DOCSLIB.ORG

Internal Kurdish Coherence

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Internal Kurdish Coherence Internal Kurdish Coherence Analyzing Alliances, Capacities, Threats, and Political Objectives of Kurdish Groups and Parties in Syria and Iraq 2015-2017 By David Vestenskov & Andreas Høj Fierro Internal Kurdish Coherence Analyzing Alliances, Capacities, Threats, and Political Objectives of Kurdish Groups and Parties in Syria and Iraq 2015–2017 By David Vestenskov & Andreas Høj Fierro SCANDINAVIAN MILITARY STUDIES Published by Scandinavian Military Studies (SMS) Ryvangs Allé 1 DK-2100 Copenhagen Denmark Text © David Vestenskov & Andreas Høj Fierro Licence CC-BY First published 2019 Cover design by Royal Danish Defence College Licensed under Creative Commons CC0 ISBN (EPUB): 978-87-971251-1-3 ISBN (Mobi): 978-87-971251-3-7 ISBN (PDF): 978-87-971251-2-0 DOI: https://doi.org/10.31374/book1 This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ or send a letter to Creative Commons, 444 Castro Street, Suite 900, Mountain View, California, 94041, USA. This license allows for copying any part of the work for personal and commercial use, providing author attribution is clearly stated. The full text of this book has been peer-reviewed to ensure high academic standards. For full review policies, see https://press.sjms.nu/ Suggested citation: Vestenskov, D. & Fierro, A. H. (2019). Internal Kurdish Coherence: Analyzing Alliances, Capacities, Threats, and Political Objectives of Kurdish Groups and Parties in Syria and Iraq 2015–2017. Copenhagen: Scandinavian Military Studies. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31374/book1. License: CC-BY To read the free, open access version of this book online, visit https://doi.org/10.31374/book1 or scan this QR code with your mobile device: Contents List of Illustrations v About the Authors vii Acknowledgements ix Acronyms xi Introduction 1 Aim of the Book 2 Research Design 2 Structure of the Book 5 PART ONE: The Syrian Kurds 7 The Kurdish Supreme Committee 7 Kurdish National Council Post KSC 10 Syrian Democratic Forces and Syrian Democratic Council 12 Syrian Democratic Forces’ Major Military Campaigns 14 Rojava Proclaims Federalism 16 Reported Affiliation between PKK and PYD/YPG 19 International Actors’ Positions toward the Syrian Kurdish Groups 21 Likely Side Effects from Continued/Enhanced Support to the SDF 24 PART TWO: The Iraqi Kurdistan Region 27 The Origins of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and the KRG 27 The Kurdish Regional Government in Post-Saddam Iraq 29 The Economic Downfall of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region 32 ISIS Attacks Kurdistan – The Fall of Sinjar 34 The Iraqi Kurdish Capture of Kirkuk 35 The State of Press Freedom in Iraqi Kurdistan 35 Iraq’s Political Development Post-ISIS 36 Relationship with Turkey 39 The Fallout of the Kurdish Region’s Independence Referendum 40 Conclusion: Internal Kurdish Coherence 45 Iraqi Kurdistan 45 Northern Syria 46 iv Internal Kurdish Coherence Kurdish Transnational Coherence 46 Policy Implications 50 Epilogue 51 Literature 53 List of Illustrations Map 1. Syria, Archive: RDDC 8 Map 2. Northern Syria – Rojava Region, Archive: RDDC 17 Map 3. Iraq, Archive: RDDC 28 Table 1. Kurdish Supreme Committee (KSC) 9 Table 2. Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat – Democratic Union Party (PYD) / Yekîneyên Parastina Gel - People’s Protection Units (YPG) 10 Table 3. Kurdish National Council (KNC) 12 Table 4. SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) / SDC (Syrian Democratic Council) 13 Table 5. Responses to the Democratic Federal System for Rojava and Northern Syria 18 Table 6. International Actors’ Official Views on the Alleged Affiliation between the PYD and PKK 23 Table 7. Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) 29 Table 8. Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) 30 Table 9. Gorran (Movement for Change) 32 About the Authors DAVID VESTENSKOV is a consultant at the Royal Danish Defence College and project coordinator on the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Programme for Afghanistan and Pakistan. His current work comprises international security issues, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, as well as regional peace building. ANDREAS HØJ FIERRO is a Political Scientist and free-lance researcher. He has lived and worked in Latin America and has a profound interest for Turkish society and foreign policy. His current work comprises of peace processes, democratic regimes, as well as counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism in the Middle