april 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 4

Improving India’s Domestic Structure and Capabilities All of these pathologies were evident in India’s police and internal security the failure to prevent or appropriately Counterterrorism Policy system is highly fragmented and often respond to the Mumbai attacks.5 There after Mumbai poorly coordinated. The country’s was in fact significant intelligence federal political system leaves most suggesting a seaborne terrorist attack By Paul Staniland policing responsibilities to the states, was likely, and even that prominent which usually possess their own sites such as the Taj Hotel would be india has emerged as one of the world’s counterterrorism and intelligence units. targeted. This information, however, most consistent targets of Islamist These forces, especially local police, was ignored by several key bureaucratic militants. Although the Mumbai are often poorly trained and equipped. actors—including the Coast Guard attacks of November 2008 attracted Local personnel are frequently hired on and the Maharashtra state director- the most global attention, they were the basis of political patronage and are general of police—because it was merely the most recent and dramatic notorious for high levels of corruption. deemed unactionable.6 Others, such in a series of bloody terrorist incidents as the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism throughout urban India. On July 11, There is also a variety of central Squad, at least attempted some kind 2006, for example, terrorists planted investigative, law enforcement, and of preparation.7 The differences in seven bombs on the Suburban Railway intelligence agencies. The Ministry of readiness highlight the extent of of Mumbai, causing the deaths of Home Affairs includes the Intelligence fragmentation among the security more than 200 people. The November Bureau, Central Reserve Police Force, apparatus. Even when Mumbai police 2008 attacks, however, brought into Indian Police Service, and new National tried to take preventive action, they clear focus the inability of the Indian Investigation Agency, while the Research lacked the manpower to sustain security apparatus to anticipate and and Analysis Wing and Central Bureau increased security at the hotels. Once appropriately respond to major terrorist of Investigation are answerable to the the attack occurred, the security incidents. As one prominent analyst prime minister.2 The military—which forces did not have sufficient night- wrote, the government’s responses to the is primarily geared toward foreign vision equipment, heavy weaponry, Mumbai attacks were “comprehensive threats, including terrorism—also or information about the attack sites, failures from the point of view of India’s generates intelligence with relevance leading to a long response time and the security establishment.”1 While some to domestic terrorism, and there is a emergence of a disastrous siege.8 Indian analysts and politicians prefer centrally controlled National Security to focus on Pakistan’s role as a haven Guard (NSG) that specializes in hostage Previous attempts at reform and for a variety of militant groups, it is and terrorist attack situations. improvement have been largely clear that India needs to dramatically inadequate—politicians have made enhance its domestic counterterrorism The combination of state and central sweeping rhetorical claims, juggled infrastructure. Improvement will authorities is ostensibly coordinated personnel at all levels, and repeatedly require significant infusions of through joint committees, task forces, promised better coordination at the resources, policy consistency, and subsidiary intelligence bureaus, and national level, but key capacity has not political will that are often lacking in a Multi-Agency Center. All of these improved. Mumbai finally triggered the India. coordinating mechanisms aim to resignation of Union Home Minister harmonize the intelligence gathered by Shivraj Patil, on whose watch a series This article outlines the current these agencies and to generate shared of previous attacks had occurred. Yet structure of counterterrorism policy in threat perceptions and associated Patil’s resignation and his replacement India, and then assesses some possible responses, but they are often slow and by the more competent Palaniappan reforms. Thoroughgoing institutional cumbersome. States and the central Chidambaram (who worked on internal reform in India will be challenging. agencies frequently compete over security under Rajiv Gandhi) marks The country suffers from a fragmented resources and bureaucratic autonomy, only the beginning of the necessary