Olive Branch Raport
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Syrian Arab Republic
Syrian Arab Republic News Focus: Syria https://news.un.org/en/focus/syria Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria (OSES) https://specialenvoysyria.unmissions.org/ Syrian Civil Society Voices: A Critical Part of the Political Process (In: Politically Speaking, 29 June 2021): https://bit.ly/3dYGqko Syria: a 10-year crisis in 10 figures (OCHA, 12 March 2021): https://www.unocha.org/story/syria-10-year-crisis-10-figures Secretary-General announces appointments to Independent Senior Advisory Panel on Syria Humanitarian Deconfliction System (SG/SM/20548, 21 January 2021): https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sgsm20548.doc.htm Secretary-General establishes board to investigate events in North-West Syria since signing of Russian Federation-Turkey Memorandum on Idlib (SG/SM/19685, 1 August 2019): https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sgsm19685.doc.htm Supporting the future of Syria and the region - Brussels V Conference, 29-30 March 2021 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-ministerial-meetings/2021/03/29-30/ Supporting the future of Syria and the region - Brussels IV Conference, 30 June 2020: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-ministerial-meetings/2020/06/30/ Third Brussels conference “Supporting the future of Syria and the region”, 12-14 March 2019: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-ministerial-meetings/2019/03/12-14/ Second Brussels Conference "Supporting the future of Syria and the region", 24-25 April 2018: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-ministerial-meetings/2018/04/24-25/ -
Health Cluster Bulletin
HEALTH CLUSTER BULLETIN April 2020 Fig.: Disinfection of an IDP camp as a preventive measure to ongoing COVID-19 Turkey Cross Border Pandemic Crisis (Source: UOSSM newsletter April 2020) Emergency type: complex emergency Reporting period: 01.04.2020 to30.04.2020 12 MILLION* 2.8 MILLION 3.7 MILLION 13**ATTACKS PEOPLE IN NEED OF HEALTH PIN IN SYRIAN REFUGGES AGAINST HEALTH CARE HEALTH ASSISTANCE NWS HNO 2020 IN TURKEY (**JAN - APR 2020) (A* figures are for the Whole of Syria HNO 2020 (All figures are for the Whole of Syria) HIGHLIGHTS • During April, 135,000 people who were displaced 129 HEALTH CLUSTER MEMBERS since December went back to areas in Idleb and 38 IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS REPORTING 1 western Aleppo governorates from which they MEDICINES DELIVERED TREATMENT COURSES FOR COMMON were displaced. This includes some 114,000 people 281,310 DISEASES who returned to their areas of origin and some FUNCTIONAL HEALTH FACILITIES HERAMS 21,000 IDPs who returned to their areas of origin, FUNCTIONING FIXED PRIMARY HEALTH forcing partners to re-establish health services in 141 CARE FACILITIES some cases with limited human resources. 59 FUNCTIONING HOSPITALS • World Health Day (7 April 2020) was the day to 72 MOBILE CLINICS celebrate the work of nurses and midwives and HEALTH SERVICES2 remind world leaders of the critical role they play 750,416 CONSULTATIONS in keeping the world healthy. Nurses and other DELIVERIES ASSISTED BY A SKILLED health workers are at the forefront of COVID-19 10,127 ATTENDANT response - providing high quality, respectful 8,530 REFERRALS treatment and care. Quite simply, without nurses, 822,930 MEDICAL PROCEDURES there would be no response. -
Turkey's Strategic Reasoning Behind Operation Olive Branch
NO: 34 PERSPECTIVE JANUARY 2018 Turkey’s Strategic Reasoning behind Operation Olive Branch MURAT YEŞİLTAŞ • What is the strategic reasoning behind Turkey’s military operation against the PKK in the Afrin region? • What does Turkey’s game plan mean for the region? • What are the implications of Turkey’s military operation for the future of the Turkey-U.S.