East and Latin America. Acknowledgements As the whole is never greater than the sum of its parts, we of course want to thank for the support we have received for developing and writing the book. The authors would like to thank the Royal Danish Defence College for providing a sound academic frame as well as the resources for the making of this book. Especially the patient support from the Dean’s Office and the Institute for Military Operations is highly appreciated. Many people have during the last three years played a role in the research and editing process and though we will not mention each and all we would like to thank everybody for their contribution. One person however do deserves to be singled out and a very special vote of thanks goes to RDDC’s research assistant Dea Andersen for her relentless contribution in editing and structuring the final output of this study. Acronyms Iraq KRG Kurdish Regional Government KDP Kurdistan Democratic Party PUK Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Syria PYD Democratic Union party YPG People’s Protection Unit YPJ Women’s Protection Unit Tev-Dem Movement for a Democratic Society KNC Kurdish National Council KSC Kurdish Supreme Committee SDF Syrian Democratic Forces SNC Syrian National Council NC National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces Turkey AKP Justice and Development Party PKK Kurdistan Worker’s Party Iran PJAK Free Life Party of Kurdistan Transnational KCK Kurdistan Communities Union Introduction Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) shocked the world when it entered the world stage in 2014. Having seized very large territories in Syria and Iraq, its expansion within the Middle East seemed unrestrainable by the end of 2014. The Iraqi Army’s initial effort to halt ISIS failed catastrophically, with soldiers fleeing their positions; and in Syria the various actors were caught up in a bloody civil war. With US air support, the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds were the main force acting as boots on the ground and managed to halt the ISIS advance at the Syrian town of Kobane,1 which became a turning point for ISIS expansion. Simultaneously in Iraq, Kurdish Peshmerga forces stopped the ISIS advance only 50 kilometers from the Kurdish Regional Government’s (KRG) capital Erbil. Halting ISIS advances in both countries was a significant achievement for the Iraqi and Syrian Kurds, something which no other Syrian oppositional groups nor the Iraqi Army had been able to accomplish. The Kurdish success against ISIS quickly won them acclaim from the West (especially the US and European countries) and rendered them the key ally in the continued US-led effort against ISIS. Iraqi and Syrian Kurds have since then won significant victories in their fight against ISIS. In Iraq, Kurdish groups have regained 95% of the Iraqi Kurdish territory initially lost, and in Syria, the Kurdish militia of Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (YPG) has led fighting to retake territories near the Syrian borders to Turkey and Iraq (Kurdistan Regional Government, 2015). In Western media, the Kurds are often praised for their fight for human rights, gender equality, secular rule, and democracy, which is in sharp contrast to the horrific rule of ISIS (Watson & Tuysuz, 2014). An example is the Syrian Kurdish female fighters, frequently portrayed in newspapers’ reporting on the conflict. The narrative often frames the Kurdish groups as a homogeneous entity with a democratic baseline that aspires to Western values. Furthermore, the Kurdish people are also described as a united populous that has been denied their basic political rights and suffered substantial abuses from the states in the region. One example of this is a general description from the BBC in 2016. The historical dimension in the BBC’s description emphasizes that any move to set up an independent Kurdish nation-state has been brutally quashed, despite the victors of WW1 having made provision for a Kurdish state in the Treaty of Sèvres. In Syria, Kurds have been denied their basic rights and suppressed by the Syrian regime; and in Iraq, Saddam Hussein’s brutal attack using poison gas on 1 Situated close to Syria’s Northern border with Turkey. How to cite this book chapter: Vestenskov, D. & Fierro, A. H. (2019). Internal Kurdish Coherence: Analyzing Alliances, Capacities, Threats, and Political Objectives of Kurdish Groups and Parties in Syria and Iraq 2015–2017. Pp. 1–6. Copenhagen: Scandinavian Military Studies. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31374/book1.a. License: CC-BY 2 Internal Kurdish Coherence the Iraqi Kurds underlines the tortuous history of a persecuted people (“Who are the Kurds?”, 2017). There is no question about the suffering that Syrian and Iraqi Kurds have had to endure. This report does not intend to question said suffering. The narrative about Kurdish groups has been highly affected by the development in the security situation over the last couple of years, and the Kurdish groups now represent heavily armed forces and serve as important allies in the fight against ISIS. The political party of Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (PYD), and its armed wing (YPG), went from being a largely unknown group at the beginning of the Syrian conflict to become the leading actor in the multi-ethnic Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), defending and controlling large parts of Northern Syria and putting Turkey on high alert. In 2016, Kurdish Peshmerga forces expanded their territory to Kirkuk in Iraq, and after having halted ISIS advances they defended a more than 1,000-kilometer-long border with ISIS-held territory.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Policy Notes for the Trump Notes Administration the Washington Institute for Near East Policy ■ 2018 ■ Pn55
    TRANSITION 2017 POLICYPOLICY NOTES FOR THE TRUMP NOTES ADMINISTRATION THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY ■ 2018 ■ PN55 TUNISIAN FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN IRAQ AND SYRIA AARON Y. ZELIN Tunisia should really open its embassy in Raqqa, not Damascus. That’s where its people are. —ABU KHALED, AN ISLAMIC STATE SPY1 THE PAST FEW YEARS have seen rising interest in foreign fighting as a general phenomenon and in fighters joining jihadist groups in particular. Tunisians figure disproportionately among the foreign jihadist cohort, yet their ubiquity is somewhat confounding. Why Tunisians? This study aims to bring clarity to this question by examining Tunisia’s foreign fighter networks mobilized to Syria and Iraq since 2011, when insurgencies shook those two countries amid the broader Arab Spring uprisings. ©2018 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY ■ NO. 30 ■ JANUARY 2017 AARON Y. ZELIN Along with seeking to determine what motivated Evolution of Tunisian Participation these individuals, it endeavors to reconcile estimated in the Iraq Jihad numbers of Tunisians who actually traveled, who were killed in theater, and who returned home. The find- Although the involvement of Tunisians in foreign jihad ings are based on a wide range of sources in multiple campaigns predates the 2003 Iraq war, that conflict languages as well as data sets created by the author inspired a new generation of recruits whose effects since 2011. Another way of framing the discussion will lasted into the aftermath of the Tunisian revolution. center on Tunisians who participated in the jihad fol- These individuals fought in groups such as Abu Musab lowing the 2003 U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Young Man Freed Eight Years After Plea; Prosecutor to Talk
    15 International FRIDAY, JUNE 10, 2016 Ghana chef works against waste to feed the hungry ACCRA: Excess and waste are usually considered sympto- matic of the affluent West but trained chef Elijah Amoo Addo knows these are problems too in his home country, Ghana. One day he saw a homeless man collecting food scraps to feed others in the capital, Accra. Watching someone pick up food no-one else would eat for people no-one was helping, got him thinking. Amoo Addo believed there was enough food in the west African nation to feed all of its nearly 27 million people, but more had to be done to educate and inspire people to help those in need. The result was a charity, now called Food For All Ghana. The process is simple and not unlike recent French legislation that forces supermarkets to donate unsold food to charities and food banks, which campaigners want to see spread across Europe. Food manufacturers and suppliers are asked for unused and excess food or products approaching their best-before dates. Every weekend volunteers visit orphanages, hospitals, schools and communities using donated goods to cook for those in need and hand over ingredients for future use. “We have kids who are out of school just because they can’t get food to eat,” Amoo Adoo, 25 said. “We have families who sometimes in the day can’t even afford a plate of food. —AFP Over 130 IS fighters killed in battle for Syria’s Manbij BEIRUT: More than 130 Islamic State group fighters have been killed in a US-backed offensive on the key jihadist-held city of Manbij in northern Syria, a monitoring group said yes- terday.
