakistan: The Opportunity Cost of Conflict (Atlantic Council 2014).

Dr. Jacob Olidort

Dr. Jacob Olidort is a Soref Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, where he focuses on Salafism and Islamist groups in the Middle East, and is an adjunct professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. He received his BA in Middle Eastern Studies from Brandeis University, his AM in Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations from Harvard University, and his MA and Ph.D. in Near Eastern Studies from Princeton University, where his work focused on the intersection between Islamic law, theology and modern politics. Dr. Olidort has spent nearly two years inthe Middle East, including a Fulbright Scholarship in the UAE and field work on Salafism in Jordan. He has given presentations and has consulted on Salafism and on countering violent extremism to audiences in academia, government and policy. His writings have appeared in Foreign Affairs, the Washington Post, Lawfare, and War on the Rocks.

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Mr. Raffaello Pantucci

Raffaello Pantucci's research focuses on counter- terrorism as well as China's relations with its Western neighbours. Prior to coming to RUSI, Raffaello lived for over three years in Shanghai, where he was a visiting scholar at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS).

Before that he worked in London at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington. He has also held positions at the European Council of Foreign Relations (ECFR) and is an associate fellow at the International Center for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) at King's College, London.

He is the author of We Love Death As You Love Life: Britain's Suburban Terrorists (London: Hurst, April 2015/US: Oxford University Press, forthcoming), described by The Financial Times as 'the most articulate and carefully researched account of Britain's 'suburban terrorists' to date.'

He is currently completing a writing project looking at Chinese interests in Central Asia. His journal articles have appeared in Survival, The National Interest, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence, and RUSI Journal amongst others, and his journalistic writing has appeared in the New York Times, Financial Times, Wall Street Journal, Sunday Times, CNN, Guardian, Foreign Policy, South China Morning Post, and more. For more information on Raffaello's work please visit: http://www.raffaellopantucci.com and for his work on China and Central Asia: http://www.chinaincentralasia.com He is also the co-founder of YCW, a network organisation focused on China

Mr. Marc Pierini

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 158 Marc Pierini is a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe, where his research focuses on developments in the Middle East and Turkey from a European perspective.

Marc Pierini was a career EU diplomat from December 1976 to April 2012. He was EU Ambassador and Head of Delegation to Turkey (2006–2011), Tunisia and Libya (2002–2006), Syria (1998–2002), and Morocco (1991–1995). He also served as the first coordinator for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (“Barcelona Process”) (1995-1998) and was the main negotiator for the release of the Bulgarian hostages from Libya (2004-2007).

Marc Pierini served as counselor in the cabinet of two European commissioners: Claude Cheysson, (1979- 1981) and Abel Matutes (1989- 1991). He has published three essays in French: “Le prix de la liberté” (Actes Sud, 2008)(also in Bulgarian at Janet45), “Télégrammes diplomatiques” (Actes Sud, 2010), and “Où va la Turquie?” (Actes Sud, 2012)(also in Turkish at Doğan Kitap).

Marc Pierini is a member of the International Council of the “Museum of European and Mediterranean Civilizations” (MuCEM) in Marseille. He is also a member of the Board of Advisors of “Turkish Policy Quarterly”.

Mara Revkin, JD Mara Revkin is a fellow with the Abdallah S. Kamel Center for the Study of Islamic Law and Civilization at Yale Law School, from which she received her J.D. She is pursuing a Ph.D. in political science at Yale University, focusing on governance and lawmaking by armed groups in the Middle East. Her work has been published in the Oxford Handbook of Islamic Law, the Annual Review of Law and Social Science, and the UCLA Journal of Islamic and Near Eastern Law, among others. She has conducted fieldwork most recently in southeastern Turkey, Iraqi Kurdistan, and the Sinai Peninsula. After receiving her B.A. in Political Science and Arabic from Swarthmore College, she served as a Fulbright Fellow in Jordan and Oman (2009-2010), and as a Junior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2010-2011).