-Russia triangle? Following Operation Euphrates Shield (OES), Tur- has been designated as a terrorist organization by key added a new dimension to its ongoing military NATO, the EU and the U.S., the YPG controls 65% activity in Syria in order to curb the PKK’s influence of the Turkey-Syria border and uses its position to at- in northern Syria and to “de-territorialize” it in the tack Turkey. More importantly, the YPG is playing a medium term in the rest of the Syrian territory. With vital role in the PKK’s ongoing terrorist attacks inside the advent of the Afrin operation, Turkey’s military Turkey.1 It is also well-known that the YPG is tactical- activity has spread to a wider geographical area in the ly used by the PKK as an integral part of its irregular western bank of the Euphrates. The operation, which warfare strategy both in terms of manpower and mili- had been in the preparation phase for a long time, tary equipment in the fight against the Turkish Armed started on October 20 with the offensive phase, Forces in the southeastern part of Turkey.2 Therefore, shortly after President Erdoğan’s statement with first and foremost, Operation Olive Branch (OOB) is strong references to the UNSC’s decisions with re- an integral part of Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy, gards to war on terror and the ‘self-defense’ element which Turkish security forces have adopted against in Article 51 of the UN Charter. -
Health Cluster Bulletin, May 2018 Pdf, 1.17Mb
HEALTH CLUSTER BULLETIN Gaziantep, May 2018 A man inspects a damaged hospital after air strikes in Eastern Ghouta. Source: SRD Turkey Cross Border Emergency type: complex emergency Reporting period: 01.05.2018 to 31.05.2018 11.3 MILLION 6.6 MILLION 3.58 MILLION 111 ATTACKS IN NEED OF INTERNALLY SYRIAN REFUGEES AGAINST HEALTH CARE HEALTH ASSISTANCE DISPLACED IN TURKEY (JAN-MAY 2018) (All figures are for the Whole of Syria) HIGHLIGHTS HEALTH CLUSTER Mentor Initiative treated 33,000 cases of 96 HEALTH PARTNERS & OBSERVERS Cutaneous Leishmaniasis and 52 cases of 1 Visceral Leishmaniasis in 2017 through 135 MEDICINES DELIVERED health facilities throughout Syria. TREATMENT COURSES FOR COMMON 369,170 DISEASES The Health Cluster’s main finds from multi- FUNCTIONAL HEALTH FACILITIES sectoral Rapid Needs Assessment which FUNCTIONING FIXED PRIMARY covered 180 communities (out of 220) from 166 HEALTH CARE FACILITIES seven sub-districts in Afrin from 3 to 8 May indicates limited availability of health facilities 82 FUNCTIONING HOSPITALS and medical staff, lack of transportation and 70 MOBILE CLINICS the lack of medicines and specialized services. HEALTH SERVICES The medical referral mechanism implemented 1 M CONSULTATIONS in Idleb governorate includes 48 facilities and 10,210 DELIVERIES ASSISTED BY A SKILLED 14 NGO partners that will be fully operational ATTENDANT as a network by end of August. The network, 8,342 REFERRALS which also includes 9 secondary health care VACCINATION facilities, in total serves a catchment 2 population of 920,000 people. In May 2018, 29,646 CHILDREN AGED ˂5 VACCINATED these facilities produced 1,469 referrals. DISEASE SURVEILLANCE In northern Syria as of end of May, there are 495 SENTINEL SITES REPORTING OUT OF 77 health facilities that are providing MHPSS A TOTAL OF 500 services, including the active mhGAP doctors FUNDING $US3 who are providing mental health 63 RECEIVED 14.3% 85.7% GAP consultations. -
The Turkish War on Afrin Jeopardizes Progress Made Since the Liberation of Raqqa April 2018
Viewpoints No. 125 The Turkish War on Afrin Jeopardizes Progress Made Since the Liberation of Raqqa April 2018 Amy Austin Holmes Middle East Fellow Wilson Center Turkey’s assault on Afrin represents a three-fold threat to the civilian population, the model of local self-governance, and the campaign to defeat the Islamic State. None of this is in the interest of the United States. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ The Turkish operation in Afrin is not just another battle in a small corner of Syria, but represents a new stage in the Syrian civil war and anti-ISIS campaign. President Erdoğan’s two-month battle to capture Afrin signals that Turkey will no longer act through proxies, but is willing to intervene directly on Syrian territory to crush the Kurdish YPG forces and the experiment in self-rule they are defending.i Emboldened after claiming victory in Afrin, and enabled by Russia, Erdoğan is threatening further incursions into Syria and Iraq. Erdoğan has demanded that American troops withdraw from Manbij, so that he can attack the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) who are stationed in the area, and who have been our most reliable partners in the anti-ISIS coalition. If Erdoğan is not deterred, much of the progress made since the liberation of Raqqa could be in jeopardy. The Afrin intervention has already displaced at least 150,000 people. Many of them are Kurds, Yezidis, or Christians who established local government councils in the absence of the regime over the past five years. Even if imperfect, the self-administration is an embryonic form of democracy that includes women and minorities while promoting religious tolerance and linguistic diversity. -