    [Show full text]
  • Call for Solidarity with Efrîn
    Call for Solidarity with Efrîn 12.03.2018 Preface This document includes declaration of several NGO’s and humanitarian organizations. Contents - NGOs and Humanitarian Actors signed on the statement. - Efrîn - Detailed file on the committed massacres done by the Turkish airstrikes and its allies on Efrîn. - Suspirations of using chemical weapons in Efrîn. - Civilian suffers in photos - Documented Victims in the period 20.1.2018 until 23.2.2018 - Detailed document on children victims of Turkish attacks on Efrîn. - Detailed document about women women victims o Turkish attacks on Efrîn. - Report about Basuteh massacre. - Attachment (signs and stamps of the NGOs) Annex - Map of the Efrîn 2 We the undersigning NGOs and humanitarian organizations, on the basis of the following statements and documentation reported by the Kurdish Red Crescent and other Humanitarian actors, deplore the aggression moved by Turkey against Efrîn region in north Syria, from where we get reports showing that the violations of human rights have reached to tragic levels. There are evidents that the Turkish state is braking international law and opposing the international conventions and resolutions during the ongoing massacres against the indigenous peoples of the region and also against the persons displaced in the same area. The Turkish state and some Free Syrian Army groups started this military attack on the 20th of January 2018 with an intensive shelling by Turkish warplanes, targeting both military sites and civil buildings in Efrîn such as houses, schools and hospitals. The Kurdish Red Crescent documented the death of 227 civilians, among those 32 child and 28 women, and 651 civilian are injured, among those 87 children and 93 women, due to Turkish attacks until 26’th of February.
    [Show full text]
  • ENERGY GAME: SYRIA & KURDISH CORRIDOR by Necdet Karakurt and Oğuzhan Akyener
    ENERGY GAME: SYRIA & KURDISH CORRIDOR by Necdet Karakurt and Oğuzhan Akyener has been proved by Turkey that PYD/YPG is INTRODUCTION the parallel extension of so called Kurdistan “The balance in Workers’ Party (PKK), known as a terrorist organization. However, USA and EU tend Syria has been inter- A huge lack in the governmental authorita- to close their ears on Turkey’s warnings. Per- tive figures and the head of country being un- changeable since it haps, in the near future, when the crisis or reasonably selfish and foolish have left Syria unrest in Syria ends, those terrorists will start is possible to relate in the hands of the hell-hounds, who havoc wreaking havoc in today’s supporter coun- throughout the country and devastate cities, each terrorist group tries as history always repeats itself. settlements, and villages, where especially with a country. When- the Arabs and Turkmen live. Terrorism cre- Turkey, out of all the countries involved in ated a realm of chaos in Syria that increased ever a country loses the region, focuses on the civilian rights and appetite for many powerful countries to play perhaps, it is the only country that lacks a the upper hand or a key role and get the biggest share from the powerful energy strategy regarding the re- energy resources in the region. The balance tries to settle its politi- serves in the region. Terrorist groups like in Syria has been interchangeable since it is Daesh and PYD/YPG are the puppets of the cal struggles in Syria, possible to relate each terrorist group with a international assembly and their tasks are to country.