She can be reached at [email protected] and on Twitter @MaraRevkin http://twitter.com/mararevkin

Mr. Mark Robinson Mark Robinson is the Director of the Multimedia Laboratory of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He holds an MA in Communication Studies, with a focus on media and internet technologies, and a BFA in Studio Art, both from Chapel Hill. He has developed and taught a number of courses on media and media technology, which engage with audio and

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 159 visual communication and their consumption and processing, thus integrating cultural, technical and psychological systems analysis in order to understand the relationship of meaning within culture. As a maker of multimedia: software, hardware, video, audio, robotics, electronic interface, web application and delivery, he has employed technology and research in order to understand the technical aspects of what is seen and heard as well as the artistic and scientific approaches to ascertain the potential of such media including, message, effectiveness, strategy and tactical use.

Prof. Yezid Sayigh

Yezid Sayigh is a senior associate at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, where his work focuses on the Syrian crisis, the political role of Arab armies, security sector transformation in Arab transitions, the reinvention of authoritarianism, and the Israeli- Palestinian conflict and peace process.

Previously, Sayigh was professor of Middle East studies at King’s College London. From 1994–2003, he served as assistant director of studies at the Centre of International Studies, Cambridge. From 1998–2003, he headed the Middle East program of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. Sayigh was also an adviser and negotiator in the Palestinian delegation to the peace talks with Israel from 1991–1994. Since 1999, he has provided policy and technical consultancy on the permanent-status peace talks and on Palestinian reform.

Sayigh is the author of numerous publications, including most recently Dilemmas of Reform: Policing in Arab Transitions (March 2016); Haidar al-‘Abadi’s First Year in Office: What Prospects For Iraq? (September 2015); Crumbling States: Security Sector Reform in Libya and Yemen (June 2015); Missed Opportunity: The Politics of Police Reform in Egypt and Tunisia (March 2015); Militaries, Civilians and the Crisis of the Arab State (December 2014); The Syrian Opposition’s Leadership Problem (April 2013); Above the State: The Officers’ Republic in Egypt (August 2012); “We serve the people”: Hamas policing in Gaza (2011); and Policing the People, Building the State: Authoritarian transformation in the West Bank and Gaza (2011).

Prof. Mark Tessler Mark Tessler is Samuel J. Eldersveld Collegiate Professor of Political Science. He specializes in Comparative Politics and Middle East Studies. He has studied and/or conducted field research in Tunisia, Israel, Morocco, Egypt, and Palestine (West Bank and Gaza). He is one of the very few American scholars to have attended university and lived for extended periods

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 160 in both the Arab world and Israel. He has also spent several years teaching and consulting in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Many of Professor Tessler’s scholarly publications examine the nature, determinants, and political implications of attitudes and values held by ordinary citizens the Middle East. Among his fifteen books are Public Opinion in the Middle East: Survey Research and the Political Orientations of Ordinary Citizens (2011); Islam, Democracy and the State in Algeria: Lessons for the Western Mediterranean and Beyond (2005); and Area Studies and Social Science: Strategies for Understanding Middle East Politics (1999).

His most recent book, supported by an award from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, is Islam and Politics in the Middle East: Explaining the Views of Ordinary Citizens (2015). Based on 42 nationally representative surveys carried out in 15 countries between 1988 and 2011, this work investigates popular perceptions and preferences relating to the role that Islam should play in government and political affairs.

Professor Tessler also co-directs the Arab Barometer Survey project. The first wave of Arab Barometer surveys, carried out in eight Arab countries and completed in 2009, was named the best new data set in comparative politics by the American Political Science Association in 2010. The second wave of Arab Barometer surveys was carried out in twelve countries during 2010-2011, and the third wave was carried out in ten countries from late 2012 to early 2014. These data are available through the Arab Barometer website.

Professor Tessler has also conducted research and written extensively on the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. His publications on the subject include A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. The first edition of the book, published in 1994, won national honors and was named a “Notable Book of the Year” by The New York Times. An updated and expanded edition was published in 2009.

