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Home , Afrin Canton, Aleppo Governorate, Manbij offensive, Operation Olive Branch

December 2018

The 2018 Turkish Military Operation in Northern : ’s Ambiguous Realpolitik Between the USA and Russia

Author: Elettra Pelino

Abstract

With the recent fall of Daesh in Syraq (the Syrian and Iraqi territories), a more unstable scenario has unfolded where regional state actors attempt to impose their strategies in order to fill the vacuum of power in the Middle East, and ethnic groups like the seek independence and claim the establishment of a homeland, referred to as “”. At the international level of analysis, the of America and Russia, deeply involved in the ongoing Syrian crisis due to the significant interests at stake, are closer to a military clash than they were during the Cold War. Against this background, Erdoğan’s Turkey, an important NATO partner and regional power in the Middle East, is playing a “keeping a foot in both camps” strategic game with Russia and the USA to advance its interests. The 2018 Turkish military operation in northern Syria, known as “” and launched with Moscow’s tacit support against Kurdish fighters - the most capable Washington's allies in the fight against Daesh - testifies this ambiguous posture and poses new questions on Turkey’s role on the grand chessboard of geopolitics. The aim of this paper is to investigate the current geopolitical stance of Erdoğan’s Turkey, increasingly oriented towards a Realpolitik approach implying conflicts of interests with its traditional NATO allies, as epitomized by Operation Olive Branch.

Keywords: Turkey; United States of America; Russia; NATO; Syrian conflict; Post- Daesh; Kurdish question; Turkish foreign policy; Turkish Realpolitik

Language: English

About the author

ELETTRA PELINO

Degree in Politics, Philosophy and Economics, LUISS

Any opinions or ideas expressed in this paper are those of the individual author and don’t represent views of IsAG.

ISSN: 2281-8553 © Istituto di Alti Studi in Geopolitica e Scienze Ausiliarie

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Contents

1. Introduction ...... 4

2. Literature review ...... 5

3. The conflict’s framework ...... 5 3.1 Turkey’s shifting conduct throughout the Syrian conflict ...... 5 3.2 Operation Olive Branch ...... 8

4. Conclusions ...... 11

5. References ...... 12

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4 1. Introduction the goal of “zero problem with neighbors”, By virtue of its strategic geographical exposing his vision of Turkey as an “order position between Europe and Asia, Turkey setting agent” at the center of a geography stands at the crossroad of world affairs. As stretching across the Balkans to the Middle Brzezinski put it, «Turkey, a post-imperial state East, drawn together by solid trade and still in the process of redefining its identity, is pulled diplomatic ties due to a shared historical, in three directions: the modernists would like to see it cultural and religious heritage dating back become a European state and thus look to the west; to the (Akkoyunlu, the Islamists lean in the direction of the Middle East Nicolaïdis and Öktem, 2013). The 2011 and a Muslim community and thus look to the pro-democracy Arab uprisings presented south; and the historically minded nationalists see in with the opportunity to reassert the Turkic peoples of the Caspian Sea basin and itself as an example of a successful Muslim Central Asia a new mission for a regionally democracy (Taşpinar, 2012). The full extent dominant Turkey and thus look eastward. Each of of its Neo-Ottoman ambitions has been these perspectives posits a different strategic axis, and especially visible through its engagement in the clash between them introduces for the first time the Syrian conflict after 2011, when the soft- since the Kemalist revolution a measure of power approach turned into proxy policies uncertainty regarding Turkey’s regional role» and an increasingly hard-power strategy (Brzezinski, 1997, 134). (Manhoff, 2017). Hence, the war in Syria Therefore, Turkey enjoys substantial may be conceived as the starting point of the leverage on a plethora of local, regional and Neo-Ottoman approach. global actors. While this pro-active course nearly Since the foundation of the Republic in caused Turkey’s complete isolation in the 1923, Turkish foreign policy has followed a region, as well as alienation from its path of Westernization and has aimed at traditional NATO partners and a achieving balance and keeping the status rapprochement with Russia, Ankara has quo (CIDOB, 2011). During the Cold War, engaged in the re-setting of its foreign policy Turkey served as a bulwark against the objectives towards Syria since mid-2016. expansion of Soviet influence into the Rather than committing itself to toppling Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. the Assad regime, Turkey has prioritized re- The Turkish-American entente was then cementing its influence in Syria and institutionalized in 1952 through Turkey’s focusing on perceived security threats from accession to NATO, which provided the Kurdish nationalist mobilization in favor of alliance with its longest border with the separatism within and beyond its southern Soviet Union. border. Since the border between Turkey With the end of the bipolar world and and Syria results from the colonial Georgia acting as a buffer between Russia engineering that occurred in the aftermath and Turkey, the most relevant raison d’être for of World War One, with the Turkey’s Western stance in foreign policy dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, and national security threat for Turkey border drawing did not observe the pre- dissipated, bringing about an alteration in its existent multi-confessional socio- geopolitical identity (Aktürk, 2017). demographic composition (Okyay, 2017). Accordingly, Ankara’s policy horizons Accordingly, the borderland has been home broadened and Turkey shifted to a more to multi-ethnic and multi-confessional independent role on the international stage. communities with trans-state affiliations. In The rise to power of the Justice and the Syrian areas near the Turkish border, Development Party (AKP) in 2002 while there are small groups of Armenians, determined an increase in Turkey’s Circassians, Chechens and -speaking projection in the Middle East. Ahmet Christians, the predominant minorities are Davutoğlu, who became Turkish Foreign the Kurds (8.9 per cent of the total Minister in 2009, inaugurated a versatile population) and – predominantly Alevi – foreign policy paradigm in compliance with Turkmen (0.7 per cent of the total