Syrie : Situation De La Population Yézidie Dans La Région D'afrin
Syrie : situation de la population yézidie dans la région d’Afrin Recherche rapide de l’analyse-pays Berne, le 9 mai 2018 Impressum Editeur Organisation suisse d’aide aux réfugiés OSAR Case postale, 3001 Berne Tél. 031 370 75 75 Fax 031 370 75 00 E-mail: [email protected] Internet: www.osar.ch CCP dons: 10-10000-5 Versions Allemand et français COPYRIGHT © 2018 Organisation suisse d’aide aux réfugiés OSAR, Berne Copies et impressions autorisées sous réserve de la mention de la source. 1 Introduction Le présent document a été rédigé par l’analyse-pays de l’Organisation suisse d’aide aux ré- fugiés (OSAR) à la suite d’une demande qui lui a été adressée. Il se penche sur la question suivante : 1. Quelle est la situation actuelle des Yézidi-e-s dans la région d’Afrin ? Pour répondre à cette question, l’analyse-pays de l’OSAR s’est fondée sur des sources ac- cessibles publiquement et disponibles dans les délais impartis (recherche rapide) ainsi que sur des renseignements d’expert-e-s. 2 Situation de la population yézidie dans la région d’Afrin De 20’000 à 30’000 Yézidi-e-s dans la région d'Afrin. Selon un rapport encore à paraître de la Société pour les peuples menacés (SPM, 2018), quelque 20 000 à 30 000 Yézidis vivent dans la région d'Afrin. Depuis mars 2018, Afrin placée sous le contrôle de la Turquie et des groupes armés alliés à la Turquie. Le 20 janvier 2018, la Turquie a lancé une offensive militaire pour prendre le contrôle du district d'Afrin dans la province d'Alep. -
Turkish Incursion Into Syria: U.S
INSIGHTi Turkish Incursion into Syria: U.S. Policy Implications October 11, 2019 On October 9, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced the start of “Operation Peace Spring,” which he stated would target both Kurdish and Islamic State (IS, aka ISIL/ISIS) fighters in northern Syria. Turkey then launched an air and ground assault against Kurdish forces. Turkey’s foreign minister has stated that Turkish forces plan to go 18 miles into Syrian territory, and eventually to occupy a corridor along the border. The commander of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) had stated that the SDF would resist, and fighting has escalated. The launch of the operation followed an October 6 call between President Donald Trump and Erdogan, after which the White House announced that Turkey would “soon be moving forward with its long- planned operation into Northern Syria,” and that U.S. forces would “no longer be in the immediate area.” Some Members of Congress then argued that a “precipitous withdrawal” of U.S. forces would benefit Russia, Iran, the Islamic State, and the Syrian regime. State Department and Pentagon officials subsequently emphasized that roughly 50 U.S. Special Forces personnel had been withdrawn from two outposts to “more secure areas,” and that the move did not signal a pullout of U.S. troops from Syria. On October 8, President Trump tweeted, “We may be in the process of leaving Syria, but in no way have we Abandoned the Kurds.” He warned that if Turkey took any unspecified steps that he considered “off-limits,” he would “totally destroy and obliterate” Turkey’s economy, while also inviting Erdogan to Washington in mid-November. -
Operation Euphrates Shield: Implementation and Lessons Learned Lessons and Implementation Shield: Euphrates Operation