    [Show full text]
  • Of Iraq's Kirkuk
    INSTITUT KURDDE PARIS E Information and liaison bulletin N° 392 NOVEMBER 2017 The publication of this Bulletin enjoys a subsidy from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Ministry of Culture This bulletin is issued in French and English Price per issue : France: 6 € — Abroad : 7,5 € Annual subscribtion (12 issues) France : 60 € — Elsewhere : 75 € Monthly review Directeur de la publication : Mohamad HASSAN Misen en page et maquette : Ṣerefettin ISBN 0761 1285 INSTITUT KURDE, 106, rue La Fayette - 75010 PARIS Tel. : 01-48 24 64 64 - Fax : 01-48 24 64 66 www.fikp.org E-mail: bulletin@fikp.org Information and liaison bulletin Kurdish Institute of Paris Bulletin N° 392 November 2017 • ROJAVA: PREPARING MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE • TURKEY: THE REPRESSION EXPANDS TO LIBER- AL CIRCLES; THE VIOLENCE IS INCREASING • IRAQI KURDISTAN: UNCONSTITUTIONAL DEMANDS FROM BAGHDAD, ARABISATION OF KIRKUK RESTARTED ROJAVA: PREPARING MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE. broad the “World Day for beginning to return to Raqqa, liber- the 17th with a suicide attack on a Kobani” was celebrated ated on 17th October. Regarding checkpoint that caused at least 35 on 1st November largely Deir Ezzor, the SDF fighters from victims in the Northeast of Deir as a symbol of this Syrian the “Jezirah Storm” operation, Ezzor Province, between the hydro- A Kurdish town’s unremit- launched on 9th September, liberated carbon fields of Conoco and Jafra. It ting resistance to the attack 7 villages near the town and about was, nevertheless, not able to pre- launched by ISIS in 2014 with fifteen km from the Iraqi borders, vent the SDF from reaching the Iraqi Turkish connivance.
    [Show full text]
  • Conflict, Cropland and Food Prices
    Conflict, Cropland and Food Prices Syrian Arab Republic Sep 2016 opposition military activities while also halting humanitarian access. Although conflict intensity steadily declined 1,842 The conflict map below shows the density of security incidents observed between Number of Incidents Cessation of 1,629 02 May 2016 through September 2016 (with over 5,500 events recorded). The city nationwide, the siege in Aleppo levied a huge burden on civilian access to food, water, and medical supplies, a hostilities 1,439 of Aleppo had the highest conflict density as the regime offensive to take the condition that remained and worsened throughout the rest of the reporting period culminating in the bombing of rebel-held east that began in April continued and intensified throughout the a UN aid convoy carrying food during an attempted ceasefire in mid-September. 1,202 reporting period. The incidents in Rural Damascus, Dar’a al Balad, and northern 1,117 1,288 As the overlay with cropland areas shows, the majority of incidents are concentrated in populated areas with 1,094 1,102 1,112 Quneitra also represent conflict between the regime and opposition groups as 989 agricultural land. The damage to fields and agricultural infrastructure as well as restrictions on supply lines for 1,026 does the fighting around Tartous, Lattakia and Idleb. In the east however, conflict 818 machinery, livestock feed, seeds and other essential inputs has a devastating effect on national agricultural Siege of Aleppo in Manbij, Homa, Ar-Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zor represents strikes against territory output, starting with a decrease in areas planted.
    [Show full text]
  • JM 2016.08.31 US in Syria
    The US fatal mistake in northern Syria By Joe Macaron August 31, 2016 The moment the Turkish incursion into Syrian Territory began on August 24, the stage was set for a looming direct military confrontation between Ankara and Kurdish forces in northern Syria. The US attempt to play both sides of the fence in a volatile conflict is unravelling now and Washington once again has overestimated its ability to shape the Middle East’s political dynamics. The US and Turkey appear to have agreed on the general principle of having a “safe zone” over northern Syria, however the discord that prevented this move centers around actual control on the ground. The strained relation between the two countries following the July 15 military coup attempt in Turkey prompted Washington to concede on one of Ankara’s major demands: preventing a Kurdish corridor on its border. Hence, the White House surprisingly decided to walk this tightrope in northern Syria, adding further confusion to an already faltering US policy. As Vice President Joe Biden was visiting Ankara, Turkish and American warplanes were pounding the Syrian border allowing a coalition of Turkish troops, the Free Syrian Army and Turkmen fighters to reach Jarablus within 12 hours. “We have made it clear to Kurdish forces that they must move back across the (Euphrates) river. They cannot and will not get American support if they do not keep that commitment,” affirmed Biden while giving no indication at all that Washington has any reservation about this incursion. Indeed, the US not only carried out surveillance flights and targeted the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) militants, but also advised the Turkish military in planning the incursion.