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5 population). The Kurds, whose share in The research paper by Okyay (2017) Turkey’s population is estimated at around underlines that the fluctuation in Turkey’s 18 per cent, inhabit the borderlands southern border management reflects adjacent to mostly Kurdish areas in Syria. concern over the security threat to Turkey’s Therefore, Turkey has grown increasingly national unity and territorial integrity posed worried that the People’s Protection Units by Kurdish demands for greater autonomy. (YPG) – the Syrian Kurdish militant group, D’Alema (2017) agrees that Ankara’s together with its political arm, the current priority lies in the prevention of an Democratic Union Party (PYD), aligned independent Kurdistan in Syria under the with Turkey’s arch-nemesis, the Kurdistan’s sponsorship of the PYD, as this novel entity Worker Party (PKK) – will establish an would provide logistical support for the autonomous zone along Turkey’s boundary PKK’s activities in Turkey. In order to with Syria. If Ankara regards the PYD as a pursue this goal, Turkey is ready to engage terrorist organization, many states, in diplomacy with and Russia, fuelling including the USA, recognize it as a worries that this trilateral relationship could “legitimate” interlocutor and the most develop into an alliance that would be a effective and credible ground force in the barrier to American and NATO interests in fight against Daesh. the Middle East. This paper aims to explore the current Turkey’s Eastern pivot, parallel to the geopolitical posture of Erdoğan’s Turkey, adoption of a Syria policy at odds with which has shifted to a Realpolitik approach NATO, has been the object of a report by characterized by the focus on critical the Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law national security concerns, implying greater (2018L) that argues that Erdoğan is adaptability in the choice of its partners. constantly recalibrating his Western and Operation Olive Branch is representative of Eurasianist ties to improve Turkey’s this foreign policy shift and marks a perilous position. Turkey’s misguided belligerence phase in the relations between two NATO towards Syrian Kurdish Militias constitutes allies, namely the USA and Turkey. one of the motives addressed by the authors to conclude that Turkey is no longer reliably 2. Literature review aligned with American and NATO interests, The evolution of Turkey’s Syria policy despite being a military partner of the USA has been widely covered in the recent as well as one of the most powerful members literature. Manhoff (2017) analyses Turkey’s of NATO. The understanding of Turkey’s paradigm shift in foreign policy throughout Afrin Operation will draw on the political- the Syrian conflict – from the Neo-Ottoman military assessment produced by the to the Realpolitik approach – paying Congressional Research Service, as well as particular attention to Turkey-US and on the evaluations made by the Centre for Turkey-Russia relations. He maintains that Economics and Foreign Policy Studies Turkey appears to have become flexible (Edam) and the Center for Strategic and with respect to the choice of its partners and International Studies (CSIS). puts forward its own strategic interests Finally, the importance of newspapers rather than following its traditional Western must not be undervalued, as they reported allies. As a matter of fact, Turkey’s objective daily updates and official statements. of curbing Kurdish ambitions for independence contrasts with the priorities of 3. The conflict’s framework the US-led coalition and NATO, which consider the defeat of ISIS as the main 3.1 Turkey’s shifting conduct throughout the Syrian objective in both theaters of war and the conflict alliance with Kurdish groups such as the When the uprisings broke out in Syria in (SDF) and YPG the spring of 2011, several Turkish as a crucial means in attaining this goal. delegations attempted to persuade the Assad regime to cease its brutal repression of the

