The Turkey-Russia Rift Heralds an Autonomous Kurdistan in Syria

Mustafa Gurbuz April 5, 2017 The Turkey-Russia Rift Heralds an Autonomous Kurdistan in Syria Mustafa Gurbuz

Turkey effectively ended its military operation Moscow’s strategy of backing the YPG against in Syria, Operation Euphrates Shield, soon after Ankara has capably undermined Turkey’s Russia reached an agreement with the Syrian military operations in Syria. Kurds. Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan withdrew his earlier plan to push the As both the United States and Russia appear Turkish military forward to the Manbij and sympathetic to some form of Kurdish autonomy Afrin cantons, following the successful in northern Syria, it is important to analyze how operations in al-Bab. The decision to withdraw autonomous Kurdish cantons would look like. was inevitable indeed because Ankara’s options The current reality on the ground suggests that became too narrow, as both the United States (1) the Kurdish cantons in the eastern and Russia took steps to back the People’s Euphrates—namely Jazira and Kobani—would Protection Units (YPG), an affiliate of the enjoy more domestic autonomy compared to Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The US ones in the western Euphrates, i.e., Afrin military deployed its forces in Manbij to deter Canton and the Shahba region; and, (2) Turkish attacks on the YPG; and when Turkey Washington’s strategic decisions, such as began to shell Kurdish forces in the Afrin conditions for US arming of the YPG and region, Russia followed a similar strategy. On measures to define future management of oil March 20, Moscow announced that it was fields that are captured from the Islamic State, setting up a military area in YPG-held Afrin to will be decisive in shaping the characteristics of ensure the durability of the cease-fire, agreed to Kurdish autonomy. in the Astana talks, between the YPG and the Turkey-backed Free Syrian Army. The move Russia Plays a Balancing Act between Turkey angered Ankara because it boxed Turkish forces and the YPG in northern Aleppo. The end of Operation Euphrates Shield came with Erdoğan’s remarks, Russia’s direct intervention in Syria has been “The Russian and US interest in the terrorist the main source of tension between Ankara and YPG saddens us.” Moscow since September 2015. When confronted with the conflicting interests of Turkey’s recent rift with Russia heralds an Turkey and the Syrian Kurds, Moscow autonomous Kurdish region in Syria—an idea perceived that its best interest was to act as that has gained some sympathy in Washington adjudicator. As Aaron Stein astutely circles. Turkey’s frustration with the Obama documents, such a strategy has had a military Administration and ensuing rapprochement dimension: Russia has a track record of using with Russia resulted in the Syrian regime’s the Afrin-based YPG militia as a counter triumph in Aleppo as well as Ankara’s victory escalation tool in order to stop Turkey’s over the YPG in capturing the strategic town of advances with Operation Euphrates Shield. As al-Bab. Although Turkey effectively blocked the a result of frequent Russia-YPG cooperation, possibility of a full territorial unification of Ankara would never be able to gain leverage Kurdish cantons, Ankara’s plan of complete over Moscow on the ground. removal of YPG forces from the western side of the Euphrates was never realized. Given the fact Moscow’s deals with Ankara aimed to ensure that the Trump Administration has continued that any progress on the part of the Syrian to work with the YPG for the Raqqa operation, opposition is halted—no matter whether it

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Arab Center Washington DC April 2017

helps or hurts the YPG’s long-term ambitions. The YPG’s close relations with the Asad regime In both the Russian-Turkish agreement over indicate that the Syrian Kurds may continue to Aleppo and the Russian-Kurdish agreement receive special treatment and be accorded a over Afrin, Moscow focused on curbing the relatively autonomous status, even if Syria effectiveness of the Syrian rebels. never assumed a federal structure. The Kurdish region called Rojava—meaning “the West” in Russia’s pro-government media recently Kurdish, in reference to all Kurdish cantons in suggested that Turkey should mend fences with Syria as Western Kurdistan in the Middle East— the Asad regime in order to crush the Kurdish has been immune from the regime’s air strikes autonomous zones. Such an engagement is since the beginning of the Syrian civil war. In highly unlikely as it would require Turkey’s addition, Damascus enabled Rojava residents to abandonment of support for Syrian rebels in enjoy access to central government services exchange for a dubious alliance with the Syrian such as public sector salaries, schools, health regime. Russia would welcome such a care, travel by civilian airlines, and the issuing surprising development, as its priority will be of identity cards, passports, and property weakening the Syrian opposition. records.

