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Astana Process in Context with Iranian, Russian and Turkish Foreign Policies on Syrian Complexity

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ASTANA PROCESS IN CONTEXT WITH IRANIAN, RUSSIAN AND TURKISH FOREIGN POLICIES ON SYRIAN COMPLEXITY A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES OF MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY BY MEHMET İLBEY ÇOBAN IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SEPTEMBER 2020 Approval of the thesis: ASTANA PROCESS IN CONTEXT WITH IRANIAN, RUSSIAN AND TURKISH FOREIGN POLICIES ON SYRIAN COMPLEXITY submitted by MEHMET İLBEY ÇOBAN in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in International Relations, the Graduate School of Social Sciences of Middle East Technical University by, Prof. Dr. Yaşar KONDAKÇI Dean Graduate School of Social Sciences Prof. Dr. Oktay TANRISEVER Head of Department International Relations Prof. Dr. Hüseyin BAĞCI Supervisor International Relations Examining Committee Members: Prof. Dr. İhsan DAĞI (Head of the Examining Committee) Middle East Technical University International Relations Prof. Dr. Hüseyin BAĞCI (Supervisor) Middle East Technical University International Relations Assist. Prof. Dr. Bayram SİNKAYA Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University International Relations ii PLAGIARISM I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work. Name, Last name : Mehmet İlbey Çoban Signature : iii ABSTRACT ASTANA PROCESS IN CONTEXT WITH IRANIAN, RUSSIAN AND TURKISH FOREIGN POLICIES ON SYRIAN COMPLEXITY Çoban, Mehmet İlbey MSc., Department of International Relations Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı September 2020, 163 pages This thesis is based on explaining the dynamics that led the Iran, Russia and Turkey to initiate Astana Process within the framework of the Syrian Civil War’s changing dynamics. The theoretical part intends to combine neorealism with the “complexity” paradigm. Neorealism’s linear ontology is problematic in explaining the changing dynamics. The complexity paradigm explains non-linear processes derived from its ontological foundation. Especially the variety and diversity of actors, their interconnection, interdependence, and adaptation to the situation can be a solution against the reductionism of this phenomenon. Actors in the Syrian crisis are very diverse, and it can be observed that actors like ISIS can profoundly affect the policies in this process, and the Syrian issue can affect varied actors’ security and foreign policies that are also based on power competition. At the same time, it can be seen iv that with the emergence of ISIS and Russian activism in the Syrian complexity, especially her intervention in Syria as well as other actors’ policies on this complexity, the regional and global powers have also co-adapted their policies on the changing dynamics. In order to comprehend this process, the Complex Adaptive System model was improved to apply in the changing dynamics in Syria and actors’ positions as well as interconnected interactions involved in the area. This co- adaptation also derives from the intertwined causalities in the complexity which is between the order and disorder. The Astana process is also an expression of this co- adaptation in Iranian, Russian and Turkish policies in Syrian Complexity. Keywords: Astana Process, Iranian Foreign Policy, Russian Foreign Policy, Turkish Foreign Policy, Syrian Complexity v ÖZ SURİYE KARMAŞIKLIĞINDA İRAN, RUS VE TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKALARI BAĞLAMINDA ASTANA SÜRECİ Mehmet İlbey Çoban Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı Eylül 2020, 163 sayfa Bu tezdeki asıl soru Astana sürecinin tanımlanması ve garantör ülkelerin Suriye iç savaşının değişen dinamikleri çerçevesinde böyle bir süreci başlatmasına neden olan dinamikleri açıklamaya dayanmaktadır. Teorik kısım, neorealizmi hem doğa bilimlerinde hem de Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplininde yeni yeni kullanılan “karmaşıklık” paradigmasıyla birleştirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Teorik kapsamda savunulacak durum, doğrusal bir ontoloji izlerken neorealizm devletlerin dış politikalarındaki değişen dinamikleri açıklamakta sorun yaşayabileceği yönündedir. Karmaşıklık paradigması, ontolojik temelinden kaynaklan doğrusal olmayan süreçleri açıklar. Özellikle aktörlerin çeşitliliği ve çeşitliliği, aralarındaki bağlantı, karşılıklı bağımlılık ve değişen çevreye uyumun bu fenomenin indiregenmesine karşı bir çözüm olabileceği öne sürülecektir. Nitekim Suriye krizindeki aktörler çok vi çeşitlidir ve IŞİD gibi aktörlerin bu süreçteki politikaları derinden etkileyebildiği ve Suriye meselesinin devletlerin güvenliği ve aynı zamanda güç rekabetine dayalı dış