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6 protests, while Turkey sustained the slowly delivery of Qatari and Saudi arms and forming movement in equipment to radical groups and also . This implies a pronounced desire tolerating the inflow of foreign jihadists and in Turkey’s foreign policy to determine the fighters into Syria through its southern evolution of the Syrian conflict from its borders – in order to advance its regional beginning. ambitions. The manipulation of the Turkey- Later, Ankara started to endorse the Syria border, which served as a gateway for Syrian upheaval more explicitly and some and as a barrier for others1, Erdoğan’s devoted itself to the transformation of the employment of refugees from Syraq as Syrian opposition into the Syrian National “weapons” when he warned the European Council (SNC) in Istanbul in August 2011. Union that Turkey could open its border for In September 2011, it cut all diplomatic ties refugees to enter Europe after members of with the Syrian regime due to Assad’s the European Parliament voted for a increasing military oppression of the Syrian temporary interruption of membership talks opposition. From this point onwards Turkey in 2016 constitute a clear indicator of became fully committed to overthrowing the Erdoğan’s searching of an autonomous Assad regime and establishing a Turkish- strategic position in the geopolitics of the friendly regime in Syria. Its involvement was Middle East (Mortimer, 2016). translated in two lines of approach. First, US-Turkish relations were critical from Ankara deepened its diplomatic efforts to the beginning of the conflict, for the USA end the conflict in Syria, by calling for an declined reiterated calls by Turkey to international intervention in the conflict and enforce no-fly zones in Syria to neutralise the establishment of “safe-zones” in Syria on the regime’s air superiority. Moreover, with behalf of the armed opposition. The the rise of Daesh in the summer of 2014, statements of Turkish officials like Foreign Western interests, particularly those of the Minister Davutoğlu signified that Turkey US, started to clash with Turkish interests in would only act in coordination with the the region. The Global Coalition against international community, an effort that Daesh condemned Turkey for its reluctance would ultimately prove vane due to the to join the fight against Daesh and its lack of blocking of Russia and China towards commitment to supervising its borders to foreign interventions in the conflict. prevent Jihadist fighters from joining the Second, when it emerged that the UN group. The international pressure, coupled was unable to come to a consensus on the with the persistent threat of Daesh Syrian question, Turkey, together with progressing along the Turkish border, finally other countries such as the USA, , prompted Turkey to join the US-led Saudi Arabia and Qatar, started granting coalition against the group in September weapons, training and logistical support to 2014. More tensions between Turkey and the armed opposition in Syria under the the USA stemmed from the fact that the aegis of the allied SNC and the Free Syrian latter was looking for a reliable partner on Army (FSA). the ground to oppose the new threat, and In winter 2013, the heightened influence they found it in the PYD and the YPG. of radical Islamist forces led the USA and When Daesh militants began their of UK to stop providing lethal-equipment the YPG held town of Kobani in the deliveries to the Syrian opposition. At this summer of 2014, Turkish troops effectively point Turkey truly undertook the Neo- sealed the border region around the town, Ottoman Adventurism. Instead of making it impossible for Kurdish forces to complying with its Western allies, who were becoming extremely concerned they were backing the very terrorist organizations 1 In 2014 refugees flowed into Turkey to escape the Caliphate advance into the Kobanî Canton. they were willing to fight against, Turkey Turkish security forces did not allow YPG kept on supporting Islamic extremist militants and other volunteers to go the other way, opposition faction – by facilitating the using teargas and water cannons.