Thus, the strategic positioning of Ankara and Although there were skirmishes and short Moscow continues to reinforce the tacit periods of violence between the Asad regime agreement between Syrian Kurds and the Asad and the YPG, the strategic interests of both sides regime since the beginning of the Syrian quickly prevailed and restored the relationship. revolution: for the regime, YPG forces are The tensions in Hasakah—a major city in the neither friends nor foes, but they are surely Jazira Canton—are a case in point. On August helpful strategic allies against the Syrian 18, 2016, the Syrian Air Force made its first opposition. There are good reasons to believe bombing on YPG-controlled territory, targeting that such a relationship would become several places in Hasakah. Violence ended institutionalized as parties find a modus within a week’s time as the Syrian regime ceded vivendi in an increasingly fragmented Syria. more territory in Hasakah to the YPG, retaining only five percent of the city. The regime’s Kurdish Autonomy Looks More Probable attacks were perceived as a warning to defend Than Ever its hegemony over Arab tribes, on which the YPG has increasingly expanded its influence. As Radwan Ziadeh rightly suggests, there is no As Aron Lund aptly notes, the YPG’s control meaningful history of federalism in Syria, and over lucrative oil wells and smuggling routes thus, a Syrian Kurdish proposal for self- has enabled the Syrian Kurds to pay governance under a federal structure is not significantly higher salaries to allied Arab tribes realistic. Equally true, however, is the fact that compared to the regime’s offerings, thus Kurdish YPG forces will not relinquish their diminishing the government’s role as the arbiter territorial gains without fierce resistance— of local disputes and as a primary source of unless an unlikely military alliance between patronage. In short, the Asad regime does not Turkey and the Asad regime is formed. like losing its influence in Rojava, and yet, it perceives the Syrian Kurds not as an enemy to be eliminated but merely as a competitor.Given The Turkey-Russia Rift Heralds an Autonomous Kurdistan in Syria Mustafa Gurbuz such a tacit strategic alliance between the YPG All Kurdish Cantons are Equal, but Some are and the Asad regime, the Syrian Kurds’ “More Equal” than Others equivocal discourse on federalism serves a double purpose. On the one hand, the YPG Managing to secure deals with both the United leadership avoids provoking the ire of the States and Russia, the Syrian Kurds plan to set regime by downplaying its aspirations for up a fourth Kurdish canton—called the Shahba independence; on the other hand, the group region—that would mostly consist of divided provides hope for its constituency by equating parts of the Azaz and Manbij Districts, which federalism—which is unknown by many—with are now separated by Syrian opposition forces. de facto independence. Moreover, the Kurdish On March 12, the Manbij Civilian Assembly quest for federalism is often presented with an declared self-governance in the town of Manbij emphasis on democratic ideals that targets a and elected an Arab civil engineer, Ibrahim western audience for support. Consider, for Kaftan, and a Kurdish woman representative, example, last year’s equivocal statements by Zeynep Kender, as co-chairs. Hediye Yusuf, the co-chair of the Constituent Assembly of the Rojava Democratic Federal Nonetheless, if the Syrian Kurdish dream of System: autonomy is realized, the Jazira and Kobani Cantons—which are located on the eastern side We believe that a federal system is [the] ideal of the Euphrates—will be relatively well- form of governance for Syria…We will not positioned and resource-rich for two major allow for Syria to be divided; all we want is the reasons. First, Kurdish territorial claims in the democratization of Syria; its citizens must live western Euphrates, i.e. the Afrin and Manbij in peace, and enjoy and cherish the ethnic regions, are surrounded by Turkish forces who diversity of the national groups inhabiting the are dedicated to remain in order to curtail the country. PKK’s influence. The Asad regime may have neither the will nor the power to push Turkish Despite its attractive discourse on democracy, forces away from the Azaz-Jarablus line, as their the YPG leadership has yet to fulfill its promises presence would serve as the sword of Damocles for diversity and free speech. Amnesty hanging over the YPG—a reality on the ground International’s documents show that Rojava has that the regime may utilize as leverage in its long been multiethnic and that the YPG militia negotiations with the Syrian Kurds in the not only engaged in ethnic cleansing to change future. In this regard, Turkey’s focus to protect demographics of the region, but also expelled its gains in the Manbij region will mean uneven Syrian Kurds who were critical of the YPG development and discrepancy among the regime. The YPG is accused of assassinations of Kurdish cantons. Kurdish leaders including Mish’al Tammu, Mahmud Wali, and Ahmad Bunjak, and the Second, the Jazira region has been the hub of group’s repressive measures have been Syrian Kurdish life for decades and historically especially successful when they targeted the connected to Turkey’s town of Cizre (Jazira in Syrian Arab opposition, which is considered the Turkish language), a Kurdish populated restive number one enemy of the Asad regime. town. Moreover, the envisioned Jazira Canton also includes the larger Hasakah region where some of Syria’s major oil fields are located. For