    [Show full text]
  • Annual Report on Civilian Casualties in Connection with United States Military Operations in 2019
    UNCLASSIFIED Department of Defense Annual Report on Civilian Casualties In Connection With United States Military Operations in 2019 Submitted pursuant to Section 1057 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115-91), as amended The estimated cost of this report for the Department of Defense is approximately $20,000 for the 2020 Fiscal Year. This includes $25 in expenses and $20,000 in DoD labor. Generated on 2020April22 A-60DF323 1 UNCLASSIFIED Section 1057 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115- 91), as amended, states the following: Annual Report on Civilian Casualties in Connection With United States Military Operations (a) ANNUAL REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than May 1 each year, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on civilian casualties caused as a result of United States military operations during the preceding year. (b) ELEMENTS.—Each report under subsection (a) shall set forth the following: (1) A list of all the United States military operations, including each specific mission, strike, engagement, raid, or incident, during the year covered by such report that were confirmed, or reasonably suspected, to have resulted in civilian casualties. (2) For each military operation listed pursuant to paragraph (1), each of the following: (A) The date. (B) The location. (C) An identification of whether the operation occurred inside or outside of a declared theater of active armed conflict. (D) The type of operation. (E) An assessment of the number of civilian and enemy combatant casualties, including a differentiation between those killed and those injured.
    [Show full text]
  • A Perspective on Syria
    Internal bulletin – rs21 National Meeting 9 June – 10 June 2018 A perspective on Syria The Steering Group In 2011 Syrians engaged in some of the largest mass democratic protests in the country’s recent history. In what was viewed across the Arab world as a continuation of the ‘Arab Spring’, initially catalysed by the Tunisian Revolution, hundreds of thousands of Syrians took part in protests calling for greater civil liberties and an end to the Assad regime. Background – Syrian Ba’athism before the revolution In hindsight, it is easy to see why the protests happened when they did and on the scale that they did. For decades previously the policy of the ruling Ba’ath Party in Syria had been to suppress independent organisations in Syrian civil society by incorporating them within the state and offering financial incentives to maintain compliance from trade union bureaucracies, as well as making welfare provision dependent upon membership of state- monitored organisations. In the early 2000s a series of shocks to the Syrian economy threatened the viability of this model, and austerity measures of the regime weakened the stranglehold over Syrian civil society. Nevertheless, the Assad regime maintained an enormous state surveillance apparatus and a grotesque network of prisons, where political prisoners were, and continue to be, tortured. The Ba’athist policy in Syria pursued by the Assad Government - in which many key posts are held by members of the minority Alawite sect - was one of formal equality for ethnic minorities. Alawites in particular were a specifically persecuted group prior to the Assad regime, and much of the support for the regime from minority groups in the Syrian conflict can be attributed to fears of a loss of status if the regime falls.
    [Show full text]
  • Returning Foreign Terrorists: What Type of Security Challenges Are
    Violent Extremism Keys Returning Foreign Terrorists: What Type of Security Challenges Are They Posing? Violent Extremism Dr Eman Ragab It is estimated that the cohort of foreign terrorists Expert in Regional Security who joined ISIS since 2014 represents around 50% Acting Head of Security and Military Studies Unit, of the organization, with varying fighting experience, al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies as some of them acted as foot soldiers or middle- or (ACPSS), Cairo very high-ranking officers.3 It is noticeable that most of the efforts being done to counter the recent flow of foreign terrorists fol- The recent reverse flow of foreign terrorist fighters1 lowing the Battle of Raqqa is focusing on one as- out of Syria and Iraq following the declared defeat of pect of that flow, which is the reverse flow to home ISIS is dominating academic and policy circles not countries, known as the ‘returnees.’ This aspect is only in Europe but in the Middle East as well. Ac- inspired by ISIS’ strategy of ‘remaining and ex- cording to the 2017 Euromed Survey of Experts and panding,’ which is based on the creation of new Actors, an average of 61% of respondents from theatres of action4 guided by ISIS spokesman both regions agree that foreign terrorists are repre- Abu Muhammad al-Adnani’s call in September 87 senting the biggest threat posed by violent extrem- 2014 for “all supporters who could not join the ca- ism. The number of respondents from Tunisia, Alge- liphate to attack the enemy wherever they could, ria, Morocco and France agreeing with that statement and with whatever means, without waiting for in- are more than other countries.2 structions.” These perceptions can be justified in light of the This article argues that there are other aspects of number of foreign terrorist fighters who joined ISIS that flow that raise other challenges to national and and other terrorist organizations in Syria and Iraq.