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7 aid the attacked YPG troops. Although instrumentally expanded in order to Ankara eventually let Peshmerga from the eliminate the threat of attacks by the group Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) along Turkey’s southern border, to win back and FSA forces assist in the liberation of the the trust of the international community, town, Turkey’s foreign policy concerning and thereby obtain increased political Kobani unveiled Turkish intentions, namely leverage against the YPG. Assad’s to weaken YPG influence in the region, deposition still remained a major interest instead of supporting the Kurds in their but was relegated to what could be defined fight against Daesh. as a face-saving policy for Turkey. The primary goal of overturning the Ankara’s strengthening of ties with Assad regime in Syria seemed inevitable in Moscow in June 2016 favoured new policy the summer of 2015, as a Turkish, Saudi options for Turkey in Syria that had and Qatari-supported coalition of Islamist previously been denied by the hostile rebel groups was at the point of entering the Russian military presence. On August 26, Latakia province. Nonetheless, the timely 2016, Ankara launched “Operation intervention of Russia in September 2015 Shield” in a bid to create a secure and increased Iranian involvement suddenly corridor from the Turkish border to the made the fall of the regime look unlikely. town of al-Bab and, on top of that, to Considering the reality on the ground, in impede the establishment of a coherent mid-2016 Ankara began to revise its Neo- YPG-controlled area along the Turkish Ottoman Adventurism approach. The border by blocking the connection of the stepping down of then Prime Minister YPG-controlled cantons of Afrin and Davutoğlu and the inauguration of his Kobani. Russia, on the other hand, did not successor Binali Yildirim may be conceived preclude the from as the turning point in Turkish foreign conducting missions in Syrian airspace, policy in Syria. In his first speech in something that had been impossible until parliament on May 24, 2016, Yildirim then. This suggests that there seems to have declared Turkey’s new Realpolitik approach been an implicit agreement between Russia of “More friends, fewer enemies”, directly and Turkey concerning “Operation linked with Turkey’s position, isolated from Euphrates Shield”. both its Western allies and Russia. Turkey’s novel pragmatism also became Turkey’s relations with Assad’s allies – apparent on the diplomatic level. Together Russia and Iran – were already strained in with Russia, Ankara sponsored the Astana the early stages of the conflict. After the Peace Talks. The first meeting between Russian intervention and the downing of a Russia, Iran and Turkey produced a Russian jet by Turkey in November 2015, ceasefire agreement on December 28, 2016, the situation intensified and escalated into a which laid the groundwork for further diplomatic crisis between Moscow and negotiations between the diverse Syrian Ankara. In addition to that, Turkish actions factions. So far, there have been nine in Syria were limited because the Russian rounds of peace talks in the Kazakh capital, military presence precluded Ankara from which resulted in an agreement between directly intervening on the side of the rebels Russia, Iran and Turkey to create de- or from combatting Daesh. Thus, Turkey escalation zones inside Syria. By bringing quickly attempted to normalise relations Russia, Iran, and the Syrian regime to the with Russia and officially apologised for table, Ankara was able to gain a seat at the shooting down the Russian jet. This most advanced peace talks and to exclude rapprochement was followed by a shift of the YPG from negotiations. Ankara’s priorities in Syria. Instead of Concurrently with this, Turkish seeking regime change, Turkey devoted its compliance with its NATO ally, the United efforts to contrasting the YPG along its States, remains ambiguous. On the one border, or at least implementing a strategy hand, Turkey renewed its call for the of containment. The fight against Daesh removal of Assad and pledged to collaborate