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Ms. Steffany A. Trofino Steffany Trofino is a graduate of the University of Aberdeen Scotland having obtained her Master’s Degree, in Strategic Studies - Global Security, with honors. Ms. Trofino also studied Russian Language at Moscow State University, Moscow Russia in 1992. She is an honor graduate of the Navy Intelligence Officers Program (NIOBC), Damn Neck Virginia as well a graduate of the Department of Defense Strategic Debriefer certification program. Ms. Trofino has published several reports on weak and failed states and the manner by which such conditions foster and support terrorist activity including an assessment of Russian FSB Operations in Dagestan. In addition, Ms. Trofino has produced several White Papers on terrorism and counterterrorism initiatives including assessments of terrorist activity in Sub- Sahara Africa. In 2012, Ms. Trofino developed a theory, The Reverse Assessment of Asymmetric Warfare, which was used as a foundational model for an Army 5-5 study. Her assessments have been used by former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), the Honorable James Woolsey, to support his testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Middle East and North Africa, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade. She has worked with the US Department of Justice, Sub-Sahara Africa division as well as the US Department of Defense. Ms. Trofino specializes in research and analysis of proxy activity in weak and failed states including understudied, underdeveloped regions of the world.

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 162 Dr. Shalini Venturelli

Dr. Shalini Venturelli is Associate Professor of International Communication and International Relations, in the School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC. She conducts international sociocultural field research and multidisciplinary complex qualitative analysis on the information environment of conflict, culture and international security, analysis & forecasting of strategic threat systems and outcomes. She investigates strategic competitors, regional stability systems, high-complexity asymmetric conflict environments, ideology & influence projection, strategic communication, sociocultural drivers of violent networks, analysis of global social media networks, evolutionary analysis of extremist networks, and assessments of governance, security and stabilization in volatile world regions. Current research projects include: • Design and application of evolutionary model of information dynamics to identify and predict unstable human ecosystems in trans-regional environments. • Identify critical drivers of human ecosystem volatility across diverse security and information and orders with the aim advancing capabilities in detection, deterrence and information engagement. • Control systems mechanisms of asymmetric information and influence capabilities of geopolitical power actors Russia, China, Iran and their non-state proxies across transregional land and maritime domains in Euro-Asia, East Asia and MENA. • Evolutionary capabilities and strategic impacts of violent terrorist networks, including ISIL, within and across regions. • For her front-line research efforts in support of U.S. forces in Southwest Asia and the Middle East with field investigation and analysis of the strategic information environment and sociocultural drivers of conflict, Prof. Venturelli was awarded the U.S. Army Commander’s Medal for Civilian Service, and the Secretary of Defense Medal for the Global War on Terrorism.

Dr. Venturelli has multidisciplinary expertise, and is multilingual. She is the author of many studies and publications on information and communication environments and information networks, the global communication and knowledge revolution, and culture, media and international security. Professor Venturelli received a Ph.D. from the University of Colorado at Boulder in International Communication & International Relations, an M.A. from the University of Chicago in Interdisciplinary Social Science, and a B.S. from Illinois State University in Economics.

Mr. Gary Warner

Gary Warner is the Director of Research in Computer Forensics at UAB. Since arriving at UAB in 2007, Warner has created and taught a variety of classes in Computer Science and Justice Sciences related to Cyber Security and Computer Forensics. More than 150 students have worked as employees or volunteers in the UAB Computer Forensics Research Lab, which was established in March of 2010, serving the community by assisting in investigations for many companies and law enforcement agencies. In 2012, inventions and patents from the lab were licensed to create Malcovery Security, a local cyber intelligence company with more than 20

This white paper does not represent official USG policy or position. 163 employees. Malcovery was acquired in October 2015 by PhishMe where Warner now serves as Chief Threat Scientist. In 2013, the UAB lab doubled in size with the creation of the Facebook Suite, largely funded by a generous contribution from Facebook in response to our assistance in fighting cybercrime.

Warner has been recognized for his efforts with many rewards, including the MAAWG J.D. Falk Award in 2013, the NCFTA Cybercrime Fighter Award, the IC3.gov Partnership Award, and has received the Microsoft MVP in Enterprise Security six times. Involved in cyber security since 1989, he began his career helping large organizations connect securely to the Internet for the first time. He has worked as an IT Director for a local publicly-traded utility, and has served as a Task Force Officer for the FBI Cybercrimes Task Force. With regards to Critical Infrastructure Protection, he founded the Birmingham InfraGard chapter, and has served on the national boards of the FBI’s InfraGard program and DHS’s Energy ISAC.

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