and inefficient bureaucracy, far fewer and they both do a highly uneven job changes. India faces a “dire need to resources than developed countries even of cooperating with one another.3 though it faces a higher threat level, In addition to these organizational Clear Command Structure,” Outlook, January 6, 2009. and a political elite focused primarily challenges, many of the security 5 Vijay Oberoi, “Never Again,” Indian Express, December on electoral politics. It is likely only a institutions at all levels of government 2, 2008. matter of time before another significant are understaffed, undertrained, and 6 Saikat Datta, Smruti Koppikar and Dola Mitra, “The 4 terrorist attack occurs. Nevertheless, technologically backward. Armies of the Night,” Outlook, December 15, 2008. focusing on a series of substantial 7 The Mumbai police put extra guard on prominent sites but distinct tasks, with the support 2 A critical analysis of the Ministry of Home Affairs forc- and met with hotel officials. The extra guard was not of India’s international partners, can es can be found in K.S. Subramanian, Political Violence maintained, however, because of the strain it put on man- slowly but steadily improve India’s and the Police in India (New Delhi: Sage, 2007). For a brief power. Praveen Swami, “Pointed Intelligence Warnings counterterrorism capabilities. overview of RAW, see Jayshree Bajoria, “RAW: India’s Preceded Attacks,” Hindu, November 30, 2008. External Intelligence Agency,” Council on Foreign Rela- 8 “‘Rot’ at Heart of Indian Intelligence,” BBC, December tions, November 7, 2008. 2, 2008; Praveen Swami, “Lethal Lapse,” Frontline, De- 3 “Securing the Home Front,” India Today, January 12, cember 6-19, 2008; Saikat Datta, Smruti Koppikar and 1 Ajai Sahni, “The Uneducable Indian,” Outlook, Decem- 2009. Dola Mitra, “The Armies of the Night,” Outlook, Decem- ber 1, 2008. 4 On the understaffing of police, see P. Chidambaran, “A ber 15, 2008. april 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 4 redress its numerous deficiencies in its In addition to the limits of putting hear terror-related cases.16 The NIA internal security arrangements.”9 pressure on Pakistan and Bangladesh, will be filled out by new staff drawn a number of major attacks have been from existing intelligence and law The Nature of the Threat: Domestic and Foreign carried out with significant help from enforcement agencies throughout India. One common response to India’s Indian Muslims under the aegis of the An infusion of funding and personnel counterterrorism failures has been a Indian Mujahidin (IM). This clearly into the overall security apparatus has quick acknowledgement of domestic shows that the problem is not simply also been promised, and the NSG has weaknesses, followed by a far more one of containing Pakistan.13 The been deployed throughout the country vocal demand to “get tough” on Pakistan. Indian police and intelligence agencies to offer a quicker response to future While Pakistan’s role as a sanctuary were forced to scramble in the wake attacks.17 These steps represent a useful (both voluntary and involuntary) for of bombings in Jaipur, Delhi, Uttar beginning. These efforts on their own, militants is indisputable, India’s options Pradesh, and elsewhere claimed by however, will lead to little substantive are relatively limited. The coercive the IM, which revealed a significant results unless they have three major diplomacy following the December 13, indigenous capability for terrorism. characteristics. 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament, Bolstering domestic intelligence will named Operation Parakram, did become increasingly central if a trend of First, they will need to be sustained not prevent Pakistan’s continued radicalization continues among small, over a long period of time. Dramatically patronage of Lashkar-i-Tayyiba and but potentially growing portions of bolstering the institutional capacity other militant groups operating in India’s Muslim community. Although of India’s counterterrorism apparatus Kashmir.10 Pakistan’s nuclear weapon there have been pockets of radicalization is a task of at least half a decade, and “shield” makes credible Indian coercive uncovered as far south as Kerala, on probably longer.18 The training of diplomacy difficult. balance it seems that urban areas of new and current personnel alone is north and west India have been the an enormous task, much less properly India’s current government has learned primary recruiting grounds for Islamist equipping them. A new federal agency this lesson well, and instead engaged in radicals.14 or set of laws will contribute little to a coordinated diplomatic