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8 fully with the USA in the aftermath of the attacks in the future, Turkish chief of staff Khan Sheikhoun chemical attack and indicated a more ambitious ensuing US cruise-missile bombardment of goal, professing that «the operation will continue a Syrian airbase in early April, 2017. On the until the last terrorist is neutralized in our region». other hand, Turkish officials repeatedly A cautious understanding to minimize asserted that the USA must stop supporting the impact of the operation to the already Kurdish forces and were infuriated by strained relationship with Turkey marked Trump’s decision to arm the YPG as part of the initial reaction of the United States to the effort to take back the Daesh-led city of the operation (ibidem). On January 22, US . In June 2017, Erdoğan stated: «At Defense Secretary recognized one side we will be together in NATO but on the that Turkey had «legitimate security concerns», other side you will act together with terror while Secretary of State organizations... Those so-called friends don’t see any declared that the United States planned to issue walking along with terror organizations who see «what we can do to work together to address want to divide Turkey... All of these moves are Turkey’s legitimate security concerns in a way that’s against NATO... In this case, the NATO treaty satisfactory to Turkey». Nevertheless, both should be revised» (Ensor, 2017). officials also called for “restraint,” with Tillerson emphasizing that Turkey should 3.2 Operation Olive Branch «ensure that its operations are limited in scope and It is against this background that the duration». Significantly, the second part of 2018 Turkish military operation in Afrin their message to Ankara was stressed on needs to be analyzed. On January 20, the January 23 by White House spokesperson (TAF) and the Sarah Huckabee Sanders. Turkish-backed FSA embarked upon a As reported by the Turkish General Staff military campaign designated Operation (2018), on the very first day of OOB, Olive Branch (OOB) across its southern Turkey flew approximately one-fourth of its borders advancing west, north and whole fighter aircraft arsenal. It constitutes northeast into Syrian lands toward the the highest sortie rates and the most Kurdish-controlled , in the intensive operational tempo in Turkey’s Governorate. The offensive followed cross-border military record in the last an announcement by the Pentagon that it decade. In contrast to their Operation would establish a 30.000 border guard in Euphrates Shield, of which it represents northern Syria as part of its strategy to a continuum, OOB has achieved its goals in prevent the resurgence of Daesh. Around a much shorter time than expected, taking half of that force would comprise retrained over the centre of Afrin on March 18 fighters from the SDF, dominated by YPG without harming the facilities or residents. militia (Wintour, 2018). Erdoğan, who The main combat phase ended on March branded Trump’s initiative 24, when Turkish forces and Syrian fighters “unacceptable”5, added: «A country we call an seized the last remaining villages and ally is insisting on forming a terror army on our established full control of the city (Usta, borders. What can that terror army target but 2018). Erdoğan declared that 3,731 Turkey? Our mission is to strangle it before it’s even “terrorists” had been neutralized since the born» (Russia Today, 2018). beginning of the operation as of March 24 Asserting that there had been more than (TRT World, 2018). In the aftermath of the 700 attacks from Afrin in 2017, presidential operation, the Syrian Observatory for spokesperson Ibrahim Kalin justified Human Rights (SOHR) revealed it had Turkish operation under Article 51 of the reliable information that Turkey was UN Charter, referring to “Turkey’s right to carrying on «an orchestrated demographic change» self-defense” (Aliriza, 2018). While Prime to replace Kurds with displaced Minister Yildirim maintained that Turkey’s coming from Eastern – of which the objective in Afrin was to «create a 30-kilometer Syrian regime took control of in April deep security belt» that would prevent similar (Cockburn, 2018).

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Fig.1: The Turkish Intervention in Afrin. The territorial control as of January 25, 2018 Source: http://edmaps.com/Battle_for_Afrin_January_25_2018a.png

Fig. 2: The Turkish Intervention in Afrin. The territorial control as of March 28, 2018 Source: https://www.edmaps.com/html/afrin_-_northwestern_syria_-_m.html