REPORT REPORT OPERATION EUPHRATES SHIELD: IMPLEMENTATION OPERATION AND LESSONS LEARNED EUPHRATES MURAT YEŞILTAŞ, MERVE SEREN, NECDET ÖZÇELIK The report presents a one-year assessment of the Operation Eu- SHIELD phrates Shield (OES) launched on August 24, 2016 and concluded on March 31, 2017 and examines Turkey’s future road map against the backdrop of the developments in Syria. IMPLEMENTATION AND In the first section, the report analyzes the security environment that paved the way for OES. In the second section, it scrutinizes the mili- tary and tactical dimensions and the course of the operation, while LESSONS LEARNED in the third section, it concentrates on Turkey’s efforts to establish stability in the territories cleansed of DAESH during and after OES. In the fourth section, the report investigates military and political MURAT YEŞILTAŞ, MERVE SEREN, NECDET ÖZÇELIK lessons that can be learned from OES, while in the fifth section, it draws attention to challenges to Turkey’s strategic preferences and alternatives - particularly in the north of Syria - by concentrating on the course of events after OES. OPERATION EUPHRATES SHIELD: IMPLEMENTATION AND LESSONS LEARNED LESSONS AND IMPLEMENTATION SHIELD: EUPHRATES OPERATION ANKARA • ISTANBUL • WASHINGTON D.C. • KAHIRE OPERATION EUPHRATES SHIELD IMPLEMENTATION AND LESSONS LEARNED COPYRIGHT © 2017 by SETA All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, without permission in writing from the publishers. SETA Publications 97 ISBN: 978-975-2459-39-7 Layout: Erkan Söğüt Print: Turkuvaz Haberleşme ve Yayıncılık A.Ş., İstanbul SETA | FOUNDATION FOR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH Nenehatun Caddesi No: 66 GOP Çankaya 06700 Ankara TURKEY Tel: +90 312.551 21 00 | Fax :+90 312.551 21 90 www.setav.org | [email protected] | @setavakfi SETA | İstanbul Defterdar Mh. -
Operation Olive Branch: a Political – Military Assessment Dr
Foreign Policy & Security 2018/2 January 2018 Operation Olive Branch: A Political – Military Assessment Dr. Can Kasapoğlu | EDAM Defense Analyst Sinan Ülgen | EDAM Chairman Foreign Policy & Security 2018/2 Operation Olive Branch: A Political – Military Assessment Dr. Can Kasapoğlu | EDAM Defense Analyst Sinan Ülgen | EDAM Chairman Executive Summary Operation Olive Branch’s air campaign, especially at the already declared objective of clearing the entire Afrin its outset, marked the highest sortie– rates and the most province from PKK terrorist organization’s offshoots, then intensive operational tempo in Turkey’s cross–border mili- the second ground phase has to take place in the form tary record in the last decade. As reported by the Turkish of urban warfare. Considering the al–Bab offensive during General Staff, on the very first day of the intervention, the the Euphrates Shield, Turkish military planners should at- air force assigned 72 combat aircraft which is tantamount tach utmost importance to tunnel and trench complexes, to roughly 25% of the total F–16 variants and the F–4 2020s improvised explosive devices, and anti–tank guided mis- in the inventory.1 At the time of writing, about %10 of the siles (ATGMs). fighter arsenal have been flying combat missions over -Af rin. Despite the pilot–to–cockpit ratio problems, so far, the An alternative option to fighting a risky urban warfare Turkish Air Force is performing decisively. is to lay siege on Afrin’s town center, and force the YPG mil- itants to the leave. Although siege warfare is legal in terms The underlying reason of the abovementioned heavy of the law of armed conflict, such a risk–aversive concept bombardment strategy is to gain rapid dominance for the could only succeed when coupled with very effective infor- follow–on land operations. -
People from Afrin District Are Estimated to Have Been Displaced by Escalating Violence Since 20 January 2018 and by the Shift In
AFRIN DISPLACEMENT Facts and Figures Last updated: 18 April 2018 Overview: 1 137,070 people from Afrin district are estimated to 150,000 have been displaced by escalating violence since 20 January 2018 people are and by the shift in control on 18 March 2018 estimated to remain in Afrin 90,250 30,000 15,000 district, including 50,000 in Afrin city. in Tall Refaat in Nabul & Zahraa in Kafr Naseh and Fafin IDP registration is progressing slowly, and all IDP numbers remain estimates. There is limited information on the humanitarian situation inside Afrin district. Key Concerns: FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IS SEVERELY RESTRICTED. IDPs are currently not permitted to move to Aleppo city or to return to Afrin district. Some 2,000 IDPs were stuck for nine days at the crossing point between Burj Elqas and Kimar when trying to return to Afrin district. LACK OF ACCESS: The UN currently do not have access to Afrin district, and whilst some local partners are present in the district, they sometimes face movement restrictions at checkpoints. LACK OF FUNDING: The UN and partners in Syria require at least $73m to continue responding with life-saving assistance and protection services to those displaced from Afrin district. Additional funding is required for the response from Gaziantep. Humanitarian Assistance: The UN and partners are scaling-up the response to those affected by the Afrin crisis. [selected highlights as of 16 April] A total of 28,350 ready-to-eat food rations, 3,000 canned food parcels, 5,000 food FOOD rations, 31,200 litres of milk, and hot meals were provided to 20,000 people in the IDP sites. -