offensive that this fundamental task unless they are has brought at least rhetorical results. Therefore, India faces threats spilling able to sustain the momentum necessary Military threats against Pakistan out of porous borders and weak for years of unglamorous but crucial are unlikely to bear fruit, while even governments both to the east and to the training and institution-building. successful diplomacy will have a limited west. These foreign threats coalesce Locking in lines of budgetary approval impact.11 Pakistan simply lacks the with a troubled internal security over a 5-10 year period will be critical capacity, and probably the will, to engage apparatus and some level of domestic to avoid the effort falling victim to the in the kind of domestic policies that will radicalization to create a dangerous vicissitudes of domestic politics and significantly lessen the threat posed situation. elections. to India. Improving India’s internal security apparatus must therefore be The Path Forward: Coordination and Capacity- Second, reform efforts must be properly the primary focus of Indian security and Building resourced. India is a poor country with political elites.12 In addition to Pakistan, The major domestic response to Mumbai many pressing needs, and security India also faces cross-border terrorism has been an emphasis on streamlined funding reflects India’s lack of wealth. from Bangladesh. Attacks attributed coordination between agencies across Compared to the budgets of even much to jihadist groups such as Harkat-ul- state and federal lines, and the creation smaller developed countries, India Jihad-al-Islam (HuJI) are believed to of a new National Investigation Agency simply does not provide sufficient money have been launched from the country. (NIA).15 The aim of the NIA is to for its security agencies on a per capita Bangladesh’s political instability and empower a federal agency to investigate basis.19 This causes them to undertrain weak state capacity, however, make it major crimes such as terrorism and and understaff their personnel, leading difficult for India to consistently shape organized crime without having to to corruption and a reliance on crude Bangladeshi counterterrorism policy. be asked to do so by the states. There and often counterproductive policing will be special courts that can rapidly techniques. International assistance, in the form of grants for training and equipping police forces, could reduce 9 Angel Rabasa et al., The Lessons of Mumbai (Washing- 13 Animesh Roul, “India’s Home-Grown Jihadi Threat: the impact of this reform on India’s ton, D.C.: RAND Corporation, 2009), p. 15. A Profile of the Indian Mujahideen,” Terrorism Monitor budget. In the current economic 10 On Parakram and its aftermath, see V.K. Sood and 7:4 (2009). environment, large-scale international Pravin Sawhney, Operation Parakram: The War Unfin- 14 These are the areas of greatest Muslim demographic ished (New Delhi: Sage, 2003); P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal presence and also of communal rioting. Although firm 16 “Govt Tables Bill to Set Up National Investigation Cheema, and Stephen P. Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace data is elusive, many experts argue that the 2002 Gujarat Agency,” Times of India, December 16, 2008. Process: American Engagement in South Asia (Washington, riots have propelled Islamist recruitment. For more, see 17 “NSG Inks Agreements with Eight Airlines,” Hindu, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007). “India Fears that Some of its Muslims are Joining in Ter- March 1, 2009. 11 Rabasa et al., p. 21. rorism,” New York Times, August 9, 2006; “Ahmedabad 18 See the quote by Praveen Swami in “Will India’s Secu- 12 As Shishir Gupta notes, “Pakistan is only part of the Attacks: The Usual Suspects,” Hindu, August 1, 2008. rity Overhaul Work?” BBC, December 11, 2008. problem.” See Shishir Gupta, “Less Blame, More Action,” 15 The NIA is discussed in R.K. Raghavan, “Terror 19 Sahni, “Uneducable Indian,” argues that the police-to- Indian Express, December 5, 2008. Trackers,” Frontline, January 3-16, 2009. population ratio in India is 125:100,000. april 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 4 aid is unlikely, but small measures There has also been increased undermine imperfect but existing could make a significant difference, intelligence sharing with India, most of reform efforts, while actively trying to particularly if focused on the cities most it obviously related to Afghanistan and reduce tensions on the subcontinent. likely to be attacked in the future (Delhi Pakistan. The process of bolstering Indian and Mumbai). counterterrorism