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Ankara sought to achieve a variety of March 28, the Turkish National Security policy objectives with OOB. Council chaired by Erdoğan declared: «The The first aim is domestic. The US support terrorists in should be immediately removed to the PYD generated public pressure at home from the region, otherwise Turkey will not hesitate to for a much harsher Turkish response to take initiative there by itself, as it did in other address the increasingly tangible security areas…We have the same determination concerning the challenges associated with the expansion of terrorists nested on Syrian soil east of the Euphrates» the PYD influence in northern Syria. (Aliriza, 2018). It clearly emerges that Manbij, According to SETA (2018), a think-tank close where a significant portion of the 2,000 U.S. to Erdoğan’s regime, OOB was launched «to Special Forces in Syria is deployed, was to be ensure security and stability in Turkey’s southern Ankara’s next target. This expanded scope border. PKK’s logistical supplies from northern Syria would have raised the chance of to its terrorist activities in Turkey, group’s hundreds of direct confrontation with the US forces harassing attacks from Afrin into Turkish soil, and the located in and around the Manbij region for protection of the territorial integrity of Syria could be the training of and support to the YPG said to precipitate the ground for military operation». (Humud, Blanchard and Nikitin, 2018). By eliminating the threat of the PKK-YPG, Eventually, after months of disagreements Turkey aimed to create a safe zone for local between the United States and Turkey, in populations and restore societal and political mid-May the two NATO allies have reached stability. To this purpose, Özcan, head of the a consensus concerning a roadmap to Turkish Foreign Ministry’s Center for cooperate on security in the area (Sputnik Strategic Research (SAM), argued that, while News, 2018). Turkey stabilization efforts proved fruitful: OOB could not have been successful «Following the defeat of Daesh, it is understood that without Russian assistance, and Erdoğan there is no need for the PKKregarding providing himself praised Russia’s posture: «Afrin will be security in the region» (Daily , 2018). As a dealt with. We discussed this with our Russian matter of fact, US Secretary of Defense friends, we are in agreement» (Aliriza, 2018). Mattis recognized that the Turkish attack First of all, Ankara could have not entered pushed some Kurdish units that had Syria’s airspace, an essential requirement for previously operated with the SDF to move to the unfolding of the operation, without Afrin, indicating that OOB had been helpful consulting Moscow. Furthermore, before for Daesh militants to reorganize their forces shifting Turkish- backed FSA forces to Afrin, (US Department of Defense, 2018). Turkey needed assurances from Russia that The second goal is to enhance Turkey’s Assad would not take advantage of the role as a strong actor in the negotiations over situation and try to seize back Turkish- Syria’s future order where Turkey intends to controlled positions in the province of . limit the territorial ambitions of the Syrian An examination of last year’s evolution Kurds. As of April 2018, Turkey hosts 3.9 displays that the seeds of the coordination million of Syrian refugees (UNCHR, 2018). between Moscow and Ankara regarding The Kurds fear that Ankara plans to displace Afrin, at the expense of the Kurds, were the returnees and engineer what is technically planted last summer in the talks held between known as a coercive engineered migration, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and described by Greenhill (2010) as «those cross- Turkish Chief-of-Staff Hulusi Akar in border population movements that are deliberately Istanbul. During the meeting, Moscow created or manipulated in order to induce political, consented to the partial use of Syria’s airspace military and/or economic concessions from a target by the TAF, paving the way for Turkey’s state or states». In other words: «what Turkey seeks Afrin operation. Moscow’s approval of the to do in Afrin is not eradicate terrorism, but rather to offensive was revealed at the beginning of the engage in » (Rubin, 2018). hostilities, when the Russian Ministry of Finally, Turkey aimed to deter the US, its Defence proclaimed the withdrawal of NATO ally, from backing the PYD. On Russian troops from Afrin (Issaev, 2018). Also, Istituto di Alti Studi in Geopolitica e Scienze Ausiliarie

11 in the brief statement it issued regarding the 4. Conclusions operation on January 20, the Russian One of the lowest points in Turkey-US Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018) solely relations, Operation Olive Branch, carried expressed a duty of “concern” that was out over the protests of the US and with the interpreted as a “green light” to Turkey’s apparent assent of Russia, marks a dicey new military campaign. As a reward for its tacit phase in relations between two NATO allies approval of OOB, Moscow received and poses questions on how long the alliance concessions from Ankara in Idlib. In fact, on can survive such conflicts of interests between the same day Turkey launched its operation, its members. the Syrian regime circulated that it had Strong of its power to influence the Middle caught the opposition-controlled Abu Duhur East scenario, Erdoğan has reached more airport in Idlib without any obstacle. bargaining power with both the USA and Notably, while Trump seems to push for a Russia. From the above-mentioned analysis of withdrawal of US troops from Syria (Ward, Turkey’s foreign policy throughout the Syrian 2018), the leaders of Russia, Turkey and Iran conflict, it becomes evident that Turkey is convened for a summit in Ankara on April 4 interested in exploiting the Arab geo-strategic to discuss the Syrian conundrum, post-Daesh voids and is ready to play a consolidating their influence on the outcome “keeping a foot in both camps” game in order of the conflict and isolating the United States to accommodate its power politics agenda. from the region’s decisive diplomacy Hence, it is no longer unthinkable to assume (Frantzman, 2018). that the Syrian crisis could signify a long-term political shift for Ankara towards closer relations with Russia and Iran, should their goals converge with Turkish national security interests. Overall, Ankara’s recent conduct hints at its willingness to be flexible in its current foreign policy priorities in Syria, due to its reduced policy options. Its present Realpolitik approach may be summarised by Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston’s famous quote: «We have no eternal allies, and we have not perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and Fig. 3: Presidents Hassan Rouhani of Iran, perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow». Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey and of Russia hold a joint news conference after their meeting in Ankara, Turkey April 4, 2018.