politikalarındaki değişikliğin birçok aktörü de etkileyebileceği görülebilir.Bununla birlikte, Suriye karmaşıklığında IŞİD’in ortaya çıkması ve özellikle Suriye’ye müdahalesi ile birlikte Rus aktivizminin yanı sıra diğer aktörlerin bu karmaşıklığa ilişkin politikalarının bölgesel ve küresel güçlerin de değişen dinamikler karşısında değişen dinemikler karşısında etkileşimli olarak politikalarını uyarladıkları görülebilir. Bu süreci anlamak için, Karmaşık Uyarlamalı Sistem (CAS) modeli, Suriye’deki değişen dinamiklere ve aktörlerin pozisyonlarına ve bölgedeki birbiriyle bağlantılı etkileşimlere uygulanacak şekilde geliştirilmiştir. Bu birlikte adaptasyon, aynı zamanda, düzen ve düzensizlik arasındaki karmaşıklıktaki iç içe geçmiş nedenselliklerden de kaynaklanır. Astana süreci de Suriye Karmaşıklığında İran, Rus ve Türk dış politikalarında bu eşgüdümlü karmaşık uyarlamanın bir dışavurumudur. Anahtar Kelimeler: Astana Süreci, İran Dış Politikası, Rus Dış Politikası, Türk Dış Politikası, Suriye Karmaşıklığı vii DEDICATION In memory of my father Alparslan Çoban viii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This thesis is an output of much valuable advice, guidance, and support from many individuals. I would like to express my deepest gratitude and respect to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı, for his academic guidance and valuable advice. Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı offered me new aspects of world politics and enriched my academic vision. It is impossible not to learn new things if you are his student. I believe, the books and articles he (flying professor) recommends, the guidance he offers that how to be an excellent academic will nurture me as a good academic in the future. Without his support, motivation, and encouragement, it would not have been possible to study this thesis. Through my academic career, it is an honor to be his student. I am much thankful to Prof. Dr. Taşansu Türker and Asst. Prof. Dr. Bayram Sinkaya, for their guidance and contributions that enabled me to progress in the initial phase of this research. I owe great appreciation to Dr. Şuay Nilhan Açıkalın for her support and guidance on the complexity paradigm. Without her direction, the theoretical aspect of this research would not be satisfying. I would also like to express my appreciation to the distinguished members of my thesis committee, Prof. Dr. İhsan Dağı, and Asst. Prof. Dr. Bayram Sinkaya for their valuable comments, contributions, encouragement, patience, and advice for future researches. ix I would like to mention my mother Nilgün Çalışkan’s motivational support as well as Dilek Demirhan’s patience and moral support throughout my academic career in almost every step since 2017. I am also grateful to my research assistant colleagues and friends Çağrı Sürek, Yusuf Fidan, and Onur Çöpoğlu for their motivation and help during the research process. And I owe thanks to Tekin Baykız for overcoming technical difficulties. Last but not least, considering the learning process is an endless journey, I would like to mention the contributions of “Mülkiye” as a stop for this journey. I am also profoundly grateful for METU for the enormous enrichment of my academic skills and horizon in which the journey would never end. x TABLE OF CONTENTS PLAGIARISM .......................................................................................................... iii ABSTRACT .............................................................................................................. iv ÖZ ............................................................................................................................. vi DEDICATION ........................................................................................................ viii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS......................................................................................... ix TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... xi LIST OF FIGURES................................................................................................. xiv LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................. xv CHAPTERS 1. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................. 1 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: POWER COMPETITION IN THE SYRIAN COMPLEXITY .......................................................................................................... 8 2.1.Neorealism ...................................................................................................... 10 2.2.Ontological Shift: Complexity ....................................................................... 15 2.3.Varied and Diversified Actors in the Syrian
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