capabilities will be The relationship should move beyond long and difficult, and is unlikely to Finally, India’s political leadership must investigative collaboration and bring any sudden successes, but it is exert the will to push past bureaucratic intelligence sharing into a broader nevertheless essential. and state-centric rivalries. This is an project of training and capacity building. enormous challenge for a political class One of the traditional strengths of the Paul Staniland is a Ph.D. candidate focused above all else on the cut-throat U.S. law enforcement establishment has in political science and member of the electoral competition that characterizes been training other countries’ police Security Studies Program at MIT. During Indian politics. Despite these challenges, and domestic intelligence forces. India the 2008-09 academic year, he is also a maintaining a degree of consistency would benefit enormously from even a predoctoral research fellow in the Belfer and follow-through is essential so that small, but sustained program bringing Center for Science and International the reform process does not stall or Indian police to the United States Affairs at Harvard University’s Kennedy end up wasting huge amounts of time for training, and sending American School of Government. Mr. Staniland and money. Government ministers trainers to India to lecture on successful has published in International Security, must not allow themselves to be used practices. This could be a small program Security Studies, the Washington Quarterly, as pawns in bureaucratic battles over aimed at providing specialized training two edited volumes, and with the RAND turf, resources, and responsibilities. to state and federal police. Corporation. His field research focuses Specialized task forces led by elected on insurgent and paramilitary groups in officials, and supported at the highest Even basic training would have South Asia and Northern Ireland. levels, must be given the power to a broader effect of increasing the engage in oversight over the security professionalism of India’s domestic apparatus. This will involve overcoming security forces. In addition to helping a traditional aversion to transparency to prevent and respond to terrorist on the part of the police and intelligence attacks, increased professionalism agencies. might reduce the resentment of the security forces in parts of the Indian Given these deep challenges, the Indian Muslim community, which perceive the leadership is best advised to manage police as indiscriminate and brutal.22 a pair of distinct projects—first, Small but meaningful grants could also building on the short-term changes in be provided for training and equipping coordination that can leverage existing police forces. assets and capabilities, and second, engaging in the much lengthier and Preparing for the Inevitable broader task of improving training Even if significant reform and Indo- and technical capacities across India’s U.S. cooperation emerge, however, it is security apparatus. Conflating the two likely that India will be hit once again into one grand reform agenda is likely with a significant terrorist attack. One to slow both down and undermine the of the key challenges after the event overall effort. India must pursue a will be avoiding yet another cycle series of discrete, manageable tasks if of rhetorically compelling but under- it is to fortify itself against the threats resourced, soon-forgotten institutional flowing both from across the border and reform. There will be further risks of from among its own population. an Indo-Pakistan crisis spiraling out of control after a dramatic incident. An American Role The United States can play a helpful role The United States and India’s other in bolstering India’s counterterrorism partners can be a constituency capabilities.20 There has already been advocating a certain degree of continuity extensive cooperation between the U.S. to avoid disruptive policy shifts that Federal Bureau of Investigation and Indian security services in the wake November 28, 2008. Also see the testimony by FBI Chief of Mumbai, illustrating the dramatic Intelligence Officer Donald Van Duyn before the Senate 21 improvement in Indo-U.S. relations. on January 8, 2009 outlining the FBI’s investigation in Mumbai, available at www.fbi.gov/congress/con- 20 Lisa Curtis, “After Mumbai: Time to Strengthen US- gress09/vanduyn010809.htm. India Counterterrorism Cooperation,” Heritage Founda- 22 Somini Sengupta, “As Indian Police Crack Down tion, December 9, 2008. After Bombings, Mistrust Grows,” International Herald 21 “FBI Sends Agents to Mumbai,” Wall Street Journal, Tribune, October 3, 2008.