Source: Frantzman, S., J. (2018) Fallout from the Turkey- Russia – Iran meeting. The Jerusalem Post (Apr, 6) [Online] Available from: https://www.jpost.com/International/Fall out-from-the-Turkey-Iran-Russia-meeting- 549022 [27/05/2018]

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12 References: § D’Alema, F. (2017) The evolution of Turkey’s Syria Policy. Istituto Affari § Akkoyunlu, K., Nicolaïdis, K. and Öktem, Internazionali 17| 28 [Online] Available K. (2013) The Western Condition: Turkey, the from: US and the EU in the New Middle East. South http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaiw East European Studies at Oxford p1728.pdf [27/05/2018] [Online] Available from: § (2018) Afrin operation https://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/f proved YPG not needed for post-Daesh iles/thewesterncondition.pdf [27/05/201 stability, experts say. (March 30) [Online] 8] Available from: § Aktürk, Ş (2017) Turkey’s role in the Arab https://www.dailysabah.com/war-on- spring and the Syrian conflict. Turkish terror/2018/03/31/afrin-operation- Policy Quarterly, Volume 15 Number 4 proved-ypg-not-needed-for-post- daesh- [Online] Available from: stability-experts-say [27/05/2018] http://turkishpolicy.com/files/articlepdf/ § Ensor, J. (2017) Turkey's Erdogan calls for turkeys-role-in-the-arab-spring-and-the- review of Nato over US arming of Kurds syrian-conflict_en_4321.pdf fighting Isil in Syria The Telegraph (June, [27/05/2018] 26) [Online] Available from: § Aliriza, B. (2018) Understanding Turkey’s http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/ Afrin Operation. Centre for Strategic & 06/26/turkeys-erdogan-calls-review-- International Studies (Jan 25) [Online] us-arming-kurds-fighting- Available from: isil/ [27/05/2018] https://www.csis.org/analysis/understan § Frantzman, S., J. (2018) Fallout from the ding-turkeys-afrin-operation Turkey-Russia-Iran meeting. The Jerusalem [27/05/2018] Post (Apr, 6) [Online] Available § Brzezinski, Z. (1997) The Grand Chessboard: from: https://www.jpost.com/Internation American Primacy and Its Geostrategic al/Fallout-from-the-Turkey-Iran-Russia- Imperatives. New York: Basic Books meeting-549022 [27/05/2018] § Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law § Greenhill, K., M. (2010) Weapons of Mass (2018) Turkey’s Eastern Pivot: A Challenge for Migration. Forced Displacement Coercion and NATO and a Threat to US National Security Foreign Policy. Ithaca: Cornell University [Online] Available from: Press. https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/75 § Humud, C., E., Blanchard, C. M., 39-turkey-nato-1192018 [27/05/2018] Nikitin, M. B. D. (2018) Armed Conflict § CIDOB (2011) CIDOB International Yearbook in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response. 2011. Country Profile: Turkey. 07/2011 Congressional Research Service, Feb. 27 [Online] Available from: [Online] Available from: § https://www.cidob.org/en/media2/publi https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL3348 cacions/anuario_cidob/2011/anuario_ci 7.pdf [27/05/2018] dob_2011_english/foreign_policy_of_the § Issaev, L. (2018)Why is Russia helpin _turkish_republic [27/05/2018] g Turkey in Afrin? (Jan 29) § Cockburn, P. (2018) who suffered [Online] Available from: under Isis face forced conversion to Islam https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opin amid fresh persecution in Afrin. The ion/russia-helping-turkey-afrin- Independent (April, 18) [Online] Available 180125122718953.html#http://tass.ru/a from: rmiya-i-%20opk/4889273 [27/05/2018] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/w § Kasapoğlu, C., Ülgen, S. (2018) orld/middle-east/syria-yazidis-isis-islam- Operation Olive Branch: A Political – conversion-afrin-persecution-kurdish- Military Assessment. Centre for Economics a8310696.html [27/05/2018] and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) [Online] Available from: http://edam.org.tr/wp-