    [Show full text]
  • <V[Czhr] `E Μ9raaz Vdd¶ E`Fc Xfzuv W`C >V]R ZR
    = >"? !"? ? (*$#(% +,-. RNI Regn. No. CHHENG/2012/42718, Postal Reg. No. - RYP DN/34/2013-2015 0. 1 !' 2 (() 34 0! - -- 9-/1- .9$. 7)8 8-)&98-1) : &)) &-6 )) .- 8)&%9) 98) ;<% /9 8-18--- !" / 01/ 02023 ,4. + $ %'( $) QR were to welcome Melania at the school and brief her about rationale behind introduction of “happiness classes” as well as the Delhi Government’s over- all reform initiatives in the edu- !" " P$% cation sector, officials said. Q ' ( “Names of Kejriwal and " " --./) Sisodia have been dropped " )*)* + " Kejriwal and Sisodia from the from the list of invitees. We do % " "( ames of Delhi Chief list. The comments actually not know who will receive and NMinister Arvind Kejriwal indicated that there is some- brief the First Lady about hap- (,"-". and his deputy Manish Sisodia thing fishy,” Bhardwaj claimed. piness classes when she visits # % * " L" are missing from the guest list According to the original our school,” said a Delhi &' ()* + * L for the February 25 event when schedule, Kejriwal and Sisodia Government official. ! " US First Lady Melania Trump " " is scheduled to visit a Delhi ) ( Government school in the * 0 ' % national Capital to watch “hap- ( piness classes” and interact OP with the students, sources said. "" (3 "" " The
    [Show full text]
  • The Evolution of Russian, Syrian, and Iranian Actions Against the Jihadist Movements and Turkish-U.S
    ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security Issue The Evolution of Russian, Syrian, and Iranian Actions Against the No. 394 Jihadist Movements and Turkish-U.S. Responses Jan 2016 Yossef Bodansky The Evolution of Russian, Syrian, and Iranian Actions Against the Jihadist Movements and Turkish-U.S. Responses Yossef Bodansky January 2016 Abstract Almost three months into the Russian military intervention in Syria and Iraq - a clear strategy has emerged. Russia is spearheading a regional allied effort to consolidate tangible gains - to stabilize the lines before Winter freezes the fighting. When fighting resume in early Spring 2016, the Jihadist forces will no longer be able to threaten the Fertile Crescent of Minorities and the buffer areas surrounding Shiite Iraq. Emboldened, better equipped and retrained - the forces allied with Russia will then be able to go on the strategic offensive under a unified master-plan. In mid-October, the Kremlin clarified that the Russian strategic-political objectives in Syria are to stabilize and consolidate the Assad administration as the key to defeating the Jihadist forces, as well as to compel the US-led West to accept and acknowledge this reality. For the Kremlin, all anti-Assad forces are terrorists. In mid-November, Putin returned to Moscow from the G-20 summit convinced that any attempt to deal with Obama was an exercise in futility and that a major face-off, even crisis, over Syria was only a question of time. Hence, the Kremlin resolved to seize the strategic initiative. Thus, the Russian military intervention has already had a profound impact on the region’s strategic-political posture.
    [Show full text]