Whole-Of-Syria DONOR UPDATE: January-June 2019 5 1
Whole-of-Syria DONOR UPDATE January - June 2019 A WHO staff member greets a mother and her child outside the Paediatric Hospital in Damascus. Credit: WHO CONTENT 04 FOREWORD 06 1. OVERVIEW 10 2. GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS OF FOCUS 10 North-west Syria 13 North-east Syria 18 Al-Hol camp 20 South-west Syria 21 Rukban settlement 22 3. SHIFTING TO A HEALTH RESPONSE BASED ON THE SEVERITY SCALE 25 4. ATTACKS ON HEALTH CARE 25 Background 25 Attacks on health care from a global perspective 26 Attacks in Syria in 2019 28 The consequences of attacks on health care 29 Impact of attacks on health care delivery in Syria 32 5. ACTIVITIES JANUARY-JUNE 2019 32 Trauma care 33 Secondary health care and referral 35 Primary health care 38 Immunization and polio eradication 38 Mental health and psychosocial support WHO Country Office (Damascus – Syrian Arab Republic) 40 Health information Dr Ni’ma Abid, WHO Representative a.i 41 Health sector coordination [email protected] 42 Nutrition 43 Water, sanitation and hygiene 43 Working with partners WHO Country Office (Damascus – Syrian Arab Republic) Noha Alarabi, Donor Relations 6. MAIN DISEASES OF CONCERN [email protected] 45 45 Measles WHO Headquarters (Geneva, Switzerland) 46 Polio Laila Milad, Manager, Resource Mobilization 47 Cutaneous leishmaniasis [email protected] 47 Tuberculosis 49 7. WHOLE-OF-SYRIA INTERNAL COORDINATION © World Health Organization 2019 8. FUNDS RECEIVED AS OF END JUNE 2019 Some rights reserved. This work is available under the Creative Commons Attribution- 49 NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 IGO licence (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO; https://creativecommons. -
2019 Gsm Draft Report
MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST SPECIAL GROUP (GSM) THE SITUATION IN SYRIA: AN UPDATE Draft Report by Ahmet Berat ÇONKAR (Turkey) Rapporteur 040 GSM 19 E rev. 1 | Original: English | 4 April 2019 Until this document has been adopted by the Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group, it only represents the views of the Rapporteur. 040 GSM 19 E TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION: A SIGNIFICANTLY ALTERED BATTLEFIELD .......................... 1 II. THE CURRENT DIPLOMATIC CRISIS OVER SYRIA ............................................ 4 III. RUSSIA’S APPROACH TO SYRIA ......................................................................... 6 IV. IRAN’S ROLE AND AMBITIONS IN SYRIA ............................................................ 8 V. THE VIEW FROM ANKARA .................................................................................... 9 VI. THE VIEW FROM ISRAEL .................................................................................... 12 BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................... 14 040 GSM 19 E I. INTRODUCTION: A SIGNIFICANTLY ALTERED BATTLEFIELD 1. The tragic and bloody civil war in Syria has, since its inception, exposed many of the fundamental fault lines dividing that region and threatening its stability. Those fault lines, moreover, have global implications as well, and, in some respects, mirror rivalries that are shaping contemporary international politics. Precisely for that reason, it would not be accurate to characterise this conflict simply as a civil war. Rather, it has become something of a “great game” in which both regional and external powers as well as non-state actors hold high stakes and conflicting interests. 2. But it is a great game that has also had terrible humanitarian consequences which have spilt into the neighbouring countries, broader region and beyond to Europe. A horrific refugee crisis that has compelled millions to flee their homes is the most obvious expression of the transnational humanitarian consequences of this war.