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13 content/uploads/2018/01/Operation- middleeast/201805261064833187-turkey- Olive-Branch-01.pdf [27/05/2018] us-manbij-roadmap/ [27/05/2018] § Manhoff, T. (2017) Turkey’s Foreign § Taşpinar, O. (2012) Turkey’s Strategic Policy Toward Syria. From Neo-Ottoman Vision and Syria. The Washington Quarterly, Adventurism to Neo-Ottoman Realpolitik. Vol. 35 [Online] Available from: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and al-Nahrain Center https://www.brookings.edu/wp- [Online] Available from: content/uploads/2016/06/turkey- http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_51193- taspinar.pdf [27/05/2018] 544-1- § The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 30.pdf?171221182017 [27/05/2018] Russian Federation (2018) Comment by the § Mortimer, C. (2016) President Erdogan: I Information and Press Department on Turkey’s will open gates for migrants to enter use of armed forces in the northwest of Syria Europe if EU blocks membership talks. [Online] Available from: The Independent (Nov, 25) [Online] http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/n Available from: ews/- https://www.independent.co.uk/news/w /asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/conten orld/europe/president-erdogan-turkey- t/id/3026297 [27/05/2018] eu-membership-migrants-refugees-europe- § TRT World (2018) Turkey’s Afrin warning-a7438316.html [27/05/2018] Operation: the latest updates. Available § Okyay, A., S. (2017) Turkey’s post-2011 from:https://www.trtworld.com/mea/tur approach to its Syrian border and key-s-afrin-operation- the-latest-updates- implications for domestic politics. 14443 [27/05/2018] International Affairs 93:4 [Online] Available § UNHCR (2018) Operational Portal. from: Syrian Regional Refugee Response. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/file Turkey [Online] Available from: s/chathamhouse/publications/ia/INTA9 https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/sy 3_4_04_Okya yOA.pdf [27/05/2018] ria/location/113 [27/05/2018] § Rubin, M. (2018) In Afrin, Turkey seeks § US Department of Defense (2018) On the ethnic cleansing, not terror eradication. Record Press Gaggle by Secretary James N. Washington Examiner (Jan, 26) [Onine] Mattis. (Feb. 11) [Online] Available from: Available from: https://dod.defense.gov/News/Transcrip https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/i ts/Transcript-View/Article/1438483/on- n-afrin-turkey-seeks-ethnic-cleansing-not- the-record-press-gaggle-by-secretary- terror-eradication [27/05/2018] %20james-n-mattis/ [27/05/2018] § Russia Today (2018) ‘Unacceptable’: § Usta, B. (2018) Turkey takes full control of Turkey slams US-led coalition’s new Syria Syria's Afrin: military source. ‘border force’ using Kurdish militias (Jan, (March 24) [Online] Available from: 14) [Online] Available from: https://reut.rs/2GoemY8 [27/05/2018] https://www.rt.com/news/415884-us- § Ward, A. (2018) Trump’s big sdf-border-force/ [27/05/2018] (non)decision on US troops in Syria, § SETA (2018) Operation Olive Branch: explained. Vox (Apr, 4) [Online] Available Military and Strategic Dimensions from:https://www.vox.com/2018/4/4/1 [Online] Available from: 7192656/trump-syria-troop-withdrawal https://www.setav.org/en/events/panel- [27/05/2018] operation-olive-branch-military-and- § Wintour, P. (2018) Erdoğan accuses US of strategic-dimensions/ [27/05/2018] planning to form 'terror army' in Syria. § Sputnik News (2018) Turkey, US Agree The Guardian (Jan, 15) [Online] Available on Roadmap for Cooperation in Syria’s from:https://www.theguardian.com/worl Manbij (May, 26) [Online] d/2018/jan/15/turkey-condemns-us- Available from:https://sputniknews.com/ plan-for-syrian-border-security-force [27/05/2018]