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TURKEY | SYRIA: Border Crossings Status 05 Aug 2021

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TURKEY | SYRIA: Border Crossings Status 05 Aug 2021 SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC TURKEY | SYRIA: Border Crossings Status 05 Aug 2021 GAZIANTEP KILIS GAZIANTEP SANLIURFA MARDIN SIRNAK H I J K L M N O P Q R S T HATAY 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 0 VIII IX X XI XII XIII XIV XV XVI XVII XVIII XIX XX IDLEB ALEPPO AR -RAQA AL HASAKEH G 7 VII Crossing -points Open Closed Limited Nearest Syrian City Nearest Turkish City Syrian border Yayladağı Islahiye 1 11 I Kasab XI Maydan Akbis A Yayladağı K Islahye Government of Syria Kasab Maydan Akbis Kızılçat Öncüpınar 2 12 II Samira XII Azaz B Kızılçat L Kilis Syrian National Army Samira Bab al -Salam F 6 VI Topraktutan Çobanbey Self -administration 3 13 III Yunesiya XIII Al -Ra'ee C Topraktutan M Elbeyli Yunesiya Al -Ra'ee (Kurdish) Aşşağıpulluyazı Karkamış Local Administration 4 14 IV Ein al -Bayda XIV Jarabulus D Aşağıpulluyazı N Karkamış Ein al -Bayda Jarabulus Entity E 5 V Güveççi Mürşitpınar Hayyat Tahrir Al - 5 15 V Kherbet Eljoz XV Ain al Arab E Güveççi O Suruç Kherbet Eljoz Ain al Arab Sham Şanlı Akçakale Syrian Interim 6 16 VI Darkoush XVI Tell Abyad F Karbeyaz P Akçakale Darkoush Tell Abyad Government Dostluk Köprüsü Ceylanpınar D 4 IV 7 17 VII El Lani XVII Ras al -Ain G Ziyaret Q Ceylanpınar Friendship Bridge Ras al -Ain Turkish border Cilvegözü Şenyurt 8 18 VIII Bab al -Hawa XVIII Derbassiyeh H Reyhanli R Şenyurt Turkish Red Crescent Bab al -Hawa Derbassiyeh Bükülmez Nusaybin 9 19 IX Atme XIX Qamishly I Bükülmez S Nusaybin Turkish Armed Forces Atme h Qamishly C 3 III Zeytin dalı Çavuşköy 10 20 X Al Hammam XX Ain Diwar J Hatay Hammam ı T Çavuşköy Turkish Customs Olive Branch Ain Diwar LATTAKIA Border crossing status infographic is a multi -lingual product that portrays the Data sources: The data for this map has a limited number of sources, including inner and outer border actors. The status of border crossings between Turkey and Syria on a biweekly basis. There are data has not been independently veried by third party and is subject to errors or omissions. Due to uidity of the B 2 II 20 border crossings between Turkey and Syria. The infographic shows the conict status is likely to change . The status of the crossing points represents the status for humanitarian shipments . following: Crossing -points status denition : 1) Names of towns in English/Turkish/Arabic on Turkish side Open: Humanitarian, commercial and individual crossings are allowed. (no need to obtain permission for every 2) Names of border crossing in English/Turkish/Arabic movement taking place, regulations are exible and long term permissions can be obtained – i.e. sta crossing list for 3) Names of towns in English/Turkish/Arabic on Syrian side one year) 4) Type of border control forces on Turkish and Syrian sides Limited: Permission from the authorities (the deputy or district governors) is required for every movement. 5) Status of border crossing A 1 I Humanitarian, commercial and individual crossing. The information in this map relates to humanitarian supplies only. Closed : No movement allowed . You can reach to online border crossing status dashboard: https://goo.gl/RdZK 4K For feedback : please contact ochaturkey@un .org.
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