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Arab Center Washington DC April 2017 example, before the civil war started in 2011, not give the weapons for free but “loan” a Sweidiyeh in northern Hasakah—the largest oil necessary arsenal for exclusive use in the Raqqa field in Syria—was producing about 100,000 operation, then take it back when the operation barrels per day, out of a national total of 380,000 ends. O’Hanlon believes that Washington may barrels per day. The state-owned Syrian utilize the allocation of US foreign aid for the Petroleum Company was mainly relying on the reconstruction of Rojava, conditioning such aid mature fields of Hasakah, which were on the return of loaned weapons, as promised. producing 195,000 barrels per day. In addition, Gulfsands, Sinopec, and the China National The end of the Raqqa operation may even invite Petroleum Corporation were producing 56,000 more challenges for Washington’s diplomacy barrels daily from different areas of the toward the Syrian Kurds. The governance and Hasakah region. distribution of oil fields in northeastern Syria may cause mayhem among Kurds and various Major Challenges for Washington Arab tribes, especially if YPG forces overstretch by moving deep into eastern Syria. For the YPG, Washington’s strategic decisions will shape the such territorial expansion may become nature of Syrian Kurdish autonomy in the near tempting not only for financial reasons but also future. The first test will be whether to directly for strategic purposes because of the PKK’s arm the Kurdish YPG for the Raqqa operation. recent gains in the adjacent Iraqi side of the Proponents of this idea argue that Syrian Kurds border, the Sinjar region—which attracted have proven to be the best effective force for global attention after the Islamic State’s attacks ground combat operations against the Islamic on Yazidis in 2014. The Arab tribes, on the other State. Antony Blinken, former deputy secretary hand, long complained that they never of state under the Obama Administration, benefited from the development of oil reserves claims that the United States should arm the in Syria, and thus amassed deep grievances Syrian Kurds and ask their group to “commit to about the lack of refineries and other oil- or gas- not use any weapons against Turkey, to cede based industries in their relatively rich lands. liberated Raqqa to local forces, to respect Syria’s territorial integrity and to dissociate itself from Moreover, the Sinjar region has become an the PKK.” Perhaps knowing how difficult it arena of bitter political conflict between the would be for the Syrian Kurds to disassociate PKK and the Kurdistan Regional Government from the PKK, Blinken added that Washington (KRG) in recent years. As the main ally of the “should double down on support for Turkey’s KRG, Washington may disapprove of the YPG’s fight against the PKK.” ambitions to control the al-Houl area and southern Hasakah for the protection of the If the Trump Administration follows Blinken’s PKK’s interests in the Sinjar region. In advice to arm the PKK-affiliated YPG, and particular, Iran’s rising influence in Iraqi simultaneously to support Turkey’s war against Kurdistan draws the ire of the Trump the PKK, the nuts and bolts of specific Administration. Nonetheless, Washington’s conditions will have paramount importance. ability to maneuver in supporting the YPG for Pointing out the challenges in providing arms the Raqqa operation, and later, curbing the directly to military groups, Michael O’Hanlon group’s influence for the sake of the region’s of Brookings suggests that Washington should stability, is questionable. If the YPG envisions a The Turkey-Russia Rift Heralds an Autonomous Kurdistan in Syria Mustafa Gurbuz

Kurdish autonomous zone that moves deep into eastern Syria, the group may obtain Iran’s support for strategic purposes.

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