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Turkey Country Focus European Asylum Support Office EASO Country of Origin Information Report Turkey Country Focus November 2016 SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION European Asylum Support Office EASO Country of Origin Information Report Turkey Country Focus November 2016 Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers to your questions about the European Union. Freephone number (*): 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (*) Certain mobile telephone operators do not allow access to 00800 numbers or these calls may be billed. More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu). Print ISBN: 978‐92‐9494‐248‐7 doi: 10.2847/204373 BZ‐06‐16‐156‐EN‐C PDF ISBN: 978‐92‐9494‐249‐4 doi: 10.2847/319625 BZ‐06‐16‐156‐EN‐N © European Asylum Support Office 2016 Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained herein. EASO COI REPORT TURKEY: COUNTRY FOCUS ‐ 3 Acknowledgments EASO would like to acknowledge the following national asylum and migration departments as the co‐authors, together with EASO, of this report: Finland, Finnish Migration Service, Legal Service and Country Information Unit; Lithuania, Asylum Affairs Division, Migration Department; Romania, General Inspectorate for Immigration, Country of Information Unit. The following departments reviewed this report: Germany, Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF); Greece, Regional Asylum Office of Attica; The Netherlands, Immigration and Naturalisation Service, Office for Country Information and Language Analysis (OCILA). Jean Marcou, Researcher on Turkey, Professor ‐ Director of International Relations ‐ Grenoble Institute of Political Studies (Sciences Po Grenoble ‐ France) / Director of the Master of Mediterranean and the Middle Eastern Studies, has reviewed the report as well. EASO COI REPORT TURKEY: COUNTRY FOCUS ‐ 4 Contents Acknowledgments .............................................................................................................. 3 Contents ............................................................................................................................ 4 Disclaimer .......................................................................................................................... 7 Glossary and Abbreviations ................................................................................................ 8 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 13 Methodology ....................................................................................................................... 13 Map Turkey () ................................................................................................................... 15 1. State structure .............................................................................................................. 16 1.1 Constitution ................................................................................................................... 16 1.2 Executive branch ........................................................................................................... 17 1.2.1 The President of the Republic ............................................................................... 17 1.2.2 The Prime Minister and the Cabinet ...................................................................... 17 1.3 Legislative branch .......................................................................................................... 18 1.3.1 The parliamentary system ..................................................................................... 18 1.3.2 The electoral system .............................................................................................. 19 1.3.3 The legislative process: Parliament ....................................................................... 20 1.4 Administration .............................................................................................................. 22 2. Socio‐political landscape ............................................................................................... 24 2.1 Political parties .............................................................................................................. 24 2.1.1 Justice and Development Party, AKP ..................................................................... 24 2.1.2 Republican People’s Party, CHP ............................................................................. 25 2.1.3 Nationalist Movement Party, MHP ........................................................................ 25 2.1.4 People’s Democratic Party, HDP ............................................................................ 26 2.1.5 Felicity Party, SP ..................................................................................................... 27 2.1.6 Other parties .......................................................................................................... 27 2.2 Elections ........................................................................................................................ 28 2.2.1 Local elections in 2014 ........................................................................................... 28 2.2.2 Presidential elections in 2014 ................................................................................ 28 2.2.3 Parliamentary elections in 2015 ............................................................................ 29 2.2.4 Election campaigns ................................................................................................ 29 2.3 Opposition ..................................................................................................................... 30 2.3.1 Political opposition ................................................................................................ 30 2.3.2 Armed groups ........................................................................................................ 31 EASO COI REPORT TURKEY: COUNTRY FOCUS ‐ 5 2.4 Civil society .................................................................................................................... 32 2.5 Media ............................................................................................................................ 33 2.5.1 Television and newspapers .................................................................................... 33 2.5.2 Internet .................................................................................................................. 34 3. Rule of law and state protection ................................................................................... 35 3.1 General overview .......................................................................................................... 35 3.2 Law enforcement and security forces ........................................................................... 37 3.2.1 Police ...................................................................................................................... 37 3.2.2 Jandarma and village guards ................................................................................. 39 3.2.3 Intelligence services ............................................................................................... 41 3.2.4 Military ................................................................................................................... 42 3.2.5 Accountability mechanisms ................................................................................... 45 3.3 Judiciary ......................................................................................................................... 47 3.3.1 Court system .......................................................................................................... 47 3.3.2 Capacity and judicial integrity ............................................................................... 51 3.4 The role of the Ombudsman and the accountability of the administration ................. 56 3.4.1 Structure and mandate .......................................................................................... 56 3.4.2 Filing a complaint ................................................................................................... 56 3.5 Corruption and good governance ................................................................................. 57 3.5.1 Fight against corruption ......................................................................................... 57 3.5.2 The government’s policy on governance and transparency ................................. 58 4. The security situation.................................................................................................... 59 4.1. General overview of the security situation .................................................................. 59 4.2 Actors in the conflict ..................................................................................................... 62 4.2.1 The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) ...................................................................... 62 4.2.2 Civil Defense Units (YPS)/ Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (YDG‐H) ..... 63 4.2.3 Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK)/Teyrenbazen Azadiya Kurdistan ...................... 63 4.2.4 Democratic Union Party (PYD)/ People’s Protection Units (YPG).......................... 65 4.2.5 Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party‐Front, DHKP‐C ......................................
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